Chapter 1
Adoption

Part 1
General Provisions

36-1-101. Purpose of part — Construction.

  1. The primary purpose of this part is to provide means and procedures for the adoption of children and adults that recognize and effectuate to the greatest extent possible the rights and interests of persons affected by adoption, especially those of the adopted persons, which are specifically protected by the constitutions of the United States and the state of Tennessee and to those ends seek to ensure, to the greatest extent possible, that:
    1. Children are removed from the homes of their parents or guardians only when that becomes the only alternative that is consistent with the best interest of the child;
    2. Children are placed only with those persons who have been determined to be capable of providing proper care and a loving home for an adopted child;
    3. The rights of children to be raised in loving homes that are capable of providing proper care for adopted children and that the best interests of children in the adoptive process are protected;
    4. The adoptive process protects the rights of all persons who are affected by that process and who should be entitled to notice of the proceedings for the adoption of a child;
    5. The adoption proceedings are held in an expeditious manner to enable the child to achieve permanency, consistent with the child's best interests, at the earliest possible date; and
    6. The adopted child is protected in the child's adoptive relationship from any interference by any person who may have some legal claim after the child has become properly adjusted to the child's adoptive home.
  2. The secondary purpose of this part is to:
    1. Protect biological parents and guardians of children from decisions concerning the relinquishment of their parental or guardian's rights to their children or wards that might be made as a result of undue influence or fraud;
    2. Protect adoptive parents from assuming the care and responsibility for a child about whose physical, mental, emotional, and hereditary background they are unaware;
    3. Protect the adoptive parents from the later disturbance of their parental relationship with their child by the biological or prior legal parents of the child who may have some legal claim due to the failure to protect their legal rights; and
    4. Provide adoption promotion and support services and activities designed to encourage early permanency and adoptions, when adoptions promote the best interests of children, including such activities as pre-adoptive and post-adoptive services and activities designed to expedite the adoption process.
  3. The purpose of this part shall also be to favor the rights of adopted persons or other persons for whom any closed records are maintained and their families to obtain information concerning the lives of those persons and to permit them to obtain information about themselves from the adoption records, sealed records, sealed adoption records, or post-adoption records to which they are entitled, but also to recognize the rights of parents and adopted persons not to be contacted by the persons who obtain such information, except in compliance with this part.
  4. In all cases, when the best interests of the child and those of the adults are in conflict, such conflict shall always be resolved to favor the rights and the best interests of the child, which interests are hereby recognized as constitutionally protected and, to that end, this part shall be liberally construed.

Acts 1951, ch. 202, § 1 (Williams, § 9572.15); T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 36-101; Acts 1995, ch. 532, § 1; 1996, ch. 1054, §§ 1, 2; 1998, ch. 1097, § 1.

Cross-References. Custody and care of dependent children generally, title 71, ch. 3, part 3.

Interstate Compact on Adoption and Medical Assistance, title 36, ch. 1, part 2.

Maternity leave for bonding with newly adopted child, § 4-21-408.

Special leave for adoptive parents, § 8-50-806.

Rule Reference. This part is referred to in the Advisory Commission Comments under Rule 501 of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence.

Textbooks. Coppock on Tennessee Adoption Law, (1998-99 ed., Coppock).

Tennessee Jurisprudence, 20 Tenn. Juris., Parent and Child, §§ 20, 24.

Law Reviews.

Adoption and Custody: Current Trends in Tennessee Family Law: A Roadmap Through Tennessee's New Adoption Statute, 27 U. Mem. L. Rev. 885 (1997).

Adoption and Custody: Current Trends in Tennessee Family Law: Tennessee's New Adoption Contact Veto is Cold Comfort to Birth Parents, 27 U. Mem. L. Rev. 843 (1997).

Adoption Proceedings — Revocation of Surrender Under Tennessee Code Annotated Section 36-1-117 (Bradley E. Trammell), 23 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 293 (1993).

Courts, Legislatures, and Second-Parent Adoptions: On Judicial Deference, Specious Reasoning, and the Best Interests of the Child, 66 Tenn. L. Rev. 1019 (1999).

Family Law — Adoption — Retrospective and Prospective Opening of Adoption Records to Adopted Persons Twenty-One Years of Age or Older, 67 Tenn. L. Rev. 1019 (2000).

Storied Anna Mae He Decision Clarifies Law But Leaves Unanswered Questions (Christina A. Zawisza), 38 U. Mem. L. Rev. 637 (2008).

The Jurisprudence of Genetics (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Dorothy Nelkin), 45 Vand. L. Rev. 313 (1992).

The New Adoption Law in Tennessee: A Controversial Sweeping Reform (Monica L. Allie), 32 No. 5 Tenn. B.J. 18 (1996).

Attorney General Opinions. Re-engrossment of 1995 Public Chapter 532, OAG 95-093, 1995 Tenn. AG LEXIS 105 (9/1/95).

Adoption by a same sex couple, OAG 07-140, 2007 Tenn. AG LEXIS 140 (10/10/07).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

There is a reasonable basis for the legislature's disparate treatment of children involved in adoption proceedings and those who are the subject of guardianship or foster care proceedings. In re M.J.S., 44 S.W.3d 41, 2000 Tenn. App. LEXIS 704 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000).

2. Construction.

The adoption statutes are in derogation of common law and must be strictly construed. Delamotte v. Stout, 207 Tenn. 406, 340 S.W.2d 894, 1960 Tenn. LEXIS 472 (1960); In re Adoption of Taylor, 678 S.W.2d 69, 1984 Tenn. App. LEXIS 2978 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984).

Term “child” in the statutory section regarding incarceration for 10 years also includes a child in utero; a construction to include the period of pregnancy serves the legislative goals of providing permanency and protecting the day-to-day needs of children. In re Adrianna S., 520 S.W.3d 548, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 734 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 29, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 180 (Tenn. Mar. 14, 2017).

3. Considerations.

In deciding case of the custody of children, the interests of the child are considered as of greater importance than those of the competing parents or competing parties. State ex rel. “A” v. A Licensed or Chartered Child-Placing Agency, 194 Tenn. 400, 250 S.W.2d 776, 1952 Tenn. LEXIS 394 (1952).

In adoption cases the courts will consider the welfare of the child and the rights of the adult parties will be subordinated to the best interest of the child. In re Petition of Clements, 201 Tenn. 98, 296 S.W.2d 875, 1956 Tenn. LEXIS 471 (1956); Ex parte Wolfenden, 49 Tenn. App. 1, 349 S.W.2d 713, 1959 Tenn. App. LEXIS 140 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1959), superseded by statute as stated in, Fykes v. State, — S.W.3d —, 1998 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 206 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998) , superseded by statute as stated in, Tennessee Baptist Children's Home v. Swanson (In re Swanson), 1998 Tenn. App. LEXIS 322 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 14, 1998), superseded by statute as stated in, Baker v. He (In re A.M.H.), — S.W.3d —, 2005 Tenn. App. LEXIS 736 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 23, 2005).

Fact that child might be better off in home other than that of natural parents is not ground for adoption over protest of parents. Ex parte Wolfenden, 48 Tenn. App. 433, 348 S.W.2d 751, 1961 Tenn. App. LEXIS 85 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1961).

The paramount consideration in adoption cases is the welfare of the child. Baughman v. Department of Public Welfare, 211 Tenn. 101, 362 S.W.2d 785, 1962 Tenn. LEXIS 345 (1962).

4. Rights of Natural Parents.

As a general proposition, the natural parents have the primary and superior right to custody of their children above that of all others, but where these parents are unfit or the mother, in the case of an illegitimate child, has consented and agreed according to former § 36-1-111 [repealed], for the child to be placed with a child-placing agency for adoption and there was no fraud or duress in the procurement of such consent, then there is no alternative but to sustain the adoption applied for if the best interests of the child call for such adoption. State ex rel. “A” v. A Licensed or Chartered Child-Placing Agency, 194 Tenn. 400, 250 S.W.2d 776, 1952 Tenn. LEXIS 394 (1952).

The fact that the parties petitioning for adoption were the natural parents, even though they had legally waived their rights to the child, could be considered as a matter of fact along with other things in considering what was for the welfare of the child. State ex rel. “A” v. A Licensed or Chartered Child-Placing Agency, 194 Tenn. 400, 250 S.W.2d 776, 1952 Tenn. LEXIS 394 (1952).

The parent as such has no vested right in his child that requires the protection of the courts that is accorded property rights. State ex rel. “A” v. A Licensed or Chartered Child-Placing Agency, 194 Tenn. 400, 250 S.W.2d 776, 1952 Tenn. LEXIS 394 (1952).

The interest of a father in his child is of profound importance, deserving protection. This state has a strong interest in sustaining the father-child relationship and protecting the family unit. In re Riggs, 612 S.W.2d 461, 1980 Tenn. App. LEXIS 410 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980), cert. denied, Riggs v. Terrazas, 450 U.S. 921, 101 S. Ct. 1370, 67 L. Ed. 2d 349, 1981 U.S. LEXIS 876 (1981).

There can be no valid adoption without a valid termination of parental rights. In re Riggs, 612 S.W.2d 461, 1980 Tenn. App. LEXIS 410 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980), cert. denied, Riggs v. Terrazas, 450 U.S. 921, 101 S. Ct. 1370, 67 L. Ed. 2d 349, 1981 U.S. LEXIS 876 (1981).

5. Right of Adoption.

The right of adoption is not a natural one and was unknown to the common law. Clements v. Morgan, 201 Tenn. 94, 296 S.W.2d 874, 1956 Tenn. LEXIS 470 (1956); Petition of Van Huss, 207 Tenn. 168, 338 S.W.2d 588, 1960 Tenn. LEXIS 444 (1960); Delamotte v. Stout, 207 Tenn. 406, 340 S.W.2d 894, 1960 Tenn. LEXIS 472 (1960); Adoption of Edman, 48 Tenn. App. 375, 348 S.W.2d 345, 1961 Tenn. App. LEXIS 80 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1961).

6. Method of Adoption.

The adoption of a child is governed by statute and to effect a legal adoption the statute must be strictly complied with. Clements v. Morgan, 201 Tenn. 94, 296 S.W.2d 874, 1956 Tenn. LEXIS 470 (1956); In re Petition of Clements, 201 Tenn. 98, 296 S.W.2d 875, 1956 Tenn. LEXIS 471 (1956); Petition of Van Huss, 207 Tenn. 168, 338 S.W.2d 588, 1960 Tenn. LEXIS 444 (1960); Adoption of Edman, 48 Tenn. App. 375, 348 S.W.2d 345, 1961 Tenn. App. LEXIS 80 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1961).

An adoption can be accomplished only by court order after following the procedures set out by this part. In re Petition of Clements, 201 Tenn. 98, 296 S.W.2d 875, 1956 Tenn. LEXIS 471 (1956).

A final decree of adoption that affirmatively denies to the adoptive parents the same custody and control of the child possessed of natural parents and grants visitation rights to the natural parents is not only violative of the letter of the law embodied in the statutes heretofore mentioned, but is also violative of the primary purpose of this part as set forth in subsection (a). In re Adoption of Dearing, 572 S.W.2d 929, 1978 Tenn. App. LEXIS 309 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1978).

7. Contract or Agreement to Adopt.

A contract to adopt should not be enforced in the courts of this state. In re Petition of Clements, 201 Tenn. 98, 296 S.W.2d 875, 1956 Tenn. LEXIS 471 (1956).

8. Estoppel as Creating Adoption.

Adoption by estoppel is not recognized in Tennessee. Bank of Maryville v. Topping, 216 Tenn. 597, 393 S.W.2d 280, 1965 Tenn. LEXIS 603 (1965).

9. Right to Inherit.

Before a child may inherit from one who is not his natural parent there must be substantial compliance with the adoption statutes or a contract of adoption and inheritance. Bank of Maryville v. Topping, 216 Tenn. 597, 393 S.W.2d 280, 1965 Tenn. LEXIS 603 (1965).

Right of inheritance may exist through valid contract of adoption and inheritance. Bank of Maryville v. Topping, 216 Tenn. 597, 393 S.W.2d 280, 1965 Tenn. LEXIS 603 (1965).

10. Best Interests of the Child.

Judgment finding that it was not in the children's best interest to terminate the mother's rights as a parent of the two children was reversed because the trial court focused on the rights of the mother rather than the rights of the children, as required by the statute and authorities. In re Taylor BW, — S.W.3d —, 2011 Tenn. App. LEXIS 586 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 28, 2011), rev'd, In re B. W., 397 S.W.3d 105, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 199 (Tenn. Feb. 21, 2013).

Pursuant to T.C.A. §§ 36-1-113(i) and 36-1-101(d), termination of parents'  rights was in their children's best interests, as the children had been removed from the home years earlier, had not had any visitation with their parents, and had a close and loving bond with the woman whom they were placed with and who hoped to adopt them; further, neither parent made any meaningful effort to be reunited with the children. In re Dakota C.R., 404 S.W.3d 484, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 844 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 7, 2012), appeal denied, In re Dakota R., — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 230 (Tenn. Mar. 6, 2013).

Dismissal of maternal grandparents'  complaint was appropriate because, although the grandparents were allowed to intervene when a parent surrendered parental rights to the parent's minor child to adoptive parents, the grandparents failed to present clear and convincing evidence that the child's best interest was served by taking the child away from the adoptive parents. In re R.S.M., 466 S.W.3d 766, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 93 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2015), appeal denied, In re Rebecca M., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 479 (Tenn. June 11, 2015).

Termination of a parent's parental rights was in children's best interests because the parent struggled with drugs following the children's removal, had not completed the rehabilitation program in which the parent was participating, and had not maintained a suitable home for the children. The children need permanency in their lives and, although an adoptive placement had not been found, a search for an adoptive home had begun. In re Roger T., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 261 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 27, 2015).

Determination that termination of the father's parental rights was in the child's best interests was upheld where the child had had no contact with the father in two-and-one-half years, the child was only two years old at the time of removal, the child was attached to the foster mother who was also raising the child's siblings, the father was incarcerated and was not expected to be released until 2017, he testified that he had abused marijuana for his entire adult life, and the child and her siblings had suffered abuse and neglect at her father's hands. In re Abbigail C., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 856 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 21, 2015).

Termination of parental rights was in a child's best interest because the child's guardian, who had provided a good home for the child for years after the child was approximately three months old, wished to adopt the child and the child was doing well in the guardian's home and was making good grades in school. There was evidence that the child was well-adjusted and had formed a bond with the guardian, while there was no indication that the child had any bond with the parent. In re B.C., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 964 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 11, 2015).

Trial court properly terminated a mother's rights to her child based on abandonment and in the child's best interest because the mother only visited the child twice in five years, neither of which was within the four months preceding the foster parents'  adoption petition, the mother's conduct was willful, there was no evidence that the foster parents significantly restrained and interfered with the mother's efforts to visit the child, the child had been in the foster parents'  home eight years, formed a close bond with the foster parents and their family and, was excelling in school, and removing her from the only home she had ever known would likely have a detrimental effect on her emotional and psychological condition. In re Makendra E., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 49 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 27, 2016).

Father's parental rights were properly terminated due to his wanton disregard for the welfare of his children since the father was involved in criminal behavior, he almost immediately violated his probation, and he committed domestic violence against his pregnant wife; moreover, the father was in substantial noncompliance with the statement of responsibilities in a permanency plan because he did not provide proof of housing or a legal means of income, he did not arrange a psychological evaluation or set up a drug and alcohol assessment, and he did not visit his children. Termination was in the best interest of the children based on the father's history of drugs and violence and the fact that the children were doing well in foster care. In re Lilly C., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 141 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 25, 2016).

Termination of parental rights was in a child's best interests as the child's parent and the child had no meaningful relationship due to the parent's incarceration for criminal activity and drug use, the child viewed the child's foster parents who wished to adopt the child as the child's family, and the parent, throughout the parent's time in prison, considered only the parent's interests, rather than the welfare of the child. In re Tristan B., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 301 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 2, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's finding that termination of the mother's parental rights was in her son's best interests where it showed that she had used cocaine while pregnant, she did not maintain regular visitation, she did not make it safe for her son to be in her home, she had not paid child support, and no meaningful relationship had been established. In re Jayvien O., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 394 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 7, 2016).

Evidence supported the trial court's finding that termination of the mother's rights was in the children's best interests where the mother stated that she was not ready for the children to return to her care, she failed to address her mental health issues, she failed to maintain stable housing or employment, she continued to abuse prescription medications, she attempted suicide on several occasions, and the children had flourished in their foster home. In re Rylee R., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 582 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 11, 2016).

Juvenile court properly found that termination of a father's parental rights was in the child's best interests because the father did not maintain regular visitation with the child or provide support of any kind prior to his incarceration, and the father did not show any interest in the child's well-being until after the filing of the petition for termination. In re Braxton R., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 660 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 2, 2016).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was in the child's best interests because, although she had taken steps to overcome her drug addiction, the trial court was not convinced that those steps would lead to a lasting adjustment; her contact with the child had been minimal; she and the child lacked a meaningful relationship; her sporadic contact with the child had caused psychological, emotional, and behavioral problems for the child; and the trial court was not confident that the mother could provide a safe and stable environment for the child; in contrast, the child had done well in his father's and stepmother's home; they had a meaningful relationship with the child; and the child's psychological and behavioral problems had ceased. In re Michael B., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 757 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 6, 2016).

There was clear and convincing evidence that termination of parental rights was in the best interest of the children because they had been in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Children's Services for several years while the parents failed to meet the requirements of their plans and improve their circumstances; the record clearly reflected they were flourishing in their new home environment with their foster parents. In re Angel M., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 519 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 31, 2017).

Clear and convincing evidence demonstrated that a father of two children engaged in conduct prior to his incarceration that exhibited a wanton disregard for the welfare of the children. The trial court's finding that termination of the father's parental rights was in the best interest of the children was also proven by clear and convincing evidence. In re Addison E., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 13 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 17, 2018).

Clear and convincing evidence established that termination of a mother's parental rights was in the best interest of the mother's child because the mother did not obtain and maintain stable housing and questions remained concerning the mother's mental and/or emotional status as evidenced by the mother's failure to complete a required psychological assessment. Moreover, the child resided in a safe and stable home, which was willing and able to adopt the child, and removing the child would have negatively affected the child's emotional condition. In re Jabari B., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 60 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 2, 2018).

Termination of father's parental rights was in the best interest of the father's child because, given the bond between the child and the foster parents and the child's special medical needs, removal from the foster home would likely have caused the child emotional, psychological, and/or physical detriment. There also was no evidence that the child knew the father or that there was any bond between them, and the father's recidivism and frequent returns to jail did not bode well for the father's ability to provide a long-term home for the child. In re Victoria H., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 108 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2018).

Termination of a mother's parental rights was in a child's best interests because the parents failed to make a lasting adjustment of their circumstances–including drug abuse–to make it safe for the child to be placed in their care, the parents did not maintain consistent visitation with the child and had no meaningful relationship with the child, the child was thriving in a loving, pre-adoptive home and had bonded to the foster family, and a change of caretakers and home would have had a highly negative effect on the child. In re Riley W., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 129 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 12, 2018).

There was clear and convincing proof in the record to support the trial court's finding that termination of a father's parental rights was in the child's best interest because the child had a strong bond with his foster parents, and there was no substantial bond between him and the father; to remove the child from the only stable home he had ever known would be detrimental to his well-being. In re D.N., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 383 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 3, 2018).

There was clear and convincing evidence to support the trial court's finding that termination of a mother's parental rights was in the child's best interest becuase the mother had a history of drug and alcohol abuse, and the child adjusted to her home with her great aunt and considered the great aunt to be her mother; because the mother's sobriety was unproven, and she lacked gainful employment, it did not appear that the mother would be able to care for the child at any early date. In re Taylor C., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 490 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 21, 2018).

Termination of a mother's parental rights was in the best interest of the mother's child because (1) the child was doing well in a foster home and had bonded with the foster parents; (2) the mother's ability to care for the child, while maintaining the mother's recovering sobriety, was untested; (3) a doctor opined that to put the child back in an environment where there was a significant risk the child might again be exposed to drugs was simply too great a risk to take; and (4) there did not appear to be a strong bond between the mother. In re Mason C., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 579 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 2, 2018).

There was clear and convincing evidence that termination of the parents'  rights was in the child's best interests because the physical environment of their home was unhealthy and unsafe, the child had improved physically and mentally ever since she was removed from the parents'  custody, and a change in caretakers and physical environment would have had a negative effect on the child's emotional, psychological, and medical conditions. In re Savannah M., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 44 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 28, 2019).

There was clear and convincing evidence to establish that the termination of the mother's parental rights was in the child's best interest because the mother had not made an adjustment of circumstances necessary for the child's return or maintained regular visitation with him, she failed to maintain a meaningful relationship with him during her absence, she admitted that she did not wish to regain custody but only wanted to reestablish her relationship with the child, the mother failed to remit child support, and the child had been living with his grandparents for almost four years and a change in caretakers would be detrimental to his emotional condition. In re Ethan M., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 45 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 29, 2019).

It was in a child's best interests for the parental rights of the child's mother to be terminated because no meaningful relationship existed between the child and the mother, the child would have suffered emotional and psychological harm if there was a change of caregivers at that point in time, and the child was thriving with and had become fully integrated in and formed a strong and positive bond with a relative's home and family with whom the child had been living for a few years and which wished to adopt the child. In re Melinda N., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 69 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 7, 2019).

Sufficient evidence supported the trial court's determination that termination of the father's parental rights was in the child's best interest because it showed that the no-contact order was quickly superseded by an order permitting the father to visit the child, there was no evidence that the father ever attempted to contact the child after his incarceration, the father's testimony supported the inference that he was out of contact with the child from June 2013 to December 2015, and the practical details of the father's return to society after his incarceration ended were uncertain. In re Travis R., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 557 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 13, 2019).

Termination of a father's parental rights was in the child's best interests because the father's unfortunate history with illegal drugs had been a serious issue in the case, and the record evidenced that the father made less than satisfactory progress; the child's foster mother testified that the child was doing well and that the child did not talk about the father, and there had been prolonged periods where the father had not seen the child. In re Jayda H., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 571 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 25, 2019).

Juvenile court properly terminated a the father's parental rights as in the best interest of the children because he failed to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody of the children and abandoned them by engaging in conduct that exhibited a wanton disregard for their welfare by engaging in a pattern of physical violence, domestic abuse, toward the mother and one of the children, as well as other illegal or unreasonable acts, the Department of Children's Services made reasonable efforts to reunite the father with the children, the children had no meaningful relationship with the father, and a change of caretaker and physical environment was likely to have a negative effect on the children's welfare. In re Nakayia, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 359 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 7, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's finding that termination of the father's parental rights was in the child's best interest because it showed that the father had been incarcerated since the child was three years old, the mother had stopped the video visits between them when the child began exhibiting anxiety behaviors after the visits, the child had no relationship with the father at the time of trial, and even after the father's release there would be restrictions on his being around other children due to his sex offender status. In re Jackson D., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 366 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 17, 2020).

11. Material Change In Circumstances.

Trial court utilized the appropriate legal standard because the court recognized that significant changes to a father's work and/or school schedule such as graduating, going from a night shift to a day shift position, or starting a new career might constitute a material change in circumstances. The court correctly concluded, however, that the father's alleged changes in work or school schedule were not significant and, therefore, did not meet the statutory burden for a material change in circumstance. In re Caroline U., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 489 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 4, 2019).

There could not have been a material change in circumstances when a father filed a petition to modify because the permanent parenting plan order had only become a final order that very same day. Because the facts used to establish a material change in circumstances sufficient to modify a residential parenting schedule had to occur after the entry of the plan to be modified, it was clear that no material change could have occurred between the time that the order became final and the time that the father filed the petition seeking modification. In re Caroline U., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 489 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 4, 2019).

Father's change in work schedule, change in major, and decision to stop teaching jujitsu classes was insufficient to establish a material change in circumstances because without evidence as to the significance of the work schedule effecting the father's parenting, the prior school schedule with the current school schedule, and when the father stopped teaching classes, it was impossible for the appellate court to know when the alleged changes occurred and if they impacted the child. In re Caroline U., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 489 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 4, 2019).

Father failed to establish that a material change in circumstance had occurred because the father was still working multiple jobs and nights and was still attending school, there was no change in relationship status for the father, there was no relocation or career change, and the mother was still keeping the child during the father's work and school hours. Furthermore, there was no proof that the parties had failed to abide by the previous permanent parenting plan or that the father's alleged change in circumstances had impacted the child. In re Caroline U., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 489 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 4, 2019).

12. Standing.

Non-biological parent was not a biological parent, legal parent, or step parent, and she did not seek to adopt the child; thus, she did not fit within any of these statutory definitions of a parent, rendering her without standing to pursue a parentage action or visitation with the child. Pippin v. Pippin, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 220 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 14, 2020).

36-1-102. Part definitions.

As used in this part, unless the context otherwise requires:

    1. For purposes of terminating the parental or guardian rights of a parent or parents or a guardian or guardians of a child to that child in order to make that child available for adoption, “abandonment” means that:
      1. For a period of four (4) consecutive months immediately preceding the filing of a proceeding, pleading, petition, or any amended petition to terminate the parental rights of the  parent or parents or the guardian or guardians of the child who is the subject of the petition for termination of parental rights or adoption, that the  parent or parents or the guardian or guardians either have failed to visit or have failed to support or have failed to make reasonable payments toward the support of the child;
      2. (a)  The child has been removed from the home or the physical or legal custody of a parent or parents or guardian or guardians by a court order at any stage of proceedings in which a petition has been filed in the juvenile court alleging that a child is a dependent and neglected child, and the child was placed in the custody of the department or a licensed child-placing agency;
        1. (ii)  (a)  The child has been removed from the home or the physical or legal custody of a parent or parents or guardian or guardians by a court order at any stage of proceedings in which a petition has been filed in the juvenile court alleging that a child is a dependent and neglected child, and the child was placed in the custody of the department or a licensed child-placing agency;
        2. The juvenile court found, or the court where the termination of parental rights petition is filed finds, that the department or a licensed child-placing agency made reasonable efforts to prevent removal of the child or that the circumstances of the child's situation prevented reasonable efforts from being made prior to the child's removal; and
        3. For a period of four (4) months following the physical removal, the department or agency made reasonable efforts to assist the parent or parents or the guardian or guardians to establish a suitable home for the child, but that the parent or parents or the guardian or guardians have not made reciprocal reasonable efforts to provide a suitable home and have demonstrated a lack of concern for the child to such a degree that it appears unlikely that they will be able to provide a suitable home for the child at an early date. The efforts of the department or agency to assist a parent or guardian in establishing a suitable home for the child shall be found to be reasonable if such efforts equal or exceed the efforts of the parent or guardian toward the same goal, when the parent or guardian is aware that the child is in the custody of the department;
      3. A biological or legal father has either failed to visit or failed to make reasonable payments toward the support of the child's mother during the four (4) months immediately preceding the birth of the child; provided, that in no instance shall a final order terminating the parental rights of a parent as determined pursuant to this subdivision (1)(A)(iii) be entered until at least thirty (30) days have elapsed since the date of the child's birth;
      4. A parent or guardian is incarcerated at the time of the filing of a proceeding, pleading, petition, or amended petition to terminate the parental rights of the parent or guardian of the child who is the subject of the petition for termination of parental rights or adoption, or a parent or guardian has been incarcerated during all or part of the four (4) consecutive months immediately preceding the filing of the action and has:
  1. Failed to visit, has failed to support, or has failed to make reasonable payments toward the support of the child for four (4) consecutive months immediately preceding the parent's or guardian's incarceration;
  2. Failed to visit, has failed to support, or has failed to make reasonable payments toward the support of the child during an aggregation of the first one hundred twenty (120) days of nonincarceration immediately preceding the filing of the action; or
  3. Has engaged in conduct prior to incarceration that exhibits a wanton disregard for the welfare of the child; or

The child, as a newborn infant aged seventy-two (72) hours or less, was voluntarily left at a facility by such infant's mother pursuant to § 68-11-255; and, for a period of thirty (30) days after the date of voluntary delivery, the mother failed to visit or seek contact with the infant; and, for a period of thirty (30) days after notice was given under § 36-1-142(e), and no less than ninety (90) days cumulatively, the mother failed to seek contact with the infant through the department or to revoke her voluntary delivery of the infant;

For purposes of this subdivision (1), “token support” means that the support, under the circumstances of the individual case, is insignificant given the parent's means;

For purposes of this subdivision (1), “token visitation” means that the visitation, under the circumstances of the individual case, constitutes nothing more than perfunctory visitation or visitation of such an infrequent nature or of such short duration as to merely establish minimal or insubstantial contact with the child;

For purposes of this subdivision (1), “failed to support” or “failed to make reasonable payments toward such child's support” means the failure, for a period of four (4) consecutive months, to provide monetary support or the failure to provide more than token payments toward the support of the child. That the parent had only the means or ability to make small payments is not a defense to failure to support if no payments were made during the relevant four-month period;

For purposes of this subdivision (1), “failed to visit” means the failure, for a period of four (4) consecutive months, to visit or engage in more than token visitation. That the parent had only the means or ability to make very occasional visits is not a defense to failure to visit if no visits were made during the relevant four-month period;

Abandonment may not be repented of by resuming visitation or support subsequent to the filing of any petition seeking to terminate parental or guardianship rights or seeking the adoption of a child;

“Abandonment” and “abandonment of an infant” do not have any other definition except that which is set forth in this section, it being the intent of the general assembly to establish the only grounds for abandonment by statutory definition. Specifically, it shall not be required that a parent be shown to have evinced a settled purpose to forego all parental rights and responsibilities in order for a determination of abandonment to be made. Decisions of any court to the contrary are hereby legislatively overruled;

Every parent who is eighteen (18) years of age or older is presumed to have knowledge of a parent's legal obligation to support such parent's child or children;

For purposes of this subdivision (1), it shall be a defense to abandonment for failure to visit or failure to support that a parent or guardian's failure to visit or support was not willful. The parent or guardian shall bear the burden of proof that the failure to visit or support was not willful. Such defense must be established by a preponderance of evidence. The absence of willfulness is an affirmative defense pursuant to Rule 8.03 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure;

For purposes of this subdivision (1), a period of incarceration lasting less than seven (7) consecutive days must be counted as days of nonincarceration; and

For purposes of this subdivision (1), aggregation is accomplished by counting the days preceding, following, and in-between each period of incarceration of at least seven (7) consecutive days;

“Abandonment of an infant” means, for purposes of terminating parental or guardian rights, “abandonment” of a child under one (1) year of age;

“Adopted person” means:

Any person who is or has been adopted under this part or under the laws of any state, territory, or foreign country; and

For purposes of the processing and handling of, and access to, any adoption records, sealed adoption records, sealed records, post-adoption records, or adoption assistance records pursuant to this part, “adopted person” also includes a person for whom any of those records is maintained by the court, other persons or entities or persons authorized to conduct a surrender or revocation of surrender pursuant to this part, or which records are maintained by the department, a licensed or chartered child-placing agency, a licensed clinical social worker, or the department of health or other information source, whether an adoption petition was ever filed, whether an adoption order was ever entered, whether the adoption was ever dismissed, whether the adoption was ever finalized, or whether the adoption was attempted or was otherwise never completed due to the abandonment of any necessary activity related to the completion of the adoption;

“Adoption” means the social and legal process of establishing by court order, other than by paternity or legitimation proceedings or by voluntary acknowledgment of paternity, the legal relationship of parent and child;

“Adoption assistance” means the federal or state programs that exist to provide financial assistance to adoptive parents to enable them to provide a permanent home to a special needs child as defined by the department;

“Adoption record” means:

(i)  The records, reports, or other documents maintained in any medium by the judge or clerk of the court, or by any other person pursuant to this part who is authorized to witness the execution of surrenders or revocations of surrenders, which records, reports, or documents relate to an adoption petition, a surrender or parental consent, a revocation of a surrender or parental consent, or which reasonably relate to other information concerning the adoption of a person, and which information in such records, reports, or documents exists during the pendency of an adoption or a termination of parental rights proceeding, or which records, reports, or documents exist subsequent to the conclusion of those proceedings, even if no order of adoption or order of dismissal is entered, but which records, reports or documents exist prior to those records, reports, or documents becoming a part of a sealed record or a sealed adoption record pursuant to § 36-1-126; or

The records, reports, or documents maintained in any medium by the department's social services division, or by a licensed or chartered child-placing agency or licensed clinical social worker, and which records, reports, or documents contain any social, medical, legal, or other information concerning an adopted person, a person who has been placed for adoption or a person for whom adoptive placement activities are currently occurring, and which information in such records, reports, or documents exists during the pendency of an adoption or termination of parental rights proceeding, or which exists subsequent to the conclusion of those proceedings, even if no order of adoption or dismissal of an adoption has been entered, but which records, reports, or documents exist prior to those records, reports, or documents becoming sealed records or sealed adoption records pursuant to § 36-1-126;

The adoption record is confidential and is not subject to disclosure by the court, by a licensed child-placing agency, by a licensed clinical social worker or by any other person or entity, except as otherwise permitted by this part; however, prior to the record's becoming a sealed record or a sealed adoption record pursuant to § 36-1-126, the adoption record may be disclosed as may be necessary for purposes directly related to the placement, care, treatment, protection, or supervision by the legal custodian, legal guardian, conservator, or other legally authorized caretaker of the person who is the subject of the adoption proceeding, or as may be necessary for the purposes directly related to legal proceedings involving the person who is subject to the jurisdiction of a court in an adoption proceeding or other legal proceeding related to an adoption, including terminations of parental rights, or as may otherwise be necessary for use in any child or adult protective services proceedings concerning the person about whom the record is maintained pursuant to titles 37 and 71;

The adoption record shall not, for purposes of release of the records pursuant to §§ 36-1-12736-1-141, be construed to permit access, without a court order pursuant to § 36-1-138, to home studies or preliminary home studies or any information obtained by the department, a licensed or chartered child-placing agency, a licensed clinical social worker, or other family counseling service, a physician, a psychologist, or member of the clergy, an attorney or other person in connection with a home study or preliminary home study as part of an adoption or surrender or parental consent proceeding or as part of the evaluation of prospective adoptive parents, other than those studies that are expressly included in a report to the court by such entities or persons. Information relating to the counseling of a biological mother regarding crisis pregnancy counseling shall not be included in the adoption record for purposes of release pursuant to this part without a court order pursuant to § 36-1-138;

“Adoptive parent or parents” means the person or persons who have been made the legal parents of a child by the entry of an order of adoption under this part or under of the laws of any state, territory or foreign country;

“Adult” means any person who is eighteen (18) years of age or older. An adult may be adopted as provided in this part;

“Aggravated circumstances” means abandonment, abandonment of an infant, aggravated assault, aggravated kidnapping, especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated child abuse and neglect, aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor, especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor, aggravated rape, rape, rape of a child, incest, or severe child abuse, as defined at § 37-1-102;

“Biological parents” means the woman and man who physically or genetically conceived the child who is the subject of the adoption or termination proceedings or who conceived the child who has made a request for information pursuant to this part;

“Biological relative” means:

For adopted persons for whom any adoption records, sealed adoption records, sealed records, or post-adoption records are maintained: the biological parents or child of an adopted person or person for whom any adoption record, sealed record, sealed adoption record or post-adoption record is maintained, the brothers or sisters of the whole or half blood, the blood grandparents of any degree, the blood aunts or uncles, or the blood cousins of the first degree, of such persons; and

For persons about whom any background information is sought as part of the surrender or parental consent process: the biological parents of the child, the brothers or sisters of the whole or half blood, the blood grandparents of any degree, or the blood aunts or uncles;

“Chartered child-placing agency” means an agency that had received a charter from the state of Tennessee through legislative action or by incorporation for the operation of an entity or a program of any type that engaged in the placement of children for foster care or residential care as part of a plan or program for which those children were or could have been made available for adoptive placement and that may have, at sometime during its existence, become subject to any licensing requirements by the department or its predecessors;

“Child” or “children” means any person or persons under eighteen (18) years of age;

“Child-caring agency” means any agency authorized by law to care for children outside their own homes for twenty-four (24) hours per day;

“Consent” means:

The written authorization to relinquish a child for adoption, which is given by an agency such as the department or a public child care agency of another state or country or licensed child-placing agency of this or another state, which agency has the authority, by court order or by surrender or by operation of law or by any combination of these, to place a child for adoption and to give permission for the adoption of that child by other persons;

The written permission of a parent pursuant to § 36-1-117(f) to permit the adoption of that parent's child by that parent's relative or by the parent's spouse who is the child's stepparent;

The process as described in § 36-1-117(g) by which a parent co-signs an adoption petition, with the prospective adoptive parents, for the purpose of agreeing to make the child available for adoption by the co-petitioning prospective adoptive parents, and that permits the court to enter an order of guardianship to give the adoptive parents custody and supervision of the child pending the completion or dismissal of the adoption proceedings or pending revocation of the consent by the parent. This process shall be called a “parental consent”;

The permission of a child fourteen (14) years of age or older given to the court, in chambers, before the entry of an order of adoption of such child;

The permission of a guardian ad litem for a disabled child or an adult permitting the adoption of those persons pursuant to the procedures of § 36-1-117(i) and (j);

The sworn, written permission of an adult person filed with the court where the adoption petition is filed that seeks the adoption of the adult; or

The agreement for contact by the parties to the post-adoption records search procedures that may be required in §§ 36-1-12736-1-141;

“Conservator” means a person or entity appointed by a court to provide partial or full supervision, protection, and assistance of the person or property, or both, of a disabled adult pursuant to title 34, chapter 1 or the equivalent law of another state;

(A)  “Court” means the chancery or circuit court; provided, that “court” includes the juvenile court for purposes of the authority to accept the surrender or revocation of surrenders of a child and to issue any orders of reference, orders of guardianship, or other orders resulting from a surrender or revocation that it accepts and for purposes of authorizing the termination of parental rights pursuant to § 36-1-113; title 37, chapter 1, part 1; and title 37, chapter 2, part 4;

All appeals of any orders relative to the juvenile court's actions in taking a surrender or revocation or in terminating parental rights shall be made to the court of appeals as provided by law; or

A juvenile court magistrate, appointed by the juvenile court judge pursuant to title 37, shall have authority to take a surrender of a child and to take a revocation of such surrender;

“Court report” means the report to the adoption or surrender court in response to an order of reference that describes to the court the status of the child and the prospective adoptive parents or the persons to whom the child is surrendered. Such a report may be preliminary, supplementary, or final in nature. The court report shall not include the home study or preliminary home study, but instead shall include a summary of such study;

“Department” means the department of children's services or any of its divisions or units;

“Eligible person” means, for purposes of §§ 36-1-12536-1-141, a person who is verified by the department as being in the class of individuals who is permitted by this part to receive access to records;

“Final court report” means a written document completed by the department or a licensed child-placing agency or licensed clinical social worker after submission of any prior court reports in response to the court's order of reference. It gives information concerning the status of the child in the home of the prospective adoptive parents and gives a full explanation to the court of the suitability of the prospective adoptive parent or parents to adopt the child who is the subject of the adoption petition. The final court report is designed to bring the status of the proposed adoptive home and the child up to date immediately prior to finalization of the adoption and should be the last report the court receives before finalization of the adoption by entry of an order of adoption;

“Financially able” means that the petitioners for adoption of a child are able, by use of any and all income and economic resources of the petitioners, including, but not limited to, assistance from public or private sources, to ensure that any physical, emotional, or special needs of the child are met;

“Foster care” has the meaning given to that term in § 37-1-102; provided, that no plan or permanency plan, as defined in § 37-2-402, shall be required in the case of foster care provided by or in any agency, institution or home in connection with an adoption of a child, so long as a petition for the adoption of that child by an individual or individuals to whom care of that child has been given is filed in a court of competent jurisdiction within six (6) months of the time that child first comes into the care of the agency, institution or home;

“Foster parent” has the meaning given to that term in § 37-1-102;

(A)  “Guardian” means a person or entity appointed by a court to provide care, custody, control, supervision, and protection for a child, and authorized by the court to adopt or consent to the adoption of the child as a result of a surrender, parental consent, or termination of parental rights;

“Guardian” also means a person or entity authorized by a court to adopt or consent to the adoption of a child upon proof that the child is without any living person entitled to notice pursuant to § 36-1-117(a);

For purposes of this part, “guardian” does not include:

A person or entity appointed guardian of a child by a juvenile court pursuant to § 37-1-104;

A person appointed permanent guardian of a child by a juvenile court pursuant to § 37-1-801 unless that person has also been awarded guardianship pursuant to § 36-1-113(m);

A person appointed guardian of the person or property of a child, or both, by a court of competent jurisdiction pursuant to § 34-2-101; or

Any other person or entity appointed guardian of the person or property of a child pursuant to an order that does not specifically include the right to adopt or consent to the adoption of the child and that was not entered as a result of a surrender, parental consent, termination of parental rights, or finding that the child is without any living person entitled to notice pursuant to § 36-1-117(a);

The rights of the guardian must be terminated by surrender or court order or the guardian must provide consent as defined in subdivision (15)(A) before an order of adoption can be entered; provided, that a guardian's rights need not be terminated when the guardian is the petitioner in an adoption;

When the department or a licensed child-placing agency is the guardian of the child, its rights must be terminated by court action or it must provide consent as defined in subdivision (15)(A) before an adoption can be ordered;

(A)  “Guardianship” means the status created by a court order appointing a person or entity guardian of the child. Guardianship rights are those transferred to the guardian by court order, including the right to provide care, custody, control, supervision, and protection for a child and to adopt or consent to the adoption of the child as a result of a surrender, parental consent, termination of parental rights, or finding that the child is without any living person entitled to notice pursuant to § 36-1-117(a);

Guardianship granted by a court as a result of a surrender, consent, or termination of parental rights, or the equivalent law of any other jurisdiction, may be complete or partial;

(i)  A person or entity has complete guardianship for the purpose of permitting a court to order an adoption when all necessary parental or guardianship rights have been terminated by surrender, consent, waiver of interest, or court order, and a court with jurisdiction to do so enters an order granting guardianship to that person or entity;

Complete guardianship entitles the guardian to the right to care for the child as provided under § 37-1-140, or as otherwise provided by the court order, and permits the guardian to place the child for adoption and consent to the adoption, or to be granted an adoption of the child, without further termination of parental or guardian rights;

A prospective adoptive parent granted complete guardianship is the child's guardian for the purpose of § 37-4-201;

(i)  A person or entity has partial guardianship when a court with jurisdiction to do so enters an order granting guardianship to that person or entity as a result of the surrender, parental consent, or termination of parental rights of at least one (1), but not all, parents or guardians of the child, or as a result of the death of one (1) parent or guardian when the parental or guardianship rights of the remaining parent or guardian have not been terminated by surrender, consent, waiver of interest, or court order pursuant to this part or title 37;

Partial guardianship entitles the guardian to provide care, supervision, and protection of the child pursuant to § 37-1-140, or to the extent permitted by the court order granting partial guardianship, and permits the guardian to place the child for adoption and consent to that adoption; it does not authorize the court to enter an order of adoption until all remaining parental or guardianship rights have been terminated by surrender, consent, waiver of interest, or court order;

Upon receiving partial guardianship, the department or licensed child-placing agency may place a child for adoption with prospective adoptive parents and may consent to the adoption of the child by those prospective adoptive parents; the prospective adoptive parents are required to comply with § 36-1-117 before an adoption can be granted;

“Home study” means the product of a preparation process in which individuals or families are assessed by themselves and the department or licensed child-placing agency, or a licensed clinical social worker as to their suitability for adoption and their desires with regard to the child they wish to adopt. The home study shall conform to the requirements set forth in the rules of the department and it becomes a written document that is used in the decision to approve or deny a particular home for adoptive placement. The home study may be the basis on which the court report recommends approval or denial to the court of the family as adoptive parents. A court report based upon any home study conducted by a licensed child-placing agency, licensed clinical social worker or the department that has been completed or updated within one (1) year prior to the date of the surrender or order of reference shall be accepted by the court for purposes of §§ 36-1-111 and 36-1-116. The home study shall be confidential, and at the conclusion of the adoption proceeding shall be forwarded to the department to be kept under seal pursuant to § 36-1-126, and shall be subject to disclosure only upon order entered pursuant to § 36-1-138;

“Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC)” means §§ 37-4-20137-4-207 relating to the placement of a child between states for the purposes of foster care or adoption. The ICPC is administered in Tennessee by the department through its state office in Nashville;

(A)  “Legal parent” means:

The biological mother of a child;

A man who is or has been married to the biological mother of the child if the child was born during the marriage or within three hundred (300) days after the marriage was terminated for any reason, or if the child was born after a decree of separation was entered by a court;

A man who attempted to marry the biological mother of the child before the child's birth by a marriage apparently in compliance with the law, even if the marriage is declared invalid, if the child was born during the attempted marriage or within three hundred (300) days after the termination of the attempted marriage for any reason;

A man who has been adjudicated to be the legal father of the child by any court or administrative body of this state or any other state or territory or foreign country or who has signed, pursuant to §§ 24-7-113, 68-3-203(g), 68-3-302, or 68-3-305(b), an unrevoked and sworn acknowledgment of paternity under Tennessee law, or who has signed such a sworn acknowledgment pursuant to the law of any other state, territory, or foreign country; or

An adoptive parent of a child or adult;

A man shall not be a legal parent of a child based solely on blood, genetic, or DNA testing determining that he is the biological parent of the child without either a court order or voluntary acknowledgement of paternity pursuant to § 24-7-113. Such test may provide a basis for an order establishing paternity by a court of competent jurisdiction, pursuant to the requirements of § 24-7-112;

If the presumption of paternity set out in subdivisions (29)(A)(ii)-(iv) is rebutted as described in § 36-2-304, the man shall no longer be a legal parent for purposes of this chapter and no further notice or termination of parental rights shall be required as to this person;

“Legal relative” means a person who is included in the class of persons set forth in the definition of “biological relative” or “legal parent” and who, at the time a request for services or information is made pursuant to §§ 36-1-127, 36-1-131, and 36-1-13336-1-138 or with reference to a contract for post-adoption contact under § 36-1-145 immediately prior to the execution of a surrender or the entry of an order terminating parental rights, is related to the adopted person by any legal relationship established by law, court order, or by marriage, and includes, a step-parent and the spouse of any legal relative;

(A)  “Legal representative” means:

The conservator, guardian, legal custodian, or other person or entity with legal authority to make decisions for an individual with a disability or an attorney-in-fact, an attorney at law representing a person for purposes of obtaining information pursuant to this part, or the legally appointed administrator, executor, or other legally appointed representative of a person's estate; or

Any person acting under any durable power of attorney for health care purposes or any person appointed to represent a person and acting pursuant to a living will;

For purposes of subdivision (31)(A), “disability” means that the individual is a minor pursuant to any state, territorial, or federal law, or the law of any foreign country, or that the individual has been determined by any such laws to be in need of a person or entity to care for the individual due to that individual's physical or mental incapacity or infirmity;

“Licensed child-placing agency” means any agency operating under a license to place children for adoption issued by the department, or operating under a license from any governmental authority from any other state or territory or the District of Columbia, or any agency that operates under the authority of another country with the right to make placement of children for adoption and that has, in the department's sole determination, been authorized to place children for adoption in this state;

“Licensed clinical social worker” means an individual who holds a license as an independent practitioner from the board of social worker certification and licensure pursuant to title 63, chapter 23, and, in addition, is licensed by the department to provide adoption placement services;

“Lineal ancestor” means any degree of grandparent or great-grandparent, either by birth or adoption;

“Lineal descendant” means a person who descended directly from another person who is the biological or adoptive ancestor of such person, such as the daughter of the daughter's mother or granddaughter of the granddaughter's grandmother;

“Order of reference” means the order from the court where the surrender is executed or filed or where the adoption petition is filed that directs the department or a licensed child-placing agency or licensed clinical social worker to conduct a home study or preliminary home study or to complete a report of the status of the child who is or may be the subject of an adoption proceeding, and that seeks information as to the suitability of the prospective adoptive parents to adopt a child;

“Parent” or “parents” means any biological, legal, adoptive parent or parents or, for purposes of §§ 36-1-12736-1-141, stepparents;

“Parental consent” means the consent described in subdivision (15)(C);

“Parental rights” means the legally recognized rights and responsibilities to act as a parent, to care for, to name, and to claim custodial rights with respect to a child;

“Physical custody” means physical possession and care of a child. “Physical custody” may be constructive, as when a child is placed by agreement or court order with an agency, or purely physical, as when any family, including a formal or informal foster family, has possession and care of a child, so long as such possession was not secured through a criminal act. An agency and a family may have physical custody of the same child at the same time;

“Post-adoption record” means:

The record maintained in any medium by the department, separately from the sealed record or sealed adoption record and subsequent to the sealing of an adoption record or that is maintained about any sealed record or sealed adoption record. The post-adoption record contains information, including, but not limited to, adopted persons or the legal or biological relatives of adopted persons, or about persons for whom sealed records or sealed adoption records are maintained, or about persons who are seeking information about adopted persons, or persons on whom a sealed record or sealed adoption record is maintained. The post-adoption record contains information concerning, but not limited to, the contact veto registry established by this part, the written inquiries from persons requesting access to records, the search efforts of the department pursuant to the requirements of the contact veto process, the response to those search efforts by those persons sought, information that has been requested to be transmitted from or on behalf of any person entitled to access to records pursuant to this part, any updated medical information gathered pursuant to this part, court orders related to the opening of any sealed adoption records or sealed records, and personal identifying information concerning any persons subject to this part;

The limited record maintained by the licensed or chartered child-placing agency or a licensed clinical social worker pursuant to § 36-1-126(b)(2), that indicates the child's date of birth, the date the agency received the child for placement, from whom the child was received and such person's last known address, with whom the child was placed and such person's or entity's last known address, and the court in which the adoption proceeding was filed and the date the adoption order was entered or the adoption petition dismissed; and

This record is confidential and shall be opened only as provided in this part;

(A)  “Preliminary home study” means an initial home study conducted prior to or, in limited situations, immediately after, the placement of a child with prospective adoptive parents who have not previously been subject to a home study that was conducted or updated not less than six (6) months prior to the date a surrender is sought to be executed to the prospective adoptive parents or prior to the date of the filing of the adoption petition;

The preliminary home study is designed to obtain an early and temporary initial assessment of the basic ability of prospective adoptive parents to provide adequate care for a child who is proposed to be adopted by those prospective adoptive parents, and is utilized only for the purpose of approval of surrenders or for purposes of responding to an order of reference pursuant to § 36-1-116(e)(2), or for purposes of entering a guardianship order under § 36-1-116(f)(3);

The preliminary home study shall consist of a minimum of two (2) visits with the prospective adoptive parents, at least one (1) of which shall be in the home of the prospective adoptive parents, and the study shall support the conclusion that no apparent reason exists why the prospective adoptive parents would not be fit parents for the child who is the subject of the adoption. To be valid for use as the basis for a court report in connection with a surrender or a parental consent, the preliminary home study must have been completed or updated within thirty (30) days prior to the date the surrender is accepted or the parental consent is executed or confirmed or the guardianship order is entered. The home study shall be confidential, and, at the conclusion of the adoption proceeding, shall be forwarded to the department to be kept under seal pursuant to § 36-1-126, and shall be subject to disclosure only upon order entered pursuant to § 36-1-138;

“Prospective adoptive parents” means a nonagency person or persons who are seeking to adopt a child and who have made application with a licensed child-placing agency or licensed clinical social worker or the department for approval, or who have been previously approved, to receive a child for adoption, or who have received or who expect to receive a surrender of a child, or who have filed a petition for termination or for adoption;

“Putative father” means a biological or alleged biological father of a child who, at the time of the filing of the petition to terminate the parental rights of such person, or if no such petition is filed, at the time of the filing of a petition to adopt a child, meets at least one (1) of the criteria set out in § 36-1-117(c), has not been excluded by DNA testing as described in § 24-7-112 establishing that he is not the child's biological father or that another man is the child's biological father, and is not a legal parent;

“Related” means grandparents or any degree of great-grandparents, aunts or uncles, or any degree of great-aunts or great-uncles, or step-parent, or cousins of the first degree, or first cousins once removed, or any siblings of the whole or half degree or any spouse of the above listed relatives;

(A)  “Sealed adoption record” means:

The adoption record as it exists subsequent to its transmittal to the department, or subsequent to its sealing by the court, pursuant to the requirements of § 36-1-126; or

The limited record maintained by the licensed or chartered child-placing agency or a licensed clinical social worker pursuant to § 36-1-126(b)(2);

This record is confidential and shall be opened only as provided in this part;

The sealed adoption record shall not, for purposes of release of the records pursuant to §§ 36-1-12736-1-141, be construed to permit access, without a court order pursuant to § 36-1-138, to home studies or preliminary home studies or any information obtained by the department, a licensed or chartered child-placing agency, a licensed clinical social worker, or other family counseling service, a physician, a psychologist, or member of the clergy, an attorney or other person in connection with a home study or preliminary home study as part of an adoption or surrender or parental consent proceeding or as part of the evaluation of prospective adoptive parents, other than those studies that are expressly included in a report to the court by such entities or persons. Information relating to the counseling of a biological mother regarding crisis pregnancy counseling shall not be included in the adoption record for purposes of release pursuant to this part without a court order pursuant to § 36-1-138;

(A)  “Sealed record” means:

Any records, reports, or documents that are maintained at any time by a court, a court clerk, a licensed or chartered child-placing agency, licensed clinical social worker, the department, the department of health, or any other information source concerning the foster care or agency care placement, or placement for adoption, of a person by any branch of the Tennessee children's home society authorized by Public Chapter 113 (1919); or

Any records, reports, or documents maintained by a judge, a court clerk, the department, a licensed or chartered child-placing agency, a licensed clinical social worker, the department of health, or any other information source that consist of adoption records or information about an adoption proceeding or a termination of parental rights proceeding about an adopted person, or that contain information about a person who was placed for adoption but for whom no adoption order was entered or for whom an adoption proceeding was dismissed or for whom an adoption was not otherwise completed, or that contain information concerning persons in the care of any person or agency, and which records have otherwise been treated and maintained by those persons or entities under prior law, practice, policy, or custom as confidential, nonpublic adoption records, sealed adoption records, or post-adoption records of the person, or that may be otherwise currently treated and maintained by those persons or entities as confidential, nonpublic adoption records, sealed adoption records or post-adoption records of the person; or

The limited record maintained by the licensed or chartered child-placing agency or a licensed clinical social worker pursuant to § 36-1-126(b)(2);

This record is confidential and shall be opened only as provided in this part;

The sealed record shall not, for purposes of release of the records pursuant to §§ 36-1-12736-1-141, be construed to permit access, without a court order pursuant to § 36-1-138, to home studies or preliminary home studies or any information obtained by the department, a licensed or chartered child-placing agency, a licensed clinical social worker, or other family counseling service, a physician, a psychologist, or member of the clergy, an attorney or other person in connection with a home study or preliminary home study as part of an adoption or surrender or parental consent proceeding or as part of the evaluation of prospective adoptive parents, other than those studies that are expressly included in a report to the court by such entities or persons. Information relating to the counseling of a biological mother regarding crisis pregnancy counseling shall not be included in the adoption record for purposes of release pursuant to this part without a court order pursuant to § 36-1-138;

“Sibling” means anyone having a sibling relationship;

“Sibling relationship” means the biological or legal relationship between persons who have a common biological or legal parent;

“Surrender” means a document executed under § 36-1-111, or under the laws of another state or territory or country, by the parent or guardian of a child, by which that parent or guardian relinquishes all parental or guardianship rights of that parent or guardian to a child, to another person or public child care agency or licensed child-placing agency for the purposes of making that child available for adoption; and

(A)  “Surrogate birth” means:

The union of the wife's egg and the husband's sperm, which are then placed in another woman, who carries the fetus to term and who, pursuant to a contract, then relinquishes all parental rights to the child to the biological parents pursuant to the terms of the contract; or

The insemination of a woman by the sperm of a man under a contract by which the parties state their intent that the woman who carries the fetus shall relinquish the child to the biological father and the biological father's wife to parent;

No surrender pursuant to this part is necessary to terminate any parental rights of the woman who carried the child to term under the circumstances described in this subdivision (51) and no adoption of the child by the biological parent or parents is necessary;

Nothing in this subdivision (51) shall be construed to expressly authorize the surrogate birth process in Tennessee unless otherwise approved by the courts or the general assembly.

Acts 1951, ch. 202, §§ 2, 40 (Williams, §§ 9572.16, 9572.52); 1961, ch. 227, § 1; 1972, ch. 612, § 7; 1972, ch. 624, § 1; impl. am. Acts 1975, ch. 219, § 1; 1976, ch. 394, § 1; modified; Acts 1978, ch. 704, § 1; 1983, ch. 435, § 7; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 36-102; Acts 1990, ch. 988, § 1; 1993, ch. 124, §§ 5, 6; § 36-1-102; Acts 1995, ch. 532, § 1; 1996, ch. 1054, §§ 3-15, 104; 1996, ch. 1079, § 69; 1998, ch. 1097, §§ 2, 3; 2000, ch. 981, § 51; 2001, ch. 388, § 4; 2002, ch. 630, § 1; 2003, ch. 231, §§ 1-4; 2009, ch. 235, §  1; 2009, ch. 411, §§ 1-3; 2010, ch. 760, §§ 1, 2; 2010, ch. 887, § 2; 2010, ch. 888, § 1; 2010, ch. 924, § 1; 2016, ch. 636, §§ 2, 4; 2016, ch. 716, § 2; 2016, ch. 919, §§ 1, 2; 2018, ch. 875, §§ 1-6; 2019, ch. 35, § 3; 2019, ch. 36, §§ 23, 31; 2020, ch. 525, §§ 1-4.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2009, ch. 235, § 1 directed the code commission to revise appropriate references from “child support referees” and “juvenile referees” to “child support magistrates” and “juvenile magistrates” in the code as supplements are published and volumes are replaced.

Acts 2009, ch. 411, § 12 provided that the act, which amended §§ 36-1-102, 36-1-108, 37-1-102, 37-2-402 and added new § 37-1-183, shall apply to conduct covered by the provisions of the act that occurs on or after July 1, 2009. The eighteen (18) month time period set out in § 37-1-102(b)(12)(J) [now § 37-1-102(b)(13)(J)] shall not commence until July 1, 2009.

Amendments. The 2018 amendment deleted “willfully” preceding “failed” wherever it occurs in (1)(A)(i), (1)(A)(iii), (1)(a)(iv), (1)(D), and (1)(E); in (1)(A)(i), substituted “proceeding, pleading, petition, or any amended petition” for “proceeding or pleading”; redesignated the existing language in (1)(A)(ii) as (1)(A)(ii)(a) through (1)(A)(ii)(c); rewrote present (1)(A)(ii)(a) which formerly read: “The child has been removed from the home of the parent or parents or the guardian or guardians as the result of a petition filed in the juvenile court in which the child was found to be a dependent and neglected child, as defined in § 37-1-102, and the child was placed in the custody of the department or a licensed child-placing agency,”; at the beginning of present (b), substituted “The,” for “that the”; in present (c), in the first sentence, inserted “physical”, deleted “has” preceding “made reasonable”, and substituted “have not made reciprocal” for “have made no” preceding “reasonable efforts”, and, in the second sentence, substituted “shall” for “may” and inserted “equal or” preceding “exceed”; in (1)(D), inserted “. That the parent had only the means or ability to make small payments is not a defense to failure to support if no payments were made during the relevant four-month period” preceding the semicolon at the end; in (1)(E), inserted “. That the parent had only the means or ability to make very occasional visits is not a defense to failure to visit if no visits were made during the relevant four-month period;” preceding the semicolon at the end; and, in the definition of “‘Related’”, inserted “, or first cousins once removed” following “cousins of the first degree”.

The 2019 amendment by ch. 35, in the definition of “Legal relative” substituted “a person” for “the person”, deleted “search” following “a request for”, inserted “or with reference to a contract for post-adoption contact under § 36-1-145 immediately prior to the execution of a surrender or the entry of an order terminating parental rights”, and substituted “marriage, and includes, a step-parent and the spouse of any legal relative.” for “marriage, but specifically includes, in addition, a step-parent or the spouse of any legal relative.”

The 2019 amendment by ch. 36, in the definition of “‘Putative father’”, substituted “§ 36-1-117(c) has not been excluded by DNA testing as described in § 24-7-112 establishing that he is not the child's biological father or that another man is the child's biological father, and is not a legal parent;” for “§ 36-1-117(c) and is not a legal parent;” and inserted the definition of “‘Conservator’”.

The 2020 amendment rewrote (1)(A)(iv) which read: “A parent or guardian is incarcerated at the time of the institution of an action or proceeding to declare a child to be an abandoned child, or the parent or guardian has been incarcerated during all or part of the four (4) months immediately preceding the institution of such action or proceeding, and either has failed to visit or has failed to support or has failed to make reasonable payments toward the support of the child for four (4) consecutive months immediately preceding such parent's or guardian's incarceration, or the parent or guardian has engaged in conduct prior to incarceration that exhibits a wanton disregard for the welfare of the child. If the four-month period immediately preceding the institution of the action or the four-month period immediately preceding such parent's incarceration is interrupted by a period or periods of incarceration, and there are not four (4) consecutive months without incarceration immediately preceding either event, a four-month period shall be created by aggregating the shorter periods of nonincarceration beginning with the most recent period of nonincarceration prior to commencement of the action and moving back in time. Periods of incarceration of less than seven (7) days duration shall be counted as periods of nonincarceration. Periods of incarceration not discovered by the petitioner and concealed, denied, or forgotten by the parent shall also be counted as periods of nonincarceration. A finding that the parent has abandoned the child for a defined period in excess of four (4) months that would necessarily include the four (4) months of nonincarceration immediately prior to the institution of the action, but which does not precisely define the relevant four-month period, shall be sufficient to establish abandonment; or”; added (1)(J) and (1)(K);  and rewrote the definitions of “Guardian” and “Guardianship” which read:

“(25)(A) ‘Gardian’ or ‘guardians’ or ‘co-guardian’ or ‘co-guardians’ means a person or persons or an entity, other than the parent of a child, appointed by a court or defined by law specifically as ‘guardian’ or ‘co-guardian’ or ‘conservator’ to provide supervision, protection for and care for the person or property, or both, of a child or adult; (B) ‘Guardian’ or ‘co-guardian’ also means a person or entity appointed as guardian or guardians as the result of a surrender, parental consent, or termination of parental rights; (C) The rights of the individual guardian or co-guardian or conservator of the person of a minor child or of an adult must be terminated by a surrender or court action before an order of adoption can be entered; provided, that an individual or individuals who receives or receive guardianship pursuant to a surrender, parental consent, or termination of parental rights pursuant to this part or title 37 need not give consent to the adoption when that individual is the petitioner in an adoption; (D) When the department, a licensed child-placing agency, or a child-caring agency is the guardian of the child, its rights must be terminated by court action or it must provide consent as defined in subdivision (15)(A) before an adoption can be ordered.

“(26)(A) ‘Guardianship’ or ‘co-guardianship’ means, for purposes of subdivision (24), a person or entity having the status of being a guardian or co-guardian who or which is responsible for the provision of supervision, protection, and assistance to the person of a child under this part or under other law of this or any other jurisdiction; (B)  Guardianship as a result of a surrender, consent, or termination of parental rights pursuant to this part or title 37 or the law of any other jurisdiction may be ‘complete’ or ‘partial’; (C)(i)  A person or entity has ‘complete’ guardianship for the purpose of permitting a court to order an adoption when all necessary parental or guardianship rights have been terminated by surrender, by consent, by waiver of interest, or by involuntary termination of parental rights proceedings by a court or otherwise, and the court or courts with jurisdiction to do so enters an order or orders granting guardianship status to the person or entity; (ii)  Complete guardianship pursuant to a surrender or consent under this part or pursuant to the termination of the rights of a parent or guardian of a child under this part or under title 37, and pursuant to the entry of an order of guardianship as provided in this part, shall entitle the person or entity to the right to care for the child as provided under § 37-1-140 or as otherwise provided by the court order, and shall permit the entity to place the child for adoption and to consent to the adoption, or shall permit the individual to be granted an adoption of the child, and shall authorize the court to proceed with and grant an adoption, without further termination of parental or guardian rights; (D)(i)  A person or entity has ‘partial guardianship’ when a surrender or consent has been received from at least one (1), but not all, parents or guardians of the child, or when a court-ordered termination of parental or guardianship rights has been obtained against at least one (1), but not all, parents or guardians of the child, and the court has entered an order granting guardianship of the child to the petitioning person or entity, and the remaining parent or guardian of the child has not executed a surrender or consent or the child's parental or guardianship rights have not been terminated by waiver of interest pursuant to this part, court order, or otherwise; (ii)  Partial guardianship obtained pursuant to a surrender or consent or pursuant to an order terminating less than all parental rights, and an order of partial guardianship pursuant to this part or pursuant to title 37 shall entitle the person or entity to provide care, supervision, and protection of the child pursuant to  § 37-1-140, or to the extent permitted by the court order granting partial guardianship, but it shall not be effective to allow full consent to an adoption by an entity without termination by surrender or court order or otherwise of the remaining parental or guardianship rights of other parents or guardians, and shall not authorize the court to grant an adoption to an individual until all remaining parental or guardianship rights have been surrendered, terminated, or otherwise ended; provided, that the department or licensed child-placing entity may place a child for adoption with prospective adoptive parents and may consent to the adoption of the child by those prospective adoptive parents when the department or the licensed child-placing agency has partial guardianship, and the prospective adoptive parents then shall be required to obtain complete guardianship of the child by surrender, termination of parental rights, waiver of interest, or parental consent to effect the adoption of the child;”

Effective Dates. Acts 2018, ch. 875, § 38. July 1, 2018.

Acts 2019, ch. 35, § 4. March 22, 2019.

Acts 2019, ch. 36, § 35. July 1, 2019.

Acts 2020, ch. 525, § 13. March 6, 2020.

Cross-References. Concurrent jurisdiction of juvenile, circuit, and chancery courts over abandoned children, § 37-1-104.

Confidentiality of public records, § 10-7-504.

Infant prematurely born alive during abortion declared abandoned child, custody, § 39-15-206.

Jurisdiction of courts, §§ 16-10-108, 16-11-110.

Textbooks. Gibson's Suits in Chancery (7th ed., Inman), § 8.

Tennessee Jurisprudence, 20 Tenn. Juris., Parent and Child, §§ 6, 20.

Law Reviews.

Adoption and Custody: Current Trends in Tennessee Family Law: Tennessee's New Adoption Contact Veto is Cold Comfort to Birth Parents, 27 U. Mem. L. Rev. 843 (1997).

Family Law – Who is a Mother? Determining Legal Maternity in Surrogacy Arrangements in Tennessee (Christen Blackburn), 39 U. Mem. L. Rev. 349 (2009).

New-Age Babies and Age-Old Laws: The Need for an Intent-Based Approach in Tennessee to Preserve Parent-Child Succession for Children of Assisted Reproductive Technology (Jane Marie Lewis), 43 U. Mem. L. Rev. 479 (2012).

Storied Anna Mae He Decision Clarifies Law But Leaves Unanswered Questions (Christina A. Zawisza), 38 U. Mem. L. Rev. 637 (2008).

Tennessee Civil Disabilities: A Systemic Approach (Neil P. Cohen), 41 Tenn. L. Rev. 253 (1974).

When One Parent Goes and the Other Parent Stays: The Inconsistency and Inequality of Guaranteeing Absent Parents Permanent Parental Rights (Wendee M. Hilderbrand), 56 Vand. L. Rev. 1907 (2003).

Attorney General Opinions. The General Assembly has neither explicitly nor implicitly supplied the Department of Children's Services (DCS) with authority to make decisions about extraordinary medical care, and the juvenile court may not unilaterally confer such authority upon DCS, OAG 04-127, 2004 Tenn. AG LEXIS 140 (8/11/04).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality of Definition.

The statutory definition of “willfully failed to support” and “willfully failed to make reasonable payments toward such child's support” is unconstitutional because it creates an irrebutable presumption that the failure to provide monetary support for the four months preceding the petition to terminate parental rights constitutes abandonment, irrespective of whether that failure was intentional. Tennessee Baptist Children's Homes, Inc. v. Swanson (In re Swanson), 2 S.W.3d 180, 1999 Tenn. LEXIS 475 (Tenn. 1999).

The effect of the decision in Tennessee Baptist Children's Homes, Inc. v. Swanson, 2 S.W.3d 180, 1999 Tenn. LEXIS 475 (Tenn. 1999) that T.C.A. § 36-1-102(1)(D) was unconstitutional was to restore the definition of abandonment as it existed before the 1995 amendment, with the element of intent intact. Menard v. Meeks (In re Menard), 29 S.W.3d 870, 2000 Tenn. App. LEXIS 129 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000).

2. Construction.

In the definition of abandonment, T.C.A. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(i) uses the phrase “a proceeding or pleading to terminate parental rights” in the same statutory subsection where the legislature also uses the phrase “the petition for termination of parental rights or adoption”; read as a whole, T.C.A. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(i) requires that the willful failure to visit, support, or make reasonable payments toward the support of the child must occur in the four months immediately preceding the filing of the petition currently before the court. In re D.L.B., 118 S.W.3d 360, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 983 (Tenn. 2003).

Read in the context of the statutory scheme that governs the termination of parental rights, the word “any,” under T.C.A. § 36-1-102(1)(F), is addressed only to petitions presently under the trial court's consideration; accordingly, only a parent's conduct in the four months immediately preceding the filing of a petition then before the trial court may be used as grounds to terminate parental rights under T.C.A. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(i). In re D.L.B., 118 S.W.3d 360, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 983 (Tenn. 2003).

Biological father is not automatically the legal father of a child, but rather he is only the legal father if he is married to the mother at the probable time of conception or if he has been adjudicated to be the legal father. T.C.A. § 36-1-102(28); although the parentage statutes use the term father rather than legal father, the only logical reading of the parentage statute is that a man who has been adjudicated to be the father under the parentage law has also been adjudicated to be the legal father of the child; if that were not the case, a biological father could never be the legal father of his child unless he were married to the biological mother; such a reading would be both incorrect and unconstitutional. In re T.K.Y., 205 S.W.3d 343, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 757 (Tenn. 2006), rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 891 (Tenn. Sept. 19, 2006).

Surrogacy statute, T.C.A. § 36-1-102, does not establish a public policy prohibiting traditional surrogacy agreements. In re Baby, 447 S.W.3d 807, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 642 (Tenn. Sept. 18, 2014).

T.C.A. § 36-1-102(48)(B) [now (50)(B)] operates as a statement of public policy that a woman who carries a fetus to term under the statutory definition of gestational surrogacy does not attain the status of a legal parent under Tennessee law and, therefore, the statutory procedures governing surrender and adoption do not apply. In re Baby, 447 S.W.3d 807, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 642 (Tenn. Sept. 18, 2014).

General Assembly did not intend for T.C.A. § 36-1-102(48)(B) [now (50)(B)] to operate as an independent procedure for the termination of the parental rights of a traditional surrogate. In re Baby, 447 S.W.3d 807, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 642 (Tenn. Sept. 18, 2014).

3. Applicability.

Mother's claim that her conduct did not exhibit a wanton disregard for a child's welfare was rejected as the mother's parental rights were terminated because she abandoned the child by willfully failing to support or visit during the four months immediately preceding the filing of the petition; T.C.A. § 36-1-102(l)(A)(iv) did not apply. In re A'mari B., 358 S.W.3d 204, 2011 Tenn. App. LEXIS 488 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2011), appeal denied, In re A'Mari B., — S.W.3d —, 2011 Tenn. LEXIS 1067 (Tenn. Nov. 14, 2011).

Grounds of abandonment for failure to provide a suitable home and persistence of conditions were inapplicable because the proof showed that the children were removed from the home of the father, who was living with the father's mother at the time. Furthermore, at the time of removal, the mother was incarcerated. In re Isabella G., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 667 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 3, 2017).

4. Jurisdiction of Court.

Fact that juvenile court has adjudged a child a dependent and committed its custody to the department of human services (now department of children's services) and retained jurisdiction for such further orders as it might adjudge proper did not prevent the chancery or circuit court from taking jurisdiction of adoption proceeding or from determining the question of abandonment. In re Matthews, 204 Tenn. 155, 319 S.W.2d 69, 1958 Tenn. LEXIS 254 (1958).

Chancery and circuit courts may proceed with an adoption without considering the effects of a prior juvenile court order concerning custody. In re Adoption of Hart, 709 S.W.2d 582, 1984 Tenn. App. LEXIS 3000 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984).

5. Abandoned Child.

The definition of an abandoned child contained in subdivision (1) by its express provisions applies only to an action or proceeding to declare a child to be an abandoned child and has not been extended by amendment or construction to apply when the issue of abandonment is under consideration in adoption proceeding in the chancery or circuit court. Ex parte Wolfenden, 49 Tenn. App. 1, 349 S.W.2d 713, 1959 Tenn. App. LEXIS 140 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1959), superseded by statute as stated in, Fykes v. State, — S.W.3d —, 1998 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 206 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998) , superseded by statute as stated in, Tennessee Baptist Children's Home v. Swanson (In re Swanson), 1998 Tenn. App. LEXIS 322 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 14, 1998), superseded by statute as stated in, Baker v. He (In re A.M.H.), — S.W.3d —, 2005 Tenn. App. LEXIS 736 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 23, 2005).

The ultimate question in an abandonment situation is whether there is clear and convincing evidence of an overall lack of any parental responsibility. A finding of a possible abandonment, or the lack of such a finding, on the part of one parent is not to be interpreted as conclusive to the other parent or the ultimate issue. Koivu v. Irwin, 721 S.W.2d 803, 1986 Tenn. App. LEXIS 3160 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986).

There is a distinction in the law between those cases where an abandonment is asked to be declared and those cases where not only is there an abandonment request, but also an adoption of the abandoned child. In the former situation, there is a statutory definition of abandonment, contained in T.C.A. § 36-1-102(1)(A), while in the latter, case law sets out the definition. Koivu v. Irwin, 721 S.W.2d 803, 1986 Tenn. App. LEXIS 3160 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986).

Abandonment, as it pertains to an adoption proceeding, is defined in this state as any conduct on the part of the parent that evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child. Koivu v. Irwin, 721 S.W.2d 803, 1986 Tenn. App. LEXIS 3160 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986).

Evidence supported finding of abandonment. In re Adoption of Parsons, 766 S.W.2d 196, 1988 Tenn. App. LEXIS 778 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988).

Although it was undisputed that biological father did not pay any child support before maternal grandparents filed their petition for adoption, there was evidence that he would have been willing to pay such support if mother or grandparents agreed to accept it; therefore, the evidence failed to support the conclusion that biological father abandoned his child or that he willingly failed to support her. Menard v. Meeks (In re Menard), 29 S.W.3d 870, 2000 Tenn. App. LEXIS 129 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000).

Although there was not clear and convincing evidence that parent had abandoned child to support termination of parental rights because of lack of transportation and participation in a drug rehabilitation program, failure to overcome drug addiction and substantially comply with permanency plan supported termination. In re A.D.A, 84 S.W.3d 592, 2002 Tenn. App. LEXIS 76 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002).

Mother's failure to visit her minor children for the four months immediately preceding the filing of the termination petition constituted abandonment. In re S.Y., 121 S.W.3d 358, 2003 Tenn. App. LEXIS 130 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003).

Court erred by finding that a mother had willfully abandoned her children where the mother was indigent, and the state did not present any proof to the trial court that showed that the mother was able to financially support her children in any way and did not do so. State v. Stewart (In re L.J.C.), 124 S.W.3d 609, 2003 Tenn. App. LEXIS 515 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003), appeal denied, State Dep't of Child's Servs. v. Stewart (In re L.J.C.), — S.W.3d —, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 1288 (Tenn. 2003).

Trial court properly dismissed a petition to terminate parental rights, because the evidence did not establish that either parent intended to abandon a minor child. The evidence showed that the father paid child support, but was unaware of the child's residence; and the mother was unable to pay child support due to a loss of employment, but she attempted to contact the child shortly before the petition was filed. Means v. Ashby, 130 S.W.3d 48, 2003 Tenn. App. LEXIS 712 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 161 (Tenn. Mar. 1, 2004).

Trial court did not err in refusing to terminate the biological father's parental rights pursuant to T.C.A. § 36-1-102 because the trial court's finding that there was no convincing evidence of the father's willful abandonment of the child was presumed correct where the mother and her husband failed to provide an adequate record on appeal as required by Tenn. R. App. P. 24. In re M.L.D., 182 S.W.3d 890, 2005 Tenn. App. LEXIS 339 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005), appeal denied, In re Adoption of M.L.D., — S.W.3d —, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 779 (Tenn. Sept. 12, 2005).

Record did not support the juvenile court's implicit finding that the mother “willfully” failed to visit or support her two children during the four months preceding the filing of the joint termination petition as provided under the statutory definition of abandonment in T.C.A. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(i), because the mother was incarcerated during that four-month period and the fathers of the children refused to allow visitation at the prison. However, only one statutory ground was required to support termination of the mother's parental rights under T.C.A. § 36-1-113(g) and there was sufficient evidence to support the finding that the mother failed to support or visit her children in the four months before her incarceration, which constituted abandonment under T.C.A. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(i), and that the mother's conduct prior to her incarceration showed a wanton disregard for children's welfare, which also constituted abandonment under § 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv). In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d 838, 2005 Tenn. App. LEXIS 539 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005), appeal denied, In re A.M.S. v. Ferrell, — S.W.3d —, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 1020 (Tenn. 2005).

Court properly terminated a mother's parental rights on the grounds of abandonment where the mother made child support payments in November of 2004, but made no payments during the months of December of 2004, January of 2005, and February of 2005. In addition, the mother was required to return to the child support court to have that court reassess her child support obligations, and the mother never did so. Dep't of Children's Servs. v. S.M.D., 200 S.W.3d 184, 2006 Tenn. App. LEXIS 244 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006), appeal denied, State Dep't of Children's Servs. v. S.M.D., — S.W.3d —, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 634 (Tenn. 2006), appeal denied, In re D.J.D., — S.W.3d —, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 637 (Tenn. 2006).

Juvenile court did not err in terminating a father's parental rights based on abandonment pursuant to, inter alia, T.C.A. §§ 36-1-113(g)(1) and 36-1-102(1)(A)(i); the mother and her new husband had not prevented the father from visiting his child and, except for one call on his fourth birthday, the father failed to visit or contact the child from the age of two onwards, and the child was five at the time the petition to terminate the father's parental rights was filed. And, the court found that it would not have been in the child's best interest to go back and try to establish some sort of relationship with the father. In re F.R.R., 193 S.W.3d 528, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 334 (Tenn. 2006).

Evidence in this case did not support a finding that appellant parents intentionally abandoned their daughter; although the daughter had now been with appellees for more than seven years, six of the years elapsed after the parents'  first unsuccessful legal filing to regain custody. In re A.M.H., 215 S.W.3d 793, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 13 (Tenn. Jan. 23, 2007), rehearing denied, 215 S.W.3d 793, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 235 (Tenn. 2007), cert. denied, Baker v. Shao-Qiang He, — U.S.—, — S. Ct. —, — L. Ed. 2d —, 2007 U.S. LEXIS 8357 (U.S. June 25, 2007).

Order terminating mother's parental rights was vacated because the record failed to contain clear and convincing evidence that the department of children's services made reasonable efforts to reunite the mother with the child or that the mother abandoned the child by failure to support pursuant to T.C.A. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(i); it was significant that none of the permanency plans required the mother to provide financial support to the child, yet the department wished to use her failure to support as a ground for termination. In re R.L.F., 278 S.W.3d 305, 2008 Tenn. App. LEXIS 445 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 31, 2008), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2008 Tenn. LEXIS 788 (Tenn. Oct. 20, 2008).

Where father failed to support or make reasonable payments in support of his children for four months preceding filing of the petition to terminate parental rights, trial court did not err by terminating parental rights on the ground of abandonment under T.C.A. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(i); father was employed and received an inheritance during this time period, yet failed to make any efforts to provide support for his children. In re L.M.W., 275 S.W.3d 843, 2008 Tenn. App. LEXIS 512 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 3, 2008), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2008 Tenn. LEXIS 768 (Tenn. Oct. 6, 2008).

Termination of the mother's parental rights on the grounds of abandonment by failure to visit and failure to support was proper pursuant to T.C.A. §§ 36-1-102(1)(A)(i) and 36-1-113(g)(1) because the mother's contacts with the child during the pertinent four-month period were of such an infrequent nature or of such short duration as to merely establish minimal or insubstantial contact with the child under T.C.A. § 36-1-102(1)(C). Therefore, the mother engaged in merely token visitation during the four-month period preceding the filing of the termination petition. Stephen v. Christy C., 384 S.W.3d 731, 2010 Tenn. App. LEXIS 727 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 22, 2010), appeal denied, In re Keri C., — S.W.3d —, 2011 Tenn. LEXIS 120 (Tenn. Feb. 17, 2011).

Prior order suspending the father's visitation rights did not preclude a finding that the father willfully failed to visit the children, and a preponderance of the evidence supported the conclusion that the father willfully failed to visit his children between July 2003 and July 2005 since although the father filed a petition to reinstate his visitation rights, he took no action to advance the petition, and the father had no reasonable excuse for failing to pursue the petition to reinstate visitation during those two years; therefore, the record contained clear and convincing evidence supporting termination of the father's parental rights on the ground of abandonment based on willful failure to visit under T.C.A. § 36-1-113(g)(1) and T.C.A. § 36-1-102. Because the trial court did not reach the issue of whether termination of the father's parental rights was in the best interests of the children, the court remanded the case for the trial court to consider whether termination of the father's parental rights was in the best interests of the children pursuant to T.C.A. § 36-1-113(c). In re Angela E., 402 S.W.3d 636, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 303 (Tenn. Mar. 13, 2013).

Clear and convincing evidence supported terminating a father's parental rights on grounds of abandonment for willful failure to visit because the father had visited the child, at most, two times, once in December 2010 and once in January 2011, prior to the filing of the termination petition in April 2012 and it was only after the petition was filed that the father attempted to see the child; the father's visitation after the petition was filed was, at best, token visitation. In re Jacobe M.J., 434 S.W.3d 565, 2013 Tenn. App. LEXIS 790 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 5, 2013), appeal denied, In re Jacobe J., — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 228 (Tenn. Mar. 5, 2014).

Clear and convincing evidence supported terminating a father's parental rights on grounds of abandonment by wanton disregard because the father engaged in criminal behavior, had continued incarcerations, had unresolved substance abuse issues, failed to meet the child's material needs, and demonstrated a general a lack of concern towards the child. In re Jocilyn M.P., 435 S.W.3d 773, 2014 Tenn. App. LEXIS 24 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 24, 2014), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 248 (Tenn. Mar. 11, 2014).

Clear and convincing evidence supported terminating a father's parental rights on grounds of abandonment by willful failure to support because the father had an income of at least $ 2,867 during the relevant time, paid over $ 1,600 for pain management consultations and prescriptions, but paid no support despite being aware of his duty to support the child. In re Jocilyn M.P., 435 S.W.3d 773, 2014 Tenn. App. LEXIS 24 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 24, 2014), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 248 (Tenn. Mar. 11, 2014).

Trial court erred in terminating a father's parental rights because the department of children's services (DCS) was required to make reasonable efforts to assist the father in reunification even when the ground alleged was abandonment by wanton disregard and the trial court made no findings regarding whether DCS exercised reasonable efforts to assist the father. In re Kaliyah S., — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. App. LEXIS 110 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 28, 2014), rev'd, 455 S.W.3d 533, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 14 (Tenn. Jan. 22, 2015).

Child was properly found to be abandoned based on the child's mother's failure to provide a suitable home; the presence of drug paraphernalia in the mother's home, along with the mother's ongoing substance abuse issues, rendered her home unsuitable for the child. In re Jonathan F., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 79 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 20, 2015).

Clear and convincing evidence existed to terminate a father's parental rights on the ground of abandonment by conduct exhibiting a wanton disregard for the welfare of the children because the father had been absent for all but the first few months of the children's lives, and in the four months before his date of incarceration, he worked but paid nothing for the support of the children. In re S.C.M., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 96 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 2, 2015).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was proper on the grounds of abandonment by willful failure to visit because she did not visit her son during the four month period prior to the filing of the termination petition; she had not seen the child for approximately 21 months; the problem of being arrested was one of the mother's own making as she was aware of the order of protection; even after the order of protection was dismissed, the mother never contacted the father about setting up supervised visitation in accordance with the parenting plan; she did not contact the facility that could provide supervised visitation; and she never filed a petition or motion with the divorce court to enforce the visitation schedule or to modify it. In re Noah B.B., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 115 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 12, 2015).

Clear and convincing evidence supported terminating a mother's parental rights for failure to visit the mother's child because the mother (1) only maintained sporadic phone contact with the child, and (2) did not physically contact the child for five and one-half months. In re Brittany M.C., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 182 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 24, 2015), appeal denied, In re Brittany M C, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 522 (Tenn. June 17, 2015).

Clear and convincing evidence supported terminating a mother's parental rights for abandonment due to a failure to establish a suitable home for the mother's child because (1) efforts of the Department of Children's Services (DCS) to help the mother establish a home were frustrated by the mother's continued absence and failure to maintain communication with DCS, (2) the mother did not procure a birth certificate to obtain housing, and (3) the mother refused DCS'  offers of assistance. In re Brittany M.C., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 182 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 24, 2015), appeal denied, In re Brittany M C, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 522 (Tenn. June 17, 2015).

Evidence indicated safety hazards and environmental issues with the mother's home, and her pattern of inviting manipulative and abusive men into her home and life was at the heart of the problem, and more than a year after the child was removed, the mother was no closer to being able to provide the child with a suitable home; the trial court did not err in terminating the mother's parental rights based on her failure to provide a suitable home. In re K.G.S., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 347 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 19, 2015).

Trial court did not err in terminating the father's parental rights, as the evidence did not preponderate against the findings in support of its determination that the father abandoned the child by exhibiting a wanton disregard for her welfare; the father engaged in sexual conduct with the child for years. In re T.L.G., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 369 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 26, 2015).

During the relevant four-month period, the father visited the children only once, and one visit during a four-month period constitutes only token visitation, at best; the father had no excuse for failing to visit, his failure was willful, and the facts provided clear evidence that he abandoned his children. In re Bonnie L., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 477 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 12, 2015).

In this case, the petition was filed on February 7, 2014, and thus the relevant four-month period for abandonment purposes began on October 7, 2013 and ended on February 6, 2014. In re Bonnie L., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 477 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 12, 2015).

Trial court erred in finding that the father abandoned the child by willfully failing to visit him because the evidence was insufficient to support its finding that the father's visitation with the child during the statutorily determinative period was only token; the father visited the child on seven to eight occasions during the four-month determinative period. In re Jayden B.T., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 494 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 23, 2015), appeal denied, In re Jayden T., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 818 (Tenn. Sept. 25, 2015).

Statutory ground of abandonment through failure to provide a suitable home was inapplicable to the father because the child resided with the mother prior to her exit from the home and the filing of the emergency petition for temporary custody. In re Jayden B.T., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 494 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 23, 2015), appeal denied, In re Jayden T., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 818 (Tenn. Sept. 25, 2015).

Pursuant to the plain language of the statute the definition of abandonment through failure to provide a suitable home is inapplicable to a private action that did not involve Department of Children's Services or a licensed child-placing agency. In re Jayden B.T., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 494 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 23, 2015), appeal denied, In re Jayden T., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 818 (Tenn. Sept. 25, 2015).

Evidence that the mother continued to engage in criminal behavior resulting in her incarceration, failed to find and keep steady employment, and failed to demonstrate the desire to create a safe, suitable home for the child supported the trial court's finding that the mother abandoned the child by failure to provide a suitable home. In re Mason M., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 595 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 17, 2015).

Mother abandoned her child through her failure to abide by the law and thus avoid incarceration and her failure to pay support. In re Mason M., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 595 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 17, 2015).

Clear and convincing evidence supported terminating a mother's parental rights on grounds of abandonment by willful failure to visit because the mother had numerous opportunities to visit with the child but was a “no-show,” the mother did not visit or ask to visit the child for an appreciable time period, and on one occasion when the mother did visit the child, the mother appeared intoxicated and ended the visitation early. In re Serenity L., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 622 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 31, 2015).

For almost all of his life, the child's relationship with his mother had been built during scheduled visits, many of which she failed to attend, and the mother's claim of interference was unfounded, such that the trial court's finding that she abandoned the child through a willful failure to visit was not contrary to the preponderance of the evidence. In re L.J., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 696 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2015).

Evidence did not preponderate against the finding with respect to the suitable home issue; despite reasonable assistance, the mother failed to find housing for approximately two years after the state removed her children from her home, which showed a lack of concern for her children to such a degree that it was unlikely she would be able to maintain a suitable home, and termination was proper. In re L.J., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 696 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2015).

Clear evidence supported the finding of abandonment by willful failure to visit; the mother willfully failed to comply with an order of the trial court, and her efforts to comply with conditions to have visitation reinstated with the child were too little, too late. In re Jaylah W., 486 S.W.3d 537, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 819 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 7, 2015), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 94 (Tenn. Feb. 1, 2016).

Termination of a father's parental rights based upon abandonment was proper because the father did not visit or contact the child within the four months preceding his incarceration, and the record did not reflect that the father seriously attempted to visit the child or that he was prevented from doing so. Additionally, the father had a laundry list of criminal offenses in conjunction with his lengthy history of drug abuse. In re Thomas T., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 907 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 16, 2015).

Clear and convincing evidence existed that the father abandoned the child through his conduct prior to incarceration by exhibiting wanton disregard for the child's welfare. In re Aaliyah E., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 36 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 26, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 315 (Tenn. Apr. 22, 2016).

During the determinative time period, the mother was unable to make reasonable efforts toward establishing a suitable home and department personnel were constrained in their efforts to assist her; the trial court's judgment regarding the abandonment ground was reversed. In re Aaliyah E., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 36 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 26, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 315 (Tenn. Apr. 22, 2016).

Termination was proper under the ground of abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home, given that the mother failed to make reasonable efforts to provide a suitable home and she demonstrated a lack of concern for the children to such a degree that it appeared unlikely that she would be able to provide a suitable home at an early date. In re Saliace P., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 37 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 26, 2016).

Trial court properly terminated a mother's rights to her child based on abandonment and in the child's best interest because the mother only visited the child twice in five years, neither of which was within the four months preceding the foster parents'  adoption petition, the mother's conduct was willful, there was no evidence that the foster parents significantly restrained and interfered with the mother's efforts to visit the child, the child had been in the foster parents'  home eight years, formed a close bond with the foster parents and their family and, was excelling in school, and removing her from the only home she had ever known would likely have a detrimental effect on her emotional and psychological condition. In re Makendra E., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 49 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 27, 2016).

Finding that the father abandoned the child due to his failure to provide a suitable home was supported by evidence that the father was unable to provide proof of stable housing and at times lived in an officer building owned by his parents, and, even prior to that period, the father's living situation was unsuitable due to his habitual drug usage and failed drug screenings. In re Riley C., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 113 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 12, 2016).

Trial court's final judgment terminating a father's parental rights applied an incorrect time period in finding that the father abandoned the child by willful failure to visit and willful failure to support. In re K.J.G., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 216 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 28, 2016).

Trial court did not err when it concluded that the parents had abandoned their son by willfully failing to visit him during the relevant period where their visits were so infrequent and of such short duration that they represent token visitation. In re Matthew T., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 272 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 20, 2016).

Termination of the father's rights for abandonment by wanton disregard was affirmed; in part, the father's own testimony at trial reflected his lengthy history of drug abuse and criminal activity. In re Aniston M., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 309 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 5, 2016).

Record supported the finding of abandonment based upon the father's conduct prior to incarceration, which demonstrated a wanton disregard for the children's welfare, as he engaged in domestic violence against the mother in the presence of the children, and he failed to address his mental health and substance abuse issues. In re Charles K., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 344 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 19, 2016).

While the mother was commended for taking the first step toward rehabilitation by renouncing her substance abuse, her extensive criminal activity and substance abuse issues could not be ignored; she also disregarded the children's welfare by leaving them with the father, who assaulted her and others, and thus there was clear evidence to establish that the mother engaged in conduct prior to incarceration that exhibited a wanton disregard for the welfare of the children, and termination was proper. In re Charles K., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 344 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 19, 2016).

Trial court's determination that the father, for abandonment purposes, exhibited a wanton disregard for the child was vacated; despite the abundance of evidence concerning the father's drug use, charges of selling drugs, fleeing, and assault, probation violations, and transient lifestyle, the trial court's order omitted reference to any factual findings that would support a finding of wanton disregard, in clear violation of the statute. In re Navada N., 498 S.W.3d 579, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 367 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 23, 2016).

For abandonment by willful failure to visit as to the father, despite the incorrect date as stated in the order, the ground was considered as the trial court's error of five days regarding the correct calculation of the four-month period was not determinative. In re Navada N., 498 S.W.3d 579, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 367 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 23, 2016).

Department made reasonable efforts to assist the mother in establishing a suitable home for the children in continually maintaining contact with the mother, providing her with drug screens, and assisting her with coordinating drug and alcohol assessments; while the mother's home was neat and clean, she had been unable to stop her cocaine abuse, and thus while she established a proper physical living location, her home was not free of drugs, plus she was currently incarcerated and could not provide a home at all for the children. In re Navada N., 498 S.W.3d 579, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 367 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 23, 2016).

Statute did not direct the court to review whether the father did what he could to maintain a relationship with the child while in prison; what was to be determined was whether, in the four-months preceding his incarceration, the father attempted to visit the child, and yet he made no attempt to present himself to the trial court in an effort to regain visitation, and thus he willfully failed to visit the child prior to his incarceration. In re Navada N., 498 S.W.3d 579, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 367 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 23, 2016).

For the termination ground of abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home, this ground is inapplicable when the child is not removed from the parent at issue's home before being placed with the child services department; in this case, the child could not have been removed from the father's home where he never provided one in the first instance, and thus this ground did not apply based on the dearth of evidence to establish whether the child was ever removed from the father's home. In re Navada N., 498 S.W.3d 579, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 367 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 23, 2016).

Statute governing abandonment is clear that different time periods apply to different definitions. In re Navada N., 498 S.W.3d 579, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 367 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 23, 2016).

Because of the grave consequences and high stakes in termination cases, trial courts should endeavor to be as specific as possible in their orders and treat each definition of abandonment as a separate ground for which specific findings are required In re Navada N., 498 S.W.3d 579, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 367 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 23, 2016).

Because the juvenile court did not mention the failure to provide a suitable home in its oral ruling, the fact that they were included in the order did not reflect the juvenile court's own deliberation and decision that termination would be granted on the ground of abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home. In re Milli L., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 396 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 7, 2016).

Juvenile court did not err in terminating a mother's parental rights because the finding that the mother failed to visit her child in the four months preceding the filing of the petition was supported by clear and convincing evidence; the mother gave no testimony upon which to conclude that her failure to visit the child during that period was not willful. In re Milli L., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 396 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 7, 2016).

Abandonment by failure to secure a suitable home was not established, since an order adjudicating the children as dependent and neglected was not found. In re Aiden R., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 420 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 23, 2016).

There was clear and convincing evidence that the father abandoned the child by failing to visit her, as he had no excuse for not visiting the child from the time she was less than two years old until the hearings and the father was free and able to make such visits. In re Tianna B., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 471 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 6, 2016).

All evidence indicated that the parents failed to make necessary changes to ensure that their home was sanitary, and the findings that their parental rights could be terminated on the ground of abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home; photographs were admitted into evidence showing, in part, bugs throughout the house, animal feces and urine on the floors and beds, beer cans scattered throughout, and continuing clutter in the home. In re Derrick J., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 477 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 8, 2016).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was proper as the mother abandoned the child by willfully failing to visit because, even giving the mother credit for the one visit in June, which was rescheduled, and accepting the mother's testimony that she visited in March, her visitation during the four month period preceding the filing of the petition to terminate parental rights could not be viewed as regular visitation; and the mother gave no explanation as to why she did not, or could not, have visited more often during the relevant time period. In re Bryson C., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 498 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 18, 2016).

In a termination of parental rights case, the trial court did not err in finding that the mother had abandoned the child because the mother had been convicted of driving under the influence, reckless endangerment, sale of counterfeit controlled substance, delivery of Schedule III controlled substance, shoplifting, and contributing to the delinquency of a minor, and had pled guilty to two violations of probation, which constituted the kind of conduct that exhibited wanton disregard for the welfare of a child. In re Kendra P., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 544 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 28, 2016).

Although the trial court found grounds to terminate the mother's parental rights based on abandonment and substantial non-compliance with a permanency plan, termination of the mother's parental rights to her 17-year-old child was improper as the Tennessee Department of Children's Services failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that it was in the child's best interest to terminate her mother's parental rights because the child was 17 years old, was not a candidate for adoption, and intended to maintain a relationship with the mother when she turned 18; and termination of the mother's parental rights would accomplish nothing other than setting the child adrift with no adoptive family. In re Kendra P., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 544 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 28, 2016).

Juvenile court properly terminated a father's parental rights on the ground of abandonment because he was incarcerated during the four months preceding the filing of the petition for termination, and he willfully failed to visit and support the child; the father had only seen the child once since the child was born, and despite being ordered to do so, the father never paid any child support until several months after the filing of the termination petition. In re Braxton R., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 660 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 2, 2016).

Clear and convincing evidence established abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home, as the mother failed to stay in proper contact with the Department, did not seek out counseling, did not move from her mother's residence within the first four months of the children's removal, and later moved into an apartment with her longtime boyfriend with whom she had a history of domestic violence. In re Stormie M., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 675 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 15, 2016).

Father's failure to visit the child was willful, and thus termination of the father's rights was proper; the father was not incarcerated for the first year of the child's life, he claimed his addictions prevented him from visiting the child, and it appeared that the father's failure to visit was a conscious choice, not that he was prevented from doing so. In re Elizabeth D., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 706 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 23, 2016).

Termination of the mother's rights was proper on the ground of abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home; the prior adjudication of dependency and neglect criterion was met in this case, the mother lacked a suitable home for the children, as it did not have sufficient bedrooms, and the mother's ability to set proper boundaries for the children, who had significant mental issues and had been abused in the past, was questionable. In re Jasmine B., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 709 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 22, 2016).

Juvenile court erred in finding that a mother abandoned her children because although there was sufficient evidence that the mother willfully failed to visit her children, the time frame only accounted for two months of the relevant time period; there was sufficient evidence that the mother attempted to visit the children on two occasions, and there was not evidence that she was offered assistance or alternative transportation. In re Jason S., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 715 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 23, 2016).

Terminating a father's parental rights for abandonment due to a willful failure to visit was proper because (1) the father's visitation was token, as, during the four months before the termination petition was filed, the father visited only twice, leaving after one hour of a two-hour visit, and the father's phone calls did not try to establish a healthy parental relationship, and (2) the failure to visit was willful, as, despite knowing more than token visitation was required and an ability to visit, the father did not attempt more visitation. In re Jose L., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 814 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 31, 2016).

Ground of failure to provide a suitable home was proven by clear and convincing evidence where the mother's home could not be deemed suitable so long as she refused to cooperate fully regarding her abuse of prescription drugs. In re Dillon E., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 872 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 15, 2016).

Termination for abandonment for failure to provide a suitable home was reversed, given that the trial court impermissibly based its decision in part on facts outside of the applicable four-month period defined in the statute, which would have been four months following the removal of the children from the mother's home. In re Eddie F., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 924 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 2, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 158 (Tenn. Mar. 2, 2017).

Record was devoid of any evidence that the department made any efforts related to housing during the relevant time period, and thus there was no clear evidence to establish that the mother abandoned the children by failing to provide a suitable home, and termination based on this ground was reversed. In re Yariel S., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 6, 2017).

Trial court's finding that the father had abandoned the children was affirmed where a decision to invest in his education rather than support the children was willful, and his failure to visit the children during the relevant four-month period was self-inflicted. In re Ian B., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 611 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 13, 2017).

Trial court erred in applying the definition of abandonment in T.C.A. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(i) and terminating the mother's rights to her son under that section, because the mother was incarcerated for part of the four months preceding the filing of the original petition to termination the mother's parental rights. In re Douglas H., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 662 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 29, 2017).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was proper on grounds of abandonment, given that she failed to provide a suitable home despite reasonable efforts by the Department of Children's Services. In re B.L., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 846 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 1, 2017).

Although the mother was unsuccessful in establishing a suitable home for the children, the department failed to show that it made reasonable efforts during the relevant four-month periods to assist her in obtaining suitable housing, which was required to prevail on the ground of abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home, and the judgment was reversed in this regard. In re Mc, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 332 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 20, 2018).

Because a father failed to appeal the amount of child support within the thirty-day time period, the issue of whether an order required him to pay child support was waived; even if the issue was appealable and there was no valid court order on child support, that fact, alone, did not relieve the father of his obligation to support the child, and thus, the father was not entitled to credit against arrears for child support he paid. State ex rel. Townsend v. Williamson, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 348 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 21, 2018).

Statute defining abandonment was amended and no longer includes the term willful in its definition of abandonment; because this change is substantive rather than procedural or remedial, however, the amended statute was not applied retroactively to this case. In re Gabriel B., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 413 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 23, 2018).

Termination of the father's parental rights was proper based on abandonment by an incarcerated parent by wanton disregard, abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home, and substantial noncompliance with the reasonable requirements of the permanency plan because the father raped the mother while the children were present in the home, he threatened the mother and the children with physical harm, and the children were aware of his behaviors; it did not appear that the father could provide the children with a safe home, free of domestic violence, and sexually deviant behavior; and the requirement that he address the psychological and emotional abuse issues was of paramount importance, but he did nothing toward that goal. In re R.S., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 427 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 24, 2018).

Termination of the mother's rights based on abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home for the child was proper, given that the child was removed from the mother's custody when the child was found dependent and neglected, and the department made reasonable efforts to assist the mother by, in part, developing permanency plans, providing visitation, and making referrals for the mother's alcohol and drug treatment, yet she had failed to address her mental health issues, maintain stable employment, and maintain stable housing. In re Alexis C., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 499 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 28, 2018).

In ordering the child's removal from the mother's custody, the trial court found that the Department of Children's Services was not required to exert reasonable efforts to prevent the child's removal from the home at that time due to the emergency nature of the circumstances; however, in order to satisfy the abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home ground for termination, the department was required to make reasonable efforts to assist the mother in establishing a suitable home. In re Alexis C., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 499 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 28, 2018).

There was clear evidence that the father abandoned the children by failing to provide a suitable home; despite attempts by the department to help him, the father never provided proof of safe and stable housing, and his lack of cooperation with the department and failure to improve his own living situation demonstrated that he would not be able to provide a suitable home for the children at an early date. In re Gaberiel S., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 718 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 11, 2018).

Four-month period prior to the filing of the guardian ad litem's petition was the relevant period for application of T.C.A. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(i); there was no basis to apply a different four-month period than that measured by the guardian's petition. In re Antonio J., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 759 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2018).

Petitioners failed to prove that the mother abandoned the children for willfully failing to support and visit because the record contained no evidence regarding the mother's support or visitation during the fourth-month period immediately preceding her incarceration. In re Johnathan M., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 10 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 8, 2019).

Clear evidence established that the mother abandoned the children by failing to provide a suitable home; the children's services department tried to help the mother find suitable housing, but she still lacked that, and the mother had been given notice that failure to make reasonable efforts would lead to termination. In re Gabriella H., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 12 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 8, 2019).

Mother had abandoned her children under T.C.A. § 36-1-102(a) where she allowed people visiting her to use marijuana in the home, despite knowing that her children were removed in part due to drug issues, and she had been evicted from her apartment, even if it had been an appropriate home. In re Jadarian C., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 87 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2020).

Trial court did not err in applying the relation back doctrine of the rule regarding the amendment of pleadingd and ruled that the appropriate time period to consider in the foster parents'  termination of parental rights petition based on abandonment was the four months before the filing of the original petition to terminate parental rights because the amendment did not involve a new petition with new parties, but, rather, it involved the correction of an omission in the original petition. In re Neveah M., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 92 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 4, 2020).

Both the mother's and the father's criminal history prior to their incarceration evidenced their wanton disregard for the welfare of the child and the fact that the mother allowed methamphetamine to be manufactured in the home where the child resided showed a risk of substantial harm to the child's welfare and thus, the record contained clear and convincing evidence establishing abandonment by engaging in conduct that exhibited a wanton disregard as a ground for termination of parental rights. In re Eli S., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 150 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 9, 2020).

6. —State of Mind.

Where the court of appeals held that the payments the father gave to the mother during the four months immediately preceding the child's birth were unreasonable, the court of appeals erred in terminating father's parental rights based upon T.C.A. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(iii), because the court of appeals did not address the required element of willfulness. In re D.L.B., 118 S.W.3d 360, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 983 (Tenn. 2003).

Trial court, not the court of appeals, is the proper court to make a determination of willfulness, pursuant to T.C.A. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(iii). In re D.L.B., 118 S.W.3d 360, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 983 (Tenn. 2003).

In construing T.C.A. § 36-1-102(1)(D), an element of intent cannot be read into the definitions of “willfully failed to support” and willfully failed to make reasonable payments toward such child's support. In re S.Y., 121 S.W.3d 358, 2003 Tenn. App. LEXIS 130 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003).

Trial court properly found that the father's failure to support could not be considered willful because he made sincere efforts to provide support, yet his efforts were rebuffed by the mother; therefore, the mother failed to provide grounds to terminate the father's parental rights to the child. In re Neylan H., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 997 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 29, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 175 (Tenn. Mar. 14, 2017).

7. —Incarceration.

Clear and convincing evidence supported terminating a father's parental rights on grounds of abandonment by wanton disregard for the welfare of the child prior to the father's incarceration because, inter alia, the father had a lengthy history of criminal conduct, repeated episodes of incarceration throughout the child's life, and abused prescription and non-prescription drugs; the father traded food stamps for drugs even though there was often very little food for the child to eat. In re William B., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 467 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 11, 2015).

Trial court's findings of a father's willful failure to visit and support the child were inclusive of the statutorily determinative period because the trial court found that the father had willfully failed to engage in more than token visitation during the entire time period that the child's custody was before it. In re Jayden B.T., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 494 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 23, 2015), appeal denied, In re Jayden T., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 818 (Tenn. Sept. 25, 2015).

Clear and convincing evidence supported terminating an incarcerated father's parental rights on grounds of abandonment by wanton disregard because the father reasonably suspected that he might be the child's biological father when he committed the offenses that resulted in his probation being revoked, and the father was written up during his incarceration for fighting after he was on notice that he might be the child's biological father. In re Serenity L., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 622 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 31, 2015).

Clear and convincing evidence supported terminating a mother's parental rights on grounds of abandonment by wanton disregard prior to incarceration because the mother engaged in drug use and abuse, including during the pregnancy, engaged in criminal activity, and was periodically incarcerated; the mother refused to tend to the child's physical, emotional, and medical conditions. In re Serenity L., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 622 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 31, 2015).

Trial court's finding that a mother abandoned her child pursuant to T.C.A. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv) (2014) was reversed where although her criminal history was varied and extensive, there was no evidence that she engaged in habitual criminal activity or violated her probation following the child's birth, and thus, it was not possible to conclude that the mother's decision to continue to engage in criminal behavior reflected a wanton disregard for the child's welfare. In re Brittany D., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 732 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 9, 2015).

Trial court's termination of the father's parental rights based on abandonment due to incarceration was vacated where both the trial court and the father miscalculated the relevant four-month period and did not consider the four months immediately preceding the father's incarceration. In re Abbigail C., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 856 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 21, 2015).

Ground of abandonment by an incarcerated parent through wanton disregard was met by clear and convincing evidence based on the father's criminal history, his admitted drug abuse, and his neglect of the child while in his custody. In re Abbigail C., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 856 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 21, 2015).

Department made reasonable efforts to assist the father in obtaining a suitable home while he was able to make progress in that regard, but then he was incarcerated primarily due to his own choices, and he would not be eligible for parole until July 2016; the father was in no position at the time of trial to provide a suitable home for the child, and thus the father abandoned the child pursuant to the statutory ground of failure to provide a suitable home. In re Aaliyah E., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 36 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 26, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 315 (Tenn. Apr. 22, 2016).

Given that the mother engaged in meaningful visitation in the four months preceding her incarceration, and the trial court failed to identify the four-month period that applied to the father, the application of this abandonment ground was reversed because there was no clear evidence that either parent willfully failed to visit during the requisite time period. In re Charles K., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 344 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 19, 2016).

Termination of parental rights for abandonment was appropriate because clear and convincing evidence was presented that the parent demonstrated a wanton disregard for the children's welfare as the parent was incarcerated due to the parent's criminal behavior, probation violations, incarcerations, and substance abuse. In re Jayden L., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 357 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 31, 2016).

Record revealed no clear and convincing evidence to support a finding that the mother was either incarcerated at the time the termination petition was filed or at any time in the preceding four months; her arrest, without more, did not constitute incarceration within the meaning of the termination statute. In re Navada N., 498 S.W.3d 579, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 367 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 23, 2016).

Because the mother was not incarcerated at the time the termination petition was filed or shortly before, the termination ground of abandonment by an incarcerated parent based on wanton disregard could not apply to her. In re Navada N., 498 S.W.3d 579, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 367 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 23, 2016).

From April 2013 until September 6, 2013 and again from January 14, 2014 through the April and May 2015 trial dates in this case, and was expected to be released in October 2015. Thus, it appears that, most recently, Father was not incarcerated for four consecutive months from September 14, 2013, through January 13, 2014. This period represents the relevant four month period with regard to Father's abandonment by willful failure to visit and support for an incarcerated parent. In re Navada N., 498 S.W.3d 579, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 367 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 23, 2016).

Father was incarcerated at the time the department filed the petition to terminate his parental rights, and thus the trial court properly considered the abandonment by an incarcerated parent ground. In re Navada N., 498 S.W.3d 579, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 367 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 23, 2016).

In an appeal arising from the termination of a mother's parental rights, the appellate court concluded that there was clear and convincing evidence of abandonment within the meaning of T.C.A. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv). The child's paternal grandparents proved that the mother willfully failed to support the child during the four consecutive months immediately preceding the mother's incarceration. In re Trenton W., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 378 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 31, 2016).

Juvenile court properly determined that the father had not abandoned the children by his incarceration or exhibited a wanton disregard for their welfare, and the father was not incarcerated during the requisite time period. In re Aiden R., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 420 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 23, 2016).

There was clear evidence that the mother abandoned her children by exhibiting wanton disregard for their welfare, as she was incarcerated for the requisite time period, she had an extensive history of criminal behavior, she was addicted to opiates for years, and her probation had been revoked for multiple violations. In re Aiden R., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 420 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 23, 2016).

Trial court did not err in failing to terminate the father's rights on the ground of abandonment by wanton disregard because the father was not included in the class of people to whom subsection (1)(A)(iv) applied; there was no evidence that the father was incarcerated at the time of the institution of the action or that he was incarcerated during all or part of the four months preceding the institution of the action. In re Mc, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 509 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 20, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support the termination of the father's parental rights based on abandonment where it showed that he was incarcerated on December 31, 2011 and remained incarcerated when the petition to terminate his parental rights was filed, and he made only one child support payment in 2011. In re Jacqueline G., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 536 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 26, 2016).

There was clear and convincing evidence that a father abandoned his children by exhibiting wanton disregard for their welfare prior to his incarceration because since the children were born, the father had been incarcerated three times; prior to incarceration the father exhibited a wanton disregard for the welfare of the children by exposing them to methamphetamine at such levels that it showed positive in the children's hair drug screen. In re Jason S., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 715 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 23, 2016).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was proper based on abandonment by an incarcerated parent for wanton disregard as the mother first became addicted to drugs and sold sex while she still had custody of the child; she repeatedly relapsed and engaged in criminal behavior; and that pattern continued even after the termination petition was filed. In re Michael B., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 757 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 6, 2016).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was proper based on abandonment by an incarcerated parent for willful failure to visit as the mother was incarcerated within the four months preceding the filing of the termination petition; she exercised visitation with the child only a single time in the four-month period preceding the petition; her visitation was merely token; and her failure to engage in more than token visitation was willful. In re Michael B., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 757 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 6, 2016).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was improper based on abandonment by an incarcerated parent for willful failure to support as the father and the stepmother failed to present clear and convincing evidence that the mother failed to pay support despite her capacity to do so because, although there was some evidence that the mother was employed as a prostitute at various times throughout the child's life, and the mother testified as to other jobs she held over the years, no proof was introduced as to the mother's actual or approximate income during the four-month period preceding her incarceration; and there was no evidence of the mother's expenses during the four-month period. In re Michael B., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 757 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 6, 2016).

Abandonment by wanton disregard was not applicable to the mother, as the record was devoid of any testimony that reflected that the mother was incarcerated for the time periods required. In re Tamera W., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 856 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 9, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 87 (Tenn. Feb. 9, 2017).

Termination of a mother's parental rights was appropriate because the mother's few visits during the four-month period before the mother's incarceration were of such an infrequent nature that they represented mere token visitation and could not have been considered a reasonable effort to foster meaningful parent-child bonds. Moreover, the mother's failure to visit was willful as a drug screening requirement was not an unreasonable burden, the mother could communicate with the children, and transportation could have been arranged. In re Jakob O., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 959 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 15, 2016).

Termination of a mother's parental rights was appropriate because the mother's pre-incarceration conduct displayed a wanton disregard for the welfare of the mother's children as the mother was incarcerated a few times and the mother's probation was terminated for driving under the influence and reckless endangerment. There was also evidence that the children's welfare was potentially compromised by the mother's drug usage, while one of the children observed a lot of fighting between the parents and extensive drinking of alcohol. In re Jakob O., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 959 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 15, 2016).

Termination of a mother's parental rights on the ground of failure to support before the mother was incarcerated was inappropriate because there was an absence of clear and convincing evidence that the mother willfully failed to support the mother's children in the four months preceding the mother's incarceration as the record was silent as to the mother's expenses during the relevant four-month period. In re Jakob O., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 959 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 15, 2016).

Termination of a mother's parental rights was appropriate because, although the mother's visitation rights were suspended for a period of time before they were reinstated, the mother's few visits during the four-month period before the mother's incarceration were of such an infrequent nature that they represented mere token visitation, were marked by hostility, and could not have been considered a reasonable effort to foster meaningful parent-child bonds with the children. In re Jakob O., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 959 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 15, 2016).

Trial court erred in declining to terminate a father's parental rights because the evidence preponderated against its finding that the father did not engage in conduct prior to incarceration that exhibited a wanton disregard for the welfare of the children; the father's numerous drug charges and probation violations demonstrated that he had engaged in a pattern of conduct that caused him to be incarcerated. In re A.B., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 14 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 11, 2017).

Termination of the father's parental rights based on abandonment for willful failure to visit by an incarcerated parent was supported by evidence that the father failed to engage in more than token visitation with the child and he made a conscious and willful decision to evade arrest and thereby forfeit supervised visits. In re Colton R., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 88 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 7, 2017).

Father had been incarcerated since September 18, 2015, and the proceedings to terminate his parental rights were instituted on January 12, 2016, putting his incarceration squarely within the definition of T.C.A. § 36-1-102; his conduct met the definition of abandonment by an incarcerated parent, and termination under T.C.A. § 36-1-113 was proper. In re Wesley P., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 301 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 12, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 400 (Tenn. July 6, 2017).

Father attended only two of eight visits available to him, he chose to ride his bicycle to visits, and there was testimony he did not ask for transportation help; his visitation prior to his incarceration was token at best and thus his failure to visit was willful, and termination of his rights for abandonment by willful failure to visit prior to incarceration pursuant to T.C.A. §§ 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv), 36-1-113 was proper. In re Quintin S., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 480 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 13, 2017).

Regarding abandonment by failure to visit prior to incarceration under T.C.A. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv) and the relevant four-month time period, the mother argued that her brief incarceration on January 30, 2015 for a few hours meant that the relevant time period ran from September 28, 2014 to January 29, 2015; however, a parent spending a few hours in jail did not qualify for the protections of the statute, and the relevant time period was the four-month period prior to her incarceration. In re Quintin S., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 480 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 13, 2017).

Out of the nine visits set up for the mother during the relevant time period, she attended only three, and her visits constituted only token visitation; the evidence supported the conclusion that the failure to visit was willful, and termination for abandonment by willful failure to visit prior to the mother's incarceration, pursuant to T.C.A. §§ 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv), 36-1-113, was proper. In re Quintin S., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 480 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 13, 2017).

Mother's parental rights were properly terminated under T.C.A. § 36-1-102(1)(a)(iv) where she was incarcerated within the four months preceding the filing of the termination petition, drugs had been her primary priority, she continued to use illicit drugs, and thus, her conduct evinced a wanton disregard for her children's welfare. In re Seth B., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 613 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 14, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 850 (Tenn. Dec. 11, 2017).

Termination of the father's rights due to abandonment by incarceration was not supported by the record, which did not contain any elaboration or factual findings in support of the trial court's conclusion. In re Brianna B., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 805 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 15, 2017).

Trial court properly found that the father abandoned the child by exhibiting wanton disregard for the child's welfare prior to the father's incarceration where the testimony showed that he had physically assaulted the mother and half sibling, and there were several exhibits regarding the father's criminal charges. In re Brooke E., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 830 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 22, 2017).

Termination of a father's parental rights was appropriate because the father abandoned the father's child as the father engaged in criminal behaviour and was incarcerated when the termination petition was filed, and exhibited behavior that displayed a wanton disregard for the welfare of the child prior to the father's incarceration. Neighbors testified that the child was not being fed regularly and that the father played dangerously with the child, while a case worker testified that the conditions in the home were unsafe for any child. In re Kandace D., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 8, 2018).

Trial court erred in terminating a father's parental rights on the ground of abandonment, by the father demonstrating a wanton disregard for the child's welfare, because the Tennessee Department of Children's Services failed to offer clear and convincing evidence that the father who was incarcerated knew of the child's existence when the father was engaging in the criminal behavior that demonstrated wanton disregard. In re Michael O., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 42 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 26, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support the termination of the father's rights based on abandonment by an incarcerated parent because he knew on or before the child's birth that he might have been the father, and his patterns of criminal behavior illegal drug use, and incarceration, along with his failure to take any voluntary actions to legitimate or support the child, amounted to a wanton disregard for the child's welfare. In re Ke'Andre C., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 44 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 29, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support the termination of the mother's parental rights based on abandonment by an incarcerated parent because she had been in jail for all or part of the four months preceding the filing of the proceedings, and she had not been willing or able to stay drug-free or out of jail in a way that would allow her to perform basic parenting duties for her children. In re Ke'Andre C., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 44 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 29, 2018).

Termination of a father's parental rights on the ground of abandonment by an incarcerated parent for wanton disregard was appropriate because the father had spent the majority of the child's life in jail and the father's recidivism had resulted in an inability to provide a safe and stable environment for the child. The resultant problems were the direct result of the father's decision to intentionally engage in illegal activity, and they provided clear and convincing proof of the father's wanton disregard for the child's welfare. In re Victoria H., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 108 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2018).

Termination of the mother's rights pursuant to T.C.A. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv) was affirmed as her repeated incarceration, criminal behavior, substance abuse, and failure to support her children throughout the case exhibited a wanton disregard for the welfare of her children. In re Veronica T., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 147 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 21, 2018).

Trial court's findings of fact were insufficient to support its finding that the father abandoned his child by willfully failing to visit her during the four month period preceding his incarceration. In re Haley S., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 164 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 29, 2018).

Trial court properly terminated parents'  rights to their child because it found clear and convincing evidence of the parents'  abandonment of the child by engaging in conduct prior to incarceration that exhibited a wanton disregard for the child's welfare; the Department of Children's Services presented ample evidence of the parents'  repeated incidents of criminal behavior and probation violations, resulting in repeated incarcerations, and considerable evidence demonstrated their substance abuse. In re Authur R., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 170 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 3, 2018)

Termination of a mother's parental rights was appropriate because clear and convincing evidence supported the finding that the mother engaged in conduct prior to incarceration that exhibited a wanton disregard for the welfare of the mother's child as the mother testified (telephonically from prison) concerning the mother's criminal behavior and involvement with illegal drugs, violation of probation, and choosing to become a fugitive and fleeing to Florida for over a year instead of complying with the terms of the mother's supervised release. In re Tegan W., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 184 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 9, 2018).

Father's relevant four-month period ran from June 5, 2015 to September 28, 2015, and resumed December 3, 2015 to December 10, 2015, due to his incarceration. In re Addalyne S., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 225 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 26, 2018).

Mother's failure to provide an updated address to the mother's probation officer that resulted in the mother's probation violations, in combination with the mother's other conduct, did not support a finding by clear and convincing evidence that the mother abandoned the mother's child by exhibiting a wanton disregard for the child prior to the mother's incarceration. Furthermore, some of the mother's criminal convictions were a result of behavior occurring well before the child was conceived. In re Kyle F., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 217 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 25, 2018).

Termination of the mother's parental rights based on abandonment by an incarcerated parent was proper as she testified as to the dates of her incarceration, her use of heroin during her pregnancy, the fact that she and the child tested positive for drugs at the child's birth, and her failure to complete drug and mental health treatment programs. In re Kendall M., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 298 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 29, 2018).

Father exhibited wanton disregard for the father's children because the father, before and after the birth of the children, repeatedly committed felonies and misdemeanors, and used alcohol and drugs without regard for the children's welfare, which resulted in the father's incarceration and inability to take care of the children when they were removed from their mother's custody and placed in foster care. The pattern of the father's conduct prior to incarceration exhibited disregard for the children and the father's relationship with them. In re Arianna Y., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 377 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 2, 2018).

Clear and convincing evidence showed that grounds existed to terminate a father's parental rights for abandonment by wanton disregard because the father; through repeated incarcerations, criminal behavior, a probation violation, and substance abuse issues as shown in the father's criminal convictions showed a pattern of conduct that posed a risk of substantial harm to the welfare of the child. In re Ava H., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 482 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 20, 2018).

Denial of a petition to terminate an incarcerated father's parental rights was appropriate because there was not clear and convincing evidence to establish that the father willfully failed to visit and to support during the relevant time period as the father was unaware of the mother's whereabouts during that time period due to the mother's moving and changing the mother's phone number and the failure of the mother's family to respond to the father's inquiries. Further, the evidence did not establish the father's ability to remit support. In re Ella P., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 512 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 30, 2018).

Evidence clearly and convincingly established the ground of abandonment for termination of the mother's parental rights because the mother had a long criminal history and was incarcerated for the four months preceding the filing of the petition for termination, and her conduct prior to incarceration exhibited a wanton disregard for the welfare of the child; the mother was serving a ten-year sentence and had other charges pending, and the child tested positive for illegal drugs at birth. In re Gabriel C., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 516 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 30, 2018).

Clear and convincing evidence was proven of grounds to terminate a father's parental rights to the father's children for abandonment by wanton disregard because the father was incarcerated when the petition to terminate the father's parental rights was filed and the father engaged in behavior during the relevant time period that violated the father's probation resulting in the father again being incarcerated. In re Sophie O., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 521 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 4, 2018).

Termination of a father's parental rights on the ground of abandonment by incarceration was appropriate because clear and convincing evidence showed that the father violated the terms of the father's probation and was incarcerated for a portion of the relevant period before the institution of the proceeding, had not addressed the father's addiction to drugs, while the father's continued use of illegal substances was evidence that the father had abandoned the children by engaging in conduct that exhibited a wanton disregard for their welfare. In re Virgil W., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 599 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 11, 2018).

Having determined that the Tennessee Department of Children's Services (DCS) failed to clearly demonstrate the mother's relevant periods of incarceration to facilitate a determination of the statutorily determinative period, that the trial court erred in declining to attempt such a determination, and that DCS's proof regarding the mother's ability to pay during all possibly relevant periods failed to rise to the level of clear and convincing, the trial court's finding that the mother abandoned the children by willfully failing to financially support them should be reversed. In re Steven W., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 693 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 28, 2018).

Evidence did not establish that a father abandoned a child by engaging in conduct prior to incarceration that exhibited a wanton disregard for the child's welfare because, although the father violated probation, failed to remit child support, and expended minimal efforts on a permanency plan, the father attended visitation prior to incarceration and violated probation by failing to report the father's current address, conduct that was not particularly egregious or indicative of extensive criminal behavior. In re Jeromia W., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 696 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 29, 2018).

Clear and convincing evidence supported a trial court's termination of a father's parental rights to a minor child based upon a finding of abandonment related to the father's conduct prior to incarceration because the father, who was incarcerated for the entirety of the four months preceding the filing of the termination petition, was advised of the obligation to remit support as evidenced by the parenting plans and the father's signing of the Criteria for Termination of Parental Rights, but did not remit support. In re Jeromia W., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 696 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 29, 2018).

Clear and convincing evidence supported the trial court's finding that the father abandoned the child by displaying wanton disregard for his welfare because he had two parole violations, despite knowing that he was subject to re-incarceration if he committed additional criminal offenses. In re Jeffery D., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 30 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 24, 2019).

Record supported a finding of abandonment by an incarcerated parent by wanton disregard, as the mother criminal activity started after the children were born and she had opportunities to change but fell back into the pattern of drug use and criminal activity. In re Autumn L., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 73 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 8, 2019).

There was clear and convincing evidence that the father, who was incarcerated when the termination petition was filed, abandoned the children by exhibiting wanton disregard for their welfare. The father's repeated incarcerations coupled with the evidence of physical abuse and the father's unresolved substance abuse issues indicated that the father was either unfit to parent or posed a risk of substantial harm to the children's welfare. In re Julian J., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 99 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 26, 2019).

Because the evidence did not show that the mother was incarcerated at the time of the action or during the four preceding months, termination was not established under T.C.A. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv). In re Jaxx M., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 185 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 17, 2019).

Termination of the father's parent rights was proper on the ground of abandonment by an incarcerated parent because the father had a history of incessant criminal behavior and drug abuse evincing a wanton disregard for the welfare of the children and a pattern of conduct that rendered him unfit to parent as he had been in and out of jail since 2008. In re O.M., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 197 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 26, 2019).

Ground of abandonment by wanton disregard was established by clear and convincing evidence because the mother engaged in illegal drug use, exposed the children to drugs and domestic violence, failed to comply with requirements ordered by the juvenile court in order to regain custody of her children, continued her drug usage after removal of her children, and continued to engage in criminal activities, resulting in incarceration and continuous separation from her children. In re Gracie H. Y., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 110 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 16, 2020).

Termination of a mother's parental rights on the ground of abandonment by an incarcerated parent demonstrating a wanton disregard for the children's welfare was appropriate because the mother had been in and out of jail and had failed entirely to place the children's needs before the mother's own as the mother's incarcerations had severely compromised the mother's ability to perform parental duties. Despite numerous incarcerations, the mother failed to take steps to address the mother's drug use and to stop the mother's criminal activities. In re Tucker H., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 184 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 24, 2020).

Termination of the father's parental rights based on abandonment by wanton disregard was proper because, after he was released from incarceration following the assault on his brother, he was placed on probation, but, rather than work on reunification with his child, the father engaged in activity that violated the terms of his probation and resulted in further incarceration; the decision to engage in such activities has resulted in the father not having stable employment or housing; he tested positive for methamphetamine on the day of the hearing to terminate his parental rights; and the father's engagement with people who used drugs not only showed poor judgment, but also put him at risk for further incarceration. In re Dustin M., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 191 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 28, 2020).

Clear and convincing evidence showed that the father had abandoned the children by wanton disregard as he was a career criminal who had not changed his behavior since the children were born. In re Jessica V., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 275 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 12, 2020).

In a termination of parental rights action, due to the mother's 80-day incarceration, T.C.A. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(i) was not a proper ground for termination of her parental rights. Instead, § 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv) contained the applicable definition of abandonment but since this was not plead the juvenile court's finding of abandonment by the mother had to be reversed. In re A.V.N., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 406 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 10, 2020).

8. —Suitable Home.

Termination of a mother's parental rights on the ground of failure to provide a suitable home despite reasonable efforts made by the Tennessee Department of Children's Services was appropriate because the home was unsafe while the father was there. The court found that the father, who was not married to the mother, was given towards anger and domestic violence, still lived with the mother at the time of trial despite the mother's denial, and would continue to live with the mother at times in the future. In re Jakob O., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 959 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 15, 2016).

Father abandoned the child by failure to provide a suitable home pursuant to T.C.A. § 36-1-102, as he failed to take reasonable steps to make lasting changes in his lifestyle or conduct that would allow him to provide the child with a suitable home; the father was currently incarcerated and when he was released, he had to address legal issues in another state regarding his parole violation there, and termination under T.C.A. § 36-1-113 was proper. In re Wesley P., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 301 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 12, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 400 (Tenn. July 6, 2017).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was improper based on the ground of abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home because the Tennessee Department of Children's Services (DCS) did not make reasonable efforts to assist the mother with housing during the relevant statutory period as DCS only provided the mother with a list of housing resources and discussing with her the options she could afford; and, despite knowing that the mother had mental health issues, DCS did not look into the nature of the mother's mental health issues or considered how her mental health issues might have contributed to her substance abuse or inability to secure stable housing. In re Skylar P., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 417 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 21, 2017).

Ground of abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home requires a final dependency and neglect order under T.C.A. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(ii); there was no final dependency and neglect order regarding the father because his adjudication as dependent and neglected was combined with the termination of parental rights trial, the department conceded this termination ground with respect to the mother's and father's rights to the child, and this was reversed, for purposes of T.C.A. § 36-1-113. In re Quintin S., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 480 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 13, 2017).

T.C.A. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(ii) requires the department to prove, with respect to the relevant four-month time period, three elements: (1) the parent has failed to make reasonable efforts to provide a suitable home, (2) the department has made reasonable efforts to assist the parent to establish a suitable home, and (3) the parent has demonstrated a lack of concern for the child to such a degree that it appears unlikely that they will be able to provide a suitable home for the child at an early date. In re Quintin S., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 480 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 13, 2017).

Trial court erred in terminating the mother's rights for abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home under T.C.A. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(ii); the department made reasonable efforts to assist the mother to find suitable housing, and she had been living in an acceptable home, had been drug-free for six months, and was employed, and thus the department failed to show that the mother demonstrated lack of concern to such a degree that it appeared unlikely she would be able to provide a suitable home. In re Quintin S., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 480 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 13, 2017).

Trial court properly found that a mother failed to make reasonable efforts to establish a suitable home because the mother exhibited a lack of concern for the child to the degree that it was unlikely the child would be able to return to the mother's custody at an early date; the mother's relapse and decision to go “on the run” instead of correcting her drug addiction and legal problems demonstrated a substantial lack of concern for her child. In re Mya V., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 511 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 28, 2017).

Mother and father had abandoned the children by failing to provide a suitable home where they had engaged in a transient lifestyle since the children were born, the mother continued her drug addiction, the father continued to enable her, and thus, the conditions that prevented them from obtaining and maintaining suitable housing persisted. In re Seth B., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 613 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 14, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 850 (Tenn. Dec. 11, 2017).

Clear and convincing evidence to support the determination that the Tennessee Department of Children's Services proved abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home as to both a mother and a father because they exhibited such a lack of concern for the welfare of the children that it appeared unlikely they would be able to provide them with a suitable home at an early date; both both parents had continuing problems with drug use and criminal activity failed to cooperate with the Department. In re Billy T.W., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 641 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 27, 2017).

Termination by failure to establish a suitable home was improper, because it required establishment that the child had been placed in the custody of the Department of Children's Services, which the child had not been. In re Brianna B., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 805 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 15, 2017).

Termination of the father's parental rights was proper based on abandonment as the father failed to provide the children with a suitable home because the Tennessee Department of Children's Services (DCS) caseworker testified that the father never provided DCS with a permanent address during the four months following the children's removal, making it difficult to reach the father to provide help in establishing a suitable home; the father made little to no attempt to find a suitable home during that time period; the father continued to use drugs until he was incarcerated in March 2016; and it appeared unlikely that the father would be able to provide a suitable, drug-free home for the children at an early date. In re Aaralyn O., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 14 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 18, 2018).

Circuit court properly terminated a mother's parental rights based on abandonment, failure to provide a suitable home, and in the child's best interests because she left the child at a homeless shelter with no appropriate supervision, cycled through periods of homelessness and incarceration, demonstrated a lack of concern for the child, failed to substantially comply with the reasonable responsibilities set out in the permanency plan, the child was neglected while in the mother's care, the mother never obtained a safe, stable home to which the child could return, a change of caretakers and physical environment would likely be detrimental for the child, and the child was thriving in her foster parents'  home. In re Amarria L., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 148 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 20, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support termination of the father's parental rights for failure to provide a suitable home because his denial of ever using drugs, despite a wealth of evidence to the contrary, combined with his history of domestic violence and his failure to obtain stable housing, proved the ground by clear and convincing evidence. In re Leroy H., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 446 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 3, 2018).

Clear and convincing evidence supported the decision to terminate a mother's parental rights on the ground of abandonment for failure to provide a suitable home because, during the four months immediately following removal of the children, the mother failed to make reasonable efforts to provide a suitable home and the mother's evasive, and sometimes deceitful, behavior demonstrated a lack of concern for the children. In re T.R., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 542 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 17, 2018).

Termination of the mother's and the father's parental rights was proper as the parents abandoned the child by failing to provide a suitable home at the time of the hearing because the child was removed, in part, due to the parents'  alleged drug usage; mother was less than willing to establish her sobriety through the recommended assessments and tests; and the father was still dependent upon methadone at the time of the hearing. In re Camdon H., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 672 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 21, 2018).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was proper based on abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home because the children were removed from the mother's home, placed into foster care, and found to be dependent and neglected; despite reasonable efforts, at the time of trial, the mother did not provide any documentation of a written lease for the residence where she was living; and the mother never attended counseling to address her own history as a domestic violence victim. In re Steven W., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 693 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 28, 2018).

Clear and convincing evidence supported the trial court's finding that the mother abandoned her children by failing to establish a suitable home because it showed that she made no efforts toward doing so during the four months following their removal, but focused instead on resolving her criminal charges. In re Michayla T., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 712 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 7, 2018).

There was clear and convincing evidence to support the trial court's decision to terminate the mother's parental rights on the ground of failure to establish a suitable home because although she secured housing shortly before the hearing, the Department of Children's Services had not been able to verify it and the mother continued to deny her substance abuse problem and failed to follow the necessary steps to ensure a drug-free home. In re Lesley A., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 738 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 18, 2018).

Clear and convincing evidence supported the termination of a mother's parental rights on the grounds of abandonment, by failure to establish a suitable home, because the mother, who had an intellectual disability, did not have a proper physical living location, could not provide a home free of drugs, was unlikely to establish a suitable home in the near future, and seemed incapable of giving the child appropriate care and attention. In re Frederick S., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 756 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 26, 2018).

Clear and convincing evidence supported the termination of a mother's parental rights on the ground of abandonment by failure to establish a suitable home because the mother's children were removed from the mother's home and adjudicated dependent and neglected, there were issues concerning drug use, sexual abuse, and a lack of supervision of the children in the mother's home. Moreover, the mother had continued to engage in criminal activity throughout the pendency of the case and generally showed an unwillingness to parent the children. In re H. A., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 78 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 12, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's termination of the mother's parental rights based on abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home because it showed that although she had completed a psychological evaluation and an alcohol and drug assessment, she had not followed up on the resultant recommendations, and she continued using illicit drugs despite the services offered by the Tennessee Department of Children's Services. In re Kaden W., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 230 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 13, 2019).

Termination of the mother's parental rights on the ground of abandonment for failure to provide a suitable home was warranted; the department developed a permanency plan, referred her to the services providers, and facilitated visitation, but the mother took little or no action for six months. At trial, she was unable to provide a suitable home for the child, as she was living with various relatives, had only been drug free less than three months, and her support system was weak. In re Josiah T., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 482 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 2, 2019).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was proper based on the ground of abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home because the case manager stated that, although the mother was not home and she could not go into the home, she was able to look in and observe no furniture in the home and just a pile of clothes in the middle of the floor; the mother's behavior in ignoring the case manager's requests for a home visit suggested a deeper problem; and the mother's failure to address her mental health issues rendered her unable to provide a safe and stable environment for the child and showed a lack of concern for the child and a lack of interest in regaining custody. In re Draven K., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 7, 2020).

Evidence was insufficient to support the termination of the mother's parental rights to her daughter based on abandonment by failure to establish a suitable home because at the time of the removal the daughter was residing in a hospital and the mother was not living at the hospital as evidenced by her failure to complete the mandatory rooming-in period. In re Ronon G., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 14 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 16, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to support the termination of the mother's parental rights to her son based on abandonment by failure to establish a suitable home because, even though the son was staying primarily with the mother's relatives at the time of removal, because the mother was also staying at the residence periodically prior to the removal. In re Ronon G., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 14 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 16, 2020).

Trial court failed to make sufficient findings to support the ground for termination of the mother's rights based on abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home concerning the Tennessee Department of Children's Services'  efforts during the relevant four-month period. In re Gracie H. Y., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 110 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 16, 2020).

Evidence supported terminating a mother's parental rights on the ground of abandonment by failure to establish a suitable home because the mother's child was removed and placed in custody when the mother's trial home placement was revoked, the mother had substance abuse and employment issues, the mother did not have consistent stable housing, the mother did not comply with court orders, reasonable efforts were made to assist the mother, and the mother was not in a position to provide a suitable home. In re Madux F., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 166 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 16, 2020).

Termination of the father's parental rights was proper based on abandonment for failing to provide a suitable home as the Department of Children's Services (DCS) was never permitted entry into the home the father lived in at the time of trial; and he visited the child twice over the nearly 27 months that she was in DCS's custody. In re Neveah A., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 168 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 16, 2020).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was proper based on abandonment because she did not verify that child support was being paid; and she failed to provide a suitable home as she failed drug screens and specifically avoided urine screens altogether, admittedly used marijuana pretty much every day to self-medicate for aggression, anger, and anxiety, and demonstrated noncompliance with mental health treatment. In re Neveah A., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 168 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 16, 2020).

Termination of a mother's parental rights was appropriate because clear and convincing evidence showed that the mother abandoned the child by failing to provide a suitable home, despite reasonable efforts made by Tennessee Department of Children's Services to assist her in doing so. Moreover, it appeared unlikely that the mother could have established a suitable home for the child at an early date as, throughout the custodial period, the mother did not adequately address her unstable housing and substance abuse issues. In re Kelty F., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 185 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 24, 2020).

9. —Support of Child.

Termination of the mother's parental rights on the grounds of abandonment by failure to visit and failure to support was proper pursuant to T.C.A. §§ 36-1-102(1)(A)(i) and 36-1-113(g)(1) because the absence of a court order requiring the mother to pay support did not “excuse” her from her obligation to pay support for her child and the mother candidly acknowledged that she knew that she had an obligation to pay support but nevertheless failed to do so. Further, the mother had the ability to pay support during the determinative four-month period because she was employed for at least part of that time. Stephen v. Christy C., 384 S.W.3d 731, 2010 Tenn. App. LEXIS 727 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 22, 2010), appeal denied, In re Keri C., — S.W.3d —, 2011 Tenn. LEXIS 120 (Tenn. Feb. 17, 2011).

Clear and convincing evidence supported terminating a father's parental rights on grounds of abandonment for willful failure to support because other than nominal expenditures, there was no evidence the father provided any other support for the child despite having the means to pay some level of support; the maternal grandmother paid for the child's daycare expenses, clothing, food, and everything else the child needed. In re Jacobe M.J., 434 S.W.3d 565, 2013 Tenn. App. LEXIS 790 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 5, 2013), appeal denied, In re Jacobe J., — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 228 (Tenn. Mar. 5, 2014).

Evidence did not support a finding that the mother willfully or intentionally abandoned the child where the mother was actively pursuing litigation to regain custody of the child throughout the four-month period, and she was spending a substantial portion of her limited financial resources to do the things that the Tennessee Department of Children's Services and the juvenile court instructed her to do. In re Alysia S., 460 S.W.3d 536, 2014 Tenn. App. LEXIS 834 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 17, 2014), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 254 (Tenn. Mar. 16, 2015).

Trial court did not err in terminating a father's parental rights because the evidence did not preponderate against its finding that the father abandoned the children by failing to support them in the four months before he went to prison. In re S.C.M., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 96 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 2, 2015).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was improper on the grounds of abandonment by willful failure to support because the father and stepmother did not show that the mother had the capacity to provide support as they did not submit sufficient evidence of the mother's employment status during the relevant four-month period prior to filing the petition to terminate, the number of hours she worked, the duration of her employment, her rate of pay, or whether she had assets other than regular income that might contribute to the support of the child; and the record contained no evidence regarding the mother's financial means, expenses, or obligations during the relevant four month period. In re Noah B.B., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 115 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 12, 2015).

Father simply failed to remit any form of support for the children even when he was admittedly capable of working and actually employed at various times, and there was clear and convincing evidence to establish that he abandoned the children by willfully failing to remit child support before, during, and after the relevant time period and that a statutory ground existed for termination of the father's parental rights. In re Agustine R., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 120 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 17, 2015).

Clear and convincing evidence supported terminating a mother's parental rights for failure to pay child support because (1) the mother was advised of the duty to support and the consequences for not doing so, (2) the mother paid no support despite receiving income, and (3) the mother only inquired at the child support office after a termination petition was filed. In re Brittany M.C., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 182 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 24, 2015), appeal denied, In re Brittany M C, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 522 (Tenn. June 17, 2015).

It was error to find a mother willfully failed to support a child because (1) willfulness required an ability to support, (2) nothing showed the mother was able to support the child, and (3) the mother was unemployed, expecting another child, and had to support a third child. In re Alexis B., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 220 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 14, 2015).

Clear and convincing evidence supported terminating a mother's parental rights on grounds of abandonment for willfully failing to support the children in the four months immediately preceding her incarceration because, inter alia, the mother conceded that she paid “little support” since the parties'  divorced and was paid “under the table” for cleaning houses; the mother was capable of working and offered no justifiable excuse for failing to maintain employment and pay child support. In re D.H.B., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 238 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 23, 2015).

Evidence supported a trial court's determination that a parent abandoned the parent's children by failing to visit them and willfully failing to support them financially in the four-month period preceding the filing of the termination petition. Although the parent argued that the failure to visit was not willful because the parent's visitation was suspended by the trial court, the suspension of visitation was the direct result of the parent's failure to produce negative drug screens. In re Roger T., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 261 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 27, 2015).

For purposes of establishing abandonment by failure to pay child support, the relevant four-month period is October 14, 2013 through February 13, 2014, this latter date being the day before the filing of the petition. In re K.G.S., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 347 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 19, 2015).

Mother was aware of her child support obligations and she made some payments, but she was over $ 4,000 in arrears and the brief period she unintentionally worked without pay did not excuse her failure to pay support during the entire four-month period at issue, plus she did not resume making payments until months after the petition was pending; the mother willfully failed to pay child support and the trial court did not err in terminating her rights on the ground of abandonment by willful non-support. In re K.G.S., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 347 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 19, 2015).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was proper because she abandoned the child by willfully failing to support the child as she failed to pay child support; the fact that the mother provided food, clothing, and drinks during visits with her daughter constituted mere token support, which was not sufficient to preclude a finding of a willful failure to support; and she was aware of her duty to support the child, she had the ability to provide support, and she willfully failed to do so. In re Faith W., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 360 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 20, 2015).

Evidence clearly and convincingly supported a finding that the parents willfully abandoned their daughter by willfully failing to support her, as it showed that they never paid her primary residential parents any support despite having the capacity to do so. In re Makenzie L., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 480 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 17, 2015), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 860 (Tenn. Oct. 15, 2015).

Trial court did not err in terminating a father's parental rights based upon the statutory ground of willful failure to support the child because the father failed to make any reasonable payments toward support of the child even when he was employed; the father failed to offer any details that would support a finding that he sought other employment prior to his incarceration and failed to offer any justifiable excuse for his failure to provide at least some measure of financial support. In re Jayden B.T., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 494 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 23, 2015), appeal denied, In re Jayden T., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 818 (Tenn. Sept. 25, 2015).

Trial court properly found clear evidence of abandonment through willful failure to support, as the evidence was unclear whether one payment the father made was made within the determinative period, plus he was unable to show that he had paid any support during the relevant period other than one payment; one payment would, at most, have constituted mere token support. In re Destaney D., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 495 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 23, 2015).

Clear and convincing evidence supported terminating a mother's parental rights on grounds of abandonment by willful failure to support because the juvenile court set an order of child support, which was signed by the mother's attorney, but the mother never paid child support despite having a job for a period of time. In re Serenity L., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 622 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 31, 2015).

Mother paid approximately 10 percent of the amount owed that year, but still her failure to make progress during the two years the child was in foster care was outside the scope of the abandonment determination; it was unclear whether or not the payments were insignificant given the mother's means, if the Department of Children's Services expects a finding of a willful failure to support, it must put on evidence that clearly shows willfulness, a trial court cannot be left to speculate about this, and the trial court's finding that the mother abandoned the child through a willful failure to make payments was not supported. In re L.J., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 696 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2015).

In the absence of appropriate findings and conclusions regarding the mother's payment of support, it could not be determined whether her failure to support the children was willful, and the decision to terminate her rights based on abandonment by willful failure to support was vacated. In re Jaylah W., 486 S.W.3d 537, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 819 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 7, 2015), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 94 (Tenn. Feb. 1, 2016).

Evidence preponderated against the trial court's conclusion that the mother's sister and her husband established, by clear and convincing evidence, that the father abandoned the child by willfully failing to support the child, as the father testified that he gave money to the mother for the child's care and the evidence did not show, as found by the trial court, that the father paid for the metal detector and motorcycle or spent money on drugs during the pertinent period. In re C.J.A.H., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 937 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2015).

Burden to prove abandonment by willful failure to support rests with the department; finding no clear evidence that the mother had the capacity to pay child support during the relevant four month period, the trial court's finding of abandonment for willful failure to support was vacated. In re Saliace P., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 37 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 26, 2016).

Trial court erred in terminating the mother's parental rights based on abandonment for failure to pay child support, as the mother was only obligated to pay support for about one-fourth of the relevant time period and thus, such failure was insufficient to establish willful failure to make reasonable support payments for a four-month period. In re M.A.P., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 57 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 29, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support the termination of the mother's parental rights for abandonment where it showed that despite her having appropriate housing and a job, she failed to make child support payments since August 2014. In re A'leah M., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 136 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 23, 2016).

Trial court's finding that the paternal grandparents had not proved that the mother had abandoned the child by willful failure to support, T.C.A. § 36-1-102(1)(D) was affirmed where there was no clear and convincing evidence as to the mother's employment, income, other non-monetary assets, or expenses during the four-month period. In re Destiny H., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 139 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 24, 2016).

Mother's failure to support the children was willful, and termination of her parental rights based upon this statutory ground was proper; she was able-bodied with job skills and alleged no impairment of the ability to work, yet she was content to make no or a minimal effort toward securing and maintaining employment. In re Joseph F., 492 S.W.3d 690, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 227 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 377 (Tenn. May 10, 2016).

Trial court properly found that the parents had abandoned their child by failing top provide a suitable home where the Department of Children's Services held child and family team meetings, arranged for an alcohol and drug assessment to take place in the parents'  home, arranged for the parents to have mental health assessments, and moved visitation to a more convenient location when the parents said that they were having difficulty with transportation, the father had failed his most recent drug screen, admitted to drug use, and had not completed the recommendations of his alcohol and drug assessment, and the mother did not maintain weekly contact with the Department or update her address and phone number when necessary as required in the permanency plans. In re Matthew T., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 272 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 20, 2016).

Although the showed that the mother and father failed to provide their son with financial support, the evidence adduced at trial did not show that the failure was willful where the evidence at trial was that the mother was unemployed because she quit her job, but there was no evidence presented about why she quit her job. In re Matthew T., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 272 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 20, 2016).

For abandonment by willful failure to support as to the mother, the trial court's oral ruling included detailed factual findings, but none appeared or were incorporated into the written order; mere legal conclusions did not fulfill the trial court's obligations and were not sufficient to satisfy the directive of the statute, such that termination as to this ground was vacated. In re Navada N., 498 S.W.3d 579, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 367 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 23, 2016).

Order contained insufficient findings as to whether the father willfully failed to support the child, and the order omitted any reference to his income or expenses; without such evidence, a finding of willfulness could not be sustained. In re Navada N., 498 S.W.3d 579, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 367 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 23, 2016).

Termination of the father's parental rights for abandonment based on failure to provide support was supported by evidence that the father, prior to being incarcerated, had two paying jobs but failed to pay child support or offer any assistance of the child. In re J.M.M., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 375 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 25, 2016).

Termination of parental rights was appropriate because clear and convincing evidence established that the parent abandoned their child by willfully failing to remit child support before, during, and after the relevant time period. Although the parent had limited education and difficulty in securing employment, the parent never paid child support, other than token support or small gifts, throughout the entirety of the child's lifetime even when the parent was admittedly capable of working and actually employed at various times. In re Hailey S., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 380 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 31, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 156 (Tenn. Mar. 1, 2017).

Abandonment by failure to support as a ground for termination was not shown by clear and convincing evidence because there was no clear testimony as to when and where the mother was employed. In re Milli L., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 396 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 7, 2016).

There was testimony that the mother failed to follow through on referrals for employment, that she was receiving financial support from her father, and that she was able to secure sufficient funds to be released on bond after being arrested for failure to support; she had the capacity to work or otherwise acquire funds to pay support in the four months preceding the filing of the petition and she consciously did not do so, and this failure was willful. In re Quadavon H., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 416 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 16, 2016).

Father had no source of income other than some unspecified odd job, and it was the department's burden to prove that the father's lack of full-time employment was voluntary, which the department failed to prove; the father's testimony was not clear, and the proof was insufficient to support the finding that the father was capable of working and paying child support during the period in question. In re Aiden R., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 420 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 23, 2016).

While the father admitted he did not pay any child support though he was aware of his obligation to pay, failure to pay was not enough to establish willfulness, and whether he had the financial ability to pay support had to be determined. In re Aiden R., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 420 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 23, 2016).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was improper as the mother did not abandon the child by willfully failing to pay child support as the evidence failed to show that the mother had the ability to pay child support during the relevant four month period preceding the filing of the petition to terminate parental rights. In re Bryson C., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 498 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 18, 2016).

Trial court did not err in failing to terminate the father's rights on the ground of abandonment by willful failure to pay support because there was ample evidence to support the findings that there was legitimate confusion over the payments and that there was an absence of willfulness in the father's failure to pay. In re Mc, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 509 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 20, 2016).

Trial court erred in terminating the father's parental rights based on abandonment for failure to support the children because, although the father failed to pay any support for the children during the four months immediately preceding the filing of the petition to terminate the father's rights, there was no evidence in the record to suggest that the father had the ability to provide financial support for the children during the relevant time period; thus, there was not clear and convincing evidence that the father's failure to support the children was willful. In re Keith W., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 557 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 3, 2016).

Grandmother failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the mother abandoned her son by willfully failing to support him where during the four-month period preceding the filing of the petition the mother made seven child support payments and her support was more than token, given that she was released from jail three weeks before the beginning of the four-month period, she was pregnant, and she lacked a driver's license or transportation. In re Ryder R., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 570 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 5, 2016).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was properly denied on the grounds of abandonment for failure to pay support as the record was devoid of evidence establishing the mother's willful failure to remit child support because the record reflected that the mother was ordered to remit payment through an automatic income wage assignment; and the mother testified that she advised the requisite authorities of her changes in employment and that she believed her income was withheld in accordance with the wage assignment. In re Gabriella M., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 587 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 15, 2016).

Trial court properly terminated a father's parental rights because the father willfully failed to support the child; the father conceded that he did not pay any child support during the relevant four-month period, despite admitting he was aware of his duty to pay child support, and the father was self-employed and admitted to buying cigarettes and illegal drugs. In re E.S.L., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 630 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 29, 2016).

Finding of abandonment by failure to support as supported by evidence that the father never paid child support, even when he was actually employed at times. In re Kenneth G., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 674 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 15, 2016).

Evidence was insufficient to support a finding of abandonment by willful failure to support, as it showed the mother provided the children with gifts and clothing, and made some child support payments, which the Department failed to prove were merely token. In re Stormie M., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 675 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 15, 2016).

Abandonment by failure to support was proven against the mother by clear and convincing evidence, given that she owed over $ 6,000 in child support arrears, yet she earned between $ 200 - $ 450 each week cleaning houses after the children were removed from the home, and she was aware of her duty to provide support and yet made no attempt to pay more than token support and had no justifiable excuse for not providing support. In re C.C., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 701 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 22, 2016).

Termination of a father's parental rights was appropriate because the Tennessee Department of Childrens Services proved by clear and convincing evidence that the father abandoned the father's children by willful failure to support them in that the father's failure to pay child support during the relevant four-month period before the filing of the petition for termination was willful, as the father was consistently employed during the period and did not argue inability to pay. Furthermore, termination was in the children's best interest. In re Jeramyah H., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 819 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 31, 2016).

Termination of the mother's parental rights on the basis of abandonment by willful failure to support was supported by evidence that the mother was capable of being employe but willfully failed to make any contributions toward the support of the children, providing only token support in the four months preceding the filing of the petition for termination of parental rights In re Tamera W., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 856 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 9, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 87 (Tenn. Feb. 9, 2017).

Testimony corroborated the father's testimony that he last paid child support at the end of 2012, and thus there was clear evidence to support the trial court's finding that the father had abandoned this child by willful failure to provide support during the four months immediately preceding the father's incarceration. In re Maddox C., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 860 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 9, 2016).

Ground of abandonment by failure to support was proven; the only child support payments the mother ever made were when money was taken out of her paychecks and when her tax refund was intercepted by the State, and although this occurred in the four months preceding the filing of the petition, the intercept did not constitute a voluntary payment of support, plus she was employed by several different employers and she never testified she was unable to make any contribution towards her support obligations. In re Dustin T., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 876 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 17, 2016).

Clear and convincing evidence showed that a father had abandoned a child for willful failure to visit and failure to support where, despite knowing of the child, he made no effort to provide support, visit the child, or establish a relationship, and he had not initiated contact with the child after meeting with the state agency. In re M.E.T., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 899 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 29, 2016), appeal denied, In re Miguel T., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 152 (Tenn. Mar. 3, 2017).

Termination of the father's parental rights based on abandonment for failure to support was improper, as the Tennessee Department of Children's Services failed to prove that the father, who had been released on bond but ordered to remain at home with few exceptions, had the capacity to provide support or lacked a justifiable excuse for failing to do so. In re Addison B., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 913 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2016).

Termination based on abandonment by failure to support was proven, given that the mother knew of her support obligations and the consequences of not meeting those obligations, and the trial court properly found that the mother had enough income to support herself, make her support payments, and still have some money left over each month. In re Eddie F., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 924 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 2, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 158 (Tenn. Mar. 2, 2017).

Termination of the father's parental rights was proper because the father abandoned the child by willfully failing to pay child support during the four months preceding his incarceration as the mother testified that she set up a bank account at the father's bank in order for him to deposit money to support the child the father only deposited $200 or $300 for child support; and the father testified that during the four months immediately preceding his incarceration, he made between $30,000 and $35,000, but he did not provide support for the child. In re Lydia N.-S., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 55 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2017).

Trial court did not err in finding the ground of failure to support when terminating a father's parental rights because the record clearly showed that the father was capable of working, that he did work, and that he never paid any child support to the grandfather for his children. In re Karissa, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 134 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2017), appeal denied, In re Karissa V., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 330 (Tenn. May 24, 2017).

Text messages purportedly showing that a mother engaged in illicit drug sales were not dispositive to the issue of the mother's alleged willful non-support because the text messages could be interpreted to show that the mother earned money selling drugs, which could in turn support a showing of willfulness in her failure to pay any child support, but they could perhaps better lend support to a conclusion that, if anything, the mother was a failed drug dealer. In re Karissa, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 134 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2017), appeal denied, In re Karissa V., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 330 (Tenn. May 24, 2017).

Trial court's finding of willful non-support with respect to a mother was reversed because there was no clear and convincing evidence proving willfulness during the relevant four month period; the fact that the mother abused drugs and generally was irresponsible in her life could not alone impute willfulness as to her non-support, and the mother's drug abuse and general irresponsibility did not shift the burden of proof as to willfulness from Grandfather to her. In re Karissa, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 134 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2017), appeal denied, In re Karissa V., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 330 (Tenn. May 24, 2017).

Termination of the mother's parental rights on the ground of abandonment by willful failure to support was proper; the mother provided no financial support for the child, and her argument that there was no court order requiring her to pay support was not persuasive, as parents were presumed to know of their obligation to support their children. In re Charles A., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 194 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 24, 2017).

Clear and convincing evidence supported the finding that a father's parental rights were to be terminated on the ground of abandonment by willful failure to pay support because the evidence did not preponderate against the trial court's findings that the father had the ability to provide support, but chose not to provide support, during the four months preceding the filing of the petition for termination of parental rights. In re Ja'miya T., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 206 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 28, 2017).

Trial court properly denied grandparents'  petition to terminate parental rights because the grandparents failed to prove willful failure to support by clear and convincing evidence; the record contained no evidence regarding the father's income, work record, or expenses during the pivotal time frame, and the limited evidence did not demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the mother had the capacity to provide support and lacked a justifiable excuse for failing to do so. In re Sophia P., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 207 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 30, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 394 (Tenn. June 13, 2017).

When determining whether to terminate a father's parental rights based on abandonment due to willful failure to support the child, the absence of a court order to support the child did not show the father did not willfully fail to support the child because the father had a duty to support the child without such an order. In re Jeremiah N., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 283 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 2, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 432 (Tenn. July 21, 2017).

It was error to terminate an incarcerated father's parental rights based on abandonment due to the father's willful failure to support the child because it was not found that the father had an ability to support the child during the four months before the father's incarceration. In re Jeremiah N., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 283 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 2, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 432 (Tenn. July 21, 2017).

Based on the father's own factual admissions and his failure to cite any applicable law or argument on the issue, the finding that he willfully failed to support the child as set forth in T.C.A. § 36-1-102 was affirmed, and termination under T.C.A. § 36-1-113 was proper. In re Wesley P., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 301 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 12, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 400 (Tenn. July 6, 2017).

In a parental rights termination proceeding, a trial court erred in finding that a father's failure to pay support for the child was not willful where there was no dispute that he had the ability to pay support, the father admitted that he was aware of his obligation to provide support, his petition to determine the child's parentage and set visitation did not include any effort to establish child support, and his lack of effort to pay child support after agreeing to do so evidenced that his failure to do so was the product of free will. In re Sydney B., 537 S.W.3d 452, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 302 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 12, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 469 (Tenn. Aug. 1, 2017).

Mother's testimony that the mother was aware that it was the mother's job as a parent to provide for the child, that the mother was able to and did maintain employment, and that the mother had other sources of income was clear and convincing evidence that the mother willfully failed to support the child during the four consecutive months preceding the filing of the petition for termination. In re Colby L., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 352 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 24, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 527 (Tenn. Aug. 15, 2017).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was improper based on the ground of abandonment by willfully failing to make reasonable support payments because the record included a child support payment summary showing that the mother made child support payments for January through March 2016; thus, the mother did not fail to support the children during the four months prior to prior to the Tennessee Department of Children's Services filing its petition to terminate her parental rights. In re Skylar P., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 417 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 21, 2017).

Father had a job and was current on his child support payments, and thus the trial court properly denied termination of the father's rights for abandonment by failure to support prior to incarceration under T.C.A. §§ 36-1-102, 36-1-113. In re Quintin S., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 480 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 13, 2017).

While the department argued that the mother's decision to buy drugs rather than pay child support constituted a willful failure to support her children, the department had to prove by clear evidence that the mother had the capacity to pay support but made no attempt to do so and did not possess a justifiable excuse, which the department failed to do; termination of the mother's rights for abandonment by failure to support prior to incarceration under T.C.A. §§ 36-1-102, 36-1-113 was improper. In re Quintin S., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 480 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 13, 2017).

Father's drug habit and payment of court fines did not amount to sufficient evidence of a willful failure to support his children, and the department failed to present enough evidence to eliminate any serious doubt that the father had the ability to pay support and that his failure to support his children was willful; thus, the termination of the father's rights on the ground of willful failure to support, under T.C.A. §§ 36-1-102(1)(D), 36-1-113, was reversed. In re Quintin S., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 480 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 13, 2017).

Department failed to prove the ground of abandonment by failure to support by clear and convincing evidence as to the mother and father, under T.C.A. §§ 36-1-102(1)(A)(i), 36-1-113, as they were incarcerated during the relevant time period. In re Quintin S., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 480 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 13, 2017).

Termination of the father's parental rights was proper based on abandonment for failure to remit child support because the father's claim that his failure to remit support was not willful when he was unaware of a duty to remit support was rejected as the record did not reflect that his mental capacity was so impaired that he did not understand that the child required food and other items for survival; he provided token support when the child visited his residence; the court credited the mother's testimony that he refused her request for support and advised her that it was not his responsibility to provide support; and he did not pay child support even when he was actually employed at various times. In re Bryson, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 483 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 17, 2017).

Trial court erred in finding that a mother abandoned her child by willfully failing to support the child because the Tennessee Department of Children's Services (DCS) offered no proof as to the mother's income or assets to establish an ability to pay; the proof suggested that the mother did not have the ability to pay because she was incarcerated at the time DCS filed the petition, and she testified to not having a job during the relevant four-month period and relying on friends for her need. In re Mya V., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 511 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 28, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support the termination of the parents'  rights based on abandonment because it showed that they had not remitted support in the two years prior to the filing of the termination petition despite periods of employment and food and gifts provided were token support. In re Brennen T., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 681 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 23, 2017).

Father's parental rights were properly terminated on the ground of abandonment by willful failure to pay support pursuant to T.C.A. §§ 36-1-113(g)(1), 36-1-102(1)(D), given that he made no payments toward child support when he had income and he was able to support his smoking habit; he had no justifiable excuse for failing to make child support payments. In re Miracle M., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 593 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 30, 2017), appeal dismissed, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 845 (Tenn. Nov. 30, 2017).

Petitioners failed to present enough evidence to eliminate any serious or substantial doubt that the mother had the ability to pay support and that her failure to support her daughter was therefore, willful. In re Douglas H., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 662 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 29, 2017).

Trial court properly terminated a mother's parental rights on the ground of abandonment because the record clearly and convincingly established that her failure to pay support was willful; the mother was aware of her child support obligation, and she had the ability to pay because she was employed. In re Brantley B., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 720 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 30, 2017).

The evidence did not preponderate against the trial court's holding that a mother's support was token because items and gifts did not assist the father in providing for the child on a meaningful and continuous basis; the mother testified that the money she earned or obtained, which could have been used for the child's support, was used to support her addiction. In re Brantley B., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 720 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 30, 2017).

Trial court erred by concluding that clear and convincing evidence existed to show that a mother willfully failed to support her children during the relevant four-month time period because the mother had just completed drug rehabilitation and was attempting to care for her newborn baby; the mother was unemployed for approximately two of the relevant four months, and she lived with several different members of her husband's family. In re T.W., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 847 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 17, 2017).

Chancery court erred in terminating a mother's parental rights because the evidence was less than clear and convincing that the mother willfully failed to support her children; the child's father and stepmother presented no evidence of the mother's income or available resources during the four months preceding the filing of the termination petition, and thus, there was no basis to find that the mother's failure to pay child support was willful. In re Alivia F., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 48 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 30, 2018).

Termination of a father's parental rights to the father's child on the ground of abandonment by willful failure to support was inappropriate because the Tennessee Department of Children's Services did not meet its burden to show that the father had the ability to pay support so as to establish that the father's failure to do so was willful. In re Victoria H., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 108 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2018).

Father admitted that he had no justifiable excuse for his failure to pay child support while he was gainfully employed, and the $ 80 amount he paid the grandparents for support was clearly token, and therefore the grandparents showed that the father willfully failed to provide no more than token support, for termination purposes. In re Addalyne S., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 225 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 26, 2018).

Grandparents failed to present sufficient evidence that the mother had the capacity to provide support or rebut her justifiable excuse for failing to do so, as there was no evidence of her hours worked, wage earned, or expenses; the mother's decision to purchase drugs indicated that she did have some funds for non-necessities, but the purchase of illegal drugs alone was insufficient to prove that her failure to provide support was willful, and thus abandonment by willful failure to support was not proven. In re Addalyne S., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 225 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 26, 2018).

Trial court erred in terminating a mother's parental rights to her children because the record did not clearly and convincingly establish that her failure to pay support was willful; while there was some testimony with respect to the mother's income and expenses, the testimony did not establish what her income and expenses were during the period at issue, and as a consequence, there was not clear and convincing proof from which to conclude she had the capacity to pay support during that period. In re Emily J., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 254 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 9, 2018).

Evidence found by the trial court to be credible amounted to clear and convincing evidence that a mother's parental rights had to terminated because the mother had abandoned the child by failing to support the child; after the mother was released from prison, she sent no gifts, clothing, or food for the child, and she was able-bodied and working. In re D.T., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 292 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 24, 2018).

Father was capable of and pursued employment, when it was available and he was able to arrange for transportation, he knew of his duty to support and he sought a modification of his support due to his inability to pay, and he was unable to pay for a period of time as a result of a criminal episode, and thus the evidence was not clear and convincing that he willfully failed to provide support within the meaning of the statute. In re Aden H., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 333 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 19, 2018).

Without evidence to establish that the mother had the ability to pay support for her children during the relevant time period, the department failed to show that she failed to support or make reasonable payments toward the support of her children to prove the ground of abandonment, and termination of her rights was reversed as to this ground. In re Mc, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 332 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 20, 2018).

Because the mother was in jail when the petition was filed, the relevant four-month period for the abandonment for nonsupport purposes was four months prior to the day she went to jail. In re Mc, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 332 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 20, 2018).

Record contained insufficient evidence to demonstrate that the father had the capacity to pay child support and willfully failed to do so; the burden was not on him to demonstrate an inability to work or pay and there was no proof to establish his employment, income, expenses, or resources during the critical four-month period, and without such evidence, a finding of willfulness could not be sustained. In re Kylea K., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 338 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 21, 2018).

Clear and convincing evidence showed a mother willfully failed to support the mother's children in the four months before a termination of parental rights petition was filed because the mother paid no support during that period despite being employed and receiving financial assistance from the mother's brother. In re Jarrett P., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 371 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 29, 2018).

Despite the father's substantial business enterprises, his substantial monthly interest income and his significant annual income, he paid nothing for his son's support and only provided token gifts, and the father's testimony that he was not aware of his obligation to pay support did not excuse his failure to pay; therefore, termination of the father's rights based on his willful failure to support was proper. In re Gabriel B., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 413 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 23, 2018).

Evidence was insufficient to terminate the father's parental rights for abandonment based on nonsupport because while it showed that he was employment and paid $639 in child support in the relevant four month period, the father did not testify to his rent obligations or other living expenses. In re Leroy H., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 446 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 3, 2018).

Record did not contain clear evidence of the mother's abandonment by failure to support; while the mother knew of her support obligation, was able to work during a large portion of the relevant time period, and made some payments, the proof of her broken foot and childbirth did not convince the court that she had the capacity to work throughout the pertinent period of time. In re Piper B., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 478 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 17, 2018).

Clear and convincing evidence supported the trial court's termination of a mother's parental rights on the ground of abandonment by willful failure to support because she made no financial contribution to the support of the child, and the child's great aunt testified that the mother never provided any gifts or necessaries for the child during the relevant time period; the fact that the other was not under court order to provide support did not, ipso facto, relieve her of that obligation. In re Taylor C., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 490 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 21, 2018).

Although the record supported for the determination that the father knew of his duty to support the child and the consequences of his failure to do so, the evidence was insufficient to establish the father's ability to remit support during the relevant time period, and the termination of the father's rights on this ground was reversed. In re Charles T., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 501 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 28, 2018).

Trial court erred in terminating the mother's parental rights on the ground of abandonment by willful failure to support; although there was proof that the mother was not disabled or otherwise precluded from gainful employment, the Department of Children's Services did not show that she not only had the capacity to pay support but did not do so, and had no justification for not doing so. In re Hayden L, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 515 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2018).

Trial court's finding of abandonment was vacated and findings of fact concerning the willfulness of the alleged abandonment were required on remand; the trial court did not consider the mother's arguments that her failure to provide support was not willful because she was in a rehabilitation program, and her income was used to pay for the program. In re Abagail D., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 536 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 13, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support the termination of the father's parental rights based on abandonment by failure to support because based on his testimony that he was gainfully employed during the all but two weeks of the pertinent period and that his paycheck was enough to cover his children's expenses, he had the ability to pay support. In re Jaylan W., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 546 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 18, 2018).

Father abandoned the child by willfully failing to remit support, which supported the termination of his parental rights; although he claimed that his failure to prioritize his support payments was a result of his lack of understanding of a complex system, he was advised of his obligation to remit support by a child support order, parenting plans, and his signing of the Criteria for Termination of Parental Rights, plus every parent was presumed to know of his legal obligation to support his child. In re Kaycee M., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 585 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 3, 2018).

Termination of the mother's parental rights on the ground of abandonment by failure to support was supported by the evidence; she knew of her duty to pay child support, she worked during part of the relevant time period, when she did not work during that time, she was not unable to work, and she admitted she failed to pay any support. In re Larry P., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 606 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 15, 2018).

Because petitioners failed to present clear evidence that the mother's failure to support was willful, the court vacated the findings with respect to this ground for termination; she could not be blamed for using her monthly paycheck to pay rent at an rehabilitation facility, nor could she be blamed for using her tax refund to pay overdue bills, and that she bought cigarettes during the relevant four-month period was insufficient alone to produce a firm belief that her failure to pay support was willful. In re L.U.S., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 613 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 19, 2018).

Trial court erred in terminating the mother's parental rights to her youngest child based on abandonment for failing to visit and support that child during the four months immediately preceding her re-incarceration because the relevant four-month time period was March 13 through July 12, 2011, but there was no proof showing that the mother willfully failed to support or to visit the child prior to May of 2011. In re S.D., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 664 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 15, 2018).

Termination of the mother's and the father's parental rights was proper as the parents abandoned the child by failing to visit and to remit support because they last visited the child more than two years prior to the termination petition; their telephone calls and video chats were not a substitute for in-person visitation; although they were both employed, they failed to provide any financial support until after the termination petition was filed; and their care packages did not satisfy their support obligation. In re Camdon H., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 672 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 21, 2018).

Clear and convincing evidence supported the trial court's finding that the mother abandoned her children by willful failure to support because it showed that she was incarcerated within the four-month period preceding the filing of the termination petition, she failed to make any payments toward the support of her children, and she admitted that the auto body and repair shop she owned with the stepfather generated income sufficient to support them and the children. In re Michayla T., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 712 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 7, 2018).

There was clear evidence that the father abandoned the children by willfully failing to support them; he paid nothing until ordered to do so and he provided no nonmonetary support, such as clothing or food, yet he worked several jobs and his expenses were minimal, and thus he could have provided some financial support for his children but willfully chose not to do so. In re Gaberiel S., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 718 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 11, 2018).

Trial court noted that the parenting plan did not require the mother to remit child support but the trial court did not issue any findings of fact concerning her willfulness in relation to the terms contained in the plan; thus, the finding of abandonment for failure to support was vacated.  — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 745 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 19, 2018).

There was not clear and convincing proof from which to conclude that the mother had the capacity to pay support during the relevant period; while there was some testimony in the record that the mother worked while the children were in custody, the testimony did not establish what her income and expenses were during the period at issue. In re Antonio J., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 759 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2018).

There was clear and convincing evidence to establish that the mother abandoned the child by failing to remit support because she admitted her physical ability to work during the relevant time period and that she later obtained employment after the relevant time period but still failed to provide any financial support. In re Ethan M., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 45 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 29, 2019).

Clear and convincing evidence did not show a mother abandoned her child by failing to pay child support because no evidence of the mother's failure to support for the entire four-month period before the mother was incarcerated was presented. In re J'Khari F., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 60 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2019).

Clear and convincing evidence was shown of grounds to terminate the mother's parental rights to the child for abandonment by willful failure to support because the mother had the ability to pay child support, and the capability of earning money to pay her child support, but simply chose not to work and willfully chose not to pay child support. In re Melinda N., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 69 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 7, 2019).

As there was no evidence about the mother's income, expenses, or living situation during the four-month period, and she testified that she was dependent on an abusive boyfriend for transportation and that he refused to allow her to work, willful failure to pay child support was not shown. In re Jaxx M., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 185 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 17, 2019).

Although the mother did not provide cash to the child's guardians, she spent a portion of her disposable income that was not insignificant on the child during the relevant four-month period, thereby precluding the guardians from proving abandonment by clear and convincing evidence. Specifically, the mother had between $150 and $300 per month in disposable income that she could have used to pay child support. The evidence showed that the mother spent approximately $800 on the child over the relevant four-month period, which averaged out to about $200 per month. In re Anna G., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 208 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 1, 2019).

Evidence was insufficient to support the termination of the mother's parental rights based on abandonment by willful failure to support because the record did not show that she had any capacity to pay support during the relevant period and the trial court's finding that she obtained employment well after the filing of the petition was insufficient. The evidence showed that the mother was incarcerated or in treatment for all but two weeks during the relevant time period and there was no dispute that she was not employed during this time. In re Kingston A. B., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 405 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 21, 2019).

Mother testified that on average she worked three or four days per week and at best, she earned $ 840 during the four months before the petition was filed; she had monthly expenses of $ 120 and paid an additional $ 90 toward the support of the child's half-siblings, such that her payments toward the child's support were not insignificant given her means. The department did not meet its burden to prove that the mother's payments were token support. In re Josiah T., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 482 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 2, 2019).

Ground of willful failure to support was proven against a father by the standard of clear and convincing evidence because the father had the capacity to pay support, did not do so, and had no justification for not doing so; the father testified that, at all times during the relevant statutory period, he was working, and when pressed by the trial court as to whether he had money to pay child support the father admitted that he did. In re Channing M., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 516 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 23, 2019).

Trial court erred in terminating the mother's parental rights on the ground of abandonment by willful failure to support; although the mother failed to provide any support for the child during the relevant time period, there was no proof that the mother's failure to provide support was willful, as the record was devoid of any evidence to show her income, expenses, or employment history. In re Dylan S., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 518 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 23, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support the termination of the father's parental rights based on abandonment for to support because the mother testified that the father never provided financial assistance and did not provide supplies for the child, and her testimony was corroborated by the maternal grandfather's testimony. In re Aubrie W., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 21 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 21, 2020).

Termination of a mother's parental rights on ground of abandonment was appropriate because the mother did not contend that the mother was incapable of paying support during the relevant four-month period, but refused to do so without some record. Moreover, to the extent that the mother did have discretionary income, the mother used it to buy illegal drugs, rather than support the children, and there was no evidence as to the actual amounts spent by the mother on gifts for the children during visitation in the four-month period or otherwise. In re Michael W., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 24 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 23, 2020).

Evidence was insufficient to support the trial court's termination of the father's parental rights based on abandonment by willful failure to support because the court had no evidence of his actual income during the four-month period, he had been doing odd jobs since he was injured and terminated by his employer, and he was barely able to keep his utilities turned on. In re Kelsea L., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 31 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 27, 2020).

Trial court properly terminated the mother's parental rights under the ground of abandonment by failure to support; because she did not appear at trial and presented no evidence, the unrefuted proof was that she was working, yet never provided any type of financial support for the child. In re Imerald W., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 43 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2020).

Trial court properly determined that it was not in a child's best interest for the father's parental rights to be terminated because his failure to visit the child within the statutory four-month period was not willful where his efforts to visit the child were thwarted by the mother, and, while the father did not support or make reasonable payments towards the support of the child, the child was still young enough that the father should be able to establish a meaningful relationship with him. In re Archer R., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 68 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 19, 2020).

Foster parents'  petition to terminate the parental rights of the biological mother was improperly granted as the foster parents did not show abandonment by willful failure to support the child because the foster parents failed to establish that the mother was capable of working and paying child support during the relevant four-month period. In re Neveah M., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 92 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 4, 2020).

Trial court did not err in concluding that the child's great-aunt established the existence of abandonment by failure to support because the father testified that he was employed during the relevant four-month period and despite having the ability to pay some child support the father admitted that he failed make a single support payment or pay his portion of the child's $3,000 dental bill. In re Zaylee W., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 145 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 9, 2020).

Evidence of the grounds for terminating a father's parental rights of abandonment by willful failure to support was less than clear and convincing and did not show that the father's failure to support was willful as the mother and stepfather failed to establish that the father had the capacity to pay child support during the relevant period. Furthermore, the father's responses to interrogatories showed only nominal income during the four-month period preceding the filing of the termination petition. In re Mattie L., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 152 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 14, 2020).

Trial court's ruling that petitioners met their burden to prove the father's willful failure to support in the four months prior to incarceration was erroneous because, while the father was not employed during the relevant time period, he was required to pay a multitude of fines as a result of his criminal activity and there was no evidence presented of his expenses during the relevant period. In re London B., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 155 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 14, 2020).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was proper for abandonment by failure to support; the mother had the capacity to work during the relevant time period and did work for much of it, which provided her the means to pay her expenses and provide discretionary funds for travel and entertainment, and yet she admitted she did not pay money to the grandparents for the support of the child. In re Daisy A., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 167 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 17, 2020).

Termination of the father's parental rights based on abandonment for failure to support was proper because, although he testified that he had paid approximately $80 toward the child's support, the Tennessee Department of Children's Services produced documentation showing that he, in fact, paid $20 during the entire time the child was in foster care; and, when asked why the money he used to buy cigarettes was not tendered for support of his child, the father downplayed his habit. In re Dustin M., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 191 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 28, 2020).

Termination of the mother's parental rights based on abandonment for failure to support was proper because the case worker testified that the mother was aware of the permanency plan requirement that she pay $20 per month in child support; the case worker testified that she was unaware of any impediments to the mother's ability to work; and the mother had made no payments toward the child's support. In re Dustin M., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 191 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 28, 2020).

Upon the change in the statutory requirement eliminating the willfulness requirement, the trial court erred by requiring the grandparents to prove the mother's willfulness in her failure to provide support; however, the error was harmless because the mother testified that she would have sought employment but for a lack of child care for her newborn. Thus, she proved that her lack of support was not willful, and therefore there was a lack of evidence concerning abandonment for failure to support. In re Eli H., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 206 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 8, 2020).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was proper based on abandonment for willful failure to visit and to support because, although the father had relocated to Tennessee and lived with his parents, the mother knew his email address and his parent's physical address; and, when the mother had disposable income, and had the ability to pay support, she chose not to. In re Aiden M., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 361 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 11, 2020).

10. —Failure to visit.

Finding of abandonment by failure to visit was supported by evidence that, once the child returned to the custody of the Department of Children's Services, the father only engaged in token visitation on two occasions. In re Kenneth G., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 674 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 15, 2016).

Termination of the father's parental right based on abandonment for failure to visit had to be reversed, because the father was incarcerated at the time of the filing and for the four months preceding the filing of the petition. In re Colton R., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 88 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 7, 2017).

Evidence was not clear and convincing as to the ground of a mother's willful failure to visit because the children's grandfather kept detailed logs on the mother's visits, and it was evidence from the logs that the mother visited 43 or 44 times; even if the mother visited 17 times in the relevant four-month period preceding the filing of the petition, as initially asserted, the court of appeals would be hard-pressed to deem that token visitation. In re Karissa, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 134 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2017), appeal denied, In re Karissa V., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 330 (Tenn. May 24, 2017).

Evidence relevant to the trial court's findings on the issue of a father's alleged willful failure to visit did not rise to the level of clear and convincing because the children's grandfather testified that the father did visit many times. In re Karissa, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 134 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2017), appeal denied, In re Karissa V., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 330 (Tenn. May 24, 2017).

Termination of the mother's parental rights on the ground of abandonment by willful failure to visit was proper; the last meaningful contact the mother had with the child was in 2014, and although she knew where appellees and the child lived, she made no attempt to see the child or communicate with him. In re Charles A., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 194 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 24, 2017).

Trial court properly denied grandparents'  petition to terminate parental rights because the grandparents failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence a willful failure to visit; the parents visited their child numerous times despite the restrictions imposed by the grandparents, and regardless of whether the grandparents were well-intentioned, their actions had the effect of significantly interfering with the parents'  efforts to visit the child. In re Sophia P., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 207 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 30, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 394 (Tenn. June 13, 2017).

Clear and convincing evidence supported terminating a father's parental rights due to abandonment based on a willful failure to visit because (1) he only occasionally saw the child, (2) an order of protection did not prevent him from seeing the child, (3) he made no effort to secure or enforce visitation, and (4) his visitation occurred when he visited with the child's mother. In re Jeremiah N., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 283 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 2, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 432 (Tenn. July 21, 2017).

There was clear and convincing evidence that a mother abandoned the mother's child by failing to visit with the child in the four consecutive months preceding the filing of the petition for termination. Moreover, any attempt at visitation was only token visitation. In re Colby L., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 352 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 24, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 527 (Tenn. Aug. 15, 2017).

Termination of the father's parental rights was improper on the ground of abandonment based on willful failure to visit because, while the father's alleged excuses did indeed appear poor, there was insufficient evidence in the record upon which to make a clear and convincing determination as to the father's intent not to visit; and not all of the possible reasons for the father's failure to visit rose to the level of a willful failure to visit. In re Kenya H., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 452 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 5, 2017).

Because the mother and father were incarcerated during the four months prior to the department's filing of the petition for termination, the ground of abandonment by failure to visit, for purposes of T.C.A. §§ 36-1-102, 36-1-113, was not established. In re Quintin S., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 480 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 13, 2017).

Although the father was incarcerated for significant periods of time, he was out of jail from August 2014 to August 2015, and thus the four-month period set forth in T.C.A. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(i) was the appropriate statutory ground applicable to him. In re Quintin S., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 480 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 13, 2017).

Father was allowed a total of 16 hours of visitation during the four-month period, but he used only two, plus his failure to participate in more than token visitation was willful; he said he had problems with transportation because he lost his license, and while he could ride with others, he had problems paying for gas, and thus the father abandoned the children by a willful failure to visit pursuant to T.C.A. §§ 36-1-102(1)(A)(i), 36-1-113. In re Quintin S., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 480 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 13, 2017).

Trial court properly found that a mother abandoned her child through willful failure to visit because during the relevant four month period, the mother made no attempt to visit with the child; the only excuse the mother could offer during trial for not visiting was being “on the run” after violating the terms of her probation, but evading arrest is not a justifiable excuse for failing to visit. In re Mya V., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 511 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 28, 2017).

Evidence was insufficient to support the termination of the parents'  rights based on abandonment because the record showed that the mother attended all but three or four visits during the entirety of the child's residency with his foster parents and the record was unclear as to the amount of visits the father missed. In re Brennen T., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 681 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 23, 2017).

Father's parental rights were properly terminated on the ground of abandonment by willful failure to pay visit pursuant to T.C.A. §§ 36-1-113(g)(1), 36-1-102(1)(A), given that he willfully abandoned the children by failing to visit them, his engagement at the children's doctor's appointments was sporadic and amounted to no more than token visitation, and he failed to make any effort to spend time with the children until after the petition to terminate his rights was filed. In re Miracle M., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 593 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 30, 2017), appeal dismissed, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 845 (Tenn. Nov. 30, 2017).

Trial court erred in finding clear and convincing evidence that a father's failure to visit was willful because weekly phone calls with the children did not constitute token visits; a Tennessee Department of Children's Services representative testified that during the relevant four-month time period, the father talked with the children about once a week, and the father visited them several times before he moved to another state. In re Billy T.W., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 641 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 27, 2017).

Clear and convincing evidence supported the termination of the mother's parental rights to her daughter on the ground of abandonment by willful failure to visit during the four-month period prior to the filing of the original petition pursuant to T.C.A. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(i), as her visitation during the relevant time was token at best. In re Douglas H., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 662 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 29, 2017).

Ground of abandonment for failure to visit by an incarcerated parent, under the former version of the statute, was inapplicable because, from the time of removal until the filing of the petition for termination of parental rights, the father was never free for a consecutive four-month period. In re Isabella G., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 667 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 3, 2017).

Trial court erred in terminating a mother's parental rights on the ground of abandonment because the mother did not have the capacity to visit the children during the relevant time period; the mother testified, without contradiction, that she did not own a vehicle during the relevant four months, and the trial court did not make a specific finding rejecting that testimony. In re T.W., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 847 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 17, 2017).

Trial court erred in terminating a mother's parental rights on the ground of abandonment because evidence in the record did not provide clear and convincing proof that the mother's failure to visit the children was willful; an Alabama court order effectively prohibited the mother from visiting the children because she was not entitled to supervised visitation under that order, and she had an affirmative duty not to visit her children until she satisfied the conditions of the order. In re T.W., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 847 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 17, 2017).

Mother's visits were more than perfunctory and were frequent enough to establish more than minimum contact with the child, and thus the mother's visitation did not meet the definition of token visitation, and the grandparents therefore failed to prove that the mother willfully failed to visit her child for abandonment purposes; the visitation was sufficient to continue the bond with the child, and the mother consistently maintained that she had problems obtaining reliable transportation. In re Addalyne S., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 225 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 26, 2018).

Ground for termination of the mother's parental rights of abandonment by failure to visit was not clearly and convincingly established because there was no evidence that the mother was unwilling to meet conditions in order to visit the child but that she was unable to do so. Upon leaving jail the mother's first call was to request permission to visit her child, petitioners, who had custody of the child, would not take the child to Georgia, the mother would not be permitted to take the child out of the home for overnight visitation, and petitioners advised the mother that she could not stay overnight with them. In re Emma S., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 237 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2018).

Trial court erred in terminating the mother's parental rights based on abandonment by willful failure to visit as the father and his current wife interfered with the mother's right to see her children or to communicate with them because the father did not have the right to unilaterally stop the mother's visitation, and he did not have the authority to convert the mother's unsupervised visitation to supervised visitation and then to use her failure to visit as a ground to terminate her parental rights; although the mother conceded that she abused alcohol during her marriage, she testified that she no longer drank and the children's testimony corroborated her statement; and the father blocked the mother from calling his cellular telephone. In re Justin P., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 273 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 17, 2018).

Evidence found by the trial court amounted to clear and convincing evidence to terminate a mother's parental rights for willful abandonment by failure to visit because the mother was permitted to contact the child by mail and had not done so; the mother continually failed to attempt to contact and/or visit her child, despite being aware of her duty to do so. In re D.T., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 292 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 24, 2018).

Father willfully failed to visit the child during the relevant four-month period prior to his incarceration and thus grounds for termination existed based on abandonment by willful failure to visit; the father refused to provide his contact information to the department, failed to maintain contact with the department, never proactively attempted to establish paternity, and willingly forewent his opportunity to assume fatherly responsibilities. In re Kylea K., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 338 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 21, 2018).

Clear and convincing evidence showed a mother willfully failed to visit the mother's children in the four months before a termination of parental rights petition was filed because the mother visited the children only once, despite accommodations, and showed no justifiable reason for the failure to visit. In re Jarrett P., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 371 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 29, 2018).

Trial court properly terminated a father's parental rights on the ground of abandonment by willful failure to visit because the father spent less than six hours with the child over a period of thirty-two months; the record clearly and convincingly establishes that the father's visits were no more than token in that they were of such an infrequent nature or of such short duration as to merely establish minimal or insubstantial contact with the child. In re D.N., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 383 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 3, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support termination of the father's parental rights for willful failure to visit because he admitted at trial that he had not seen the child for two years, he did not allege that he was prevented from seeing the child, and he admitted that he had not asked for visitation since 2014. In re Leroy H., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 446 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 3, 2018).

Evidence clearly and convincingly supported the trial court's termination of a mother's parental rights on the ground of abandonment by willful failure to visit because despite the fact that the mother was granted the opportunity for supervised visits, she did not seek visitation until after she was served with the petition to terminate her parental rights; there was no evidence that the mother was thwarted or otherwise precluded from seeking visitation. In re Taylor C., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 490 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 21, 2018).

Termination of the mother's rights was proper under the ground of abandonment by willful failure to visit; the mother only attended two of seven scheduled visits, her lack of visitation was due to her refusal to submit to required drug screens, and her two visits were deemed mere token visitation. In re Romeo T., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 514 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2018).

Despite the mother's admission that she understood that she was required to petition the trial court to lift the no contact order so she could visit the child, she did not do so; as she had no contact with the child since June 2016 and she had taken no overt steps to petition the trial court to set aside or modify the no contact order, there was clear evidence that she abandoned the child by willful failure to visit. In re Hayden L, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 515 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2018).

Trial court's finding of abandonment was vacated and findings of fact concerning the willfulness of the alleged abandonment were required on remand; the trial court did not consider the mother's arguments that her failure to visit was not willful because she was in a rehabilitation program, and her attempts to visit via Skype were denied. In re Abagail D., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 536 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 13, 2018).

Evidence was insufficient to support the termination of the father's parental rights based on abandonment by failure to visit because it established that he attempted to arrange rides to visit the child and had 10 telephone calls and an in-person visit with the child. In re Jaylan W., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 546 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 18, 2018).

Termination of the mother's parental rights on the ground of abandonment by willful failure to visit was supported by the evidence; the mother's visitation was contingent upon her ability to pass three consecutive, random drug screens, yet she did not make herself available for the visits and was unable to pass the necessary drug screens. In re Larry P., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 606 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 15, 2018).

Trial court did not err in finding clear evidence to terminate the mother's parental rights on the ground of abandonment by failure to visit; her choice in refusing to cooperate with an order constituted a willful decision to discontinue visiting the child, and her filing a petition to restore visitation, then failing to appear at the hearing, did not show she was actively trying to maintain visitation. In re L.U.S., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 613 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 19, 2018).

Finding of abandonment for failure to visit was vacated and the case was remanded for consideration of the mother's willfulness in light of the father's denial of visitation and the parties'  course of dealing in scheduling visitation with minimal notice since the time of the divorce; the mother visited four times during the pertinent time period, but visitation was interrupted on one date and two additional requests for visitation were denied, and the mother's attempt to visit should still be considered in assessing the willfulness of her failure to visit.  — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 745 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 19, 2018).

Mother's failure to visit her children was willful, as the evidence showed the same pattern of the mother's missing opportunities to visit with her children before and after the birth of her last child, and despite any asserted physical limitations, the mother was able to work during the four-month period. In re Antonio J., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 759 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2018).

Termination of the mother's parental rights for abandonment by willful failure to visit was proper because her visitation was merely token visitation; and it was in the child's best interest as the mother did not have a job, she had not regularly visited or spoken with the child, she did not provide any support for the child, she and the child did not have a meaningful relationship, and the child was well-cared for by the grandparents and was thriving in their custody. In re Jayla H., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 16 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 14, 2019).

Clear and convincing evidence supported the trial court's finding that the father abandoned the child by failing to visit because the father had no contact with the child after July 2015, the mother's brother, with whom the child was living, testified that he did not receive a telephone call from the father regarding setting up visitation after July 2015, and while the father claimed he did not know where the brother and his wife lived, he drove the mother to their house on the day of his only visit with the child on July 4, 2015. In re Jeffery D., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 30 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 24, 2019).

Trial court's ordering terminating the mother's parental rights on the ground of abandonment by failure to visit because the record showed that visitation was suspended pursuant to a court order in August 2016, precluding any visitation during the majority of the pertinent time period. In re Ethan M., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 45 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 29, 2019).

Clear and convincing evidence showed a mother abandoned the mother's child by failing to visit in the four months before the mother was incarcerated because the mother (1) did not seek relief from an order suspending the mother's visitation, (2) did not present herself to the court, as her counsel was instructed, and (3) was aware of her obligation to visit the child and that a failure to do so could lead to termination of parental rights. In re J'Khari F., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 60 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2019).

Clear and convincing evidence was shown of grounds to terminate the mother's parental rights to the child for abandonment by willful failure to visit because the mother waited for years before even attempting to set up visitation and the mother's attempts to set-up visitation after proceedings were commenced were minimal. In re Melinda N., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 69 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 7, 2019).

Clear and convincing evidence supported termination of a mother's parental rights for willful failure to visit because the evidence showed the mother had not visited the child at all during the four months preceding the filing of an amended termination petition. In re Paetyn M., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 81 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 14, 2019).

Chancery court properly terminated a father's parental rights on the ground of abandonment by willful failure to visit because the father admitted that he had not visited the child for at least two years prior to the filing of the petition to terminate his parental rights, and, even if the mother refused all of the father's attempts at communication regarding his visitation rights, he never made any filing with the trial court seeking enforcement of his visitation rights. In re Maddox G., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 96 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 25, 2019).

Abandonment by failure to visit was sufficiently proven where, inter alia, the mother had not regularly visited and failed to maintain any contact with the child in the four months preceding the petition's filing. In re Jaxx M., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 185 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 17, 2019).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was proper based on abandonment for willful failure to visit or to support her child because, during the four months leading up to the termination petition, the mother only visited with the child about five times; when the mother did visit, she was distracted and did not pay much attention to the child; the mother often missed her scheduled visits with the child; she only paid $18 in support; and she voluntarily quit both her jobs and did nothing to find a new job to pay child support. In re Laura F., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 200 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 29, 2019).

Evidence was less than clear and convincing that a mother abandoned the mother's child by willful failure to visit during the four months preceding the filing of the termination petition because the mother did not engage in token visitation during the applicable time period. Considering the mother's visits, the mother's testimony concerning phone contact, and the circumstances surrounding a scheduled visit, the mother did not have merely minimal or insubstantial contact during the four-month period preceding the filing of the petition. In re Raeshad B., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 242 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 20, 2019).

Trial court did not err in terminating the mother's parental rights on the ground of abandonment by failure to visit; the mother knew the child was with her grandmother, who did not keep the mother from contacting the child, and the mother had the capacity to visit the child, made no attempts to do so, and had no justifiable excuse for her failure to do so. In re Dylan S., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 518 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 23, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support the termination of the father's parental rights based on abandonment by failure to visit because it was undisputed that the father did not visit the child during the relevant time period and the record established that the father had the ability but made no effort to visit the child and he provided no justification for not doing so. In re Travis R., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 557 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 13, 2019).

Reversal of ground of abandonment by failure to visit was appropriate as there was too much ambiguity in the analysis of whether a mother failed to visit or exercise more than token visitation in the four month window before the filing of the petition. Although the record contained evidence that the mother failed to visit the children on several occasions in the four month window, given the lack of clarity as to which of the failures to visit the juvenile court held against the mother, the evidence fell short of clear and convincing evidence. In re Malik G., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 564 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 21, 2019).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was proper based on the ground of abandonment by failure to visit because there was no evidence to suggest that the mother was incapacitated or otherwise unable to engage in visitation with the child; and the mother's lackadaisical attitude during visits, her failure to play with the child, and her shunning of the child's attempts to engage, resulted in a lack of even the most tenuous bond between the mother and child. In re Draven K., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 7, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to support the termination of the father's parental rights based on abandonment for failure to visit because he did not dispute that he only visited with the child four or five times for approximately two hours each time during the relevant period. In re Aubrie W., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 21 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 21, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's termination of the father's parental rights based on abandonment by willful failure to visit because the father had no contact with the child during the four-month period, his last visit with the child occurred years before the petition was filed, and despite his knowledge of the court process for asserting his parental rights he took no action to do so. In re Kelsea L., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 31 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 27, 2020).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was proper based on abandonment by failure to visit, failure to substantially comply with permanency plans, and persistence of the conditions leading to removal of the children from the mother's home because her one or two visits with each of the children were of such an infrequent nature as to merely establish minimal or insubstantial contact with the children; she failed to pursue training in parenting her son due to his special needs; she presented no evidence of having obtained stable housing, income, or transportation; and she was unable to show that she could provide a home absent of the environmental neglect that initially caused the children to be removed from her custody. In re Serenity S., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 45 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2020).

Foster parents'  petition to terminate the parental rights of the biological mother was improperly granted based on abandonment because the mother did not willfully fail to visit the child during the four months preceding the filing of the original termination petition as she attempted to maintain visitation with the child during her time at the drug treatment center, but had not been able to contact the foster parents. In re Neveah M., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 92 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 4, 2020).

Termination of the father's parental rights based on willfully failing to visit the child was proper; an affidavit of no visitation did not prohibit him from contacting the child by telephone or email, and while the no-visitation order was set aside after a final decree of divorce, the father still made no cognizable attempts to contact the child. The alleged order suspending the father's visitation did not preclude a finding of willfulness, nothing prevented him from finding where the child lived, but the father failed to do so. In re Bentley Q., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 103 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 11, 2020).

Even though the trial court erred in calculating the four-month period for purposes of abandonment for failure to visit by analyzing two alternative time periods when the mother was incarcerated, the error was harmless because the trial court's findings concerning the ground included the correct four-month period. In re Gracie H. Y., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 110 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 16, 2020).

Ground of abandonment by the mother's failure to visit the children was established by clear and convincing evidence because the record showed that she only had two token visits with the children, she was aware of her duty to visit the children, she had the capacity to visit, she did not make sufficient attempts to visit, and she had no justifiable excuse for not visiting. In re Gracie H. Y., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 110 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 16, 2020).

Evidence was not clear and convincing that a father's abandonment by failure to visit was willful because, in addition to cutting off direct communication and not appearing for exchanges, the mother took other steps to limit the father's access to the child such as telling the child's school that the father was violent and dangerous. At trial, the mother admitted to withholding visitation because the mother was frustrated and fed up with all the father had put the mother through. In re Mattie L., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 152 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 14, 2020).

Willful failure to visit in the four months prior to the father's incarceration provided an appropriate ground for termination of the fathers parental rights based on abandonment, where the mother's testimony clearly demonstrated that no restraint, significant or otherwise, was placed on the father's ability to visit, as he had the means of contacting the mother for visitation but chose not to make any effort toward visitation during the relevant time period. In re London B., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 155 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 14, 2020).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was proper for abandonment by failure to visit; she was able to visit the child, yet only visited her five times during the relevant period, and during those visits, the mother was not fully present and engaged with the child, but instead spent much of their time together on her phone. The mother's behavior was willful and her visits amounted to token visitation. In re Daisy A., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 167 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 17, 2020).

Termination of a mother's parental rights on the ground of abandonment by an incarcerated parent for failure to visit in the four months preceding the mother's incarceration was appropriate as the mother clearly failed to engage in more than token visitation with the children-based on the mother's fear that another child would also be removed from the mother's custody due to the mother's continued use of illegal drugs while the child was in utero-and clearly failed to meet the mother's burden to show that the failure to do so was not willful. In re Tucker H., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 184 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 24, 2020).

Termination of a mother's parental rights was appropriate because the mother abandoned the child by willfully failing to visit the child during the four months preceding the filing of the petition to terminate parental rights, as the mother made one token visitation of the child during that period. The mother did not point to any acts by the Tennessee Department of Children's Services (DCS) that thwarted or actually prevented the mother from visiting the child and failed to cooperate with DCS and never asked for assistance to be provided. In re Kelty F., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 185 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 24, 2020).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was proper under the abandonment by failure to visit ground, as the mother failed to prove that she lacked willfulness in her failure to visit the child or that her failure to visit was due to circumstances outside her control; she admitted not seeking any visitation with the child and she did not provide any evidence showing how the birth of her younger child would have prevented her from visiting the child. In re Eli H., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 206 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 8, 2020).

Clear and convincing evidence supported a finding that the father abandoned the children by willful failure to visit where he made only a token visit in the four months prior to his incarceration date, he provided no financial support even though gainfully employed, and his failures were willful. In re Jessica V., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 275 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 12, 2020).

11. Aggravating Circumstance.

As termination of parents'  rights over one child was based on numerous instances of severe child abuse, which constituted “aggravating circumstances,” termination of their rights over their other child was proper without efforts towards reunification pursuant to T.C.A. §§ 37-1-166 and 36-1-102. In re Keara J., 376 S.W.3d 86, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 26 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 13, 2012), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 274 (Tenn. Apr. 11, 2012).

12. Legal Parent.

Father does not fall within any of the various meanings of the statutory words legal parent; an intent to claim paternity filed with the Putative Father Registry is not the same as a voluntary acknowledgement of paternity, and instead these are words of art, separate concepts with different meanings. In re F.N.M., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 274 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 11, 2016).

Termination grounds under the statute pertaining to persons not the legal parent or guardian of the child cannot be applied to legal parents; because there was no dispute that the mother in this case was the biological mother of the child, she was a legal parent for purposes of termination of her parental rights and this termination ground could not apply to her. In re Addison P., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 345 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 20, 2016).

Trial court properly found the father to be a putative father of the children because he did not file a paternity petition concerning either of the children and the trial court properly found that he was not a legal parent because he presented no evidence that he executed an unrevoked and sworn acknowledgement of paternity. He was recorded as the father on the children's birth certificates. In re Braxton M., 531 S.W.3d 708, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 454 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 5, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 639 (Tenn. Sept. 29, 2017).

Although the juvenile court erred in taking judicial notice of a paternity test report previously entered as an exhibit in proceedings before a magistrate, the error was harmless because the mother's copy of the report was admissible; because the report showed a statistical probability of paternity of ninety-nine percent or greater, the putative father had an extremely high burden of proof to rebut the statutory presumption of paternity, but he failed to meet that burden. In re Michael J., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 52 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2018).

Non-biological parent was not a biological parent, legal parent, or step parent, and she did not seek to adopt the child; thus, she did not fit within any of these statutory definitions of a parent, rendering her without standing to pursue a parentage action or visitation with the child. Pippin v. Pippin, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 220 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 14, 2020).

13. Surrender.

A legal surrender of parental rights denotes a termination thereof and is totally separate and distinct from the situation where a parent maintains his or her parental rights but has relinquished custody to another. In re Estate of Dobbins, 987 S.W.2d 30, 1998 Tenn. App. LEXIS 616 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998).

14. Termination of Parental Rights.

Order of termination of the mother's parental rights to her son was vacated to the extent that it was based upon a finding of abandonment under T.C.A. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv); the trial court's order failed to specify whether its decision was based upon a determination that the mother willfully failed to visit or support the child during the period immediately preceding her incarceration or, rather, upon a determination that the mother engaged in conduct prior to her incarceration that demonstrated a wanton disregard for her child's welfare. State v. C.H.K., 154 S.W.3d 586, 2004 Tenn. App. LEXIS 517 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004), appeal denied, In re J.W.P., — S.W.3d —, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 937 (Tenn. Nov. 8, 2004).

Termination of the parents'  rights based on abandonment under T.C.A. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(iii) was improper because the parents were never notified that the Tennessee department of children's services was seeking to terminate their parental rights based on this ground, and the department explicitly disclaimed that it was seeking termination on any grounds other than persistence of conditions and severe child abuse. In re Giorgianna H., 205 S.W.3d 508, 2006 Tenn. App. LEXIS 192 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006).

Termination of parental rights under T.C.A. §§ 36-1-113(g)(6) and (i) was affirmed because prior to the child's birth, the father began serving a ten-year prison sentence for felony possession of cocaine and possession with intent to sell, and there was ample evidence supporting the trial court's conclusion that termination of parental rights is in the best interest of the child. Fisher v. Young (In re K.B.H.), 206 S.W.3d 80, 2006 Tenn. App. LEXIS 246 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006), appeal denied, In re Adoption of K. B. H., — S.W.3d —, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 638( Tenn. 2006).

Evidence clearly demonstrated a wanton disregard of the child where the evidence indicated that the mother used drugs in the later months of her pregnancy and she also admitted using drugs after the child's birth and while breast feeding the child; therefore, there was clear and convincing evidence to support the termination of the mother's parental rights on the ground of abandonment pursuant to T.C.A. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv). In re S.L.A., 223 S.W.3d 295, 2006 Tenn. App. LEXIS 808 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006), appeal denied, State v. Smith (In re S.L.A.), — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 344 (Tenn. Apr. 2, 2007).

Mother's parental rights were properly terminated on ground of abandonment because she exhibited a wanton disregard for the welfare of her child, had 19 prior incarcerations, admitted to drug addiction problem to psychological examiner, and admitted that her mother was essentially taking care of and raising her child. State Dep't of Children's Servs. v. V.N., 279 S.W.3d 306, 2008 Tenn. App. LEXIS 645 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 27, 2008), appeal denied, State v. V.N., — S.W.3d —, 2009 Tenn. LEXIS 77 (Tenn. Jan. 16, 2009).

In a termination case, the state made reasonable efforts at reunification because the mother moved around often and failed to stay in contact with the state, the state made efforts to help the mother obtain subsidized housing, and the mother's repeated stints in jail were a continuing obstacle; trial court found that the state provided job counseling to the mother during the intervals in which she was not incarcerated. State v. Estes, 284 S.W.3d 790, 2008 Tenn. App. LEXIS 773 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 30, 2008), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2009 Tenn. LEXIS 151 (Tenn. Mar. 16, 2009).

Pursuant to T.C.A. § 36-1-102(1)(B) and (D), evidence clearly and convincingly established that a father abandoned his children by willfully failing to make reasonable payments towards their support, as the amount of payments that he made for his three children during the relevant four-month period were insignificant given his means, including his substantial salary and the value of his unencumbered property. In re Angela T., — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 112 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 23, 2012), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, In re Angela E., 402 S.W.3d 636, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 303 (Tenn. Mar. 13, 2013).

There was clear and convincing evidence that a father abandoned his children by willfully failing to visit them for a period of four consecutive months preceding the filing of the petition for termination of parental rights pursuant to T.C.A. § 36-1-113(g), despite the fact that there was an order in place that suspended the father's visitation rights; the father had no contact with the children for three years prior thereto, and he took no action to reinstate visitation or to maintain a relationship during that four-month period, such that his actions were deemed willful under T.C.A. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(i). In re Angela T., — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 112 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 23, 2012), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, In re Angela E., 402 S.W.3d 636, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 303 (Tenn. Mar. 13, 2013).

Pursuant to T.C.A. § 36-1-102(1)(F), a father's payments of child support after an original petition to terminate his parental rights was filed was not considered for purposes of an abandonment analysis under T.C.A. § 36-1-113(g). In re Angela T., — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 112 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 23, 2012), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, In re Angela E., 402 S.W.3d 636, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 303 (Tenn. Mar. 13, 2013).

Termination of parents'  rights based on persistence of conditions pursuant to T.C.A. § 36-1-113(g)(3) required the Department of Children's Services to prove that it made reasonable efforts at reunification with respect to the father, as a determination that termination was warranted due to his severe child abuse had been reversed pursuant to T.C.A. §§ 36-1-102 and 37-1-166(g)(4)(A); however, the record indicated that such efforts were satisfactorily made. In re Dakota C.R., 404 S.W.3d 484, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 844 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 7, 2012), appeal denied, In re Dakota R., — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 230 (Tenn. Mar. 6, 2013).

Contractual provisions in this case circumventing the statutory procedures for the termination of parental rights were unenforceable; there was no cognizable basis for the termination of the surrogate's parental rights. In re Baby, 447 S.W.3d 807, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 642 (Tenn. Sept. 18, 2014).

T.C.A. § 36-1-102(48)(B) [now (50)(B)] serves to clarify that no termination of “any” parental rights of a gestational surrogate is necessary, but does not operate as an additional independent procedure for termination. In re Baby, 447 S.W.3d 807, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 642 (Tenn. Sept. 18, 2014).

There was clear and convincing evidence of wanton disregard, given that the mother was incarcerated within four months prior to the filing of the petition, and bringing the child into the home of a man who had been abusive in the past, in addition to the mother's maintaining a relationship with another person who was abusive and used drugs, showed wanton disregard for the child, as did the mother's failure to seek treatment for her psychological issues; termination of the mother's rights was affirmed. In re Shaneeque M., — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. App. LEXIS 757 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 20, 2014), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 128 (Tenn. Feb. 20, 2015).

Department was required to offer proof of an order in which the child was adjudicated dependent and neglected, but despite indications that there was such a judicial finding, no adjudicatory order appeared of record; the grounds of abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home and the persistence of conditions that led to the child's removal were not established by clear and convincing evidence because of the absence of the necessary order, and because no grounds other than these two were alleged, the order terminating father's parental rights could not stand. In re R.L.M., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 41 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 29, 2015).

Evidence was insufficient to support termination of the father's parental rights for failure to support his children where the trial court did not expressly find that his failure to pay was willful and it did not make any findings regarding the father's income or earning capacity. In re K.M.K., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 92 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2015).

Evidence was insufficient to support termination of the father's parental rights for failure to provide a suitable home where there was no real evidence as to the condition of the father's residence, as the children were not removed from his home. In re K.M.K., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 92 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2015).

Trial court erred by finding that the father's parental rights should not be terminated for willfully failing to support the child where there was no dispute that he paid no support to the child's mother, he was gainfully employed, and his substantial delay in failing to comply with a court order to provide insurance coverage for the child constituted token support. In re Brookelyn W., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 141 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 24, 2015).

Trial court erred by finding that the father's parental rights should not be terminated for willfully failing to visit the child where it was undisputed that he had no visitation with the child in the four months preceding the filing of the termination petition, there was no evidence that he was thwarted in any effort to visit the child by the mother, and he placed all the onus to schedule and facilitate visitation on the mother and the stepfather. In re Brookelyn W., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 141 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 24, 2015).

Termination of a parent's parental rights to a minor child was appropriate because the parent willfully failed to contact, visit, or support the child during the four-month period preceding the filing of the petition in spite of the parent's assertion that the parent's right to visitation was restrained by a prospective adoptive parent and that the parent counter-petitioned to establish a parenting schedule. In re Jarett M., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 213 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 13, 2015).

Evidence was sufficient to terminate the mother's parental rights to her children based on abandonment where in addition to having no face-to-face visits the mother conceded she had not sent gifts or cards or otherwise attempted any contact with the children during the relevant four-month period or in the years since the children left Kentucky. In re E.G.H., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 216 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 14, 2015), appeal denied, In re Elaina G. H., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 518 (Tenn. June 19, 2015).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was proper based on the ground of abandonment for failure to visit because the visitations that occurred were token at best; and the mother brought additional parties to the visitations rather than spending that time with the children focusing on bonding and spending one-on-one time with them. In re Addison B., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 328 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 13, 2015).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was proper based on the ground of abandonment by wanton disregard for the children's welfare because the mother abused illegal substances prior to her incarceration; and she failed to make even minimal efforts to maintain contact with the children or the Tennessee Department of Children's Services in order to work towards reunification with the children. In re Addison B., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 328 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 13, 2015).

Clear and convincing evidence showed that grounds existed to terminate parents'  parental rights to their child and that it was in the child's best interest to terminate the parents'  parental rights because (1) the parents'  repeated drug abuse and ongoing pattern of incurring criminal charges and incarceration, failure to support the child, and token visits with the child demonstrated their inability to parent the child; and (2) the child was in pre-adoptive foster care. In re Autumn L., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 371 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 26, 2015).

Trial court erred in terminating a father's parental rights to seven children on grounds of failure to provide a suitable home because the child services agency conceded the record did not contain evidence indicating whether the agency's efforts occurred within the first four months after the children's removal. In re Kalob S., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 465 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 12, 2015).

It was not necessary for the grandparents to prove that the child was in immediate risk of substantial harm due to mother's substance abuse in order to prevail on the statutory termination ground of wanton disregard for the child's welfare exhibited prior to incarceration; it was sufficient that the mother's conduct that resulted in her incarceration rendered her an unfit parent. In re Kayden H., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 493 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 23, 2015).

Mother willfully failed to visit the child from March 2013 through September 2013, prior to her incarceration, and thus she had willfully failed to visit the child during the determinative four-month period immediately preceding the mother's incarceration prior to the filing of the termination petition and the trial court did not err in terminating the mother's parental rights based upon this statutory ground. In re Kayden H., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 493 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 23, 2015).

Evidence does not preponderate against the trial court's determination that the mother abandoned the child by willfully failing to support her during the determinative period prior to the mother's incarceration; she presented no evidence indicating that she had any conditions other than her addiction problems that prevented her from working, and she was capable of employment when not hindered by substance abuse and criminal activity, and termination was proper. In re Kayden H., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 493 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 23, 2015).

Trial court properly terminated the mother's parental rights based on the ground of abandonment by engaging in conduct prior to incarceration that exhibited a wanton disregard for the welfare of the child; the mother's previous failure to address her substance abuse issues and her ongoing criminal behavior and probation violations prior to her most recent incarceration demonstrated a broad pattern of conduct that had rendered her unfit to care for the child. In re Kayden H., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 493 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 23, 2015).

Mother willfully failed to visit the child from March 2013 through September 2013, prior to her incarceration, and thus she had willfully failed to visit the child during the determinative four-month period immediately preceding the mother's incarceration prior to the filing of the termination petition and the trial court did not err in terminating the mother's parental rights based upon this statutory ground. In re Kayden H., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 493 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 23, 2015).

Evidence does not preponderate against the trial court's determination that the mother abandoned the child by willfully failing to support her during the determinative period prior to the mother's incarceration; she presented no evidence indicating that she had any conditions other than her addiction problems that prevented her from working, and she was capable of employment when not hindered by substance abuse and criminal activity, and termination was proper. In re Kayden H., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 493 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 23, 2015).

Trial court properly terminated the mother's parental rights based on the ground of abandonment by engaging in conduct prior to incarceration that exhibited a wanton disregard for the welfare of the child; the mother's previous failure to address her substance abuse issues and her ongoing criminal behavior and probation violations prior to her most recent incarceration demonstrated a broad pattern of conduct that had rendered her unfit to care for the child. In re Kayden H., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 493 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 23, 2015).

Trial court did not err by terminating the father's parental rights to his son for abandonment where the evidence showed that the father did not visit his son during the relevant four-month period and his failure to do so was willful, despite the fact that he was living in a sober living facility during those months, because he was able to arrange visits and contact with individuals outside the facility but did not make such arrangements for his son. In re Gavin G., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 500 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 23, 2015).

Grounds for termination of parental rights existed because the evidence was clear and convincing that a parent's pre-incarceration conduct constituted wanton disregard for the welfare of the parent's children. The parent physically abused one child, exposed a second child to illicit drugs in utero, ignored the orders of the juvenile court, and twice continued to use drugs and end up back in jail. In re Kaedince M., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 849 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 19, 2015).

Ground of abandonment by failure to establish a suitable home was met by clear and convincing evidence where it showed that the child was found to be dependent and neglected and was placed in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Children's Services, the father was incarcerated and his sentence would expire in 2017, and the caseworker testified that her attempts to gain information to establish a suitable home for the child was thwarted by her inability to keep in contact with the father and his mother. In re Abbigail C., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 856 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 21, 2015).

Mother and step-father's petition seeking to terminate the parental rights of the father was properly denied because the evidence did not support the findings that the father's failure to visit the child or to pay child support were willful as he exercised regular visitation with the child for the first five years of her life, but the situation changed when the mother became engaged to the step-father as the mother took steps that made it much more difficult for the father to exercise visitation with the child, and she took unreasonable steps restricting his access to the child; she failed to provide the father with the mailing address where she and the child resided; and she interfered with the father's ability to pay child support. In re Kiara S., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 881 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 29, 2015), appeal dismissed, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 86 (Tenn. Jan. 28, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support the termination of the father's parental rights due to abandonment where the evidence provided by the child's mother, her new husband, and the father showed that he willfully failed to visit the child and he presented no proof he or his agent appeared at the meeting location in the four months preceding the filing of the termination of parental rights petition. In re Hope A., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 914 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 17, 2015).

Trial court did not err in finding that grounds existed to terminate the father's parental rights to the children for abandonment by wanton disregard; the father was incarcerated at the time of the filing of the termination petition, and prior to that, he attacked two of the children and was found to have committed severe abuse, plus he attacked the mother with a baseball bat and had pleaded guilty to the offenses, which amounted to wanton disregard for the children's welfare. In re Kyah H., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 986 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 23, 2015).

Clear and convincing evidence supported the juvenile court's decision to terminate the mother's parental rights for abandonment-willful failure to visit where it showed that she did not visit her child in person during the four-month period immediately preceding the date the petition to terminate was filed, she failed to submit to drug screens that were her only obstacle to visiting her child, and her telephone conversations with the four-year-old child were not a sufficient substitute for in-person visitation. In re Candace J., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 186 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 11, 2016).

Clear and convincing evidence supported the juvenile court's decision to terminate the mother's parental rights for abandonment-failure to provide a suitable home where the Tennessee Department of Children's Services made reasonable efforts to assist her in establishing a suitable home for the child and the mother made no effort to establish a suitable home. In re Candace J., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 186 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 11, 2016).

Even though the trial court erred by terminating the father's parental rights based on abandonment for willfully failing to pay child support, because the record showed that he was receiving Supplemental Security Income and then Social Security Disability Income benefits, the trial court did not err by terminating his rights for failure to provide a suitable home, because the record showed that none of the homes he lived in was suitable for the child. In re Benjamin A., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 187 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 14, 2016).

Trial court did not err in declining to terminate the father's parental rights under any of the grounds contained in this section because, based on the Tennessee Supreme Court's holding in the Bernard case, the grounds contained in this section not apply where the defendant parent was a putative biological father, as the father was in the instant case. In re Ashton B., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 188 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 15, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 512 (Tenn. July 6, 2016).

Trial court did not err in declining to terminate the father's parental rights based on willful failure to visit where the evidence showed that he had substantial contact with the child within the four-month period, including that they were together, along with the mother, every day during July 2013 and they lived together the first week of August 2013. In re Ashton B., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 188 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 15, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 512 (Tenn. July 6, 2016).

Trial court did not err in declining to terminate the father's parental rights based on willful failure to support where the record contained some evidence that the father and his family were supporting the child during the early weeks of the four-month period and the record did not contain sufficient evidence regarding the father's expenses. In re Ashton B., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 188 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 15, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 512 (Tenn. July 6, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support the termination of the mother's parental rights to her son based on abandonment where her monthly visits for four months were so infrequent and of such short duration that they constituted token visitation. The mother admitted she spent the majority of her time during the visits with her daughter instead of her son and only a limited relationship had been established between them. In re Jayvien O., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 394 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 7, 2016).

Termination of parental rights based upon abandonment, by a parent failing to provide a suitable home, was appropriate because the parent was unlikely to be able to provide a suitable home at an early date. The parent's then home was unlivable as a water pipe was broken, and the parent had only begun addressing the parent's mental health issues, had no plans to stop taking narcotic pain medication, and showed a lack of cooperation with Tennessee Department of Children's Services. In re Bailey W., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 408 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 10, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support the termination of the father's parental rights based on abandonment where it showed that he was sentenced to 130 months in prison on February 25, 2013 and since the child's birth the father engaged in violent behavior, abused drugs, and committed acts that resulted in a lengthy prison sentence. In re A.E.T., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 537 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 26, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support the termination of the mother's parental rights based on abandonment by willful failure to visit where the children's great-grandmother's actions did not prevent the mother visiting the children and the mother failed to visit the children for four months preceding her incarceration. In re Selena L., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 538 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 27, 2016).

Evidence was insufficient to support the termination of the mother's parental rights based on abandonment by willful failure to support where the job opportunity she turned down did not occur during or prior to the relevant four months such that it would affect her income during the determinative period. In re Selena L., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 538 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 27, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support the termination of the mother's parental rights based on abandonment by wanton disregard for the welfare of the children where she was involved in criminal activity and used illegal drugs. In re Selena L., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 538 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 27, 2016).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was proper on the grounds of abandonment for failure to visit because the record reflected that the mother signed a copy of the Criteria and Procedures for Termination of Parental Rights and that she was advised of the consequences of her failure to visit during the requisite time period; and the mother simply failed to schedule visitation as required. In re Gabriella M., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 587 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 15, 2016).

Trial court did not err in terminating the mother's parental rights on the ground of abandonment by wanton disregard, given that the mother's conduct prior to her incarceration constituted wanton disregard for the welfare of the child; the mother had been in and out of jail, abused drugs, and did not show any effort to provide the child with the stability he needed. In re Zachariah G., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 665 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 8, 2016).

Clear and convincing evidence supported terminating a father's parental rights because the father did not substantially comply with the father's reasonable responsibilities in a permanency plan. In re Mac L., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 883 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 22, 2016).

Trial court was correct in failing to terminate a father's rights on putative father grounds because the evidence did not clearly and convincingly demonstrate that the father failed to manifest an ability and willingness to assume legal and physical custody of his child; the evidence did not demonstrate that the father was aware of the Putative Father Registry or had access to the internet to register as the child's putative father. In re A.B., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 14 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 11, 2017).

Trial court did not err in terminating a mother's parental rights to her children because the evidence clearly and convincingly established that mother abandoned the children; the mother failed to maintain housing, missed appointments for drug and alcohol assessments, failed to maintain legal means of income, failed or refused drug screens, and missed psychological evaluations. In re A.B., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 14 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 11, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's determination that the mother willfully failed to visit her children because she failed to visit them during the relevant four-month period and the record showed that the Department of Children's Services tried to schedule drug screens in an effort to facilitate the mother's visitation but that she failed to communicate with them. In re S.P., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 41 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 25, 2017).

Child's maternal grandparents did not establish an interest sufficient to permit intervention by right in a proceeding to terminate the parental rights of the child's parents. Despite having lived with the child, the grandparents were neither the guardian nor custodian of the child at the time the termination petition was filed. In re C.H., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 57 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2017).

There was not clear and convincing evidence to support the termination of the parents'  rights for abandonment under because, although they did not pay child support during the relevant time period, there was no evidence of either parent's income or available resources during the four months immediately preceding their incarcerations. In re Kayla B., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 66 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 1, 2017).

There was clear and convincing evidence to support the termination of the parents'  rights for failing to provide a suitable home because it showed that their case manager showed them the hazards in the home that needed to be remedied, the parents made little or no attempt to provide their children with a suitable home, and both parents continued to struggle with substance abuse and ran afoul of the law. In re Kayla B., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 66 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 1, 2017).

Evidence was insufficient to support the termination of the father's rights for the willful failure to provide support because there was no proof as to his income and expenses during the relevant four-month time period. In re Anna B., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 70 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 1, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support the termination of the father's parental rights based on abandonment because it showed that he failed to engage in anything more than token visitation with the child for several months, while he was able to work and held numerous jobs, any money he made went to purchase drugs rather than to pay support for the child, and he engaged in criminal behavior to support his drug habit which led to his incarceration. In re Kira G., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 246 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 18, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's termination of the mother's parental rights based on her willful failure to visit the child because it showed that she attempted to set up visitation only once in the relevant four-month period, the father never refused visitation prior to the mother's theft charge, and the main reason the mother did not attempt to satisfy the conditions to regain visitation was because she could not pass the required drug screens. In re Addison P., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 289 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 8, 2017).

Evidence was insufficient to support the trial court's termination of the father's parental rights based on his willful failure to support the child because the trial court utilized an inappropriate four-month period, as it did not piece together the father's periods of non-incarceration prior to the filing of the termination petition. In re Travis H., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 290 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 5, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 468 (Tenn. July 31, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's termination of the father's parental rights based on abandonment because it showed that he failed to establish a suitable home, he was incarcerated, and he engaged in illegal drug use. In re Travis H., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 290 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 5, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 468 (Tenn. July 31, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support the termination of the father's parental rights based on abandonment due to willful failure to support because it showed that the father made no monetary contributions to the children's support during the determinative period, Christmas gifts he provided in 2014 constituted no more than token support, he did not claim to have legitimate, extraordinary expenses that would have prevented him from sending payments, and he acknowledged that he was capable of earning income when not incarcerated but instead chose to spend his discretionary income on drugs. In re Braxton M., 531 S.W.3d 708, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 454 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 5, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 639 (Tenn. Sept. 29, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support the termination of the father's parental rights based on abandonment due to willful failure to visit because he did not dispute that he failed to visit the children or speak with them during the determinative period and admitted that his last visit with the children occurred in 2014. In re Braxton M., 531 S.W.3d 708, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 454 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 5, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 639 (Tenn. Sept. 29, 2017).

Exceptional circumstances justified denying a parent relief from a void judgment terminating parental rights because the parent manifested an intention to treat the judgment as valid for 18 months after receiving actual notice of the judgment and the parent never attempted to contact, visit, or provide any financial support to the child. Furthermore, granting relief would have impaired the substantial reliance interests of the child and the adoptive parents and the child had developed significant relationships with the adoptive parents. In re Brooklyn J., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 785 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 5, 2017).

In order to provide a suitable home for the children, the father needed to provide more than a physically sound structure, he needed to ensure that he could protect the children in the home from sexual abuse; he failed to complete recommendations and thus failed to address this issue, and therefore the termination ground of failure to provide a suitable home, for purposes of T.C.A. §§ 36-1-102(1)(A)(ii), 36-1-113(g)(1), was established by clear and convincing evidence. In re Da'Vante M., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 797 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 12, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support the termination of the father's parental rights based on abandonment through wanton disregard because his testimony established that he was aware of the child's existence when the committed aggravated burglary, he never attempted to contact, visit, or develop a relationship with the child, and he never financially supported the child. In re Catherine J., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 54 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 30, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support the termination of the father's parental rights based on abandonment through willful failure to visit and support the child because he never appeared for any medical appointments despite the child's foster mother providing him with notice of all medical appointments, and he never provided financially for the child during the four months prior to his incarceration. In re Catherine J., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 54 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 30, 2018).

Clear and convincing evidence supported the termination of the parents'  rights for abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home because it showed that the parents had continued to reside in an inappropriate home filled with lice, fleas, dog and cat feces, with insufficient food stores and they did not properly supervise the children. In re Mack E., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 71 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 9, 2018).

Evidence was insufficient to support the termination of the mother's parental rights based on willful failure to support because, given the frequency of the mother's incarcerations, her periods of non-incarceration were not as often as it would take to get a job. In re Homer, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 126 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 9, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support the termination of the mother's parental rights based on abandonment by failing to establish a suitable home because she moved in and out of friends'  homes for a couple of years, she moved in with a boyfriend who was a registered sex offender, and her mental illness rendered her unable to provide a stable, safe home for her children. In re Roderick R., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 192 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 11, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support the termination of the parents'  rights based on abandonment by failure to support because the mother was deemed to be aware of her obligation to support her children, the father was making child support payments for his other children, the parents were employed for the majority of the pertinent time period, and the children's foster parents testified that they received no support from the parents. In re Kah'Nyia J., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 238 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2018).

Clear and convincing evidence supported the termination of the mother's parental rights based on abandonment by failure to establish a suitable home because it showed that the Tennessee Department of Children's Services provided her with a multitude of services in four months following the removal of the child, she made little to no effort to free herself from drugs, and she only sporadically attended counseling. The evidence showed that because the mother continued to associate with the father, despite the domestic violence he inflicted on her, it was unlikely that she would be able to provide a suitable home for the child at an early date. In re Isaiah B., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 247 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 8, 2018).

Evidence was insufficient to support the termination of mother's parental rights based on abandonment for failure to support because there was no proof introduced of the mother's income, employment (or willful unemployment), or expenses during the relevant time period from which the court could conclude that she had the capacity to pay support. In re Ethan B., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 303 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 30, 2018).

Evidence was insufficient to support the termination of mother's parental rights based on abandonment for failure to visit because the record did not contain clear and convincing proof that the mother's failure to visit was willful, as there was no proof as to the mother's capacity to visit or lack of an excuse for not visiting during the relevant period. In re Ethan B., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 303 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 30, 2018).

Trial court erred by terminating the father's parental rights based on abandonment because once DNA testing confirmed the father to be the child's biological father he maintained consistent visitation with her and although the father did not pay any child support, the DCS failed to establish that he had the ability to pay support, as there was no proof as to his income and expenses. In re Natascha B., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 614 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 23, 2018).

Evidence was insufficient to support the termination of the mother's parental rights based on abandonment by willful failure to provide a suitable home because the record contained no order expressly adjudicating the children dependent and neglected. In re Francis R., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 623 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 25, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support the termination of the mother's parental rights based on abandonment by willful failure to support because she admitted that she willfully chose not to pay child support, and there was no evidence that she had any justification or infirmity, other than her drug addiction, to preclude her from obtaining gainful employment. In re Francis R., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 623 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 25, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's termination of the father's parental rights based on abandonment for failure to visit because it showed that visitation was offered but the father refused the conditions because he felt uncomfortable, he only offered a day's  notice when requesting a suitable time to see the child, and while he saw the child out in the community, those visits were token in nature. In re Ruger N., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 659 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 9, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's termination of the father's parental rights based on abandonment for nonsupport because the father admitted at the hearing that he had a duty to remit support, he had the capacity to remit support, and that he failed to do so because the mother refused his request for visitation. In re Ruger N., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 659 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 9, 2018).

Tennessee Department of Children's Services failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence the ground of abandonment by wanton disregard for the welfare of the children because there was no evidence that the father had any knowledge of one child when he committed the robbery and the record contained no evidence of conduct by the father showing a wanton disregard for the welfare of the children other than the robbery. In re Lailonnii J., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 89 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 19, 2019).

Clear and convincing evidence supported the trial court's termination of the mother's parental rights based on abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home because the mother took no action to establish a suitable home until mid-2018 and she lost that home due to failure to pay rent. In re Boston G., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 194 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 29, 2020).

Clear and convincing evidence supported the trial court's termination of the mother's parental rights based on abandonment by an incarcerated parent because it showed that prior to her incarceration the mother only visited the child once. In re Boston G., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 194 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 29, 2020).

Clear and convincing evidence supported the trial court's termination of the father's parental rights based on abandonment by exhibiting wanton disregard for the child's welfare because the father had an extensive list of criminal convictions and in several instances his pre-incarceration interactions with the mother were violent. In re Boston G., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 194 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 29, 2020).

Even though the trial court err by applying two different four-month periods, as the grandparents'  amended petition did not set forth separate or distinct allegations, the error was harmless because the ground of failure to support was proven by clear and convincing evidence, as the mother conceded she never paid the grandparents any child support and her sporadic gifts were token in nature. In re Ava M., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 226 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 20, 2020).

15. Determination of Abandonment.

Clear and convincing evidence supported terminating a mother's parental rights on grounds of abandonment by wanton disregard because the mother refused to show concern for the eight-month-old child's physical health, specifically his nutritional health and weight, which demonstrated a broader pattern of conduct that rendered the mother unfit; the mother missed a recheck appointment after a pediatrician expressed concern about the child's low weight and poor growth rate. In re Jaden W., — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. App. LEXIS 856 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 26, 2014), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 280 (Tenn. Mar. 25, 2015).

Clear and convincing evidence supported terminating a father's parental rights on grounds of abandonment by wanton disregard because the father abused prescription pain and anxiety medications in the family home, had to “doctor shop” in order to obtain the medication, and nutritionally and medically neglected the eight-month-old child. In re Jaden W., — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. App. LEXIS 856 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 26, 2014), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 280 (Tenn. Mar. 25, 2015).

Clear and convincing evidence supported terminating a mother's and a father's parental rights on grounds of abandonment by failure to provide suitable housing because, despite myriad services, in-home counseling, and ample opportunity, there was a general lack of progress in the areas of housekeeping and personal hygiene, and the parents continued to struggle with basic parenting skills; the children's clothes smelled of urine and the parents were hoarders. In re Kim C., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 106 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 6, 2015).

Evidence was insufficient to support the termination of the mother's parental rights for abandonment for failure to support where the testimony of the service worker did not show the mother's ability to prove support for her son during the applicable four month period. In re Malaki E., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 143 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 23, 2015).

Evidence was sufficient to support the termination of the mother's rights for failure to provide a suitable home where her whereabouts were unknown for several months even though she knew that her son was in the custody of Tennessee Department of Children's Services and she failed to visit him or advise the Department of her whereabouts. In re Malaki E., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 143 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 23, 2015).

It was not error to find a mother's visitation with the mother's child during a relevant period was “token,” for purposes of termination of parental rights, because (1) the mother visited only twice, (2) the mother's claim of lack of transportation was unavailing, and (3) the mother did not address the finding on appeal. In re Alexis B., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 220 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 14, 2015).

Although the petition to terminate a mother's parental rights failed to specifically allege the ground of abandonment by an incarcerated parent, the ground was tried by the mother's implied consent because, inter alia, the father's attorney questioned mother and other witnesses regarding mother's contact with the children, her payment of support, and the time she spent in jail during the four month period of time preceding the filing of the termination petition. In re D.H.B., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 238 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 23, 2015).

Evidence supported a trial court's ruling that a parent abandoned the parent's children by failing to establish a suitable home because, when the children were removed while the parent was incarcerated after testing positive for drugs, they were staying at a camper that lacked both space and food. Furthermore, the parent did not make any significant strides, notwithstanding efforts in assisting the parent, towards providing suitable housing following release. In re Roger T., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 261 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 27, 2015).

Statutorily determinative period applicable to consideration of the mother's alleged failure to visit and support the child began four months immediately preceding her incarceration; this determinative period would apply even under the assumption, arguendo, that Mother's incarceration ended on December 17, 2013, because she was nonetheless incarcerated for part of the four months immediately preceding the filing of the petition on January 28, 2014. In re Kayden H., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 493 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 23, 2015).

Four-month determinative period was not applicable to the ground of abandonment through wanton disregard for the child's welfare because consideration of this ground required consideration of the mother's conduct throughout the child's life prior to the mother's incarceration. In re Kayden H., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 493 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 23, 2015).

Clear and convincing evidence supported terminating a mother's parental rights for abandonment, due to a failure to establish a suitable home and lack of concern, because, in the four months preceding the filing of the termination petition, the mother did not have a stable residence and did not visit the children, and the mother's failure to arrive on time for the termination hearing showed a continued lack of concern for the children. In re A.C.S., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 767 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 23, 2015).

Evidence was not clear and convincing that an unmarried parent abandoned the parent's children by willfully failing to visit them because the parent did visit the children during the four months preceding the parent's incarceration, including overnight on a weekend, and apparently sought to continue visitation following an altercation with the other parent. The parent's overnight visit constituted more than a token visit. In re Malina W., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 799 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 29, 2015).

Evidence preponderated against the trial court's findings that an unmarried parent failed to support the parent's children in the four months preceding the parent's incarceration because the evidence was undisputed that the parent did provide monetary support for the children during the relevant time period. Specifically, the parent's payment of $1,300, from the parent's income tax return, to the other parent during the four months preceding incarceration was more than a token amount, given the parent's means. In re Malina W., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 799 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 29, 2015).

Termination of a parent's parental rights to a minor child, on the ground of abandonment by willful failure to visit, was appropriate because the parent failed to visit the child during the four month period immediately preceding the filing of the petition to terminate the parent's rights and for adoption of the child. Although the parent filed a petition seeking visitation, when the parent alleged interference with visitation had occurred, the petition was dismissed for the parent's failure to advance the petition. In re B.C., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 964 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 11, 2015).

Trial court's finding that the paternal grandparents had not proven that the mother's failure to visit was willful for purposes of abandonment under T.C.A. § 36-1-102(1)(E) was affirmed where there was no clear and convincing evidence as to the exact requirements the mother was required to meet, and there was evidence that the mother had completed an alcohol and drug treatment plan during the four-month period. In re Destiny H., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 139 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 24, 2016).

Because there was no dispute that Mother was incarcerated at the time of the filing of the termination petition, either of two abandonment definitions contained in the statute could apply in this case; although the latter definition was not pleaded, as the parties discussed the mother's visitation at length and neither party objected to evidence in this regard, it was considered whether the mother willfully failed to visit in the four months prior to her incarceration. In re Addison P., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 345 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 20, 2016).

Trial court was not entitled to terminate the mother's parental rights on the ground of abandonment by an incarcerated parent through wanton disregard because the termination petition did not sufficiently allege this ground, it was not referenced in the trial court's prior order, and it was not tried by implied consent. In re Addison P., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 345 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 20, 2016).

While the trial court did find that the mother did not visit the child, there was no finding that the mother's failure to do so was willful; because no other grounds were found by the trial court and sustained on appeal, the case was remanded for the trial court to address the willfulness issue. In re Addison P., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 345 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 20, 2016).

Trial court erred by terminating parental rights based on a parent having abandoned the parent's children, as the parent failed to provide any child support while the children were in foster care, because the evidence was less than clear and convincing that the parent willfully failed to support the children as the parent, during the applicable four month period, was unemployed, apparently lived with various friends and family members, did not have a high school education, and was out of the work force during marriage. In re Bailey W., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 408 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 10, 2016).

Clear and convincing evidence supported terminating a mother's parental rights due to abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home because the mother (1) did not make use of the Department of Children's Services'  efforts to assist the mother, (2) had no stable home, and (3) continued to abuse drugs and alcohol. In re S.D.D., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 532 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 26, 2016).

Although the trial court erred in terminating the father's parental rights based on abandonment by wanton disregard and for failure to support the children, termination of the father's parental rights was proper based on abandonment by willfully failing to visit the children because the father did not visit the children during the four months immediately preceding the filing of the petition to terminate the father's rights; and the father was released from prison in late 2014, but up until the time of the hearing on November 19, 2015, he had not visited with the children a single time. In re Keith W., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 557 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 3, 2016).

Evidence did not support a finding that a father abandoned the father's children by failing to provide a suitable home because the father obtained sufficient housing during the relevant time period and maintained appropriate housing through trial. Moreover, there was insufficient evidence that the father's relationship with mother, who had a problem with the use of drugs, rendered the father's home unsuitable. In re Jeramyah H., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 819 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 31, 2016).

Clear and convincing evidence supported terminating a father's parental rights on grounds of abandonment because the father, even before the father's incarceration, both willfully failed to visit, as the father failed to fulfill the father's responsibilities under the permanency plan to prove to the court the father was ready to resume visitation once it was suspended, and engaged in conduct exhibiting a wanton disregard for the welfare of the child. In re Mac L., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 883 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 22, 2016).

Abandonment was a ground for terminating a father's parental rights because clear and convincing evidence showed that the father engaged in conduct prior to the father's incarceration that evidenced a wanton disregard for the welfare of the father's children as the father engaged in criminal conduct, substance abuse, reckless behavior, and was incarcerated at times. Because of this conduct and behavior, the father was unable to establish a stable father-child relationship with the father's children. In re Casyn B., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 361 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 26, 2017).

Termination of a mother's parental rights under T.C.A. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(ii) was appropriate where the Department of Children's Services had made reasonable efforts to assist her in establishing a suitable home, and the mother continued to use drugs and made no corresponding efforts to remedy her living situation. In re Michael B., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 545 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 3, 2017).

Grounds for termination of a father's parental rights existed because there was clear and convincing evidence that the father was willful in the father's failure to provide support and to visit the children during the relevant statutory period as neither the mother, nor circumstances outside the father's control prevented the father from visiting and providing support to the children. Accordingly, the trial court on remand was to determine whether termination of the father's parental rights was in the children's best interests. In re James D., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 56 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 7, 2020).

16. Reasonable Efforts.

Department of children's services made reasonable efforts toward reunification where, upon receiving custody of the child, the Department met with the father to address his criminal issues and prescription drug abuse, and made reasonable efforts to find a family member to care for the child. In re Robert C., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 58 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 3, 2015).

Record preponderated in favor of the trial court's finding that the Tennessee Department of Children's Services (DCS) satisfied its requirement to make reasonable efforts to assist the parents, given in part that DCS funded an in-home service provider to help the family, DCS conducted numerous home visits, kept the parents apprised of the children's doctor appointments, and when the children were removed, DCS made numerous foster home visits to ensure that the children's needs were being met. In re Derrick J., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 477 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 8, 2016).

Children's case worker testified that the department paid for homemaker services, clinical assessment, and pest control, plus, in part, provided gas cards and transportation to attend the children's appointments; there was clear proof that the department made reasonable efforts to assist the mother, who failed to avail herself of these opportunities. In re Jasmine B., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 709 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 22, 2016).

Reunification efforts by the Tennessee Department of Children's Services (DCS) were reasonable because, given the services which the DCS provided, which included drug and alcohol counseling, psychological evaluations, and bus passes, and the fact that, for a long period of time, a father was not in communication with the DCS, the efforts by the DCS to assist the father exceeded the father's efforts in the case. In re Ja'miya T., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 206 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 28, 2017).

Actions of the Tennessee Department of Children's Services to assist a mother in establishing a suitable home were reasonable because the Department submitted an affidavit of reasonable efforts by its representative, detailing the services provided during the four months after the children's removal from the home; the Department developed a permanency plan, and it provided the mother with money to pay pay overdue utility bills in order to help her obtain suitable housing. In re Billy T.W., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 641 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 27, 2017).

Juvenile court erred in terminating a father's parental rights on the ground of abandonment for failure to provide a suitable home because the Tennessee Department of Children's Services failed to meet its burden of proof on the question of reasonable efforts in that the appellate court was not able to determine from the testimony of a caseworker when the assistance was actually provided and whether the assistance was rendered within the four-month period following removal or some time thereafter. In re Isabella G., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 667 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 3, 2017).

In connection with the termination ground of lack of a suitable home, the department's efforts were found to be reasonable given the circumstances of the case, and thus the termination judgment was not disturbed on the basis of an alleged lack of reasonable efforts by the department. In re Da'Vante M., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 797 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 12, 2017).

There was clear and convincing evidence to establish that a mother abandoned the mother's child by failing to provide a suitable home. Furthermore, the record did not support the mother's claim that the Tennessee Department of Children's Services failed to assist the mother in securing suitable housing as the record showed that the mother simply failed to accept the assistance provided. In re Jabari B., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 60 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 2, 2018).

Tennessee Department of Children's Services'  (DCS) effort were reasonable where it attempted to assist the mother for well over a year before filing the petition to terminate her parental rights, DCS applied for funding and provided her with access to a parenting assessment, paid for an expensive bed for her disabled child, visited the mother monthly, made recommendations as how she could make her home suitable for the children, and invited her to all family meetings, foster care meetings, and permanency plan meetings. The mother's refusal to provide DCS with a release form so that it could obtain her medical records hindering DCS's attempts to offer her additional assistance. In re Roderick R., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 192 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 11, 2018).

17. Wanton Disregard.

Logically, a person cannot disregard or display indifference about someone whom he does not know exists, and while the statutory reference to “the child” can mean a child in utero, the wanton disregard language must be construed to require that the father has knowledge of the child at the time his actions constituting wanton disregard are taken; a father cannot exercise wanton disregard for the welfare of a child if he does not know the child exists, and in this case, the guardian ad litem did not prove that the father had such knowledge, and the holding that he abandoned the child was reversed. In re Anthony R., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 459 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 9, 2015).

Father's parental rights were properly terminated due to his wanton disregard for the welfare of his children since the father was involved in criminal behavior, he almost immediately violated his probation, and he committed domestic violence against his pregnant wife; moreover, the father was in substantial noncompliance with the statement of responsibilities in a permanency plan because he did not provide proof of housing or a legal means of income, he did not arrange a psychological evaluation or set up a drug and alcohol assessment, and he did not visit his children. Termination was in the best interest of the children based on the father's history of drugs and violence and the fact that the children were doing well in foster care. In re Lilly C., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 141 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 25, 2016).

No case law was found holding that a person acts with wanton disregard by conceiving the child, regardless of the criminal and social history of the individuals involved, and the trial court's reasoning to the contrary was rejected; the father's actions in committing crimes and failing to send the mother any money were actions that occurred after his incarceration, and wanton disregard considers a parent's conduct prior to incarceration, and his actions then were insufficient to establish that he acted with wanton disregard for the child's welfare. In re F.N.M., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 274 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 11, 2016).

Trial court erred in terminating the father's parental rights based on abandonment by wanton disregard because the father was released from incarceration in October 2014, and the petition to terminate was not filed until June 2015; and the father was not incarcerated at the time of the filing of the petition or during the four months immediately preceding the institution of the action. In re Keith W., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 557 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 3, 2016).

Although the wanton disregard statute applies only when the parent has knowledge of the child in question, this is based on the statutory language that requires that the parent disregard the child; conversely, termination for incarceration for 10 years is not based on the parent's actions or knowledge, but is based on the parent's status, having received a prison sentence of ten or more years, and thus the father's knowledge of the child at the time of sentencing was irrelevant. In re Adrianna S., 520 S.W.3d 548, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 734 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 29, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 180 (Tenn. Mar. 14, 2017).

Trial court properly found that the father abandoned the child based on his engagement in conduct prior to incarceration that exhibited a wanton disregard for the welfare of the child; since the child was approximately 21 months old, the father had engaged in a pattern of criminal activity, which has culminated in a prison sentence of approximately 15 years. In re Maddox C., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 860 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 9, 2016).

State proved the grounds of wanton disregard against father, given that he had 19 judgments resulting from felonies, to which he pleaded guilty, he was incarcerated when the children were removed from the home, he violated his probation, and he continued to be charged with other crimes. In re Dustin T., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 876 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 17, 2016).

Termination of the father's parental rights based on abandonment due to wanton disregard for the welfare of the child was proper, as the evidence showed that the father pled guilty to two counts of attempted child rape, with one victim being the child at issue In re Addison B., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 913 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2016).

Mother's parental rights were terminated for abandonment because her actions prior to her incarceration exhibited a wanton disregard for the welfare of the children; the mother's criminal convictions, probation violations, incarceration, and substance abuse placed her children in danger, and her actions showed a failure to act in the interest of her children on a consistent basis. Termination was in the best interest of the children because the mother continued to use drugs, she was unable to care for the children in a safe and stable manner, and it was difficult for her to maintain a meaningful relationship with the children due to her criminal behavior. In re A.B., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 43 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 24, 2017).

Given the father's multiple theft convictions, his decision to expose the child to criminal activity, and his decision to evade law enforcement, his conduct prior to incarceration exhibited a wanton disregard for the welfare of the child and supported termination of the father's rights. In re Colton R., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 88 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 7, 2017).

It was error to find an incarcerated father abandoned the father's child by wanton disregard of the child's welfare because (1) the father's criminal conduct occurred before the child was born, and (2) the father's prison discipline did not fall under the purview of the applicable statute. In re Jeremiah N., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 283 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 2, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 432 (Tenn. July 21, 2017).

It was not error to find an incarcerated father abandoned the father's child by wanton disregard of the child's welfare because, after he learned of the child's mother's pregnancy, he was charged with a probation violation and otherwise engaged in criminal behavior, including aggravated domestic assault and resisting arrest, and he was convicted of the offense for which he was currently incarcerated before the child's birth. In re Jeremiah N., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 283 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 2, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 432 (Tenn. July 21, 2017).

Record was indicative of the father's patterns of criminal behavior, drug abuse, incarceration, and refusal to financially support the child, which amounted to a wanton disregard for the child's welfare, and this ground for termination under T.C.A. § 36-1-113 was established by clear and convincing evidence. In re Wesley P., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 301 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 12, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 400 (Tenn. July 6, 2017).

Termination of the father's parental rights was improper on the grounds of substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan and willful failure to visit, but proper on the ground of wanton disregard based on abandonment by an incarcerated parent because the mother testified to the abuse perpetrated by the father upon her while she was pregnant with the child; and the abuse described by the mother was of an especially cruel nature and directly imperiled the child as the father pushed her down some steps and she landed directly on her stomach, beat her with extension cords, and held her hostage at the home without allowing her to seek medical attention for her injuries and medical attention to assist with the birth of the child. In re Kenya H., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 452 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 5, 2017).

Termination of the mother's rights based on abandonment by wanton disregard under T.C.A. §§ 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv), 36-1-113 was proper; the mother's chronic drug abuse and inability to maintain sobriety, plus her criminal behavior and unstable housing exhibited a wanton disregard for the welfare of her children. In re Quintin S., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 480 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 13, 2017).

Plain language of T.C.A. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv) does not require a dependency and neglect order to base a termination of parental rights on the ground of abandonment by wanton disregard. In re Quintin S., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 480 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 13, 2017).

For termination based on abandonment by wanton disregard, T.C.A. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv) requires that wanton disregard be based upon the parent's conduct prior to incarceration, and the trial court erred in focusing on actions that occurred subsequent to the department's removal of the child from the mother's custody. In re Quintin S., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 480 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 13, 2017).

Termination of the father's rights based on abandonment by wanton disregard under T.C.A. §§ 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv), 36-1-113 was proper; while he exhibited the ability to provide support, his criminal behavior, probation violations, substance abuse, and incarcerations exhibited a wanton disregard for the child's welfare. In re Quintin S., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 480 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 13, 2017).

Trial court properly found that a mother exhibited a wanton disregard for her child's welfare because the mother displayed a broad pattern of criminal behavior and drug abuse. In re Mya V., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 511 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 28, 2017).

Termination of parental rights was appropriate because the parents engaged in conduct prior to incarceration that exhibited a wanton disregard for their children's welfare in that one child tested positive for opiates at birth, the mother did not begin to address the mother's drug addiction until one year after the child's birth, the mother engaged in criminal conduct that led to the mother's arrest almost on a continual basis, the father voluntarily left the children with the father's mother, and the father was convicted multiple times. In re Isabella G., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 667 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 3, 2017).

Termination of the father's parental rights was proper based on abandonment based on behavior that demonstrated a wanton disregard for the welfare of his children because he was incarcerated beginning in March 2016, and was still incarcerated at the time of the termination proceeding in May 2017; the father's history of criminal behavior began well before the birth of the children but did not abate after their births; just one month after the children's removal, in September 2015, the father was charged with vandalism and, in March 2016, convicted of violating his probation; and he failed drug screenings after the children were removed, and admitted to consistent drug abuse until he was incarcerated in March 2016. In re Aaralyn O., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 14 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 18, 2018).

Based on the father's string of criminal behavior, termination of his parental rights on the ground of wanton disregard for the child's welfare prior to his incarceration was proper because, during the relevant time period between the father learning of the mother's pregnancy and his incarceration, the father committed seven felony auto burglaries and one misdemeanor theft. In re Bentley D., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 153 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 21, 2018).

Evidence was clear and convincing that the mother's conduct exhibited a wanton disregard for the children's welfare and termination proper; two of the children tested positive for drugs, another child was born with drugs in her system, the mother relapsed twice after treatment, and she was incarcerated at different times during the pendency of this action. In re Mc, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 332 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 20, 2018).

Termination of the father's parental rights was proper based on abandonment through wanton disregard of the child's welfare because the father had been involved in criminal activity and been convicted of some offenses after the child's birth; he had not consistently financially supported the child; and he had not paid child support since April 2015. In re Amynn K., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 343 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 20, 2018).

Father's conduct evidenced wanton disregard for the well-being of the child and constituted grounds to terminate his parental rights; the father was aware of his duty to visit, yet he had willfully not visited the child in the four month period prior to his incarceration, plus he had been incarcerated within four months of the petition to terminate being filed, and thus he engaged in drug abuse and criminal activities rather than making progress towards reunifying with his child. In re Charles T., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 501 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 28, 2018).

There was clear evidence to support termination of the mother's parental rights on the ground of abandonment by wanton disregard; the mother's criminal record was prolific, particularly troubling was the manufacture of methamphetamine and endangerment charges because the child was in the house where the drugs were being made, and the mother admitted to taking drugs during her pregnancy despite the fact that she had lost custody of her first child by the same action. In re Hayden L, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 515 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2018).

Father abandoned the child by engaging in conduct prior to incarceration that exhibited a wanton disregard for her welfare; the child languished in custody while the father continued in his criminal behavior and continually failed to adequately address his substance abuse issues. In re Kaycee M., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 585 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 3, 2018).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was proper based on abandonment through wanton disregard for the children's welfare because the mother never attended counseling to address her own history as a domestic violence victim; the mother repeatedly engaged in conduct that resulted in her incarceration and negatively affected the children; and the mother failed to make any monetary payments toward the financial support of the children. In re Steven W., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 693 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 28, 2018).

Trial court's determination that petitioners proved abandonment by engaging in conduct prior to incarceration that exhibited a wanton disregard for the welfare of the child was supported by the mother's multiple arrests and incarcerations and multiple probation violations. In re Johnathan M., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 10 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 8, 2019).

Trial court correctly concluded that the mother abandoned her children by engaging in conduct that would exhibit a wanton disregard for the children, given that she continued to use drugs after the children's removal, she was incarcerated twice on different charges, and before her incarceration, she did not once visit the children, plus she willfully made no child support payments. In re Gabriella H., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 12 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 8, 2019).

Clear and convincing evidence showed a mother's abandonment of her child by wanton disregard because the evidence showed she (1) was in and out of jail, (2) never provided stable housing or an appropriate environment for the child, (3) did not address being a domestic violence victim, and (4) did not obtain recommended treatment and continued to relapse. In re J'Khari F., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 60 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2019).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was proper on the ground of wanton disregard for the children's welfare because she violated her probation, engaged in criminal behavior, abused drugs, and failed to properly care for the children as none of the children had ever been to a dentist, and they all had serious problems with their teeth; they were behind on their immunizations when they went with the mother to the shelter; and, the eldest, who was seven years old when the children were removed from the mother's care, had never been to school. In re Trey S., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 303 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 20, 2019).

Termination of the father's parental rights was proper on the ground of wanton disregard for the children's welfare because he was physically abusive to the mother in front of his daughter; at the time of trial, he had charges pending against him for manufacturing between 10 and 70 pounds of a controlled substance while the children were on their trial home visit; and evidence was presented that he was altering his urine drug tests. In re Trey S., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 303 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 20, 2019).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was proper based on the ground of abandonment through wanton disregard because she was incarcerated during the entire four months preceding the termination petition; prior to her incarceration, she used drugs without a prescription, and she was arrested and convicted of theft, DUI, and aggravated assault; and she stayed with her boyfriend and agreed to the supervised visitation. In re Khloe B., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 415 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 26, 2019).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was proper based on the ground of abandonment by wanton disregard for the child because the mother was incarcerated at various points during the four months before the termination petition was filed; she admitted to using cocaine while pregnant; and she used drugs, violated her probation, and was unable to supervise the child. In re Jayda S., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 416 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 26, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support the termination of the father's parental rights based on his exhibiting a wanton disregard for the child's welfare because it was undisputed that he was arrested multiple times in Tennessee after the child's birth and he admitted that he violated the terms of his probation again after being released in 2014. These acts, when coupled with his history of criminal behavior before the child's birth, demonstrated a pattern of conduct that rendered the father unfit to parent the child. In re Travis R., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 557 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 13, 2019).

Termination of parental rights for abandonment by wanton disregard was appropriate because a father was incarcerated when the termination petition was filed or during all or part of the four months immediately preceding the institution of the action and the father engaged in conduct prior to incarceration that exhibited a wanton disregard for the welfare of the children, as the father failed to visit or support the children during the periods of non-incarceration and had pending criminal charges. In re Nevaeh B., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 133 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2020).

Evidence was clear and convincing that the father abandoned the child by engaging in conduct that exhibited a wanton disregard for her welfare because he was incarcerated, and he engaged in parole violations, substance abuse, and assaulted the child's mother. In re Isabella W., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 200 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 29, 2020).

Tennessee law requires more to sustain the ground of wanton disregard than just incarceration; if a parent's actions resulting in incarceration always are sufficient to show wanton disregard, the Tennessee General Assembly would just need to say incarceration alone is a ground for termination of parental rights, but it has not done so. The court thus vacated termination based on the ground of wanton disregard. In re Trinity H., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 388 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 28, 2020).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was proper because she was incarcerated from November 2018 through April 2019, which was during part of the four months preceding the filing of the petition; and she exhibited wanton disregard for the child's welfare as she admitted to drug use while pregnant with the child, and she engaged in criminal behavior while the child was in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Children's Services, resulting in the violation of her probation and hindering her ability to complete the requirements of her permanency plan. In re Kash F., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 399 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 4, 2020).

18. Prospective Adoptive Parent.

Grandmother lacked standing to petition to terminate the mother's parental rights; the extended family member had to be caring for a related child, but she was not, plus she could not be considered a prospective adoptive parent because to adopt the child, the grandmother would have to terminate the rights to her son and daughter, the mother, and the petition made clear that she had no such intention. In re Ava B., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 296 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 27, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 509 (Tenn. July 1, 2016).

Because the foster parents had physical custody of the child at the time the petition was filed, the foster parents had standing to file and pursue their adoption petition. In re Neveah W., 525 S.W.3d 223, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 77 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 3, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 276 (Tenn. May 9, 2017).

19. Child Abuse.

Child was severely abused as a result of manufacturing of methamphetamine in the home and testing positive for methamphetamine; because the father was found to have committed severe abuse as defined in T.C.A. § 36-1-102 under a prior court order, this ground for termination under T.C.A. § 36-1-113 was established by clear and convincing evidence. In re Wesley P., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 301 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 12, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 400 (Tenn. July 6, 2017).

Mother tested positive for amphetamine and her child tested positive for methamphetamine and amphetamine when she was born; termination of the mother's rights on severe child abuse grounds was proper. In re Mc, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 332 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 20, 2018).

Because the mother did not appeal the trial court's earlier order regarding severe child abuse of the older three children, the issue of whether her parental rights could be terminated as to those child on the ground of severe child abuse was res judicata. In re Mc, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 332 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 20, 2018).

20. Abandonment.

Trial court erred in terminating the mother's rights for abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home under T.C.A. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(ii); the department made reasonable efforts to assist the mother to find suitable housing, and she had been living in an acceptable home, had been drug-free for six months, and was employed, and thus the department failed to show that the mother demonstrated lack of concern to such a degree that it appeared unlikely she would be able to provide a suitable home. In re Quintin S., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 480 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 13, 2017).

Trial court properly terminated a mother's parental rights on the ground of abandonment because the record clearly and convincingly established that her failure to pay support was willful; the mother was aware of her child support obligation, and she had the ability to pay because she was employed. In re Brantley B., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 720 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 30, 2017).

Juvenile court properly terminated a father's parental rights based on abandonment because, while the father knew the whereabouts of his child, for most of the child's life, the father was content to allow others to care for him, the father had not written, visited, or sent money or gifts for five years and only called once, the child had enjoyed a stable, loving home environment with a foster parent for two years who wanted to adopt him, and it was unclear when, if ever, the father would be in a position to provide a safe and appropriate home for his child. In re Jonathan M., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 626 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 26, 2018).

Evidence was insufficient to support the trial court's termination of the mother's parental rights based on abandonment for willful failure to support because the mother's acknowledgment during her deposition that she had between $80 and $100 extra per month was not introduced into evidence and there was no competent evidence in the record showing that the mother had the ability to provide support. In re Alexis S., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 526 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 29, 2019).

Trial court failed to make sufficient specific findings to support its termination of the mother's parental rights based on abandonment for willful failure to visit because the trial court made no specific findings of fact regarding the frequency, duration, or quality of the mother's visits. In re Alexis S., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 526 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 29, 2019).

21. Persistent Conditions.

Trial court erred in terminating a mother's parental rights on the ground of persistence of conditions because the record contained no adjudication or any finding the child was dependent and neglected; given the high standard of proof applicable, the court of appeals could not assume that the requirement that there be a finding that the child was dependent, neglected, or abused had been met or that there was clear and convincing evidence that he was found to be dependent or abused. In re Brantley B., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 720 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 30, 2017).

36-1-103. Prior adoptions and terminations of parental rights involving minors and prior adoptions of adults ratified.

  1. All proceedings for the adoption of children in the courts of this state, including any proceedings that terminated parental or guardianship rights, are hereby validated and confirmed and the orders and judgments entered therein prior to January 1, 1996, are declared to be binding upon all parties to the proceedings and such parties' privies and all other persons, until such orders or judgments shall be vacated as provided by law; provided, that this section does not apply to adoption proceedings or terminations of parental rights proceedings actually pending on January 1, 1996, in which the validity of a prior adoption or termination of parental rights proceeding is at issue.
  2. Adoptions and terminations of parental rights pending on January 1, 1996, and surrenders and consents executed prior to January 1, 1996, shall be governed by prior existing law.
  3. All adoptions of persons who are adults as of January 1, 1996, that were completed before January 1, 1996, in the courts of this state, pursuant to the then-existing provisions of this part, are hereby in all things ratified and confirmed.
  4. Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, surrenders taken and adoptions filed on or after January 1, 1996, and before October 1, 1996, which complied with the prior adoption law that was in effect on December 31, 1995, are in all things ratified and confirmed and shall be valid and lawful; provided, that this section does not apply to adoption proceedings or terminations of parental rights proceedings actually pending on January 1, 1996, in which the validity of a prior adoption or termination of parental rights proceeding is at issue. It is the intent of the general assembly to prevent any declaration of invalidity of any surrenders or adoptions taken or filed on or after January 1, 1996, and before October 1, 1996, for failure to properly comply with the provisions of Chapter 532 of the Public Acts of 1995, which took effect on January 1, 1996, and which amended prior adoption law and procedures. This section is remedial legislation and shall have retrospective effect in order to promote the public welfare and to preserve the permanency of adoptive placements for children.

Acts 1965, ch. 152, § 1; T.C.A., § 36-138; Acts 1978, ch. 704, § 2; T.C.A., § 36-139; § 36-1-138; Acts 1995, ch. 532, § 1; 1996, ch. 1054, § 105.

Compiler's Notes. Former § 36-1-103, concerning persons to whom part is applicable, was transferred to § 36-1-107, effective January 1, 1996.

Cross-References. “Placement” defined, § 36-1-108.

Law Reviews.

Domestic Relations — Adoption — Validity of a Legal Adoption in Tennessee, 39 Tenn. L. Rev. 361 (1971).

36-1-104. Withholding of material information concerning the status of the parents or guardian of a child subject to surrender, termination of parental rights or adoption — Misdemeanor.

Any person who, upon request by any party to an adoption or the party's agent or attorney, a licensed child-placing agency or licensed clinical social worker, the department, or the court, knowingly and willfully withholds any information related to the child who is the subject of a surrender, a termination of parental rights, or an adoption proceeding, or who knowingly and willfully withholds any material information concerning the identity, status, or whereabouts of the child's legal parent or parents, putative father, or guardian or who knowingly and willfully gives false information concerning the child or the identity, status, or whereabouts of the child's legal parent, putative father, or guardian commits a Class A misdemeanor. Nothing in this section shall be construed to require a person or agency to disclose any confidential or privileged information protected by any state or federal law or regulation.

Acts 1995, ch. 532, § 1; 1996, ch. 1054, § 16; 2019, ch. 36, § 18.

Compiler's Notes. Former § 36-1-104, concerning venue, was transferred to § 36-1-114.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment, in the first sentence, substituted “child’s legal parent or parents, putative father, or guardian” for “child’s parent or parents or a guardian or guardians”, substituted “child’s legal parent, putative father, or guardian commits” for “child’s parent or parents or guardian or guardians commits”, substituted “in this section shall be construed to require a person or agency to disclose any confidential or privileged information” for “herein shall be construed to require any person or agency to disclose any information, the confidentiality or privilege of which is” in the second sentence.

Effective Dates. Acts 2019, ch. 36, § 35. July 1, 2019.

Cross-References. Confidentiality of public records, § 10-7-504.

Penalty for Class A misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

36-1-105. Violation of criminal provisions of part by state employee — Dismissal.

Any employee of the state of Tennessee who is convicted of the violation of any of the criminal provisions of this part shall be instantly dismissed from the state service and shall never again be eligible for employment in state service.

Acts 1995, ch. 532, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Former § 36-1-105, concerning petition for adoption, was transferred to § 36-1-115.

36-1-106. Readoption.

  1. Any minor child who was previously adopted under the laws of any jurisdiction may be subsequently readopted in accordance with this part.
  2. With respect to a child sought to be adopted a second time or subsequent time by new adoptive parents, all provisions in this part relating to the biological parents or legal parents or guardians shall apply to the prior adoptive parents, except that in no case of readoption shall a biological or legal parent or guardian whose rights were previously terminated before the child was initially adopted and whose rights were not subsequently restored be made a party to the new adoption proceeding, nor shall such person's surrender, parental consent, or waiver of interest be necessary. The prior adoptive parents whose rights have not been previously terminated and any other persons who otherwise would be entitled to notice pursuant to this part subsequent to the previous adoption of the child shall be the only necessary parties to the new termination or adoption proceedings and only their surrenders or parental consent, or the termination of their rights, shall be necessary.
    1. With respect to a child sought to be readopted under the laws of this state who has been previously adopted pursuant to the laws of a foreign country, the circuit and chancery courts are specifically authorized to enter new orders of adoption as they may be required for purposes of compliance with any requirements of the government of the United States for children who were adopted in foreign countries. In such instances, if an adoption was conducted in accordance with the laws of the foreign jurisdiction, no further termination of parental rights of the child's parents or guardians need be made, no home study need be conducted, no court report need be made and no time period for which an adoption petition must be on file before a final adoption order is entered shall be required. Further, no consultation of the putative father registry maintained by the department shall be required, and the affidavits otherwise required by § 36-1-120(b)(1) and (2) need not be filed, if the attorney, social worker, or child-placing agency, as the case may be, that provided professional services in the underlying foreign adoption, does not maintain an office in the United States.
      1. When a Tennessee resident adopts a child in a foreign country in accordance with the laws of the foreign country and such adoption is recognized as full and final by the United States government, such resident may file, with a petition, a copy of the decree, order or certificate of adoption that evidences finalization of the adoption in the foreign country, together with a certified translation of the decree, order or certificate of adoption, if it is not in English, and proof of full and final adoption from the United States government, with the clerk of the chancery or circuit court of any county in this state having jurisdiction over the person or persons filing such documents.
      2. The court shall assign a docket number and file and enter the documents referenced in subdivision (c)(2)(A) with an order recognizing such foreign adoption without the necessity of a hearing. Such order, along with the final decree, order or certificate from the foreign country, shall have the same force and effect as if a final order of readoption were granted in accordance with this part.
      3. When the order referenced in subdivision (c)(2)(B) is filed and entered, the adoptive parents may request a report of foreign birth pursuant to § 68-3-310 by submitting an application for report of foreign birth.
      4. Individuals obtaining a report of foreign birth under subdivision (c)(2)(C) are exempt from the disclosure of fees requirements of § 36-1-116(b)(16).

Acts 1951, ch. 202, § 31 (Williams, § 9572.45); T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 36-137; Acts 1978, ch. 704, § 2; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 36-138; § 36-1-137; Acts 1995, ch. 532, § 1; 1996, ch. 1054, § 17; 2003, ch. 231, § 5; 2005, ch. 137, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Former § 36-1-106 (Acts 1951, ch. 202, § 15 (Williams, § 9572.29); 1959, ch. 223, § 2; impl. am. Acts 1975, ch. 219, § 1; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 36-106; Acts 1986, ch. 767, § 6), concerning disclosure of adoption records, was repealed by Acts 1995, ch. 532, § 1.

Textbooks. Coppock on Tennessee Adoption Law, (1998-99 ed., Coppock).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Preclusion and Effect of Judgments.

As prior divorce litigation between a mother and father which was resolved by a parenting plan giving the mother visitation rights was a different cause of action than the father and stepmother's petition to terminate the mother's parental rights, res judicata did not bar the termination action. In re B. W., 397 S.W.3d 105, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 199 (Tenn. Feb. 21, 2013).

36-1-107. Persons to whom this part is applicable.

  1. Any person, irrespective of place of birth, citizenship, or place of residence, may be adopted or readopted in accordance with this part.
  2. A single person may file a petition for the adoption of a child.
  3. An adult may be adopted.

Acts 1951, ch. 202, § 3 (Williams, § 9572.17); T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 36-103; § 36-1-103; Acts 1995, ch. 532, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Former § 36-1-107 (Acts 1951, ch. 202, § 14 (Williams, § 9572.28); T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 36-107), concerning name of child used in adoption proceedings, was repealed by Acts 1995, ch. 532, § 1.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 20 Tenn. Juris., Parent and Child, § 21.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Adoption of Adults.

An adult may be adopted. Coker v. Celebrezze, 241 F. Supp. 783, 1965 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6358 (E.D. Tenn. 1965).

36-1-108. Entities authorized to place children for adoption — Advisory and agency capacity authorized — Injunction to stop illegal payments.

    1. No person, corporation, agency, or other entity, except the department or a licensed child-placing agency or licensed clinical social worker, as defined in § 36-1-102, shall engage in the placement of children for adoption; provided, that this section shall not be construed to prohibit any person from advising parents of a child or prospective adoptive parents of the availability of adoption, or from acting as an agent or attorney for the parents of a child or prospective adoptive parents in making necessary arrangements for adoption so long as no remuneration, fees, contributions, or things of value are given to or received from any person or entity for such service other than usual and customary legal and medical fees in connection with the birth of the child or other pregnancy-related expenses, or for counseling for the parents and/or the child, and for the legal proceedings related to the adoption.
    2. Only a licensed child-placing agency, as defined in § 36-1-102, a licensed clinical social worker, as defined in § 36-1-102, prospective adoptive parents, or a lawyer who is subject to the Tennessee supreme court rules regarding lawyer advertising may advertise for the placement of children for adoption in this state. In order to advertise for the placement of children for adoption in Tennessee, out-of-state licensed child placing agencies, licensed clinical social workers or lawyers must:
      1. Be authorized to do business in this state under respective licensing laws; and
      2. Maintain a physical office within this state or incur expenses involved in the transportation of a licensing consultant to the closest physical office of the agency, social worker or lawyer.
    3. Any advertisement in this state for the placement of children for adoption in another state by an agency or individual not licensed or authorized to do such business in this state shall clearly state that the agency or individual is not licensed or authorized to do such business in this state.
  1. “Placement of a child or children for adoption” means, for purposes of this section and § 36-1-109 and for licensing purposes in title 37, chapter 5, part 5, and for § 37-5-507, that a person, corporation, agency, or other entity is employed, contracted, or engaged, in any manner for any remuneration, fee, contribution, or thing of value, of any type by, or on behalf of, any person:
    1. In the selection of prospective adoptive parents for a child by determining the relative qualifications of prospective adoptive parents in a decision by that person, corporation, agency, or other entity to place any child or children, including specifically, but not limited to, the preparation of home studies, preliminary home studies, court reports for surrenders or adoptions, or the provision of supervision of a child in an adoptive home as part of the adoptive process; or
      1. In the business of arranging services or assistance directed primarily, and not as an incidental part of its primary business, toward bringing to or placing with prospective adoptive parents a child or children for the purpose of foster care leading to adoption or as an adoptive placement for a child or children, including, but not limited to, advertising for such services, accepting clients for a fee, or providing any placing services for a fee;
      2. Nothing in subdivision (b)(2)(A) shall include the provision of reasonable and necessary legal services related to the adoption proceedings, or medical or counseling services for the child or the parent in connection with the child's birth or in connection with the parent's decision to relinquish the child for adoption or for counseling services for the prospective adoptive parents.
    1. Any court of competent jurisdiction, upon the filing of a sworn complaint by the department or by a licensed child-placing agency, or by any person aggrieved, may temporarily enjoin or restrain any person, corporation, agency, or other entity from engaging or attempting to engage in placing children for adoption in violation or in threatened violation of this part or title 71, chapter 3, part 5, and upon final hearing, if the court determines that there has been a violation, or threatened violation, thereof, the injunction shall be made permanent.
    2. If the court finds that any person, corporation, agency, or other entity has engaged in the illegal placement of children for adoption, that person, corporation, agency, or other entity shall be liable for all the costs of the legal proceedings and for all attorney fees for private persons or private agencies who brought the action, or for the cost of attorney and staff time for the department, involved in the proceeding.
    1. In order to allow the prospective adoptive parents to have information available to them to permit informed choices regarding the employment of persons or entities involved in the placement of children, or in counseling, or in the provision of legal services, the department shall collect the information concerning fees or other costs charged by licensed child-placing agencies, licensed clinical social workers, attorneys, and counseling services that are disclosed in accordance with §§ 36-1-116(b)(16) and 36-1-120(b).
    2. This information shall be used by the department to develop an informational database in order for the department to provide, upon request of prospective adoptive parents or other interested persons, information concerning fees charged for home studies, placement services, counseling and legal fees. Such information shall be made available by the department in written form to any person so requesting. No employee of the department shall make any recommendation regarding or comment upon any information concerning such attorney, licensed child-placing agency or licensed clinical social worker.
    3. The department is specifically authorized to promulgate rules pursuant to the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, compiled in title 4, chapter 5, to regulate fees charged by licensed child-placing agencies and licensed clinical social workers or their practices, if it determines that the practices of those licensed child-placing agencies or licensed clinical social workers demonstrate that the fees charged are excessive or that any of the agency's practices are deceptive or misleading; provided, that such rules regarding fees shall take into account the use of any sliding fee by an agency or licensed clinical social worker that or who uses a sliding fee procedure to permit prospective adoptive parents of varying income levels to utilize the services of such agencies or persons.
    4. The department shall promulgate rules pursuant to the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act to require that all licensed child-placing agencies and licensed clinical social workers provide written disclosures to all prospective adoptive parents of any fees or other charges for each service performed by the agency or person, and file an annual report with the department that states the fees and charges for those services, and to require them to inform the department in writing forty (40) days  in advance of any proposed changes to the fees or charges for those services.
    5. The department is specifically authorized to disclose to prospective adoptive parents or other interested persons any fees charged by any licensed child-placing agency, licensed clinical social worker, attorney or counseling service or counselor for all legal and counseling services provided by that licensed child-placing agency, licensed clinical social worker, attorney or counseling service or counselor.

Acts 1951, ch. 202, § 36 (Williams, § 9572.50); impl. am. Acts 1975, ch. 219, § 1; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 36-135; Acts 1986, ch. 767, § 9; T.C.A., § 36-1-134; Acts 1995, ch. 532, § 1; 1996, ch. 1054, §§ 18, 127; 2000, ch. 981, § 54; 2009, ch. 411, § 4; 2009, ch. 519, §§ 1, 2; 2018, ch. 758, § 1; 2018, ch 875, § 36.

Compiler's Notes. Former § 36-1-108, concerning parties to proceedings, consent of parent or guardian, and service of process, was transferred to § 36-1-117.

Acts 2009, ch. 411, § 12 provided that the act, which amended §§ 36-1-102, 36-1-108, 37-1-102, 37-2-402 and added new § 37-1-183, shall apply to conduct covered by the provisions of the act that occurs on or after July 1, 2009. The eighteen (18) month time period set out in § 37-1-102(b)(12)(J) [now § 37-1-102(b)(13)(J)] shall not commence until July 1, 2009.

Amendments. The 2018 amendment by ch. 758, effective January 1, 2019, substituted “forty (40) days” for “thirty (30) days” in (d)(4).

The 2018 amendment by ch. 875 substituted “§§ 36-1-116(b)(16) and 36-1-120(b)” for “§§ 36-1-111(k)(4)(A), 36-1-116(b)(16) and 36-1-120(b)” in (d)(1).

Effective Dates. Acts 2018, ch. 758, § 2. January 1, 2019.Acts 2018, ch. 875, § 38. July 1, 2018.

Law Reviews.

New reproductive technologies: The legal problem and a solution, 49 Tenn. L. Rev. 303 (1982).

Attorney General Opinions. Role of DCS in the selection of an attorney under adoption assistance program. OAG 14-57, 2014 Tenn. AG Lexis 58 (5/20/14)

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Compensation to Surrogate Parent.

Consistent with the policies underlying T.C.A. §§ 36-1-108 and 36-1-109, the terms of a surrogacy contract pertaining to compensation will only be enforceable to the extent that they are not contingent upon the surrogate's surrender of the child or the termination of her parental rights, and to the extent that they reflect the reasonable costs of services, expenses, or injuries related to the pregnancy, the birth of the child, or other matters inherent to the surrogacy process. In re Baby, 447 S.W.3d 807, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 642 (Tenn. Sept. 18, 2014).

36-1-109. Illegal payments in connection with placement of child — Penalty.

  1. It is unlawful for any person, corporation, agency, or other entity other than the department or a licensed child-placing agency or licensed clinical social worker, as defined in § 36-1-102, that is subject to regulation by the department to:
      1. Charge or receive from or on behalf of any person or persons legally adopting or accepting a child for adoption any remuneration, fee, contribution, or thing of value whatsoever for rendering any service described in § 36-1-108 in connection with the placement of such child for adoption or in connection with the placement of such child for foster care or adoption with one other than the child's parent or parents other than that now or hereafter allowed by law;
        1. This section shall not be construed to prohibit the payment by any interested person of reasonable charges or fees for hospital or medical services for the birth of the child, or for medical care and other reasonable birth-related expenses for the mother and/or child incident thereto, for reasonable counseling fees for the parents or prospective adoptive parents and/or child, for reasonable legal services or the reasonable costs of legal proceedings related to the adoption of any child or for reasonable, actual expenses for housing, food, maternity clothing, child's clothing, utilities or transportation for a reasonable period not to exceed ninety (90) days prior to or forty-five (45) days after the birth or surrender or parental consent to the adoption of the child, unless a court with jurisdiction for the surrender or adoption of a child, based upon detailed affidavits of a birth mother and the prospective adoptive parents and such other evidence as the court may require, specifically approves in a written order, based upon a motion filed by the prospective adoptive parents for that purpose, any expenses specifically allowed in this subdivision (a)(1)(B) for a period prior to or after the periods noted above;
        2. Such expenses must be incurred directly in connection with the maternity, birth, and/or placement of the child for adoption, or for legal services or for costs of legal proceedings directly related to the adoption of the child, or for counseling for a period of up to one (1) year for the parent who surrenders the child or consents to the adoption of the child;
        3. The payment for such expenses may only be for expenses or costs actually incurred during the periods permitted in subdivisions (a)(1)(B)(i) and (ii). This shall not be construed to prohibit the actual payment or receipt of payment for such expenses or costs after those periods that were actually incurred during those periods;
    1. Sell or surrender a child to another person for money or anything of value; and it is unlawful for any person to receive such minor child for such payment of money or thing of value; provided, that nothing herein shall be construed as prohibiting any person who is contemplating adopting a child not yet born or surrendered or for whom a parental consent may be given from payment of the expenses set forth in subdivision (a)(1)(B);
    2. Having the rights and duties of a parent or guardian with respect to the care and custody of a minor child, assign or transfer such parental or guardianship rights for the purpose of, incidental to, or otherwise connected with, selling or offering to sell such rights and duties for money or anything of value; or
    3. Assist in the commission of any acts prohibited in subdivision (a)(1), (a)(2), or (a)(3).
  2. A violation of this section is a Class C felony.
  3. Any adoption completed before March 27, 1978, shall not be affected by this section.

Acts 1978, ch. 704, § 2; T.C.A., § 36-136; Acts 1992, ch. 1019, § 1; T.C.A., § 36-1-135; Acts 1995, ch. 532, § 1; 1996, ch. 1054, § 19; 2003, ch. 231, § 6.

Compiler's Notes. Former § 36-1-109, concerning parents under eighteen, was transferred to § 36-1-110.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class C felony, § 40-35-111.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Compensation to Surrogate Parent.

Consistent with the policies underlying T.C.A. §§ 36-1-108 and 36-1-109, the terms of a surrogacy contract pertaining to compensation will only be enforceable to the extent that they are not contingent upon the surrogate's surrender of the child or the termination of her parental rights, and to the extent that they reflect the reasonable costs of services, expenses, or injuries related to the pregnancy, the birth of the child, or other matters inherent to the surrogacy process. In re Baby, 447 S.W.3d 807, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 642 (Tenn. Sept. 18, 2014).

36-1-110. Parent under eighteen years of age — Surrender.

  1. A parent who has not reached eighteen (18) years of age shall have the legal capacity to surrender a child or otherwise give parental consent to adoption or execute a waiver of interest and to release such parent's rights to a child, and shall be as fully bound thereby as if the parent had attained eighteen (18) years of age.
  2. The court shall have the authority to appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor parent of a child who may be surrendered or for whom a parental consent or waiver of interest is given if deemed necessary to advise and assist the minor parent with respect to surrender, parental consent, waiver, or termination of the minor parent's parental rights.

Acts 1951, ch. 202, § 8 (Williams, § 9572.22); T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 36-109; § 36-1-109; Acts 1995, ch. 532, § 1; 1996, ch. 1054, § 20.

Compiler's Notes. Former § 36-1-110, concerning abandonment, was transferred to § 36-1-113.

Cross-References. Age of majority, § 1-3-105.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 20 Tenn. Juris., Parent and Child, §§ 20, 21.

Law Reviews.

The Tennessee Court System — Chancery Court (Frederic S. Le Clercq), 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 281 (1978).

When One Parent Goes and the Other Parent Stays: The Inconsistency and Inequality of Guaranteeing Absent Parents Permanent Parental Rights (Wendee M. Hilderbrand), 56 Vand. L. Rev. 1907 (2003).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Failure to Comply With Statutory Requirements.

A final adoption decree was res judicata, notwithstanding failure to strictly comply with the requirements of this section. Brown v. Raines, 611 S.W.2d 594, 1980 Tenn. App. LEXIS 407 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980).

2. Prior Orders.

Chancery and circuit courts may proceed with an adoption without considering the effects of a prior juvenile court order concerning custody. In re Adoption of Hart, 709 S.W.2d 582, 1984 Tenn. App. LEXIS 3000 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984).

36-1-111. Presurrender request for home study or preliminary home study — Surrender of child — Consent for adoption by parent — Effect of Surrender — Form of surrender — Waiver of interest — Interpreter for non-English speaking parents.

    1. Prior to receiving a surrender by a parent of a child or prior to the execution of a parental consent by a parent in a petition for adoption, the prospective adoptive parents shall request a licensed child-placing agency, a licensed clinical social worker, or, if indigent under federal poverty guidelines, the department, to conduct a home study or preliminary home study for use in the surrender, or parental consent proceeding, or in the adoption.
    2. A court report based upon the home study or preliminary home study must be available to the court or, when using a Tennessee surrender form, to the persons under subsection (h), (i), or (j), and, before the surrender to prospective adoptive parents is executed, the court report must be reviewed by the court or persons under those subsections in any surrender proceeding in which the surrender is not made to the department or a licensed child-placing agency. When a parental consent is executed, pursuant to § 36-1-117(g), the court report based upon the home study or preliminary home study must be filed with the adoption petition, and must be reviewed by the court before the entry of an order of guardianship giving the prospective adoptive parents guardianship of the child.
    3. All court reports submitted under this subsection (a) shall be confidential and shall not be open to inspection by any person except by order of the court entered on the minute book. The court shall, however, disclose to prospective adoptive parents any adverse court reports or information contained therein, but shall protect the identities of any person reporting child abuse or neglect in accordance with law.
    4. A surrendering party shall complete a social and medical history form as promulgated by the department of children's services, or a substantially similar form, and attach the completed and executed form to the surrendering party's pre-surrender information form.
    1. All surrenders must be made in chambers before a judge of the chancery, circuit, or juvenile court except as provided herein, and the court shall advise the person or persons surrendering the child of the right of revocation of the surrender and time for the revocation and the procedure for such revocation.
    2. A surrender form shall be legally sufficient if it contains statements comparable to the “Form of Surrender” set forth in subdivision (b)(3). The information requested on the pre-surrender information forms under subdivisions (b)(4) and (5) shall be collected, to the extent that such information is known to the surrendering or accepting party respectively, on the forms provided in subdivisions (b)(4) and (5) or by a substantially similar method and shall be attached to the surrender form proffered to the judge or officiant for execution.
    3. TENNESSEE SURRENDER FORM

      I, (full name of surrendering party)  , born (surrendering party's date of birth) , sign this surrender to end my parental rights and responsibilities to (full name of child)  , born (child's date of birth)  in (location of child's birth)  . I am this child's (circle one) mother / father / possible father / guardian.

      I surrender my parental rights to and request that this Court give guardianship to (a person/family with a current, approved home study, or a licensed child-placing agency)   .

      I know I only have three (3) days to change my mind and revoke this decision after I sign this form. This decision may not be changed if I do not revoke this surrender on or before  (three days after today, calculated under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 6.01). To revoke, I must sign a revocation form before the Judge or officiant with me now or his or her successor.

      I have completed the Surrendering Party Pre-Surrender Information Form. I have provided true and complete answers to all the questions on that form to the best of my knowledge.

      I know that I should only sign this form if I want my parental rights terminated. If I want to talk to my own lawyer before I sign this form, I should tell the Judge or other officiant now and this surrender process will stop. I can talk to my lawyer and then decide if I still want to end my parental rights.

      If anyone is putting pressure on me to sign this surrender, or trying to make me sign against my will, or has promised me something I value in order to make me want to sign this surrender, I understand that I should tell the Judge or officiant about that before I sign this form. The Judge or officiant will not allow me to be forced to sign this surrender.

      No one is pressuring, threatening, or paying me to get me to sign this form. I believe voluntary termination of my parental rights is in the best interest of my child.

      By signing below I voluntarily terminate my parental rights and surrender my child to the person(s) or agency listed above.

      This  day of  , 20 .

      Surrendering Party's Signature

      Judge or Officiant Attestation

      I interviewed the surrendering party and witnessed execution of the foregoing surrender as required by T.C.A. § 36-1-111. The surrendering party understands that he/she is surrendering parental rights to this child. There is no reason to believe that this is not a voluntary act.

      The Surrendering Party's Pre-Surrender Information Form, the surrendering party's Social and Medical History Form, and if the surrender is to an individual, or individuals, as opposed to an agency, the individual's, or individuals', court report based upon a current and approved home study are attached to this form. The Pre-Surrender Information Form and Social and Medical History Form are properly verified by a notary or I reviewed the information with the surrendering party and he/she has attested before me to the correctness of those forms.

      This  day of  , 20 .

      Judge or Officiant's Signature

      Name and Title:

      Court or Employing Institution and Location:

      ACCEPTANCE BY AGENCY or PROSPECTIVE ADOPTIVE PARENT(S)

      I/We  and  individually or I,  , on behalf of the licensed child-placing agency,  , hereby accept the surrender of  (child) from  (surrendering party) and plan to adopt the surrendered child or for an agency, expect and intend to place this child for adoption with an appropriate family. I/We or the undersigned agency have physical custody of this child or will have physical custody upon discharge of this child from a healthcare facility. I/We or the undersigned agency agree(s) to assume responsibility for obtaining guardianship of the surrendered child through a court order within thirty (30) days of the date of the surrender. I/We or the undersigned agency agree(s), to be responsible for the care, custody, financial support, medical care, education, moral, and spiritual training of this child, pending an adoption.

      I/We have completed the Accepting Party's Pre-Acceptance Information Form. The information provided in that form is true to the best of my/our knowledge.

      This  day of  , 20 .

      Signature of Prospective Adoptive Parent

      Signature of Prospective Adoptive Parent

      Signature of Agency Representative and Title

      Judge or Officiant Attestation

      I interviewed the accepting parties and witnessed execution of the foregoing acceptance.

      The Accepting Party's Pre-Acceptance Information Form and any accepting individual's/individuals' court report based upon a current and approved home study are attached to this form. The Accepting Party's Pre-Acceptance Information Form is properly verified by a notary or I reviewed the information with the accepting parties and they have attested before me to the correctness of the form.

      This  day of  , 20 .

      Judge or Officiant's Signature

      Name and Title:

      Court or Employing Institution and Location:

    4. SURRENDERING PARTY'S PRE-SURRENDER INFORMATION FORM

      STATE OF

      COUNTY OF

      Being duly sworn according to law, affiant would state:

      1.  I am:

      a.  Mother:     (Date of Birth)  or

      b.  Father:     (Date of Birth)  or

      c.  Legal Guardian:     (Date of Birth)  of

      2.

      a.  Child's Name

      b.  Child's Date of Birth

      c.  Child's Place of Birth

      d.  Child's Sex

      e.  Child's Race

      3.  This child was born in wedlock [ ] out of wedlock [ ] in wedlock but the mother's husband is not the child's biological father [ ].

      4.  State the names and relationships of any other legal parents, putative fathers, and legal guardians for this child:

      a.

    5. Telephone Number: Home:  Work:
    6. Other identifying information concerning the above identified other legal or biological parent/legal guardian.

      b.

      5.  If the above named parties' whereabouts are unknown, please describe why that is the case:

      6.  Is the child or surrendering parent or another legal parent of the child a member of a federally recognized American Indian or Alaskan Native tribe?

      If “yes,” please provide the name and address of the tribe, all available information regarding the tribal membership, including a membership number if there is one, or the basis for the belief that one may be a tribal member. If there is a tribal membership card or tribal enrollment document please provide a copy by attaching it to this form.

      7.

      a.  Will this child be sent out of Tennessee to another state for adoption?

      Yes [ ] No [ ]

      b.  If yes, name of state:

      8.  Have you been paid, received, or promised any money or other remuneration or thing of value in connection with the birth of the above-named child or placement of this child for adoption?

      Yes [ ] No [ ] If no, go to #9.

      If yes, please list the amount paid, to whom the payment was made, who made the payment, when was the payment made, and for what purpose the payment was made:

      9.  Does the child own any real or personal property? Yes [ ] No [ ] If yes, please describe property, its value, and any relevant circumstances:

      10.

      a.  I currently have (___) legal, (___) physical, or (___) legal and physical custody of the child.

      b.  If someone else has legal or physical custody of the child, please identify the person or agency that holds custody of the child and whether they have legal custody, physical custody, or both.

      For a custodian, other than the surrendering party, please list the custodians:

      Custodian(s)

      Street

      City  , State  , Zip

      Telephone Number: Home:  Work:

      11.

      a.  There may be state assistance-money, classes, health insurance, food aid and such, available to help you if you parent the child yourself.

      b.  There is counseling available if you want to talk to a counselor about your choice before you sign a surrender form.

      c.  You can talk to a lawyer who only represents you, if you want to, before you sign a surrender form.

      Do you understand that all these things are available? Yes [ ] No [ ]

      12.  Contact Veto.

      I understand that information about who I am, where I live, my social and medical history and other similar information will be available to the adopted person when he/she is 21 years old or older if the adopted person asks for the information. Identifying information about me will not be released if I am the victim of rape or incest and that fact is known to DCS and I have not consented to release of the information. Even if the adopted person obtains information about me, I understand that I may direct that the adopted person not be allowed to contact me by registering a “contact veto” on this form or separately with the Tennessee Department of Children's Services at:

      Contact Veto Registry Post Adoption Unit Tennessee Department of Children's Services 315 Deaderick Street UBS Tower, 9th Floor Nashville, TN 37243

      I may also change my previously expressed direction regarding contact at the same address. If I am contacted in violation of a contact veto, the adopted person will be guilty of a Class B misdemeanor and I can sue them for injunctive relief and compensatory and punitive damages and attorney's fees.

      a.  Do you want to register a contact veto in order to prevent the adopted person from contacting you in the future? Yes [ ] No [ ].

      b.  If identifying information about you is going to be released to the adopted person do you want to be notified before the information is released? Yes [ ] No [ ].

      c.  Please supply a permanent address and telephone number for the Department to use to consult with you regarding release of information about you to the adopted person:

      d.  Please describe any other directions regarding future contact and or any information you want passed on to the adopted person:

      FURTHER, AFFIANT SAITH NOT.

      This  day of  , 20 .

      Signature: Biological [ ] Legal [ ] Mother  ________________________________

      Biological [ ] Legal [ ] Father  ________________________________

      Legal Guardian  of

      Name of Child

      Sworn to and subscribed before me this the  day of  , 20 .

      Notary Public

      My commission expires:

      (A notary is necessary if information on this form is not reviewed by and acknowledged before a Judge or officiant.)

      ACCEPTING PARTY'S PRE-ACCEPTANCE INFORMATION FORM

      STATE OF

      COUNTY OF

      Being duly sworn affiants would state:

      1.

      a.  I am  , Prospective Adoptive Parent.

      b.  Prospective Adoptive Parent's Date of Birth

      c.  Prospective Adoptive Parent's Place of Birth

      d.  Prospective Adoptive Parent's Marital Status

      2.

      a.  I am  , Prospective Adoptive Parent.

      b.  Prospective Adoptive Parent's Date of Birth

      c.  Prospective Adoptive Parent's Place of Birth

      d.  Prospective Adoptive Parent's Marital Status  Or

      3.  I am  , representative of  a licensed child placing agency with offices at:

      4.  The following costs have been paid or promised by  (me/us) for activities involving the placement of this child. Please include, amount paid or promised, to whom, by whom, date paid and type of service or cost:

      5.

      a.  ____ I/We have physical custody of this child; or

      b.  ____ I/We will receive physical custody of the child from the parent or legal guardian within five (5) days of this surrender; or

      c.  ____ I/We have the right to receive physical custody of the child upon his or her release from a hospital or health care facility; or

      d.  _____ Another person or agency currently has physical control of the child. I/We have presented to the court an affidavit of the person or agency required by T.C.A § 36-1-111(d)(6) which indicates their waiver of right to custody of the child upon entry of a guardianship order pursuant to T.C.A. § 36-l-136(r).

      6.  Yes [ ] No [ ]. I/We have presented to the court a currently effective or updated home study or preliminary home study of my/our home conducted by a licensed child-placing agency, a licensed clinical social worker, or the Tennessee Department of Children's Services as required by Tennessee law. (Not applicable for agency placements)

      7.

      a.  If the child is to be removed from Tennessee for adoption in another state, will there be compliance with the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children. Yes [ ] No [ ] Not Applicable [ ].

      b.  If yes, who will be responsible for preparing and submitting the ICPC package?

      FURTHER, AFFIANT SAITH NOT.

      This  day of  , 20 .

      Signature of Prospective Adoptive Parent

      Signature of Prospective Adoptive Parent

      OR

      Signature of Representative of Agency

      Name of Agency

      Sworn to and subscribed before me this the  day of  , 20 .

      Notary Public

      My commission expires:

      (A notary is necessary if information on this form is not reviewed by and acknowledged before a Judge or officiant.)

      REVOCATION OF SURRENDER BY A PARENT OR GUARDIAN

      STATE OF

      COUNTY OF

      Being duly sworn affiants would state:

      1.  I am:

      a.  Mother:

      b.  Father: , or

      c.  Legal Guardian: , of:

      2.

      a.  Child's Name:

      b.  Child's Date of Birth:

      c.  Child's Place of Birth:

      d.  Child's Sex:

      e.  Child's Race:

      3.  On (Date)  , I executed a surrender of my parental or guardianship rights to the child named in #2 to:

      a.  Prospective Adoptive Parent(s)

      b.  Licensed Child-Placing Agency

      c.  Tennessee Department of Children's Services

      4.  The surrender was executed before:  (Name of Judge or Officiant)

      5.  I hereby revoke the surrender of the above-named child.

      FURTHER, AFFIANT SAITH NOT.

      This  day of  , 20 .

      Signature:   Biological Legal Mother:

      Biological Legal Father:

      Legal Guardian:

      Sworn to and subscribed before me this  day of  , 20 .

      This Revocation of Surrender was received by me on the  day of  , 20 .

      Please Print:

      Signature:

      Judge or Officiant

  1. A surrender or parental consent may be made or given to any prospective adoptive parent who has attained eighteen (18) years of age, the department, or a licensed child-placing agency in accordance with this section.
    1. No surrender or any parental consent shall be valid that does not meet the requirements of subdivision (a)(2).
    2. No surrender or parental consent shall be valid that is made prior to the birth of a child, except a surrender executed in accordance with subsection (h).
    3. No surrender or parental consent shall be valid that is made within three (3) calendar days subsequent to the date of the child's birth, such period to begin on the day following the child's birth; provided, that the court may, for good cause shown, which is entered in an order in the minute book of the court, waive this waiting period.
    4. No surrender or parental consent shall be valid if the surrendering or consenting party states a desire to receive legal or social counseling until such request is satisfied or withdrawn.
    5. Unless the surrender or parental consent is made to the physical custodian or unless the exceptions of subdivision (d)(6) otherwise apply, no surrender or parental consent shall be sufficient to make a child available for adoption in any situation where any other person or persons, the department, a licensed child-placing agency, or other child-caring agency in this state or any state, territory, or foreign country is exercising the right to physical custody of the child under a current court order at the time the surrender is sought to be executed or when a parental consent is executed, or when those persons or entities have any currently valid statutory authorization for custody of the child.
    6. No surrender shall be valid unless the person or persons or entity to whom or to which the child is surrendered or parental consent is given:
      1. Has, at a minimum, physical custody of the child;
      2. Will receive physical custody of the child from the surrendering parent or guardian within five (5) days of the surrender;
      3. Has the right to receive physical custody of the child upon the child's release from a health care facility; or
      4. Has a sworn, written statement from the person, the department, the licensed child-placing agency, or child-caring agency that has physical custody pursuant to subdivision (d)(5), which waives the rights pursuant to that subdivision (d)(5).
  2. [Deleted by 2018 amendment.]
  3. The commissioner, or the commissioner's authorized representatives, or a licensed child-placing agency, through its authorized representatives, may accept the surrender of a child and they shall be vested with guardianship or partial guardianship of the child in accordance with this section and § 36-1-102; provided, that the department or any licensed child-placing agency may refuse to accept the surrender of any child.
  4. In any surrender proceeding, the court or other person authorized herein to conduct a surrender proceeding, and when a parental consent is executed in the adoption petition, the court shall require that the person or persons surrendering the child for adoption or the person or persons giving consent and the person or persons accepting the child through the surrender or receiving parental consent to satisfactorily prove their identities before the surrender is executed or the parental consent is accepted. No surrender or parental consent may be executed in any form in which the identities of the person or persons executing the surrender or parental consent or the person or persons or agencies receiving the surrender or the identity of the child whose name is known are left blank or in any form in which those persons, the child, or agencies are given pseudonyms on the form or in the petition at the time of the execution of the surrender or parental consent.
  5. In cases where the person executing the surrender resides in another state or territory of the United States, the surrender may be made in accordance with the laws of such state or territory or may be made before the judge or chancellor of any court of record or before the clerk of any court of record of such state or territory and such surrender shall be valid for use in adoptions in this state.
  6. In cases where the surrendering person using the Tennessee form of surrender or the form provided by applicable law resides or is temporarily in a foreign country, the surrender may be made before any officer of the United States armed forces authorized to administer oaths, or before any officer of the United States foreign service authorized to administer oaths. A citizen of a foreign country may, in accordance with the law of the foreign country, execute a surrender of a child that states that all parental rights of that person are being terminated or relinquished by the execution of the document or that the child is being given to an agency or other person for the purposes of adoption.
  7. In cases where the person executing surrender is incarcerated in a state or federal penitentiary, the surrender may be executed before the warden or deputy warden of the penitentiary or a notary public.
      1. When a person executing a surrender is unable to read, read in the English language, see, or otherwise unable to review and comprehend the surrender form and attachments offered for the person's signature or provided on the person's behalf, the person shall be provided with appropriate and sufficient assistance to make the documents and attachments understandable to the person both before and during the surrender hearing. The accepting party shall be responsible for payment of the cost of such interpreter or assistance if the surrendering party requires such assistance.
        1. The court, or other persons authorized by this part to accept surrenders, shall personally verify under oath by the surrendering or consenting person who has provided the information required surrender or parental consent process pursuant to this part, that the parent or guardian agrees with the information provided in the forms and attachments and that such person does accept the surrender of the subject child.
        2. The pre-surrender information forms for the birth parent and accepting party and all required attachments must be attached to the surrender or parental consent when the surrender and acceptance are executed and maintained with the surrender or parental consent form by the court or the court clerk, or person authorized by this part to accept surrenders, and transmitted to the department as otherwise required by this part.
        1. In all other respects, the court, or other persons authorized by this part to accept surrenders, must witness the actual act of surrender, or must confirm the parental consent, by verifying directly with the parent or guardian the parent's or guardian's understanding and willingness to terminate parental rights and, by witnessing the parent's or guardian's signature on the surrender form, or by questioning the parent on the matters required by this part before the entry of an order of confirmation of the parental consent.
        2. The court may not accept any surrenders executed prior to its approval of the surrender that relinquish the parent's or guardian's rights, nor may it enter any orders confirming a parental consent, based upon any written statement of the parent agreeing to relinquish the parent's rights to the child, except as may be otherwise specifically provided by this part.
        3. The execution of the surrender or parental consent shall occur in private in the chambers of the court or in another private area, and in the presence of the surrendering or consenting person's legal counsel if legal counsel has been requested by the surrendering or consenting person. In the discretion of the court or other person conducting the surrender or parental consent proceeding, the court's officer or other employee may be present.
      2. For surrenders taken pursuant to subsection (h), (i) or (j), the information required by this part to be supplied by the prospective adoptive parents, the department, or a licensed child-placing agency and the acceptance of a surrender by the prospective adoptive parents or the department or the licensed child-placing agency may be made by affidavit contained with the Tennessee surrender forms.
    1. [Deleted by 2018 amendment.]
    2. [Deleted by 2018 amendment.]
    3. [Deleted by 2018 amendment.]
    1. In the case of a surrender directly to prospective adoptive parents, if the person surrendering the child desires to have counseling prior to execution of the surrender and the child is being surrendered directly to the prospective adoptive parents, the prospective adoptive parents shall, if so requested by the surrendering person or persons, compensate a licensed child-placing agency, a licensed clinical social worker, or the department for such counseling, which must be completed before the surrender can be executed.
    2. If the person surrendering the child states a desire to have legal counseling prior to or during the execution of a surrender directly to the prospective adoptive parents, the prospective adoptive parents shall, if so requested by the surrendering person or persons, compensate the attorney for such counseling sought, which must be completed before the surrender can be executed.
    3. This subsection (l ) shall also apply to the use of parental consents pursuant to § 36-1-117(g) prior to entry of the order of confirmation.
    4. The payment of compensation by the prospective adoptive parents shall not establish any professional/client relationship between the prospective adoptive parents and the counselor or attorney providing services under subdivisions (l )(1) and (2).
    5. The department shall, by rule, establish the form of the certification required by this section, including the counseling criteria that must be met with the surrendering parent as part of the certification.
  8. Before the surrender is received and before an order of guardianship is entered based upon a parental consent, the person or persons to whom the child is to be surrendered or the persons to whom a parental consent is given, other than the department or a licensed child-placing agency, shall present with the surrender executed in this state or on a Tennessee form at the time of the execution of the surrender or before confirmation of a parental consent by the court, a court report based upon a currently effective or updated home study or preliminary home study conducted by a licensed child-placing agency, a licensed clinical social worker, or the department.
  9. [Deleted by 2018 amendment.]
  10. [Deleted by 2018 amendment.]
      1. The person or persons executing the surrender and the person or persons, the local representative of the department or the local representative of the licensed child-placing agency to whom the child is surrendered shall receive certified copies of the original surrender from the clerk of the court immediately upon the conclusion of the surrender proceeding.
      2. Costs of all certified copies provided under this subdivision (p)(1) shall be taxed only to the person or persons receiving the surrender, the department, or the licensed child-placing agency.
      1. The original of the surrender executed before the court shall be entered on a special docket for surrenders and shall be styled: “In Re: (Child's Name),” and shall be permanently filed by the court in a separate file designated for that purpose maintained by the judge, or the judge's court officer, who accepted the surrender and shall be confidential and shall not be inspected by anyone without the written approval of the court where the file is maintained or by a court of competent jurisdiction with domestic relations jurisdiction if the file is maintained elsewhere. There will be no court costs or litigation tax assessed for the surrender. Within five (5) days, a certified copy of the surrender shall be sent by the clerk or the court to the adoptions unit in the state office of the department in Nashville.
        1. The original of the surrender executed before the persons authorized under subsections (h) and (i), or, in out-of-state correctional facilities under subsection (j), shall be maintained in a separate file designated for that purpose, which shall be confidential and shall not be inspected by anyone else without the written approval of a court with domestic relations jurisdiction where the file is maintained.
        2. For surrenders executed under subsection (j) in federal and state correctional facilities in Tennessee, the original shall be filed in a secure file in the office of the warden, which shall not be open to inspection by any other person, and after ten (10) days from the date of the surrender, the original shall be sent to the adoptions unit in the state office of the department in Nashville and a copy shall be maintained by the warden.
      1. The clerk of the court, or the department as the case may be, upon request, shall send certified copies of the original surrender to:
        1. The court where the adoption petition or where the petition to terminate parental rights is filed;
        2. A party who is petitioning for an adoption in cases where the child was not placed by the department or a licensed child-placing agency; provided, however, where the child was placed by the department or a licensed child-placing agency, the parties petitioning for an adoption or termination of parental rights are not entitled to copies of the surrenders made to the department or a licensed child-placing agency; and
        3. The department's county office or a licensed child-placing agency or licensed clinical social worker that or who is performing any service related to an adoption or that has intervened in an adoption proceeding.
      2. Costs of providing certified copies under this subdivision (p)(3) may be taxed or charged to the person, the department, or the licensed child-placing agency that requests the certified copies, except where the department, the licensed child-placing agency, or licensed clinical social worker is responding to an order of reference from a court or where the department, licensed child-placing agency, or licensed clinical social worker is conducting any investigation related to the adoption or to the child's welfare.
    1. The party to whom the child is surrendered pursuant to subsection (h), (i) or (j) shall file a certified copy of the surrender of a child with the chancery, circuit, or juvenile court in Tennessee where the child or the prospective adoptive parents reside, or with the court in which an adoption petition is filed in Tennessee, within fifteen (15) days of the date the surrender is actually received, or within fifteen (15) days of the date the child or the person or persons to whom the child has been surrendered becomes a resident of this state, whichever is earlier.
    2. The surrender filed pursuant to subdivision (q)(1) shall be recorded by the court and shall be processed by the clerk as required by subdivision (p)(2)(A).
    3. In cases under subdivision (q)(1), where the child is in the legal custody of the department or a licensed child-placing agency, the surrender also may be filed in the chancery, circuit, or juvenile court or other court that had placed custody of the child with the department or the licensed child-placing agency.
    4. In cases under subdivision (q)(1), and in accordance with subsection (r), the court shall enter such other orders for the guardianship and supervision of the child as may be necessary or required pursuant to this section or § 36-1-118.
        1. A surrender, a confirmed parental consent, or a waiver of interest executed in accordance with this part shall have the effect of terminating all rights as the parent or guardian to the child who is surrendered, for whom parental consent to adopt is given, or for whom a waiver of interest is executed. It shall terminate the responsibilities of the surrendering parent or guardian and the consenting parent. It shall terminate the responsibilities of the person executing a waiver of interest under this section for future child support or other future financial responsibilities pursuant to subsection (w) if the child is ultimately adopted; provided, that this shall not eliminate the responsibility of such parent or guardian for past child support arrearages or other financial obligations incurred for the care of such child prior to the execution of the surrender, parental consent, or waiver of interest; provided further, that the court may, with the consent of the parent or guardian, restore such rights and responsibilities, pursuant to § 36-1-118(d).
        2. If, after determining the surrender to be in the child's best interest, the department accepts a surrender of a child, who was previously placed for adoption by the department, from the child's adoptive parent or parents, the unrevoked surrender of such child shall terminate the responsibilities of the surrendering adoptive parent or parents for future child support or other future financial responsibilities; provided, that this shall not be construed to eliminate the responsibility of such parent or parents for past child support arrearages or other financial obligations incurred for the care of such child prior to the execution of the surrender; and provided further, that the court may, with the consent of the parent or parents, restore such rights and responsibilities pursuant to § 36-1-118(d).
      1. Notwithstanding subdivision (r)(1)(A), a child who is surrendered, for whom a parental consent has been executed, or for whom a waiver of interest has been executed, shall be entitled to inherit from a parent who has surrendered the child or executed a parental consent or waiver of interest until the final order of adoption is entered.
      1. Unless prior court orders or statutory authorization establishes guardianship or custody in the person or entity to whom the surrender or parental consent is executed, the surrender or parental consent alone does not vest the person, persons or entities who or that receive it with the legal authority to have custody or guardianship or to make decisions for the child without the entry of an order of guardianship or partial guardianship as provided in subdivision (r)(6)(A) or as provided in § 36-1-116(f). The court accepting the surrender or the parental consent shall not enter any orders relative to the guardianship or custody of a child for whom guardianship or custody is already established under prior court orders or statutory authorization, except upon motion under subdivision (r)(4)(D) by the person, persons or entities to whom the surrender or parental consent is executed.
      2. In order to preserve confidentiality, the court clerk or the court shall have a separate adoption order of guardianship minute book, which shall be kept locked and available for public view only upon written approval of the court.
      1. Except as provided in subdivisions (r)(2) and (4), a validly executed surrender shall confer jurisdiction of all matters pertaining to the child upon the court where the surrender is executed or filed until the filing of the adoption petition, at which time jurisdiction of all matters pertaining to the child shall transfer to the court where the adoption petition is filed; provided, that the jurisdiction of the juvenile court to adjudicate allegations concerning any delinquent, unruly, or truant acts of a child pursuant to title 37 shall not be suspended.
      2. A waiver of interest does not confer jurisdiction over the child in any court nor does it permit the entry of any order of custody or guardianship based solely upon such waiver, but shall only permit a court to find that that person's parental rights, if any, are terminated.
      1. When, at the time the surrender or parental consent is executed, a prior court order is in effect that asserts that court's jurisdiction over the child who is the subject of the surrender or parental consent, the prior court order shall remain effective until, and only as permitted by this section, an alternate disposition for the child is made by the court where the surrender is executed or filed or until, and only as permitted by this section, an alternate disposition is made for the child on the basis of a termination of parental rights proceeding, or, as permitted by § 36-1-116, until an alternate disposition for the child is made by the court where the adoption petition is filed.
      2. If the prior court order under subdivision (r)(4)(A) gives the right to legal and physical custody of the child to a person, the department, a licensed child-placing agency, or other child-caring agency, a surrender or parental consent by the parent or guardian to any other person, persons or entities shall be invalid as provided under subdivision (d)(5), and any purported surrender or parental consent to such other person or persons or entities shall not be recognized to grant standing to file a motion pursuant to subdivision (r)(6) and § 36-1-116(f)(3) to such other person or persons or entities who or that received the surrender or parental consent, and no order of guardianship or partial guardianship based upon that surrender or parental consent and motion shall be effective to deprive the existing legal or physical custodians under the court's prior order of legal or physical custody of that child. Any orders to the contrary shall be void and of no effect whatsoever.
      3. If the court that has entered the prior custody order under subdivision (r)(4)(A) has subject matter jurisdiction to terminate parental or guardian rights at the time a surrender of the child who is the subject of that order is validly executed in another court pursuant to subdivision (r)(4)(D) or at the time a petition to terminate parental rights is filed pursuant to subdivision (r)(4)(E), it shall continue to have jurisdiction to complete any pending petitions to terminate parental or guardian rights that are filed prior to the execution of the surrender or prior to the filing of the petition to terminate parental rights in the other court pursuant to subdivision (r)(4)(E). The court shall not have jurisdiction to complete any pending petitions to terminate parental rights subsequent to the filing of a petition for adoption. The court may enter orders of guardianship pursuant to the termination of parental rights proceedings unless prior thereto an order of guardianship is entered by another court pursuant to subdivisions (r)(4)(D) and (E). Any orders of guardianship entered pursuant to subdivisions (r)(4)(D) and (E) or pursuant to § 36-1-116 shall have priority over the orders of guardianship entered pursuant to this subdivision (r)(4)(C); provided, that orders terminating parental rights entered pursuant to this subdivision (r)(4)(C) shall be effective to terminate parental rights.
      4. If the person, persons or entities in subdivision (r)(4)(B) to whom the surrender is made have legal and physical custody of the child or the right to legal and physical custody of the child pursuant to a prior court order at the time the surrender is executed to them, any court with jurisdiction to receive a surrender may receive a surrender that is executed to them and shall have jurisdiction, upon their motion, to enter an order giving guardianship or partial guardianship to the person, persons or entities, and, notwithstanding subdivision (r)(4)(A), such order may make an alternate disposition for the child.
      5. Notwithstanding subdivision (r)(4)(A), a person, the department, or a licensed child-placing agency that had custody of the child pursuant to a court's prior order, may file in any court with jurisdiction to terminate parental or guardian rights, and in which venue exists, any necessary petitions to terminate the remaining parental or guardian rights of any person or persons to the child, and if they have any subsequent orders of guardianship or partial guardianship based upon an executed surrender or a termination of parental rights from the other court of competent jurisdiction, they may place the child for adoption in accordance with those subsequent orders.
    1. If multiple surrenders or parental consents are received with respect to the same child in different courts, subject to the restrictions of subdivisions (r)(2) and (4), the court that first receives a surrender or parental consent or in which the surrender is first filed pursuant to subsection (q), and that enters an order of guardianship or partial guardianship, shall have jurisdiction of the child and shall issue any necessary orders of reference required by this section. Any other court that receives a surrender or parental consent or in which a surrender or parental consent is filed pursuant to subsection (q) subsequent to the surrender shall, upon notification by the first court, send the original of the surrender or filed pleading to the first court and shall retain a certified copy of the original in a closed file, which shall not be accessed by any person without the written order of the court.
      1. Subject to the restrictions of subdivisions (r)(2) and (4), a validly executed surrender under this section or a parental consent shall give to the person to whom the child is surrendered or to whom a parental consent is given standing to file a written motion for an express order of guardianship or partial guardianship, as defined in § 36-1-102, from the court where the child was surrendered or where, under subsection (q), the surrender was filed, or in the court that, pursuant to subdivision (r)(4)(A), has granted legal custody of the child to such person, or in the court in which the adoption petition is filed. A validly executed surrender shall entitle the department or the licensed child-placing agency that received the surrender to have the court enter an order of guardianship pursuant to subdivision (r)(6)(C).
      2. The motion, which may be filed by any person or by that person's attorney, shall contain an affidavit that the party seeking the order of guardianship or partial guardianship has physical custody of the child, or if filed at the time of the execution of the surrender or the filing of the adoption petition containing a parental consent, it shall contain the affidavits otherwise required by subdivision (d)(6).
      3. If the person, the department, or the licensed child-placing agency to whom the child is surrendered or to whom parental consent is given has physical custody or has otherwise complied with the requirements of subdivision (d)(6), and if there has been full compliance with the other provisions of this section, the court may, contemporaneously with the surrender or the filing of an adoption petition, immediately upon written motion by the person or the person's attorney, and the court shall, if the surrender is to a licensed child-placing agency or the department, enter an order giving the person, the licensed child-placing agency, or the department, guardianship or partial guardianship of the child.
      4. A copy of the surrender, the motion and any resulting order shall be sent by the clerk to the adoptions unit in the state office of the department in Nashville, which shall record the surrender, the motion, and the order and their dates of filing and entry for purposes of tracking the child's placement status and the status of the adoption process involving the child.
    2. If an order of guardianship is entered, the appointed guardians shall have authority to act as guardian ad litem or next friend of the child in any suit by the child against third parties while the child is in the care and custody of the petitioners. The court may appoint a special guardian for the child for such purpose upon motion by the department for a child in its guardianship.
    3. If the court grants guardianship or custody of the child upon the filing of the surrender or upon the filing of a parental consent and the child is possessed of any real or personal property to be administered, the court shall appoint a guardian of the property of the child if no guardian of the property exists, and such guardian may be the same person or persons who are guardians of the person of the child except if the child is in the guardianship of the department in which case another person or entity shall be appointed.
  11. [Deleted by 2018 amendment.]
    1. Upon receipt of the surrender or upon filing a parental consent for an adoption by a person other than a related person, and if no home study had been completed or updated within six (6) months prior to the surrender or the filing of a parental consent, and no court report based upon the home study has been filed with the court, the court shall, by an order of reference issued within five (5) days, direct that a home study be conducted and filed as provided in this part.
    2. The order of reference shall be directed to a licensed child-placing agency or a licensed clinical social worker unless the prospective adoptive parents are indigent under current federal poverty guidelines, in which case the order shall be directed to the department.
    3. The court report based upon the home study shall be filed with the court within sixty (60) days of the date of the order of reference.
    4. The court shall order a licensed child-placing agency, a licensed clinical social worker, or the department, if the parents are indigent under federal poverty guidelines, to provide supervision for the child who is in the home of prospective adoptive parents pursuant to a surrender or a parental consent under this section, and to make any necessary court reports that the court should have concerning the welfare of the child pending entry of the final order in the case; provided, that this subdivision (t)(4) shall not apply when the surrender is made to related persons.
    5. If the adoption petition is filed before the home study is completed or before the court report based upon the home study is filed, and the adoption petition is filed in a court other than the one where the surrender was executed, the court where the surrender was executed shall, upon request of the court where the adoption petition is filed or upon motion of the prospective adoptive parents, send any court report it receives to the adoption court.
    6. Unless they are indigent under federal poverty guidelines, the prospective adoptive parents shall be assessed by the court the costs of the study and the supervision of the placement by the agency, and the costs shall be paid by them to the licensed child-placing agency or licensed clinical social worker that performed the home study or supervision.
    1. Failure to fully comply with this section or failure to file the surrender executed pursuant to subsection (h), (i) or (j) within the fifteen-day period required by subsection (q), or failure to obtain an order of guardianship in accordance with this section within thirty (30) days of the date the surrender is executed or filed, or within thirty (30) days of the date parental consent is filed, shall be grounds for removal of the child from the physical care and control of the person, the department, or licensed child-placing agency receiving the surrender; provided, that this shall not apply when the persons, the department or the licensed child-placing agency have legal custody or partial guardianship under an order of a court entered prior to the execution of the surrender or parental consent or pursuant to any statutory authority giving custody to the department or licensed child-placing agency.
    2. A sworn complaint concerning the grounds alleged in subdivision (u)(1) and concerning the best interests of a child for whom a surrender is sought or on whom a surrender or parental consent was executed or guardianship order entered, or which complaint otherwise seeks to present proof concerning the best interests of the child, may be filed by any person, the department, a licensed child-placing agency, or a licensed clinical social worker.
    3. The complaint may be filed in the court where the surrender was executed or filed or where the adoption petition containing a parental consent was filed. If the surrender was not executed or filed in Tennessee or if the surrender was not executed before a court or if the surrender was not filed at all, then the complaint may be filed in the circuit, chancery, or juvenile court in the county where the child resides.
      1. Upon its own motion or upon the complaint filed pursuant to subsection (u) and subject to the restrictions concerning custody of the child who is not in the custody of the prospective adoptive parents as stated in subdivisions (r)(2) and (4) and § 36-1-116(f)(1), the court receiving the surrender or entering the order of guardianship or partial guardianship and the adoption court to which jurisdiction may be transferred may make any suitable provisions for the care of the child and, notwithstanding the restrictions of subdivisions (r)(2) and (4) and § 36-1-116(f)(1), the court shall have jurisdiction to enter any necessary orders, including any emergency ex parte orders for the child's emergency protection, care, and supervision based upon probable cause that the child's health and safety is immediately endangered; provided, that such emergency orders shall only remain effective for thirty (30) days when the restrictions of subdivisions (r)(2) and (4) and § 36-1-116(f)(1) apply.
      2. If another court has jurisdiction under a prior order because of such restrictions, upon completion of all proceedings to protect the child, the court shall then return all jurisdiction over the child to the court having jurisdiction under the prior order; provided, that the juvenile court shall maintain jurisdiction pursuant to title 37 to adjudicate allegations of delinquency, unruliness, or truancy involving the child.
      3. If the child has no legal custodian with authority to provide temporary care for the child, then, subject to the restrictions of subdivisions (r)(2) and (4) and § 36-1-116(f)(1), the court shall give temporary legal custody pursuant to § 37-1-140 to the department or a licensed child-placing agency until full compliance has been effected and until a guardianship or partial guardianship order can be entered, or until some other disposition is made for the child by the court. The court may permit the department or a licensed child-placing agency, in its discretion, to place the child with any suitable person, including the prospective adoptive parents, under the department's or the licensed child-placing agency's supervision.
      4. If an emergency ex parte order removes the child from the custody of the prospective adoptive parents or the department or licensed child-placing agency, a preliminary hearing shall be held within five (5) days, excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays, to determine if probable cause exists for the continuance of such order.
    1. The prospective adoptive parents or entities from which the child was removed shall be necessary parties at the preliminary hearing and the final hearing, and the court may order the department or a licensed child-placing agency or licensed clinical social worker to provide any necessary information or court reports concerning the welfare of the child as it may require.
    2. A final hearing shall be held within thirty (30) days of the date of the preliminary hearing, except for good cause entered upon the record.
    3. Upon the final hearing, and based upon clear and convincing evidence that the action is in the best interests of the child, the court shall have jurisdiction to enter an order removing the child from the prospective adoptive parents or other custodian or guardian of the child, and may award temporary legal custody giving any person, the department or licensed child-placing agency, or a child-caring agency, the care and custody of the child as provided under § 37-1-140 or may enter a guardianship or partial guardianship order with the rights provided under this part, all subject to the rights of any remaining parent or guardian.
    1. Notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, a waiver of interest and notice, when signed under oath by the alleged biological father, shall serve to waive the alleged biological father's interest in the child and the alleged biological father's rights to notice of any proceedings with respect to the child's adoption, custody or guardianship. The alleged biological father who executes the waiver shall not be required to be made a party to any adoption proceedings, custody or guardianship proceedings with respect to the child and shall not be entitled to receive notice thereof, and the court in any adoption proceeding, notwithstanding any law to the contrary, shall have jurisdiction to enter a final order of adoption of the child based upon the waiver, and in other proceedings to determine the child's legal custody or guardianship shall have jurisdiction to enter an order for those purposes. The waiver may not be revoked.
      1. The execution of the waiver, in conjunction with a final order of adoption of the child, shall irrevocably terminate all rights the alleged biological father has or may have to the child and any rights the child has or may have relative to the alleged biological father. Upon entry of a final order of adoption of the child, the waiver, except as provided in subdivision (w)(2)(B), shall also terminate the responsibility of the alleged biological father for any future child support or other financial obligations to the child, or to the child's mother that are related to the child's support, arising after the date of the execution of the waiver.
      2. If, after execution of the waiver, a final order of adoption is not entered, and a parentage action is initiated against the alleged biological father or the alleged biological father executes a voluntary acknowledgment of paternity, the alleged biological father shall become liable for child support or other financial obligations to the child, or to the child's mother that are related to the child's support, arising after the execution of the waiver and beginning with the date of the entry of an order establishing the biological father's parentage to the child or upon the date of the biological father's execution of a voluntary acknowledgment of paternity; provided, if paternity is later established, the alleged biological father who executed the waiver shall be liable for all or a portion of the actual medical and hospital expenses of the child's birth and all or a portion of the mother's prenatal and postnatal care up to thirty (30) days following the child's birth if the parentage action is initiated or the voluntary acknowledgment of paternity is executed within two (2) years of the date of the execution of the waiver.
    2. The waiver shall not be valid for use by a legal father as defined under § 36-1-102 or for any man listed as the father of a child on the child's birth certificate.
    3. The waiver of interest and notice may be executed at any time after the biological mother executes a statement identifying such person as the biological father or possible biological father of the biological mother's child to be born, or at any time after the birth of the child.
    4. The waiver of interest and notice shall be legally sufficient if it contains a statement comparable to the following:

      WAIVER OF INTEREST AND NOTICE STATE OF   ) COUNTY OF   ) Pursuant to  Tennessee Code Annotated, § 36-1-111(w) , and first being duly sworn according to law, affiant would state the following: My name is  . I understand that I have been named by  , the mother of a child [to be born], or a [child who was born in   (City)   (State) on the   day of  , 19  (or 20 )], as the father or possible father of that child. I further understand that the mother has placed or wishes to place this child for adoption or that the child is the subject of legal proceedings leading to the child's adoption or leading to a determination of the child's legal custody or guardianship. I am not necessarily admitting or saying that I am the father of this child, but if I am, I do not wish to provide care for this child, and I feel it would be in the child's best interest for this adoption to occur, or for other custody or guardianship proceedings to occur in the child's best interests. I hereby formally waive any right to notice of the legal proceedings: to adopt this child; to otherwise make this child available for adoption; or to award the child's legal custody or guardianship to other persons or agencies. I hereby formally waive any further parental rights to the child and execute this document to finally terminate my rights, if I have any rights, to this child, upon entry of a final order of adoption for this child. If the child is not yet born:  [I have received and reviewed a copy of the statement of the child's mother in which the mother identifies me as the father of the child.] I consent to adoption of this child by any persons chosen by the child's mother or by any public or private agency, and consent to the establishment of any legal custody or guardianship arrangements for the child. I understand that by execution of this waiver, this child may be adopted by other persons or that other custody or guardianship proceedings regarding the child's status may occur and that I will have no rights, if I have any, to act as parent, to visit with, or otherwise be involved in this child's life, unless and until a legal relationship is established between me and the child. I further understand that I may not revoke this waiver at any time after I sign it. I further understand that if the child is not adopted, that legal proceedings can be brought to seek to establish me as the legal father, and I may become liable for financial support or financial obligations for this child or to the child's mother that are related to the child's support, arising after I sign this waiver, and beginning on the date an order is entered that establishes me as the child's father or beginning on the date I sign a voluntary acknowledgment of paternity of the child. I also understand that if the child is not adopted and paternity is later established by legal proceedings, or if I sign a voluntary acknowledgement of paternity, I could be liable for all or a portion of the actual medical and hospital expenses of the child's birth and all or a portion of the mother's prenatal and postnatal care up to thirty (30) days following the child's birth if the legal proceeding to establish me as the child's father is brought, or the voluntary acknowledgment of paternity of the child is signed, within two (2) years of the date I sign this waiver.  FURTHER, AFFIANT SAITH NOT. DATED: THE   DAY OF  ,19  (20  ).     Alleged Father (Please Print)     Signature of Alleged Father     Address Personally appeared before me the above-named   who is known to me and who acknowledged that he executed the above Waiver of Interest and Notice as his own free and voluntary act.   Notary Public My commission expires:

      Click to view form.

    1. Notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, a denial of paternity and notice of a child, when signed under oath by the child's legal father claiming not to be the child's biological father, who is not the child's adoptive father, and when accompanied by credible proof that the legal father is not the father of the child, shall waive the legal father's parental rights and all parental interests with respect to the child. No further notice to the legal father or termination of the legal father's parental rights is necessary for the child to be placed in guardianship or adopted. “Credible proof” includes the written sworn statement of the child's mother.
    2. The parental rights of a man denying paternity of a child are terminated and the man's future parental responsibilities with respect to the child are terminated upon adoption of the child by other persons.
    3. The denial of paternity and notice shall not be valid for use by a legal father who is also a biological parent as defined in § 36-1-102.
    4. A denial of paternity and notice under this section may be executed at any time after conception of the child who is the subject of the denial, and may not be revoked by the father unless the adoption plan is abandoned. A father who executes a denial of paternity and notice under this section relinquishes any right to petition to have the father's legal or biological relationship to the child determined by a court.
    5. The denial of paternity and notice shall be legally sufficient if it contains a statement comparable to the following:

      DENIAL OF PATERNITY AND NOTICE BY A LEGAL FATHER

      STATE OF

      COUNTY OF

      Pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-111(x), and first being duly sworn according to law, affiant would state the following:

      My name is  . I am personally acquainted with  , the biological mother of  , a child [to be born], or a [child who was born] in  (City)  (State) on the  day of  , 20  .

      I am or I have been told that I am or may be the presumed and/or legal father of the above- named child.

      I AM CERTAIN THAT I AM NOT THE BIOLOGICAL FATHER OF THIS CHILD.

      I understand that the mother has placed or wishes to place this child for adoption, or that the child is the subject of legal proceedings leading to the child's adoption, or leading to a determination of the child's legal custody or guardianship. I do not want custody of this child. I either agree with an adoption plan or I do not wish to be involved in the decision.

      I HEREBY WAIVE MY PARENTAL RIGHTS TO THIS CHILD, IF I HAVE ANY RIGHTS, AND I WANT MY PARENTAL RIGHTS, IF ANY, TO BE TERMINATED WITHOUT FURTHER ACTION BY, OR NOTICE TO, ME.

      I formally waive my rights to notice of legal proceedings regarding the child including: adoption, custody, guardianship, and termination of other parents' rights and any other similar actions.

      I understand that by my execution of this Denial of Paternity and Notice, along with the finalization of the child's adoption, I will lose any right I may have to act as parent, to visit with, or otherwise be involved in this child's life. I also relinquish any right to petition to have my legal and biological relationship to this child determined by a court.

      I FURTHER UNDERSTAND THAT I MAY NOT REVOKE THIS DENIAL AT ANY TIME AFTER I SIGN IT.

      I also understand that while this denial is not revocable, it is not effective to terminate my parental rights or responsibilities unless or until an adoption of the child is finalized. If the adoption is not finalized, I understand that I retain any rights that I otherwise had to rebut a presumption that I am the father of the child.

      FURTHER AFFIANT SAITH NOT this  DAY OF  , 20 .

      Legal Father (Please Print)

      Signature of Legal Father

      Address

      City, State, Zip Code

      Personally appeared before me the above-named  , who is known to me and who acknowledged that he executed the above Denial of Paternity and Notice as his own free and voluntary act.

      Notary Public  My commission expires:

    1. If a child is surrendered to a person other than a licensed child-placing agency or the department, and, after the expiration of the three-day period for revocation, the person or persons to whom the child was surrendered decide that they no longer wish to adopt the child, and if no order of guardianship has been entered by a court that gives those persons who had received the surrender the guardianship of the child, they may surrender the child to a licensed child-placing agency or the department without notice to the parent or guardians who originally had executed the surrender to them.
    2. In this event, the licensed child-placing agency or the department shall have the same rights as set forth above just as if the child had been originally surrendered to them; provided, that if the court has entered a guardianship order as set forth above, the surrender cannot be utilized in this manner, and a motion must be made to the court to modify the existing guardianship order.
    3. Certified copies of all such surrenders and orders modifying any order of guardianship shall be sent by the clerk to the adoptions unit in the state office of the department in Nashville.
  12. [Deleted by 2018 amendment.]

Name

Relationship to the child

Address

City, State, Zip

Name

Relationship to the child

Address

City, State, Zip

Telephone Number: Home:  Work:

Other identifying information concerning the above identified other legal or biological parent/legal guardian.

Acts 1995, ch. 532, § 1; 1996, ch. 1054, §§ 21-39, 106-110; 1998, ch. 1098, § 3; 2000, ch. 922, § 3; 2003, ch. 231, § 7; 2005, ch. 409, § 1; 2010, ch. 915, § 1; 2015, ch. 113, § 4; 2016, ch. 636, § 1; 2016, ch. 919, §§ 3-5; 2018, ch. 875, §§ 21-31, 37; 2019, ch. 36, §§ 1, 2, 5-17.

Compiler's Notes. Former § 36-1-111 (Acts 1951, ch. 202, § 6 (Williams, § 9572.20); 1975, ch. 196, § 1; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 36-111; Acts 1984, ch. 681, § 2; 1986, ch. 767, § 1; 1992, ch. 994, §§ 2, 3), concerning children born out of wedlock, was repealed by Acts 1995, ch. 532, § 1, effective January 1, 1996.

This section, as enacted by Acts 1995, ch. 532, did not contain a subdivision (p)(3). The compiler has redesignated (p)(4) in the act as (p)(3).

Amendments. The 2018 amendment, in (a)(2), inserted “pursuant to § 36-1-117(g),” following “When a parental consent is executed,”; added (b)(2) through(b)(6); at the end of (d)(4), substituted “until such request is satisfied or withdrawn” for “under subdivisions (k)(2)(E) and (F) until certification of satisfaction or withdrawal of such request is received by the court as provided in subsection (l )”; deleted (e) which read: “Any public or private agency that may have custody or complete or partial guardianship of the child and that has not given consent as provided under this part shall be made a defendant and given notice of the filing of the adoption or termination of parental or guardian rights petition filed under this part or under title 37, and shall be permitted to assert its rights to custody or guardianship of the child.”; rewrote (k)(1)(A) which read: “Notwithstanding any other provisions of this part, in obtaining any medical or social background information, contact veto information or other information required as part of the surrender or parental consent process pursuant to this part, the court, or, at its direction, its court officers or its clerks, or other persons authorized to accept a surrender or parental consent pursuant to this part, may accept notarized statements attached to each of the forms promulgated by the department that verify that the informant of the required information has previously reviewed the form or, if unable to read, has had the contents of the form explained to the person, and that the person has accurately supplied the information on the form and the person's responses have not been subject to duress by any person.”; in (k)(1)(B)(i), deleted “, however,” following “personally”, substituted “required” for “in a” preceding “surrender or”, and substituted “and attachments and that such person does accept the surrender of the subject child” for “required pursuant to this part, and the notarized statement shall have a section for the court, or other persons authorized by this part to accept surrenders, to ratify that this verification has occurred by providing a space for the signature of the judge or chancellor accepting the surrender or parental consent or other person authorized by this part to accept a surrender, and the date on which this was done.” at the end; in (k)(1)(B)(ii), substituted “pre-surrender information forms for the birth parent and accepting party and all required attachments” for “notarized statements” following “The” and inserted “when the surrender and acceptance are executed”; deleted (k)(2) through (k)(4), which read: “(2) In accordance with subdivision (k)(1), the following information shall be obtained under oath at the time of the surrender in Tennessee, when using a Tennessee surrender form, or at the time of the confirmation of the parental consent:“(A) A statement of the surrendering or consenting parent identifying any other legal or biological parent or legal guardian of the child being surrendered or for whom parental consent is being given and such person's whereabouts, or a statement that the identity or whereabouts of such other parent or guardian is not known;“(B) Whether the child is of Native American heritage and the tribal organization of which the child is a member or in which the child is eligible for membership, if known;“(C) Whether the child is intended to be sent out of state for the purposes of adoption, and, if the child surrendered is to be adopted under the laws of any jurisdiction other than Tennessee, a statement of the surrendering parent or guardian stating that the surrendering parent or guardian elects to have the surrender governed in all respects by Tennessee law, including choice of law;“(D) Whether the person has paid or received or has been promised any money or other remuneration or thing of value in connection with the birth of the child or placement of the child for adoption and, if so, to or from whom, the specific amount, and the purpose for which it was or is to be paid or received;“(E) Whether such person desires counseling from the department or a licensed child-placing agency or a licensed clinical social worker concerning the decision to surrender or give parental consent to the adoption of the child and if the person has been made aware of any assistance that might be available to the person should the person decide not to place the child for adoption;“(F) Whether the person is represented by legal counsel and, if not, whether the person wishes to consult with legal counsel prior to execution of the surrender or prior to the confirmation of the parental consent;“(G) Whether such person is freely and voluntarily executing the surrender or parental consent with full knowledge of its consequences and whether such person knows and understands the right to revoke the surrender or consent and the time limits in which the revocation may be executed;“(H) Whether the child is possessed of any real or personal property of any kind, or has any expectation of any real or personal property and the nature of such interest;“(I) A statement of the surrendering parent or guardian concerning whether that parent or guardian or some other person or persons or entity has legal and/or physical custody of the child at the time of the surrender or whether such person intends to give custody to the prospective adoptive parents, the department or a licensed child-placing agency.“(3)(A) The court shall require the person or persons surrendering the child for adoption or consenting to the child's adoption to complete the portion of the surrender or a parental consent form that indicates whether the person desires, or wishes to veto, further contact with other persons eligible under this part to have contact with the surrendering parent at a later time in accordance with §§ 36-1-12736-1-131.“(B) The form that the surrendering or consenting parent signs shall notify the parent that the parent may withdraw or vary the veto or consent at any time and the form, or an attachment to the form, shall inform the parent of the procedures for doing so.“(C) Upon receipt of the completed form, the department shall enter the surrendering or consenting person's request on the contact veto registry and shall maintain a copy of the form and all modifications to the form as part of the post-adoption record.“(4)(A) The court or persons authorized to receive the surrender shall obtain from the prospective adoptive parents or from a licensed child-placing agency receiving the surrender at the time of the execution of the surrender, or the court shall obtain, at the time an order of guardianship is entered that is based upon the execution of a parental consent, a statement of the fees paid to any person or persons, licensed child-placing agency, licensed clinical social worker, attorney, or other entity for the placement of the child or for legal costs or any other costs related in any way to the adoption or placement for adoption of the child as of the time the surrender is executed or at the time the parental consent is executed.“(B) In the case of a surrender of a child to be removed from Tennessee for adoption, the court shall obtain a statement from the prospective adoptive parents that there will be compliance with the interstate compact on the placement of children and how that compliance will be effected;”; in (l )(1), deleted “under subdivision (k)(2)(E)” following “desires” and “certified as having been” following “must be”; in (l )(2), deleted “under subdivision (k)(2)(F)” following “a desire” and “certified as having been” following “must be”; in (m), in the introductory language, substituted “this state” for “Tennessee” following “executed in” and deleted “all of the following documents” following “the court”; removed the (m)(1) designation and changed the semicolon at the end of former (m)(1) to a period; deleted former (m)(2) through (m)(5) which read:“(2) Certification of the completion of any counseling requested under subsection (l );“(3) An affidavit of the person or persons stating whether they have physical custody of the child at the time of the surrender or the affidavits required by subdivision (d)(6);“(4) If the child has been brought to Tennessee from another state or territory, a copy of the ICPC Form 100A, or other substitute form required for ICPC compliance, showing approval of the department for the child brought into Tennessee for foster care or adoption or a sworn statement stating why such form is not required pursuant to the ICPC; and“(5) A sworn statement that if the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.), applies because of the child's Native American heritage, there has been compliance with that act.”; deleted (n) and (o) which read:“(n)(1) A licensed child-placing agency receiving the surrender shall complete the provisions of subdivisions (m)(3)–(5).“(2) The department, when receiving the surrender, shall complete the provisions of subdivisions (m)(3) and (5).“(o) No surrender shall be accepted by the Tennessee court or on a Tennessee form by those persons authorized to accept a surrender under subsection (h), (i) or (j), nor shall a parental consent be confirmed by the court, nor shall an order of guardianship be entered by the court under subsection (r) based upon a surrender or a parental consent until there has been compliance with subsections (l ), (m) and (n).”; deleted (s) which read: “(s) The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, compiled in chapter 6, part 2 of this title, shall govern jurisdiction for the disposition of the child and the proceedings under this section.”; in (w)(4), deleted “sworn” preceding “statement” and inserted “the biological father or possible”; and deleted (z) which read: “(z) An interpreter shall be provided to a surrendering parent or guardian who is not fluent in English, before a final hearing on an adoption is conducted. The prospective adoptive parent or parents shall be responsible for payment of the cost of such interpreter.”

The 2019 amendment added (a)(4), in (b)(3), substituted “before I sign this form” for “before I sign the form”, substituted “execution of the foregoing surrender as required” for “execution of the foregoing surrender and as required”, substituted “true to the best of” for “true and to the best of”; in (b)(4), substituted “go to #9” for “go to #10”, substituted “who made the payment” for “whom made the payment”, substituted “punitive damages” for “putative damages”, substituted “UBS” for “USB” in the address for the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services; in (b)(5), substituted “Prospective Adoptive Parent’s Marital Status ______ Or 3. I am ______, representative of _____ a licensed child placing agency with offices at: ______ 4. The following costs have been paid or promised by ______ (me/us) for activities involving the placement of this child. Please include, amount paid or promised, to whom, by whom, date paid and type of service or cost: ______.” for “Prospective Adoptive Parent's Marital Status ______ 3.  The following costs have been paid or promised by ______ (me/us)  for activities involving the placement of this child. Please include, amount paid or promised, to whom, by whom, date paid and type of service or cost: ______ 4.  I am ______  representative of ______ a licensed child placing agency with offices at: ______”, deleted “. The affidavit required by T.C.A. § 36-1-111(d)(6) of the custodial parent or guardian to this effect has been presented to the court at this time” following “(5) days of this surrender” in 5.b.; substituted  “; or” for “, and the affidavit of the custodial parent or guardian to this effect required by T.C.A. § 36-1-111(d)(6) has been presented to the court at this time;” in 5.c.; substituted “Guardian” for “Gaurdian” in (b)(6)1.c.; in (d)(6), deleted “, as evidenced by the affidavit of the person or persons receiving the surrender and by affidavit of the surrendering or consenting parent or guardian or court order” at the end of (d)(6)(B); deleted “as evidenced by an affidavit of the person or persons or entities receiving the child and by the affidavit of the surrendering or consenting parent or guardian or court order” at the end of (d)(6)(B)(C); and deleted “sworn” following “copy of the” in (w)(5).

Effective Dates. Acts 2018, ch. 875, § 38. July 1, 2018.

Acts 2019, ch. 36, § 35. July 1, 2019.

Cross-References. Confidentiality of public records, § 10-7-504.

Law Reviews.

Adoption and Custody: Current Trends in Tennessee Family Law: Tennessee's New Adoption Contact Veto is Cold Comfort to Birth Parents, 27 U. Mem. L. Rev. 843 (1997).

Family Law — Adoption — Retrospective and Prospective Opening of Adoption Records to Adopted Persons Twenty-One Years of Age or Older, 67 Tenn. L. Rev. 1019 (2000).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Compliance With Statutory Requirements.

Where the biological mother did not contend that the juvenile judge failed to ask the questions required by T.C.A. § 36-1-111(k)(1)(C)(i), and was knowledgeable about and comfortable with her decision at the time of the surrender, the proceedings substantially complied with the requirements contained in this section. In re Hatcher, 16 S.W.3d 792, 1999 Tenn. App. LEXIS 832 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999).

Where proceedings substantially complied with the requirements in this section for a valid surrender, biological mother no longer had standing to raise other unfulfilled requirements that undoubtedly lurk in the labyrinthine provisions of the adoption laws. In re Hatcher, 16 S.W.3d 792, 1999 Tenn. App. LEXIS 832 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999).

Notwithstanding the fact that the biological parent surrendered all parental rights to the child, the parent had the right to choose the child's adoptive parent, subject to the trial court's later determination that the proposed adoption was in the child's best interests. In re M.J.S., 44 S.W.3d 41, 2000 Tenn. App. LEXIS 704 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000).

Dismissal of maternal grandparents'  complaint was appropriate because, although the grandparents were allowed to intervene when a parent surrendered parental rights to the parent's minor child to adoptive parents, the grandparents failed to present clear and convincing evidence that the child's best interest was served by taking the child away from the adoptive parents. In re R.S.M., 466 S.W.3d 766, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 93 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2015), appeal denied, In re Rebecca M., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 479 (Tenn. June 11, 2015).

2. Construction.

Adoption statutes repeatedly utilize the terms, physical custody and legal custody, as two distinct and separate concepts; the statutory sections intimate that the concept of physical custody is synonymous with having physical possession of the child inasmuch as they expressly provide for an order of custody to follow. In re Joseph F., 492 S.W.3d 690, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 227 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 377 (Tenn. May 10, 2016).

Term “legal custody” denotes a distinction from physical possession, which is demonstrated by the fact that the Department of Children's Services often exercises legal custody or guardianship over children who are in the possession of foster parents or relatives. In re Joseph F., 492 S.W.3d 690, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 227 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 377 (Tenn. May 10, 2016).

Construing the language of the adoption and termination statutory scheme, the term “physical custody” as utilized in the statutory sections would be synonymous with having physical possession of a child and would not require a court order or other judicial act; the statutory definition of custody contained in the juvenile court statutory scheme is inapplicable in the context of a termination or adoption proceeding, and physical custody means physical possession of a child, as granted by a parent, guardian, child-placing agency, or court, but physical custody as used in the statutory scheme does not include the unlawful taking of a child. In re Joseph F., 492 S.W.3d 690, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 227 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 377 (Tenn. May 10, 2016).

Guardianship order pursuant to the surrender statute cannot be entered when an adoption court has previously assumed exclusive jurisdiction and any guardianship actions were thereby suspended pursuant to the adoption statute; the court interprets the surrender statute as authorizing the entry of a guardianship order only in the absence of a suspension due to a pending adoption petition, and the surrender statute entitles Tennessee Department of Children's Services to obtain the entry of an order of guardianship only in the absence of any existing suspension of guardianship proceedings pursuant to the adoption statute. In re Neveah W., 525 S.W.3d 223, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 77 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 3, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 276 (Tenn. May 9, 2017).

3. Guardianship Orders.

Chancery court had exclusive jurisdiction over all matters pertaining to the child due to the filing of the adoption petition in 2014, and pursuant to the adoption statute, any separate proceedings seeking guardianship of the child should have been suspended pending orders in the adoption proceeding and should not have been heard until final adjudication of the adoption; the chancery court was not authorized to enter the order awarding guardianship of child to the department in the context of the surrender proceeding. In re Neveah W., 525 S.W.3d 223, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 77 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 3, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 276 (Tenn. May 9, 2017).

36-1-112. Revocation of surrender or parental consent — Form.

      1. A person who executed a surrender may revoke the surrender at any time within three (3) calendar days of the date of the surrender. The three-day period shall be calculated using the method for computation of time established in the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 6.01.
      2. The surrender shall be revoked by appearing before the judge who accepted the surrender or that judge's successor or substitute, or another judge of a court with jurisdiction to accept a surrender in the absence of the judge who accepted the surrender or that judge's successor or substitute, or by appearing before the person, or that person's successor, pursuant to § 36-1-111(h), (i) or (j) before whom the surrender was executed and by executing the revocation of surrender form.
      3. The three-day period for revocation of the surrender shall not limit the court's authority to order the revocation of the surrender pursuant to § 36-1-118.
      4. The revocation of the surrender shall be executed under oath by the parent or guardian who executed the surrender of the child, and the judge or other person who accepted the surrender or the judge's successor or substitute as indicated in subdivision (a)(1)(B) shall sign and date the revocation form.
      5. In the event the person under § 36-1-111(h), (i) or (j) is unavailable or has no authorized successor, the person may apply to a court that is qualified to receive a surrender in Tennessee or a court with domestic relations jurisdiction in another state or country to execute the revocation before a judge of that court as provided herein.
        1. No surrender may be revoked by the person surrendering the child or set aside by a court after the expiration of the three-day period except as the surrender may be invalidated by court order entered pursuant to a timely filed complaint filed pursuant to subsection (d) or as permitted by order of the court entered pursuant to § 36-1-118.
        2. The execution of a revocation of a surrender within the three-day period shall be grounds for the dismissal of any adoption petition filed during that period and, upon motion of the person who revoked the surrender, the court shall dismiss the adoption petition without prejudice.
      1. A parental consent may be revoked at any time prior to the entry of an order of confirmation of the parental consent by the court.
      2. The parent who executed the parental consent shall appear before the judge of the court in which the adoption petition is filed, or in the judge's absence, the judge's successor or substitute or, if no successor or substitute, any judge or a court with jurisdiction to adjudicate adoption petitions, and shall execute a revocation of the parental consent.
  1. [Deleted by 2018 amendment.]
    1. The court or person receiving the revocations shall maintain the originals in the office of the clerk or the office of the person receiving the surrender, together with the original of the surrender or adoption petition containing the parental consent, if available, and shall personally give or shall send by certified mail, return receipt requested, certified copies of the revocations to the child's parents, the prospective adoptive parents, the local office of the department, or a licensed child-placing agency to whom the child had been surrendered, and if the prospective adoptive parents are represented by counsel, a certified copy of the revocation shall be forwarded to such counsel.
      1. When the revocation is received, the court or the person before whom the revocation was executed shall attach a certified copy of the revocation to a certified copy of the surrender or petition for adoption containing the parental consent, and shall within three (3) days mail the copies of both documents by certified mail, return receipt requested, to the adoptions unit in the state office of the department in Nashville.
      2. If the revocation must be executed before a court or person before whom the surrender was not executed or in which the adoption petition was not filed, the original of the revocation shall be sent within three (3) days to the court or person before whom the surrender was executed or in which the adoption petition was filed, and that court or person shall be responsible for sending the forms to the department and to the persons or agencies who are entitled to copies of the revocation.
      3. The department shall record the revocation with the copies of the surrender or adoption petition containing the parental consent and the order of guardianship for purposes of tracking the adoptive placement status of the child.
  2. After the revocation period has expired or after the court has entered an order confirming a parental consent, no surrender or waiver of interest or parental consent shall be set aside by a court except upon clear and convincing evidence of duress, fraud, intentional misrepresentation or for invalidity under § 36-1-111(d), and no surrender, waiver of interest, or parental consent may be set aside for any reason under this part unless the action based on these grounds is initiated within thirty (30) days of the execution of the surrender, waiver of interest or within thirty (30) days of the date of entry of the order of confirmation of the parental consent.
    1. A surrender or parental consent that is revoked shall have the effect of returning the child's legal status to that which existed before the surrender was executed, and the department, a licensed child-placing agency, or the person who or that had custody or guardianship of the child prior to the surrender pursuant to any parental status, prior court order or statutory authorization shall continue or resume custody or guardianship under that prior parental status, prior court order, or statutory authority, that had established the custodial or guardianship status of the child prior to the execution of the surrender or parental consent, unless a court of competent jurisdiction shall otherwise determine as specifically provided herein.
      1. Unless they had received or maintained custody or guardianship of the child pursuant to a court order entered or pursuant to statutory authority prior to the execution of the surrender or parental consent, the department, the licensed child-placing agency, or the person or persons to whom the child was surrendered and who has physical custody of the child, shall, within five (5) days of the receipt by such department, agency or person of the revocation, return the child to the child's parents or guardian who executed and revoked the surrender or parental consent; provided, that a sworn complaint may be filed in the court where the revocation was executed, or in the event that the surrender was executed before a person or court pursuant to § 36-1-111(h), (i) or (j), in the chancery, circuit, or juvenile court where the child resides in Tennessee, to show cause why the child would likely suffer immediate harm to the child's health and safety if returned to the child's parent or parents or guardian who had executed the surrender.
      2. If a complaint is filed pursuant to subdivision (e)(2)(A), the child shall remain in the physical and/or legal custody or guardianship of the persons or agencies to whom the child was surrendered or with respect to whom the parental consent was executed until the court makes any further orders pursuant to this section, and those persons or agencies shall have authority to provide any necessary care and supervision of the child, subject to further orders of the court.
        1. The complaint filed under this subdivision (e)(2) shall name the parent or parents or guardian or guardians who executed and revoked the surrender or parental consent as defendant or defendants. Except for cause shown in an order entered on the record, the court shall hold a preliminary hearing within three (3) days of the filing of the petition to determine if there is probable cause to believe that the child will be subject to immediate harm to the child's health or safety if the child is returned to the child's parent or parents or guardian or guardians.
        2. If probable cause is not established in the preliminary hearing, the child shall be immediately returned to the child's parent or parents or guardian who executed the surrender that has been revoked.
        3. If probable cause is established, the court shall continue the child in the custody of the persons or the agency to whom the child was surrendered or with respect to whom a parental consent was executed, subject to further orders of the court, pending the final hearing.
        4. The court may make any necessary orders pending the final hearing for the protection of the child.
      3. The case shall be set for a final hearing on the merits within thirty (30) days of the preliminary hearing except for cause shown in a written order of the court entered on the record.
      4. Unless clear and convincing evidence at the final hearing shows that the child's safety and health would be in immediate danger if the child is returned or remains in the custody of the parent or guardian who executed the surrender or filed the parental consent, the complaint shall be dismissed. If the child was not returned to the parent at the preliminary hearing, the child shall be immediately returned to the child's parent or guardian who had executed the surrender or filed the parental consent.
      1. If no complaint is filed pursuant to subdivision (e)(2), the court where the surrender or parental consent was revoked shall enter any orders that are necessary to effect the return of the child to the parent or parents or guardian who had custody of the child prior to the execution of the surrender or prior to filing the parental consent, unless another person, the department, or a licensed child-placing agency had custody or guardianship of the child under a prior order entered before the execution of the surrender or filing of the parental consent, or that had custody or guardianship under statutory authorization prior to the execution of the surrender or parental consent that was revoked by that parent.
      2. The court in which a surrender, revocation or parental consent is given or filed, or adoption court may not modify any prior custody or guardianship order that had given custody or guardianship of the child to the department, a licensed child-placing agency, or another person under a prior order or pursuant to any statutory authorization prior to the surrender or the filing of the parental consent, and if such order or statutory authority exists, the court's jurisdiction over the child shall terminate after the execution of the revocation of the surrender or parental consent, and the prior parental status, prior court order or prior statutory authority shall continue in effect; provided, that if for any reason, the agencies or persons who had prior custody or guardianship of the child are unable or unwilling to resume custody of the child, the court receiving the revocation shall be authorized to make a custody determination and award temporary custody of the child to any suitable person, the department, or a licensed child-placing agency with custodial authority pursuant to § 36-1-140, or it may make an order of guardianship or partial guardianship pursuant to § 36-1-102, with the right to adopt or consent to the child's adoption.
    2. In the event that the surrender was executed before a person or court under § 36-1-111(h), (i) or (j), the chancery, circuit or juvenile court where the surrender was filed pursuant to § 36-1-111(q), or in the county where the child resides in Tennessee if the surrender has not been filed, shall have jurisdiction to enter orders in compliance with this subsection (e) to effect the child's return to the child's parent or parents or guardian or to provide for the child's custody or guardianship as permitted herein.
  3. If the child is not returned to the child's parent or parents or guardian pursuant to subdivision (e)(2)(E), and unless the department, a licensed child-placing agency, or another person to whom the child was surrendered or to whom a parental consent was executed had custody or guardianship of the child pursuant to a court order entered prior to the filing of the surrender or the parental consent or pursuant to statutory authorization prior to the execution of the surrender or parental consent, the court where the revocation was executed shall have jurisdiction following a revocation of the surrender or parental consent to award temporary custody to any appropriate person, the department, or any other licensed child care agency, with the authority as legal custodian pursuant to § 37-1-140, or the court may award guardianship or partial guardianship pursuant to § 36-1-102 with the right to adopt or consent to the child's adoption.
  4. The department or a licensed child-placing agency or licensed clinical social worker shall have the right to intervene in any complaint filed pursuant to subdivision (e)(2)(A) for the purpose of introducing proof as to the child's health and safety.

Acts 1951, ch. 202, § 11 (Williams, § 9572.25); 1959, ch. 223, § 6; impl. am. Acts 1975, ch. 219, § 1; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 36-117; Acts 1986, ch. 767, § 7; 1993, ch. 124, § 3, 4; T.C.A., § 36-1-117; Acts 1995, ch. 532, § 1; 1996, ch. 1054, §§ 40, 111; 2000, ch. 981, § 51; 2015, ch. 113, §§ 1-3; 2016, ch. 919, § 6; 2018, ch. 875, § 33.

Compiler's Notes. Former § 36-1-112 (Acts 1951, ch. 202, §§ 9, 11 (Williams, §§ 9572.23, 9572.25); impl. am. Acts 1975, ch. 219, § 1; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 36-112), concerning filing of consent making the consenting person a party to the proceedings, was repealed by Acts 1995, ch. 532, § 1, effective January 1, 1996.

Amendments. The 2018 amendment deleted former (b) which read: “The form for the revocation of a surrender or parental consent shall be prescribed by the department pursuant to rules promulgated by it pursuant to this part, and a copy of the form shall be attached to the parent's copy of the surrender.”

Effective Dates. Acts 2018, ch. 875, § 38. July 1, 2018.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 20 Tenn. Juris., Parent and Child, § 21.

Law Reviews.

Adoption Proceedings — Revocation of Surrender Under Tennessee Code Annotated Section 36-1-117 (Bradley E. Trammell), 23 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 293 (1993).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Construction.

A final order of adoption is subject to the provisions of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 that provide that fraud or undue influence are good grounds for vacating an adoption order; however, the physical and emotional welfare of all parties requires assurance of the finality of the adoption order. Therefore, after a final adoption order is entered, a natural parent who consented to the adoption must present clear and convincing evidence in order to set aside the adoption order. In re Bishop, 678 S.W.2d 471, 1984 Tenn. App. LEXIS 2925 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984).

Adoption statutes repeatedly utilize the terms, physical custody and legal custody, as two distinct and separate concepts; the statutory sections intimate that the concept of physical custody is synonymous with having physical possession of the child inasmuch as they expressly provide for an order of custody to follow. In re Joseph F., 492 S.W.3d 690, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 227 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 377 (Tenn. May 10, 2016).

Construing the language of the adoption and termination statutory scheme, the term “physical custody” as utilized in the statutory sections would be synonymous with having physical possession of a child and would not require a court order or other judicial act; the statutory definition of custody contained in the juvenile court statutory scheme is inapplicable in the context of a termination or adoption proceeding, and physical custody means physical possession of a child, as granted by a parent, guardian, child-placing agency, or court, but physical custody as used in the statutory scheme does not include the unlawful taking of a child. In re Joseph F., 492 S.W.3d 690, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 227 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 377 (Tenn. May 10, 2016).

This statute applies to surrenders, not to orders of guardianship, and thus the trial court erred in refusing to set aside the order of guardianship based on this statute. In re Neveah W., 525 S.W.3d 223, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 77 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 3, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 276 (Tenn. May 9, 2017).

2. Proceedings After Thirty-Day Period.

Where mother of illegitimate child prior to marriage with father and legitimation of child surrendered and released child to child-placing agency the consent was irrevocable after 30-day period, and petition for writ of habeas corpus by parents after 30-day period was properly denied by chancellor, but petition could be amended at discretion of chancellor so as to pray for adoption of child at which time the chancellor could consider the best interest of the child in determining whether child should be placed with parents or placed with others. State ex rel. “A” v. A Licensed or Chartered Child-Placing Agency, 194 Tenn. 400, 250 S.W.2d 776, 1952 Tenn. LEXIS 394 (1952), (decision under prior law).

3. Compliance with Statutory Requirements.

Proceedings substantially complied with statutory requirements for a valid surrender. In re Hatcher, 16 S.W.3d 792, 1999 Tenn. App. LEXIS 832 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999).

36-1-113. Termination of parental or guardianship rights.

  1. The chancery and circuit courts shall have concurrent jurisdiction with the juvenile court to terminate parental or guardianship rights to a child in a separate proceeding, or as a part of the adoption proceeding by utilizing any grounds for termination of parental or guardianship rights permitted in this part or in title 37, chapter 1, part 1 and title 37, chapter 2, part 4. All pleadings and records filed in the chancery and circuit courts pursuant to this section shall be placed under seal and shall not be subject to public disclosure, in the same manner as those filed in juvenile court, unless otherwise provided by court order.
    1. The prospective adoptive parent or parents, including extended family members caring for a related child, any licensed child-placing agency having physical custody of the child, the child’s guardian ad litem, or the department shall have standing to file a petition pursuant to this part or title 37 to terminate parental or guardianship rights of a person alleged to be a parent or guardian of the child. The child’s parent, pursuant to subdivision (g)(10), (g)(11), or (g)(15), shall also have standing to file a petition pursuant to this part or title 37 to terminate parental or guardianship rights of a person alleged to be a parent or guardian of the child. The prospective adoptive parents, including extended family members caring for a related child, shall have standing to request termination of parental or guardianship rights in the adoption petition filed by them pursuant to this part.
    2. The court shall notify the petitioning parent that the duty of future child support by the parent who is the subject of the termination petition will be forever terminated by entry of an order terminating parental rights.
  2. Termination of parental or guardianship rights must be based upon:
    1. A finding by the court by clear and convincing evidence that the grounds for termination of parental or guardianship rights have been established; and
    2. That termination of the parent's or guardian's rights is in the best interests of the child.
    1. The petition to terminate parental rights may be made upon information and belief and shall be verified. If a parent whose parental rights are proposed for termination is the legal parent of the child, as defined in § 36-1-102, and if such parent is alleged to be deceased, then diligent efforts must be made by the petitioner to verify the death of such parent. Upon proof satisfactory to the court that such parent is deceased, no further action shall be required to terminate parental rights of that person.
      1. The petition to terminate parental rights shall state:
        1. The child's birth name;
        2. The child's age or date of birth;
        3. The child's current residence address or county of residence or that the child is in the custody of the department or a licensed child-placing agency;
        4. Any other facts that allege the basis for termination of parental rights and that bring the child and parties within the jurisdiction of the court;
        5. Any notice required pursuant to subdivision (d)(4) has been given; and
        6. The medical and social history of the child and the child's biological family has been completed to the extent possible on the form promulgated by the department pursuant to § 36-1-111(k); provided, however, the absence of such completed information shall not be a barrier to termination of parental rights.
      2. Initials or pseudonyms may be used in the petition in lieu of the full names of the petitioners to promote the safety of the petitioners or of the child, with permission of the court;
      1. The petition to terminate parental rights must state that:
        1. The Tennessee putative father registry has been consulted prior to the filing of the petition or will be consulted within ten (10) days thereafter unless the biological father has been identified through DNA testing as described in § 24-7-112 and that identification is set out in the petition; and a copy of the response to this inquiry shall be provided to the court immediately upon receipt by the petitioner; and
        2. Notice of the filing of the termination petition has been provided to the Tennessee putative father registry if the child is less than thirty (30) days old at the time the petition is filed.
      2. [Deleted by 2019 amendment.]
      3. The petition to terminate, or the adoption petition that seeks to terminate parental rights, shall state that:
        1. The petition or request for termination in the adoption petition, if granted, shall have the effect of forever severing all of the rights, responsibilities, and obligations of the parent or parents or the guardian or guardians to the child who is the subject of the order, and of the child to the parent or parents or the guardian or guardians;
        2. The child will be placed in the guardianship of other person, persons or public or private agencies who, or that, as the case may be, shall have the right to adopt the child, or to place the child for adoption and to consent to the child's adoption; and
        3. The parent or guardian shall have no further right to notice of proceedings for the adoption of the child by other persons and that the parent or guardian shall have no right to object to the child's adoption or thereafter, at any time, to have any relationship, legal or otherwise, with the child, except as provided by contract pursuant to § 36-1-145.
    2. The petition to terminate parental rights, if filed separately from the adoption petition, may be filed as provided in § 36-1-114. If the petition is filed in a court different from the court where there is a pending custody, dependency, neglect or abuse proceeding concerning a person whose parental rights are sought to be terminated in the petition, a notice of the filing of the petition, together with a copy of the petition, shall be sent by the petitioner to the court where the prior proceeding is pending. In addition, the petitioner filing a petition under this section shall comply with the requirements of § 36-1-117(e).
  3. Service of process of the petition shall be made as provided in § 36-1-117.
  4. Before terminating the rights of any parent or guardian who is incarcerated or who was incarcerated at the time of an action or proceeding is initiated, it must be affirmatively shown to the court that such incarcerated parent or guardian received actual notice of the following:
    1. The time and place of the hearing to terminate parental rights;
    2. That the hearing will determine whether the rights of the incarcerated parent or guardian should be terminated;
    3. That the incarcerated parent or guardian has the right to participate in the hearing and contest the allegation that the rights of the incarcerated parent or guardian should be terminated, and, at the discretion of the court, such participation may be achieved through personal appearance, teleconference, telecommunication or other means deemed by the court to be appropriate under the circumstances;
    4. That if the incarcerated parent or guardian wishes to participate in the hearing and contest the allegation, such parent or guardian:
      1. If indigent, will be provided with a court-appointed attorney to assist the parent or guardian in contesting the allegation; and
      2. Shall have the right to perpetuate such person's testimony or that of any witness by means of depositions or interrogatories as provided by the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure; and
    5. If, by means of a signed waiver, the court determines that the incarcerated parent or guardian has voluntarily waived the right to participate in the hearing and contest the allegation, or if such parent or guardian takes no action after receiving notice of such rights, the court may proceed with such action without the parent's or guardian's participation.
  5. Initiation of termination of parental or guardianship rights may be based upon any of the grounds listed in this subsection (g). The following grounds are cumulative and nonexclusive, so that listing conditions, acts or omissions in one ground does not prevent them from coming within another ground:
    1. Abandonment by the parent or guardian, as defined in § 36-1-102, has occurred;
    2. There has been substantial noncompliance by the parent or guardian with the statement of responsibilities in a permanency plan pursuant to title 37, chapter 2, part 4;
      1. The child has been removed from the home or the physical or legal custody of a parent or guardian for a period of six (6) months by a court order entered at any stage of proceedings in which a petition has been filed in the juvenile court alleging that a child is a dependent and neglected child, and:
        1. The conditions that led to the child's removal still persist, preventing the child's safe return to the care of the parent or guardian, or other conditions exist that, in all reasonable probability, would cause the child to be subjected to further abuse or neglect, preventing the child's safe return to the care of the parent or guardian;
        2. There is little likelihood that these conditions will be remedied at an early date so that the child can be safely returned to the parent or guardian in the near future; and
        3. The continuation of the parent or guardian and child relationship greatly diminishes the child's chances of early integration into a safe, stable, and permanent home;
      2. The six (6) months must accrue on or before the first date the termination of parental rights petition is set to be heard;
    3. The parent or guardian has been found to have committed severe child abuse, as defined in § 37-1-102, under any prior order of a court or is found by the court hearing the petition to terminate parental rights or the petition for adoption to have committed severe child abuse against any child;
    4. The parent or guardian has been sentenced to more than two (2) years' imprisonment for conduct against a child that has been found under any prior order of a court or that is found by the court hearing the petition to be severe child abuse, as defined in § 37-1-102. Unless otherwise stated, for purposes of this subdivision (g)(5), “sentenced” shall not be construed to mean that the parent or guardian must have actually served more than two (2) years in confinement, but shall only be construed to mean that the court had imposed a sentence of two (2) or more years upon the parent or guardian;
    5. The parent has been confined in a correctional or detention facility of any type, by order of the court as a result of a criminal act, under a sentence of ten (10) or more years, and the child is under eight (8) years of age at the time the sentence is entered by the court;
    6. The parent has been:
      1. Convicted of first degree or second degree murder of the child's other parent or legal guardian; or
      2. Found civilly liable for the intentional and wrongful death of the child's other parent or legal guardian;
      1. The chancery and circuit courts shall have jurisdiction in an adoption proceeding, and the chancery, circuit, and juvenile courts shall have jurisdiction in a separate, independent proceeding conducted prior to an adoption proceeding to determine if the parent or guardian is mentally incompetent to provide for the further care and supervision of the child, and to terminate that parent's or guardian's rights to the child;
      2. The court may terminate the parental or guardianship rights of that person if it determines on the basis of clear and convincing evidence that:
        1. The parent or guardian of the child is incompetent to adequately provide for the further care and supervision of the child because the parent's or guardian's mental condition is presently so impaired and is so likely to remain so that it is unlikely that the parent or guardian will be able to assume or resume the care of and responsibility for the child in the near future; and
        2. That termination of parental or guardian rights is in the best interest of the child;
      3. In the circumstances described under subdivisions (8)(A) and (B), no willfulness in the failure of the parent or guardian to establish the parent's or guardian's ability to care for the child need be shown to establish that the parental or guardianship rights should be terminated;
      1. The parental rights of any person who, at the time of the filing of a petition to terminate the parental rights of such person, or if no such petition is filed, at the time of the filing of a petition to adopt a child, is the putative father of the child may also be terminated based upon any one (1) or more of the following additional grounds:
        1. [Deleted by 2019 amendment.]
        2. The person has failed, without good cause or excuse, to make reasonable and consistent payments for the support of the child in accordance with the child support guidelines promulgated by the department pursuant to § 36-5-101;
        3. The person has failed to seek reasonable visitation with the child, and if visitation has been granted, has failed to visit altogether, or has engaged in only token visitation, as defined in § 36-1-102;
        4. The person has failed to manifest an ability and willingness to assume legal and physical custody of the child;
        5. Placing custody of the child in the person's legal and physical custody would pose a risk of substantial harm to the physical or psychological welfare of the child; or
        6. The person has failed to file a petition to establish paternity of the child within thirty (30) days after notice of alleged paternity, or as required in § 36-2-318(j), or after making a claim of paternity pursuant to § 36-1-117(c)(3);
        1. For purposes of this subdivision (g)(9), “notice” means the written statement to a person who is believed to be the biological father or possible biological father of the child. The notice may be made or given by the mother, the department, a licensed child-placing agency, the prospective adoptive parents, a physical custodian of the child, or the legal counsel of any of these people or entities; provided, that actual notice of alleged paternity may be proven to have been given to a person by any means and by any person or entity. The notice may be made or given at any time after the child is conceived and, if not sooner, may include actual notice of a petition to terminate the putative father's parental rights with respect to the child;
        2. “Notice” also means the oral statement to an alleged biological father from a biological mother that the alleged biological father is believed to be the biological father, or possible biological father, of the biological mother's child;
      1. The parent has been convicted of aggravated rape pursuant to § 39-13-502, rape pursuant to § 39-13-503, or rape of a child pursuant to § 39-13-522, from which crime the child was conceived. A certified copy of the conviction suffices to prove this ground;
      2. When one (1) of the child's parents has been convicted of one (1) of the offenses specified in subdivision (g)(10)(A), the child's other parent shall have standing to file a petition to terminate the parental rights of the convicted parent. Nothing in this section shall give a parent standing to file a petition to terminate parental rights based on grounds other than those listed in this subdivision (g)(10) or subdivision (g)(11) or (g)(15);
        1. The parent has been found to have committed severe child sexual abuse under any prior order of a criminal court;
        2. For the purposes of this section, “severe child sexual abuse” means the parent is convicted of any of the following offenses towards a child:
          1. Aggravated rape, pursuant to § 39-13-502;
          2. Aggravated sexual battery, pursuant to § 39-13-504;
          3. Aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor, pursuant to § 39-17-1004;
          4. Especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor, pursuant to § 39-17-1005;
          5. Incest, pursuant to § 39-15-302;
          6. Rape, pursuant to § 39-13-503; or
          7. Rape of a child, pursuant to § 39-13-522;
      1. When one (1) of the child’s parents has been convicted of one (1) of the offenses specified in subdivision (g)(11)(A)(ii), the child’s other parent shall have standing to file a petition to terminate the parental rights of the abusive parent. Nothing in this section shall give a parent standing to file a petition to terminate parental rights based on grounds other than those listed in subdivision (g)(10), this subdivision (g)(11), or subdivision (g)(15);
    7. The parent or guardian has been convicted of trafficking for commercial sex act under § 39-13-309;
    8. The parent or guardian has been convicted on or after July 1, 2015, of sex trafficking of children or by force, fraud, or coercion under 18 U.S.C. § 1591, or a sex trafficking of children offense under the laws of another state that is substantially similar to § 39-13-309;
    9. A parent or guardian has failed to manifest, by act or omission, an ability and willingness to personally assume legal and physical custody or financial responsibility of the child, and placing the child in the person's legal and physical custody would pose a risk of substantial harm to the physical or psychological welfare of the child; and
      1. The parent or legal guardian has been convicted of attempted first degree murder or attempted second degree murder of the child's other parent or legal guardian;
      2. When one (1) of the child's parents or legal guardians has been convicted of attempted first degree murder or attempted second degree murder of the child's other parent or legal guardian, the child's non-offending parent or legal guardian shall have standing to file a petition to terminate the parental or guardianship rights of the convicted parent or legal guardian. Nothing in this section shall give a parent or legal guardian standing to file a petition to terminate parental or guardianship rights based on grounds other than those listed in subdivision (g)(10) or (g)(11) or this subdivision (g)(15).
    1. The department shall file a petition to terminate the parental rights of the child's parents (or, if such a petition has been filed by another party, seek to be joined as a party to the petition), and, concurrently, to identify, recruit, process, and approve a qualified family for an adoption, under the following circumstances:
      1. In the case of a child who has been in foster care under the responsibility of the department for fifteen (15) of the most recent twenty-two (22) months; or
      2. If a court of competent jurisdiction has determined a child to be an abandoned infant as defined at § 36-1-102; or
      3. If a court of competent jurisdiction has made a determination in a criminal or civil proceeding that the parent has committed murder of a child, committed voluntary manslaughter of a child, aided or abetted, attempted, conspired, or solicited to commit such a murder or such a voluntary manslaughter of a child, or committed a felony assault that has resulted in serious bodily injury or severe child abuse as defined at § 37-1-102 to a child. For the purposes of this subsection (h), such a determination shall be made by a jury or trial court judge designated by § 16-2-502 through an explicit finding, or by such equivalent courts of other states or of the United States; or
      4. If a juvenile court has made a finding of severe child abuse as defined at § 37-1-102.
    2. At the option of the department, the department may determine that a petition to terminate the parental rights of the child's parents shall not be filed (or, if such a petition has been filed by another party, shall not be required to seek to be joined as a party to the petition), if one of the following exists:
      1. The child is being cared for by a relative;
      2. The department has documented in the permanency plan, which shall be available for court review, a compelling reason for determining that filing such a petition would not be in the best interests of the child; or
      3. The department has not made reasonable efforts under § 37-1-166 to provide to the family of the child, consistent with the time period in the department permanency plan, such services as the department deems necessary for the safe return of the child to the child's home.
  6. In determining whether termination of parental or guardianship rights is in the best interest of the child pursuant to this part, the court shall consider, but is not limited to, the following:
    1. Whether the parent or guardian has made such an adjustment of circumstance, conduct, or conditions as to make it safe and in the child's best interest to be in the home of the parent or guardian;
    2. Whether the parent or guardian has failed to effect a lasting adjustment after reasonable efforts by available social services agencies for such duration of time that lasting adjustment does not reasonably appear possible;
    3. Whether the parent or guardian has maintained regular visitation or other contact with the child;
    4. Whether a meaningful relationship has otherwise been established between the parent or guardian and the child;
    5. The effect a change of caretakers and physical environment is likely to have on the child's emotional, psychological and medical condition;
    6. Whether the parent or guardian, or other person residing with the parent or guardian, has shown brutality, physical, sexual, emotional or psychological abuse, or neglect toward the child, or another child or adult in the family or household;
    7. Whether the physical environment of the parent's or guardian's home is healthy and safe, whether there is criminal activity in the home, or whether there is such use of alcohol, controlled substances or controlled substance analogues as may render the parent or guardian consistently unable to care for the child in a safe and stable manner;
    8. Whether the parent's or guardian's mental and/or emotional status would be detrimental to the child or prevent the parent or guardian from effectively providing safe and stable care and supervision for the child; or
    9. Whether the parent or guardian has paid child support consistent with the child support guidelines promulgated by the department pursuant to § 36-5-101.
  7. In the hearing on the petition, the circuit, chancery, or juvenile court shall admit evidence, pursuant to the Tennessee Rules of Evidence, and shall recognize the exemptions to privileges as provided pursuant to §§ 37-1-411 and 37-1-614.
  8. The court shall ensure that the hearing on the petition takes place within six (6) months of the date that the petition is filed, unless the court determines an extension is in the best interests of the child. The court shall enter an order that makes specific findings of fact and conclusions of law within thirty (30) days of the conclusion of the hearing. If such a case has not been completed within six (6) months from the date the petition was served, the petitioner or respondent shall have grounds to request that the court of appeals grant an order expediting the case at the trial level.
    1. An order terminating parental rights shall have the effect of severing forever all legal rights and obligations of the parent or guardian of the child against whom the order of termination is entered and of the child who is the subject of the petition to that parent or guardian. The parent or guardian shall have no further right to notice of proceedings for the adoption of that child by other persons and shall have no right to object to the child's adoption or thereafter to have any relationship, legal or otherwise, with the child. It shall terminate the responsibilities of that parent or guardian under this section for future child support or other future financial responsibilities even if the child is not ultimately adopted; provided, that the entry of an order terminating the parental rights shall not eliminate the responsibility of such parent or guardian for past child support arrearages or other financial obligations incurred for the care of such child prior to the entry of the order terminating parental rights.
    2. Notwithstanding subdivision (l )(1), a child who is the subject of the order for termination shall be entitled to inherit from a parent whose rights are terminated until the final order of adoption is entered.
  9. Upon termination of parental or guardian rights, the court may award guardianship or partial guardianship of the child to a licensed child-placing agency or the department. Such guardianship shall include the right to place the child for adoption and the right to consent to the child's adoption. Upon termination of parental or guardian rights, the court may award guardianship or partial guardianship to any prospective adoptive parent or parents with the right to adopt the child, or to any permanent guardian who has been appointed pursuant to title 37, chapter 1, part 8. In any of these cases, such guardianship is subject to the remaining rights, if any, of any other parent or guardian of the child. Before guardianship or partial guardianship can be awarded to a permanent guardian, the court shall find that the department or licensed child-placing agency currently having custody of the child has made reasonable efforts to place the child for adoption and that permanent guardianship is in the best interest of the child.
  10. An order of guardianship or partial guardianship entered by the court pursuant to this section shall supersede prior orders of custody or guardianship of that court and of other courts, except those prior orders of guardianship or partial guardianship of other courts entered as the result of validly executed surrenders or revocations pursuant to § 36-1-111 or § 36-1-112, or except as provided pursuant to § 36-1-111(r)(4)(D) and (E), or except an order of guardianship or partial guardianship of a court entered pursuant to § 36-1-116; provided, that orders terminating parental rights entered by a court under this section prior to the filing of an adoption petition shall be effective to terminate parental rights for all purposes.
  11. If the court terminates parental or guardianship rights, under this part or title 37 or a consent is given pursuant to § 36-1-117(f) or (g), or if there have been surrenders of parental or guardianship rights of all other necessary parties, then no further surrender or consent of that parent or guardian shall be necessary to authorize an adoption; provided, that the adoption court may review and confirm the validity of any denials of parentage made by persons under any statutory provisions from outside the state of Tennessee.
  12. A copy of the order or orders obtained by the prospective adoptive parents terminating parental or guardianship rights under this section shall be filed with the petition for adoption.
  13. After the entry of the order terminating parental rights, no party to the proceeding, nor anyone claiming under such party, may later question the validity of the termination proceeding by reason of any defect or irregularity therein, jurisdictional or otherwise, but shall be fully bound thereby, except based upon a timely appeal of the termination order as may be allowed by law; and in no event, for any reason, shall a termination of parental rights be overturned by any court or collaterally attacked by any person or entity after one (1) year from the date of the entry of the final order of termination. This provision is intended as a statute of repose.

Acts 1951, ch. 202, § 5 (Williams, § 9572.19); Acts 1955, ch. 320, § 1; 1957, ch. 292, § 1; 1959, ch. 111, § 1; 1959, ch. 223, § 4; impl. am. Acts 1975, ch. 219, § 1; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 36-110; § 36-1-110; Acts 1995, ch. 532, § 1; 1996, ch. 1054, §§ 41-44; 1997, ch. 379, § 1; 1997, ch. 551, § 54; 1998, ch. 1097, §§ 4-11; 1998, ch. 1098, § 4; 1999, ch. 467, § 1; 2000, ch. 683, §§ 1, 3; 2003, ch. 84, §§ 1, 2; 2003, ch. 231, §§ 9, 10; 2006, ch. 890, § 2; 2007, ch. 372, §§ 1, 2; 2008, ch. 1059, §§ 1-3; 2008, ch. 1162, §§ 3, 4; 2010, ch. 821, § 1; 2010, ch. 842, § 1; 2010, ch. 881, § 2; 2012, ch. 848, § 8; 2012, ch. 1042, §§ 1-3; 2013, ch. 298, § 1; 2013, ch. 365, § 1; 2015, ch. 237, § 1; 2016, ch. 636, § 5; 2016, ch. 659, § 1; 2016, ch. 919, §§ 7-9, 20; 2017, ch. 263, § 1; 2018, ch. 560, §§ 1-5; 2018, ch. 875, §§ 7, 9-12, 17; 2019, ch. 36, §§ 3, 4, 24-28; 2020, ch. 525, §§ 5-7.

Compiler's Notes. Former § 36-1-113 (Acts 1951, ch. 202, § 9 (Williams, § 9572.23); impl. am. Acts 1975, ch. 219, § 1; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 36-113), concerning consent filed with petition, was repealed by Acts 1995, ch. 532, § 1, effective January 1, 1996.

Acts 2000, ch. 683, § 4 provided that the act shall apply to all proceedings and petitions pending on May 8, 2000 and all arising on or after May 8, 2000.

Acts 2006, ch. 890, § 1 provided that the provisions of the act may be collectively known as the “Child Protection Act of 2006.”

Acts 2018, ch. 560, § 6 provided that the act, which amended this section, shall apply to petitions filed on or after March 14, 2018.

Amendments. The 2017 amendment, in (j), substituted “shall admit evidence, pursuant to the Tennessee Rules of Evidence,” for “shall, in addition to the Tennessee Rules of Evidence, admit evidence as permitted under the Tennessee Rules of Juvenile Procedure,”.

The 2018 amendment by ch. 560, in (b)(1), substituted “(g)(10), (g)(11), or (g)(15)” for “(g)(11)” following “subdivision”; rewrote the introductory language in (7) which read: “The parent has been convicted of or found civilly liable for the intentional and wrongful death of the child's other parent or legal guardian;” and added (A) and (B); in (g), inserted “or subdivision (g)(11) or (g)(15)” following “in this subdivision (g)(10)(B)” and substituted “in subdivision (g)(10), this subdivision (g)(11), or subdivision (g)(15)” for “in this subdivision (g)(11)” in (g)(11)(B); and added (g)(15.

The 2018 amendment by ch. 875 added (d)(2)(B); rewrote (d)(3)(A)(ii) and (d)(3)(A)(iii) which read: “(ii) Indicates if there exists any other claim or potential claim to the paternity of the child; “(iii) Describes whether any other parental or guardianship rights have been terminated by surrender, parental consent, or otherwise, and whether any other such rights must be terminated before the child can be made available for adoption;”; redesignated former (d)(3)(A)(iv) and (d)(3)(A)(v) as (d)(2)(A)(v) and (d)(2)(A)(vi), respectively; in (d)(3)(C)(i), inserted “, if granted,”; rewrote the former introductory language in (g)(3) which read: “The child has been removed from the home of the parent or guardian by order of a court for a period of six (6) months and”, and redesignated it as (g)(3)(A); rewrote former (g)(3)(A) which read: “The conditions that led to the child’s removal or other conditions that in all reasonable probability would cause the child to be subjected to further abuse or neglect and that, therefore, prevent the child’s safe return to the care of the parent or parents or the guardian or guardians, still persist;” and redesignated it as (g)(3)(A)(i); rewrote former (g)(3)(B) which read: “There is little likelihood that these conditions will be remedied at an early date so that the child can be safely returned to the parent or parents or the guardian or guardians in the near future;” and redesignated it as (g)(3)(A)(ii); redesignated former (g)(3)(A)(C) as (g)(3)(A)(iii); added present (g)(3)(B); at the end of (g)(4), substituted “any child” for “the child who is the subject of the petition or against any sibling or half-sibling of such child, or any other child residing temporarily or permanently in the home of such parent or guardian”; and, in (g)(14), deleted “legal” preceding “parent”.

The 2019 amendment,  in (d), deleted “, or allegations in the adoption petition,” following “The petition” at the beginning, and added the third sentence in (d)(1); substituted “petition to terminate parental rights” for “petition, or allegations in the adoption petition,” in (d)(2)(A); rewrote (d)(3)(A), which read: “The petition, or allegations in the adoption petition, shall contain a verified statement that: (i) The putative father registry maintained by the department has been consulted within ten (10) working days of the filing of the petition and shall state whether there exists any claim on the registry to the paternity of the child who is the subject of the termination or adoption petition; (ii) Any putative father registry maintained by another state in which the child was born has been consulted within ten (10) working days of the filing of the petition and shall state whether there exists any claim on that registry to the paternity of the child who is the subject of the termination or adoption petition; and (iii) If the petitioner knows or has reason to believe that the mother was living or present in another state at the time of the child's conception, any putative father registry maintained by that state has been consulted within ten (10) working days of the filing of the petition and shall state whether there exists any claim on that registry to the paternity of the child who is the subject of the termination or adoption petition.”; deleted (d)(3)(B), which read: “Any person or persons entitled to notice pursuant to § 36-1-117 shall be named as defendants in the petition to terminate parental rights or in the adoption petition and shall be served with a copy of the petition as provided by law.”; and substituted “petition to terminate parental rights, if filed separately from the adoption petition,” for “petition, if filed separately from the adoption petition,” in (d)(4); deleted (g)(9)(A)(i), which read: “The person has failed, without good cause or excuse, to pay a reasonable share of prenatal, natal, and postnatal expenses involving the birth of the child in accordance with the person’s financial means promptly upon the person’s receipt of notice of the child’s impending birth;” and inserted “or possible biological father,” in (g)(9)(B)(ii).The 2020 amendment substituted “with the child, except as provided by contract pursuant to § 36-1-145” for “with the child” in (d)(3)(C)(iii);  substituted “a child” for “the child who is the subject of the petition, or for conduct against any sibling or half-sibling of the child or any other child residing temporarily or permanently in the home of such parent or guardian,” in (g)(5); and rewrote the first sentence of (h)(1)(C) which read: “If a court of competent jurisdiction has made a determination in a criminal or civil proceeding that the parent has committed murder of any sibling or half-sibling of the child who is the subject of the petition or any other child residing temporarily or permanently in the home, committed voluntary manslaughter of another such child, aided or abetted, attempted, conspired, or solicited to commit such a murder or such a voluntary manslaughter of the child that is the subject of the petition or any sibling or half-sibling of the child who is the subject of the petition or any other child residing temporarily or permanently in the home, or committed a felony assault that has resulted in serious bodily injury or severe child abuse as defined at § 37-1-102 to the child that is the subject of the petition or any sibling or half-sibling of the child who is the subject of the petition or any other child residing temporarily or permanently in the home.”

Effective Dates. Acts 2017, ch. 263, § 5. July 1, 2017.

Acts 2018, ch. 560, § 6. March 14, 2018.

Acts 2018, ch. 875, § 38. July 1, 2018.

Acts 2019, ch. 36, § 35. July 1, 2019.

Acts 2020, ch. 525, § 13. March 6, 2020.

Cross-References. Concurrent jurisdiction of juvenile court, § 37-1-104.

Rule Reference. This section is referred to in Rule 803 of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence.

Law Reviews.

New Reproductive Technologies: The Legal Problem and a Solution, 49 Tenn. L. Rev. 303 (1982).

Parental Immunity from Liability in Tort: Evolution of a Doctrine in Tennessee (Irene Hansen Saba), 36 U. Mem. L. Rev. 829 (2006).

Storied Anna Mae He Decision Clarifies Law But Leaves Unanswered Questions (Christina A. Zawisza), 38 U. Mem. L. Rev. 637 (2008).

When One Parent Goes and the Other Parent Stays: The Inconsistency and Inequality of Guaranteeing Absent Parents Permanent Parental Rights (Wendee M. Hilderbrand), 56 Vand. L. Rev. 1907 (2003).

Attorney General Opinions. Constitutionality of 1997 amendment, OAG 97-082, 1997 Tenn. AG LEXIS 81 (5/21/97).

Juvenile court disposition of children following a termination of parental rights, OAG 99-208, 1999 Tenn. AG LEXIS 190 (10/20/99).

T.C.A. § 36-1-113(g)(6) authorizes the termination of parental rights even if the parent has already served his or her sentence and been released.  OAG 11-33, 2011 Tenn. AG LEXIS 35 (4/12/11).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

Neither T.C.A. § 36-1-113(c)(2) nor (g)(6) is blatantly unconstitutional. In re Adoption of E.N.R., 42 S.W.3d 26, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 287 (Tenn. 2001).

Incarcerated mother's constitutional rights were not violated when the trial court terminated her parental rights under T.C.A. § 36-1-113(g)(4) for prior criminal convictions for actions against the child's sibling, and not for any action, neglect, or abuse directed against the child herself. In re C.A.F., 114 S.W.3d 524, 2003 Tenn. App. LEXIS 134 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003).

A judicial finding of severe child abuse against any child creates an obvious presumption of parental unfitness and the incorporation of this presumption into statutory law is not obviously or blatantly unconstitutional. In re C.A.F., 114 S.W.3d 524, 2003 Tenn. App. LEXIS 134 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003).

Under T.C.A. § 36-1-113(c)(1), in every case in which parental rights are terminated, there must be a finding by the court by clear and convincing evidence that the grounds for termination of parental or guardianship rights have been established, and this finding must be contained in a written order entered by the trial court; therefore, as long as the juvenile court has correctly found that at least one of the statutory grounds for termination of parental rights exists, the constitutional requirement of a showing of parental unfitness or a risk of substantial harm to the welfare of a child has been satisfied. Once a statutory ground for termination has been established, there is no constitutional requirement that the trial court make an additional finding of substantial harm. In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d 838, 2005 Tenn. App. LEXIS 539 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005), appeal denied, In re A.M.S. v. Ferrell, — S.W.3d —, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 1020 (Tenn. 2005).

T.C.A. § 36-1-113(g)(6) is constitutional and does not violate a parent's due process rights because trial court does not have to make a finding of unfitness or a risk of substantial harm after finding at least one of the statutory grounds for termination of parental rights. In re T.M.G., 283 S.W.3d 318, 2008 Tenn. App. LEXIS 713 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 25, 2008), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2009 Tenn. LEXIS 86 (Tenn. Feb. 24, 2009).

2. Construction.

Construing the language of the adoption and termination statutory scheme, the term “physical custody” as utilized in the statutory sections would be synonymous with having physical possession of a child and would not require a court order or other judicial act; the statutory definition of custody contained in the juvenile court statutory scheme is inapplicable in the context of a termination or adoption proceeding, and physical custody means physical possession of a child, as granted by a parent, guardian, child-placing agency, or court, but physical custody as used in the statutory scheme does not include the unlawful taking of a child. In re Joseph F., 492 S.W.3d 690, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 227 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 377 (Tenn. May 10, 2016).

3. Applicability.

T.C.A. § 36-1-113 was inapplicable because the order that the Tennessee department of children's services alleged was superseded was not an order of guardianship, but rather, a pending custody petition; therefore, it was inapplicable under its own terms. State Dep't of Children's Servs. v. Owens, 129 S.W.3d 50, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 182 (Tenn. 2004).

Trial court terminated father's parental rights pursuant to T.C.A. § 36-1-113 and not T.C.A. § 36-1-111; father consented to termination of his parental rights, and on appeal did not dispute that he agreed to terminate his parental rights before the trial court at the hearing on the amended petition for termination of parental rights and for adoption by a step-parent. In re Adoption of A.E., — S.W.3d —, 2008 Tenn. App. LEXIS 679 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 28, 2008), rev'd, In re Angela E., 303 S.W.3d 240, 2010 Tenn. LEXIS 87 (Tenn. Feb. 16, 2010).

Statute expressly provides that the termination language is not applicable to a legal parent of a child; rather, it is only applicable to a father who is described in the putative father statute. In re F.N.M., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 274 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 11, 2016).

Juvenile court erred in terminating a father's parental rights on the ground that the father failed to assume legal and physical custody because that ground was inapplicable to putative biological fathers. In re Mac L., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 883 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 22, 2016).

Trial court erred by applying an amended version of this section that was not yet in affect when the children's grandparents filed the action to terminate the father's parental rights. In re Braxton M., 531 S.W.3d 708, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 454 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 5, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 639 (Tenn. Sept. 29, 2017).

Grounds of abandonment for failure to provide a suitable home and persistence of conditions were inapplicable because the proof showed that the children were removed from the home of the father, who was living with the father's mother at the time. At the time of removal, the mother was incarcerated. In re Isabella G., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 667 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 3, 2017).

4. Jurisdiction to Declare Child Abandoned.

The chancery or circuit court has jurisdiction to declare a child an “abandoned child” only in a case in which abandonment has been alleged in support of a petition to adopt. St. Peter's Orphan Asylum Asso. v. Riley, 43 Tenn. App. 683, 311 S.W.2d 336, 1957 Tenn. App. LEXIS 144 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1957).

Under the former Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA), Tennessee courts could adjudicate child custody issues, including termination of parental rights proceedings, even if one of the parents did not have minimum contacts with Tennessee. Graham v. Copeland (In re Copeland), 43 S.W.3d 483, 2000 Tenn. App. LEXIS 221 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000), review or rehearing denied, In re Adoption of Copeland, — S.W.3d —, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 352 (Tenn. Apr. 16, 2001).

5. Jurisdiction for Adoption.

A decree of abandonment by the juvenile court does not deprive the chancery or circuit court of jurisdiction of adoption proceedings. In re Matthews, 204 Tenn. 155, 319 S.W.2d 69, 1958 Tenn. LEXIS 254 (1958).

Trial court erred in separating grandparents'  termination and adoption actions and transferring only the termination portion of the proceedings to the juvenile court because once the grandparents filed their adoption and termination petition, the trial court acquired exclusive jurisdiction over the matter to the exclusion of all other courts, including the juvenile court. In re Tyler G., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 280 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 3, 2017).

6. Standing.

In a termination of parental rights case, a court properly denied grandparents' motion to intervene where the grandparental relationship did not alone support intervention, and intervention as of right was not appropriate, because there was a party in the underlying suit, the child's father, who could adequately represent the grandparents' interests. Gonzalez v. Tenn. Dep't of Children's Servs., 136 S.W.3d 613, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 566 (Tenn. 2004).

Jurisdiction to terminate parental or guardianship rights resides concurrently in the chancery, circuit, and juvenile courts under T.C.A. § 36-1-113(a); standing to intervene in a termination proceeding in juvenile court should be analyzed under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 24. Gonzalez v. Tenn. Dep't of Children's Servs., 136 S.W.3d 613, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 566 (Tenn. 2004).

Child's great aunt and uncle did not have standing to file a petition to terminate a father's parental rights because they were not members of any of the groups to standing was granted; extended family members caring for related children were granted standing if they were prospective adoptive parents, and the great aunt and uncle were not. In re M.L.P., — S.W.3d —, 2008 Tenn. App. LEXIS 217 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 8, 2008), aff'd, 281 S.W.3d 387, 2009 Tenn. LEXIS 299 (Tenn. 2009).

Standing existed because original petition was filed jointly by one biological parent and a stepparent seeking termination of the other biological parent's parental rights and seeking adoption of the subject child. In re Jarett M., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 213 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 13, 2015).

As an abuse and neglect proceeding in juvenile court, the rule applied to the guardian ad litem's original appointment, and notwithstanding the adjudicatory hearing order, which relieved all attorneys of further responsibility, the guardian ad litem had standing to petition for termination of parental rights, and the mother's argument effectively precluded the court from considering the standing issue. In re Destiny W., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 289 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2015).

Statute provided only a single circumstance under which a parent could petition to terminate the parental rights of another parent, where the respondent parent had been found to have committed severe child sexual abuse under any prior order of a criminal court; in this case, the father made no claim that the mother had been convicted of such an offense, and thus he lacked standing to petition to terminate the mother's parental rights. In re Ava B., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 296 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 27, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 509 (Tenn. July 1, 2016).

Grandmother lacked standing to petition to terminate the mother's parental rights; the extended family member had to be caring for a related child, but she was not, plus she could not be considered a prospective adoptive parent because to adopt the child, the grandmother would have to terminate the rights to her son and daughter, the mother, and the petition made clear that she had no such intention. In re Ava B., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 296 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 27, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 509 (Tenn. July 1, 2016).

Despite having lived with a child, the child's maternal grandparents lacked standing to file a termination petition under T.C.A. § 36-1-113(b)(1), as the grandparents had not filed a petition for termination or for adoption, nor had they filed a petition to intervene in an adoption proceeding. In re C.H., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 57 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2017).

Trial court erred in terminating a mother's parental rights where, with the exception of a stepparent, T.C.A. § 36-1-113(g)(11) unambiguously stated that the rights of both parents had to be terminated before a third party became eligible to adopt the child, the grandmother was not a stepparent under T.C.A. § 36-1-117(f), and under T.C.A. § 36-1-113(b)(1), the father and grandmother lacked standing to file an adoption petition without first terminating the rights of both parents. In re Lyric A., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 690 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 12, 2017).

Trial court had subject matter jurisdiction of a stepmother's termination of parental rights petition because the stepmother sought to adopt the subject child. In re Paetyn M., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 81 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 14, 2019).

7. Defects in Petition.

Although the petition to terminate a mother's parental rights failed to specifically allege the ground of abandonment by an incarcerated parent, the ground was tried by the mother's implied consent because, inter alia, the father's attorney questioned mother and other witnesses regarding mother's contact with the children, her payment of support, and the time she spent in jail during the four month period of time preceding the filing of the termination petition. In re D.H.B., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 238 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 23, 2015).

8. Procedural Matters.

Although a biological parent, who married, had no standing to petition for the termination of the parental rights of the other biological parent, the biological parent who married was a necessary party to the stepparent's petition for adoption. In re Malina W., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 799 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 29, 2015).

Any alleged deficiencies in the dependency and neglect proceedings were remedied by the protections afforded the father by the termination proceeding, and in any event, he was not disadvantaged by any alleged deficiencies. In re Aniston M., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 309 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 5, 2016).

Lack of a transcript prevented the appellate court from determining whether sufficient evidence supported the termination of a father's parental rights on the ground of abandonment and denied the father proper appellate consideration of his claims. The statement of the evidence included only the most general summary of the testimony of each of the witnesses and fell far short of what was necessary to permit a proper review of the father's claims. In re Ian B., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 318 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 11, 2016).

While there were logistical difficulties for counsel in Tennessee to consult with the father, who was incarcerated in Florida, the record did not show any basis upon which to conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in denying a continuance of the second hearing, particularly because there was a hearing held on a third day and the father filed no motion or sought any relief or specific accommodation between the second and third hearing days; the father was not deprived of his right to due process of law. In re Elizabeth D., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 706 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 23, 2016).

Although the court can find no prohibition to conducting hearings on dependency and neglect and termination of parental rights consecutively, the hearings must be distinct, and one method of accomplishing that goal would be to separate the hearings by at least a day or more; furthermore, evidence admitted in a dependency and neglect hearing should not be relied upon for parental termination unless that evidence was also admitted in the hearing on parental termination. In re Envy J., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 705 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 22, 2016), appeal dismissed, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 944 (Tenn. Dec. 16, 2016).

Mother failed to timely object to the admission of the exhibits from the dependency and neglect hearing in the parental termination proceeding; counsel for the mother initially agreed that the exhibits from the dependency and neglect would be admitted in the termination hearing, and when counsel for the department announced its intention to put on no further proof regarding severe abuse but was still proceeding on the ground of severe abuse for terminating rights, counsel should have objected, but failed to do so, and the issue was thus waived. In re Envy J., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 705 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 22, 2016), appeal dismissed, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 944 (Tenn. Dec. 16, 2016).

Nothing in the definition of a dependent and neglected child requires that a ground for termination of parental rights has been established by appropriate proof, and the same is true of the definition of severe abuse; there are no cases in which Tennessee courts have held that a ground for termination or a best interest determination must be made in order to adjudicate a child dependent and neglected or the victim of severe abuse, and dependency and neglect proceeding and termination of parental rights proceeding are separate proceedings. In re Tamera W., 515 S.W.3d 860, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 859 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 10, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 88 (Tenn. Feb. 8, 2017).

Nothing in either the definition of a dependent and neglected child or severe abuse requires that the trial court determine whether the parent has complied with an applicable permanency plan; whether the parent has made lasting adjustment after reasonable efforts by available social services agencies alone does not prevent the trial court from finding the children dependent and neglected or to be the victims of severe abuse. In re Tamera W., 515 S.W.3d 860, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 859 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 10, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 88 (Tenn. Feb. 8, 2017).

Mother failed to appear at the hearing and never requested the appointment of counsel, and thus the court did not err in failing to appoint counsel for her. In re Yariel S., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 6, 2017).

Return of service provided that the summons and petition were delivered to the mother on March 26, 2016, and the process server was also identified by name and address on the return as required; thus, the trial court acquired personal jurisdiction over the mother in this termination case through service of process. In re Yariel S., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 6, 2017).

Trial court properly found the father to be a putative father of the children because he did not file a paternity petition concerning either of the children and the trial court properly found that he was not a legal parent because he presented no evidence that he executed an unrevoked and sworn acknowledgement of paternity. He was recorded as the father on the children's birth certificates. In re Braxton M., 531 S.W.3d 708, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 454 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 5, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 639 (Tenn. Sept. 29, 2017).

Evidence supported the trial court's findings that a guardian was provided with enough information to qualify a father as a putative father because the mother specifically named the father in a previous court proceeding with the guardian present and gave the city and state where he lived; the guardian made no further attempt to diligently inquire into the father's whereabouts so as to provide him with service and include him in the adoption proceeding. In re Gabrielle W., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 465 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 11, 2017), review denied and ordered not published, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 737 (Tenn. Nov. 29, 2017).

Expedition of the hearing in a termination of parental rights case, not dismissal, was the appropriate remedy when more than six months had passed from the filing of the petition. In re Preston L., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 649 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 27, 2017).

Trial court properly exercised its decision to deny a father's motion to stay and/or continue termination proceedings because it determined that even if the father's convictions were eventually overturned, it would take several years to do so, and the children at issue deserved resolution; by the time of the hearing on the termination petition, the father's convictions had been upheld by the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals and the Tennessee Supreme Court. In re Hailey C., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 658 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 28, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 895 (Tenn. Dec. 21, 2017).

Trial court erred in relying upon the ground of persistence of conditions in terminating a mother's parental rights because, while a magistrate found probable cause to believe the mother's child was dependent and neglected by order which the magistrate entered, the record was devoid of evidence of an order actually finding the child as such until entry of the final order less than six months prior to the termination petition. In re Jabari B., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 60 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 2, 2018).

Trial court did not err by not compelling the Department of Children's Services (DCS) to join in the foster parents'  petition to terminate parental rights because the record supported the trial court's determination that DCS had a compelling reason not to pursue the petition, as the permanency plans submitted to the trial court adequately documented the parents'  compliance. In re Zayne P., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 239 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2018).

Trial court did not err by terminating parental rights prior to ruling on a petition by the Tennessee Department of Children's Services to adjudicate dependency and neglect. In re J.T., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 256 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 10, 2018).

Consideration of whether grounds for the termination of a father's parental rights to his son existed and whether the termination of his rights was in the child's best interest was ripe for adjudication because the son's sexual abuse of his sibling was reported and addressed from that time up until the time of trial; the father was made aware of the son's issues as soon as the Department of Children's Services was notified of them, prior to the petition for termination being filed. In re Dakota M., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 329 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 18, 2018).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a mother's motion for a continuance of a termination of parental rights proceeding because, although the mother claimed to have been sexually assaulted before the hearing, the court properly followed its statutory obligation to expedite termination proceedings in a manner that was consistent with due process. Furthermore, the court, with the benefit of hearing the mother's testimony and observing the mother's demeanor, found the mother to be coherent and able to participate in the proceeding. In re T.R., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 542 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 17, 2018).

Applicable four-month window includes the four months preceding the day the petition to terminate parental rights is filed but excludes the day the petition is filed; the same holds true for the start date of the parent's incarceration. In re Kaycee M., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 585 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 3, 2018).

Based on the trial court's delay concerning the entry of its order, the father contended that the order should be reversed, but this argument was rejected, as case law held that failure to comply with the statute did not require vacating the judgment, nor did a trial court lose jurisdiction over a case if it failed to enter a timely order. In re Mason C., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 723 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 14, 2018).

It was not an abuse of discretion to deny a mother's request for a continuance of a hearing on termination of the mother's parental rights because (1) the matter was pending for 21 months, (2) a hearing was statutorily required within six months, and (3) the mother's documentation did not support the mother's stated reason for seeking a continuance. In re Paetyn M., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 81 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 14, 2019).

Adoption statute had no application in this case because although the end goal was adoption of the child, the only remedy sought by the department was the termination of the mother's rights, and the department could be afforded complete relief without the father's participation; his rights were terminated before this trial, he had no interest to protect, and the mother failed to show that the father had to be joined. In re Josiah T., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 482 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 2, 2019).

Father did not receive sufficient notice of the grounds for termination of his parental rights; despite the fact that the order did not cite abandonment by an incarcerated parent, by applying the time period prior to the father's incarceration, the trial court terminated his rights on this ground, which appellees did not plead, plus the ground was not tried by consent of the parties. In re Justine J., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 505 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 10, 2019).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion by proceeding with termination of parental rights proceedings against a parent, despite the pendency of related criminal charges against the parent, so as to prevent the parent's children from languishing in foster care unnecessarily. In re Deishun M., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 562 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 18, 2019).

As the trial court only addressed two of the four grounds for termination raised in the petition, the trial court's judgment was not final and thus the case was remanded for further proceedings. In re A.W., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 8, 2020).

9. Right to Counsel.

Court erred in finding that the parents, in a complex, extended dependency and neglect case, were not indigent and finding their seven children dependent and neglected and that the parents had committed severe child abuse; that finding could have led to termination of parental rights and the parents clearly had a right to appointed counsel if they were indigent. The parents were entitled to a thorough hearing in compliance with T.C.A. § 40-14-202 to determine if they were indigent and thus, entitled to appointed counsel under Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 13(d)(2)(B). Tenn. Dep't of Children's Servs. v. David H., 247 S.W.3d 651, 2006 Tenn. App. LEXIS 193 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 21, 2006).

Trial court properly denied a father's motion to disqualify opposing counsel in a termination of parental rights proceeding because counsel gained no information in the prosecution of a criminal case against the father that would give her an advantage and make it unethical to represent the mother; Grounds for termination were established on the face of the father's convictions, and nothing in the record suggested counsel used any information not otherwise available to the public. In re Hailey C., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 658 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 28, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 895 (Tenn. Dec. 21, 2017).

10. Presence at Hearing.

Termination of father's parental rights violated his right to due process as his motion to continue was denied and the trial proceeded in his absence after the father's counselor refused to allow him to participate in the trial by telephone from a detention center as permitted by T.C.A. § 36-1-113(f)(3). In re A'mari B., 358 S.W.3d 204, 2011 Tenn. App. LEXIS 488 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2011), appeal denied, In re A'Mari B., — S.W.3d —, 2011 Tenn. LEXIS 1067 (Tenn. Nov. 14, 2011).

In a termination of parental rights case, the trial court did not err in denying the father's motion to continue the trial because the transcript reflected that the proceedings were transmitted via telephone to the father, who was in prison; the court instructed the father to let the court know if for any reason he could not hear; the father participated and was able to respond to questions as they were asked; the father's counsel was present and participated fully in the proceeding; and the father was able to communicate with the court when he was unable to hear so that the witnesses or the attorneys could repeat what they had said, reposition the telephone, and/or speak more loudly. In re Lydia N.-S., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 55 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2017).

Mother had notice of the trial and was present before it began, and upon learning she was absent from the courtroom, the trial court granted time to call out and permitted the attorneys to attempt to contact her, but when she failed to appear, the trial court conducted a full hearing, requiring the State to prove each element; as the mother had notice of the hearing, was present before it began, and was represented by counsel, the decision of the trial court was affirmed. In re Gabriella H., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 12 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 8, 2019).

11. Evidence.

In a termination of the mother's parental rights case, although the trial court did not make a specific finding that rule of sequestration was violated, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the child's paternal grandmother to testify only with respect to her desire to adopt the child, but did not permit her to testify with respect to any grounds supporting termination, or in regard to anything that was discussed outside of the courtroom between the grandmother and her daughter regarding the care given to the child by the daughter. In re Brayden S., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 735 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 11, 2015).

In a termination of the mother's parental rights case, the mother's brief did not clearly articulate how the rule of sequestration might have been violated by the court's allowance of the paternal grandmother's testimony, and it did not provide the appropriate references to the record to establish how the testimony violated the rule of sequestration. In re Brayden S., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 735 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 11, 2015).

Order of adjudication was erroneously introduced through the mother after she denied knowledge of the document; the order was also not self-authenticating because it failed to meet the rule requirements, plus the petition was inadmissible because it contained hearsay, but any error in the admission of the evidence was harmless when the facts in the documents were duplicative and unnecessary to support the grounds of termination or the best interest finding. In re Charles K., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 344 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 19, 2016).

Facts supported the finding of severe abuse, and termination of the mother's rights was proper on this ground; the mother had tested positive for marijuana, benzodiazepines, and barbiturates, the child's drug screens were positive for marijuana, methamphetamine, and benzodiazepines, and shortly after he was born, he suffered from an enlarged heart and a flap of skin covering his airway, and he was likely to have lifelong respiratory issues and special needs. In re Envy J., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 705 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 22, 2016), appeal dismissed, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 944 (Tenn. Dec. 16, 2016).

Any objection to admission of the chancery court order raised for the first time on appeal could not be considered in the absence of plain error affecting substantial rights; any appeal from the order would have been time-barred, the mother failed to show that an appeal was pending, and there was no abuse of discretion by the trial court in admitting the order terminating the mother's rights to two of her other children. In re Envy J., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 705 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 22, 2016), appeal dismissed, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 944 (Tenn. Dec. 16, 2016).

Mother's objection based on chain of custody was misplaced; the witnesses identified the drug screen result forms entered into evidence, the mother signed both forms in the presence of each witness, and the witnesses recorded the results shown on the drug test cups, and thus the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the drug screen results in this termination case. In re Envy J., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 705 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 22, 2016), appeal dismissed, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 944 (Tenn. Dec. 16, 2016).

Personal appearance by the father, who was incarcerated out of state, was not feasible, nothing indicated that teleconferencing capabilities were available, and the court and parties made the best use of the available technology, and the father's right to participate in the hearing was not violated. In re Elizabeth D., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 706 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 23, 2016).

Identity of the children's father had no bearing on the grounds for terminating the mother's parental rights and was not considered in the trial court's best interest determination; thus, the admission of the DNA test establishing paternity of the children, if error, was harmless. In re Envy J., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 705 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 22, 2016), appeal dismissed, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 944 (Tenn. Dec. 16, 2016).

Documents from a prior juvenile court proceeding were relevant in the mother's termination case in explaining how and why the investigator took the steps she did when contacting the mother, and the documents as offered were not hearsay for that reason. In re Envy J., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 705 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 22, 2016), appeal dismissed, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 944 (Tenn. Dec. 16, 2016).

Trial court erred in terminating a father's parental rights to his son based upon his stipulation that the Department of Children's Services could prove that grounds to terminate existed because the father's stipulation that the evidence satisfied the statutory grounds for termination was a nullity; the court of appeals was obliged to consider whether the evidence clearly and convincingly established that grounds existed to terminate the father's rights. In re Dakota M., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 329 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 18, 2018).

12. Burden of Proof.

In a termination of parental rights proceeding, given the absence of information regarding steps taken to identify the father, an adoption agency did not carry its burden of demonstrating the diligent inquiry required by T.C.A. § 21-1-203(a) in order to use service by publication, as simply asking the birth mother if she knew the name of the father and then giving up was not sufficient; the location of the party, the name of the host of the party, the names of attendees of the party, and the type of vehicle in which the child was conceived were all obvious areas of inquiry. Adoption Place, Inc. v. Doe, 273 S.W.3d 142, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 750 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 5, 2007), appeal denied, The Adoption Place, Inc. v. Doe, — S.W.3d —, 2008 Tenn. LEXIS 90 (Tenn. Feb. 4, 2008).

Termination of father’s parental rights was proper because clear and convincing evidence established that father was mentally incompe- tent and it was the in the children’s best interest. Department of Children's Servs. v. Mims, 285 S.W.3d 435, 2008 Tenn. App. LEXIS 706 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 24, 2008), appeal denied, In re N.B., — S.W.3d —, 2009 Tenn. LEXIS 146 (Tenn. Mar. 16, 2009).

Termination of parents'  rights based on persistence of conditions pursuant to T.C.A. § 36-1-113(g)(3) required the Department of Children's Services to prove that it made reasonable efforts at reunification with respect to the father, as a determination that termination was warranted due to his severe child abuse had been reversed pursuant to T.C.A. §§ 36-1-102 and 37-1-166(g)(4)(A); however, the record indicated that such efforts were satisfactorily made. In re Dakota C.R., 404 S.W.3d 484, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 844 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 7, 2012), appeal denied, In re Dakota R., — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 230 (Tenn. Mar. 6, 2013).

Father's parental rights were erroneously terminated based on a finding of severe child abuse pursuant to T.C.A. §§ 37-1-102 and 36-1-113(g)(4), as the father was apparently absent from the home when one child was injured, and there was a lack of proof that the children were abused prior to that time; there was conflicting evidence as to the existence of, cause of, and seriousness of, the children's other “marks” on their bodies. In re Dakota C.R., 404 S.W.3d 484, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 844 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 7, 2012), appeal denied, In re Dakota R., — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 230 (Tenn. Mar. 6, 2013).

It was the burden of the Department of Children Services to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, the existence of at least one ground for termination. In re R.L.M., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 41 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 29, 2015).

Trial court found two grounds for termination had been established against both parents: the failure to provide a suitable home and the failure to remedy persistence of conditions; the children's services department must establish proof of these grounds against each individual parent, however, given the mother and father's living situation, as well as issues that caused the children's removal, the court disagreed that the mother and father generally had substantially different circumstances as it related to these two grounds. In re C.C., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 701 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 22, 2016).

Record contained clear and convincing evidence that a father was criminally convicted of the intentional and wrongful death of the children's mother and that termination of the father's parental rights pursuant to T.C.A. § 36-1-113(g)(7) was in his children's best interest. The father had exhibited brutality, and physical, emotional, and psychological abuse toward the children's mother, and the father's incarceration prevented him from providing a home for his children or maintaining any meaningful relationship with them. In re Christopher J., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 784 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 4, 2017).

Clear and convincing evidence demonstrated that a father of two children engaged in conduct prior to his incarceration that exhibited a wanton disregard for the welfare of the children. The trial court's finding that termination of the father's parental rights was in the best interest of the children was also proven by clear and convincing evidence. In re Addison E., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 13 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 17, 2018).

There was not enough evidence to determine how a change of caretaker and environment would affect the children, as the only information in the record was that the children had been in the same foster home since being placed in Department of Children's Services'  custody and they were doing well in that placement; because the department bore the burden to show evidence of this factor, this factor weighed against termination. In re Briana H., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 518 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2018).

13. Findings of Fact.

While summation of the evidence may be necessary and helpful to the trial court in making its findings and conclusions, the court must go beyond mere summation by linking the evidence to its clearly stated findings of fact and conclusions of law. In re S.S.-G., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 917 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 16, 2015).

Trial court stated only that the father had sexually abused the child, which constituted severe abuse, but the trial court's failure to include the specific statutory definitions that it relied upon prevented meaningful review; where the statute provides several possible definitions for a ground, the trial court must specify the exact definition that it relies upon in reaching its ultimate conclusion, and the termination of the father's rights on the ground of severe child abuse was vacated. In re S.S.-G., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 917 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 16, 2015).

Although the trial court entered a conclusion of law as to certain termination grounds of abandonment, its order did not contain any findings of fact with respect to these grounds in contravention of the statute. In re Jaylah W., 486 S.W.3d 537, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 819 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 7, 2015), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 94 (Tenn. Feb. 1, 2016).

Trial court failed to make any other findings of fact or conclusions of law with respect to the termination ground of substantial noncompliance, plus it appeared the trial court applied an incorrect standard; the appropriate standard is whether there has been substantial noncompliance, and in the absence of appropriate findings on this ground and the application of an incorrect standard, the trial court's decision to terminate the mother's rights on this ground was vacated. In re Jaylah W., 486 S.W.3d 537, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 819 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 7, 2015), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 94 (Tenn. Feb. 1, 2016).

Trial court's final judgment terminating a father's parental rights did not include or incorporate written findings of fact justifying its decision as required by T.C.A. § 36-1-113(k). The trial court's noncompliance with this rule fatally undermined the validity of the termination order. In re K.J.G., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 216 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 28, 2016).

Trial court complied with the requirements of T.C.A. § 36-1-113(k) in terminating the parent's rights where it deliberated and made its own decision, made oral findings that several of the grounds alleged in the petition had been proven by clear and convincing evidence and that termination of parental rights was in the child's best interest of the child, and then signed and entered a written order containing more specific findings of fact and conclusions of law. In re Matthew T., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 272 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 20, 2016).

Trial court satisfied the statutory requirements by making extensive written findings of fact and conclusions of law that supported the finding of severe abuse. In re Envy J., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 705 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 22, 2016), appeal dismissed, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 944 (Tenn. Dec. 16, 2016).

Trial court's order only provided a conclusory statement regarding the ground of mental incompetence and offered little explanation as to how the lower court arrived at its determination, as it failed to explain or identify the mother's diagnoses, the doctor's qualifications as an expert, the effect of the diagnoses on the child, and whether any amount of training, education, or counseling could bring the mother to a level where she could parent the child. In re B.B., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 143 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 28, 2017).

Trial court said that the father “apparently” had a relapse; however, “apparently” was not a finding of a relapse by clear and convincing evidence. In re Quintin S., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 480 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 13, 2017).

Because a trial court failed to provide a rationale for its decision to terminate parental rights and the final order entered by the trial court was nearly a verbatim recitation of the termination petition, the order of the trial court was vacated,and the case was remanded for the entry of an order that reflected that it was the product of the trial court's individualized decision-making and independent judgment. In re Colton B., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 829 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 22, 2017).

Trial court erred in terminating a mother's parental rights on the ground of abandonment by willful failure to support because although the order contained a legal conclusion, the trial court failed to support its conclusion with any factual findings. In re Noah S., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 27 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 23, 2018).

Despite the father's consent to trying the statutory ground for termination that he was incarcerated subject to at least a 10-year sentence, the trial court failed to make requisite findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding the establishment of that ground because, although the trial court considered the father's criminal sentence of at least 10 years in making its determination regarding the best interest of the child, no express determination was made regarding its basis as a statutory ground for termination of his parental rights; however, because the father was on notice of and consented to trying that ground for termination, the matter was remanded for entry of the requisite findings of fact and conclusions of law. In re Haley S., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 164 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 29, 2018).

Trial court's findings of fact were insufficient to support its finding that the father abandoned his child by willfully failing to visit her during the four month period preceding his incarceration. In re Haley S., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 164 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 29, 2018).

In a case in which a mother appealed a judgment of the trial court that terminated her parental rights, the appellate court concluded that the trial court did not make specific findings of fact and conclusions of law as required by T.C.A. § 36-1-113(k) to support its ruling that the Department of Children's Services had proven the grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence. In re K.O., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 327 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 14, 2018).

Court of appeals was unable to conduct its review due to the lack of specific factual findings in the trial court's order terminating a father's parental rights to his son; the order did not comply with subsection (k) because the trial court did not discuss the grounds in its oral ruling at the conclusion of trial and did not allow the court of appeals to conclude that the order was the result of the trial court's own considered conclusions. In re Dakota M., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 329 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 18, 2018).

Even if the trial court, which denied a petition to terminate parental rights, held the authority to designate the children's stepfather as their permanent guardian, the trial court did not issue the requisite findings in support of its order of guardianship. In re Kira D., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 358 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 26, 2018).

Order terminating the mother's parental rights did not satisfy the trial court's responsibility imposed by T.C.A. § 36-1-113(k), as it was largely a verbatim recitation of the allegations in the petition and contained no discussion or elaboration beyond the allegations of the petition. In re Atrivium K., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 493 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 23, 2018).

Differences between the trial court's oral ruling and the subsequent written order were significant and it could not be determined on appeal that the written order represented the trial court's own independent analysis and judgment; remand was required for entry of findings of fact and conclusions of law in compliance with the statute that reflected the trial court's independent deliberations and decision. In re Marneasha D., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 588 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 4, 2018).

Trial court's written order contains a dearth of findings of fact to support its conclusion that the parents had abandoned the children and that termination was in their best interest; as the trial court failed to enter sufficient findings and conclusions, the judgment was vacated and the case was remanded. In re Mason C., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 723 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 14, 2018).

Clear and convincing evidence supported the finding that a father failed to manifest an ability and willingness to assume legal and physical custody of a child because based upon his course of conduct, he did not have the ability to provide a reliable source of financial support and a stable household for the child; the father was incarcerated at the time the petition was filed, he acknowledged his criminal history and past problems with alcohol, and he had not paid child support in the past. In re Rilyn S., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 124 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 12, 2019).

Trial court made an independent determination that the evidence constituted clear and convincing evidence to satisfy each ground for termination of a father's parental rights and made the required findings of fact and conclusions of law because in its memorandum opinion and order, the trial court detailed the stipulated facts as well as the facts proven by exhibits submitted at trial and the facts proven through testimony. In re Rilyn S., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 124 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 12, 2019).

Trial court failed to comply with subsection (k) because instead of making specific findings of fact to support its legal conclusions, the trial court's order simply made broad, conclusory statements regarding the grounds for termination and the child's best interests; because the trial court failed to comply, the case was remanded to the trial court with instructions to make specific findings of fact and conclusions of law. In re M.N., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 281 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 5, 2019).

Trial court made sufficient findings of fact to support its conclusion that guardianship should be placed with the paternal grandparents because it recognized that the maternal grandmother and the child loved each other, but it found that the child was more stable and performed better at school and home during times that the child was not exposed to the grandmother. The trial court also agreed with the recommendation that the child not visit the grandmother due to her maladaptive behaviors and the psychological harm that has occurred to the child during times of visitation. In re Alexis S., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 526 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 29, 2019).

Appellate court reversed the trial court's finding that abandonment by wanton disregard was established because it failed to identify specific findings of fact upon which the conclusion was based. In re Aubrie W., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 21 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 21, 2020).

On remand, the trial court failed to remedy the deficiencies of its original order terminating the parents'  rights because it did not determine the relevant time period for abandonment and failed to make a determination on the willfulness criterion as it was silent regarding the parents'  ability to pay. The trial court also again failed to independently weigh the best interest factors, and rather than engaging in the required independent analysis it simply adopted appellee's filings and conclusions over the parents'  objections. In re Nathan C., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 61 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 12, 2020).

Trial court did not identify specific factual findings and conclusions of law related to each ground for termination separately, but did elucidate factual findings that could apply to one or more of the grounds; despite the order's lack of clarity, taken as a whole, the order provided sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law to support the decision to terminate the father's parental rights respecting two statutory grounds and remand was not required. In re Bentley Q., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 103 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 11, 2020).

14. Adequate Record Required.

Although the trial court is required to find only one statutory ground for termination of parental rights, given the importance of establishing the permanent placement of a child who is the subject of a termination of parental rights proceeding, the trial court should include in its final order findings of fact and conclusions of law with regard to each ground presented, as if the trial court addressed each ground that is raised in a termination proceeding, so the child's permanent placement will not be unnecessarily delayed due to a remand for findings on alternate grounds. In re D.L.B., 118 S.W.3d 360, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 983 (Tenn. 2003).

Trial court's order of termination of the mother's parental rights to her son was vacated to the extent that it was based upon a finding of abandonment under T.C.A. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv); it was remanded for preparation of findings of fact and conclusion of law as required by T.C.A. § 36-1-113(k). Where a trial court does not comply with T.C.A. § 36-1-113(k), the appellate court cannot simply review the record de novo and determine where the preponderance of the evidence is, as it would in other civil, non-jury cases. State v. C.H.K., 154 S.W.3d 586, 2004 Tenn. App. LEXIS 517 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004), appeal denied, In re J.W.P., — S.W.3d —, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 937 (Tenn. Nov. 8, 2004).

Provisions of T.C.A. § 36-1-113(k) are mandatory, and the failure to comply with the section may necessitate remand to prepare written findings of fact and conclusions of law; however, where a termination of parental rights case had been proceeding for seven years, a court proceeded to decide an appeal on the basis of the trial court's oral findings. White v. Moody, 171 S.W.3d 187, 2004 Tenn. App. LEXIS 890 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 265 (Tenn. Mar. 21, 2005).

Trial court did not err in refusing to terminate the biological father's parental rights pursuant to T.C.A. § 36-1-113 because the trial court's finding that there was no convincing evidence of the father's willful abandonment of the child was presumed correct where the mother and her husband failed to provide an adequate record on appeal as required by Tenn. R. App. P. 24; the trial court had considered affidavits and presumably testimony regarding whether the mother had prevented the father from continuing his relationship with the child by refusing to allow him access to the child. In re M.L.D., 182 S.W.3d 890, 2005 Tenn. App. LEXIS 339 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005), appeal denied, In re Adoption of M.L.D., — S.W.3d —, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 779 (Tenn. Sept. 12, 2005).

Remand was necessary in a termination of parental rights case for the juvenile court to make specific findings of fact and conclusions of law because the juvenile court's order failed to comply with the requirement that the court make specific factual findings, which precluded appellate review of grounds for termination and the best-interests determination. In re Nakayia S., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 548 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 18, 2018).

15. Timeliness of Final Order.

While a juvenile court did not comply with the statutory requirements in the timeliness of entering its order, there was no specified remedy such as remand required. The juvenile court already had made sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law, and to remand would have been pointless. In re Autumn L., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 371 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 26, 2015).

Even though the trial court failed to strictly comply with this section's 30-day timeline, as the order terminating the father's parental rights was entered approximately seven days after the expiration of the 30-day time period, reversal was not warranted where the father received notice of the ruling within the statutory timeframe and filed his notice of appeal before the entry of the final order. In re Abbigail C., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 856 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 21, 2015).

Trial court's failure to enter its order, which contained detained and specific findings of fact, within 30 days of the conclusion of the hearing on the petition to terminate the mother's parental rights was not fatal to the validity of the order. In re Maison W., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 356 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 27, 2016).

Mother was denied relief due to the trial court's failure to enter a timely written order as T.C.A. § 36-1-113(k)' s 30-day time frame was not mandatory. In re Jaxx M., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 185 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 17, 2019).

16. Grounds for Terminating Parental Rights, Generally.

It is beyond question that before a parent's rights can be terminated, there must be a showing that the parent is unfit or that substantial harm to the child will result if parental rights are not terminated. Tennessee Baptist Children's Homes, Inc. v. Swanson (In re Swanson), 2 S.W.3d 180, 1999 Tenn. LEXIS 475 (Tenn. 1999).

The existence of any one of the statutory bases under T.C.A. § 36-1-113(g) will support a termination of parental rights. In re C.W.W., 37 S.W.3d 467, 2000 Tenn. App. LEXIS 327 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000).

There was clear and convincing evidence of wanton disregard, given that the mother was incarcerated within four months prior to the filing of the petition, and bringing the child into the home of a man who had been abusive in the past, in addition to the mother's maintaining a relationship with another person who was abusive and used drugs, showed wanton disregard for the child, as did the mother's failure to seek treatment for her psychological issues; termination of the mother's rights was affirmed. In re Shaneeque M., — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. App. LEXIS 757 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 20, 2014), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 128 (Tenn. Feb. 20, 2015).

Juvenile court erred in terminating a father's parental rights because no permanency plan was admitted into evidence upon which the court could find that the father failed to substantially comply, the father's standing as a putative biological father precluded the application of the statutory ground of failure to legitimate one of his children, and the juvenile court had personal and subject matter jurisdiction where the father was properly served with the termination petition, he and the children were domiciled in Tennessee, he made a voluntary general appearance in order to defend the suit on the merits, and he claimed at all times to be the children's biological father. In re Cloey R., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 23 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 21, 2015).

Neither the trial court nor the court is permitted to proceed to termination absent clear and convincing proof of every necessary element of a ground for termination. In re R.L.M., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 41 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 29, 2015).

Because the mother did not present an argument that the juvenile court erred in finding statutory grounds for termination of her parental rights, any such issue was waived. In re Destiny W., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 289 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2015).

Record contained clear and convincing proof to support the trial court's findings regarding the mother's substantial noncompliance with her plan; she failed to comply substantially with the requirements, in part, that she submit to random drug screens, take her medication as prescribed by treating professionals, and continue with mental health services. In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d 507, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 49 (Tenn. Jan. 29, 2016).

Trial court did not err in declining to terminate the father's parental rights under any of the grounds contained in this section because, based on the Tennessee Supreme Court's holding in the Bernard case, the grounds contained in this section not apply where the defendant parent was a putative biological father, as the father was in the instant case. In re Ashton B., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 188 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 15, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 512 (Tenn. July 6, 2016).

Certain grounds for termination apply to any person who is not the legal parent of such child or who is described in the statute, as in this case; when the petition to terminate his rights was filed, father was not the child's legal parent, as he filed a petition to establish paternity after the child was the subject of an adoptive proceeding, and he had not established paternity at that time and he filed an intent to claim paternity a few weeks before the child's birth. In re F.N.M., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 274 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 11, 2016).

Father failed to manifest an ability to assume legal and physical custody of the child; he continued to be reliant on his mother and stepfather for housing and transportation, his employment could not be verified, and he had significant demands on his income due to child support, probation fees, and restitution fees. In re F.N.M., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 274 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 11, 2016).

Petitioners had a significant bond with the child, who knew no other family besides them, and father did not have a relationship with the child, and thus petitioners proved that removing the child from their custody and placing her with father would cause her substantial physical and psychological harm. In re F.N.M., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 274 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 11, 2016).

Children were placed with the maternal grandparents as an alternative to custody with the department when it was determined that neither parent could adequately care for the children, and they were then removed from the maternal grandparents and placed into department custody when the grandparents indicated that they could no longer provide adequate care; thus, the facts of this case supported the court's consideration of the abuse neglect statutory ground of termination. In re Charles K., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 344 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 19, 2016).

Termination grounds under the statute pertaining to persons not the legal parent or guardian of the child cannot be applied to legal parents; because there was no dispute that the mother in this case was the biological mother of the child, she was a legal parent for purposes of termination of her parental rights and this termination ground could not apply to her. In re Addison P., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 345 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 20, 2016).

State proved the grounds of wanton disregard against father, given that he had 19 judgments resulting from felonies, to which he pleaded guilty, he was incarcerated when the children were removed from the home, he violated his probation, and he continued to be charged with other crimes. In re Dustin T., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 876 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 17, 2016).

Juvenile court made detailed findings to support termination of the father's parental rights on the grounds of substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan and persistent conditions, finding that the father failed to maintain sobriety, failed to submit to drug screens, failed to address anger management issues, and failed to establish a suitable home for the children. In re Yariel S., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 998 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 29, 2016).

It was no error to rely on T.C.A. § 36-1-113(g)(6) to terminate a father's parental rights when the ground was not specifically pled because the father had adequate notice of this ground. In re Jeremiah N., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 283 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 2, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 432 (Tenn. July 21, 2017).

Record was indicative of the father's patterns of criminal behavior, drug abuse, incarceration, and refusal to financially support the child, which amounted to a wanton disregard for the child's welfare, and this ground for termination under T.C.A. § 36-1-113 was established by clear and convincing evidence. In re Wesley P., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 301 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 12, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 400 (Tenn. July 6, 2017).

Father abandoned the child by failure to provide a suitable home pursuant to T.C.A. § 36-1-102, as he failed to take reasonable steps to make lasting changes in his lifestyle or conduct that would allow him to provide the child with a suitable home; the father was currently incarcerated and when he was released, he had to address legal issues in another state regarding his parole violation there, and termination under T.C.A. § 36-1-113 was proper. In re Wesley P., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 301 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 12, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 400 (Tenn. July 6, 2017).

Clear and convincing evidence supported the trial court's termination of the father's parental rights based on wanton disregard because despite knowing that the child's mother was pregnant and the child might be his, the father incurred a number of drug charges and a federal gun possession charge, the result being that he was incarcerated and unable to provide for the child's welfare, and he also violated probation for a previous charge. In re Jase P., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 411 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 21, 2017).

Clear and convincing evidence supported the trial court's termination of the father's parental rights based on his failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume legal custody of the child because the trial court found that the father took no action once he suspected or knew the child was his. In re Jase P., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 411 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 21, 2017).

Clear and convincing evidence supported the trial court's termination of the father's parental rights based on the failure to establish paternity of the child because the trial court found that the father took no action once he suspected or knew the child was his. In re Jase P., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 411 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 21, 2017).

Clear and convincing evidence supported the trial court's termination of the father's parental rights based on risk of substantial harm to the child's physical or psychological welfare because the father was not in a position to assume physical custody due to his incarceration, he knew nothing of the child's heightened physical and psychological needs secondary to his in utero drug exposure. In re Jase P., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 411 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 21, 2017).

Termination of the mother's rights on the ground of prior conviction of sever child abuse with a sentence of greater than two years was supported by evidence of the mother's prior conviction for aggravated child neglect, resulting in a sentence of 15 years in prison. In re Jayden R., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 544 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 11, 2017).

Evidence that the mother had been convicted of aggravated neglect, which by definition adversely impacted the welfare of the children, was sufficient to support the termination of the mother's parental rights on the ground of wanton disregard. In re Jayden R., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 544 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 11, 2017).

In order to provide a suitable home for the children, the father needed to provide more than a physically sound structure, he needed to ensure that he could protect the children in the home from sexual abuse; he failed to complete recommendations and thus failed to address this issue, and therefore the termination ground of failure to provide a suitable home, for purposes of T.C.A. §§ 36-1-102(1)(A)(ii), 36-1-113(g)(1), was established by clear and convincing evidence. In re Da'Vante M., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 797 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 12, 2017).

Only one statutory ground is required to support the termination of parental rights. In re Jabari B., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 60 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 2, 2018).

Circuit court properly terminated a mother's parental rights based on abandonment, failure to provide a suitable home, and in the child's best interests because she left the child at a homeless shelter with no appropriate supervision, cycled through periods of homelessness and incarceration, demonstrated a lack of concern for the child, failed to substantially comply with the reasonable responsibilities set out in the permanency plan, the child was neglected while in the mother's care, the mother never obtained a safe, stable home to which the child could return, a change of caretakers and physical environment would likely be detrimental for the child, and the child was thriving in her foster parents'  home. In re Amarria L., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 148 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 20, 2018).

Termination ground under T.C.A. § 36-1-113(g)(14) could not serve as a basis for terminating the parents'  rights, as they wanted to assume legal and physical custody of the children and were willing to assume financial responsibility for them; the court declined to adopt the department's suggestion that the word “and” in the statute be interpreted in the disjunctive so the department only had to prove an inability or unwillingness of the parents to assume custody of the children. In re Ayden S., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 306 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 31, 2018).

T.C.A. § 36-1-113(g)(14) requires the party seeking termination to prove a negative: that the parent failed to manifest an ability and willingness to personally assume legal and physical custody or financial responsibility of the child. In re Ayden S., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 306 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 31, 2018).

First prong of T.C.A. § 36-1-113(g)(14) requires that a petitioner prove that a parent has failed to meet the requirement of manifesting both a willingness and an ability to assume legal and physical custody of the child or has failed to meet the requirement of manifesting both a willingness and an ability to assume financial responsibility of the child. In re Amynn K., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 343 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 20, 2018).

Termination of the father's parental rights was proper based on his inability and unwillingness to personally assume legal and physical custody of the child and financial responsibility for the child because he had incurred several criminal charges, had not maintained safe and stable housing, and had not visited with the child as he should have; he had failed to pay child support for the child since April 2015 and had no legal, verifiable income by which to support the child; placing the child in the father's legal and physical custody would pose a risk of substantial harm to the child's physical and psychological welfare; and the child had been placed with the foster parents for four years and had developed a bond with them. In re Amynn K., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 343 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 20, 2018).

Termination of the mother's rights for failure to manifest an ability to assume custody or financial responsibility was proper; the mother continued to associate with abusive men, did not complete the domestic violence class, and struggled to maintain a stable home or job, plus she failed to fully address her drug addiction, mental illness, and domestic violence issues through therapy, all of which created a substantial hazard to the children's welfare. In re Piper B., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 478 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 17, 2018).

Termination of the mother's rights for failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody or responsibility for the child was proper; the stability of the mother's home was relevant to the substantial harm analysis inasmuch as it demonstrated whether the child would be at risk of substantial harm if placed in that environment. In re Alexis C., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 499 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 28, 2018).

Termination of the mother's rights for failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody or responsibility for the child was proper; the child has remained out of the mother's custody since 2015, the mother had failed to provide a stable home to which the child could return, plus she had not maintained stable employment or addressed her mental health issues. In re Alexis C., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 499 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 28, 2018).

Father's ability to assume legal and physical custody of the child was extremely questionable, and termination of the father's rights under T.C.A. § 36-1-113(g)(14) was proper; the father's drug habits, homeless situation, and incarceration made it near impossible for the child to be raised without a risk of substantial harm. In re Charles T., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 501 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 28, 2018).

Termination of the mother's rights was proper under the failure to manifest an ability and willingness to personally assume custody ground; despite the array of resources offered to her, the mother had been unable to personally assume custody of the children, and she exhibited a complete unwillingness to parent them, as she was suicidal and using methamphetamine on a daily basis. In re Briana H., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 518 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2018).

Father failed to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody of the child and her placement in the home would pose a risk of substantial harm to her welfare; his criminal behavior continued, he failed to address his substance abuse issues, and his home was also not yet suitable for the child as evidenced by the lack of sufficient utilities at the time of the hearing. In re Kaycee M., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 585 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 3, 2018).

Termination of the mother's parental rights based on a failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody of the children was supported by evidence that the mother had no place to live or legal means to support herself or her children and was reliant on other for support. In re Karisah N., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 684 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 27, 2018).

Termination of the mother's parental rights based on the failure to manifest ability or willingness to assume custody or financial responsibility of the children was supported by evidence that the mother failed to show she was able to provide sufficient housing and indictees a lack of willingness to assume custody or financial responsibility due to her inaction and non-compliance with substance abuse treatment. In re Alexis S., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 700 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2018).

Termination of the father's parental rights was appropriate due to his failure to show an ability and willingness to assume custody of the children; the father did not complete his responsibilities under the permanency plans, he did not manifest an ability and willingness to assume financial responsibility of the children, and he failed to establish safe and stable housing. In re Gaberiel S., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 718 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 11, 2018).

Terminating the mother's parental rights on the ground of failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume legal and physical custody was inappropriate because the mother had made positive changes and, while a relapse was possible, the Department of Children's Services failed to prove it was a reasonable probability. In re Serenity W., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 75 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 8, 2019).

Juvenile court had subject matter jurisdiction to determine custody because Tennessee was the child's home state on the date of the commencement of the juvenile court action; the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction to terminate the father's parental rights because when the foster parents filed their termination petition, Tennessee remained the home state and exercised continuing jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act. In re Rilyn S., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 124 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 12, 2019).

termination ground of failure to establish a suitable home was proven by clear and convincing evidence, given that despite the department's reasonable efforts to assist the mother, she never made even minimal efforts to improve her home or personal condition, despite being advised of the threat to her parental rights should she not act. In re Charlie-Lynn P., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 322 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 27, 2019).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was proper based on abandonment by failure to visit, failure to substantially comply with permanency plans, and persistence of the conditions leading to removal of the children from the mother's home because her one or two visits with each of the children were of such an infrequent nature as to merely establish minimal or insubstantial contact with the children; she failed to pursue training in parenting her son due to his special needs; she presented no evidence of having obtained stable housing, income, or transportation; and she was unable to show that she could provide a home absent of the environmental neglect that initially caused the children to be removed from her custody. In re Serenity S., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 45 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2020).

17. Persistent Conditions.

Conditions that led to the removal of the child persisted, as the father remained unable to provide a suitable and stable home for the child and continued to engage in a pattern of wanton disregard. In re Robert C., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 58 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 3, 2015).

Evidence was insufficient to support termination of the father's parental rights for persistence of conditions where the children were not removed from his home. In re K.M.K., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 92 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2015).

Clear and convincing evidence supported terminating a mother's and a father's parental rights on grounds of persistence of conditions because the children were previously found to be dependent and neglected, the lack of proper hygiene in the parents'  home continued and the problems ran the proverbial gamut from spoiled food to insect infestation, and the parents had not gained sufficient parenting skills during the course of the proceedings nor learned to co-parent. In re Kim C., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 106 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 6, 2015).

Evidence was sufficient to support the termination of the mother's rights for persistence of conditions where the child had been removed for lack of supervision and drug exposure and the mother continued to use drugs. She also made very few visits and eventually ceased visiting. In re Malaki E., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 143 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 23, 2015).

Clear and convincing evidence supported terminating a mother's parental rights for persistence of the conditions leading to removal of the mother's child from the mother's custody because (1) the child was removed due to the mother's homelessness and drug addiction, and (2) the mother was still without a stable residence and had not received treatment for drug addiction. In re Brittany M.C., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 182 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 24, 2015), appeal denied, In re Brittany M C, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 522 (Tenn. June 17, 2015).

Termination of parental rights was appropriate because the parent continued to struggle with drugs following the children's removal, and although the parent was participating in a rehabilitation program, the parent had not completed the program. Moreover, the parent had not maintained a suitable home for the children to live in as of the date of trial, and the evidence convincingly suggested that there was little likelihood that the parent would be able to provide one at an early date. In re Roger T., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 261 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 27, 2015).

Mother's lack of progress in addressing her deficiencies showed that the conditions persisted, plus the mother offered no evidence that she had any means of support, and thus the preponderance of the evidence supported the holding that the conditions not only persisted but would not be remedied. In re Eve C., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 279 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 29, 2015).

Clear and convincing evidence supported terminating a father's parental rights to seven children on grounds of substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan and persistence of conditions because the father failed to allege that he substantially completed the permanency plan requirements or resolved the conditions that led to the children's removal; the father did not, inter alia, abide by the terms of his probation, refrain from incurring new legal charges, and remain drug free. In re Kalob S., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 465 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 12, 2015).

Trial court found that the children had been removed from the parents' home for at least six months, the conditions that led to the children's removal still persisted and would prevent their safe return, given the fact that the mother did not fully complete alcohol treatment and the father had yet to address his anger issues, there was little likelihood they could remedy their issues in the near future, and the children deserved the opportunity to integrate into a safe and stable home; the trial court did not err in concluding that termination of parental rights was justified on the ground of persistence of conditions. In re Bonnie L., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 477 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 12, 2015).

Clear and convincing evidence supported terminating a mother's and father's parental rights to two children on grounds of persistence of conditions because neither parent demonstrated the ability to parent the children for extremely short periods of time without continual prompting, placing the children with either parent would cause the children to be subjected to further neglect, and it was unlikely the parents would ever retain the information necessary to properly parent any child. In re Aisha R., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 470 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 15, 2015).

Termination of the mother's parental rights based on persistence of conditions, was supported by the mother's long history of chronic emotional and behavioral instability, coupled with drug used and its related issues.In re M.P.H., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 475 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 15, 2015).

Evidence that the child was removed from the parents'  custody as a result of his mother leaving the rehabilitation program she was assigned to and the father, by his own testimony, being in circumstances which rendered him unable to care for the child, and that the father suffered from alcoholism and mental illness that he refused to treat, was sufficient to support termination of the father's parental rights due to the persistence of conditions. In re Steven C., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 503 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 15, 2015), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 743 (Tenn. Sept. 9, 2015).

Persistence of conditions could not be considered as a potential ground for termination of the parents'  rights to their daughter because the February 2012 order naming her great-aunt and uncle as her primary residential parents did not adjudicate the daughter dependent or neglected. In re Makenzie L., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 480 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 17, 2015), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 860 (Tenn. Oct. 15, 2015).

Statutory ground of persistence of conditions was not applicable to the father because the record contained no court order removing the child from the father's home; when the trial court entered the emergency protective order placing the child in the temporary custody of the maternal aunt and her husband, the child had not been residing in the father's home. In re Jayden B.T., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 494 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 23, 2015), appeal denied, In re Jayden T., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 818 (Tenn. Sept. 25, 2015).

Statutory termination ground of persistence of conditions was not applicable to the father as the record contained no court order removing the children from the father's home, and the finding on this ground was reversed. In re Destaney D., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 495 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 23, 2015).

Clear and convincing evidence existed to support the termination of a mother's parental rights on the ground of persistence of conditions where the mother was mentally incompetent to care for her children she was unable to ameliorate her current intellectual deficiencies to the point where it was safe for her to resume care of the children, and expert testimony established that despite her best efforts, she simply did not have the abstract capacity to develop into an adequate caretaker for her children. In re Domingo W., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 590 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 23, 2015).

Child was removed by court order from the father's home as well as the mother's home and the department established the threshold consideration for the persistence of conditions statutory ground; prior to the child's physical removal from the mother's home, the child had been residing during alternating weeks with the father, and the child was removed from his home based on the father's failure to provide a stable home. In re Alleyanna C., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 642 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 10, 2015).

Child was removed from the father's home because he admittedly could not provide a stable home, had been using marijuana in the recent past, and refused a drug screen; continuation of the parent-child relationship would greatly diminish the child's chances of integration into a safe, stable, and permanent home, and the trial court properly terminated the father's parental rights on the persistence of conditions ground. In re Alleyanna C., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 642 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 10, 2015).

Mother failed to acknowledge responsibility for the situation giving rise to the child's removal from her care, and continuation of the parent-child relationship between the mother and the child would greatly diminish the child's chances of integration into a safe, stable, and permanent home, such that termination of the mother's rights on the persistence of conditions ground was proper. In re Alleyanna C., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 642 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 10, 2015).

Clear and convincing evidence supported terminating a mother's parental rights for persistence of conditions because, (1) while the mother had six years to improve the mother's living conditions, the mother had not done so, as the mother was living temporarily with a person the mother met while incarcerated, awaiting repairs at two other locations, (2) the mother had no driver's license or job, (3) it appeared unlikely the mother would be able to provide suitable living conditions for the children in the near future, and (4) continuing the parent-child relationship would harm the children's chances of integrating into a stable home. In re A.C.S., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 767 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 23, 2015).

Mother had developed a pattern of drug and alcohol abuse, violent and threatening behavior, and criminal activity that had not been remedied sufficient enough to allow the children to return to the home at an early date, and the trial court's decision finding clear evidence to support the termination ground of persistent conditions was affirmed. In re Jaylah W., 486 S.W.3d 537, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 819 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 7, 2015), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 94 (Tenn. Feb. 1, 2016).

Clear and convincing evidence existed to support a finding that the conditions which led to the children's removal persisted because, inter alia, the mother denied the dangers her children faced and was unable to grasp the gravity of the abuse one child faced, the mother did not have a plan on how she could prevent the abuse in the future, and the children were placed in a relative foster home that wished to adopt the children. In re Nolan G., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 825 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 7, 2015).

Ground of persistent conditions was met by clear and convincing evidence where it showed that the child had been removed from the father's custody for incarceration and drug use and placed in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Children's Services for more than six months, the court was unable to discern if any improvements the father had made with his drug use would continue upon his release from prison, and he was likely to remain incarcerated until 2017. In re Abbigail C., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 856 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 21, 2015).

If the order outlining the conditions that led to the removal of the child is pending appeal, that order is not res judicata, and until that order has reached its final completion, the prior order cannot form the basis alone for termination on any ground that contemplates reliance on a previous finding or order; because the current posture of the father's appeal from the order on dependency and neglect, where the juvenile court found the child was a victim of sexual abuse, could be determined, the trial court erred in terminating his rights on the ground of persistence of conditions. In re S.S.-G., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 917 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 16, 2015).

Persistence of conditions ground for termination of parental rights did not apply to the father because the permanent parenting plan was not an “order of the court” by which the child had been removed from the father's home. In re Hope A., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 914 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 17, 2015).

Evidence supported the findings as to persistence of the conditions; the mother had not remedied conditions to the point that she could care for the child or would be able to care for the child in the foreseeable future, the mother's continuing struggle with substance abuse was closely linked to the actions that led to her incarceration and inability to care for the child, and the mother's progress was too tenuous to constitute a change in conditions. In re Aaliyah E., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 36 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 26, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 315 (Tenn. Apr. 22, 2016).

Evidence supported the findings as to persistence of the conditions; the conditions leading to removal of the child into protective custody persisted, the father was incarcerated, and continuation of the parent-child relationship would greatly diminish the child's chances of integration into a safe, stable, and permanent home. In re Aaliyah E., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 36 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 26, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 315 (Tenn. Apr. 22, 2016).

Mother remained in a relationship plagued by domestic violence, she was in need of drug and mental health treatment, and she did not have suitable home; continuing the parent-child relationship greatly diminished the children's chances of early integration into a stable and permanent home, and termination on persistent conditions grounds was affirmed. In re Saliace P., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 37 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 26, 2016).

Record contained clear and convincing proof to support the trial court's findings of persistent conditions; the mother's behavioral problems stemming from her histrionic personality disorder were among the conditions that resulted in the child's removal, and the mother's behavioral problems had not improved and were unlikely to improve sufficiently in the near future to make it safe for the child to return to her care. In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d 507, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 49 (Tenn. Jan. 29, 2016).

Termination of parental rights was appropriate, on the ground of persistent conditions, because clear and convincing evidence showed that the parent, despite improving the parent's education and obtaining employment, did not remedy the situation such as to correct the conditions that led to removal of the parent's children. The parent never comprehensively completed treatment for the parent's own mental health issues and acknowledged that the children were not ready to reside with the parent. In re Phillip I.P., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 127 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 19, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support the termination of the mother's parental rights for persistent conditions where it showed that she refused to take responsibility for her own actions and she continued to use marijuana. In re A'leah M., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 136 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 23, 2016).

Trial court's finding of persistent conditions was affirmed where the father had continued to use drugs, although the mother had attempted to make some changes, she was still in constant contact with the father and her parents, with whom she purported to live, abused prescription medication. In re Matthew T., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 272 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 20, 2016).

Termination of a parental rights was appropriate because clear and convincing evidence showed that the parent had not remedied the persistent conditions of criminal activity and drug use which led to the child's removal in a sufficient manner to allow the child to return to the parent at an early date. Moreover, continuing the relationship between the parent and the child greatly diminished the child's chances of early integration into a safe, stable, and permanent home. In re Tristan B., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 301 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 2, 2016).

Record did not contain evidence that the conditions that led to the child's removal persisted and thus, termination based on persistent conditions was erroneous. In re Jimmy B., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 321 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 11, 2016).

Juvenile court erred in finding the ground of persistent conditions, when the children had not been removed from the father's home for six months or more, and there was no basis for the court to look at the aggregate time over the four years of the case. In re Kaitlin W., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 332 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 16, 2016).

Evidence does not preponderate against the finding that persistent conditions were established, that continuation of the parent-child relationship would greatly diminish the children's integration into a safe home, and this ground existed for termination of the father's rights; he did not claim to be able to care for the children. In re Charles K., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 344 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 19, 2016).

Mother was commended for her success in addressing her substance abuse issues, but the fact remained that she was unable to provide stable housing or meet the children's basic needs and could not provide the trial court with a definitive answer as to when she might be able to support them; the department was in the process of securing the children's placement in a potential adoptive home, and the evidence did not preponderate against the finding that persistent conditions were established. In re Charles K., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 344 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 19, 2016).

Termination of the mother's parental rights based on persistent conditions was supported by evidence that the mother failed a drug screen, returned the company of know drug users, and lived with her brother who had a criminal record. In re Maison W., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 356 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 27, 2016).

Trial court did not err in concluding that termination of parental rights was justified on the ground of persistence of conditions because each of the elements were established by clear and convincing evidence; the conditions that led to the children's removal still persisted and would prevent their safe return to the mother, and there was little likelihood that the mother could remedy her substance abuse and mental health issues. In re Malaya B., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 360 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 24, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 527 (Tenn. Aug. 10, 2016).

Ground of persistence of conditions was proved by clear and convincing evidence, as the mother had developed a pattern of drug abuse that had not been sufficiently remedied to allow the children to return to the home at an early date; the mother showed that it was uncertain if she would ever be able to stop abusing cocaine, and she had not made a lasting adjustment or change to her lifestyle involving drug abuse. In re Navada N., 498 S.W.3d 579, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 367 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 23, 2016).

Termination of parental rights, based upon the alleged persistence of conditions that led to removal, was inapplicable to a parent at the time of the hearing to terminate parental rights when a final order had not yet been entered. In re Hailey S., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 380 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 31, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 156 (Tenn. Mar. 1, 2017).

Clear and convincing evidence supported the trial court's decision to terminate the mother's parental rights to her children under T.C.A. § 36-1-113(g)(3) where, after receiving three years of assistance from the Tennessee Department of Children's Services, she was unable to care for herself and the six children at the same time, and the children had adjusted to their placements and had bonded with their respective families. In re Christian P., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 391 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 6, 2016).

Evidence was clear and convincing that the conditions that led to the child's removal persisted because the mother continued to use drugs while in treatment programs. In re Milli L., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 396 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 7, 2016).

Termination of parental rights based on persistence of conditions, which prevented the safe return of the children to the parent in the near future, was appropriate because the children would have been subjected to further abuse or neglect. The parent had unreliable and insufficient income, could not live in the parent's own home, was relying on the generosity of friends and family to pay bills, had only attended one therapy session to address the parent's mental health issues, and was still taking narcotic pain medication. In re Bailey W., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 408 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 10, 2016).

For persistent conditions purposes, the focus is not solely on the conditions which led to the removal of the children but includes the consideration of whether other conditions exist which would prevent the children's return, and the evidence in this case met that criteria; the trial court made findings regarding the mother's living situation, drug abuse treatment, employment, and efforts to receive counseling, and the findings were supported and established that the conditions that led to the children's removal persisted, along with other conditions preventing their safe return. In re Quadavon H., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 416 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 16, 2016).

There was insufficient evidence to establish the statutory ground of persistence of conditions given the absence of a prior order removing the children from the parents'  home based on a judicial finding of dependency, neglect, or abuse. In re Aiden R., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 420 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 23, 2016).

Termination of the parents' rights under the persistence of conditions ground was proper, given that they stipulated to a finding of dependency and neglect based on environmental neglect, and they made no reasonable efforts to provide a clean home for the children, which demonstrated a lack of concern on the parents' part. In re Derrick J., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 477 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 8, 2016).

Termination of the mother's parental rights based on persistent conditions was proper because the mother's lack of a suitable home and lack of a legal means of income existed, which would in all reasonable probability cause the child to be subjected to further abuse or neglect, as the mother's current housing situation was dependent upon her boyfriend and her boyfriend's parents, whom she had known for a very short period of time; and the mother had not had a job for months and had no legal means of income. In re Bryson C., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 498 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 18, 2016).

Clear and convincing evidence showed a persistence of conditions, authorizing a termination of a father's parental rights, because the father (1) did not address anger control issues, (2) minimized the father's participation in the child's abuse, (3) did not consistently visit the child, and (4) did not consistently participate in required treatment. In re Daymien T., 506 S.W.3d 461, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 540 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 27, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 752 (Tenn. Oct. 21, 2016).

Clear evidence did not support the trial court's reliance on persistent conditions as a ground for terminating the mother's parental rights; the mother's efforts to stop using pain medication were severely disrupted by her arm injury and the three surgeries that followed; while there was little evidence of the mother's efforts to overcome her addiction to pain medication, given the peculiar circumstances of this case, the record did not contain sufficient evidence that it still persisted at the time of the termination hearing. In re Destiny S., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 559 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 4, 2016).

While the mother's failure to complete plan requirements was sufficient to support termination for substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan, it did not relieve the department of its burden to prove that the condition still persisted by clear and convincing evidence. In re Destiny S., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 559 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 4, 2016).

Grandmother failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence persistence of conditions where the record lacked a prior order removing the son from the mother's home or custody based on a judicial finding of dependency, neglect, or abuse. In re Ryder R., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 570 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 5, 2016).

Trial court erred by terminating the mother's parental rights on the ground of persistence of conditions because the children were not removed from the mother's home and there was not an order adjudicating dependency and neglect. In re Rylee R., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 582 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 11, 2016).

Where the child was adjudicated as dependent and neglected and placed with the grandmother as an alternative to Department of Children's Services (DCS) custody when it was determined that the mother could not adequately care for the child, and the child was then removed from the grandmother and placed into DCS custody based upon the grandmother's inability to provide a suitable home, the facts of the case supported the court's consideration of the statutory ground for termination regarding the persistence of conditions which led to removal. In re Gabriella M., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 587 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 15, 2016).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was proper on the grounds of the persistence of conditions which led to removal because the mother was still unable to parent and provide a suitable home for the child; despite adequate time in which to address the conditions, the mother failed to progress or estimate when she might be able to provide suitable care; and the child resided in a pre-adoptive home and was bonded to her foster family. In re Gabriella M., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 587 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 15, 2016).

Evidence did not support a finding of persistent conditions, as there was no countervailing evidence in the record to dispute the mother's testimony that she has not had contact with a former abusive boyfriend in a few years, and the mother was living in a two-bedroom apartment with two of her children and was currently employed, earning sufficient income to maintain her housing and to provide daycare for the two other children. In re Jaiden C., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 591 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 18, 2016).

Trial court did not err by terminating the mother's parental rights based on persistence of conditions under § 36-1-113(g)(3) where the evidence showed that mother's mental condition had not improved at the time of trial such that she was capable of safely caring for her child and that it was unlikely to improve in the near future so as to allow the child to return to the mother's custody. In re Lillian D., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 626 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 26, 2016).

Termination of the father's parental rights based on persistent conditions was supported by evidence he failed to provide a suitable home for the child, paid little support, and violated probation and returned to jail. In re D.R.S., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 631 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 29, 2016).

Because there was no judicial finding of dependency, neglect, or abuse removing the children from the custody of the mother and the father more than six months prior to the termination hearing, the ground of termination of parental rights due to persistence of conditions was not shown by clear and convincing evidence. In re Savannah F., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 657 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2016).

Although the record shows that the children were removed from Mother's home for a period of more than six months on the basis of a court order, the other elements of persistence of conditions were not established by clear and convincing evidence, as, even in spite of the mother's admission that her mental health issues generally persisted and that she would never be through with therapy, the record did not clearly show the impact that the mother's mental health has on her ability to parent. In re Stormie M., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 675 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 15, 2016).

Statutory ground for termination of parental rights due to persistence of conditions was not applicable to the father because the record contained no court order removing the child from the father's home on grounds of dependency and neglect or otherwise, and the father was incarcerated at the time of the child's removal. In re Mickia J., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 678 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 19, 2016).

Termination was proper for both the mother and father due to their failure to remedy persistent conditions, in part because the children had numerous medical and emotional issues that the parents did not tend to, the parents failed to provide a suitable home for the children, even though the department had made reasonable efforts to help the parties remedy those conditions, the mother was in a master-slave sexual relationship with another man, in addition to being married to someone else and living with the father, and the children were exposed to this lifestyle and the mother's business in the marketing of sex toys. In re C.C., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 701 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 22, 2016).

Evidence established the elements necessary to terminate the mother's parental rights on the ground of persistence of conditions; the mother had failed to secure adequate employment, obtain dependable transportation, and be involved in the children's activities, the conditions would likely lead to further abuse and neglect of the children, plus the matter has been in litigation since 2013 and the court could not foresee any reasonable probability that the conditions would be remedied at an early date. In re Jasmine B., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 709 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 22, 2016).

Tennessee Department of Children's Services met its burden of proving persistence of conditions because the conditions that prevented the children's return to the mother and father remained at the time of the hearing and would cause the children to be subjected to further abuse or neglect, and there was little likelihood the mother and father would remedy them; the children's foster family met all of the children's medical needs and ensured the children's success in school. In re Jason S., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 715 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 23, 2016).

Termination of the mother's rights on the grounds of persistent conditions was proper; the testimony was independent evidence that the conditions that led to the findings in the order finding severe abuse of one of the children had not changed and were unlikely to change, and thus the trial court was permitted to draw a negative inference about these facts from the mother's invocation of the Fifth Amendment, and her refusal to testify made it impossible to determine that the child would be provided with a safe home, which the mother had to prove in this instance. In re Alfonzo E., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 797 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 26, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 76 (Tenn. Jan. 24, 2017).

Evidence did not support a finding that a father's parental rights were to be terminated based on persistence of conditions because, although the mother's abuse of drugs was a concern, the evidence did not conclusively show that the parents were still in a relationship as the father was attempting to share parenting responsibilities with the mother. In re Jeramyah H., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 819 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 31, 2016).

Persistent conditions are established if evidence shows the existence of conditions that led to the children's removal or other conditions that in all reasonable probability would lead to further abuse or neglect; the proof was clear that at the time of trial, the mother did not have stable housing or employment, she was financially unstable and had failed to provide ongoing support for the children, and she had been sporadic in maintaining contact with the children, plus she was in violation of her probation and at risk of continued incarceration. In re Dustin T., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 876 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 17, 2016).

Father was currently incarcerated and was not in a position to parent the children, no reliable evidence was introduced showing when he would be released, and thus the ground of persistent conditions was proven. In re Dustin T., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 876 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 17, 2016).

Evidence preponderated against the trial court's finding that termination was appropriate due to persistent conditions where a dependency and neglect order only removed the child from the mother's custody, not the father's custody. In re M.E.T., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 899 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 29, 2016), appeal denied, In re Miguel T., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 152 (Tenn. Mar. 3, 2017).

Termination of the father's parental rights based on persistent conditions was improper, as there was no evidence of an appropriate order removing the child from the home based on a finding of dependency and neglect. In re Addison B., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 913 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2016).

Termination of the mother's rights on persistent conditions grounds was proper; nothing had substantially changed within a two-year time frame to allow for the children's safe return to the home, from which they had been removed based on neglect, the mother had relapsed into drugs, and she was still incarcerated for failing to support the children. In re Eddie F., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 924 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 2, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 158 (Tenn. Mar. 2, 2017).

Termination of a mother's parental rights on the ground of persistence of conditions was appropriate because the mother's children were removed from the mother's care for over six months, and the evidence showed that a return of the children to the mother's care was inhibited by the father's continued presence. The father, who was not married to the mother, was given towards anger and domestic violence. In re Jakob O., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 959 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 15, 2016).

Clear and convincing evidence supported terminating a mother's parental rights due to a persistence of conditions because the mother did not take advantage of offered assistance to address conditions leading to removal of the mother's children, and the mother's circumstances were unlikely to change with additional time. In re Casey C., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 966 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 19, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 80 (Tenn. Jan. 25, 2017).

Termination of the mother's rights based on persistence of conditions, was supported by evidence that she returned to the father's home despite the history of domestic violence, the mother's drug use and mental health issues remained a problem, and the mother lacked stable housing In re Linette B., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 983 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 21, 2016).

Ground of persistent conditions did not apply to the father, because the child who was the subject of the termination of parental rights action never lived with the father or was in the custody of the father. In re Heaven J., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 979 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 22, 2016).

Mother's parental rights were properly terminated due to persistence of conditions, as, despite initial progress toward establishing a safe and secure home, the parents had repeatedly shown they were unable to maintain a safe, stable, and appropriate environment for the children, with their being environmental neglect issues, lack of supervision issues, and inappropriate persons living in the family home with unrestricted access to the children. In re Renaldo M., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 1003 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 30, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 90 (Tenn. Feb. 7, 2017).

Conditions that led to removal had not been remedied, namely the mother's failure to address her substance abuse issues, and despite services, she failed to progress; the trial court's termination decision based upon the persistence of conditions was proper. In re Yariel S., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 6, 2017).

Trial court did not err in terminating a mother's parental rights to her children because the evidence clearly and convincingly established persistence of conditions as to the mother; the mother tested positive for medications not prescribed to her and showed up for visitation with track marks on her arms, she refused to attend drug and alcohol treatment, and she also incurred new legal charges. In re A.B., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 14 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 11, 2017).

Evidence preponderated against the trial court's finding that the ground of persistence of conditions existed to terminate the mother's parental rights because the children were living with their grandparents and not their mother at the time they were removed. In re S.P., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 41 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 25, 2017).

There was clear and convincing evidence to support the termination of the parents'  rights for persistence of conditions because neither parent had sufficiently addressed their substance abuse issues, both failed drug screens, and previously the children had spent almost two years in foster care because of the parents'  drug use. In re Kayla B., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 66 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 1, 2017).

Record contained only a temporary order from the juvenile court, and there was no indication that an adjudicatory hearing actually occurred; as temporary orders were not sufficient to support termination of parental rights on the ground of persistence of conditions, this ground for termination of the mother's parental rights was reversed. In re Charles A., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 194 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 24, 2017).

Clear and convincing evidence supported the termination of a father's parental rights because the conditions that led to removal of the father's child persisted, specifically, the father's insistence on remaining in the home with the mother despite the mother's untreated drug addiction and unaddressed mental health issues. The father's complacency in this regard indicated too high a risk that the child would be further exposed to neglect and abuse if placed in a household in which these issues persisted. In re Ja'miya T., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 206 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 28, 2017).

In a termination of parental rights case, the juvenile court erred in finding the ground of persistent conditions because there was an outstanding appeal to circuit court of the juvenile court's dependency and neglect order; thus, the order was not res judicata. In re Lorenda B., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 243 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 19, 2017).

Statutory ground for termination of parental rights based on persistence of conditions was not applicable to the father under the facts presented, as the record contained no court order removing the child from the father's home (on grounds of dependency and neglect or otherwise), and there was no evidence to suggest that the child was residing in the father's home at the time of his removal. In re Damien G. M., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 282 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 3, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's termination of the father's parental rights based on substantial non-compliance with permanency plans because it showed that he failed to follow the recommendations from the assessments, failed to establish a suitable home, and was incarcerated at the time of trial. In re Travis H., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 290 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 5, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 468 (Tenn. July 31, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's termination of the father's parental rights based on persistence of conditions because of the father's incarceration and ongoing concerns regarding his ability to find a suitable home for the child and to refrain from engaging in further criminal activity or drug use. In re Travis H., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 290 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 5, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 468 (Tenn. July 31, 2017).

There was clear and convincing evidence to terminate the father's parental rights based on persistent conditions under T.C.A. § 36-1-113; while the record was unclear regarding when the father's current incarceration would end, upon release he would have to return to Kentucky to resolve legal issues there, the child has been in foster care since 2013, the child was doing well in that foster home, and lingering in state custody any longer would be detrimental to the child. In re Wesley P., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 301 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 12, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 400 (Tenn. July 6, 2017).

Termination of parental rights based on persistence of conditions was improper, as six months had not elapsed from the date of the adjudicatory hearing order and filing the termination petition. In re Lena G., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 358 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 26, 2017).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was proper under the persistence of conditions ground because the mother had not secured a safe and stable home for the children by the time of the trial; she was unsuccessful in completely removing drugs from her life; although the mother completed an alcohol and drug assessment and submitted to random drug screens, she admitted to using methamphetamine four to six months prior to trial; she continued to surround herself with other drug users; she failed to obtain sponsorship through Narcotics Anonymous or Alcoholics Anonymous; and the foster mother testified that she and her husband would like to adopt the children if they became available for adoption. In re Skylar P., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 417 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 21, 2017).

Termination of both parents rights for persistence of conditions was proper, as the mother obtained new criminal charges multiple times after the development of the plan and the father failed to complete an alcohol and drug assessment. In re C.J.B., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 436 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 28, 2017), appeal denied, In re Chaz B., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 624 (Tenn. Sept. 22, 2017).

Termination based on persistent conditions under T.C.A. § 36-1-113(g) was proper; the mother's improvements in the months preceding the hearing were too little too late in light of her long history of unstable housing, drug use, and incarcerations, and continuation of the mother's relationship with the children greatly diminished their chances of early integration into a safe and permanent home. In re Quintin S., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 480 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 13, 2017).

Trial court properly terminated a mother's parental rights on the ground that persistent conditions could subject the child to further neglect or abuse because the child would not be able to safely return to the mother's custody within a reasonable time since the mother was a drug addict; the child was in the care of a foster family that wished to adopt, and to delay the integration into a permanent home would be unfair to the child, who needed stability. In re Mya V., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 511 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 28, 2017).

Termination of the mother's rights on the ground of persistent conditions was supported by evidence that the conditions that led to removal still existed and had never been remedied In re Jayden R., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 544 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 11, 2017).

Statutory ground of persistence of conditions under T.C.A. § 36-1-113(g)(3) was not applicable to the father as there was no evidence to suggest that the children were residing in his home at the time of their removal. In re Miracle M., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 593 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 30, 2017), appeal dismissed, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 845 (Tenn. Nov. 30, 2017).

Mother's and father's parental rights were properly terminated under T.C.A. § 36-1-113(g)(3) where clear and convincing evidence showed that the mother was still addicted to drugs, had not properly addressed her mental health issues, and had not established stable housing or employment, there was proof that the father was unable to acquire stable housing and employment, there was evidence suggesting that the father was unable to separate himself from the mother so as to provide the children with a stable and drug-free home, and given the pattern of behavior by and between the parents, there was little likelihood that the conditions that led to the children's removal would be remedied at an early date. In re Seth B., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 613 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 14, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 850 (Tenn. Dec. 11, 2017).

Trial court did not err in terminating a mother's parental rights on the ground of persistent conditions because the mother continued to have criminal problems, and she was arrested on charges of theft and criminal trespass; the mother did not have stable housing at the time of trial, and she conceded that she was not ready to have the children return to her care. In re Billy T.W., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 641 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 27, 2017).

Tennessee Department of Children's Services presented clear and convincing evidence that the conditions that necessitated removal of the children because housing instability, lack of cooperation with the Department, and outstanding criminal issues, prevented the safe return of the children. In re Billy T.W., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 641 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 27, 2017).

Record did not contain clear and convincing evidence that a mother's substance abuse problems persisted at the time of trial because the inference that the mother's failure to comply with drug screens and attend follow-up alcohol and drug treatment strongly suggested ongoing drug issues did not constitute clear and convincing evidence to support the persistence of conditions ground. In re Billy T.W., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 641 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 27, 2017).

Termination of a father's parental rights based on persistent conditions was appropriate where his failure to provide an appropriate home for the children led to their removal, he had subsequently failed to secure housing that would have been safe and appropriate for the children, he failed to maintain contact with the Department of Children's Services (DCS), had been uncooperative with DCS throughout the case, failed to take responsibility for his actions leading to the removal of the children, and refused to acknowledge the harm that he had caused the children. In re L.M.H., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 657 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 28, 2017).

Termination of a father's parental rights on the ground of persistence of conditions was inappropriate because the trial court's analysis improperly focused on the father's efforts rather than whether the conditions that led to the children's removal still persisted. The evidence was less than clear and convincing that the conditions which led to the children's removal or other conditions that in all reasonable probability would have caused the children to be subjected to further abuse or neglect still persisted. In re Isabella G., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 667 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 3, 2017).

Father was unable to grasp the importance that he had to protect the children from sexual abuse and he never addressed his mental health issues or received the specialized training he needed to parent the children, and thus the conditions that led to the children's removal still existed; as the father did not appear able or willing to rectify those conditions in the near future, the ground of persistent conditions was established by clear and convincing evidence. In re Da'Vante M., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 797 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 12, 2017).

Termination of the father's parental rights based on persistence of conditions was not proper, as the record contained no order related to the prior proceedings in which the child was allegedly adjudicated dependent and neglected. In re Brianna B., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 805 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 15, 2017).

Termination of a mother's parental rights was appropriate because the mother's children were in foster care for over a year and there was little likelihood that the mother would remedy the mother's housing situation or end the mother's associations with individuals who had histories of violence and drug use at an early date in the near future. In re M.E.N.J., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 835 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 27, 2017).

There was clear evidence of persistence of conditions, given that the conditions that led to the removal of the children involved a lack of appropriate housing for the children, yet the mother continued to having housing issues, and it was unlikely the children could be safely returned to her in the near future. In re B.L., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 846 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 1, 2017).

Termination of a father's parental rights on the ground of persistence of conditions was inappropriate because the child had already been removed from the father's home by a neighbor with the biological parents'  consent at least a month before the Tennessee Department of Children's Services (DCS) became involved. The ground of persistence of conditions required both that the child be adjudicated to be dependent and neglected and that the child be removed from the parent's home by the DCS. In re Kandace D., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 8, 2018).

Termination of the father's parental rights was proper based on persistent conditions because the father had ongoing issues with maintaining a stable home, resolving his drug problems, and refraining from illegal activities that were not likely to be remedied in the near future; and those issues prevented the safe return of the children to the father's home at the time of trial and in the foreseeable future. In re Aaralyn O., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 14 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 18, 2018).

Clear and convincing evidence supported the termination of a mother's rights to the mother's child, based upon the persistence of the conditions that led to the removal of the child, because the child had resided in the same foster home for more than three years, the mother had issues with the mother's mental and emotional status and finances and housing, and there was little likelihood that the mother was able to remedy the mother's mental and financial instability at an early date. In re K.Y.H., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 30 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 23, 2018).

Chancery court erred in terminating a mother's parental rights because the evidence was less than clear and convincing that the conditions that led to the child's removal or other conditions that in all reasonable probability would cause the child to be subjected to further abuse or neglect still persisted; there was no evidence that the mother continued to abuse illegal drugs or that her relationship with a man that the Tennessee Department of Children's Services had warned her against continued. In re Alivia F., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 48 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 30, 2018).

Although the statutory ground of persistence of conditions refers to “conditions that led to the child's removal or other conditions, an apparent isolated incident of alcohol use is not indicative of a condition that might lead to further abuse or neglect of the child. In re Alivia F., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 48 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 30, 2018).

Evidence was insufficient to support the termination of the mother's parental rights based on persistence of conditions because the record showed that the children were removed from the home of their grandmother and the mother did not live at the home. In re Homer, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 126 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 9, 2018).

Grounds for terminating a mother's parental rights to the mother's child for persistent conditions were proven by clear and convincing evidence as the child was removed from the parents'  home by court order for more than six months and was adjudicated dependent and neglected and the conditions that led to the child's removal–illegal drug use, a lack of safe and stable housing–still persisted, so that there was little likelihood that the conditions would be remedied at an early date for the safe return of the child in the near future. In re Riley W., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 129 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 12, 2018).

Trial court erred in terminating the mother's parental rights based on the statutory ground of persistence of conditions because the record contained no court order removing the children from the mother's custody based on a finding of dependency, neglect, or abuse. In re Haley S., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 164 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 29, 2018).

Trial court properly found by clear and convincing evidence that the conditions leading to removal of the child from the mother's home persisted because the mother made no effort to improve her circumstances and failed to procure stable housing or employment; the child was in the mother's custody from the time of his birth until his removal, such that he was clearly removed from her “home,” and the fact that the mother was “homeless” and living in a motel did not alter the analysis. In re Authur R., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 170 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 3, 2018).

Persistence of conditions could not be a ground for terminating a mother's parental rights because the children had not been removed from her home for a period of six months by court order based on a finding of dependency, neglect, or abuse. Accordingly, the juvenile court erred in relying on T.C.A. § 36-1-113(g)(3) as a ground for terminating the mother's parental rights. In re Maya R., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 171 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 4, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support the termination of the mother's parental rights based on persistence of conditions because six months had passed since this children's removal, the mother's mental instability persisted, and the expert testified that the mother was presently unable to parent her children and would likely never be able to do so because of her mental illness and prognosis. In re Roderick R., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 192 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 11, 2018).

Persistence of conditions was not available as a ground to terminate the parents'  rights because at the time the children came into the custody of the Tennessee Department of Children Services, they were in the custody of a neighbor, not in that of either parent. In re Kah'Nyia J., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 238 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2018).

Child's foster parents failed to prove persistence of conditions by clear and convincing evidence because the evidence showed that the parents had fully complied with the permanency plan and drug treatment and that they had provided a safe environment for the child. In re Zayne P., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 239 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2018).

Clear and convincing evidence supported the termination of the mother's parental rights based on on persistence of conditions because it showed that the mother continued to associate with the father and domestic violence was still a substantial risk as long as he was involved in the mother's life. In re Isaiah B., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 247 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 8, 2018).

There was clear and convincing evidence of each element of subsection (g)(3) because the conditions that led to children's removal from a mother's home persisted from the time of the children were placed in the custody of their paternal aunt and uncle to the time of trial; the children were placed in the legal custody of the aunt and uncle in a proceeding that resulted in a finding that they were dependent and neglected, and the statute did not require that they be placed in foster care. In re Emily J., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 254 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 9, 2018).

Because the record contained no final adjudicatory dependency-and-neglect order that removed the children from the parents'  home, the trial court erred in its determination that clear and convincing evidence supported the ground of persistence of conditions. In re J.T., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 256 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 10, 2018).

Evidence was less than clear that the conditions that led to the children's removal still persisted, and thus termination under the persistence of conditions ground was improper; the mother had not failed a drug test since 2013, no one could remember the last time the father failed a drug test, the evidence was insufficient to establish that their drug problems persisted, plus there was inadequate evidence as to whether the father committed domestic violence since he received services, and evidence of the mother's inadequate parenting skills was mixed. In re Ayden S., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 306 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 31, 2018).

Clear and convincing evidence supported the termination of a father's parental rights, based on persistent conditions, because the father was either unable or unwilling to adjust the conditions that led to the child's removal and keep the child's mother away from the child until the mother stopped abusing drugs. In re D.T., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 328 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 18, 2018).

Evidence that the children were removed for parents for more than six months, the conditions that led to their removal would likely subject the children to further abuse or neglect, and there was little liklihood that the conditions would be remedied in the near future to safely return the children to the parents'  custody supported termination based on persistence of conditions. In re Damon B., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 352 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 25, 2018).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was proper on the ground of persistence of conditions because, although the record did not contain clear and convincing evidence that the mother's substance abuse problems persisted at the time of trial, she still lacked stable housing, was unemployed, and did not have valid transportation; and there was little chance that those conditions would be remedied soon so that the children could be returned safely to the home. In re McKenzie O., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 387 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 5, 2018).

Persistence of conditions termination ground was shown by clear and convincing evidence, as the child was dependent and neglected, having been initially removed because the parents were caught shoplifting to buy drugs and were subsequently jailed, the father never provided proof that he was legally employed, the conditions that led to the child's removal still persisted and would not remedied anytime soon, and the child's foster parents were interested in adopting him. In re Gabriel B., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 413 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 23, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support termination of the father's parental rights for persistence of conditions because the child was removed from the father's custody due to exposure to drugs and domestic violence and at the time of the hearing those conditions persisted. The father's ongoing domestic violence issues were shown by his admitted arrest record, he tested positive for cocaine on more than one occasion, and he continued to live in a “three-quarter house.” In re Leroy H., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 446 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 3, 2018).

Termination of the mother's parental rights based on persistence of conditions was supported by evidence that the mother had now acknowledged her own abuse of the child, the mother had harassed and coerced the child into making disclosures she was being sexually abused by children at school, and the mother made no progress in seeking treatment. In re McKenzi W., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 454 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 9, 2018).

Termination of the mother's rights for persistence of conditions was proper; the mother had no stable living situation, continued to involve herself in abusive relationships, and chose not to fully address her drug addiction and mental health issues, and the conditions that led to the children's removal still persisted. In re Piper B., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 478 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 17, 2018).

Mother had not remedied the conditions that led to the child's removal and other conditions persisted that would cause the child to be subjected to further abuse and neglect, as the mother was still unable to provide a stable home for the child, and she had failed to address her mental health concerns; termination of the mother's rights for persistent conditions was affirmed. In re Alexis C., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 499 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 28, 2018).

Supplemental protective custody order found there was probable cause to believe that the children were dependent and neglected, but the order did not find by clear and convincing evidence that the children are dependent and neglected; such a temporary order was not sufficient to support termination of the mother's parental rights on the ground of persistence of conditions. In re Romeo T., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 514 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2018).

Persistence of conditions ground for termination was proven, as the children were adjudicated dependent and neglected and remained in the Department of Children's Services'  custody for 14 months before the filing of the termination petition, plus the mother had no plan for housing, continued to test positive for cocaine and methamphetamine throughout the case, and attended mental health treatment on an irregular and inconsistent basis. In re Briana H., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 518 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2018).

Clear and convincing evidence was proven of grounds to terminate a father's parental rights to the father's children for persistent conditions because the  conditions that led to removal of the children still persisted as the father allowed the mother to move in to the father's home, despite a no-contact order between the mother and the children. Further, there was crime in the father's home and the father was incarcerated with no certain release date. In re Sophie O., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 521 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 4, 2018).

Clear and convincing evidence supported the termination of a mother's parental rights on the ground of persistence of conditions because, although the children were in foster care and an examination of the mother's home was not completed, the mother continued to display signs of substance abuse and it was unlikely that the mother's financial hardships were to remedied at an early date. If the children were returned to the mother, it also was likely they would have been living in a home where substance abuse and criminal activity was rampant. In re T.R., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 542 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 17, 2018).

Termination of the mother's parental rights on the ground of persistence of conditions was supported by the evidence; the children were removed from the mother's home due to concerns that she was abusing drugs, the conditions that led to removal still persist as to the mother, and there was little chance that mother would be able to rectify her conditions in the immediate future as mother has not consistently shown she could stay sober and even after a period of sobriety, she relapsed. In re Larry P., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 606 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 15, 2018).

Evidence was insufficient to support the termination of the mother's parental rights based on persistence of conditions because the appellate record did not contain a court order removing the children from the mother's custody based on a finding of dependency, neglect, or abuse. In re Francis R., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 623 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 25, 2018).

Termination of the mother's and the father's parental rights based on the persistence of conditions ground was proper because, given the mother's failure to address her possible substance abuse issues, and the father's continued dependency on methadone, there was little likelihood that the conditions which led to removal would be remedied at an early date so that the child could be safely returned in the near future; and the continuation of the relationship greatly diminished the child's chances of early integration into a safe, stable and permanent home. In re Camdon H., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 672 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 21, 2018).

Termination of the mother's parental rights based on a finding that the conditions that led to the children's removal persisted was supported by evidence that the mother had done little to combat her drug issues and had done little to remedy her admitted mental health issues. In re Karisah N., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 684 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 27, 2018).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was proper based on persistence of conditions leading to removal of the children from her home because the children were removed from the mother's custody and found to be dependent and neglected; the mother's lack of stable housing was not the sole reason for the children's removal from her custody as, at the time of removal, the mother and her family were the subject of several referrals and an investigation focusing on allegations of inadequate supervision, lack of stable housing, child abuse, substance abuse, and domestic violence concerns; and continuation of the parent-child relationship would greatly diminish the children's chances of integration into a safe, stable, and permanent home. In re Steven W., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 693 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 28, 2018).

Termination of the mother's parental rights based on the persistence of conditions was supported by evidence of the mother's ongoing drug abuse and overall noncompliance with attempts to assist her in improving her condition and regaining custody. In re Alexis S., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 700 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2018).

Clear and convincing evidence supported the trial court's finding of persistence of conditions because the mother still struggled with abusing illegal drugs, there was little likelihood that she could remedy her substance abuse and other issues in the near future so that the children could be safely returned to her, and she acknowledged that she at least seven and a half months of inpatient treatment to complete. In re Michayla T., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 712 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 7, 2018).

Termination of the father's parental rights on the ground of persistence of conditions was proper; the department made efforts to provide help to improve the parenting abilities over a long period of time, and those efforts have proved ineffective, as the father had over two years to cooperate and make the necessary adjustments that would enable the children's safe return to his care, yet he failed to do so. In re Gaberiel S., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 718 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 11, 2018).

There was clear and convincing evidence to support the trial court's decision to terminate the mother's parental rights on the ground of persistent conditions because she failed to follow the recommendations designed to address her prescription drug dependency, and at the time of the hearing the Department of Children's Services had not determined whether her new residence was satisfactory. In re Lesley A., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 738 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 18, 2018).

Trial court erred in terminating the father's parental rights based on the persistence of conditions because one of the main reasons the children were removed from the father was a positive marijuana test and the father rectified that and no longer had a substance abuse issue, and the father no longer misunderstood the issues regarding his daughter's dental care. In re Kiara S., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 750 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 20, 2018).

in light of other clear and convincing proof that the mother had not remedied the conditions that led to the children's placement with the child placement agency and the trial court's holding that the children were dependent and neglected, certain testimony did not establish, as the mother claimed, that there were no conditions preventing the children's return. In re Antonio J., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 759 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2018).

Trial court determined that the children were dependent and neglected as the mother was unable to care for them without the assistance of others, and the trial court approved an agreement that the children remain in child placement agency's custody; there was no basis for the mother's argument that the children were not removed because she voluntarily placed them with the agency, and the order satisfied the persistence of conditions requirement that the child be removed from the parent's home by order of the court. In re Antonio J., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 759 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2018).

Conditions leading to the removal of the children persisted and there was little chance that these conditions would be remedied soon; once the children were removed, the mother failed to complete random drug screening and an alcohol and drug rehabilitation program, she declined to maintain consistent visitation with the children, and she was incarcerated four times. In re Gabriella H., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 12 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 8, 2019).

Evidence clearly and convincingly established the elements necessary to terminate the parents'  rights on the ground of persistence of conditions because they repeatedly showed that they were unable to maintain an appropriate home environment free from debris, clutter, animals, animal waste, and unsafe conditions, and they had shown an inability to keep persons not approved by the Department of Children's Service from entering their home as required by permanency plans and trial court orders. In re Savannah M., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 44 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 28, 2019).

Clear and convincing evidence supported termination of a mother's parental rights based on a persistence of conditions because (1) the conditions leading to the removal of the mother's child persisted, (2) other conditions persisted that would, in all probability, cause the child to be subjected to further abuse and neglect, (3) there was little likelihood the mother would remedy the conditions at an early date to allow the child's return, and (4) continuation of the legal parent-child relationship would greatly diminish the child's chances of early integration into a stable and permanent home. In re J'Khari F., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 60 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2019).

The trial court's finding that appellants met their burden to show that the conditions that led to the children's removal persisted was supported by evidence that the mother had an admitted history of drug use and criminal activity and relapse and the children did not want to live with her because they did not think she would ever change. In re Autumn L., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 73 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 8, 2019).

Clear and convincing evidence supported the termination of a mother's parental rights on the ground of persistence of conditions because the mother's children were removed from the mother's home and adjudicated dependent and neglected, there were issues concerning drug use, sexual abuse, and a lack of supervision of the children in the mother's home. Moreover, the mother had continued to engage in criminal activity throughout the pendency of the case and generally showed an unwillingness to parent the children. In re H. A., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 78 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 12, 2019).

It was not appropriate to terminate a mother's parental rights on the ground of persistence of conditions because such a ground was not alleged in the petition. In re Paetyn M., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 81 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 14, 2019).

Clear and convincing evidence showed that termination of a father's parental rights to both of the father's children was appropriate on the ground of persistent conditions because the children were removed from the father's custody when the father was arrested and the father's lenghty incarceration rendered the father unable to provide the children with a home until they attained adulthood. In re D.V., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 111 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 6, 2019).

Termination was proper on the ground of persistence of conditions as the child was removed because of the father's involvement with child pornography and use of drugs, but the mother had returned to live with him for a time; the mother was still struggling to get back on her feet after leaving the father; the mother had no job and was living in a shelter for domestic violence victims; and continuation of the parent and child relationship greatly diminished the child's chances of early integration into a safe, stable, and permanent home. In re Laura F., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 200 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 29, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's termination of the mother's parental rights based on persistence of conditions because the child was removed from the mother's custody due to her drug use, noncompliance with the Tennessee Department of Children's Services (DCS) Family Support Services in obtaining drug treatment, and failure to ensure that the child received his medication. she had failed to complete the recommended intensive outpatient drug treatment or parenting classes. Throughout the time that the child was in DCS custody, the mother had continued using drugs and had failed to complete treatment to remedy her drug addiction. In re Kaden W., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 230 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 13, 2019).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was proper based on the ground of persistence of conditions because she seemed to have substituted alcohol for drugs, and had not presented evidence showing that she had addressed her struggles with alcohol; there was a concern that the mother would reunite with the father despite past domestic violence; and the children's court appointed special advocate testified that she was concerned about returning the children to the mother because of her substance abuse issues and her difficulty controlling the children. In re Trey S., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 303 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 20, 2019).

Ground of persistent conditions was proven by clear and convincing evidence; by trial, the mother had not fully addressed the issues that precipitated the children's removal, the main barriers to reunification was her mental health situation and domestic violence, the court only had the mother's word to go on that she resolved her mental health issues and proclivity toward violence, and the children were thriving in the foster mother's care. In re Charlie-Lynn P., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 322 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 27, 2019).

Trial court properly concluded that the undisputed evidence in the record clearly and convincingly supported termination of a mother's parental rights on the ground of persistent conditions because six months after the child's removal, the mother continued to use illegal drugs; given the mother's consistent drug use, failure to follow treatment recommendations, and other acts of noncompliance with the permanency plan, it was unlikely she would resolve her drug issues. In re K.S., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 376 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 2, 2019).

Termination of the mother's parental rights on the ground of persistence of conditions was proper; the child had been removed from the mother's custody for more than six months, the mother was homeless, and her recent relapse and lack of progress on other issues made reunification in the near future unlikely. In re Josiah T., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 482 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 2, 2019).

In the absence of the necessary adjudicatory order on dependency and neglect, appellees failed to meet their burden to show that the conditions that led to the child's removal from the mother persisted, and the court reversed termination on this ground. In re Dylan S., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 518 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 23, 2019).

Termination of a father's parental rights was appropriate because the conditions that led to the children's removal persisted as the father testified at the termination hearing that the father had been on drugs from when the father was twelve years old and the court stated that attempts at rehabilitation had been unsuccessful. The father's drug use occurred before the children were born, led to their removal, and continued uninterrupted thereafter. In re B.A., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 549 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 12, 2019).

Termination of a mother's parental rights to the mother's children on the ground of persistent conditions was appropriate because the trial court properly found persistence of conditions due to the mother's lack of suitable housing, failure to comply with her mental health treatment, and pending criminal charges, leading to the finding that there was little chance the existing conditions preventing the children's return to the mother would be remedied soon. In re Deishun M., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 562 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 18, 2019).

Termination of mother's parental rights on ground of persistent conditions was appropriate because the mother's living situation was precarious, the mother had only begun to truly address substance abuse problems and was defiant about treatment, and there was no proof that the mother could adequately provide for the children. In multiple respects, the mother's circumstances remained what they were at the time of removal, with no indication that they were likely to change fundamentally. In re Malik G., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 564 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 21, 2019).

Record clearly and convincingly established the persistence of conditions ground for termination because a father failed to take the situation seriously or make any significant improvement in his circumstances until after the filing of the petition to terminate his rights, and the conditions that led to removal of the child continued to persist as of the time of the filing of the petition; it was extremely doubtful that the father's circumstances would be remedied in the near future. In re Jayda H., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 571 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 25, 2019).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was proper except on the ground of persistence of the conditions that led to the child's removal because, although the trial court entered an order finding that there was probable cause to believe the child was dependent and neglected, none of the subsequent orders from the trial court adjudicated dependency and neglect by clear and convincing evidence. In re Draven K., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 7, 2020).

Evidence was clear and convincing that the conditions preventing the child's safe return persisted where the mother lacked an appropriate home and had not prioritized her drug or mental health treatment, those conditions were unlikely to be remedied in the near future, and continuation of the parental relationship diminished the child's chances of early integrations into a stable home. In re Emma S., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2020).

Termination of the father's parental rights based on the ground of persistent conditions was supported by evidence that the children were removed from the home of parents, and the removal was predicated upon the domestic violence, the mother's drug use, the father's continued relationship with the mother despite her drug use and the father's failure to attend family counseling. In re Mahaley P., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 10 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2020).

Evidence was insufficient to support the termination of the mother's parental rights to her daughter based on persistence of conditions because the daughter was not removed from the mother's home but rather was living at a hospital at the time of her removal. In re Ronon G., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 14 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 16, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to support the termination of the mother's parental rights to her son based on persistence of conditions because at the time of trial, he had been removed from the mother's custody for a period of over four years pursuant to adjudication of dependency and neglect, the mother moved from one unsuitable home to another, never making any real progress, and there was a lack of safe, stable housing and a means of support. In re Ronon G., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 14 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 16, 2020).

Terminating parents'  parental rights for persistent conditions was proper because, (1) while a mother remedied a lack of housing causing the children's removal, the mother was consistently voluntarily unemployed or underemployed, took no parenting classes, provided no mental health recommendations, and smoked in the children's presence, while (2) the father refused alcohol treatment. In re C.L., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 20 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 21, 2020).

Termination of a mother's parental rights on the ground of persistence of conditions was appropriate because clear and convincing evidence was presented that the mother's drug abuse issue that led to the removal of the children still persisted, that there was little likelihood that the condition was to be remedied in the near future, and the mother's inability to maintain sobriety deprived the children of a safe, stable, and permanent home so long as the mother was a part of their lives. In re Michael W., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 24 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 23, 2020).

Termination of the mother's parental rights for persistence of conditions was proper, as she failed to comply with or complete any plan requirements, refused to have a home study completed, and failed to acknowledge the inappropriateness of her discipline techniques. In re Imerald W., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 43 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2020).

Whether the mother was admitted to a mental health institute had no bearing on her failure to remedy the conditions that led to removal when the statute did not require that the parent's failure be willful; therefore, exclusion of the evidence, even if admissible, was harmless. In re Benjamin P., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 54 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 4, 2020).

Conditions that led to the children's removal still persisted in the mother's case, for termination of parental rights purposes; one child was hospitalized as a result of the mother's nutritional neglect and she was homeless at the time of the hearing and without the ability to provide a stable and habitable residence in the near future. In re Benjamin P., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 54 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 4, 2020).

Trial court properly found that persistent conditions as a ground to terminate a mother's parental rights where the children had been removed six months prior due to the mother's drug issues and neglect of the children, following the removal, issues related to the mother's mental health, housing, and lack of reliable transportation surfaced, and at the time of trial, more than a year following the removal, these issues had not been remedied. In re Jadarian C., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 87 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2020).

Ground of persistence of the conditions leading to the children's removal from the mother was established by clear and convincing evidence because the record showed that the children were removed from the mother's custody due to her drug use and a physical assault against one child by the mother's boyfriend, the mother's drug use had continued, she tested positive on a drug test for methamphetamine and amphetamines at trial, as of the date of trial she had failed to complete drug treatment to address her drug abuse issues, and she failed to address her mental health issues. In re Gracie H. Y., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 110 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 16, 2020).

Sufficient evidence supported the termination of the mother's parental rights based on persistence of conditions because it showed that the child was removed from the mother's custody in large part because of her consistent drug use and the presence of drugs in her home, and her testimony made it clear that she continued to use methamphetamine, did not complete her required treatments, and saw her drug use as necessary for her to function. In re Caydan T., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 143 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 7, 2020).

With respect to the ground of persistence of conditions, the was no evidence that the mother's manufacturing of methamphetamine persisted since she had been incarcerated and, due to her incarceration, no assessment could be made as to whether the conditions prior to her arrest persisted. Accordingly, the elements of the ground of persistence of conditions were not clearly and convincingly established as to the mother. In re Eli S., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 150 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 9, 2020).

Trial court's reliance on the persistence of conditions ground for terminating a mother's parental rights was vacated because the trial court failed to make specific findings regarding each of the elements applicable to the persistence of conditions ground. In re Madux F., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 166 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 16, 2020).

Termination of a mother's parental rights on the ground of persistence of conditions was appropriate because the trial court adjudicated the child dependent and neglected and a victim of severe child abuse, the child was removed from the mother's custody and placed in foster care for two-and-a-half years, and the conditions that led to the child's removal still existed, preventing the child from returning safely as the mother put forth minimal effort to improve the conditions that led to the child's removal. In re Kelty F., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 185 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 24, 2020).

Termination of the mother's parental rights based on persistence of conditions was proper because, toward the end of the home visit period, the mother tested positive for methamphetamine; although Tennessee Department of Children's Services (DCS) continued to work with the mother, she refused to submit to further drug screens; she stopped taking the case worker's phone calls and failed to appear in court; the mother refused to return the child when ordered; the child's condition on return was poor as he was dirty, with bruises and scratches on his arms and face; the mother was largely absent and refused to cooperate with DCS; and, on the day of the termination hearing, the mother tested positive for methamphetamine. In re Dustin M., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 191 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 28, 2020).

Termination of the father's parental rights based on persistence of conditions was proper because, in addition to violating his probation and fraternizing with drug users, the father testified that he had been unable to secure appropriate housing or employment; he tested positive for methamphetamine on the day of the termination hearing; and it was not likely that the father would take steps to remedy those conditions. In re Dustin M., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 191 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 28, 2020).

Clear and convincing evidence supported the trial court's termination of the mother's parental rights based on persistence of conditions because the month prior to trial the mother had moved to a long-term treatment facility, she had yet to address her issues with domestic violence, and she had barely begun to obtain a mental health assessment and drug and alcohol treatment. In re Boston G., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 194 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 29, 2020).

Conditions that led to the child's removal from the mother's legal custody persisted, preventing the child's safe return to her care, and there was little likelihood that these conditions would be remedied at an early date; the mother had incurred criminal charges and was incarcerated for a period of time, the grandparents testified that the mother had struggled with drug addiction for years, and the residence where she lived was leased to the father, who also had a drug problem, and the mother had no independent source of support. In re Eli H., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 206 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 8, 2020).

Child was removed from the mother's legal custody by court order dated January 30, 2017, following entry of a court order dated July 5, 2016 finding the child to be dependent and neglected; accordingly, the trial court erred in determining that this statutory ground was inapplicable. Because the child was removed from the mother's legal custody on January 30, 2017, the child had been removed for a period of more than six months by the time of the termination trial on May 14, 2019, in satisfaction of the statute's requirement. In re Eli H., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 206 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 8, 2020).

Evidence supported the juvenile court's finding that the parents'  rights should be terminated on the ground of persistence of conditions; the children had been previously adjudicated dependent and neglected and victims of severe child abuse, and the parents never accepted responsibility for their behavior and refused to acknowledge the severe child abuse, which showed that conditions that led to the children's removal still persisted and there was little likelihood that the conditions would be remedied in the near future. In re Shyanne H., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 292 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 25, 2020).

Conditions remained present that would likely cause the child to be subjected to further neglect and these conditions were likely to remain for the near future, making termination for persistence of conditions proper; whether the mother would be offered support from a rescue mission and whether she would be able to care for her son were precariously balanced on a slew of contingencies, plus she would need to maintain her sobriety. In re Raylan W., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 375 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 20, 2020).

Clear and convincing evidence supported the trial court's termination of the mother's parental rights based on persistence of conditions because the record showed that the mother was not equipped to deal with the child's health needs, as she had difficulty understanding those needs and taking directions from medical professionals. The mother was unable to answer basic questions about the child's medical needs and history. In re Katrina S., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 398 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 3, 2020).

Termination based on persistent of ocnditions was proper because there was insufficient evidence to conclude that the parents conditions would be remedied at an early date, as the mother continued to use drugs and saw no issue with sharing an apartment with other drug users, the mother had a pending DUI charge and $3,500 of unpaid fees on her driver's license, and the parents'  difficulties in maintaining employment were caused in large part by their drug and criminal issues. In re A.V.N., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 406 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 10, 2020).

18. Abandonment.

Definition of abandoned child contained in § 36-1-102 by its express provisions applies only to an action or proceeding to declare a child to be an abandoned child and has not been extended to adoption proceeding. Ex parte Wolfenden, 49 Tenn. App. 1, 349 S.W.2d 713, 1959 Tenn. App. LEXIS 140 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1959), superseded by statute as stated in, Fykes v. State, — S.W.3d —, 1998 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 206 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998) , superseded by statute as stated in, Tennessee Baptist Children's Home v. Swanson (In re Swanson), 1998 Tenn. App. LEXIS 322 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 14, 1998), superseded by statute as stated in, Baker v. He (In re A.M.H.), — S.W.3d —, 2005 Tenn. App. LEXIS 736 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 23, 2005).

Issue of whether natural father had abandoned child was of vital importance in adoption proceeding and was an issue of fact to be determined by trial court. Ex parte Wolfenden, 49 Tenn. App. 1, 349 S.W.2d 713, 1959 Tenn. App. LEXIS 140 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1959), superseded by statute as stated in, Fykes v. State, — S.W.3d —, 1998 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 206 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998) , superseded by statute as stated in, Tennessee Baptist Children's Home v. Swanson (In re Swanson), 1998 Tenn. App. LEXIS 322 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 14, 1998), superseded by statute as stated in, Baker v. He (In re A.M.H.), — S.W.3d —, 2005 Tenn. App. LEXIS 736 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 23, 2005); Fancher v. Mann, 58 Tenn. App. 471, 432 S.W.2d 63, 1968 Tenn. App. LEXIS 309 (1968).

Abandonment to warrant a court in allowing an adoption over the protest of the natural parent must be unequivocal and the evidence clear and convincing. Ex parte Wolfenden, 49 Tenn. App. 1, 349 S.W.2d 713, 1959 Tenn. App. LEXIS 140 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1959), superseded by statute as stated in, Fykes v. State, — S.W.3d —, 1998 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 206 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998) , superseded by statute as stated in, Tennessee Baptist Children's Home v. Swanson (In re Swanson), 1998 Tenn. App. LEXIS 322 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 14, 1998), superseded by statute as stated in, Baker v. He (In re A.M.H.), — S.W.3d —, 2005 Tenn. App. LEXIS 736 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 23, 2005); Fancher v. Mann, 58 Tenn. App. 471, 432 S.W.2d 63, 1968 Tenn. App. LEXIS 309 (1968).

Abandonment imports any conduct on the part of the parent that evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child; however, it does not follow that the purpose may not be repented of and in proper cases all parental rights again acquired but when abandonment is shown to have existed it becomes a judicial question whether or not it has been terminated or can be consistently with the welfare of the child. Ex parte Wolfenden, 48 Tenn. App. 433, 348 S.W.2d 751, 1961 Tenn. App. LEXIS 85 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1961); Fancher v. Mann, 58 Tenn. App. 471, 432 S.W.2d 63, 1968 Tenn. App. LEXIS 309 (1968).

Abandonment by natural parents may be found only where, being given benefit of every controverted fact, such inference follows as a matter of law. Ex parte Wolfenden, 48 Tenn. App. 433, 348 S.W.2d 751, 1961 Tenn. App. LEXIS 85 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1961); Fancher v. Mann, 58 Tenn. App. 471, 432 S.W.2d 63, 1968 Tenn. App. LEXIS 309 (1968).

The ultimate question in an abandonment situation is whether there is clear and convincing evidence of an overall lack of any parental responsibility. A finding of a possible abandonment, or the lack of such a finding, on the part of one parent is not to be interpreted as conclusive on the other parent or the ultimate issue. Koivu v. Irwin, 721 S.W.2d 803, 1986 Tenn. App. LEXIS 3160 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986).

There is a distinction in the law between those cases where an abandonment is asked to be declared and those cases where not only is there an abandonment request, but also an adoption of the abandoned child. In the former situation, there is a statutory definition of abandonment, contained in § 36-1-102, while in the later, case law sets out the definition. Koivu v. Irwin, 721 S.W.2d 803, 1986 Tenn. App. LEXIS 3160 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986).

Mother abandoned child when she left the very young child alone at home, voluntarily surrendered custody to child's father, made no contribution to child's support and exercised no visitation after child went to live with father. Webb v. Wilson (In re Gordon), 980 S.W.2d 372, 1998 Tenn. App. LEXIS 188 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998), appeal denied, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 544 (Tenn. Oct. 5, 1998).

The definition found in T.C.A. § 36-1-102 of “willfully failed to support” and “willfully failed to make reasonable payments toward such child's support” is unconstitutional because it creates an irrebutable presumption that the failure to provide monetary support for the four months preceding the petition to terminate parental rights constitutes abandonment, irrespective of whether that failure was intentional. Tennessee Baptist Children's Homes, Inc. v. Swanson (In re Swanson), 2 S.W.3d 180, 1999 Tenn. LEXIS 475 (Tenn. 1999).

The effect of the decision in Tennessee Baptist Children's Homes, Inc. v. Swanson, 2 S.W.3d 180, 1999 Tenn. LEXIS 475 (Tenn. 1999), that T.C.A. § 36-1-102(1)(D) was unconstitutional was to restore the definition of abandonment as it existed before the 1995 amendment, with the element of intent intact. Menard v. Meeks (In re Menard), 29 S.W.3d 870, 2000 Tenn. App. LEXIS 129 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000).

Although the mother had made significant adjustments in her conduct and circumstances, the evidence supported the finding that termination of mother's rights was in the child's best interests because the mother was unemployed, unable to provide a home for the children or other support, and had not used any of the funds she received from a drug treatment program to provide her child with gifts or basic necessities. In re C.W.W., 37 S.W.3d 467, 2000 Tenn. App. LEXIS 327 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000).

In the definition of abandonment, T.C.A. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(i) uses the phrase “a proceeding or pleading to terminate parental rights” in the same statutory subsection where the legislature also uses the phrase “the petition for termination of parental rights or adoption”; read as a whole, T.C.A. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(i) requires that the willful failure to visit, support, or make reasonable payments toward the support of the child must occur in the four months immediately preceding the filing of the petition currently before the court. In re D.L.B., 118 S.W.3d 360, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 983 (Tenn. 2003).

Mother's failure to visit her minor children for the four months immediately preceding the filing of the termination petition constituted abandonment. In re S.Y., 121 S.W.3d 358, 2003 Tenn. App. LEXIS 130 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003).

Court erred by finding that a mother had willfully abandoned her children where the mother was indigent, and the state did not present any proof to the trial court that showed that the mother was able to financially support her children in any way and did not do so. State v. Stewart (In re L.J.C.), 124 S.W.3d 609, 2003 Tenn. App. LEXIS 515 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003), appeal denied, State Dep't of Child's Servs. v. Stewart (In re L.J.C.), — S.W.3d —, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 1288 (Tenn. 2003).

Trial court properly dismissed a petition to terminate parental rights, because the evidence did not establish that either parent intended to abandon a minor child. The evidence showed that the father paid child support, but was unaware of the child's residence; and the mother was unable to pay child support due to a loss of employment, but she attempted to contact the child shortly before the petition was filed. Means v. Ashby, 130 S.W.3d 48, 2003 Tenn. App. LEXIS 712 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 161 (Tenn. Mar. 1, 2004).

Record included no evidence that the department of children's services explained to the father that he was obligated to pay support, lest he lose all parental rights to his children; the permanency plans not only failed to state the father was obligated to pay child support, they, in fact, implied that he was not required to do so unless there was a court order of support, such that the father's failure to pay could not have been considered willful, and the termination of his parental rights on the ground of abandonment had to be reversed. State v. Calabretta (In re J.J.C.), 148 S.W.3d 919, 2004 Tenn. App. LEXIS 47 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004), appeal denied, In re J.J.C., — S.W.3d —, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 408 (Tenn. May 10, 2004).

Record did not support the juvenile court's implicit finding that the mother “willfully” failed to visit or support her two children during the four months preceding the filing of the joint termination petition as provided under the statutory definition of abandonment in T.C.A. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(i), because the mother was incarcerated during that four-month period and the fathers of the children refused to allow visitation at the prison. However, only one statutory ground was required to support termination of the mother's parental rights under T.C.A. § 36-1-113(g) and there was sufficient evidence to support the finding that the mother failed to support or visit her children in the four months before her incarceration, which constituted abandonment under T.C.A. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(i), and that the mother's conduct prior to her incarceration showed a wanton disregard for children's welfare, which also constituted abandonment under § 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv). In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d 838, 2005 Tenn. App. LEXIS 539 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005), appeal denied, In re A.M.S. v. Ferrell, — S.W.3d —, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 1020 (Tenn. 2005).

Court properly terminated a mother's parental rights on the grounds of abandonment where the mother made child support payments in November of 2004, but made no payments during the months of December of 2004, January of 2005, and February of 2005. In addition, the mother was required to return to the child support court to have that court reassess her child support obligations, and the mother never did so. Dep't of Children's Servs. v. S.M.D., 200 S.W.3d 184, 2006 Tenn. App. LEXIS 244 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006), appeal denied, State Dep't of Children's Servs. v. S.M.D., — S.W.3d —, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 634 (Tenn. 2006), appeal denied, In re D.J.D., — S.W.3d —, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 637 (Tenn. 2006).

Juvenile court did not err in terminating a father's parental rights based on abandonment pursuant to T.C.A. §§ 36-1-113(g)(1) and 36-1-102(1)(A)(i); the mother and her new husband had not prevented the father from visiting his child and, except for one call on his fourth birthday, the father failed to visit or contact the child from the age of two onwards, and the child was five at the time the petition to terminate the father's parental rights was filed. And, the court found that it would not have been in the child's best interest to go back and try to establish some sort of relationship with the father. In re F.R.R., 193 S.W.3d 528, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 334 (Tenn. 2006).

Evidence in this case did not support a finding that appellant parents intentionally abandoned their daughter; although the daughter had now been with appellees for more than seven years, six of the years elapsed after the parents'  first unsuccessful legal filing to regain custody. In re A.M.H., 215 S.W.3d 793, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 13 (Tenn. Jan. 23, 2007), rehearing denied, 215 S.W.3d 793, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 235 (Tenn. 2007), cert. denied, Baker v. Shao-Qiang He, — U.S.—, — S. Ct. —, — L. Ed. 2d —, 2007 U.S. LEXIS 8357 (U.S. June 25, 2007).

Court erred by failing to terminate a father's parental rights on the ground of abandonment because it was undisputed that the father did not visit or support the child during the four-month period leading up to the termination petition, and the father never sent financial support or gifts to the child. In re M.L.P., — S.W.3d —, 2008 Tenn. App. LEXIS 217 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 8, 2008), aff'd, 281 S.W.3d 387, 2009 Tenn. LEXIS 299 (Tenn. 2009).

Where father failed to support or make reasonable payments in support of his children for four months preceding filing of the petition to terminate parental rights, trial court did not err by terminating parental rights on the ground of abandonment under T.C.A. § 36-1-113; father was employed and received an inheritance during this time period, yet failed to make any efforts to provide support for his children. In re L.M.W., 275 S.W.3d 843, 2008 Tenn. App. LEXIS 512 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 3, 2008), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2008 Tenn. LEXIS 768 (Tenn. Oct. 6, 2008).

Mother's parental rights were properly terminated on ground of abandonment because she exhibited a wanton disregard for the welfare of her child, had 19 prior incarcerations, admitted to drug addiction problem to psychological examiner, and admitted that her mother was essentially taking care of and raising her child. State Dep't of Children's Servs. v. V.N., 279 S.W.3d 306, 2008 Tenn. App. LEXIS 645 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 27, 2008), appeal denied, State v. V.N., — S.W.3d —, 2009 Tenn. LEXIS 77 (Tenn. Jan. 16, 2009).

Termination of the mother's parental rights on the grounds of abandonment by failure to visit and failure to support was proper pursuant to T.C.A. §§ 36-1-102(1)(A)(i) and 36-1-113(g)(1) because the absence of a court order requiring the mother to pay support did not “excuse” her from her obligation to pay support for her child and the mother candidly acknowledged that she knew that she had an obligation to pay support but nevertheless failed to do so. Further, the mother had the ability to pay support during the determinative four-month period because she was employed for at least part of that time. Stephen v. Christy C., 384 S.W.3d 731, 2010 Tenn. App. LEXIS 727 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 22, 2010), appeal denied, In re Keri C., — S.W.3d —, 2011 Tenn. LEXIS 120 (Tenn. Feb. 17, 2011).

Termination of mother's parental rights was proper as: (1) the mother did not visit the child in the four months before the petition was filed; (2) the mother was not denied visitation by the child's foster mother; (3) the mother did not return to Tennessee where the child was living upon her release from prison; and (4) the mother did not pay the child support ordered by the court. In re A'mari B., 358 S.W.3d 204, 2011 Tenn. App. LEXIS 488 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2011), appeal denied, In re A'Mari B., — S.W.3d —, 2011 Tenn. LEXIS 1067 (Tenn. Nov. 14, 2011).

Mother's claim that her conduct did not exhibit a wanton disregard for a child's welfare was rejected as the mother's parental rights were terminated because she abandoned the child by willfully failing to support or visit during the four months immediately preceding the filing of the petition; T.C.A. § 36-1-102(l)(A)(iv) did not apply. In re A'mari B., 358 S.W.3d 204, 2011 Tenn. App. LEXIS 488 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2011), appeal denied, In re A'Mari B., — S.W.3d —, 2011 Tenn. LEXIS 1067 (Tenn. Nov. 14, 2011).

There was clear and convincing evidence that a father abandoned his children by willfully failing to visit them for a period of four consecutive months preceding the filing of the petition for termination of parental rights pursuant to T.C.A. § 36-1-113(g), despite the fact that there was an order in place that suspended the father's visitation rights; the father had no contact with the children for three years prior thereto, and he took no action to reinstate visitation or to maintain a relationship during that four-month period, such that his actions were deemed willful under T.C.A. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(i). In re Angela T., — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 112 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 23, 2012), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, In re Angela E., 402 S.W.3d 636, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 303 (Tenn. Mar. 13, 2013).

Although an amended petition for termination of a father's parental rights did not mention abandonment by willful failure to support pursuant to T.C.A. § 36-1-113(g), but both parties discussed the issue and provided proof thereon as if it had been alleged in the petition, the court considered the petition amended to include that ground pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 15.02. In re Angela T., — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 112 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 23, 2012), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, In re Angela E., 402 S.W.3d 636, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 303 (Tenn. Mar. 13, 2013).

Pursuant to T.C.A. § 36-1-102(1)(F), a father's payments of child support after an original petition to terminate his parental rights was filed was not considered for purposes of an abandonment analysis under T.C.A. § 36-1-113(g). In re Angela T., — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 112 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 23, 2012), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, In re Angela E., 402 S.W.3d 636, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 303 (Tenn. Mar. 13, 2013).

Clear and convincing evidence supported terminating a father's parental rights on grounds of abandonment for willful failure to visit because the father had visited the child, at most, two times, once in December 2010 and once in January 2011, prior to the filing of the termination petition in April 2012 and it was only after the petition was filed that the father attempted to see the child; the father's visitation after the petition was filed was, at best, token visitation. In re Jacobe M.J., 434 S.W.3d 565, 2013 Tenn. App. LEXIS 790 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 5, 2013), appeal denied, In re Jacobe J., — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 228 (Tenn. Mar. 5, 2014).

Clear and convincing evidence supported terminating a father's parental rights on grounds of abandonment by wanton disregard because the father, engaged in criminal behavior, had continued incarcerations, had unresolved substance abuse issues, failed to meet the child's material needs, and demonstrated a general a lack of concern towards the child. In re Jocilyn M.P., 435 S.W.3d 773, 2014 Tenn. App. LEXIS 24 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 24, 2014), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 248 (Tenn. Mar. 11, 2014).

Clear and convincing evidence supported terminating a father's parental rights on grounds of abandonment by willful failure to support because the father had an income of at least $ 2,867 during the relevant time, paid over $ 1,600 for pain management consultations and prescriptions, but paid no support despite being aware of his duty to support the child. In re Jocilyn M.P., 435 S.W.3d 773, 2014 Tenn. App. LEXIS 24 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 24, 2014), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 248 (Tenn. Mar. 11, 2014).

Evidence did not support a finding that the mother willfully or intentionally abandoned the child where the mother was actively pursuing litigation to regain custody of the child throughout the four-month period, and she was spending a substantial portion of her limited financial resources to do the things that the Tennessee Department of Children's Services and the juvenile court instructed her to do. In re Alysia S., 460 S.W.3d 536, 2014 Tenn. App. LEXIS 834 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 17, 2014), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 254 (Tenn. Mar. 16, 2015).

Clear and convincing evidence supported terminating a mother's parental rights on grounds of abandonment by wanton disregard because the mother refused to show concern for the eight-month-old child's physical health, specifically his nutritional health and weight, which demonstrated a broader pattern of conduct that rendered the mother unfit; the mother missed a recheck appointment after a pediatrician expressed concern about the child's low weight and poor growth rate. In re Jaden W., — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. App. LEXIS 856 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 26, 2014), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 280 (Tenn. Mar. 25, 2015).

Clear and convincing evidence supported terminating a father's parental rights on grounds of abandonment by wanton disregard because the father abused prescription pain and anxiety medications in the family home, had to “doctor shop” in order to obtain the medication, and nutritionally and medically neglected the eight-month-old child. In re Jaden W., — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. App. LEXIS 856 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 26, 2014), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 280 (Tenn. Mar. 25, 2015).

Department was required to offer proof of an order in which the child was adjudicated dependent and neglected, but despite indications that there was such a judicial finding, no adjudicatory order appeared of record; the grounds of abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home and the persistence of conditions that led to the child's removal were not established by clear and convincing evidence because of the absence of the necessary order, and because no grounds other than these two were alleged, the order terminating father's parental rights could not stand. In re R.L.M., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 41 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 29, 2015).

Trial court's finding that the father abandoned the child by displaying wanton disregard was supported by evidence that the father was incarcerated for the four-month period prior to the filing of the petition to terminate parental rights, remained incarcerated for the six months the petition was pending, and continued to engage in criminal activities. In re Robert C., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 58 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 3, 2015).

Termination based on abandonment by failure to establish a suitable home and lack of concern was supported by evidence that the father never maintained stable housing and displayed a lack of care of concern for the child, whom he never supported. In re Robert C., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 58 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 3, 2015).

Decision that a father abandoned his child by willful failure to visit was improper, as it is not at all clear from the record that the father failed to visit the child in the requisite time period; the record showed that the father, the mother, the father's girlfriend, and the child all lived together during the relevant time period. In re Jonathan F., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 79 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 20, 2015).

Evidence was insufficient to support termination of the father's parental rights for failure to support his children where the trial court did not expressly find that his failure to pay was willful and it did not make any findings regarding the father's income or earning capacity. In re K.M.K., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 92 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2015).

Evidence was insufficient to support termination of the father's parental rights for failure to provide a suitable home where there was no real evidence as to the condition of the father's residence, as the children were not removed from his home. In re K.M.K., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 92 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2015).

Clear and convincing evidence supported terminating a mother's and a father's parental rights on grounds of abandonment by failure to provide suitable housing because, despite myriad services, in-home counseling, and ample opportunity, there was a general lack of progress in the areas of housekeeping and personal hygiene, and the parents continued to struggle with basic parenting skills; the children's clothes smelled of urine and the parents were hoarders. In re Kim C., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 106 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 6, 2015).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was proper on the grounds of abandonment by willful failure to visit because she did not visit her son during the four month period prior to the filing of the termination petition; she had not seen the child for approximately 21 months; the problem of being arrested was one of the mother's own making as she was aware of the order of protection; even after the order of protection was dismissed, the mother never contacted the father about setting up supervised visitation in accordance with the parenting plan; she did not contact the facility that could provide supervised visitation; and she never filed a petition or motion with the divorce court to enforce the visitation schedule or to modify it. In re Noah B.B., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 115 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 12, 2015).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was improper on the grounds of abandonment by willful failure to support because the father and stepmother did not show that the mother had the capacity to provide support as they did not submit sufficient evidence of the mother's employment status during the relevant four-month period prior to filing the petition to terminate, the number of hours she worked, the duration of her employment, her rate of pay, or whether she had assets other than regular income that might contribute to the support of the child; and the record contained no evidence regarding the mother's financial means, expenses, or obligations during the relevant four month period. In re Noah B.B., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 115 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 12, 2015).

Father simply failed to remit any form of support for the children even when he was admittedly capable of working and actually employed at various times, and there was clear and convincing evidence to establish that he abandoned the children by willfully failing to remit child support before, during, and after the relevant time period and that a statutory ground existed for termination of the father's parental rights. In re Agustine R., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 120 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 17, 2015).

Evidence was insufficient to support the termination of the mother's parental rights for abandonment for failure to support where the testimony of the service worker did not show the mother's ability to prove support for her son during the applicable four month period. In re Malaki E., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 143 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 23, 2015).

Evidence was sufficient to support the termination of the mother's rights for failure to provide a suitable home where her whereabouts were unknown for several months even though she knew that her son was in the custody of Tennessee Department of Children's Services and she failed to visit him or advise the Department of her whereabouts. In re Malaki E., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 143 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 23, 2015).

Trial court erred by finding that the father's parental rights should not be terminated for willfully failing to support the child where there was no dispute that he paid no support to the child's mother, he was gainfully employed, and his substantial delay in failing to comply with a court order to provide insurance coverage for the child constituted token support. In re Brookelyn W., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 141 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 24, 2015).

Trial court erred by finding that the father's parental rights should not be terminated for willfully failing to visit the child where it was undisputed that he had no visitation with the child in the four months preceding the filing of the termination petition, there was no evidence that he was thwarted in any effort to visit the child by the mother, and he placed all the onus to schedule and facilitate visitation on the mother and the stepfather. In re Brookelyn W., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 141 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 24, 2015).

Evidence was sufficient to terminate the mother's parental rights to her children based on abandonment where in addition to having no face-to-face visits the mother conceded she had not sent gifts or cards or otherwise attempted any contact with the children during the relevant four-month period or in the years since the children left Kentucky. In re E.G.H., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 216 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 14, 2015), appeal denied, In re Elaina G. H., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 518 (Tenn. June 19, 2015).

It was not error to find a mother's visitation with the mother's child during a relevant period was “token,” for purposes of termination of parental rights, because (1) the mother visited only twice, (2) the mother's claim of lack of transportation was unavailing, and (3) the mother did not address the finding on appeal. In re Alexis B., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 220 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 14, 2015).

Clear and convincing evidence supported terminating a mother's parental rights on grounds of abandonment for willfully failing to support the children in the four months immediately preceding her incarceration because, inter alia, the mother conceded that she paid “little support” since the parties'  divorced and was paid “under the table” for cleaning houses; the mother was capable of working and offered no justifiable excuse for failing to maintain employment and pay child support. In re D.H.B., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 238 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 23, 2015).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was proper based on the ground of abandonment for failure to visit because the visitations that occurred were token at best; and the mother brought additional parties to the visitations rather than spending that time with the children focusing on bonding and spending one-on-one time with them. In re Addison B., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 328 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 13, 2015).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was proper based on the ground of abandonment by wanton disregard for the children's welfare because the mother abused illegal substances prior to her incarceration; and she failed to make even minimal efforts to maintain contact with the children or the Tennessee Department of Children's Services in order to work towards reunification with the children. In re Addison B., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 328 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 13, 2015).

For purposes of establishing abandonment by failure to pay child support, the relevant four-month period is October 14, 2013 through February 13, 2014, this latter date being the day before the filing of the petition. In re K.G.S., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 347 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 19, 2015).

Mother was aware of her child support obligations and she made some payments, but she was over $ 4,000 in arrears and the brief period she unintentionally worked without pay did not excuse her failure to pay support during the entire four-month period at issue, plus she did not resume making payments until months after the petition was pending; the mother willfully failed to pay child support and the trial court did not err in terminating her rights on the ground of abandonment by willful non-support. In re K.G.S., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 347 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 19, 2015).

Evidence indicated safety hazards and environmental issues with the mother's home, and her pattern of inviting manipulative and abusive men into her home and life was at the heart of the problem, and more than a year after the child was removed, the mother was no closer to being able to provide the child with a suitable home; the trial court did not err in terminating the mother's parental rights based on her failure to provide a suitable home. In re K.G.S., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 347 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 19, 2015).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was proper because she abandoned the child by willfully failing to support the child as she failed to pay child support; the fact that the mother provided food, clothing, and drinks during visits with her daughter constituted mere token support, which was not sufficient to preclude a finding of a willful failure to support; and she was aware of her duty to support the child, she had the ability to provide support, and she willfully failed to do so. In re Faith W., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 360 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 20, 2015).

Trial court did not err in terminating the father's parental rights, as the evidence did not preponderate against the findings in support of its determination that the father abandoned the child by exhibiting a wanton disregard for her welfare; the father engaged in sexual conduct with the child for years. In re T.L.G., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 369 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 26, 2015).

Termination of the father's parental rights based on willful abandonment was supported by evidence that the father's failure to visit was willful and of his own free will, as the father moved to Puerto Rico and made no effort to locate the children in order to visit them. In re Ariana S., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 394 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 28, 2015), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 705 (Tenn. Aug. 24, 2015).

Trial court erred in finding abandonment by failure to support, as the only proof in support of a finding that the father had the ability to pay was his testimony that he was employed six years earlier, which was not clear and convincing evidence of his ability to pay support in the four months proceeding his incarceration. In re Ariana S., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 394 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 28, 2015), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 705 (Tenn. Aug. 24, 2015).

Clear and convincing evidence supported terminating a father's parental rights on grounds of abandonment by wanton disregard for the welfare of the child prior to the father's incarceration because, inter alia, the father had a lengthy history of criminal conduct, repeated episodes of incarceration throughout the child's life, and abused prescription and non-prescription drugs; the father traded food stamps for drugs even though there was often very little food for the child to eat. In re William B., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 467 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 11, 2015).

During the relevant four-month period, the father visited the children only once, and one visit during a four-month period constitutes only token visitation, at best; the father had no excuse for failing to visit, his failure was willful, and the facts provided clear evidence that he abandoned his children. In re Bonnie L., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 477 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 12, 2015).

In this case, the petition was filed on February 7, 2014, and thus the relevant four-month period for abandonment purposes began on October 7, 2013 and ended on February 6, 2014. In re Bonnie L., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 477 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 12, 2015).

During the relevant four-month period, the father visited the children only once, and one visit during a four-month period constitutes only token visitation, at best; the father had no excuse for failing to visit, his failure was willful, and the facts provided clear evidence that he abandoned his children. In re Bonnie L., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 477 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 12, 2015).

In this case, the petition was filed on February 7, 2014, and thus the relevant four-month period for abandonment purposes began on October 7, 2013 and ended on February 6, 2014. In re Bonnie L., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 477 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 12, 2015).

Evidence clearly and convincingly supported a finding that the parents willfully abandoned their daughter by willfully failing to support her, as it showed that they never paid her primary residential parents any support despite having the capacity to do so. In re Makenzie L., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 480 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 17, 2015), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 860 (Tenn. Oct. 15, 2015).

Mother willfully failed to visit the child from March 2013 through September 2013, prior to her incarceration, and thus she had willfully failed to visit the child during the determinative four-month period immediately preceding the mother's incarceration prior to the filing of the termination petition and the trial court did not err in terminating the mother's parental rights based upon this statutory ground. In re Kayden H., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 493 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 23, 2015).

Evidence does not preponderate against the trial court's determination that the mother abandoned the child by willfully failing to support her during the determinative period prior to the mother's incarceration; she presented no evidence indicating that she had any conditions other than her addiction problems that prevented her from working, and she was capable of employment when not hindered by substance abuse and criminal activity, and termination was proper. In re Kayden H., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 493 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 23, 2015).

Mother willfully failed to visit the child from March 2013 through September 2013, prior to her incarceration, and thus she had willfully failed to visit the child during the determinative four-month period immediately preceding the mother's incarceration prior to the filing of the termination petition and the trial court did not err in terminating the mother's parental rights based upon this statutory ground. In re Kayden H., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 493 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 23, 2015).

Evidence does not preponderate against the trial court's determination that the mother abandoned the child by willfully failing to support her during the determinative period prior to the mother's incarceration; she presented no evidence indicating that she had any conditions other than her addiction problems that prevented her from working, and she was capable of employment when not hindered by substance abuse and criminal activity, and termination was proper. In re Kayden H., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 493 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 23, 2015).

Statutory ground of abandonment through failure to provide a suitable home was inapplicable to the father because the child resided with the mother prior to her exit from the home and the filing of the emergency petition for temporary custody. In re Jayden B.T., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 494 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 23, 2015), appeal denied, In re Jayden T., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 818 (Tenn. Sept. 25, 2015).

Trial court erred in finding that the father abandoned the child by willfully failing to visit him because the evidence was insufficient to support its finding that the father's visitation with the child during the statutorily determinative period was only token; the father visited the child on seven to eight occasions during the four-month determinative period. In re Jayden B.T., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 494 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 23, 2015), appeal denied, In re Jayden T., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 818 (Tenn. Sept. 25, 2015).

Statutory ground of abandonment through failure to provide a suitable home was inapplicable to the father because the child resided with the mother prior to her exit from the home and the filing of the emergency petition for temporary custody. In re Jayden B.T., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 494 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 23, 2015), appeal denied, In re Jayden T., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 818 (Tenn. Sept. 25, 2015).

Trial court erred in finding that the father abandoned the child by willfully failing to visit him because the evidence was insufficient to support its finding that the father's visitation with the child during the statutorily determinative period was only token; the father visited the child on seven to eight occasions during the four-month determinative period. In re Jayden B.T., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 494 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 23, 2015), appeal denied, In re Jayden T., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 818 (Tenn. Sept. 25, 2015).

Trial court properly found clear evidence of abandonment through willful failure to support, as the evidence was unclear whether one payment the father made was made within the determinative period, plus he was unable to show that he had paid any support during the relevant period other than one payment; one payment would, at most, have constituted mere token support. In re Destaney D., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 495 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 23, 2015).

Trial court did not err by terminating the father's parental rights to his son for abandonment where the evidence showed that the father did not visit his son during the relevant four-month period and his failure to do so was willful, despite the fact that he was living in a sober living facility during those months, because he was able to arrange visits and contact with individuals outside the facility but did not make such arrangements for his son. In re Gavin G., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 500 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 23, 2015).

Clear and convincing evidence supported terminating a mother's parental rights on grounds of abandonment by willful failure to visit because the mother had numerous opportunities to visit with the child but was a “no-show,” the mother did not visit or ask to visit the child for an appreciable time period, and on one occasion when the mother did visit the child, the mother appeared intoxicated and ended the visitation early. In re Serenity L., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 622 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 31, 2015).

Clear and convincing evidence supported terminating a mother's parental rights on grounds of abandonment by willful failure to support because the juvenile court set an order of child support, which was signed by the mother's attorney, but the mother never paid child support despite having a job for a period of time. In re Serenity L., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 622 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 31, 2015).

Clear and convincing evidence supported terminating a mother's parental rights on grounds of abandonment by wanton disregard because the mother engaged in drug use and abuse, including during the pregnancy, engaged in criminal activity, and was periodically incarcerated; the mother refused to tend to the child's physical, emotional, and medical conditions. In re Serenity L., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 622 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 31, 2015).

Clear and convincing evidence supported terminating a father's parental rights on grounds of abandonment by wanton disregard because the father reasonably suspected that he might be the child's biological father when he committed the offenses that resulted in his probation being revoked, and the father was written up during his incarceration for fighting after he was on notice that he might be the child's biological father. In re Serenity L., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 622 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 31, 2015).

Department elected not to defend the abandonment statutory ground for termination and had not presented an argument that the ground was tried by implied consent, and thus the finding regarding the ground of abandonment through failure to provide a suitable home was reversed. In re Alleyanna C., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 642 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 10, 2015).

For almost all of his life, the child's relationship with his mother had been built during scheduled visits, many of which she failed to attend, and the mother's claim of interference was unfounded, such that the trial court's finding that she abandoned the child through a willful failure to visit was not contrary to the preponderance of the evidence. In re L.J., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 696 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2015).

Mother paid approximately 10 percent of the amount owed that year, but still her failure to make progress during the two years the child was in foster care was outside the scope of the abandonment determination; it was unclear whether or not the payments were insignificant given the mother's means, if the Department of Children's Services expects a finding of a willful failure to support, it must put on evidence that clearly shows willfulness, a trial court cannot be left to speculate about this, and the trial court's finding that the mother abandoned the child through a willful failure to make payments was not supported. In re L.J., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 696 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2015).

Clear and convincing evidence supported terminating a mother's parental rights for abandonment, due to a willful failure to visit, because the evidence showed the mother did not make use of multiple opportunities to visit the children, showing willfulness. In re A.C.S., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 767 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 23, 2015).

Clear and convincing evidence did not support terminating a mother's parental rights for abandonment, due to a failure to support, because the trial court's findings were insufficient. In re A.C.S., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 767 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 23, 2015).

Clear and convincing evidence supported terminating a mother's parental rights for abandonment, due to a failure to establish a suitable home and lack of concern, because, in the four months preceding the filing of the termination petition, the mother did not have a stable residence and did not visit the children, and the mother's failure to arrive on time for the termination hearing showed a continued lack of concern for the children. In re A.C.S., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 767 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 23, 2015).

Clear and convincing evidence supported terminating a mother's parental rights for abandonment, due to a willful failure to visit, because the evidence showed the mother did not make use of multiple opportunities to visit the children, showing willfulness. In re A.C.S., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 767 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 23, 2015).

Clear and convincing evidence did not support terminating a mother's parental rights for abandonment, due to a failure to support, because the trial court's findings were insufficient. In re A.C.S., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 767 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 23, 2015).

Clear and convincing evidence supported terminating a mother's parental rights for abandonment, due to a failure to establish a suitable home and lack of concern, because, in the four months preceding the filing of the termination petition, the mother did not have a stable residence and did not visit the children, and the mother's failure to arrive on time for the termination hearing showed a continued lack of concern for the children. In re A.C.S., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 767 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 23, 2015).

Evidence preponderated against the trial court's findings that an unmarried parent failed to support the parent's children in the four months preceding the parent's incarceration because the evidence was undisputed that the parent did provide monetary support for the children during the relevant time period. Specifically, the parent's payment of $1,300, from the parent's income tax return, to the other parent during the four months preceding incarceration was more than a token amount, given the parent's means. In re Malina W., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 799 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 29, 2015).

Parent engaged in conduct prior to incarceration that exhibited a wanton disregard for the welfare of the parent's children, which constituted a ground for terminating the parental rights of the parent, because the parent admitted to being a drug addict who was at times “high” in the presence of the children. Furthermore, the parent admitted to probation violations for driving on a revoked license and various criminal charges. In re Malina W., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 799 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 29, 2015).

Evidence was not clear and convincing that an unmarried parent abandoned the parent's children by willfully failing to visit them because the parent did visit the children during the four months preceding the parent's incarceration, including overnight on a weekend, and apparently sought to continue visitation following an altercation with the other parent. In re Malina W., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 799 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 29, 2015).

Clear evidence supported the finding of abandonment by willful failure to visit; the mother willfully failed to comply with an order of the trial court, and her efforts to comply with conditions to have visitation reinstated with the child were too little, too late. In re Jaylah W., 486 S.W.3d 537, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 819 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 7, 2015), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 94 (Tenn. Feb. 1, 2016).

Taking the department's assertion as true that clear evidence did not exist as to certain abandonment grounds, the trial court's decision to terminate the mother's rights based on these grounds was reversed. In re Jaylah W., 486 S.W.3d 537, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 819 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 7, 2015), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 94 (Tenn. Feb. 1, 2016).

Four-month period for purposes of establishing abandonment by failure to visit and support was September 11, 2014 until January 11, 2015, the day before the petition was filed. In re Jaylah W., 486 S.W.3d 537, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 819 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 7, 2015), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 94 (Tenn. Feb. 1, 2016).

In the absence of appropriate findings and conclusions regarding the mother's payment of support, it could not be determined whether her failure to support the children was willful, and the decision to terminate her rights based on abandonment by willful failure to support was vacated. In re Jaylah W., 486 S.W.3d 537, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 819 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 7, 2015), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 94 (Tenn. Feb. 1, 2016).

Clear and convincing evidence supported a trial court's finding that a mother willfully abandoned her children by failing to support them because the mother was aware of her duty to pay support of $ 40 per week, there was no proof that the mother was unable to work or had a condition which necessitated her resignation, and providing diapers during visitation was a requirement of the permanency plan and did not satisfy the requirement to provide financial support. In re Nolan G., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 825 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 7, 2015).

Ground of abandonment by failure to establish a suitable home was met by clear and convincing evidence where it showed that the child was found to be dependent and neglected and was placed in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Children's Services, the father was incarcerated and his sentence would expire in 2017, and the caseworker testified that her attempts to gain information to establish a suitable home for the child was thwarted by her inability to keep in contact with the father and his mother. In re Abbigail C., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 856 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 21, 2015).

Trial court's termination of the father's parental rights based on abandonment due to incarceration was vacated where both the trial court and the father miscalculated the relevant four-month period and did not consider the four months immediately preceding the father's incarceration. In re Abbigail C., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 856 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 21, 2015).

Ground of abandonment by an incarcerated parent through wanton disregard was met by clear and convincing evidence based on the father's criminal history, his admitted drug abuse, and his neglect of the child while in his custody. In re Abbigail C., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 856 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 21, 2015).

Mother and step-father's petition seeking to terminate the parental rights of the father was properly denied because the evidence did not support the findings that the father's failure to visit the child or to pay child support were willful as he exercised regular visitation with the child for the first five years of her life, but the situation changed when the mother became engaged to the step-father as the mother took steps that made it much more difficult for the father to exercise visitation with the child, and she took unreasonable steps restricting his access to the child; she failed to provide the father with the mailing address where she and the child resided; and she interfered with the father's ability to pay child support. In re Kiara S., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 881 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 29, 2015), appeal dismissed, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 86 (Tenn. Jan. 28, 2016).

Termination of a father's parental rights based upon abandonment was proper because the father did not visit or contact the child within the four months preceding his incarceration, and the record did not reflect that the father seriously attempted to visit the child or that he was prevented from doing so. Additionally, the father had a laundry list of criminal offenses in conjunction with his lengthy history of drug abuse. In re Thomas T., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 907 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 16, 2015).

Evidence was sufficient to support the termination of the father's parental rights due to abandonment where the evidence provided by the child's mother, her new husband, and the father showed that he willfully failed to visit the child and he presented no proof he or his agent appeared at the meeting location in the four months preceding the filing of the termination of parental rights petition. In re Hope A., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 914 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 17, 2015).

Trial court erred in not finding that the father abandoned the child by willfully failing to support her where he never presented medical proof documenting a disability, he was unsuccessful in obtaining disability benefits and did not provide evidence of an inability to work during the relevant four-month period, and he spent the money he was given by his mother on pain medication and gave none to his child. In re Hope A., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 914 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 17, 2015).

Termination of a parent's parental rights to a minor child, on the ground of abandonment by willful failure to visit, was appropriate because the parent failed to visit the child during the four month period immediately preceding the filing of the petition to terminate the parent's rights and for adoption of the child. Although the parent filed a petition seeking visitation, when the parent alleged interference with visitation had occurred, the petition was dismissed for the parent's failure to advance the petition. In re B.C., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 964 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 11, 2015).

Trial court did not err in finding that grounds existed to terminate the father's parental rights to the children for abandonment by wanton disregard; the father was incarcerated at the time of the filing of the termination petition, and prior to that, he attacked two of the children and was found to have committed severe abuse, plus he attacked the mother with a baseball bat and had pleaded guilty to the offenses, which amounted to wanton disregard for the children's welfare. In re Kyah H., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 986 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 23, 2015).

During the determinative time period, the mother was unable to make reasonable efforts toward establishing a suitable home and department personnel were constrained in their efforts to assist her; the trial court's judgment regarding the abandonment ground was reversed. In re Aaliyah E., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 36 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 26, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 315 (Tenn. Apr. 22, 2016).

Clear and convincing evidence existed that the father abandoned the child through his conduct prior to incarceration by exhibiting wanton disregard for the child's welfare. In re Aaliyah E., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 36 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 26, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 315 (Tenn. Apr. 22, 2016).

Department made reasonable efforts to assist the father in obtaining a suitable home while he was able to make progress in that regard, but then he was incarcerated primarily due to his own choices, and he would not be eligible for parole until July 2016; the father was in no position at the time of trial to provide a suitable home for the child, and thus the father abandoned the child pursuant to the statutory ground of failure to provide a suitable home. In re Aaliyah E., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 36 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 26, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 315 (Tenn. Apr. 22, 2016).

Burden to prove abandonment by willful failure to support rests with the department; finding no clear evidence that the mother had the capacity to pay child support during the relevant four month period, the trial court's finding of abandonment for willful failure to support was vacated. In re Saliace P., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 37 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 26, 2016).

Termination was proper under the ground of abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home, given that the mother failed to make reasonable efforts to provide a suitable home and she demonstrated a lack of concern for the children to such a degree that it appeared unlikely that she would be able to provide a suitable home at an early date. In re Saliace P., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 37 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 26, 2016).

Termination of the father's parental rights for abandonment due to failure to support was supported by evidence that he had the means to provide support for the child but did not. In re Riley C., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 113 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 12, 2016).

Termination of the father's parental rights for abandonment due to failure to visit was supported by evidence that he made no attempts to restore visitation for more than seven months after the child's mother died, supporting a finding his failure was willful. In re Riley C., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 113 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 12, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support the termination of the mother's parental rights for abandonment where it showed that despite her having appropriate housing and a job, she failed to make child support payments since August 2014. In re A'leah M., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 136 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 23, 2016).

Clear and convincing evidence supported the juvenile court's decision to terminate the mother's parental rights for abandonment-willful failure to visit where it showed that she did not visit her child in person during the four-month period immediately preceding the date the petition to terminate was filed, she failed to submit to drug screens that were her only obstacle to visiting her child, and her telephone conversations with the four-year-old child were not a sufficient substitute for in-person visitation. In re Candace J., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 186 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 11, 2016).

Clear and convincing evidence supported the juvenile court's decision to terminate the mother's parental rights for abandonment-failure to provide a suitable home where the Tennessee Department of Children's Services made reasonable efforts to assist her in establishing a suitable home for the child and the mother made no effort to establish a suitable home. In re Candace J., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 186 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 11, 2016).

Even though the trial court erred by terminating the father's parental rights based on abandonment for willfully failing to pay child support, because the record showed that he was receiving Supplemental Security Income and then Social Security Disability Income benefits, the trial court did not err by terminating his rights for failure to provide a suitable home, because the record showed that none of the homes he lived in was suitable for the child. In re Benjamin A., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 187 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 14, 2016).

Trial court did not err in declining to terminate the father's parental rights based on willful failure to visit where the evidence showed that he had substantial contact with the child within the four-month period, including that they were together, along with the mother, every day during July 2013 and they lived together the first week of August 2013. In re Ashton B., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 188 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 15, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 512 (Tenn. July 6, 2016).

Trial court did not err in declining to terminate the father's parental rights based on willful failure to support where the record contained some evidence that the father and his family were supporting the child during the early weeks of the four-month period and the record did not contain sufficient evidence regarding the father's expenses. In re Ashton B., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 188 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 15, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 512 (Tenn. July 6, 2016).

Termination of a parental rights was appropriate because clear and convincing evidence supported a trial court's finding of abandonment by wanton disregard because the parent's pre-incarceration criminal activity and drug use constituted wanton disregard for the welfare of the parent's child. In re Tristan B., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 301 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 2, 2016).

Termination of the father's rights for abandonment by wanton disregard was affirmed; in part, the father's own testimony at trial reflected his lengthy history of drug abuse and criminal activity. In re Aniston M., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 309 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 5, 2016).

While the father did not pay child support during the relevant four-month period, the evidence was insufficient to support termination of his parental rights based on abandonment, because the Department of Children's Services failed to prove that the father had the capacity to support the child but did not do so. In re Jimmy B., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 321 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 11, 2016).

Juvenile court erred in finding the ground of wanton disregard to terminate the father's parental rights, when the father was incarcerated for less than 24 hours. In re Kaitlin W., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 332 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 16, 2016).

Given that the mother engaged in meaningful visitation in the four months preceding her incarceration, and the trial court failed to identify the four-month period that applied to the father, the application of this abandonment ground was reversed because there was no clear evidence that either parent willfully failed to visit during the requisite time period. In re Charles K., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 344 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 19, 2016).

Record supported the finding of abandonment based upon the father's conduct prior to incarceration, which demonstrated a wanton disregard for the children's welfare, as he engaged in domestic violence against the mother in the presence of the children, and he failed to address his mental health and substance abuse issues. In re Charles K., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 344 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 19, 2016).

While the mother was commended for taking the first step toward rehabilitation by renouncing her substance abuse, her extensive criminal activity and substance abuse issues could not be ignored; she also disregarded the children's welfare by leaving them with the father, who assaulted her and others, and thus there was clear evidence to establish that the mother engaged in conduct prior to incarceration that exhibited a wanton disregard for the welfare of the children, and termination was proper. In re Charles K., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 344 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 19, 2016).

Plan requirements were reasonable and related to remedying the conditions that led to the children's removal from the home, and the mother met some requirements, but termination was based on her failure to not meet other requirements; the application of this statutory ground was reversed because the mother diligently completed the requirements to the best of her ability and there was no clear evidence of substantial noncompliance. In re Charles K., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 344 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 19, 2016).

Because there was no dispute that Mother was incarcerated at the time of the filing of the termination petition, either of two abandonment definitions contained in the statute could apply in this case; although the latter definition was not pleaded, as the parties discussed the mother's visitation at length and neither party objected to evidence in this regard, it was considered whether the mother willfully failed to visit in the four months prior to her incarceration. In re Addison P., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 345 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 20, 2016).

Trial court was not entitled to terminate the mother's parental rights on the ground of abandonment by an incarcerated parent through wanton disregard because the termination petition did not sufficiently allege this ground, it was not referenced in the trial court's prior order, and it was not tried by implied consent. In re Addison P., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 345 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 20, 2016).

While the trial court did find that the mother did not visit the child, there was no finding that the mother's failure to do so was willful; because no other grounds were found by the trial court and sustained on appeal, the case was remanded for the trial court to address the willfulness issue. In re Addison P., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 345 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 20, 2016).

Statute governing abandonment is clear that different time periods apply to different definitions. In re Navada N., 498 S.W.3d 579, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 367 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 23, 2016).

For the termination ground of abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home, this ground is inapplicable when the child is not removed from the parent at issue's home before being placed with the child services department; in this case, the child could not have been removed from the father's home where he never provided one in the first instance, and thus this ground did not apply based on the dearth of evidence to establish whether the child was ever removed from the father's home. In re Navada N., 498 S.W.3d 579, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 367 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 23, 2016).

Department made reasonable efforts to assist the mother in establishing a suitable home for the children in continually maintaining contact with the mother, providing her with drug screens, and assisting her with coordinating drug and alcohol assessments; while the mother's home was neat and clean, she had been unable to stop her cocaine abuse, and thus while she established a proper physical living location, her home was not free of drugs, plus she was currently incarcerated and could not provide a home at all for the children. In re Navada N., 498 S.W.3d 579, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 367 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 23, 2016).

Because of the grave consequences and high stakes in termination cases, trial courts should endeavor to be as specific as possible in their orders and treat each definition of abandonment as a separate ground for which specific findings are required In re Navada N., 498 S.W.3d 579, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 367 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 23, 2016).

For abandonment by willful failure to support as to the mother, the trial court's oral ruling included detailed factual findings, but none appeared or were incorporated into the written order; mere legal conclusions did not fulfill the trial court's obligations and were not sufficient to satisfy the directive of the statute, such that termination as to this ground was vacated. In re Navada N., 498 S.W.3d 579, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 367 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 23, 2016).

For abandonment by willful failure to visit as to the father, despite the incorrect date as stated in the order, the ground was considered as the trial court's error of five days regarding the correct calculation of the four-month period was not determinative. In re Navada N., 498 S.W.3d 579, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 367 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 23, 2016).

Trial court's determination that the father, for abandonment purposes, exhibited a wanton disregard for the child was vacated; despite the abundance of evidence concerning the father's drug use, charges of selling drugs, fleeing, and assault, probation violations, and transient lifestyle, the trial court's order omitted reference to any factual findings that would support a finding of wanton disregard, in clear violation of the statute. In re Navada N., 498 S.W.3d 579, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 367 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 23, 2016).

Statute did not direct the court to review whether the father did what he could to maintain a relationship with the child while in prison; what was to be determined was whether, in the four-months preceding his incarceration, the father attempted to visit the child, and yet he made no attempt to present himself to the trial court in an effort to regain visitation, and thus he willfully failed to visit the child prior to his incarceration. In re Navada N., 498 S.W.3d 579, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 367 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 23, 2016).

Termination of parental rights for failure to remedy persistent conditions was proper because there was clear and convincing evidence that the conditions that led to the children's removal a year earlier still persisted and prevented their safe return, there was little likelihood that these conditions would be remedied at an early date so that the children could be safely returned in the near future, and continuation of the parent-child relationship diminished the children's chances of early integration into a safe, stable, and permanent home. In re Jayden L., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 357 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 31, 2016).

Termination of parental rights was appropriate because clear and convincing evidence established that the parent abandoned their child by willfully failing to remit child support before, during, and after the relevant time period. Although the parent had limited education and difficulty in securing employment, the parent never paid child support, other than token support or small gifts, throughout the entirety of the child's lifetime even when the parent was admittedly capable of working and actually employed at various times. In re Hailey S., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 380 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 31, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 156 (Tenn. Mar. 1, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support the termination of the mother's parental rights to her son based on abandonment where her monthly visits for four months were so infrequent and of such short duration that they constituted token visitation. The mother admitted she spent the majority of her time during the visits with her daughter instead of her son and only a limited relationship had been established between them. In re Jayvien O., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 394 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 7, 2016).

Juvenile court did not err in terminating a mother's parental rights because the finding that the mother failed to visit her child in the four months preceding the filing of the petition was supported by clear and convincing evidence; the mother gave no testimony upon which to conclude that her failure to visit the child during that period was not willful. In re Milli L., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 396 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 7, 2016).

Abandonment by failure to support as a ground for termination was not shown by clear and convincing evidence because there was no clear testimony as to when and where the mother was employed. In re Milli L., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 396 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 7, 2016).

Because the juvenile court did not mention the failure to provide a suitable home in its oral ruling, the fact that they were included in the order did not reflect the juvenile court's own deliberation and decision that termination would be granted on the ground of abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home. In re Milli L., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 396 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 7, 2016).

Termination of parental rights based upon abandonment, by a parent failing to provide a suitable home, was appropriate because the parent was unlikely to be able to provide a suitable home at an early date. The parent's then home was unlivable as a water pipe was broken, and the parent had only begun addressing the parent's mental health issues, had no plans to stop taking narcotic pain medication, and showed a lack of cooperation with Tennessee Department of Children's Services. In re Bailey W., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 408 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 10, 2016).

Trial court erred by terminating parental rights based on a parent having abandoned the parent's children, as the parent failed to provide any child support while the children were in foster care, because the evidence was less than clear and convincing that the parent willfully failed to support the children as the parent, during the applicable four month period, was unemployed, apparently lived with various friends and family members, did not have a high school education, and was out of the work force during marriage. In re Bailey W., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 408 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 10, 2016).

There was testimony that the mother failed to follow through on referrals for employment, that she was receiving financial support from her father, and that she was able to secure sufficient funds to be released on bond after being arrested for failure to support; she had the capacity to work or otherwise acquire funds to pay support in the four months preceding the filing of the petition and she consciously did not do so, and this failure was willful. In re Quadavon H., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 416 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 16, 2016).

Abandonment by failure to secure a suitable home was not established, since an order adjudicating the children as dependent and neglected was not found. In re Aiden R., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 420 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 23, 2016).

There was clear evidence that the mother abandoned her children by exhibiting wanton disregard for their welfare, as she was incarcerated for the requisite time period, she had an extensive history of criminal behavior, she was addicted to opiates for years, and her probation had been revoked for multiple violations. In re Aiden R., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 420 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 23, 2016).

There was clear and convincing evidence that the father abandoned the child by failing to visit her, as he had no excuse for not visiting the child from the time she was less than two years old until the hearings and the father was free and able to make such visits. In re Tianna B., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 471 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 6, 2016).

All evidence indicated that the parents failed to make necessary changes to ensure that their home was sanitary, and the findings that their parental rights could be terminated on the ground of abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home; photographs were admitted into evidence showing, in part, bugs throughout the house, animal feces and urine on the floors and beds, beer cans scattered throughout, and continuing clutter in the home. In re Derrick J., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 477 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 8, 2016).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was proper as the mother abandoned the child by willfully failing to visit because, even giving the mother credit for the one visit in June, which was rescheduled, and accepting the mother's testimony that she visited in March, her visitation during the four month period preceding the filing of the petition to terminate parental rights could not be viewed as regular visitation; and the mother gave no explanation as to why she did not, or could not, have visited more often during the relevant time period. In re Bryson C., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 498 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 18, 2016).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was improper as the mother did not abandon the child by willfully failing to pay child support as the evidence failed to show that the mother had the ability to pay child support during the relevant four month period preceding the filing of the petition to terminate parental rights. In re Bryson C., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 498 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 18, 2016).

Clear and convincing evidence supported terminating a mother's parental rights due to abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home because the mother (1) did not make use of the Department of Children's Services'  efforts to assist the mother, (2) had no stable home, and (3) continued to abuse drugs and alcohol. In re S.D.D., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 532 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 26, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support the termination of the father's parental rights based on abandonment where it showed that he was sentenced to 130 months in prison on February 25, 2013 and since the child's birth the father engaged in violent behavior, abused drugs, and committed acts that resulted in a lengthy prison sentence. In re A.E.T., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 537 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 26, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support the termination of the mother's parental rights based on abandonment by willful failure to visit where the children's great-grandmother's actions did not prevent the mother visiting the children and the mother failed to visit the children for four months preceding her incarceration. In re Selena L., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 538 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 27, 2016).

Evidence was insufficient to support the termination of the mother's parental rights based on abandonment by willful failure to support where the job opportunity she turned down did not occur during or prior to the relevant four months such that it would affect her income during the determinative period. In re Selena L., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 538 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 27, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support the termination of the mother's parental rights based on abandonment by wanton disregard for the welfare of the children where she was involved in criminal activity and used illegal drugs. In re Selena L., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 538 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 27, 2016).

In a termination of parental rights case, the trial court did not err in finding that the mother had abandoned the child because the mother had been convicted of driving under the influence, reckless endangerment, sale of counterfeit controlled substance, delivery of Schedule III controlled substance, shoplifting, and contributing to the delinquency of a minor, and had pled guilty to two violations of probation, which constituted the kind of conduct that exhibited wanton disregard for the welfare of a child. In re Kendra P., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 544 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 28, 2016).

Although the trial court erred in terminating the father's parental rights based on abandonment by wanton disregard and for failure to support the children, termination of the father's parental rights was proper based on abandonment by willfully failing to visit the children because the father did not visit the children during the four months immediately preceding the filing of the petition to terminate the father's rights; and the father was released from prison in late 2014, but up until the time of the hearing on November 19, 2015, he had not visited with the children a single time. In re Keith W., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 557 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 3, 2016).

Trial court erred in terminating the father's parental rights based on abandonment by wanton disregard because the father was released from incarceration in October 2014, and the petition to terminate was not filed until June 2015; and the father was not incarcerated at the time of the filing of the petition or during the four months immediately preceding the institution of the action. In re Keith W., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 557 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 3, 2016).

Grandmother failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the mother abandoned her son by willfully failing to support him where during the four-month period preceding the filing of the petition the mother made seven child support payments and her support was more than token, given that she was released from jail three weeks before the beginning of the four-month period, she was pregnant, and she lacked a driver's license or transportation. In re Ryder R., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 570 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 5, 2016).

Evidence did not clearly and convincingly support a finding that the mother's failure to visit the child was willful, as required for a finding of abandonment, because the mother's supervised visits were “canceled” when the paternal grandmother's husband became ill, the day of visitation got changed, and the mother was unable to attend due to her work schedule. In re Jaiden C., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 591 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 18, 2016).

Termination of parental rights based on abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home was supported by evidence that the father was incarcerated when the child was taken into custody and, thus, was not then providing a suitable home, failed to provide a suitable home once released, and the mother remained incarcerated and unable to provide a home for the child. In re D.R.S., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 631 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 29, 2016).

Termination of parental rights based on abandonment by an incarcerated parent was supported by evidence that the father violated probation and the mother continued to use drugs and alcohol, resulting in their incarceration. In re D.R.S., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 631 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 29, 2016).

Juvenile court properly terminated a father's parental rights on the ground of abandonment because he was incarcerated during the four months preceding the filing of the petition for termination, and he willfully failed to visit and support the child; the father had only seen the child once since the child was born, and despite being ordered to do so, the father never paid any child support until several months after the filing of the termination petition. In re Braxton R., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 660 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 2, 2016).

Trial court did not err in terminating the mother's parental rights on the ground of abandonment by wanton disregard, given that the mother's conduct prior to her incarceration constituted wanton disregard for the welfare of the child; the mother had been in and out of jail, abused drugs, and did not show any effort to provide the child with the stability he needed. In re Zachariah G., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 665 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 8, 2016).

Abandonment by failure to support was proven against the mother by clear and convincing evidence, given that she owed over $ 6,000 in child support arrears, yet she earned between $ 200 - $ 450 each week cleaning houses after the children were removed from the home, and she was aware of her duty to provide support and yet made no attempt to pay more than token support and had no justifiable excuse for not providing support. In re C.C., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 701 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 22, 2016).

Termination of the mother's rights was proper on the ground of abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home; the prior adjudication of dependency and neglect criterion was met in this case, the mother lacked a suitable home for the children, as it did not have sufficient bedrooms, and the mother's ability to set proper boundaries for the children, who had significant mental issues and had been abused in the past, was questionable. In re Jasmine B., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 709 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 22, 2016).

Father's failure to visit the child was willful, and thus termination of the father's rights was proper; the father was not incarcerated for the first year of the child's life, he claimed his addictions prevented him from visiting the child, and it appeared that the father's failure to visit was a conscious choice, not that he was prevented from doing so. In re Elizabeth D., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 706 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 23, 2016).

Juvenile court erred in finding that a mother abandoned her children because although there was sufficient evidence that the mother willfully failed to visit her children, the time frame only accounted for two months of the relevant time period; there was sufficient evidence that the mother attempted to visit the children on two occasions, and there was not evidence that she was offered assistance or alternative transportation. In re Jason S., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 715 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 23, 2016).

Terminating a father's parental rights for abandonment due to a willful failure to visit was proper because (1) the father's visitation was token, as, during the four months before the termination petition was filed, the father visited only twice, leaving after one hour of a two-hour visit, and the father's phone calls did not try to establish a healthy parental relationship, and (2) the failure to visit was willful, as, despite knowing more than token visitation was required and an ability to visit, the father did not attempt more visitation. In re Jose L., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 814 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 31, 2016).

Evidence did not support a finding that a father abandoned the father's children by failing to provide a suitable home because the father obtained sufficient housing during the relevant time period and maintained appropriate housing through trial. Moreover, there was insufficient evidence that the father's relationship with mother, who had a problem with the use of drugs, rendered the father's home unsuitable. In re Jeramyah H., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 819 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 31, 2016).

Termination of a father's parental rights was appropriate because the Tennessee Department of Childrens Services proved by clear and convincing evidence that the father abandoned the father's children by willful failure to support them in that the father's failure to pay child support during the relevant four-month period before the filing of the petition for termination was willful, as the father was consistently employed during the period and did not argue inability to pay. Furthermore, termination was in the children's best interest. In re Jeramyah H., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 819 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 31, 2016).

Trial court properly found that the father abandoned the child based on his engagement in conduct prior to incarceration that exhibited a wanton disregard for the welfare of the child; since the child was approximately 21 months old, the father had engaged in a pattern of criminal activity, which has culminated in a prison sentence of approximately 15 years. In re Maddox C., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 860 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 9, 2016).

Ground of failure to provide a suitable home was proven by clear and convincing evidence where the mother's home could not be deemed suitable so long as she refused to cooperate fully regarding her abuse of prescription drugs. In re Dillon E., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 872 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 15, 2016).

Clear and convincing evidence supported terminating a father's parental rights on grounds of abandonment because the father, even before the father's incarceration, both willfully failed to visit, as the father failed to fulfill the father's responsibilities under the permanency plan to prove to the court the father was ready to resume visitation once it was suspended, and engaged in conduct exhibiting a wanton disregard for the welfare of the child. In re Mac L., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 883 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 22, 2016).

Clear and convincing evidence showed that a father had abandoned a child for willful failure to visit and failure to support where, despite knowing of the child, he made no effort to provide support, visit the child, or establish a relationship, and he had not initiated contact with the child after meeting with the state agency. In re M.E.T., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 899 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 29, 2016), appeal denied, In re Miguel T., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 152 (Tenn. Mar. 3, 2017).

Termination for abandonment for failure to provide a suitable home was reversed, given that the trial court impermissibly based its decision in part on facts outside of the applicable four-month period defined in the statute, which would have been four months following the removal of the children from the mother's home. In re Eddie F., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 924 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 2, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 158 (Tenn. Mar. 2, 2017).

Clear and convincing evidence supported terminating a mother's parental rights due to a failure to establish a suitable home and lack of concern because the mother did not engage in gainful employment, resulting in the mother continuing to reside with the person accused of abusing her child. In re Casey C., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 966 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 19, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 80 (Tenn. Jan. 25, 2017).

Termination of the mother's parental rights based on abandonment by failure to visit was supported by evidence that the mother failed to visit the child during the four months preceding the filing of the termination petition and that the mother's failure to willful, as her relapse into drug use did not incapacitate her or make her physically unable to keep up with responsibilities and she admitted she avoided contact with the Department of Children's Services because she feared the caseworker would learn of her continued drug use. In re Lynx C., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 977 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 20, 2016).

Termination of the mother's parental rights based on abandonment by failure to support was not supported by evidence, as the record lacked any evidence related to the mother's wages, expenses, or other financial responsibilities. In re Lynx C., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 977 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 20, 2016).

Father's parental rights could not be terminated based on abandonment by willful failure to visit, as the evidence showed that the father attempted to visit the child but could not get visits arranged. In re Heaven J., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 979 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 22, 2016).

Father's parental rights could not be terminated based on abandonment by willful failure to support, as the record contained no evidence regarding his income, ability to work, or expenses during the relevant time period. In re Heaven J., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 979 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 22, 2016).

Termination of the mother's parental rights based on abandonment due to conduct amount to a wanton disregard for the children's welfare and nonsupport was supported by evidence the mother had been incarcerated on several occasions for using drugs and the mother had the ability to provide support but failed to due to her decision to use drugs and not seek employment as a result of the drug use. In re Sophie O., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 985 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 23, 2016).

Trial court properly found that the father's failure to support could not be considered willful because he made sincere efforts to provide support, yet his efforts were rebuffed by the mother; therefore, the mother failed to provide grounds to terminate the father's parental rights to the child. In re Neylan H., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 997 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 29, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 175 (Tenn. Mar. 14, 2017).

Grounds to terminate the father's parental rights for abandonment by wanton disregard had been proven by clear and convincing evidence, as he was incarcerated at the time the termination petition was filed, and he engaged in conduct prior to his incarceration that exhibited a wanton disregard for the welfare of the child, which included kidnapping his girlfriend with the child in the car. In re Cheyanna B., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 1000 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 29, 2016).

Trial court erred in termination the mother's parental rights based on abandonment due to wanton disregard, because the evidence of the mother's pre-incarceration conduct, her show of care and concern for the children, effort to establish a meaningful relationship with them, and her completion of tasks on the permanency plan, did not support such a finding. In re Renaldo M., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 1003 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 30, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 90 (Tenn. Feb. 7, 2017).

Record was devoid of any evidence that the department made any efforts related to housing during the relevant time period, and thus there was no clear evidence to establish that the mother abandoned the children by failing to provide a suitable home, and termination based on this ground was reversed. In re Yariel S., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 6, 2017).

Trial court did not err in terminating a mother's parental rights to her children because the evidence clearly and convincingly established that mother abandoned the children; the mother failed to maintain housing, missed appointments for drug and alcohol assessments, failed to maintain legal means of income, failed or refused drug screens, and missed psychological evaluations. In re A.B., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 14 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 11, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's determination that the mother willfully failed to visit her children because she failed to visit them during the relevant four-month period and the record showed that the Department of Children's Services tried to schedule drug screens in an effort to facilitate the mother's visitation but that she failed to communicate with them. In re S.P., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 41 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 25, 2017).

There was clear and convincing evidence to support the termination of the parents'  rights for failing to provide a suitable home because it showed that their case manager showed them the hazards in the home that needed to be remedied, the parents made little or no attempt to provide their children with a suitable home, and both parents continued to struggle with substance abuse and ran afoul of the law. In re Kayla B., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 66 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 1, 2017).

There was not clear and convincing evidence to support the termination of the parents'  rights for abandonment under because, although they did not pay child support during the relevant time period, there was no evidence of either parent's income or available resources during the four months immediately preceding their incarcerations. In re Kayla B., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 66 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 1, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support the termination of the father's rights for the willful failure to visit because it was undisputed that the father had not seen the children for approximately six years and there was no indication in the record that he had made any attempt to seek visitation. In re Anna B., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 70 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 1, 2017).

Mother's extensive criminal record and involvement in a domestic altercation with a paramour who lived in her home and had previously been arrested for domestic assault supported termination of the mother's rights based on abandonment by exhibiting wanton disregard for the child's welfare. In re John J., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 108 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 17, 2017).

Evidence that the mother knew she had to support her child but failed to do so because her alcohol and drug addiction, supported the termination of her parental rights based on abandonment by wilfully failing to support the child. In re John J., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 108 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 17, 2017).

Evidence that the mother engaged in no more than token visitation within the meaning of T.C.A. § 36-1-102(1)(C), supported the termination of her parental rights based on abandonment by wilfully failing to visit. In re John J., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 108 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 17, 2017).

Evidence was not clear and convincing as to the ground of a mother's willful failure to visit because the children's grandfather kept detailed logs on the mother's visits, and it was evidence from the logs that the mother visited 43 or 44 times; even if the mother visited 17 times in the relevant four-month period preceding the filing of the petition, as initially asserted, the court of appeals would be hard-pressed to deem that token visitation. In re Karissa, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 134 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2017), appeal denied, In re Karissa V., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 330 (Tenn. May 24, 2017).

Evidence relevant to the trial court's findings on the issue of a father's alleged willful failure to visit did not rise to the level of clear and convincing because the children's grandfather testified that the father did visit many times. In re Karissa, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 134 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2017), appeal denied, In re Karissa V., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 330 (Tenn. May 24, 2017).

Termination of the father's rights for failure to establish a suitable home was inappropriate where the evidence showed that the children lived in a different home from the father at the time they were placed in foster care. In re Promise A., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 177 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 16, 2017).

Termination of parental rights on the ground of abandonment by failure to visit and provide support was appropriate where his past visits and admission that he was not prevented from visiting showed that his failure to visit was willful, and he had not paid any child support despite the fact that he was working. In re Promise A., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 177 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 16, 2017).

Termination of the mother's parental rights on the ground of abandonment by willful failure to visit was proper; the last meaningful contact the mother had with the child was in 2014, and although she knew where appellees and the child lived, she made no attempt to see the child or communicate with him. In re Charles A., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 194 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 24, 2017).

Clear and convincing evidence supported the finding that a father's parental rights were to be terminated on the ground of abandonment by willful failure to pay support because the evidence did not preponderate against the trial court's findings that the father had the ability to provide support, but chose not to provide support, during the four months preceding the filing of the petition for termination of parental rights. In re Ja'miya T., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 206 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 28, 2017).

Trial court properly denied grandparents'  petition to terminate parental rights because the grandparents failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence a willful failure to visit; the parents visited their child numerous times despite the restrictions imposed by the grandparents, and regardless of whether the grandparents were well-intentioned, their actions had the effect of significantly interfering with the parents'  efforts to visit the child. In re Sophia P., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 207 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 30, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 394 (Tenn. June 13, 2017).

Trial court properly denied grandparents'  petition to terminate parental rights because the grandparents failed to prove willful failure to support by clear and convincing evidence; the record contained no evidence regarding the father's income, work record, or expenses during the pivotal time frame, and the limited evidence did not demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the mother had the capacity to provide support and lacked a justifiable excuse for failing to do so. In re Sophia P., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 207 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 30, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 394 (Tenn. June 13, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support the termination of the father's parental rights based on abandonment because it showed that he failed to engage in anything more than token visitation with the child for several months, while he was able to work and held numerous jobs, any money he made went to purchase drugs rather than to pay support for the child, and he engaged in criminal behavior to support his drug habit which led to his incarceration. In re Kira G., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 246 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 18, 2017).

In the absence of any proof as to the father's income and expenses during either the four-month time period before his alleged incarceration, or during the four-month time period immediately preceding the filing of the petition to terminate his parental rights, the Department of Children's Services failed to show, by clear and convincing proof, that the father abandoned the child by willful failure to provide support. In re Damien G. M., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 282 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 3, 2017).

When determining whether to terminate a father's parental rights based on abandonment due to willful failure to support the child, the absence of a court order to support the child did not show the father did not willfully fail to support the child because the father had a duty to support the child without such an order. In re Jeremiah N., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 283 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 2, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 432 (Tenn. July 21, 2017).

It was error to terminate an incarcerated father's parental rights based on abandonment due to the father's willful failure to support the child because it was not found that the father had an ability to support the child during the four months before the father's incarceration. In re Jeremiah N., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 283 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 2, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 432 (Tenn. July 21, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's termination of the mother's parental rights based on her willful failure to visit the child because it showed that she attempted to set up visitation only once in the relevant four-month period, the father never refused visitation prior to the mother's theft charge, and the main reason the mother did not attempt to satisfy the conditions to regain visitation was because she could not pass the required drug screens. In re Addison P., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 289 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 8, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's termination of the father's parental rights based on abandonment because it showed that he failed to establish a suitable home, he was incarcerated, and he engaged in illegal drug use. In re Travis H., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 290 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 5, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 468 (Tenn. July 31, 2017).

Evidence was insufficient to support the trial court's termination of the father's parental rights based on his willful failure to support the child because the trial court utilized an inappropriate four-month period, as it did not piece together the father's periods of non-incarceration prior to the filing of the termination petition. In re Travis H., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 290 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 5, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 468 (Tenn. July 31, 2017).

Father had been incarcerated since September 18, 2015, and the proceedings to terminate his parental rights were instituted on January 12, 2016, putting his incarceration squarely within the definition of T.C.A. § 36-1-102; his conduct met the definition of abandonment by an incarcerated parent, and termination under T.C.A. § 36-1-113 was proper. In re Wesley P., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 301 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 12, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 400 (Tenn. July 6, 2017).

Termination of a mother's parental rights to the mother's child on the grounds of abandonment was appropriate because the mother wilfully failed to visit and to support the child in the four consecutive months preceding the filing of the petition for termination. In re Colby L., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 352 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 24, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 527 (Tenn. Aug. 15, 2017).

Abandonment was a ground for terminating a father's parental rights because clear and convincing evidence showed that the father engaged in conduct prior to the father's incarceration that evidenced a wanton disregard for the welfare of the father's children as the father engaged in criminal conduct, substance abuse, reckless behavior, and was incarcerated at times. Because of this conduct and behavior, the father was unable to establish a stable father-child relationship with the father's children. In re Casyn B., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 361 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 26, 2017).

Termination of the parents'  rights based on abandonment was supported by evidence that the parents failed to provide a suitable home, where the mother's mental health issues were addressed and the father participated in services to adequately parent the child. In re Lena G., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 358 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 26, 2017).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was improper based on the ground of abandonment by willfully failing to make reasonable support payments because the record included a child support payment summary showing that the mother made child support payments for January through March 2016; thus, the mother did not fail to support the children during the four months prior to prior to the Tennessee Department of Children's Services filing its petition to terminate her parental rights. In re Skylar P., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 417 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 21, 2017).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was improper based on the ground of abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home because the Tennessee Department of Children's Services (DCS) did not make reasonable efforts to assist the mother with housing during the relevant statutory period as DCS only provided the mother with a list of housing resources and discussing with her the options she could afford; and, despite knowing that the mother had mental health issues, DCS did not look into the nature of the mother's mental health issues or considered how her mental health issues might have contributed to her substance abuse or inability to secure stable housing. In re Skylar P., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 417 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 21, 2017).

Trial court erred in terminating the mother's parental rights based on abandonment by failure to establish a suitable home, because the Tennessee Department of Children's Services did not meet its burden to show that it exercised reasonable efforts to assist the mother in obtaining suitable housing. In re Rylan G., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 429 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 28, 2017).

Because the mother was not incarcerated during the applicable time period, there was not clear and convincing evidence to support termination of her rights due to abandonment by an incarcerated parent. In re C.J.B., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 436 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 28, 2017), appeal denied, In re Chaz B., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 624 (Tenn. Sept. 22, 2017).

Termination of the father's parental rights was improper on the grounds of substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan and willful failure to visit, but proper on the ground of wanton disregard based on abandonment by an incarcerated parent because the mother testified to the abuse perpetrated by the father upon her while she was pregnant with the child; and the abuse described by the mother was of an especially cruel nature and directly imperiled the child as the father pushed her down some steps and she landed directly on her stomach, beat her with extension cords, and held her hostage at the home without allowing her to seek medical attention for her injuries and medical attention to assist with the birth of the child. In re Kenya H., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 452 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 5, 2017).

Termination of the father's parental rights was improper on the ground of abandonment based on willful failure to visit because, while the father's alleged excuses did indeed appear poor, there was insufficient evidence in the record upon which to make a clear and convincing determination as to the father's intent not to visit; and not all of the possible reasons for the father's failure to visit rose to the level of a willful failure to visit. In re Kenya H., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 452 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 5, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support the termination of the father's parental rights based on abandonment due to willful failure to support because it showed that the father made no monetary contributions to the children's support during the determinative period, Christmas gifts he provided in 2014 constituted no more than token support, he did not claim to have legitimate, extraordinary expenses that would have prevented him from sending payments, and he acknowledged that he was capable of earning income when not incarcerated but instead chose to spend his discretionary income on drugs. In re Braxton M., 531 S.W.3d 708, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 454 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 5, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 639 (Tenn. Sept. 29, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support the termination of the father's parental rights based on abandonment due to willful failure to visit because he did not dispute that he failed to visit the children or speak with them during the determinative period and admitted that his last visit with the children occurred in 2014. In re Braxton M., 531 S.W.3d 708, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 454 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 5, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 639 (Tenn. Sept. 29, 2017).

Termination of a mother's parental rights for abandonment by wanton disregard was improper where although she had many chances to become an appropriate parent, she repeatedly made poor decisions without regard for the child's safety. In re Zane W., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 453 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 6, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 636 (Tenn. Sept. 25, 2017).

Termination of the father's rights based on abandonment by wanton disregard under T.C.A. §§ 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv), 36-1-113 was proper; while he exhibited the ability to provide support, his criminal behavior, probation violations, substance abuse, and incarcerations exhibited a wanton disregard for the child's welfare. In re Quintin S., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 480 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 13, 2017).

Termination of the mother's rights based on abandonment by wanton disregard under T.C.A. §§ 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv), 36-1-113 was proper; the mother's chronic drug abuse and inability to maintain sobriety, plus her criminal behavior and unstable housing exhibited a wanton disregard for the welfare of her children. In re Quintin S., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 480 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 13, 2017).

Father was allowed a total of 16 hours of visitation during the four-month period, but he used only two, plus his failure to participate in more than token visitation was willful; he said he had problems with transportation because he lost his license, and while he could ride with others, he had problems paying for gas, and thus the father abandoned the children by a willful failure to visit pursuant to T.C.A. §§ 36-1-102(1)(A)(i), 36-1-113. In re Quintin S., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 480 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 13, 2017).

Because the mother and father were incarcerated during the four months prior to the department's filing of the petition for termination, the ground of abandonment by failure to visit, for purposes of T.C.A. §§ 36-1-102, 36-1-113, was not established. In re Quintin S., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 480 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 13, 2017).

Ground of abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home requires a final dependency and neglect order under T.C.A. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(ii); there was no final dependency and neglect order regarding the father because his adjudication as dependent and neglected was combined with the termination of parental rights trial, the department conceded this termination ground with respect to the mother's and father's rights to the child, and this was reversed, for purposes of T.C.A. § 36-1-113. In re Quintin S., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 480 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 13, 2017).

Trial court erred in finding that a mother abandoned her child by willfully failing to support the child because the Tennessee Department of Children's Services (DCS) offered no proof as to the mother's income or assets to establish an ability to pay; the proof suggested that the mother did not have the ability to pay because she was incarcerated at the time DCS filed the petition, and she testified to not having a job during the relevant four-month period and relying on friends for her need. In re Mya V., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 511 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 28, 2017).

Trial court did not err in terminating the father's parental rights on the ground of abandonment by willful failure to visit, as the father did not visit the child during the relevant four-month period, and, contrary to the father's contention, he did not appear to have made substantial efforts during the determinative period such that he was actively trying to maintain visitation with the child. In re Savanna C., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 592 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2017).

Father's parental rights were properly terminated on the ground of abandonment by willful failure to pay visit pursuant to T.C.A. §§ 36-1-113(g)(1), 36-1-102(1)(A), given that he willfully abandoned the children by failing to visit them, his engagement at the children's doctor's appointments was sporadic and amounted to no more than token visitation, and he failed to make any effort to spend time with the children until after the petition to terminate his rights was filed. In re Miracle M., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 593 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 30, 2017), appeal dismissed, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 845 (Tenn. Nov. 30, 2017).

Trial court erred in finding clear and convincing evidence that a father's failure to visit was willful because weekly phone calls with the children did not constitute token visits; a Tennessee Department of Children's Services representative testified that during the relevant four-month time period, the father talked with the children about once a week, and the father visited them several times before he moved to another state. In re Billy T.W., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 641 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 27, 2017).

Clear and convincing evidence to support the determination that the Tennessee Department of Children's Services proved abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home as to both a mother and a father because they exhibited such a lack of concern for the welfare of the children that it appeared unlikely they would be able to provide them with a suitable home at an early date; both parents had continuing problems with drug use and criminal activity failed to cooperate with the Department. In re Billy T.W., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 641 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 27, 2017).

Finding of abandonment based on willful failure to support was not supported by the record, as the mother and step-father failed to present evidence to establish that the father willfully failed to support the child during the relevant period. In re Preston L., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 649 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 27, 2017).

Finding of abandonment based on wanton disregard was not supported by the record, because, despite the father's incarceration, there was no evidence of a broader pattern of conduct that rendered the father unfit or posed a risk of substantial harm to the welfare of the child. In re Preston L., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 649 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 27, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support the termination of the parents'  rights based on abandonment because it showed that they had not remitted support in the two years prior to the filing of the termination petition despite periods of employment and food and gifts provided were token support. In re Brennen T., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 681 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 23, 2017).

Evidence was insufficient to support the termination of the parents'  rights based on abandonment because the record showed that the mother attended all but three or four visits during the entirety of the child's residency with his foster parents and the record was unclear as to the amount of visits the father missed. In re Brennen T., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 681 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 23, 2017).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was proper on grounds of abandonment, given that she failed to provide a suitable home despite reasonable efforts by the Department of Children's Services. In re B.L., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 846 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 1, 2017).

Trial court erred by concluding that clear and convincing evidence existed to show that a mother willfully failed to support her children during the relevant four-month time period because the mother had just completed drug rehabilitation and was attempting to care for her newborn baby; the mother was unemployed for approximately two of the relevant four months, and she lived with several different members of her husband's family. In re T.W., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 847 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 17, 2017).

Trial court erred in terminating a mother's parental rights on the ground of abandonment because evidence in the record did not provide clear and convincing proof that the mother's failure to visit the children was willful; an Alabama court order effectively prohibited the mother from visiting the children because she was not entitled to supervised visitation under that order, and she had an affirmative duty not to visit her children until she satisfied the conditions of the order. In re T.W., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 847 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 17, 2017).

Trial court erred in terminating a mother's parental rights on the ground of abandonment because the mother did not have the capacity to visit the children during the relevant time period; the mother testified, without contradiction, that she did not own a vehicle during the relevant four months, and the trial court did not make a specific finding rejecting that testimony. In re T.W., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 847 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 17, 2017).

Termination of a father's parental rights was appropriate because the father abandoned the father's child as the father engaged in criminal behaviour and was incarcerated when the termination petition was filed, and exhibited behavior that displayed a wanton disregard for the welfare of the child prior to the father's incarceration. Neighbors testified that the child was not being fed regularly and that the father played dangerously with the child, while a case worker testified that the conditions in the home were unsafe for any child. In re Kandace D., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 8, 2018).

Tennessee Department of Children's Services (DCS) failed to carry its burden of establishing abandonment by willful failure to support, as DCS presented no evidence of the mother's income or available resources during the relevant time period. In re Nashay B., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 10, 2018).

Trial court erred in terminating a father's parental rights on the ground of abandonment, by the father demonstrating a wanton disregard for the child's welfare, because the Tennessee Department of Children's Services failed to offer clear and convincing evidence that the father who was incarcerated knew of the child's existence when the father was engaging in the criminal behavior that demonstrated wanton disregard. In re Michael O., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 42 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 26, 2018).

Chancery court erred in terminating a mother's parental rights because the evidence was less than clear and convincing that the mother willfully failed to support her children; the child's father and stepmother presented no evidence of the mother's income or available resources during the four months preceding the filing of the termination petition, and thus, there was no basis to find that the mother's failure to pay child support was willful. In re Alivia F., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 48 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 30, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support the termination of the father's parental rights based on abandonment through willful failure to visit and support the child because he never appeared for any medical appointments despite the child's foster mother providing him with notice of all medical appointments, and he never provided financially for the child during the four months prior to his incarceration. In re Catherine J., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 54 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 30, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support the termination of the father's parental rights based on abandonment through wanton disregard because his testimony established that he was aware of the child's existence when the committed aggravated burglary, he never attempted to contact, visit, or develop a relationship with the child, and he never financially supported the child. In re Catherine J., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 54 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 30, 2018).

Clear and convincing evidence established that a mother abandoned a child by failing to provide a suitable home because the mother failed to maintain housing long enough for the Tennessee Department of Children's Services to confirm the mother's residency and its suitability and was without housing at the time of the hearing. The mother's failure to properly address the mother's living situation demonstrated a lack of concern for the child such that it appeared unlikely that the mother was able to provide a suitable home at an early date. In re Jabari B., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 60 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 2, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support the termination of the father's parental rights based on abandonment because he last saw his child in January 2017 in what the court considered to be a token visit and he did not visit the child during the four-month period immediately preceding the filing of the petition for termination. In re Taya K., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 67 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 6, 2018).

Clear and convincing evidence supported the termination of the parents'  rights for abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home because it showed that the parents had continued to reside in an inappropriate home filled with lice, fleas, dog and cat feces, with insufficient food stores and they did not properly supervise the children. In re Mack E., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 71 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 9, 2018).

Termination of a father's parental rights to the father's child on the ground of abandonment by willful failure to support was inappropriate because the Tennessee Department of Children's Services did not meet its burden to show that the father had the ability to pay support so as to establish that the father's failure to do so was willful. In re Victoria H., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 108 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2018).

Evidence was insufficient to support the termination of the mother's parental rights based on willful failure to support because, given the frequency of the mother's incarcerations, her periods of non-incarceration were not as often as it would take to get a job. In re Homer, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 126 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 9, 2018).

Trial court erred in terminating a mother's parental rights due to persistent conditions and abandonment by failure to establish a suitable home where the children had not been removed from her home as a result of a petition filed in the juvenile court, and there was no order removing the children from the home based on dependency, neglect, or abuse. In re Veronica T., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 147 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 21, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support the termination of the mother's parental rights based on abandonment by failing to establish a suitable home because she moved in and out of friends'  homes for a couple of years, she moved in with a boyfriend who was a registered sex offender, and her mental illness rendered her unable to provide a stable, safe home for her children. In re Roderick R., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 192 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 11, 2018).

Mother's visits were more than perfunctory and were frequent enough to establish more than minimum contact with the child, and thus the mother's visitation did not meet the definition of token visitation, and the grandparents therefore failed to prove that the mother willfully failed to visit her child for abandonment purposes; the visitation was sufficient to continue the bond with the child, and the mother consistently maintained that she had problems obtaining reliable transportation. In re Addalyne S., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 225 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 26, 2018).

Ground for termination of the mother's parental rights of abandonment by failure to visit was not clearly and convincingly established because there was no evidence that the mother was unwilling to meet conditions in order to visit the child but that she was unable to do so. Upon leaving jail the mother's first call was to request permission to visit her child, petitioners, who had custody of the child, would not take the child to Georgia, the mother would not be permitted to take the child out of the home for overnight visitation, and petitioners advised the mother that she could not stay overnight with them. In re Emma S., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 237 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2018).

Clear and convincing evidence supported the termination of the mother's parental rights based on abandonment by failure to establish a suitable home because it showed that the Tennessee Department of Children's Services provided her with a multitude of services in four months following the removal of the child, she made little to no effort to free herself from drugs, and she only sporadically attended counseling. The evidence showed that because the mother continued to associate with the father, despite the domestic violence he inflicted on her, it was unlikely that she would be able to provide a suitable home for the child at an early date. In re Isaiah B., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 247 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 8, 2018).

Trial court erred in terminating a mother's parental rights to her children because the record did not clearly and convincingly establish that her failure to pay support was willful; while there was some testimony with respect to the mother's income and expenses, the testimony did not establish what her income and expenses were during the period at issue, and as a consequence, there was not clear and convincing proof from which to conclude she had the capacity to pay support during that period. In re Emily J., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 254 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 9, 2018).

Trial court erred in terminating the mother's parental rights based on abandonment by willful failure to visit as the father and his current wife interfered with the mother's right to see her children or to communicate with them because the father did not have the right to unilaterally stop the mother's visitation, and he did not have the authority to convert the mother's unsupervised visitation to supervised visitation and then to use her failure to visit as a ground to terminate her parental rights; although the mother conceded that she abused alcohol during her marriage, she testified that she no longer drank and the children's testimony corroborated her statement; and the father blocked the mother from calling his cellular telephone. In re Justin P., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 273 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 17, 2018).

Evidence found by the trial court to be credible amounted to clear and convincing evidence that a mother's parental rights had to terminated because the mother had abandoned the child by failing to support the child; after the mother was released from prison, she sent no gifts, clothing, or food for the child, and she was able-bodied and working. In re D.T., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 292 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 24, 2018).

Evidence found by the trial court amounted to clear and convincing evidence to terminate a mother's parental rights for willful abandonment by failure to visit because the mother was permitted to contact the child by mail and had not done so; the mother continually failed to attempt to contact and/or visit her child, despite being aware of her duty to do so. In re D.T., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 292 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 24, 2018).

Evidence was insufficient to support the termination of mother's parental rights based on abandonment for failure to support because there was no proof introduced of the mother's income, employment (or willful unemployment), or expenses during the relevant time period from which the court could conclude that she had the capacity to pay support. In re Ethan B., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 303 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 30, 2018).

Evidence was insufficient to support the termination of mother's parental rights based on abandonment for failure to visit because the record did not contain clear and convincing proof that the mother's failure to visit was willful, as there was no proof as to the mother's capacity to visit or lack of an excuse for not visiting during the relevant period. In re Ethan B., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 303 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 30, 2018).

Although the mother was unsuccessful in establishing a suitable home for the children, the department failed to show that it made reasonable efforts during the relevant four-month periods to assist her in obtaining suitable housing, which was required to prevail on the ground of abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home, and the judgment was reversed in this regard. In re Mc, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 332 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 20, 2018).

Evidence was clear and convincing that the mother's conduct exhibited a wanton disregard for the children's welfare and termination proper; two of the children tested positive for drugs, another child was born with drugs in her system, the mother relapsed twice after treatment, and she was incarcerated at different times during the pendency of this action. In re Mc, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 332 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 20, 2018).

Termination of the father's parental rights was proper based on abandonment through wanton disregard of the child's welfare because the father had been involved in criminal activity and been convicted of some offenses after the child's birth; he had not consistently financially supported the child; and he had not paid child support since April 2015. In re Amynn K., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 343 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 20, 2018).

Evidence that parents domestic violence issues were ongoing and they had not been forthcoming with their drug use despite the reasonable efforts made by the Department of Children's Services, supported the termination of their parental rights based on abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home. In re Damon B., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 352 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 25, 2018).

Because the Tennessee Department of Children's Services removed the children from the home of the mother's friends, not the mother's home, neither the statutory ground of abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home nor persistence conditions applied. In re Keilyn O., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 362 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 28, 2018).

Evidence was less than clear and convincing that a mother abandoned her children by willful failure to visit during the four months preceding the filing of the petition because there was no indication that the Tennessee Department of Children's services specifically offered to help with transportation to visit the children; in lieu of visits, the mother talked with her children on a daily basis. In re Keilyn O., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 362 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 28, 2018).

Clear and convincing evidence supported termination of a mother's parental rights on the ground of abandonment by willful failure to support because both the permanency plan and the adjudicatory hearing order addressed the mother's obligation to pay child support; the mother and her attorney were present at the adjudicatory hearing, and after the hearing, the family service worker explained both her obligation to support her children and the consequences of failure to do so. In re Keilyn O., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 362 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 28, 2018).

Termination of a father's parental rights on the ground of willful failure to support was affirmed given the father's contradictory explanations, and the evidence that his reason for not sending money was an ever-present hostility toward the potential adoptive parents rather than a lack of means. In re Apex R., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 366 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 29, 2018).

Termination of a father's parental rights on the ground of willful failure to visit was affirmed given the unfavorable credibility determination of the father, and the communication problems with the potential adoptive parents were of the father's making. In re Apex R., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 366 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 29, 2018).

Clear and convincing evidence showed a wanton disregard for the child's well-being given the mother's criminal convictions, probation violations, removal of other children due to domestic violence, and her remaining in a relationship with the abusive father In re Chase L., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 368 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 29, 2018).

Trial court's determination that a mother willfully failed to visit her child during the relevant period was affirmed given the implicit finding that testimony that the foster parent had not significantly interfered with the mother's efforts to develop a relationship was more credible. In re Chase L., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 368 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 29, 2018).

Father exhibited wanton disregard for the father's children because the father, before and after the birth of the children, repeatedly committed felonies and misdemeanors, and used alcohol and drugs without regard for the children's welfare, which resulted in the father's incarceration and inability to take care of the children when they were removed from their mother's custody and placed in foster care. The pattern of the father's conduct prior to incarceration exhibited disregard for the children and the father's relationship with them. In re Arianna Y., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 377 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 2, 2018).

Trial court properly terminated a father's parental rights on the ground of abandonment by willful failure to visit because the father spent less than six hours with the child over a period of thirty-two months; the record clearly and convincingly establishes that the father's visits were no more than token in that they were of such an infrequent nature or of such short duration as to merely establish minimal or insubstantial contact with the child. In re D.N., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 383 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 3, 2018).

Termination of the father's parental rights was proper based on abandonment by an incarcerated parent by wanton disregard, abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home, and substantial noncompliance with the reasonable requirements of the permanency plan because the father raped the mother while the children were present in the home, he threatened the mother and the children with physical harm, and the children were aware of his behaviors; it did not appear that the father could provide the children with a safe home, free of domestic violence, and sexually deviant behavior; and the requirement that he address the psychological and emotional abuse issues was of paramount importance, but he did nothing toward that goal. In re R.S., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 427 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 24, 2018).

Evidence was insufficient to terminate the father's parental rights for abandonment based on nonsupport because while it showed that he was employment and paid $639 in child support in the relevant four month period, the father did not testify to his rent obligations or other living expenses. In re Leroy H., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 446 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 3, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support termination of the father's parental rights for failure to provide a suitable home because his denial of ever using drugs, despite a wealth of evidence to the contrary, combined with his history of domestic violence and his failure to obtain stable housing, proved the ground by clear and convincing evidence. In re Leroy H., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 446 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 3, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support termination of the father's parental rights for willful failure to visit because he admitted at trial that he had not seen the child for two years, he did not allege that he was prevented from seeing the child, and he admitted that he had not asked for visitation since 2014. In re Leroy H., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 446 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 3, 2018).

Abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home was proven with evidence of the mother's multiple, unfounded accusations of sexual abuse at school. In re McKenzi W., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 454 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 9, 2018).

Termination of the mother's parental rights based on abandonment for failure to visit was not improper, as the mother was provided a clearly defined pathway to obtain visitation, but refuse to obtain a psychological evaluation from a licensed clinical psychologist so that she could visit the child. In re McKenzi W., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 454 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 9, 2018).

Clear and convincing evidence showed that grounds existed to terminate a father's parental rights for abandonment by wanton disregard because the father–through repeated incarcerations, criminal behavior, a probation violation, and substance abuse issues as shown in the father's criminal convictions–showed a pattern of conduct that posed a risk of substantial harm to the welfare of the child. In re Ava H., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 482 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 20, 2018).

Clear and convincing evidence supported the trial court's termination of a mother's parental rights on the ground of abandonment by willful failure to support because she made no financial contribution to the support of the child, and the child's great aunt testified that the mother never provided any gifts or necessaries for the child during the relevant time period; the fact that the other was not under court order to provide support did not, ipso facto, relieve her of that obligation. In re Taylor C., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 490 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 21, 2018).

Evidence clearly and convincingly supported the trial court's termination of a mother's parental rights on the ground of abandonment by willful failure to visit because despite the fact that the mother was granted the opportunity for supervised visits, she did not seek visitation until after she was served with the petition to terminate her parental rights; there was no evidence that the mother was thwarted or otherwise precluded from seeking visitation. In re Taylor C., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 490 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 21, 2018).

Father's conduct evidenced wanton disregard for the well-being of the child and constituted grounds to terminate his parental rights; the father was aware of his duty to visit, yet he had willfully not visited the child in the four month period prior to his incarceration, plus he had been incarcerated within four months of the petition to terminate being filed, and thus he engaged in drug abuse and criminal activities rather than making progress towards reunifying with his child. In re Charles T., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 501 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 28, 2018).

Termination of the mother's rights based on abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home for the child was proper, given that the child was removed from the mother's custody when the child was found dependent and neglected, and the department made reasonable efforts to assist the mother by, in part, developing permanency plans, providing visitation, and making referrals for the mother's alcohol and drug treatment, yet she had failed to address her mental health issues, maintain stable employment, and maintain stable housing. In re Alexis C., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 499 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 28, 2018).

Denial of a petition to terminate an incarcerated father's parental rights was appropriate because there was not clear and convincing evidence to establish that the father willfully failed to visit and to support during the relevant time period as the father was unaware of the mother's whereabouts during that time period due to the mother's moving and changing the mother's phone number and the failure of the mother's family to respond to the father's inquiries. Further, the evidence did not establish the father's ability to remit support. In re Ella P., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 512 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 30, 2018).

Evidence clearly and convincingly established the ground of abandonment for termination of the mother's parental rights because the mother had a long criminal history and was incarcerated for the four months preceding the filing of the petition for termination, and her conduct prior to incarceration exhibited a wanton disregard for the welfare of the child; the mother was serving a ten-year sentence and had other charges pending, and the child tested positive for illegal drugs at birth. In re Gabriel C., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 516 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 30, 2018).

Termination of the mother's rights was proper under the ground of abandonment by willful failure to visit; the mother only attended two of seven scheduled visits, her lack of visitation was due to her refusal to submit to required drug screens, and her two visits were deemed mere token visitation. In re Romeo T., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 514 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2018).

There was clear evidence to support termination of the mother's parental rights on the ground of abandonment by wanton disregard; the mother's criminal record was prolific, particularly troubling was the manufacture of methamphetamine and endangerment charges because the child was in the house where the drugs were being made, and the mother admitted to taking drugs during her pregnancy despite the fact that she had lost custody of her first child by the same action. In re Hayden L, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 515 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2018).

Despite the mother's admission that she understood that she was required to petition the trial court to lift the no contact order so she could visit the child, she did not do so; as she had no contact with the child since June 2016 and she had taken no overt steps to petition the trial court to set aside or modify the no contact order, there was clear evidence that she abandoned the child by willful failure to visit. In re Hayden L, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 515 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2018).

Clear and convincing evidence was proven of grounds to terminate a father's parental rights to the father's children for abandonment by wanton disregard because the father was incarcerated when the petition to terminate the father's parental rights was filed and the father engaged in behavior during the relevant time period that violated the father's probation resulting in the father again being incarcerated. In re Sophie O., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 521 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 4, 2018).

Trial court's finding of abandonment was vacated and findings of fact concerning the willfulness of the alleged abandonment were required on remand; the trial court did not consider the mother's arguments that her failure to visit was not willful because she was in a rehabilitation program, and her attempts to visit via Skype were denied. In re Abagail D., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 536 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 13, 2018).

Clear and convincing evidence supported the decision to terminate a mother's parental rights on the ground of abandonment for failure to provide a suitable home because, during the four months immediately following removal of the children, the mother failed to make reasonable efforts to provide a suitable home and the mother's evasive, and sometimes deceitful, behavior demonstrated a lack of concern for the children. In re T.R., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 542 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 17, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support the termination of the father's parental rights based on abandonment by failure to support because based on his testimony that he was gainfully employed during the all but two weeks of the pertinent period and that his paycheck was enough to cover his children's expenses, he had the ability to pay support. In re Jaylan W., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 546 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 18, 2018).

Evidence was insufficient to support the termination of the father's parental rights based on abandonment by failure to visit because it established that he attempted to arrange rides to visit the child and had 10 telephone calls and an in-person visit with the child. In re Jaylan W., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 546 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 18, 2018).

Finding of abandonment for failure to visit was vacated and the case was remanded for consideration of the mother's willfulness in light of the father's denial of visitation and the parties'  course of dealing in scheduling visitation with minimal notice since the time of the divorce; the mother visited four times during the pertinent time period, but visitation was interrupted on one date and two additional requests for visitation were denied, and the mother's attempt to visit should still be considered in assessing the willfulness of her failure to visit.  — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 745 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 19, 2018).

Father abandoned the child by engaging in conduct prior to incarceration that exhibited a wanton disregard for her welfare; the child languished in custody while the father continued in his criminal behavior and continually failed to adequately address his substance abuse issues. In re Kaycee M., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 585 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 3, 2018).

Termination of a father's parental rights on the ground of abandonment by incarceration was appropriate because clear and convincing evidence showed that the father violated the terms of the father's probation and was incarcerated for a portion of the relevant period before the institution of the proceeding, had not addressed the father's addiction to drugs, while the father's continued use of illegal substances was evidence that the father had abandoned the children by engaging in conduct that exhibited a wanton disregard for their welfare. In re Virgil W., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 599 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 11, 2018).

Termination of the mother's parental rights on the ground of abandonment by willful failure to visit was supported by the evidence; the mother's visitation was contingent upon her ability to pass three consecutive, random drug screens, yet she did not make herself available for the visits and was unable to pass the necessary drug screens. In re Larry P., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 606 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 15, 2018).

Trial court did not err in finding clear evidence to terminate the mother's parental rights on the ground of abandonment by failure to visit; her choice in refusing to cooperate with an order constituted a willful decision to discontinue visiting the child, and her filing a petition to restore visitation, then failing to appear at the hearing, did not show she was actively trying to maintain visitation. In re L.U.S., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 613 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 19, 2018).

Trial court erred by terminating the father's parental rights based on abandonment because once DNA testing confirmed the father to be the child's biological father he maintained consistent visitation with her and although the father did not pay any child support, the DCS failed to establish that he had the ability to pay support, as there was no proof as to his income and expenses. In re Natascha B., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 614 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 23, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support the termination of the mother's parental rights based on abandonment by willful failure to support because she admitted that she willfully chose not to pay child support, and there was no evidence that she had any justification or infirmity, other than her drug addiction, to preclude her from obtaining gainful employment. In re Francis R., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 623 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 25, 2018).

Evidence was insufficient to support the termination of the mother's parental rights based on abandonment by willful failure to provide a suitable home because the record contained no order expressly adjudicating the children dependent and neglected. In re Francis R., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 623 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 25, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's termination of the father's parental rights based on abandonment for failure to visit because it showed that visitation was offered but the father refused the conditions because he felt uncomfortable, he only offered a days'  notice when requesting a suitable time to see the child, and while he saw the child out in the community, those visits were token in nature. In re Ruger N., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 659 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 9, 2018).

Trial court erred in terminating the mother's parental rights to her youngest child based on abandonment for failing to visit and support that child during the four months immediately preceding her re-incarceration because the relevant four-month time period was March 13 through July 12, 2011, but there was no proof showing that the mother willfully failed to support or to visit the child prior to May of 2011. In re S.D., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 664 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 15, 2018).

Termination of the mother's parental rights due to abandonment through wanton disregard was supported by evidence of the mother's drug use during pregnancy, criminal activity, and failure to maintain contact with the child due to her incarceration. In re Savanna I., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 680 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 26, 2018).

Trial court did not err in terminating the mother's parental rights based on abandonment due to the mother's persistent failure to make an effort to address her drug and mental health issues, rendering her home unsafe. In re Karisah N., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 684 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 27, 2018).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was proper based on abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home because the children were removed from the mother's home, placed into foster care, and found to be dependent and neglected; despite reasonable efforts, at the time of trial, the mother did not provide any documentation of a written lease for the residence where she was living; and the mother never attended counseling to address her own history as a domestic violence victim. In re Steven W., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 693 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 28, 2018).

Having determined that the Tennessee Department of Children's Services (DCS) failed to clearly demonstrate the mother's relevant periods of incarceration to facilitate a determination of the statutorily determinative period, that the trial court erred in declining to attempt such a determination, and that DCS's proof regarding the mother's ability to pay during all possibly relevant periods failed to rise to the level of clear and convincing, the trial court's finding that the mother abandoned the children by willfully failing to financially support them should be reversed. In re Steven W., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 693 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 28, 2018).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was proper based on abandonment through wanton disregard for the children's welfare because the mother never attended counseling to address her own history as a domestic violence victim; the mother repeatedly engaged in conduct that resulted in her incarceration and negatively affected the children; and the mother failed to make any monetary payments toward the financial support of the children. In re Steven W., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 693 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 28, 2018).

Evidence did not establish that a father abandoned a child by engaging in conduct prior to incarceration that exhibited a wanton disregard for the child's welfare because, although the father violated probation, failed to remit child support, and expended minimal efforts on a permanency plan, the father attended visitation prior to incarceration and violated probation by failing to report the father's current address, conduct that was not particularly egregious or indicative of extensive criminal behavior. In re Jeromia W., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 696 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 29, 2018).

Clear and convincing evidence supported a trial court's termination of a father's parental rights to a minor child based upon a finding of abandonment related to the father's conduct prior to incarceration because the father, who was incarcerated for the entirety of the four months preceding the filing of the termination petition, was advised of the obligation to remit support as evidenced by the parenting plans and the father's signing of the Criteria for Termination of Parental Rights, but did not remit support. In re Jeromia W., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 696 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 29, 2018).

Termination of the mother's parental rights on the ground of abandonment by willful failure to visit was supported by evidence that the mother had not visited the children during the applicable time period and the mother's ongoing substance abuse was the primary basis for suspension of her visitation rights. In re Alexis S., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 700 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2018).

Termination of the mother's parental rights on the ground abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home was supported by evidence that the mother made no effort during the four-month statutory period to change the situation that precipitated the removal of the children or to establish a safe and stable environment to which they could return. In re Alexis S., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 700 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2018).

Clear and convincing evidence supported the trial court's finding that the mother abandoned her children by willful failure to support because it showed that she was incarcerated within the four-month period preceding the filing of the termination petition, she failed to make any payments toward the support of her children, and she admitted that the auto body and repair shop she owned with the stepfather generated income sufficient to support them and the children. In re Michayla T., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 712 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 7, 2018).

Clear and convincing evidence supported the trial court's finding that the mother abandoned her children by failing to establish a suitable home because it showed that she made no efforts toward doing so during the four months following their removal, but focused instead on resolving her criminal charges. In re Michayla T., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 712 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 7, 2018).

There was clear and convincing evidence to support the trial court's decision to terminate the mother's parental rights on the ground of failure to establish a suitable home because although she secured housing shortly before the hearing, the Department of Children's Services had not been able to verify it and the mother continued to deny her substance abuse problem and failed to follow the necessary steps to ensure a drug-free home. In re Lesley A., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 738 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 18, 2018).

There was clear evidence that the father abandoned the children by failing to provide a suitable home; despite attempts by the department to help him, the father never provided proof of safe and stable housing, and his lack of cooperation with the department and failure to improve his own living situation demonstrated that he would not be able to provide a suitable home for the children at an early date. In re Gaberiel S., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 718 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 11, 2018).

Termination of the father's parental rights based on abandonment by failure to support was supported by evidence that the father offered no financial support during the relevant fourth month period, but admitted at trial that he could have paid support for the children. In re Kiara S., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 750 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 20, 2018).

Termination of the father's parental rights based on abandonment by wilful failure to visit was supported by evidence that, during the relevant four month period, the father on exercised his allotted visitation two out of eight times and offered no explanation for not exercising his right the other six times, and by evidence that the father failed to exercise all of his allotted phone visitation and that, when he did, such calls were often not appropriate with the father yelling at the daughter. In re Kiara S., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 750 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 20, 2018).

Termination of the father's parental rights based on abandonment due to failure to support was supported by evidence that the father knew of his duty to support, was capable of working and earning money, did not pay support during the relevant time period, and had no justifiable excuse for failing to pay support. In re Mikko B., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 748 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 21, 2018).

Termination of the father's parental rights based on abandonment due to failure to visit was supported by evidence that the father did not attempt to engage counsel or otherwise seek to enforce the juvenile court order giving him visitation or alternative means to exercise visitation. In re Mikko B., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 748 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 21, 2018).

Clear and convincing evidence supported the termination of a mother's parental rights on the grounds of abandonment, by failure to establish a suitable home, because the mother, who had an intellectual disability, did not have a proper physical living location, could not provide a home free of drugs, was unlikely to establish a suitable home in the near future, and seemed incapable of giving the child appropriate care and attention. In re Frederick S., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 756 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 26, 2018).

Clear and convincing evidence supported the termination of a mother's parental rights on the grounds of abandonment, by mental incompetence, because the mother, who had an intellectual disability, did not have a proper physical living location, could not provide a home free of drugs, was unlikely to establish a suitable home in the near future, and seemed incapable of giving the child appropriate care and attention. In re Frederick S., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 756 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 26, 2018).

Mother's failure to visit her children was willful, as the evidence showed the same pattern of the mother's missing opportunities to visit with her children before and after the birth of her last child, and despite any asserted physical limitations, the mother was able to work during the four-month period. In re Antonio J., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 759 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2018).

Trial court correctly concluded that the mother abandoned her children by engaging in conduct that would exhibit a wanton disregard for the children, given that she continued to use drugs after the children's removal, she was incarcerated twice on different charges, and before her incarceration, she did not once visit the children, plus she willfully made no child support payments. In re Gabriella H., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 12 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 8, 2019).

Clear evidence established that the mother abandoned the children by failing to provide a suitable home; the children's services department tried to help the mother find suitable housing, but she still lacked that, and the mother had been given notice that failure to make reasonable efforts would lead to termination. In re Gabriella H., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 12 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 8, 2019).

Clear and convincing evidence supported the trial court's finding that the father abandoned the child by failing to visit under T.C.A. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv) because the father had no contact with the child after July 2015, the mother's brother, with whom the child was living, testified that he did not receive a telephone call from the father regarding setting up visitation after July 2015, and while the father claimed he did not know where the brother and his wife lived, he drove the mother to their house on the day of his only visit with the child on July 4, 2015. In re Jeffery D., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 30 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 24, 2019).

Clear and convincing evidence supported the trial court's finding that the father abandoned the child by displaying wanton disregard for his welfare because he had two parole violations, despite knowing that he was subject to re-incarceration if he committed additional criminal offenses. In re Jeffery D., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 30 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 24, 2019).

Trial court's ordering terminating the mother's parental rights on the ground of abandonment by failure to visit because the record showed that visitation was suspended pursuant to a court order in August 2016, precluding any visitation during the majority of the pertinent time period. In re Ethan M., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 45 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 29, 2019).

Clear and convincing evidence was shown of grounds to terminate the mother's parental rights to the child for abandonment by willful failure to support because the mother had the ability to pay child support, and the capability of earning money to pay her child support, but simply chose not to work and willfully chose not to pay child support. In re Melinda N., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 69 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 7, 2019).

Clear and convincing evidence was shown of grounds to terminate the mother's parental rights to the child for abandonment by willful failure to visit because the mother waited for years before even attempting to set up visitation and the mother's attempts to set-up visitation after proceedings were commenced were minimal. In re Melinda N., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 69 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 7, 2019).

Terminating the mother's parental rights based on abandonment was inappropriate because, by the time of trial, the mother had completed inpatient rehabilitation and participated in intensive outpatient drug treatment, had been drug free for several months, and was taking medication for her mental health issues and participating in individual therapy, and thus, there was not clear and convincing evidence that she lacked concern for the welfare of her child and would be unable to provide a suitable home at an early date. In re Serenity W., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 75 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 8, 2019).

Clear and convincing evidence supported the termination of a mother's parental rights on the ground of abandonment by failure to establish a suitable home because the mother's children were removed from the mother's home and adjudicated dependent and neglected, there were issues concerning drug use, sexual abuse, and a lack of supervision of the children in the mother's home. Moreover, the mother had continued to engage in criminal activity throughout the pendency of the case and generally showed an unwillingness to parent the children. In re H. A., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 78 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 12, 2019).

There was clear and convincing evidence that the father, who was incarcerated when the termination petition was filed, abandoned the children by exhibiting wanton disregard for their welfare. The father's repeated incarcerations coupled with the evidence of physical abuse and the father's unresolved substance abuse issues indicated that the father was either unfit to parent or posed a risk of substantial harm to the children's welfare. In re Julian J., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 99 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 26, 2019).

Clear and convincing evidence supported the trial court's decision to terminate a father's parental rights on the ground of failure to visit because the father stipulated and testified that he never requested a visit with the child. In re Rilyn S., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 124 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 12, 2019).

Termination of a mother's parental rights under T.C.A. § 36-1-113(g)(14) was upheld where her failure to support or visit the child, complete drug and alcohol classes, and other acts and omissions indicated that she was not willing or able to personally assume custody or financial responsibility for the child, and given the mother's instability and the fact that she had no relationship with the child, placing the child in the mother's custody would have poses a risk of substantial harm to the physical or psychological welfare of the child. In re Jaxx M., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 185 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 17, 2019).

Termination of the father's parent rights was proper on the ground of abandonment by an incarcerated parent because the father had a history of incessant criminal behavior and drug abuse evincing a wanton disregard for the welfare of the children and a pattern of conduct that rendered him unfit to parent as he had been in and out of jail since 2008. In re O.M., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 197 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 26, 2019).

Termination of the father's parental rights was in the children's best interest because the father's history was replete with drugs and crime; there were no indicia of a meaningful relationship between the children and father; removing the children from their current caretakers and physical environment would have a profoundly detrimental effect on their wellbeing; and the foster mother had provided a drug-free, safe home for the children. In re O.M., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 197 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 26, 2019).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was proper based on abandonment for willful failure to visit or to support her child because, during the four months leading up to the termination petition, the mother only visited with the child about five times; when the mother did visit, she was distracted and did not pay much attention to the child; the mother often missed her scheduled visits with the child; she only paid $18 in support; and she voluntarily quit both her jobs and did nothing to find a new job to pay child support. In re Laura F., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 200 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 29, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's termination of the mother's parental rights based on abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home because it showed that although she had completed a psychological evaluation and an alcohol and drug assessment, she had not followed up on the resultant recommendations, and she continued using illicit drugs despite the services offered by the Tennessee Department of Children's Services. In re Kaden W., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 230 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 13, 2019).

Evidence was less than clear and convincing that a mother abandoned the mother's child by willful failure to visit during the four months preceding the filing of the termination petition because the mother did not engage in token visitation during the applicable time period. Considering the mother's visits, the mother's testimony concerning phone contact, and the circumstances surrounding a scheduled visit, the mother did not have merely minimal or insubstantial contact during the four-month period preceding the filing of the petition. In re Raeshad B., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 242 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 20, 2019).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was proper on the ground of wanton disregard for the children's welfare because she violated her probation, engaged in criminal behavior, abused drugs, and failed to properly care for the children as none of the children had ever been to a dentist, and they all had serious problems with their teeth; they were behind on their immunizations when they went with the mother to the shelter; and, the eldest, who was seven years old when the children were removed from the mother's care, had never been to school. In re Trey S., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 303 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 20, 2019).

Termination of the father's parental rights was proper on the ground of wanton disregard for the children's welfare because he was physically abusive to the mother in front of his daughter; at the time of trial, he had charges pending against him for manufacturing between 10 and 70 pounds of a controlled substance while the children were on their trial home visit; and evidence was presented that he was altering his urine drug tests. In re Trey S., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 303 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 20, 2019).

Clear and convincing evidence supported terminating parents'  parental rights due to abandonment by a willful failure to visit the children because, during the four months preceding the filing of a termination petition, the parents took no steps to do what was required to visit the children by participating in therapy. In re Nicholas C., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 348 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 15, 2019).

Undisputed evidence in the record clearly and convincingly supported termination of a mother's parental rights on the ground of abandonment for failure to support because the mother failed to make a single child support payment; because the mother did not attend the termination hearing, she did not carry her burden of proof that the failure to support was not willful, and she waived all evidentiary objections. In re K.S., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 376 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 2, 2019).

Trial court properly ruled that clear and convincing evidence existed to terminate a mother's parental rights on the ground of abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home because the Department of Children's Services made reasonable efforts to prevent removal of the child, and the mother missed multiple appointments, failed drug screens, failed to start therapy, and continued to live with the father despite a history of substance abuse and domestic violence. In re K.S., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 376 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 2, 2019).

Termination of the father's parental rights based on abandonment by willfully failing to visit the child was supported by evidence that the father had only visited the child during the relevant four-month period and the fact that there was no evidence that the foster parents were unwilling to allow the father to visit the child. In re Keagan P., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 377 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 5, 2019).

Evidence was insufficient to support the termination of the mother's parental rights based on abandonment by willful failure to support because the record did not show that she had any capacity to pay support during the relevant period and the trial court's finding that she obtained employment well after the filing of the petition was insufficient. The evidence showed that the mother was incarcerated or in treatment for all but two weeks during the relevant time period and there was no dispute that she was not employed during this time. In re Kingston A. B., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 405 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 21, 2019).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was proper based on the ground of abandonment through wanton disregard because she was incarcerated during the entire four months preceding the termination petition; prior to her incarceration, she used drugs without a prescription, and she was arrested and convicted of theft, DUI, and aggravated assault; and she stayed with her boyfriend and agreed to the supervised visitation. In re Khloe B., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 415 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 26, 2019).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was proper based on the ground of abandonment by wanton disregard for the child because the mother was incarcerated at various points during the four months before the termination petition was filed; she admitted to using cocaine while pregnant; and she used drugs, violated her probation, and was unable to supervise the child. In re Jayda S., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 416 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 26, 2019).

Termination of the mother's parental rights on the ground of abandonment for failure to provide a suitable home was warranted; the department developed a permanency plan, referred her to the services providers, and facilitated visitation, but the mother took little or no action for six months. At trial, she was unable to provide a suitable home for the child, as she was living with various relatives, had only been drug free less than three months, and her support system was weak. In re Josiah T., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 482 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 2, 2019).

Trial court did not err in terminating the mother's parental rights on the ground of abandonment by failure to visit; the mother knew the child was with her grandmother, who did not keep the mother from contacting the child, and the mother had the capacity to visit the child, made no attempts to do so, and had no justifiable excuse for her failure to do so. In re Dylan S., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 518 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 23, 2019).

Trial court failed to make sufficient specific findings to support its termination of the mother's parental rights based on abandonment for willful failure to visit because the trial court made no specific findings of fact regarding the frequency, duration, or quality of the mother's visits. In re Alexis S., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 526 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 29, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support the termination of the father's parental rights based on abandonment by failure to visit because it was undisputed that the father did not visit the child during the relevant time period and the record established that the father had the ability but made no effort to visit the child and he provided no justification for not doing so. In re Travis R., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 557 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 13, 2019).

Reversal of ground of abandonment by failure to visit was appropriate as there was too much ambiguity in the analysis of whether a mother failed to visit or exercise more than token visitation in the four month window before the filing of the petition. Although the record contained evidence that the mother failed to visit the children on several occasions in the four month window, given the lack of clarity as to which of the failures to visit the juvenile court held against the mother, the evidence fell short of clear and convincing evidence. In re Malik G., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 564 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 21, 2019).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was proper based on the ground of abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home because the case manager stated that, although the mother was not home and she could not go into the home, she was able to look in and observe no furniture in the home and just a pile of clothes in the middle of the floor; the mother's behavior in ignoring the case manager's requests for a home visit suggested a deeper problem; and the mother's failure to address her mental health issues rendered her unable to provide a safe and stable environment for the child and showed a lack of concern for the child and a lack of interest in regaining custody. In re Draven K., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 7, 2020).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was proper based on the ground of abandonment by failure to visit because there was no evidence to suggest that the mother was incapacitated or otherwise unable to engage in visitation with the child; and the mother's lackadaisical attitude during visits, her failure to play with the child, and her shunning of the child's attempts to engage, resulted in a lack of even the most tenuous bond between the mother and child. In re Draven K., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 7, 2020).

Termination of the father's parental rights to his two children was proper on the ground of abandonment because he was incarcerated for the four months prior to the filing of the termination petition; and the trial court found that he had raped a young child, the children's half-sibling, and found clear and convincing evidence that the father's criminal behavior, conviction, and 35-year prison sentence showed a wanton disregard for the welfare of his children. In re O.W., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2020).

Evidence was insufficient to support the termination of the mother's parental rights to her daughter based on abandonment by failure to establish a suitable home because at the time of the removal the daughter was residing in a hospital and the mother was not living at the hospital as evidenced by her failure to complete the mandatory rooming-in period. In re Ronon G., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 14 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 16, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to support the termination of the mother's parental rights to her son based on abandonment by failure to establish a suitable home because, even though the son was staying primarily with the mother's relatives at the time of removal, because the mother was also staying at the residence periodically prior to the removal. In re Ronon G., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 14 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 16, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to support the termination of the father's parental rights based on abandonment for to support because the mother testified that the father never provided financial assistance and did not provide supplies for the child, and her testimony was corroborated by the maternal grandfather's testimony. In re Aubrie W., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 21 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 21, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to support the termination of the father's parental rights based on abandonment for failure to visit because he did not dispute that he only visited with the child four or five times for approximately two hours each time during the relevant period. In re Aubrie W., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 21 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 21, 2020).

Termination of a mother's parental rights on ground of abandonment was appropriate because the mother did not contend that the mother was incapable of paying support during the relevant four-month period, but refused to do so without some record. Moreover, to the extent that the mother did have discretionary income, the mother used it to buy illegal drugs, rather than support the children, and there was no evidence as to the actual amounts spent by the mother on gifts for the children during visitation in the four-month period or otherwise. In re Michael W., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 24 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 23, 2020).

Evidence was insufficient to support the trial court's termination of the father's parental rights based on abandonment by willful failure to support because the court had no evidence of his actual income during the four-month period, he had been doing odd jobs since he was injured and terminated by his employer, and he was barely able to keep his utilities turned on. In re Kelsea L., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 31 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 27, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's termination of the father's parental rights based on abandonment by willful failure to visit because the father had no contact with the child during the four-month period, his last visit with the child occurred years before the petition was filed, and despite his knowledge of the court process for asserting his parental rights he took no action to do so. In re Kelsea L., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 31 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 27, 2020).

Grounds for termination of a father's parental rights existed because there was clear and convincing evidence that the father was willful in the father's failure to provide support and to visit the children during the relevant statutory period as neither the mother, nor circumstances outside the father's control prevented the father from visiting and providing support to the children. Accordingly, the trial court on remand was to determine whether termination of the father's parental rights was in the children's best interests. In re James D., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 56 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 7, 2020).

Mother had abandoned her children under T.C.A. § 36-1-102(a) where she allowed people visiting her to use marijuana in the home, despite knowing that her children were removed in part due to drug issues, and she had been evicted from her apartment, even if it had been an appropriate home. In re Jadarian C., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 87 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2020).

Foster parents'  petition to terminate the parental rights of the biological mother was improperly granted based on abandonment because the mother did not willfully fail to visit the child during the four months preceding the filing of the original termination petition as she attempted to maintain visitation with the child during her time at the drug treatment center, but had not been able to contact the foster parents. In re Neveah M., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 92 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 4, 2020).

Foster parents' petition to terminate the parental rights of the biological mother was improperly granted as the foster parents did not show abandonment by willful failure to support the child because the foster parents failed to establish that the mother was capable of working and paying child support during the relevant four-month period. In re Neveah M., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 92 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 4, 2020).

Termination of the father's parental rights based on willfully failing to visit the child was proper; an affidavit of no visitation did not prohibit him from contacting the child by telephone or email, and while the no-visitation order was set aside after a final decree of divorce, the father still made no cognizable attempts to contact the child. The alleged order suspending the father's visitation did not preclude a finding of willfulness, nothing prevented him from finding where the child lived, but the father failed to do so. In re Bentley Q., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 103 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 11, 2020).

Ground of abandonment by the mother's failure to visit the children was established by clear and convincing evidence because the record showed that she only had two token visits with the children, she was aware of her duty to visit the children, she had the capacity to visit, she did not make sufficient attempts to visit, and she had no justifiable excuse for not visiting. In re Gracie H. Y., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 110 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 16, 2020).

Ground of abandonment by wanton disregard was established by clear and convincing evidence because the mother engaged in illegal drug use, exposed the children to drugs and domestic violence, failed to comply with requirements ordered by the juvenile court in order to regain custody of her children, continued her drug usage after removal of her children, and continued to engage in criminal activities, resulting in incarceration and continuous separation from her children. In re Gracie H. Y., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 110 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 16, 2020).

Trial court failed to make sufficient findings to support the ground for termination of the mother's rights based on abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home concerning the Tennessee Department of Children's Services'  efforts during the relevant four-month period. In re Gracie H. Y., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 110 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 16, 2020).

Termination of parental rights for abandonment by wanton disregard was appropriate because a father was incarcerated when the termination petition was filed or during all or part of the four months immediately preceding the institution of the action and the father engaged in conduct prior to incarceration that exhibited a wanton disregard for the welfare of the children, as the father failed to visit or support the children during the periods of non-incarceration and had pending criminal charges. In re Nevaeh B., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 133 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2020).

Trial court did not err in concluding that the child's great-aunt established the existence of abandonment by failure to support because the father testified that he was employed during the relevant four-month period and despite having the ability to pay some child support the father admitted that he failed make a single support payment or pay his portion of the child's $3,000 dental bill. In re Zaylee W., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 145 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 9, 2020).

Evidence was not clear and convincing that a father's abandonment by failure to visit was willful because, in addition to cutting off direct communication and not appearing for exchanges, the mother took other steps to limit the father's access to the child such as telling the child's school that the father was violent and dangerous. At trial, the mother admitted to withholding visitation because the mother was frustrated and fed up with all the father had put the mother through. In re Mattie L., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 152 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 14, 2020).

Evidence of the grounds for terminating a father's parental rights of abandonment by willful failure to support was less than clear and convincing and did not show that the father's failure to support was willful as the mother and stepfather failed to establish that the father had the capacity to pay child support during the relevant period. Furthermore, the father's responses to interrogatories showed only nominal income during the four-month period preceding the filing of the termination petition. In re Mattie L., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 152 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 14, 2020).

Evidence supported terminating a mother's parental rights on the ground of abandonment by failure to establish a suitable home because the mother's child was removed and placed in custody when the mother's trial home placement was revoked, the mother had substance abuse and employment issues, the mother did not have consistent stable housing, the mother did not comply with court orders, reasonable efforts were made to assist the mother, and the mother was not in a position to provide a suitable home. In re Madux F., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 166 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 16, 2020).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was proper for abandonment by failure to visit; she was able to visit the child, yet only visited her five times during the relevant period, and during those visits, the mother was not fully present and engaged with the child, but instead spent much of their time together on her phone. The mother's behavior was willful and her visits amounted to token visitation. In re Daisy A., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 167 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 17, 2020).

Termination of the father's parental rights was proper based on abandonment for failing to provide a suitable home as the Department of Children's Services (DCS) was never permitted entry into the home the father lived in at the time of trial; and he visited the child twice over the nearly 27 months that she was in DCS's custody. In re Neveah A., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 168 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 16, 2020).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was proper based on abandonment because she did not verify that child support was being paid; and she failed to provide a suitable home as she failed drug screens and specifically avoided urine screens altogether, admittedly used marijuana pretty much every day to self-medicate for aggression, anger, and anxiety, and demonstrated noncompliance with mental health treatment. In re Neveah A., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 168 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 16, 2020).

Termination of a mother's parental rights on the ground of abandonment by an incarcerated parent demonstrating a wanton disregard for the children's welfare was appropriate because the mother had been in and out of jail and had failed entirely to place the children's needs before the mother's own as the mother's incarcerations had severely compromised the mother's ability to perform parental duties. Despite numerous incarcerations, the mother failed to take steps to address the mother's drug use and to stop the mother's criminal activities. In re Tucker H., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 184 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 24, 2020).

Termination of a mother's parental rights on the ground of abandonment by an incarcerated parent for failure to visit in the four months preceding the mother's incarceration was appropriate as the mother clearly failed to engage in more than token visitation with the children—based on the mother's fear that another child would also be removed from the mother's custody due to the mother's continued use of illegal drugs while the child was in utero—and clearly failed to meet the mother's burden to show that the failure to do so was not willful. In re Tucker H., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 184 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 24, 2020).

Termination of a mother's parental rights was appropriate because clear and convincing evidence showed that the mother abandoned the child by failing to provide a suitable home, despite reasonable efforts made by Tennessee Department of Children's Services to assist her in doing so. Moreover, it appeared unlikely that the mother could have established a suitable home for the child at an early date as, throughout the custodial period, the mother did not adequately address her unstable housing and substance abuse issues. In re Kelty F., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 185 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 24, 2020).

Termination of a mother's parental rights was appropriate because the mother abandoned the child by willfully failing to visit the child during the four months preceding the filing of the petition to terminate parental rights, as the mother made one token visitation of the child during that period. The mother did not point to any acts by the Tennessee Department of Children's Services (DCS) that thwarted or actually prevented the mother from visiting the child and failed to cooperate with DCS and never asked for assistance to be provided. In re Kelty F., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 185 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 24, 2020).

Clear and convincing evidence supported the trial court's termination of the father's parental rights based on abandonment by exhibiting wanton disregard for the child's welfare because the father had an extensive list of criminal convictions and in several instances his pre-incarceration interactions with the mother were violent. In re Boston G., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 194 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 29, 2020).

Clear and convincing evidence supported the trial court's termination of the mother's parental rights based on abandonment by an incarcerated parent because it showed that prior to her incarceration the mother only visited the child once. In re Boston G., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 194 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 29, 2020).

Clear and convincing evidence supported the trial court's termination of the mother's parental rights based on abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home because the mother took no action to establish a suitable home until mid-2018 and she lost that home due to failure to pay rent. In re Boston G., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 194 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 29, 2020).

Evidence was clear and convincing that the father abandoned the child by engaging in conduct that exhibited a wanton disregard for her welfare within the meaning of T.C.A. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv) because he was incarcerated, and he engaged in parole violations, substance abuse, and assaulted the child's mother. In re Isabella W., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 200 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 29, 2020).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was proper under the abandonment by failure to visit ground, as the mother failed to prove that she lacked willfulness in her failure to visit the child or that her failure to visit was due to circumstances outside her control; she admitted not seeking any visitation with the child and she did not provide any evidence showing how the birth of her younger child would have prevented her from visiting the child. In re Eli H., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 206 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 8, 2020).

Trial court did not err in declining to find the ground of failure to visit because they were not so meaningless as to be token and the grandmother stopped the mother from visiting the children from May 2018 onward. In re Ava M., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 226 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 20, 2020).

Evidence was in sufficient to support the termination of the mother's parental rights based on abandonment by failure to visit because the trial court failed to make findings of fact identifying the relevant four-month period. In re Aryana S., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 227 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 21, 2020).

Clear and convincing evidence supported a finding that the father abandoned the children by willful failure to visit where he made only a token visit in the four months prior to his incarceration date, he provided no financial support even though gainfully employed, and his failures were willful. In re Jessica V., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 275 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 12, 2020).

Clear and convincing evidence showed that the father had abandoned the children by wanton disregard as he was a career criminal who had not changed his behavior since the children were born. In re Jessica V., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 275 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 12, 2020).

Clear and convincing evidence supported the conclusion that the father had abandoned the child by failure to support where he offered no evidence to explain his drastic change in taxable income as compared to when he and the mother were together. In re Jaxon W.H., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 304 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 2, 2020).

Clear and convincing evidence showed that a father had abandoned the child by failure to visit during the relevant time period where he allowed the conflict and confrontation with the mother to continue for several years, he had not visited the child for over three years and as a result, the child no longer knew the father. In re Jaxon W.H., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 304 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 2, 2020).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was proper based on abandonment for willful failure to visit and to support because, although the father had relocated to Tennessee and lived with his parents, the mother knew his email address and his parent's physical address; and, when the mother had disposable income, and had the ability to pay support, she chose not to. In re Aiden M., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 361 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 11, 2020).

Tennessee law requires more to sustain the ground of wanton disregard than just incarceration; if a parent's actions resulting in incarceration always are sufficient to show wanton disregard, the Tennessee General Assembly would just need to say incarceration alone is a ground for termination of parental rights, but it has not done so. The court thus vacated termination based on the ground of wanton disregard. In re Trinity H., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 388 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 28, 2020).

19. Substantial Noncompliance.

Father's parental rights could not be terminated based on substantial noncompliance, as the father made efforts to legitimate the child, complied with drug testing requirements, remained drug free, and made efforts to visit, although he was ultimately not permitted to do so. In re Heaven J., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 979 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 22, 2016).

Termination of the father's parental rights for failure to substantially comply with the permanency plan was not supported by the evidence, which showed that the father satisfied the majority of the requirements of the plan and, although he failed to submit to random drug screens, the most recent alcohol and drug assessment recommended no further treatment. In re Damien G. M., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 282 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 3, 2017).

Termination of parental rights based on substantial noncompliance with permanency plans was supported by evidence that the parents failed to follow through with recommendations from their parenting assessments, failed to address issue that led to the child's removal, did not participate in visitation with the child, and the father did not comply with recommendations stemming from a drug and alcohol assessment. In re Lena G., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 358 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 26, 2017).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was proper under the substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan ground because she admitted during cross-examination that she had used methamphetamine between four and six months prior to trial; she failed to comply with the requirements of providing the Tennessee Department of Children's Services with a copy of a lease agreement in her name and maintaining residential stability for six months; and she failed to comply with the requirements of obtaining sponsorship through Narcotics Anonymous or Alcoholics Anonymous, attending couples counseling with her boyfriend, and following all recommendations. In re Skylar P., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 417 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 21, 2017).

In a termination of the mother's parental rights case, the Tennessee Department of Children's Services (DCS) was not required to prove it made reasonable efforts to assist the mother in complying with the requirements of the permanency plans for the trial court to terminate her parental rights based upon the ground of substantial noncompliance; however, the appellate court would weigh DCS's efforts to assist the mother in the best-interest analysis section. In re Skylar P., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 417 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 21, 2017).

Termination of the father's parental rights was proper on the ground of substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans under T.C.A. § 36-1-113(g)(2); he visited the child only three times, he lost his house and relapsed on drugs, he was incarcerated several times, and he did not provide evidence of completion of certain required classes or assessments. In re Quintin S., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 480 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 13, 2017).

Termination of the father's parental rights was proper on the ground of substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans under T.C.A. § 36-1-113(g)(2); he had ongoing criminal issues, no income, appropriate home or transportation, and while he did have an alcohol and drug assessment, did not complete the follow-up. In re Quintin S., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 480 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 13, 2017).

One of the main reasons the children were removed from the mother's custody was drug exposure, but the trial court's vague statement that she apparently had not followed through on whatever recommendations were made did not constitute clear evidence that she failed to substantially comply with the plan recommendations; the department failed to prove the elements necessary to terminate the mother's parental rights on the ground of substantial noncompliance under T.C.A. § 36-1-113(g)(2). In re Quintin S., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 480 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 13, 2017).

Trial court correctly found that the mother was in substantial noncompliance with her permanency plan because the mother violated her probation repeatedly, incurred additional aggravated assault charges, failed to submit to drug screening, and “went on the run” rather than maintaining contact with Tennessee Department of Children's Services and working toward the goals of her plan. In re Mya V., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 511 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 28, 2017).

Trial court did not err in terminating parental rights because the parents failed to substantially comply with the reasonable requirements of the permanency plans; the trial court properly concluded that the parents had neglected to complete the reasonable requirements most closely related to the reason for their children's removal, substance abuse. In re Angel M., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 519 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 31, 2017).

Clear and convincing evidence supported the trial court's finding that parents did not substantially comply with the permanency plan because the parents never maintained suitable housing or maintained consistent visitation; both parents had unresolved criminal charges, they never completed parenting classes after being terminated for nonattendance, and they also failed to follow the recommendations of their mental health and alcohol and drug assessments. In re Billy T.W., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 641 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 27, 2017).

Termination ground of substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans under T.C.A. § 36-1-113(g)(2) was established by clear and convincing evidence; the two most critical requirements under the permanency plans for the father were appropriate housing and addressing his mental health issues, which requirements were reasonable and related to remedying the conditions that led to the children's foster care placement; the father neglected to undertake the necessary actions and demonstrated a substantial lack of compliance. In re Da'Vante M., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 797 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 12, 2017).

Termination was proper based on the father's substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans because the requirements that the father not be around people who were using illegal substances and that he allow the mother only supervised visitation and not allow her overnight stays with the children were reasonably related to the mother's drug use and the overall lack of safety and stability afforded the children while living in the home. In re Alyssa W., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 803 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 14, 2017).

Termination of a mother's parental rights was appropriate because the mother had failed to substantially comply with the statement of responsibilities in a permanency plan. In re M.E.N.J., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 835 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 27, 2017).

Termination of the father's parental rights was proper based on substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans because the requirements of the plans were reasonably related to the conditions that necessitated removal of the children as the children were removed from the home due to the mother and the father's drug use, drug paraphernalia present in the home, and environmental neglect; the father did not provide or maintain suitable housing for children or refrain from illegal activity as evidenced from his incarceration at the time of the trial; and, despite the drug use that led to the children's removal, the father failed to participate in an A&D assessment, and failed to successfully complete a substance abuse program. In re Aaralyn O., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 14 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 18, 2018).

Clear and convincing evidence supported the finding that a mother failed to substantially comply with the reasonable requirements of the permanency plans because she lost her housing, became involved with a methamphetamine offender, failed to submit to drug screens, and had very little contact with the Department of Children's Services; although, the mother completed an inpatient drug treatment program, she never provided documentation showing she was in compliance with the recommendation. In re Noah S., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 27 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 23, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support the termination of the mother's parental rights based on substantial noncompliance with permanency plans because she failed to complete her alcohol and drug treatment or individual counseling, she routinely and repeatedly failed random drug screens, she failed to provide proof that she applied for employment and failed to provide proof of income, she failed to develop a transportation plan and did not obtain a valid driver's license, and the Department of Children's Services attempted on more than one occasion to verify the mother's housing situation but she was either not home or failed to show up for a scheduled visit. In re Ke'Andre C., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 44 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 29, 2018).

Evidence was insufficient to support the termination of the father's parental rights based on substantial noncompliance with permanency plans because the portions of his permanency plan with which he did not comply were created for him after his incarceration, at which time it was all but impossible for him to comply. In re Ke'Andre C., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 44 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 29, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support the termination of the mother's parental rights based on substantial noncompliance with the requirements of the permanency plans because she did not have stable housing or proof of a stable income, her visits with the children had been suspended, she failed to cooperate with the Tennessee Department of Children's Services, and her testimony showed that she did not comply with the alcohol and drug assessment. In re Homer, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 126 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 9, 2018).

Trial court properly terminated the rights of a mother and a father based upon clear and convincing evidence of substantial noncompliance with permanency plans because the mother failed to complete alcohol and drug treatment, pass random drug screens, avoid incarceration, and maintain contact with the Department of Children's Services; there was no proof that the father had ever completed drug and alcohol treatment, and he failed to pass random drug screens and avoid incarceration. In re Authur R., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 170 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 3, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support the termination of the parents'  rights based on substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan because it showed that the father continued to use drugs, the parents continued to engage in incidents of domestic violence, they owed thousands of dollars in unpaid court costs, the mother had received two citations for driving on a suspended license, and they failed to address their parenting deficiencies since their release from custody. In re Kah'Nyia J., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 238 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2018).

Substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan was available as a ground for termination of the parents'  rights because the evidence and testimony showed that the foster parents were providing the children with child care, and coupled with the substantial involvement of the Tennessee Department of Children Services (DCS), as the children were very young and the foster parents had provided a home for them and for them to attend daycare and a headstart program. The care in which the children were placed qualified as foster care with the DCS or in the care of an agency. In re Kah'Nyia J., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 238 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2018).

Clear and convincing evidence supported the termination of parental rights on the ground of substantial non-compliance with a permanency plan because, although the parents completed anger management, parenting, and domestic violence classes, they did not fully perform tasks relating to the maintenance and proof of sobriety. In addition to the parents'  failure to pass drug screens and to submit to pill counts, the parents substantially failed to attend and complete various drug treatment programs and substantially failed to attend mental health appointments and therapy sessions. In re J.T., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 256 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 10, 2018).

Termination of the mother's rights based on substantial noncompliance with permanency plans was proper as she testified that she understood that she was required to get drug treatment, have a mental health evaluation, pay child support, and visit the child regularly, but she did not comply with those requirements; and there was no evidence that she was not aware of her responsibilities or was unable to express any concern as to her responsibilities under either permanency plan. In re Kendall M., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 298 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 29, 2018).

Termination of the father's parental rights was proper based on his failure to substantially comply with the reasonable responsibilities set out in the permanency plans because he had been unable to provide a safe, stable home for the child; had not obtained his driver's license or vehicular insurance; had not provided proof of legal, verifiable income; and was inconsistent in his visitation with the child. In re Amynn K., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 343 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 20, 2018).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was proper on the ground of substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan because she did not complete the recommendations of the alcohol and drug assessment and failed multiple drug screens; she had not obtained housing suitable for herself and the children; she was unemployed at the time of trial; and she did not have valid transportation or a plan for transportation. In re McKenzie O., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 387 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 5, 2018).

Termination of the mother's and the father's parental rights was proper because they failed to substantially comply with their permanency plans as they did not demonstrate appropriate parenting skills during visits with the child; they were unable to keep their home free and clean from animal waste; they did not provide the Department of Children Services (DCS) with proof of rent, mortgage, or payment of utilities; and they did not cooperate with DCS, including failing to allow DCS to conduct announced and unannounced visits. In re Charles R., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 425 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 25, 2018).

Termination of the mother's parental rights on the ground of substantial noncompliance was proper, as the mother's actions did not reflect a serious effort to comply with the goals of the plans; she failed to complete or largely attempt the requirements of the plans, including maintaining stable housing, maintaining sobriety, submitting to random drug screens, and addressing her ongoing mental health issues, and the deviations were significant in light of the circumstances surrounding the children's removal. In re Briana H., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 518 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2018).

Father failed to substantially comply with the requirements of the permanency plan; although he completed several assessments and participated in sessions, he simply failed to address the most important aspects of the plan that would have resulted in his ability to care for the child, namely to resolve his legal issues and adequately address his drug abuse. In re Kaycee M., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 585 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 3, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support the termination of the mother's parental rights based on substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan because it showed that the mother did not participate in homemaker services, she failed to pay any child support, she did not have a job or legal means of income, she failed to maintain sobriety and continued to test positive for illegal substances, and she did not successfully complete alcohol and drug assessment recommendations. In re Francis R., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 623 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 25, 2018).

Termination of the mother's and the father's parental rights was proper because the mother failed to substantially comply with the requirements of the permanency plan as she failed to complete new assessments and to adequately address concerns relating to her possible drug usage; however, termination of the father's parental rights on that ground was improper because he completed the secondary assessments as required, resolved his legal issues, obtained employment and transportation, was remitting child support, and showed great improvement in his effort to combat his drug addiction. In re Camdon H., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 672 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 21, 2018).

Termination of the mother's parental rights based on substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan was supported by evidence that the mother failed to address her drug and mental health issues and failed to follow the recommendations made after drug and alcohol assessments, continuing to test positive for illegal drugs. In re Karisah N., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 684 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 27, 2018).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was proper as the mother failed to substantially comply with the reasonable responsibilities set out in the permanency plans because, although she completed an alcohol and drug assessment, she did not follow through on the assessment recommendation for outpatient treatment; she did not complete individual domestic violence counseling; she provided no proof of employment through pay stubs, work schedules, or any other documentation; and her argument regarding her efforts to obtain and maintain housing were unavailing. In re Steven W., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 693 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 28, 2018).

Termination of the mother's parental rights on the ground of substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans was supported by evidence that the mother failed to follow through with alcohol and drug treatment, failed to appear for a psychological evaluation, failed to visit the children, and failed to participate in parenting education. In re Alexis S., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 700 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2018).

Clear and convincing evidence supported the trial court's finding that the mother failed to comply with the permanency plans because by the trial date, she had only partially complied with the requirement of submitting to drug screens, she started an inpatient treatment program only in the month prior to the trial, and she only partially complied with the requirement that she resolve all pending legal charges. In re Michayla T., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 712 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 7, 2018).

There was clear and convincing evidence to support the trial court's decision to terminate the mother's parental rights on the ground of substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan because she consistently denied having a substance abuse problem and resisted recommendations of individual counseling, a hair follicle test was positive for multiple opiates, she moved four times, and the Department of Children's Services had not yet been able to approve her residence at the time of the hearing. In re Lesley A., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 738 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 18, 2018).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was proper based on substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan requirements because, although the mother was required to follow all recommendations from her alcohol and drug assessment and pass all random drug screens and pill counts, she failed multiple drug screens, refused to take certain drug screens, failed to complete in-patient treatment, and openly admitted to going on methamphetamine binges. In re Mickeal Z., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 29 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 25, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's termination of the mother's parental rights based on substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans because she failed to attend all of the parenting classes, she continued to use drugs, she did not complete intensive outpatient treatment, and did not provide proof of a transportation plan. In re Kaden W., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 230 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 13, 2019).

Termination of the father's parental rights was proper on the grounds of substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan because he had not obtained housing for the children that was safe or stable, he was unemployed, he was not drug-free, and he failed to introduce evidence that he had resolved any of his legal issues; he had not seen his children for nine months, which showed that he was neither successfully parenting the children nor remaining involved in their lives; and he failed to complete the domestic violence classes he was directed to attend. In re Trey S., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 303 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 20, 2019).

Ground of substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan was proven by clear and convincing evidence; while the mother took certain initial steps to meet her responsibilities under the permanency plans, she failed to follow through in key areas, including taking her medication as prescribed. In re Charlie-Lynn P., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 322 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 27, 2019).

Clear and convincing evidence supported terminating parents'  parental rights due to substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan because (1) the permanency plan's requirements were reasonably related to the reasons for the parents'  children's removal, (2) other than the mother signing releases for providers and having money for child support deducted from her monthly Social Security benefits, the parents did nothing to comply with the plan, and, (3) after directing the Department of Children's Services (DCS) to only communicate with the parents through counsel, the parents did not maintain contact with counsel, preventing DCS from making reasonable efforts to assist the parents. In re Nicholas C., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 348 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 15, 2019).

Trial court properly determined that clear and convincing evidence supported termination of the mother's parental rights on the ground of substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan because the mother continued to test positive for illegal drugs throughout the pendency of the case; the mother's visitation with the child became progressively sporadic in the months leading to the filing of the termination petition, and the mother failed to pay any child support. In re K.S., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 376 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 2, 2019).

Termination of father's parental rights was appropriate because the father, when given the opportunity, failed to complete any steps laid out in the court's prior orders to increase visitation or seek a change of custody. In re B.A., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 549 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 12, 2019).

The ground for termination of parental rights of substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan was proven by clear and convincing evidence because, although a mother completed multiple tasks on the permanency plans, these achievements occurred after the petition was filed. Furthermore, the mother offered no reason other than the mother's anger as to why the mother waited until after the petition was filed to get moving in earnest on the mother's permanency plan responsibilities. In re Malik G., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 564 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 21, 2019).

Juvenile court properly terminated a father's parental rights on the ground of substantial noncompliance with the requirements of the permanency plan because the father's belated efforts, compounded by other incomplete areas of the permanency plan established substantial noncompliance with the plan; the father failed to demonstrate diligent efforts to achieve sobriety, and he had not completed the recommendations of his alcohol and drug assessment by the time of trial. In re Jayda H., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 571 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 25, 2019).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was proper based on the ground of failure to substantially comply with the requirements of the permanency plan because the mother failed to engage in the substantive requirements of the permanency plans as she failed to address her mental health issues, parenting issues, and housing issues because, although the mother submitted to a mental health evaluation, she did not follow the recommendations; and, although the mother attended parenting classed, she failed to demonstrate good parenting skills in her visits with the child. In re Draven K., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 7, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to support the termination of the mother's parental rights based on substantial noncompliance with permanency plans because it showed that she failed to make lasting effort to establish and maintain an appropriate home for the children, she failed to make consistent child support payments, she was not consistent with visitation, she could not maintain any employment for a significant length of time, and she had not made a significant effort to bond with the children. In re Ronon G., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 14 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 16, 2020).

Termination of a mother's parental rights on the ground of substantial noncompliance with permanency plans was inappropriate because the mother had no stated responsibilities under a properly created permanency plan to the mother's children. Therefore, because the record on appeal contained no permanency plans that applied to the children, substantial noncompliance with the statement of responsibilities in a permanency plan could not serve as a ground for termination as to the children. In re Michael W., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 24 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 23, 2020).

Termination of the mother's rights was proper for substantial noncompliance with her permanency plan; she failed to comply with or complete any of the plan requirements, including providing support of the child, visiting the child, and proving that she had stable housing. Even if she did suffer hardships that impeded her ability to satisfy plan requirements, such hardships did not excuse her failure to satisfy any of those requirements. In re Imerald W., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 43 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2020).

Ground of substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan requirements was established by clear and convincing evidence because the record showed that the mother failed to visit the children consistently, she had not maintained stable housing, she had a legal income when she was not incarcerated but she had not financially supported the child, she continued to fail drug screens throughout the time her children were in DCS custody, she did not substantially comply with homemaker services or domestic violence counseling, and she consistently failed to comply with the rules of her probation. In re Gracie H. Y., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 110 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 16, 2020).

Record supported termination based on substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan and the father did not dispute that he failed to comply with all requirements of plan, and the record made clear that he mother had not completed many of the important conditions in the plan, including addressing the drug-related behaviors. In re Eli S., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 150 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 9, 2020).

Termination of a mother's parental rights on the ground of substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan was appropriate because the evidence was clear that the mother took virtually no steps in meaningfully addressing the permanency plan requirements prior to the filing of the petition to terminate the mother's parental rights. The mother's recent entry into rehab by the time of trial was too little, too late. In re Madux F., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 166 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 16, 2020).

Termination of both parents'  rights to the child was proper based on substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan because, although the father attended a domestic violence class, paid child support, and submitted to a random drug screen one week before trial, he failed to complete any other requirements or engage in the case generally; and the mother did not financially support the child, was uncooperative with drug testing, did not make an effort to receive adequate mental health treatment, was dismissed from counseling for missing too many appointments, and did not cease using marijuana daily. In re Neveah A., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 168 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 16, 2020).

Termination of a mother's parental rights on the ground of failure to substantially comply with the requirements of the parenting plan was appropriate because the mother's inability to remain sober and arrest free and failure to address employment and housing requirements was sufficient proof of the mother's failure to substantially comply with the requirements of the permanency plan. Furthermore, the mother's drug use and accompanying criminal activity were of paramount concern to the safety and welfare of the children. In re Tucker H., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 184 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 24, 2020).

Termination of a mother's parental rights was appropriate because the mother was substantially noncompliant with the mother's responsibilities under the permanency plans as the mother completed very few of her responsibilities under the permanency plans, and, more significantly, the mother failed to comply with the responsibilities aimed at addressing the mother's substance abuse issue and unstable housing situation. In re Kelty F., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 185 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 24, 2020).

Termination of the father's parental rights based on the failure to substantially comply with the reasonable requirements of the permanency plans was proper because he had no stable housing or employment; he had violated his probation and served additional jail time; he had paid no more than token support for the child; he had been non-compliant with assessments, counseling, and treatment; he was likely using illegal drugs based on his positive test for methamphetamine; he had not maintained visitation with the child; and there was no indication that he had availed himself of any of the resources offered by the Tennessee Department of Children's Services. In re Dustin M., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 191 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 28, 2020).

Termination of the mother's parental rights based on the failure to substantially comply with the reasonable requirements of the permanency plans was proper because the case worker testified that the only requirement the mother completed was the parenting component of the clinical assessment; and she made no other progress on the permanency plans as she was not employed and had no housing, she had some new citations for possession of drugs, she declined the requests of the Tennessee Department of Children's Services (DCS) for drug tests, she failed to submit to alcohol or drug assessment, she did not provide any support for the child, and she failed to maintain contact with DCS or her appointed counsel. In re Dustin M., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 191 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 28, 2020).

Substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans ground for termination of parental rights was proven by clear and convincing evidence because the father failed to complete mental health and parenting assessments and he failed to maintain safe and stable housing. In re Isabella W., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 200 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 29, 2020).

Termination of a mother's parental rights to the mother's minor children was appropriate because the ground for termination of substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans was proven by clear and convincing evidence as the mother did not complete a required mental health assessment and did not comply with and pass random drug screens. In re Johnathan T., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 281 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 18, 2020).

Termination of the mother's parental rights based on substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan was proper because she failed to remedy her legal issues and incurred new charges, lessening her ability to complete the requirements of the permanency plan; she failed to remit child support, pass random drug screens, and provide proof of income; she had not yet completed a new drug assessment following her incarceration; and she was arrested for theft days before the termination hearing. In re Kash F., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 399 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 4, 2020).

20. Incarcerated Parent.

There was clear and convincing evidence of at least one ground to support the termination of the father's rights where at the time he was sentenced to 16 years in prison the record showed that his child was three months old. In re Matthew J., 2014 Tenn. App. LEXIS 835 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 19, 2014).

Termination of the father's parental rights was proper because the copies of the judgments from July 6, 2011, indicated that the father was convicted of 20 counts of sexual exploitation of a minor and one count of aggravated statutory rape and sentenced to an effective sentence of 16 years; and, at the time the father was sentenced, the record showed that the child was three months old. In re Matthew J., 2014 Tenn. App. LEXIS 835 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 19, 2014).

Certified copies of the father's conviction indicated that he was convicted of two crimes and sentenced to 11 years in prison in May 2013, and while he might be paroled in less than 10 years, the possibility of early parole was not a sufficient basis to negate this statutorily-defined termination ground; the child was less than one year old at the time the father was sentenced, and thus the incarceration termination ground was proven by clear evidence. In re Jaceton B., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 179 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 30, 2015).

Mother was detained prior to her sentencing hearing, but she was immediately released to the supervision of the community corrections program and was never specifically ordered to serve any portion of her sentence in confinement, and thus the trial court's rejection of this statutory ground of termination was proper. In re Charles K., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 344 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 19, 2016).

From April 2013 until September 6, 2013 and again from January 14, 2014 through the April and May 2015 trial dates in this case, and was expected to be released in October 2015. Thus, it appears that, most recently, Father was not incarcerated for four consecutive months from September 14, 2013, through January 13, 2014. This period represents the relevant four month period with regard to Father's abandonment by willful failure to visit and support for an incarcerated parent. In re Navada N., 498 S.W.3d 579, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 367 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 23, 2016).

Record revealed no clear and convincing evidence to support a finding that the mother was either incarcerated at the time the termination petition was filed or at any time in the preceding four months; her arrest, without more, did not constitute incarceration within the meaning of the termination statute. In re Navada N., 498 S.W.3d 579, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 367 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 23, 2016).

Father was incarcerated at the time the department filed the petition to terminate his parental rights, and thus the trial court properly considered the abandonment by an incarcerated parent ground. In re Navada N., 498 S.W.3d 579, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 367 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 23, 2016).

Because the mother was not incarcerated at the time the termination petition was filed or shortly before, the termination ground of abandonment by an incarcerated parent based on wanton disregard could not apply to her. In re Navada N., 498 S.W.3d 579, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 367 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 23, 2016).

Termination of parental rights for abandonment was appropriate because clear and convincing evidence was presented that the parent demonstrated a wanton disregard for the children's welfare as the parent was incarcerated due to the parent's criminal behavior, probation violations, incarcerations, and substance abuse. In re Jayden L., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 357 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 31, 2016).

Juvenile court properly determined that the father had not abandoned the children by his incarceration or exhibited a wanton disregard for their welfare, and the father was not incarcerated during the requisite time period. In re Aiden R., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 420 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 23, 2016).

Trial court properly terminated a father's parental rights because the evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrated the father's wanton disregard for the welfare of the child; the record reflected numerous criminal charges against the father, with multiple charges coming after the birth of the child, and for those charges, the father was incarcerated on multiple occasions, and he had a history of substance abuse. In re E.S.L., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 630 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 29, 2016).

There was clear and convincing evidence that a father abandoned his children by exhibiting wanton disregard for their welfare prior to his incarceration because since the children were born, the father had been incarcerated three times; prior to incarceration the father exhibited a wanton disregard for the welfare of the children by exposing them to methamphetamine at such levels that it showed positive in the children's hair drug screen. In re Jason S., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 715 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 23, 2016).

Father had been sentenced to more than 10 years of incarceration, and the sentence was imposed when the child was approximately three years old, and thus the evidence supported termination of the father's rights. In re Maddox C., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 860 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 9, 2016).

Trial court did not err in terminating the parental rights of a mother on the ground of abandonment because the mother was incarcerated when the termination proceedings were initiated. In re G.L., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 993 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2016).

Trial court erred in declining to terminate a father's parental rights because the evidence preponderated against its finding that the father did not engage in conduct prior to incarceration that exhibited a wanton disregard for the welfare of the children; the father's numerous drug charges and probation violations demonstrated that he had engaged in a pattern of conduct that caused him to be incarcerated. In re A.B., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 14 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 11, 2017).

Termination of the father's parental rights was proper because the father was incarcerated for 25 years when the child was approximately two years and nine months old. In re Lydia N.-S., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 55 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2017).

Out of the nine visits set up for the mother during the relevant time period, she attended only three, and her visits constituted only token visitation; the evidence supported the conclusion that the failure to visit was willful, and termination for abandonment by willful failure to visit prior to the mother's incarceration, pursuant to T.C.A. §§ 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv), 36-1-113, was proper. In re Quintin S., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 480 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 13, 2017).

Father attended only two of eight visits available to him, he chose to ride his bicycle to visits, and there was testimony he did not ask for transportation help; his visitation prior to his incarceration was token at best and thus his failure to visit was willful, and termination of his rights for abandonment by willful failure to visit prior to incarceration pursuant to T.C.A. §§ 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv), 36-1-113 was proper. In re Quintin S., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 480 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 13, 2017).

Termination of the father's parental rights was proper based on his convictions for felony murder, aggravated child abuse, and false report surrounding the death of his daughter and the imposition of a sentence of more than two years'  imprisonment because the father was already serving a life sentence for his convictions; and undisputed evidence showed that the deceased child was the sibling of the children who were the subject of the parental termination case. In re Demarkus T., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 529 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 3, 2017).

Father did not dispute that his parental rights should be terminated as a result of his incarceration under a sentence of 10 or more years and the child being under eight, and the trial court properly concluded that termination of the father's rights was in the best interest of the child, as there was not a strong bond between the two, there was no regular visitation even before the father's incarceration, and the child was in a stable home. In re Preston L., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 649 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 27, 2017).

Termination of parental rights was appropriate because the parents engaged in conduct prior to incarceration that exhibited a wanton disregard for their children's welfare in that one child tested positive for opiates at birth, the mother did not begin to address the mother's drug addiction until one year after the child's birth, the mother engaged in criminal conduct that led to the mother's arrest almost on a continual basis, the father voluntarily left the children with the father's mother, and the father was convicted multiple times. In re Isabella G., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 667 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 3, 2017).

Trial court properly found that the father abandoned the child by exhibiting wanton disregard for the child's welfare prior to the father's incarceration where the testimony showed that he had physically assaulted the mother and half sibling, and there were several exhibits regarding the father's criminal charges. In re Brooke E., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 830 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 22, 2017).

Ground of incarceration on a sentence of 10 or more years when the child was under the age of eight years old at the time of sentencing was proven by clear and convincing evidence where it was undisputed that the father had received two 15-year sentences for aggravated robbery. In re Ken'Bria B., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 4, 2018).

Termination of a father's parental rights was appropriate because the father was sentenced to a total of ten years of confinement in the Tennessee Department of Corrections after pleading guilty to multiple felonies and the father's child was approximately one-year old when the father was sentenced. In re Kandace D., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 8, 2018).

Trial court erred in terminating a father's parental rights on the ground of abandonment, by the father demonstrating a wanton disregard for the child's welfare, because the Tennessee Department of Children's Services failed to offer clear and convincing evidence that the father who was incarcerated knew of the child's existence when the father was engaging in the criminal behavior that demonstrated wanton disregard. In re Michael O., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 42 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 26, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support the termination of the father's rights based on abandonment by an incarcerated parent because he knew on or before the child's birth that he might have been the father, and his patterns of criminal behavior illegal drug use, and incarceration, along with his failure to take any voluntary actions to legitimate or support the child, amounted to a wanton disregard for the child's welfare. In re Ke'Andre C., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 44 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 29, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support the termination of the mother's parental rights based on abandonment by an incarcerated parent because she had been in jail for all or part of the four months preceding the filing of the proceedings, and she had not been willing or able to stay drug-free or out of jail in a way that would allow her to perform basic parenting duties for her children. In re Ke'Andre C., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 44 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 29, 2018).

Termination of a father's parental rights on the ground of abandonment by an incarcerated parent for wanton disregard was appropriate because the father had spent the majority of the child's life in jail and the father's recidivism had resulted in an inability to provide a safe and stable environment for the child. The resultant problems were the direct result of the father's decision to intentionally engage in illegal activity, and they provided clear and convincing proof of the father's wanton disregard for the child's welfare. In re Victoria H., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 108 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2018).

Termination of the mother's rights pursuant to T.C.A. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv) was affirmed as her repeated incarceration, criminal behavior, substance abuse, and failure to support her children throughout the case exhibited a wanton disregard for the welfare of her children. In re Veronica T., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 147 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 21, 2018).

Trial court properly terminated parents'  rights to their child because it found clear and convincing evidence of the parents'  abandonment of the child by engaging in conduct prior to incarceration that exhibited a wanton disregard for the child's welfare; the Department of Children's Services presented ample evidence of the parents'  repeated incidents of criminal behavior and probation violations, resulting in repeated incarcerations, and considerable evidence demonstrated their substance abuse In re Authur R., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 170 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 3, 2018).

Termination of a mother's parental rights was appropriate because clear and convincing evidence supported the finding that the mother engaged in conduct prior to incarceration that exhibited a wanton disregard for the welfare of the mother's child as the mother testified (telephonically from prison) concerning the mother's criminal behavior and involvement with illegal drugs, violation of probation, and choosing to become a fugitive and fleeing to Florida for over a year instead of complying with the terms of the mother's supervised release. In re Tegan W., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 184 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 9, 2018).

Mother's failure to provide an updated address to the mother's probation officer that resulted in the mother's probation violations, in combination with the mother's other conduct, did not support a finding by clear and convincing evidence that the mother abandoned the mother's child by exhibiting a wanton disregard for the child prior to the mother's incarceration. Furthermore, some of the mother's criminal convictions were a result of behavior occurring well before the child was conceived. In re Kyle F., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 217 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 25, 2018).

Termination of the mother's parental rights based on abandonment by an incarcerated parent was proper as she testified as to the dates of her incarceration, her use of heroin during her pregnancy, the fact that she and the child tested positive for drugs at the child's birth, and her failure to complete drug and mental health treatment programs. In re Kendall M., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 298 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 29, 2018).

Father exhibited wanton disregard for the father's children because the father, before and after the birth of the children, repeatedly committed felonies and misdemeanors, and used alcohol and drugs without regard for the children's welfare, which resulted in the father's incarceration and inability to take care of the children when they were removed from their mother's custody and placed in foster care. The pattern of the father's conduct prior to incarceration exhibited disregard for the children and the father's relationship with them. In re Arianna Y., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 377 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 2, 2018).

Clear and convincing evidence showed that grounds existed to terminate a father's parental rights for abandonment by wanton disregard because the father–through repeated incarcerations, criminal behavior, a probation violation, and substance abuse issues as shown in the father's criminal convictions–showed a pattern of conduct that posed a risk of substantial harm to the welfare of the child. In re Ava H., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 482 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 20, 2018).

Denial of a petition to terminate an incarcerated father's parental rights was appropriate because there was not clear and convincing evidence to establish that the father willfully failed to visit and to support during the relevant time period as the father was unaware of the mother's whereabouts during that time period due to the mother's moving and changing the mother's phone number and the failure of the mother's family to respond to the father's inquiries. Further, the evidence did not establish the father's ability to remit support. In re Ella P., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 512 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 30, 2018).

Based on the mother's probation violation and subsequent incarceration under a sentence of 10 years while the child was under the age of eight, there was clear evidence to support termination of parental rights on the ground of incarceration under a sentence of 10 years or more imposed when the child was less than eight years old. In re Hayden L, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 515 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2018).

Clear and convincing evidence was proven of grounds to terminate a father's parental rights to the father's children for abandonment by wanton disregard because the father was incarcerated when the petition to terminate the father's parental rights was filed and the father engaged in behavior during the relevant time period that violated the father's probation resulting in the father again being incarcerated. In re Sophie O., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 521 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 4, 2018).

Termination of a father's parental rights on the ground of abandonment by incarceration was appropriate because clear and convincing evidence showed that the father violated the terms of the father's probation and was incarcerated for a portion of the relevant period before the institution of the proceeding, had not addressed the father's addiction to drugs, while the father's continued use of illegal substances was evidence that the father had abandoned the children by engaging in conduct that exhibited a wanton disregard for their welfare. In re Virgil W., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 599 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 11, 2018).

Tennessee Department of Children's Services failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence the ground of abandonment by wanton disregard for the welfare of the children because there was no evidence that the father had any knowledge of one child when he committed the robbery and the record contained no evidence of conduct by the father showing a wanton disregard for the welfare of the children other than the robbery. In re Lailonnii J., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 89 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 19, 2019).

Clear and convincing evidence supported the termination of the father's parental rights because the record included a certified copy of his judgment of conviction that expressly stated that he received a 10-year sentence for his robbery conviction and there was no dispute that both children were under the age of eight when the sentence was entered. In re Lailonnii J., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 89 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 19, 2019).

Evidence did not establish by clear and convincing evidence that the father failed to manifest a willingness to assume physical and legal custody or financial responsibility of the children because the caseworker did not provide the father any information regarding how to contact the Tennessee Department of Children's Services so he could send the children letters, cards, or pictures while he was incarcerated. In re Lailonnii J., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 89 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 19, 2019).

Clear and convincing evidence showed that termination of a father's parental rights to the father's younger child was appropriate because the father was sentenced to a minimum of 15 years in prison when the child was less than eight years old. In re D.V., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 111 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 6, 2019).

Termination of father's parental rights was appropriate because the father testified that, as a result of the severe abuse of one of the father's children, the father received a jail sentence of eight years. The father was to serve one year in either jail or rehab and the remainder on probation. In re B.A., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 549 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 12, 2019).

Termination of father's parental rights was appropriate because, at the termination hearing, the father testified that the father was found guilty of possessing a firearm while committing a dangerous felony, and sentenced to serve fifteen years when the father's children were under eight years old. In re B.A., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 549 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 12, 2019).

Termination of the father's parental rights based on abandonment by wanton disregard was proper because, after he was released from incarceration following the assault on his brother, he was placed on probation, but, rather than work on reunification with his child, the father engaged in activity that violated the terms of his probation and resulted in further incarceration; the decision to engage in such activities had resulted in the father not having stable employment or housing; he tested positive for methamphetamine on the day of the hearing to terminate his parental rights; and the father's engagement with people who used drugs not only showed poor judgment, but also put him at risk for further incarceration. In re Dustin M., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 191 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 28, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to support the termination of the father's parental rights based on his incarceration because the record established that he had been sentenced by the Georgia court to incarceration of more than 10 years and that the child was less than eight years old when the sentence was entered. In re Jackson D., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 366 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 17, 2020).

21. Parent's Mental Condition.

Termination of father's parental rights based on mental incompetence was proper because: (1) Assistance needed to ensure that father's children received proper care would have to essentially be a substitute parent, with father acting only as a caring but incompetent bystander; and (2) Doctor testified clearly that father's mental retardation was a lifelong condition and that he functioned in such a low range that no amount of training, education, or counseling could bring him up to the level where he could parent the children; thus, a showing of reasonable efforts to return the children to their home was unnecessary. Department of Children's Servs. v. Mims, 285 S.W.3d 435, 2008 Tenn. App. LEXIS 706 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 24, 2008), appeal denied, In re N.B., — S.W.3d —, 2009 Tenn. LEXIS 146 (Tenn. Mar. 16, 2009).

Ample evidence established that the mother suffered from mental incompetence, given in part that all of her children had been removed from her care, she suffered from a mental disability that rendered her incapable of caring for her children for years, and she refused to follow through with treatment recommendations, plus she showed a pattern of living with abusive men; termination of her rights was affirmed. In re Shaneeque M., — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. App. LEXIS 757 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 20, 2014), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 128 (Tenn. Feb. 20, 2015).

No expert testimony was provided in this case, but such testimony on the effect of a parent's mental illness on her ability to parent a child was not required. In re Shaneeque M., — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. App. LEXIS 757 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 20, 2014), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 128 (Tenn. Feb. 20, 2015).

Evidence preponderated in favor of the trial court's finding that the mother was incompetent to parent the child; a doctor concluded that the mother met the intellectual deficit criterion of mental retardation, other evidence corroborated the doctor's conclusions regarding the mother's intellectual abilities, and nothing showed that the mother was mentally capable of providing the appropriate care that the child required, such that termination was proper. In re K.G.S., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 347 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 19, 2015).

Clear and convincing evidence supported terminating a mother's and father's parental rights on grounds of mental incompetence because, inter alia, the mother, who had a general IQ of 35, would likely never gain the skills to competently care for the children without permanent assistance, the father, who had a general IQ of 66, lacked an adequate support system to aid him in the children's care, and neither parent was able retain the basic information necessary to properly parent the children. In re Aisha R., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 470 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 15, 2015).

Clear and convincing evidence showed that the mother was incompetent and unable to adequately care for and supervise two children because of her mental impairment, and that her mental impairment and incompetence was likely to remain and rendered her unable to adequately care for and supervise the children in the near future. In re Domingo W., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 590 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 23, 2015).

Record contained clear and convincing proof to support the trial court's findings of the mother's mental incompetence; her mental condition had been impaired for more than six years and was not likely to improve in a short time, even with continued therapy and medication, she had been hospitalized on a number of occasions, and her impaired mental condition would prevent her from assuming the care and responsibility for the child in the near future. In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d 507, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 49 (Tenn. Jan. 29, 2016).

Evidence supported the determination that the mother suffered from mental incompetence, and she was unable to adequately provide for the children's care given her mental condition, and termination of her rights was proper. In re Joseph F., 492 S.W.3d 690, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 227 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 377 (Tenn. May 10, 2016).

Trial court did not err by terminating the mother's parental rights based on mental incompetence where the record showed that the mother continued to have delusions concerning her identity during the trial and despite her efforts her condition was unlikely to be remedied in the near future. In re Lillian D., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 626 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 26, 2016).

Issue was not whether the father had impaired cognitive functioning, which he clearly did; the issue was whether this impairment adversely affected his ability to parent his children, and it could not be said clearly that it did, and thus the evidence was insufficient to show that the father's parental rights were to be terminated based upon mental incompetence. In re C.C., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 701 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 22, 2016).

Ground of parental mental incompetence was proven, as there was clear evidence that the mother was mentally incompetent to provide adequately for the future care and supervision of the children; the weight of the evidence showed that the mother's incompetence was not simply an intellectual deficiency, but rather an impairment to her understanding that her needs for socialization and intimacy could not take precedence over the children's safety. In re La'Trianna W., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 956 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 15, 2016), appeal denied, In re La'Trianna W., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 174 (Tenn. Mar. 14, 2017).

In a best interest determination in a termination of parental rights case, the judgment was modified because the record did not contain clear and convincing evidence that supported the trial court's finding that the father's mental and emotional status would prevent him from providing safe and stable care for the child. In re Lydia N.-S., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 55 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2017).

Termination of the mother's rights was proper on the grounds of substantial noncompliance with permanency plan and mental incompetence because the mother did not substantially comply with the permanency plans, particularly the need for her to address her mental health issues; she had alleged throughout the case that there was a satanic conspiracy against her and that the child was at risk of having her organs harvested for trafficking purposes; she refused steadfastly to take any medication for her mental health condition; her untreated paranoia prevented her from making well-founded decisions necessary to successfully parent the child; and she had shown no inclination toward remedying her mental health issues. In re Lorenda B., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 243 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 19, 2017).

Termination of the mother's parental rights on the ground that she was mentally incompetent was supported by evidence that she was observed speaking to individuals who were not in the room and was disconnected during visitation. In re Lena G., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 358 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 26, 2017).

Termination of a mother's parental rights to a child on the ground of mental incompetence was appropriate because the testimony of a licensed clinical psychologist and of a family services worker provided clear and convincing evidence that the mother was mentally incompetent to care for the child, and that, due to the nature of the mother's impairment, it was unlikely that the mother could reach the necessary level of competence to resume the care of the child. In re Tanya G., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 455 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 7, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support the termination of the mother's parental rights based on mental incompetence because it showed that she had been hospitalized and arrested due to her mental illnesses and aberrant behavior on several occasions, she had been diagnosed with bipolar disorder, and an expert testified that her extremely variable and unpredictable functioning rendered her unable to provide the predictability and stability that the children needed from their caregiver. In re Roderick R., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 192 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 11, 2018).

Trial court did not err in terminating a mother's parental rights because the evidence amounted to clear and convincing evidence that the mother's mental condition was so impaired and so likely to remain that way, it was improbable that she would be able to assume care and responsibility for the child; the mother suffered from borderline personality disorder and major depressive disorder, and she was prone to physically explosive tendencies with accompanying violent or aggressive behavior. In re D.T., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 292 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 24, 2018).

Clear and convincing evidence supported the termination of a mother's parental rights on the grounds of abandonment, by mental incompetence, because the mother, who had an intellectual disability, did not have a proper physical living location, could not provide a home free of drugs, was unlikely to establish a suitable home in the near future, and seemed incapable of giving the child appropriate care and attention. In re Frederick S., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 756 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 26, 2018).

Clear and convincing evidence supported the trial court's termination of the mother's parental rights based on mental incompetence to parent the child because the mother stipulated that the child was dependent and neglected in her custody because her intellectual disabilities rendered it difficult to provide the child with appropriate medical care, the mother testified that her sister maintained a conservatorship over her and managed her finances because she was unable to do so, and the mother admitted that she was often unable to understand what doctors and nurses told her and that she required another adult to attend doctor's appointments with her. In re Katrina S., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 398 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 3, 2020).

22. Child Support.

Termination of parental rights also terminates that parent's prospective support obligation; if parental rights are reinstated, the support obligation resumes upon the date that rights are reinstated. In re T.K.Y., 205 S.W.3d 343, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 757 (Tenn. 2006), rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 891 (Tenn. Sept. 19, 2006).

Clear and convincing evidence supported terminating a father's parental rights on grounds of abandonment for willful failure to support because other than nominal expenditures, there was no evidence the father provided any other support for the child despite having the means to pay some level of support; the maternal grandmother paid for the child's daycare expenses, clothing, food, and everything else the child needed. In re Jacobe M.J., 434 S.W.3d 565, 2013 Tenn. App. LEXIS 790 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 5, 2013), appeal denied, In re Jacobe J., — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 228 (Tenn. Mar. 5, 2014).

It was error to find a mother willfully failed to support a child because (1) willfulness required an ability to support, (2) nothing showed the mother was able to support the child, and (3) the mother was unemployed, expecting another child, and had to support a third child. In re Alexis B., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 220 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 14, 2015).

Trial court did not err in terminating a father's parental rights based upon the statutory ground of willful failure to support the child because the father failed to make any reasonable payments toward support of the child even when he was employed; the father failed to offer any details that would support a finding that he sought other employment prior to his incarceration and failed to offer any justifiable excuse for his failure to provide at least some measure of financial support. In re Jayden B.T., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 494 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 23, 2015), appeal denied, In re Jayden T., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 818 (Tenn. Sept. 25, 2015).

Trial court erred in terminating the mother's parental rights based on abandonment for failure to pay child support, as the mother was only obligated to pay support for about one-fourth of the relevant time period and thus, such failure was insufficient to establish willful failure to make reasonable support payments for a four-month period. In re M.A.P., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 57 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 29, 2016).

Mother's failure to support the children was willful, and termination of her parental rights based upon this statutory ground was proper; she was able-bodied with job skills and alleged no impairment of the ability to work, yet she was content to make no or a minimal effort toward securing and maintaining employment. In re Joseph F., 492 S.W.3d 690, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 227 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 377 (Tenn. May 10, 2016).

Father failed to pay a reasonable share of prenatal, natal, and postnatal expenses, which supported termination; he was in good health and had no good cause for failing to pay a share of his expenses, he worked while in prison, but never sent any money to the support the child, and although the father contested the expenses as imaginary, the trial court found that certain expenses were normal and customary. In re F.N.M., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 274 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 11, 2016).

Order contained insufficient findings as to whether the father willfully failed to support the child, and the order omitted any reference to his income or expenses; without such evidence, a finding of willfulness could not be sustained. In re Navada N., 498 S.W.3d 579, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 367 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 23, 2016).

Termination of parental rights was appropriate because clear and convincing evidence established that the parent abandoned their child by willfully failing to remit child support before, during, and after the relevant time period. Although the parent had limited education and difficulty in securing employment, the parent never paid child support, other than token support or small gifts, throughout the entirety of the child's lifetime even when the parent was admittedly capable of working and actually employed at various times. In re Hailey S., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 380 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 31, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 156 (Tenn. Mar. 1, 2017).

While the father admitted he did not pay any child support though he was aware of his obligation to pay, failure to pay was not enough to establish willfulness, and whether he had the financial ability to pay support had to be determined. In re Aiden R., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 420 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 23, 2016).

Father had no source of income other than some unspecified odd job, and it was the department's burden to prove that the father's lack of full-time employment was voluntary, which the department failed to prove; the father's testimony was not clear, and the proof was insufficient to support the finding that the father was capable of working and paying child support during the period in question. In re Aiden R., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 420 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 23, 2016).

Trial court erred in terminating the father's parental rights based on abandonment for failure to support the children because, although the father failed to pay any support for the children during the four months immediately preceding the filing of the petition to terminate the father's rights, there was no evidence in the record to suggest that the father had the ability to provide financial support for the children during the relevant time period; thus, there was not clear and convincing evidence that the father's failure to support the children was willful. In re Keith W., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 557 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 3, 2016).

Trial court properly terminated a father's parental rights because the father willfully failed to support the child; the father conceded that he did not pay any child support during the relevant four-month period, despite admitting he was aware of his duty to pay child support, and the father was self-employed and admitted to buying cigarettes and illegal drugs. In re E.S.L., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 630 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 29, 2016).

Father's failure to support the child was willful, and thus termination of the father's rights was proper; the father was working and making money but made the conscious decision to spend his earnings in ways other than contributing to the support of the child. In re Elizabeth D., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 706 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 23, 2016).

Testimony corroborated the father's testimony that he last paid child support at the end of 2012, and thus there was clear evidence to support the trial court's finding that the father had abandoned this child by willful failure to provide support during the four months immediately preceding the father's incarceration. In re Maddox C., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 860 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 9, 2016).

Ground of willful failure to support was proven against the mother by clear and convincing evidence where an exhibit showed that she paid approximately $2,000 for prescription drugs during the relevant four-month period but made no additional support payments. In re Dillon E., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 872 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 15, 2016).

Ground of abandonment by failure to support was proven; the only child support payments the mother ever made were when money was taken out of her paychecks and when her tax refund was intercepted by the State, and although this occurred in the four months preceding the filing of the petition, the intercept did not constitute a voluntary payment of support, plus she was employed by several different employers and she never testified she was unable to make any contribution towards her support obligations. In re Dustin T., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 876 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 17, 2016).

Termination based on abandonment by failure to support was proven, given that the mother knew of her support obligations and the consequences of not meeting those obligations, and the trial court properly found that the mother had enough income to support herself, make her support payments, and still have some money left over each month. In re Eddie F., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 924 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 2, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 158 (Tenn. Mar. 2, 2017).

Clear and convincing evidence supported terminating a mother's parental rights for a willful failure to support because the mother provided only token support despite being able to obtain money for cigarettes and drugs. In re Casey C., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 966 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 19, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 80 (Tenn. Jan. 25, 2017).

Termination of the father's parental rights was in the child's best interests because the father conceded that he had not supported the child and the record affirmed that the father had not paid support, other than a few hundred dollars, despite the facts that the mother opened a bank account at the father's bank to facilitate his deposit of funds; and because the father made substantial income in 2013 prior to his incarceration. In re Lydia N.-S., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 55 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2017).

Evidence was insufficient to support the termination of the father's rights for the willful failure to provide support because there was no proof as to his income and expenses during the relevant four-month time period. In re Anna B., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 70 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 1, 2017).

Text messages purportedly showing that a mother engaged in illicit drug sales were not dispositive to the issue of the mother's alleged willful non-support because the text messages could be interpreted to show that the mother earned money selling drugs, which could in turn support a showing of willfulness in her failure to pay any child support, but they could perhaps better lend support to a conclusion that, if anything, the mother was a failed drug dealer. In re Karissa, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 134 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2017), appeal denied, In re Karissa V., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 330 (Tenn. May 24, 2017).

Trial court's finding of willful non-support with respect to a mother was reversed because there was no clear and convincing evidence proving willfulness during the relevant four month period; the fact that the mother abused drugs and generally was irresponsible in her life could not alone impute willfulness as to her non-support, and the mother's drug abuse and general irresponsibility did not shift the burden of proof as to willfulness from Grandfather to her. In re Karissa, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 134 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2017), appeal denied, In re Karissa V., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 330 (Tenn. May 24, 2017).

Trial court did not err in finding the ground of failure to support when terminating a father's parental rights because the record clearly showed that the father was capable of working, that he did work, and that he never paid any child support to the grandfather for his children. In re Karissa, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 134 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2017), appeal denied, In re Karissa V., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 330 (Tenn. May 24, 2017).

Termination of the mother's parental rights on the ground of abandonment by willful failure to support was proper; the mother provided no financial support for the child, and her argument that there was no court order requiring her to pay support was not persuasive, as parents were presumed to know of their obligation to support their children. In re Charles A., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 194 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 24, 2017).

In a termination of parental rights case, the juvenile court erred in finding the ground of willful failure to support because the trial court failed to render findings of fact that the mother failed to remit the required support during the four-month period and the record did not clearly and convincingly prove as such regardless. In re Lorenda B., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 243 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 19, 2017).

Based on the father's own factual admissions and his failure to cite any applicable law or argument on the issue, the finding that he willfully failed to support the child as set forth in T.C.A. § 36-1-102 was affirmed, and termination under T.C.A. § 36-1-113 was proper. In re Wesley P., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 301 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 12, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 400 (Tenn. July 6, 2017).

In a parental rights termination proceeding, a trial court erred in finding that a father's failure to pay support for the child was not willful where there was no dispute that he had the ability to pay support, the father admitted that he was aware of his obligation to provide support, his petition to determine the child's parentage and set visitation did not include any effort to establish child support, and his lack of effort to pay child support after agreeing to do so evidenced that his failure to do so was the product of free will. In re Sydney B., 537 S.W.3d 452, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 302 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 12, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 469 (Tenn. Aug. 1, 2017).

While the department argued that the mother's decision to buy drugs rather than pay child support constituted a willful failure to support her children, the department had to prove by clear evidence that the mother had the capacity to pay support but made no attempt to do so and did not possess a justifiable excuse, which the department failed to do; termination of the mother's rights for abandonment by failure to support prior to incarceration under T.C.A. §§ 36-1-102, 36-1-113 was improper. In re Quintin S., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 480 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 13, 2017).

Father had a job and was current on his child support payments, and thus the trial court properly denied termination of the father's rights for abandonment by failure to support prior to incarceration under T.C.A. §§ 36-1-102, 36-1-113. In re Quintin S., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 480 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 13, 2017).

Father's drug habit and payment of court fines did not amount to sufficient evidence of a willful failure to support his children, and the department failed to present enough evidence to eliminate any serious doubt that the father had the ability to pay support and that his failure to support his children was willful; thus, the termination of the father's rights on the ground of willful failure to support, under T.C.A. §§ 36-1-102(1)(D), 36-1-113, was reversed. In re Quintin S., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 480 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 13, 2017).

Department failed to prove the ground of abandonment by failure to support by clear and convincing evidence as to the mother and father, under T.C.A. §§ 36-1-102(1)(A)(i), 36-1-113, as they were incarcerated during the relevant time period. In re Quintin S., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 480 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 13, 2017).

Termination of the father's parental rights was proper based on abandonment for failure to remit child support because the father's claim that his failure to remit support was not willful when he was unaware of a duty to remit support was rejected as the record did not reflect that his mental capacity was so impaired that he did not understand that the child required food and other items for survival; he provided token support when the child visited his residence; the court credited the mother's testimony that he refused her request for support and advised her that it was not his responsibility to provide support; and he did not pay child support even when he was actually employed at various times. In re Bryson, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 483 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 17, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support the termination of the father's parental rights based on failure to pay child support because he admitted that he had never paid child support. In re Taya K., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 67 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 6, 2018).

Grandparents failed to present sufficient evidence that the mother had the capacity to provide support or rebut her justifiable excuse for failing to do so, as there was no evidence of her hours worked, wage earned, or expenses; the mother's decision to purchase drugs indicated that she did have some funds for non-necessities, but the purchase of illegal drugs alone was insufficient to prove that her failure to provide support was willful, and thus abandonment by willful failure to support was not proven. In re Addalyne S., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 225 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 26, 2018).

Father admitted that he had no justifiable excuse for his failure to pay child support while he was gainfully employed, and the $ 80 amount he paid the grandparents for support was clearly token, and therefore the grandparents showed that the father willfully failed to provide no more than token support, for termination purposes. In re Addalyne S., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 225 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 26, 2018).

Failure to provide prenatal support was not available as a ground to terminate the father's parental rights because the mother testified that he paid for out-of-pocket expenses, and the father testified that he paid for food, shelter, and a share of the cost of the mother's medicine expenses. The father also testified that after his arrest and incarceration he was unable to continue to pay for the mother's expenses due to a lack of income. In re Kah'Nyia J., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 238 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support the termination of the parents'  rights based on abandonment by failure to support because the mother was deemed to be aware of her obligation to support her children, the father was making child support payments for his other children, the parents were employed for the majority of the pertinent time period, and the children's foster parents testified that they received no support from the parents. In re Kah'Nyia J., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 238 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2018).

Father was capable of and pursued employment, when it was available and he was able to arrange for transportation, he knew of his duty to support and he sought a modification of his support due to his inability to pay, and he was unable to pay for a period of time as a result of a criminal episode, and thus the evidence was not clear and convincing that he willfully failed to provide support within the meaning of the statute. In re Aden H., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 333 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 19, 2018).

Without evidence to establish that the mother had the ability to pay support for her children during the relevant time period, the department failed to show that she failed to support or make reasonable payments toward the support of her children to prove the ground of abandonment, and termination of her rights was reversed as to this ground. In re Mc, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 332 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 20, 2018).

Father willfully failed to visit the child during the relevant four-month period prior to his incarceration and thus grounds for termination existed based on abandonment by willful failure to visit; the father refused to provide his contact information to the department, failed to maintain contact with the department, never proactively attempted to establish paternity, and willingly forewent his opportunity to assume fatherly responsibilities. In re Kylea K., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 338 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 21, 2018).

Record contained insufficient evidence to demonstrate that the father had the capacity to pay child support and willfully failed to do so; the burden was not on him to demonstrate an inability to work or pay and there was no proof to establish his employment, income, expenses, or resources during the critical four-month period, and without such evidence, a finding of willfulness could not be sustained. In re Kylea K., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 338 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 21, 2018).

Despite the father's substantial business enterprises, his substantial monthly interest income and his significant annual income, he paid nothing for his son's support and only provided token gifts, and the father's testimony that he was not aware of his obligation to pay support did not excuse his failure to pay; therefore, termination of the father's rights based on his willful failure to support was proper. In re Gabriel B., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 413 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 23, 2018).

Record did not contain clear evidence of the mother's abandonment by failure to support; while the mother knew of her support obligation, was able to work during a large portion of the relevant time period, and made some payments, the proof of her broken foot and childbirth did not convince the court that she had the capacity to work throughout the pertinent period of time. In re Piper B., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 478 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 17, 2018).

Although the record supported for the determination that the father knew of his duty to support the child and the consequences of his failure to do so, the evidence was insufficient to establish the father's ability to remit support during the relevant time period, and the termination of the father's rights on this ground was reversed. In re Charles T., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 501 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 28, 2018).

Trial court erred in terminating the mother's parental rights on the ground of abandonment by willful failure to support; although there was proof that the mother was not disabled or otherwise precluded from gainful employment, the Department of Children's Services did not show that she not only had the capacity to pay support but did not do so, and had no justification for not doing so. In re Hayden L, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 515 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2018).

Trial court's finding of abandonment was vacated and findings of fact concerning the willfulness of the alleged abandonment were required on remand; the trial court did not consider the mother's arguments that her failure to provide support was not willful because she was in a rehabilitation program, and her income was used to pay for the program. In re Abagail D., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 536 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 13, 2018).

Trial court noted that the parenting plan did not require the mother to remit child support but the trial court did not issue any findings of fact concerning her willfulness in relation to the terms contained in the plan; thus, the finding of abandonment for failure to support was vacated.  — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 745 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 19, 2018).

Father abandoned the child by willfully failing to remit support, which supported the termination of his parental rights; although he claimed that his failure to prioritize his support payments was a result of his lack of understanding of a complex system, he was advised of his obligation to remit support by a child support order, parenting plans, and his signing of the Criteria for Termination of Parental Rights, plus every parent was presumed to know of his legal obligation to support his child. In re Kaycee M., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 585 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 3, 2018).

Termination of the mother's parental rights on the ground of abandonment by failure to support was supported by the evidence; she knew of her duty to pay child support, she worked during part of the relevant time period, when she did not work during that time, she was not unable to work, and she admitted she failed to pay any support. In re Larry P., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 606 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 15, 2018).

Because petitioners failed to present clear evidence that the mother's failure to support was willful, the court vacated the findings with respect to this ground for termination; she could not be blamed for using her monthly paycheck to pay rent at an rehabilitation facility, nor could she be blamed for using her tax refund to pay overdue bills, and that she bought cigarettes during the relevant four-month period was insufficient alone to produce a firm belief that her failure to pay support was willful. In re L.U.S., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 613 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 19, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's termination of the father's parental rights based on abandonment for nonsupport because the father admitted at the hearing that he had a duty to remit support, he had the capacity to remit support, and that he failed to do so because the mother refused his request for visitation. In re Ruger N., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 659 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 9, 2018).

There was clear evidence that the father abandoned the children by willfully failing to support them; he paid nothing until ordered to do so and he provided no nonmonetary support, such as clothing or food, yet he worked several jobs and his expenses were minimal, and thus he could have provided some financial support for his children but willfully chose not to do so. In re Gaberiel S., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 718 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 11, 2018).

There was not clear and convincing proof from which to conclude that the mother had the capacity to pay support during the relevant period; while there was some testimony in the record that the mother worked while the children were in custody, the testimony did not establish what her income and expenses were during the period at issue. In re Antonio J., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 759 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2018).

There was clear and convincing evidence to establish that the mother abandoned the child by failing to remit support because she admitted her physical ability to work during the relevant time period and that she later obtained employment after the relevant time period but still failed to provide any financial support. In re Ethan M., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 45 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 29, 2019).

Clear and convincing evidence did not support terminating a mother's parental rights on the ground of abandonment based on a willful failure to support because there was little to no evidence of the mother's ability to pay support. In re Paetyn M., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 81 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 14, 2019).

Chancery court erred in terminating a father's parental rights on the ground of abandonment by willful failure to support because his failure to pay support was not willful where there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that he had the ability to pay child support, inasmuch as the mother and stepfather did not present any evidence regarding the father's financial means, expenses, or obligations during the relevant four-month period, and the record reflected that the father was actively seeking employment. In re Maddox G., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 96 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 25, 2019).

Although the mother did not provide cash to the child's guardians, she spent a portion of her disposable income that was not insignificant on the child during the relevant four-month period, thereby precluding the guardians from proving abandonment by clear and convincing evidence. Specifically, the mother had between $150 and $300 per month in disposable income that she could have used to pay child support. The evidence showed that the mother spent approximately $800 on the child over the relevant four-month period, which averaged out to about $200 per month. In re Anna G., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 208 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 1, 2019).

Evidence was less than clear and convincing that a mother's failure to support was willful because, although the mother worked during the relevant time period, the evidence of the mother's ability to pay support, including evidence as to the mother's income and expenses during the relevant four-month period before the petition to terminate parental rights was filed, was lacking. In re Raeshad B., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 242 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 20, 2019).

Mother testified that on average she worked three or four days per week and at best, she earned $ 840 during the four months before the petition was filed; she had monthly expenses of $ 120 and paid an additional $ 90 toward the support of the child's half-siblings, such that her payments toward the child's support were not insignificant given her means. The department did not meet its burden to prove that the mother's payments were token support. In re Josiah T., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 482 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 2, 2019).

Ground of willful failure to support was proven against a father by the standard of clear and convincing evidence because the father had the capacity to pay support, did not do so, and had no justification for not doing so; the father testified that, at all times during the relevant statutory period, he was working, and when pressed by the trial court as to whether he had money to pay child support the father admitted that he did. In re Channing M., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 516 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 23, 2019).

Trial court erred in terminating the mother's parental rights on the ground of abandonment by willful failure to support; although the mother failed to provide any support for the child during the relevant time period, there was no proof that the mother's failure to provide support was willful, as the record was devoid of any evidence to show her income, expenses, or employment history. In re Dylan S., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 518 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 23, 2019).

Evidence was insufficient to support the trial court's termination of the mother's parental rights based on abandonment for willful failure to support because the mother's acknowledgment during her deposition that she had between $80 and $100 extra per month was not introduced into evidence and there was no competent evidence in the record showing that the mother had the ability to provide support. In re Alexis S., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 526 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 29, 2019).

Terminating parents'  parental rights for abandonment due to willful nonsupport erred because (1) a mother was entitled to credit for payments using borrowed funds, (2) no clear and convincing evidence showed the could pay more support, and (3) no such evidence showed a father's nonpayment of support was willful. In re C.L., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 20 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 21, 2020).

Trial court properly terminated the mother's parental rights under the ground of abandonment by failure to support; because she did not appear at trial and presented no evidence, the unrefuted proof was that she was working, yet never provided any type of financial support for the child. In re Imerald W., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 43 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2020).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was proper for abandonment by failure to support; the mother had the capacity to work during the relevant time period and did work for much of it, which provided her the means to pay her expenses and provide discretionary funds for travel and entertainment, and yet she admitted she did not pay money to the grandparents for the support of the child. In re Daisy A., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 167 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 17, 2020).

Termination of the father's parental rights based on abandonment for failure to support was proper because, although he testified that he had paid approximately $80 toward the child's support, the Tennessee Department of Children's Services produced documentation showing that he, in fact, paid $20 during the entire time the child was in foster care; and, when asked why the money he used to buy cigarettes was not tendered for support of his child, the father downplayed his habit. In re Dustin M., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 191 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 28, 2020).

Termination of the mother's parental rights based on abandonment for failure to support was proper because the case worker testified that the mother was aware of the permanency plan requirement that she pay $20 per month in child support; the case worker testified that she was unaware of any impediments to the mother's ability to work; and the mother had made no payments toward the child's support. In re Dustin M., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 191 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 28, 2020).

Upon the change in the statutory requirement eliminating the willfulness requirement, the trial court erred by requiring the grandparents to prove the mother's willfulness in her failure to provide support; however, the error was harmless because the mother testified that she would have sought employment but for a lack of child care for her newborn. Thus, she proved that her lack of support was not willful, and therefore there was a lack of evidence concerning abandonment for failure to support. In re Eli H., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 206 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 8, 2020).

Even though the trial court err by applying two different four-month periods, as the grandparents'  amended petition did not set forth separate or distinct allegations, the error was harmless because the ground of failure to support was proven by clear and convincing evidence, as the mother conceded she never paid the grandparents any child support and her sporadic gifts were token in nature. In re Ava M., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 226 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 20, 2020).

23. Child Abuse.

Termination of the mother's parental rights was proper because the trial court previously found, by clear and convincing evidence, that the child was severely abused by the mother in that she knowingly allowed the child to be present within a structure where the act of creating methamphetamine was occurring; and the mother did not appeal the November 2013 adjudicatory order. In re J.R.C., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 255 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 27, 2015).

Trial court did not err in terminating parental rights based upon a prior finding of severe abuse because the record indicated that a trial court's order finding that a child was a victim of severe child abuse perpetrated by the parent was not appealed, and as such, the trial court's findings were res judicata. In re Roger T., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 261 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 27, 2015).

Trial court did not err in terminating the father's parental rights based on his sentence of more than two years for conduct against the child deemed severe child abuse. In re T.L.G., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 369 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 26, 2015).

Trial court noted the father's convictions in Ohio for multiple rapes and an attempted rape of the child and found that the father's acts that led to his incarceration constituted severe child abuse, and the trial court properly considered the father's rape convictions for purposes of a parental termination proceeding; the trial court properly found that the father committed acts that fell within the definition of rape, and in addition, enumerated offenses relevant herein included aggravated sexual battery and rape of a child, and the trial court did not err in terminating the father's rights. In re T.L.G., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 369 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 26, 2015).

In proceedings to terminate a mother's parental rights, clear and convincing evidence existed to establish the ground of severe abuse because the mother and the father were again manufacturing methamphetamine in their home, the mother tested positive for methamphetamine at that time and admitted to methamphetamine use, and, shortly thereafter, the young child also tested positive for methamphetamine. In re Wesley P., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 400 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 29, 2015).

Trial court erred by refusing to allow witnesses to testify about abuse the parents'  son allegedly endured because it was relevant to the question of whether the parents'  rights to their daughter could be terminated for abuse. In re Makenzie L., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 480 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 17, 2015), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 860 (Tenn. Oct. 15, 2015).

Juvenile court properly terminated the parents'  parental rights pursuant based on severe abuse because their children made multiple disclosures of sexual abuse perpetrated on them by the parents to several individuals, the children were acting out sexually and with each other and had knowledge of sexual matters far beyond what was appropriate for children of their age, reunification was not realistic or in the best interests of the children, the absence of criminal charges relating to sexual abuse did not undermine the evidence, the suggestion of “coaching” was unsupported by the record, and the parents had made absolutely no genuine reckoning with the sexual abuse allegations. In re C.A.F., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 612 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 29, 2015).

Clear and convincing evidence supported terminating a mother's parental rights for severe child abuse because (1) the mother did not appeal a prior finding that a child was dependent or neglected for this reason, making the finding binding, and (2) the finding applied to the abused child's sibling. In re A.C.S., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 767 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 23, 2015).

Termination of the mother's parental rights to an adopted child based on severe child abuse was proper because, although the mother argued that her boyfriend had committed the abuse, the evidence in the record established that the mother also abused the child by both paddling her and binding her with cable ties; the parent facing termination of her parental rights did not have to have caused the abuse as the definition of severe child abuse included the knowing failure to protect a child from abuse or neglect that was likely to cause serious bodily injury; and the mother admitted in her interview that she knew that her boyfriend abused her children, including the adopted child, on an almost daily basis. In re Americus C., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 803 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2015).

Grounds for termination of parental rights existed because a parent (1) whipped one child to the point that the child was bruised and the child's face was lacerated; and (2) continued to abuse illicit substances while pregnant with another child, despite the parent's knowledge of the potential dangers (including the risk of serious bodily injury or even death of the in utero child) of continued illicit substance abuse during the parent's pregnancy with the child. In re Kaedince M., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 849 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 19, 2015).

Trial court did not err in finding that grounds existed to terminate the father's parental rights to the children for severe abuse; the father struck the mother with a baseball bat stating that he knew he would be arrested, the children were present at the time, and the father had attacked two of the children and was incarcerated. In re Kyah H., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 986 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 23, 2015).

Termination of the mother's rights for severe abuse was proper, given in part that she moved often and left the children in the care of boyfriends who were abusive, the children were exposed to a pattern of neglect while in the mother's custody, and they had psychological issues because of that. In re Joseph F., 492 S.W.3d 690, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 227 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 377 (Tenn. May 10, 2016).

There was clear and convincing evidence to support termination of the father's rights based on a finding of severe child abuse, because the juvenile court's prior finding of severe child abuse was not subject to collateral attack. In re Jimmy B., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 321 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 11, 2016).

Termination of the father's rights on the ground of severe child abuse was supported by evidence that the father injected drugs intravenously and let the children roam around a park for several hours unattended and left his car accessible to the children while littered with syringes and dangerous prescription medication. In re Kaitlin W., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 332 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 16, 2016).

Termination of the mother's parental rights based on a finding of sever child abuse was supported by the mother's concession to having been adjudicated as perpetuating sever abuse on the child. In re Maison W., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 356 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 27, 2016).

Clear and convincing evidence supported termination of a parent's parental rights to the parent's minor children, on the statutory ground of severe child abuse, because the parent admitted to driving while under the influence of prescription medication, for which medication the parent admitted that the parent did not have a prescription, with the children in the car. In re Addison E., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 447 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 30, 2016).

Evidence supported the findings of termination of the parental rights of the mother and father based on severe child abuse, given the second-degree burn that the child sustained while in his mother's care and the father's failure to procure medical attention for the child; there was medical testimony that the injury was consistent with non-accidental trauma that caused the child substantial pain. In re Derrick J., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 477 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 8, 2016).

Severe abuse committed by the mother against her oldest child, which occurred prior to the birth of the subject children who were the child's sibling or half-sibling, was sufficient to find that severe abuse had been met as to the children at issue. In re I.E.A., 511 S.W.3d 507, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 503 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 20, 2016).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was proper based on severe child abuse because, despite being aware of the risks, the mother persistently abused drugs while pregnant; she knowingly exposed the child to abuse that was likely to cause serious bodily injury or death; and that exposure caused the child to experience drug withdrawals after birth and necessitated the child's hospitalization for an extended period of time. In re Joshua C., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 543 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 28, 2016).

Evidence was insufficient to support the trial court's findings of severe child abuse by the mother; the finding of severe child abuse was based solely on the mother's arrest for driving under the influence and reckless endangerment, and while the mother's decision to operate a vehicle under the influence of intoxicants with her child unrestrained was abhorrent, the trial court's decision to make a finding of severe child abuse in the termination proceeding when it declined the opportunity to do so based on the same facts in the dependency and neglect proceedings appeared to be incongruous. In re Destiny S., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 559 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 4, 2016).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was proper based on severe child abuse because, prior to the termination hearing, the trial court entered an order adjudicating the child dependent and neglected based upon a finding that the mother had committed severe child abuse by failing to protect the child from acts that met the statutory definitions of rape, aggravated sexual assault, rape of a child, and incest. In re C.D.,  S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 646 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 30, 2016).

Termination of parental rights on the ground of severe abuse was appropriate because the evidence supported the finding that non-accidental trauma at the hands of the father caused one of the children's serious skull fractures, given a doctor's testimony, the inconsistencies in the parents'  account of what happened, the history of abuse in the family, and the children's unsolicited statements as to how the father hurt the injured child. The mother committed severe child abuse by knowingly failing to protect the child from serious bodily harm. In re Savannah F., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 657 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2016).

Juvenile court properly terminated a father's parental rights on the ground of severe child abuse because the father, along with the mother, perpetrated severe child abuse through the supply and use of illegal drugs and non-prescribed pain medication. In re Braxton R., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 660 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 2, 2016).

In addition to concluding that the minor children were dependent and neglected, the juvenile court's order found that the mother had committed severe child abuse against one child consistent with the definition contained in T.C.A. § 37-1-102. Because that child was a subject of the termination petition and was a half-sibling of the other two minor children at issue, once the juvenile court's order became final, a sufficient ground to terminate the mother's rights existed. In re Stormie M., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 675 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 15, 2016).

Under the severe child abuse ground for termination of parental rights, a finding of severe abuse against one child can be the basis for terminating parental rights to a sibling, including a half-sibling; thus, a finding of severe abuse against one of the mother's children could be a ground for termination as to the other child. In re Envy J., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 705 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 22, 2016), appeal dismissed, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 944 (Tenn. Dec. 16, 2016).

Department presented scant evidence regarding the mother's ability to pay support during the relevant four-month time period, and thus the proof offered was insufficient to show that the mother's failure to support her children was willful. In re Envy J., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 705 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 22, 2016), appeal dismissed, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 944 (Tenn. Dec. 16, 2016).

Because the juvenile court's order of dependency and neglect was final and was not appealed, grounds for termination existed based on severe abuse; the juvenile court adjudicated the children to be dependent and neglected after finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that all three children were victims of severe child abuse. In re Jason S., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 715 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 23, 2016).

Termination of the mother's rights on the grounds of severe child abuse was proper, given that a previously issued final order found that the mother had severely abused one child, and that finding was res judicata, plus it supported a finding that a half-sibling of the other children was the victim of severe child abuse. In re Alfonzo E., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 797 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 26, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 76 (Tenn. Jan. 24, 2017).

Termination of the father's parental rights on the basis of severe child abuse was supported by evidence that he failed to intervene when the mother duct taped the children's hands and mouths, required them to do excessive squats while waiting to be whipped, and whipped them, often with their clothes off. In re Tamera W., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 856 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 9, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 87 (Tenn. Feb. 9, 2017).

Termination of the mother's parental rights on the basis of severe child abuse was supported by evidence that the mother duct taped the children's hands and mouths, required them to do excessive squats while waiting to be whipped, and whipped them, often with their clothes off. In re Tamera W., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 856 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 9, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 87 (Tenn. Feb. 9, 2017).

Mother's conduct in failing to feed her youngest child appropriately and failing to seek medical care for him constituted severe child abuse because an expert testified that the mother's actions of neglect toward the child resulting in severe nutritional malnourishment could produce severe developmental delay or intellectual disability in the child, and was likely to cause serious bodily injury or death; she admitted to hospital personnel that she noticed that the child was not growing approximately three months before he was admitted to the hospital; the mother was aware that it was not appropriate for the child to gain only eight ounces in six months; and, despite that knowledge, she did not seek medical treatment for the child. In re Chance D., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 902 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2016).

Expert testimony establishing that the mother's actions of neglect toward the child resulting in severe malnutrition could reasonably be expected to produce severe developmental delay or intellectual disability in the child, supported termination of the mother's parental rights, based on a finding that she committed severe child abuse. In re Jude D., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 909 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2016).

Mother's conduct in failing to feed her youngest child appropriately and failing to seek medical care for him constituted severe child abuse because an expert testified that the mother's actions of neglect toward the child resulting in severe nutritional malnourishment could produce severe developmental delay or intellectual disability in the child, and was likely to cause serious bodily injury or death; she admitted to hospital personnel that she noticed that the child was not growing approximately three months before he was admitted to the hospital; the mother was aware that it was not appropriate for the child to gain only eight ounces in six months; and, despite that knowledge, she did not seek medical treatment for the child. In re Gabriella D., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 912 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2016).

Termination of the father's parental rights based on severe child abuse was supported by the trial court's finding that the father digitally penetrated the child. In re Addison B., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 913 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2016).

Termination of the mother's parental rights based on a finding of severe child abuse, was supported by evidence the mother admitted to using drugs while pregnant and the child tested positive for oxycodone at the time of his birth. In re Sophie O., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 985 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 23, 2016).

Trial court did not err in terminating the parental rights of a mother because there was clear and convincing evidence that the mother committed severe child abuse; the mother took photographs of the child's genitals and sent them to a known sex offender, who had discussed with her his sexual interest in the child, and her actions constituted especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor and severe child abuse. In re G.L., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 993 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2016).

Mother abused drugs while pregnant with one child, and termination of her rights was proper. In re Yariel S., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 6, 2017).

There was clear and convincing evidence to support the termination of the parents'  rights for severe child abuse because in 2012 a juvenile court found that two of the children were the victims of severe child abuse due to the mother's prenatal drug use and the father's knowledge of that drug use and his failure to intervene. In re Kayla B., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 66 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 1, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support the termination of the father's parental rights for sexual child abuse because it was undisputed that the father pleaded guilty to two counts of attempted aggravated sexual battery under T.C.A. § 39-13-504. In re Anna B., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 70 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 1, 2017).

There was sufficient evidence to support a termination of parental rights because an abuse issue had been fully litigated in the dependent and neglect action, a mother did not raise an argument relating to notice before the trial court, and the order entered on December 17, 2014 was final, res judicata, and could not have been relitigated in this proceeding. In re Delilah G., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 116 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 22, 2017), appeal dismissed, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 398 (Tenn. June 19, 2017).

Child was severely abused as a result of manufacturing of methamphetamine in the home and testing positive for methamphetamine; because the father was found to have committed severe abuse as defined in T.C.A. § 36-1-102 under a prior court order, this ground for termination under T.C.A. § 36-1-113 was established by clear and convincing evidence. In re Wesley P., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 301 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 12, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 400 (Tenn. July 6, 2017).

Mother was found to have committed severe child abuse as defined in T.C.A. § 37-1-102, which was a final judgment, and she was precluded from relitigating this issue; this finding established grounds for the termination of the mother's parental rights under T.C.A. § 36-1-113(g)(4) and relieved the Department of Children's Services from its obligation to make reasonable efforts to reunify the mother and the child, for purposes of T.C.A. § 37-1-166(g)(4)(A). In re Martese P., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 353 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 24, 2017).

Termination of the mother's parental rights based on child abuse was supported by evidence that the mother knew her paramour's children had been removed from his custody and he was only allowed supervised visitation and that he had abused her children. In re Rylan G., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 429 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 28, 2017).

Termination of the parents'  rights based on severe child abuse was not proper, as the evidence showed felony neglect, but that was not sufficient to show severe child abuse. In re C.J.B., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 436 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 28, 2017), appeal denied, In re Chaz B., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 624 (Tenn. Sept. 22, 2017).

T.C.A. § 36-1-113(g)(4) does not require a finding of severe abuse by a previous court; it specifically provides that the court hearing the petition to terminate parental rights may make a finding of severe child abuse. In re Quintin S., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 480 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 13, 2017).

Mother's rights were properly terminated under T.C.A. § 36-1-113(g)(4) on the ground of severe child abuse, as defined in T.C.A. § 37-1-102, given that she used drugs during her pregnancies with her daughter and son, both children had narcotic abstinence syndrome, and they suffered from problems related to their exposure to drugs; the daughter was being treated at a sleep center, she exhibited developmental delays, and she had pica, and the son had a sensory issue with feeding and could not eat even baby food at almost two years old. In re Quintin S., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 480 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 13, 2017).

Trial court properly refused to terminate the father's rights under T.C.A. § 36-1-113(g)(4) on the ground of severe child abuse, as defined in T.C.A. § 37-1-102; the father attempted to help the mother to stay off of illegal drugs during her pregnancy, and this termination ground was not established as to by clear and convincing evidence. In re Quintin S., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 480 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 13, 2017).

Termination of the father's parental rights based on severe child abuse was proper because the severe abuse he committed against the deceased child resulted in her death; he was tried and convicted of aggravated child abuse and felony murder and was serving a life sentence for his actions; his convictions established severe child abuse that served as the basis for termination of his parental rights; and severe child abuse committed against one sibling resulted in severe child abuse against the other siblings. In re Demarkus T., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 529 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 3, 2017).

Although the mother contended that a lower standard was used to imply severe child abuse against her as she was only convicted of criminally negligent homicide, because the trial court made an additional finding that the mother committed severe abuse as she knew or should have known that the father abused the children in a way that could cause serious bodily injury or death, the mother's parental rights were properly terminated as she committed severe abuse by failing to protect the deceased child from the father's known abuse. In re Demarkus T., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 529 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 3, 2017).

Trial court properly terminated a father's parental rights on the ground of severe sexual abuse because the father made no allegation that he was not found guilty of committing severe child sexual abuse within the meaning of subsection (g)(11); the father's continued assertions of innocence had no bearing on whether grounds for termination existed pursuant to the statute. In re Hailey C., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 658 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 28, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 895 (Tenn. Dec. 21, 2017).

There was no error in allowing the mother to amend her petition to include subsection (g)(11)(B) as the sole ground for termination of the father's parental rights because there was no prejudice to the father; after granted the motion to amend, the trial court asked the father's attorney whether he needed additional time to try the case, but counsel said he did not and that he was ready to move forward that day with the remainder of his proof. In re Hailey C., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 658 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 28, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 895 (Tenn. Dec. 21, 2017).

Termination of the mother's parental rights based on a finding of severe child abuse was supported by evidence that the mother exposed the son to methamphetamine manufacturing and used methamphetamine within a month or two of the daughter's birth. In re Douglas H., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 662 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 29, 2017).

Mother and stepfather proved by clear and convincing evidence that the force the father repeatedly used in smacking, popping, and throwing his girlfriend's two-year-old child would likely cause serious bodily injury to the child and thus, they proved the ground of sever child abuse. In re Lauren M., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 828 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 2, 2017).

Termination was proper based on severe child abuse because the Child Protective Services Investigator testified that the oldest child had told the father about the mother's drug use; and the father knowingly disregarded the mother's drug use around the children and he instructed one of the mother's children by another man on how to dispose of needles. In re Alyssa W., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 803 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 14, 2017).

In a termination of parental rights case, the hearsay testimony regarding the children's statements related to issues concerning severe child abuse were admissible because there was no competent evidence that their statements were not trustworthy; the children described the mother's drug use consistently at different times to the Child Protective Services Investigator and the foster mother, and the specifics of the matters about which the children reported placed them in danger of serious bodily harm by their exposure to illicit drugs and drug paraphernalia; and the father was aware of the threat to their safety inasmuch as they reported the mother's drug use to him. In re Alyssa W., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 803 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 14, 2017).

Prior orders, finding by clear and convincing evidence that the child was the victim of “severe child abuse” as defined by T.C.A. § 37-1-102, constituted clear and convincing evidence of a statutory ground for terminating the mother's parental rights In re Brianna T., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 825 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 22, 2017).

Prior orders, finding by clear and convincing evidence that one of the parents caused injuries to the child and that the father either perpetrated the abuse or failed to protect the child from it, and finding that the child was the victim of “severe child abuse” as defined by T.C.A. § 37-1-102(b)(21)(A)(i), constituted clear and convincing evidence of a statutory ground for terminating the father's parental rights In re Brianna T., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 826 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 22, 2017).

Trial court properly found that the father had severely abused a half-sibling of the child subject to the termination proceeding where the half-sibling related that while alone in the home with the father, he made her watch a pornographic video, put a condom on him, and take off her clothing, she reported that the father's private parts touched her private parts, and she testified that when she expressed to the father that she did not wish to participate, he stated to her that it was normal, that that's what parents and kids did. In re Brooke E., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 830 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 22, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support the termination of the father's parental rights based on severe abuse and imprisonment because he acknowledged that he pleaded guilty to three counts of corporal injury upon a child in California, as a result of the abuse the child suffered severe brain injuries, multiple broken bones, facial bruising, an inability to walk or sit up, and cognitive impairment, and the father was sentenced to six years in prison for his crimes. In re Roderick R., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 192 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 11, 2018).

Child's foster parents proved several child abuse by clear and convincing evidence because a juvenile court had found that the parents had committed severe child abuse by exposing the child to drugs prenatally and had entered an order, which was a final and non-appealable judgment. In re Zayne P., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 239 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2018).

Evidence amounted to clear and convincing evidence supporting termination of a mother's parental rights based on severe child abuse for physical and psychological damage to the child's half-siblings because the mother slapped one half-sibling and choked her making it difficult for the child to breathe; the child's other half-sibling witnessed the event, and an expert clinical psychologist testified to the harm that would result from being a victim of the assault and having witnessed it. In re D.T., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 292 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 24, 2018).

Evidence found by the trial court amounted to clear and convincing evidence supporting termination of a mother's parental rights based on severe child abuse because the mother drove while intoxicated with the child's half-sibling in the vehicle; that kind of reckless conduct had the potential to cause serious bodily injury and death to the child. In re D.T., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 292 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 24, 2018).

Evidence amounted to clear and convincing evidence supporting termination of a mother's parental rights based on severe child abuse because the mother's prenatal drug use constituted severe child abuse; the mother was advised by medical professionals to discontinue her use for the duration of her pregnancy, but she refused, and the child showed signs of developmental delays. In re D.T., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 292 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 24, 2018).

Mother tested positive for amphetamine and her child tested positive for methamphetamine and amphetamine when she was born; termination of the mother's rights on severe child abuse grounds was proper. In re Mc, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 332 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 20, 2018).

Because the mother did not appeal the trial court's earlier order regarding severe child abuse of the older three children, the issue of whether her parental rights could be terminated as to those child on the ground of severe child abuse was res judicata. In re Mc, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 332 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 20, 2018).

Because the juvenile court's 2016 unappealed final order found that the father committed severe child abuse against the child, this ground for terminating the father's parental rights had been established. In re Kylea K., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 338 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 21, 2018).

Clear and convincing evidence supported terminating a mother's parental rights for severe child abuse because the evidence showed the mother knew the mother's boyfriend physically and sexually abused the children. In re Jarrett P., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 371 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 29, 2018).

Termination of the mother's and the father's parental rights was proper because they committed severe child abuse as the findings of the autism center and a doctor were compelling evidence of severe child abuse while in the parents'  custody as the child was essentially nonverbal, having to grunt or point to communicate, and his language delays severely impaired his ability to function in his environment and adversely affected his ability to learn, but there was evidence that the child improved immensely after his removal from the parents'  custody; and the center ruled out autism as the cause for the child's developmental delays. In re Charles R., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 425 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 25, 2018).

Trial court properly terminated a mother's parental rights on the ground of severe child abuse because a judgment in another proceeding found her guilty of severe child abuse of the child's half-sister; viewed in context, the mother's testimony in the other proceeding simply did not establish a basis upon which to hold that the child abuse adjudication was tainted by fraud or collusion, by constitutional infirmity, or in any other way not entitled to res judicata effect. In re Gabriel C., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 516 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 30, 2018).

Because the order adjudicating the mother to have severely abused the child's sibling was a final judgment, the trial court found that she committed severe child abuse, and termination of her parental rights on this ground was proper. In re Hayden L, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 515 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to terminate the mother's parental rights on the ground of severe child abuse because the child was severely burned on two separate occasions within a one-week period, strongly suggesting that the mother recklessly disregarded the known dangers of a curling iron and a campfire, and she failed to alleviate the child's ongoing pain by seeking appropriate medical treatment. In re E.M., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 564 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 27, 2018).

Clear and convincing evidence supported the termination of a mother's parental rights to the mother's child on the ground of severe child abuse because the child tested positive for methamphetamine and marijuana in hair follicle drug screens during the time when the child was in the care and control of the mother. Furthermore, the mother testified to being aware that using methamphetamine could be harmful to the child, while a doctor testified that ingestion of the drugs could cause immediate and/or long term injury to the child. In re Mason C., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 579 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 2, 2018).

Clear and convincing evidence supported terminating a mother's parental rights due to severe child abuse because (1) the mother admittedly used illegal drugs during pregnancy, and (2) the mother's argument that parental rights could not be terminated due to harm to a fetus was rejected, as the mother's actions resulted in significant harm to the child after the child was born. In re Colton B., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 634 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 29, 2018).

Termination of the mother's parental rights due to child abuse was supported by finding that the mother used illegal substances while pregnant, causing the child to be diagnosed with Neonatal Abstinence Syndrome, Intrauterine Cocaine Exposure, and Maternal Substance Abuse. In re Savanna I., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 680 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 26, 2018).

Termination based on severe child abuse was supported by a previous order determining that sever child abuse had occurred. In re Alexis S., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 700 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2018).

There was clear and convincing evidence to terminate a mother's parental rights on the ground of severe child abuse because the mother admitted on multiple occasions that she used illegal drugs during her pregnancy, even though she knew she was pregnant. In re K.S., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 376 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 2, 2019).

Prior adjudicatory order in which the father was found to have committed severe child abuse against all three children became a final order and was properly relied upon as a ground for termination of the father's parental rights. In re Janiyah J., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 434 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 4, 2019).

Juvenile court entered a final order finding that the mother had committed severe child abuse against her daughter and the juvenile court adjudicated her son dependent and neglected, in part, based on the severe child abuse finding; this order was not appealed and thus grounds for termination existed based on severe abuse. In re Josiah T., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 482 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 2, 2019).

Termination was proper based upon the father's sentence of imprisonment for two years or more for severe child abuse; while the trial court erroneously found that the father committed severe child abuse against the child's half-sibling, this ground was still properly applied because the father was sentenced to a term of eight years for severe child abuse committed against a child he lived with temporarily. In re Brendan G., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 501 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 9, 2019).

Father did not appeal his conviction for severe child abuse; accordingly, the order became a final order and could be relied upon for purposes of the statute. In re Brendan G., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 501 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 9, 2019).

Termination of father's parental rights was appropriate because the father had previously tested positive on nail follicle drug test for amphetamine, methamphetamine, cocaine, and opiates, while, at the same time, one child tested positive for cocaine/metabolites on a hair follicle drug test. Accordingly, the father committed severe child abuse, because the father either knowingly exposed the child to cocaine, or, because of deliberate ignorance or reckless disregard for the child's safety, failed to protect the child from exposure to cocaine. In re B.A., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 549 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 12, 2019).

Termination of a mother's parental rights to the mother's children on the ground of severe child abuse was appropriate because the trial court properly found that a prior finding of severe child abuse by the mother in dependency and neglect proceedings—based on expert testimony, the home environment, the parents'  medical neglect of the children, the condition of the children's health, and the resulting developmental delays that were observed in one of the children—was res judicata in the case as to the child abuse. In re Deishun M., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 562 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 18, 2019).

Termination of the father's parental rights to his two children was proper on the ground of severe child abuse, severe child sexual abuse, and receiving a sentence more than two years for conduct against a child and a sentence of 10 or more years when the children were eight years old because he was convicted of rape of a child, and was sentenced to serve 35 years in prison at 100%. In re O.W., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2020).

Definition of serious bodily injury under T.C.A. § 39-11-106(a)(34) was inapplicable for purposes of terminating a parent's rights on the ground of severe child abuse, and instead, T.C.A. § 37-1-102(b)(27) governed. In re Imerald W., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 43 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2020).

Based on the mother's guilty plea to felony child abuse and the evidence of the child's injuries, the evidence supported the trial court's finding that the mother committed severe child abuse within the meaning of the termination statute. In re Imerald W., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 43 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2020).

Termination of parental rights due to severe child abuse was appropriate because the mother confessed to having squeezed and shaken the child in a manner which a doctor testified was consistent with the child's injuries, while the father confessed to investigators to having witnessed the mother hit the child in the head. The parents'  conduct was knowing as the doctor testified that the mother should have known that serious harm would result, while the father should have recognized that severe child abuse would occur or had already occurred. In re Kyland F., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 86 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2020).

Sufficient evidence supported the termination of the mother's parental rights based on severe child abuse because the trial court found that the child was the victim of severe child abuse in a dependency and neglect order based on his positive hair follicle test for methamphetamine, and the mother did not appeal the order. In re Caydan T., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 143 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 7, 2020).

Evidence on the ground of severe child abuse for termination of parental rights came from the testimony of the mother and an investigator for the Department of Children Services, who both testified about the manufacture of methamphetamine that took place at the home where the child resided. In re Eli S., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 150 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 9, 2020).

Ground of severe child abuse was proven by clear and convincing evidence because the child's brother was injured while in the mother's care and treated for skull fractures and subdural hematoma, for which the mother pleaded guilty to child abuse with serious injuries, unlawful wounding of a child, and cruelty to a child. In re C.S., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 197 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 29, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to support the termination of the mother's parental rights based on severe child abuse because during the adjudicatory hearing in the juvenile court proceedings, the mother stipulated to the facts in the dependency and neglect petition against her, which included her failed drug tests during her pregnancy, her drug use at the hospital while breastfeeding, the child's withdrawal symptoms following birth, and the child's diagnosis of Neonatal Abstinence Syndrome. In re Aryana S., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 227 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 21, 2020).

Termination of the father's rights was proper based on his child abuse sentence; he pleaded guilty to attempted aggravated child neglect and received a suspended sentence of 10 years imprisonment, the incident underlying his conviction, where one child obtained a loaded and unsecured handgun and shot himself in the arm, was found by the juvenile court to constitute severe child abuse, and the fact that the father did not serve any jail time did not preclude termination of his rights on this ground. In re Shyanne H., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 292 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 25, 2020).

Because the issue of whether the parents committed severe child abuse in the past was fully litigated, that issue was res judicata, plus the juvenile court also properly terminated the parents'  rights based upon new findings that they had committed severe child abuse; the children disclosed that the father hit, choked, and whipped them, and the mother held one child by the neck and hit her in the face with a frying pan. The abuse the children endured caused them severe psychological issues, as determined by a clinical psychologist. In re Shyanne H., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 292 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 25, 2020).

Termination of a father's parental rights was appropriate because, while the father may have taken steps to stop the father's use of drugs and to remove the father's father from the father's life, clear and convincing evidence supported the finding that the father had committed severe child abuse as the child was present during incidents of domestic violence at the home of the father's parents and the father had taken the child with the father to places where the father used or acquired drugs. In re Adalee H., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 356 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 7, 2020).

Mother and the department were parties to the dependency and neglect case and the issue of whether the mother committed severe abuse was litigated in that case; therefore, the issue of whether she committed severe abuse was res judicata, and the trial court properly found this a ground for termination. In re Raylan W., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 375 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 20, 2020).

In a March 2019 order, the juvenile court found that the father committed severe child abuse against two of the child's siblings for failure to protect them from their mother's drug exposure; as the father did not challenge the finality or validity of the order finding severe child abuse either in the proceedings below or on appeal, the ground of severe child abuse was proven by clear and convincing evidence. In re Trinity H., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 388 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 28, 2020).

23.5 Failure to Manifest an Ability and Willingness to Assume Custody or Financial Responsibility.

Clear and convincing evidence supported terminating a mother's parental rights due to failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody or financial responsibility because (1) the mother's drug use and unstable housing and employment rendered the mother unable to assume custody, (2) the mother's failure to take steps to address these issues and general disinterest in custody showed an unwillingness to assume custody, and (3) placing the child with the mother would pose a risk of substantial harm to the child, as it was likely to result in additional drug exposure and instability. In re Colton B., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 634 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 29, 2018).

Termination of the mother's parental rights due to failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody or financial responsibility was supported by evidence that the mother, who was incarcerated, was unable to assume physical or legal custody or financial responsibility for the child. In re Savanna I., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 680 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 26, 2018).

Clear and convincing evidence supported terminating parents'  parental rights due to a failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody or financial responsibility for the parents'  children because the evidence did not preponderate against findings that (1) the parents, collectively and separately, did nothing to have the children returned, (2) did not stay in contact with counsel after directing the Department of Children's Services to contact them through counsel, (3) did not obtain stable housing or meaningfully attempt to obtain the right to visit the children, (4) did not keep themselves informed of the children's welfare, and (5) that returning the children to the parents was unsafe. In re Nicholas C., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 348 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 15, 2019).

Evidence clearly and convincingly supported termination of mother's rights on the ground that she failed to personally assume legal and physical custody or financial responsibility of the child because the mother continued to abuse illegal drugs, she failed to take meaningful steps to address the mental health issues that fueled her drug addiction, and her relationship with her abusive boyfriend was troubling; the mother failed to demonstrate her willingness to assume custody of the child. In re K.S., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 376 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 2, 2019).

Terminating the mother's parental rights on the ground of failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume legal and physical custody was appropriate, as she did not exhibit an ability and willingness to personally assume custody or financial responsibility for the child; the mother had recently suffered another relapse, she was homeless with minimal income, and she remained unable to care for the child, and returning him to her custody would pose a risk of substantial harm to his welfare. In re Josiah T., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 482 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 2, 2019).

Even when faced by the possibility of having her parental rights forever terminated, the mother failed to make any real effort, which showed a failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume parental responsibility, and there was clear evidence that returning the child to the mother's custody would pose a risk of substantial harm to the child. In re Dylan S., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 518 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 23, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support the termination of the father's parental rights based on his failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody or financial responsibility for the child because he did not explain why he stayed in New Jersey from 2014 to 2016 during which the child was removed from the mother's care and placed with a maternal aunt, the father took no action whatsoever to assume custody of the child during that time, and the father provided no evidence of his ability to assume custody of the child following his release from prison. In re Travis R., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 557 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 13, 2019).

Termination of mother's parental rights for failure to manifest a willingness and ability to assume legal and physical custody of children was appropriate as the mother refused to participate in treatment recommended by a drug and alcohol assessment, had no home of the mother's own, relied upon a paramour with whom the mother had a tumultuous relationship, and produced no proof of income or ability to support the children. Returning the children posed a risk of substantial emotional harm from the mother's inability to provide for the children. In re Malik G., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 564 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 21, 2019).

There was no error in concluding that the failure to manifest an ability to parent ground for termination was properly established because returning the child to a father's custody would pose a risk of substantial psychological and/or physical harm to her; the child suffered from Post Traumatic Stress Syndrome and night terrors resulting from the turmoil she had experienced in her young life, and the father had continued drug problems. In re Jayda H., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 571 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 25, 2019).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was proper based on the ground of failure to manifest an ability and willingness to personally assume legal and physical custody or financial responsibility of the child because she failed to provide a suitable home for the child, failed to engage in meaningful visitation with the child, and failed to follow the recommendations of her mental health assessment; and placing the child in the mother's custody would pose a substantial risk to the child's psychological welfare as, following visits with the mother, the child would be withdrawn, very quiet, and uncommunicative about the visits; and she exhibited negative behaviors, including lying, cursing, and stealing, after she visited the mother. In re Draven K., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 7, 2020).

Termination of the father's parental rights was affirmed except as to the ground of failure to manifest an ability and willingness to parent the children because the appellate court had significant doubt that the detailed findings contained in the trial court's written order as to that ground were the product of the trial court's independent judgment; and, in considering only those findings that were clearly made by the trial court, the appellate court concluded that insufficient findings of fact were made to support that ground for termination. In re O.W., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2020).

Termination of the father's parental rights based on a failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody was supported by evidence of the father's refusal to engage in the task of family counseling and learn how to act appropriately and civilly around his family. In re Mahaley P., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 10 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2020).

Mother failed to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody and financial responsibility of the child; the mother failed to comply with or complete any of the permanency plan requirements, and any alleged hardships did not excuse her total lack of compliance with the plan, plus placing the child in the mother's custody would pose a risk of substantial harm to the child. In re Imerald W., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 43 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2020).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was proper because she failed to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody or financial responsibility of the children, and placing the children in her legal and physical custody would pose a risk of substantial harm to the children's physical and psychological welfare as she had not demonstrated the ability and willingness to establish the stability needed to provide a safe home for the children, given her repeated changes of residence, and lack of documentation concerning her current income and living situation; she continued to test positive for illegal substances; and she failed to seek training to parent a child with her son's special needs. In re Serenity S., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 45 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2020).

Considering the obstacles presented by their incarceration and the tasks which the parents accomplished in the short period following their release such as obtained employment, housing, and insurance to get services and signing up for classes and assessments, the evidence did not establish that the parents had failed to manifest, by act or omission, an ability and willingness to personally assume legal and physical custody or financial responsibility of the child. In re Kyland F., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 86 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to show that a mother lacked the willingness and ability to assume custody or financial responsibility for her children where she admitted that she was still working on providing a home for the children, her lack of consistent transportation and inability to remember appointments prevented her from keeping her own appointments or the multiple appointments that the children had to attend, her employment following the removal was not consistent, and she failed to attend a multitude of visitations with the children, sometimes stating that she simply forgot to do what was necessary to ensure that the visitation occurred. In re Jadarian C., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 87 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2020).

Foster parents'  petition to terminate the parental rights of the biological mother was improperly granted as the trial court did not make a finding that the mother failed to manifest both an ability and a willingness to assume legal and physical custody of the child. In re Neveah M., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 92 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 4, 2020).

Termination of the father's parental rights based on a failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody or financial responsibility of the child was proper; the father took no affirmative steps to comply with his child support payments, he had not contacted the child since October 2015, and his lack of presence in the child's life posed a sufficient probable risk of substantial harm to the child's psychological welfare if the father were to suddenly obtain custody. In re Bentley Q., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 103 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 11, 2020).

Ground of failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody of the children was established by clear and convincing evidence because the record showed that the mother had not consistently visited the children, she had not financially supported the children, and she had not addressed her mental health issues, complied with the terms of her probation, or taken advantage of the multiple services offered to her throughout the case. The mother had continued using illegal drugs throughout the case and tested positive for methamphetamine and amphetamines at the time of trial. In re Gracie H. Y., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 110 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 16, 2020).

Termination of parental rights for failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody was appropriate because a father's actions and omissions indicated that the father was not willing or able to personally assume custody or financial responsibility for the children. Due to the father's instability, continued drug use, unresolved criminal charges, and the lack of any meaningful relationship between the father and the children, putting the children in the father's custody would have posed a risk of substantial harm to the children. In re Nevaeh B., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 133 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2020).

Sufficient evidence supported the termination of the mother's parental rights based on her failure to manifest a willingness and ability to parent the child because in the months following the mother's loss of custody, she continued to use methamphetamine, failed to take prescribed medication for her mental health, and lied to leave substance abuse treatment before its completion. In re Caydan T., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 143 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 7, 2020).

Evidence supported termination of the mothers'  and the father's parental rights based on failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody where both parents were incarcerated, the father testified that his sister was able to get the child, and the mother would not be in a position to care for the child for over six months after she was paroled. In re Eli S., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 150 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 9, 2020).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was proper for failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody; she made one $ 40 payment to the grandparents since the child was placed in their custody and had made no serious attempts to regain custody of her child. The mother did not have a stable housing situation and her history of drug use and decision to live with someone who smoked marijuana on a daily basis posed a risk of substantial harm to the child. In re Daisy A., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 167 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 17, 2020).

Termination of a mother's parental rights on the ground of failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody was appropriate because the mother manifested neither a willingness, nor an ability to assume custody and responsibility due to the mother's drug use, accompanying criminal activity and incarcerations, and employment and housing issues. Furthermore, placing the children in the mother's legal and physical custody would have posed a risk of substantial harm to the children. In re Tucker H., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 184 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 24, 2020).

Termination of a mother's parental rights was appropriate because the mother failed to manifest an ability and willingness to personally assume legal and physical custody or financial responsibility of the child and placing the child in the mother's legal and physical custody would have posed a risk of substantial harm to the physical or psychological welfare of the child as the mother failed to address substance abuse and unstable housing issues. Furthermore, the child was doing well with the preadoptive foster family. In re Kelty F., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 185 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 24, 2020).

Termination of both parents'  rights based on a failure to manifest, by act or omission, an ability and willingness to personally assume legal and physical custody or financial responsibility of the child was proper because the parents failed to provide a suitable home for the child; they failed to engage in meaningful visitation with the child and failed to provide support; they had failed to engage in the process (as outlined in the parenting plans) that would allow them to resume custody; they continued to use illegal drugs and to engage in other behaviors that would pose a substantial risk to the child; and placing the child in their legal and physical custody would pose a risk of substantial harm to the child. In re Dustin M., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 191 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 28, 2020).

Clear and convincing evidence supported the trial court's termination of the mother's parental rights based on failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody because the mother had only had two visits with the child in the 15 months he was in foster care and her mental health assessment, drug and alcohol abuse, and domestic violence issues remained unaddressed. The mother remained unable to care for the child without significant assistance. In re Boston G., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 194 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 29, 2020).

Department of Children's Services (DCS) failed to prove the failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody ground for termination of parental rights by clear and convincing evidence because the record contained evidence of his willingness to assume custody, as, while on parole, the father contacted DCS to request a home visit to determine if his home was appropriate and a case worker testified that the father was cooperative with him and, but for his incarceration, wanted to get custody of the child. In re Isabella W., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 200 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 29, 2020).

Mother lacked both the ability and willingness to personally assume legal and physical custody of or financial responsibility for the child, making termination proper; the mother continued to reside in a home with a known drug abuser and was unable to show she had sufficiently resolved her own drug issues, plus she had no source of income, no driver's license, and no method of transportation, and she continued to accrue criminal convictions. In re Eli H., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 206 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 8, 2020).

Trial court did not err finding that the ground of failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody because the mother's petition for unsupervised visitation was filed only two months before the filing of the petition to terminate her rights, she never made a child support payment, and she had not parented the children in any substantial way. In re Ava M., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 226 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 20, 2020).

Termination was appropriate under T.C.A. § 36-1-113(g)(14) where the children's maternal aunt and uncle had exclusive physical custody of the Children since May 2015, the father had not attempted to become their custodian, he had not taken financial responsibility for the children, save a one-time payment made in January or February of 2017, and he a lengthy criminal history and has been incarcerated for most of the children's lives. In re Jessica V., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 275 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 12, 2020).

Clear and convincing evidence supported the conclusion the father failed to manifest and ability and willingness to assume custody, T.C.A. § 36-1-113(g)(14), where his testimony established that he unable to take care of the children, did not have housing or income, and had substance abuse issues that would take at least six months to resolve, and there was no evidence of any attempt by the father to overcome the obstacles that prevented him from assuming custody of the children. In re Justin D., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 348 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 4, 2020).

Clear and convincing evidence did not support the conclusion the mother failed to manifest and ability and willingness to assume custody, T.C.A. § 36-1-113(g)(14), where she provided negative drug screens, secured employment and housing, and taken steps to have her license reinstated. Those steps demonstrated that she was willing to assume custody, as she had attempted to overcome the obstacles that would have prevented her from assuming custody. In re Justin D., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 348 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 4, 2020).

Termination of a father's parental rights was appropriate because the father failed to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody or financial responsibility for the child due to the father's positive drug test and admission that the father had been a long term user of drugs, the father had an anger management problem, the father was in arrears in child support, and returning the child to the father's custody would have posed a risk of substantial harm to the child's psychological welfare. In re Adalee H., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 356 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 7, 2020).

Juvenile court properly terminated a the father's parental rights as in the best interest of the children because he failed to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody of the children and abandoned them by engaging in conduct that exhibited a wanton disregard for their welfare by engaging in a pattern of physical violence, domestic abuse, toward the mother and one of the children, as well as other illegal or unreasonable acts, the Department of Children's Services made reasonable efforts to reunite the father with the children, the children had no meaningful relationship with the father, and a change of caretaker and physical environment was likely to have a negative effect on the children's welfare. In re Nakayia, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 359 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 7, 2020).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was improper based on the failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody or financial responsibility because only the mother's acts and omissions from when the law took effect to the time of the trial were material to that ground as it was not a ground for termination when the original petition was filed, and retroactively applying the amendment could deprive the mother of her vested rights as a parent; however, the facts preponderated against a finding that petitioners proved any of the essential elements to establish that ground even by a preponderance of the evidence. In re Aiden M., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 361 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 11, 2020).

Trial court erred terminating a father's parental rights and in finding that termination was in the child's best interests because, although the court addressed the first element by finding that the father's constant entanglement with the law and his apparent lack of preparedness or familiarity with the child negated any ability on his part to assume legal or physical custody, the court made no specific finding as to whether placing the child in the father's legal or physical custody would pose a risk of substantial harm to the physical or psychological welfare of the child as statutorily required. In re Nevaeh B., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 373 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 20, 2020).

Ground of failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody was proven by clear and convincing evidence; the father had unresolved substance abuse and mental health issues, he was found to have committed severe child abuse against two of the child's siblings, and the child had no relationship with the father. To remove the child from a stable environment and return her to the father's custody posed a risk of substantial harm to the child. In re Trinity H., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 388 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 28, 2020).

Father manifested neither an ability nor a willingness to assume custody of the child, and termination was proper, as the father did not show up for trial even though he was released from jail and had notice of the proceedings. In re Trinity H., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 388 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 28, 2020).

Clear and convincing evidence supported the trial court's termination of the mother's parental rights based on failure to manifest a willingness and ability to assume custody because she stipulated that her intellectual disabilities rendered it difficult for her to provide appropriate care to the child and the record showed that the child was unable to maintain a sufficient weight when in the mother's custody. In re Katrina S., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 398 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 3, 2020).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was proper because, while she expressed a willingness to assume responsibility for the child, her failure to act prior to the filing of the termination petition did not support her claims or indicate any evidence of an ability to assume responsibility; she was incarcerated as a result of a probation violation while the child was in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Children's Services and was arrested again days before the termination hearing; and placing the child with her would posed a risk of substantial harm to his physical or psychological welfare given her failure to adequately address her drug abuse and his current placement in an adoptive home, the only home he had ever known. In re Kash F., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 399 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 4, 2020).

Termination of parental rights based on failure to manifest a willingness and ability to parent was supported by evidence that the mother continued to use drugs and reside in a home with two other drug users and the father continued to use alcohol and drugs and plead guilty to multiple crimes. In re A.V.N., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 406 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 10, 2020).

24. Best Interests of Children.

It was in the best interests of an 11-year-old girl to terminate the parental rights of her father and allow her step-father to adopt her, where the step-father was the only father she had known and she had no connection with her natural father. White v. Moody, 171 S.W.3d 187, 2004 Tenn. App. LEXIS 890 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 265 (Tenn. Mar. 21, 2005).

While a finding of parental unfitness is a necessary prerequisite to terminate a parent's rights, a finding of unfitness does not necessarily require that the parent's rights be terminated. Because not all parental misconduct is irredeemable, Tennessee's termination of parental rights statutes recognize the possibility that terminating an unfit parent's parental rights is not always in the child's best interests. White v. Moody, 171 S.W.3d 187, 2004 Tenn. App. LEXIS 890 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 265 (Tenn. Mar. 21, 2005).

Court properly terminated parental rights as being in the children's best interests where the children had not formed a meaningful relationship with the parents, a change in caretakers would have a detrimental effect on the children's emotional and psychological condition, and since being placed with the foster parents, the children had begun to thrive and no longer suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder. In re M.A.R., 183 S.W.3d 652, 2005 Tenn. App. LEXIS 477 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 1048 (Tenn. Nov. 21, 2005).

Where the Tennessee department of children's services established that the mother failed to maintain stable housing and continued to abuse drugs, which rendered her unable to care for the children in a safe and stable manner, termination of parental rights was in the children's best interest. The children were doing very well with foster parents who wanted to adopt all four of them. State Dep't of Children's Servs. v. A.M.H., 198 S.W.3d 757, 2006 Tenn. App. LEXIS 156 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006), appeal denied, In re A. B., — S.W.3d —, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 543 (Tenn. June 5, 2006), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 537 (Tenn. 2006).

Clear and convincing evidence supported the termination of the parents'  rights under T.C.A. § 36-1-113(g) based on the best interest of the parents'  seven children; it was not disputed that the children had been educationally deprived, subjected to severe corporal punishment, and had been physically and psychologically abused by their parents; it was likewise undisputed that there had been a significant, positive transformation in the children since their removal from their parents'  custody. Despite over three years of intervention by the Tennessee department of children's services, the parents demonstrated little ability or inclination to modify their lifestyles or to improve their parenting skills. In re Giorgianna H., 205 S.W.3d 508, 2006 Tenn. App. LEXIS 192 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006).

Termination of a mother's parental rights was in the children's best interests where the mother had not made an adjustment of circumstances or conditions such that it would be safe for the children to be returned to her. The state clearly made a reasonable effort to assist the mother, but the mother failed to make a lasting adjustment. Dep't of Children's Servs. v. S.M.D., 200 S.W.3d 184, 2006 Tenn. App. LEXIS 244 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006), appeal denied, State Dep't of Children's Servs. v. S.M.D., — S.W.3d —, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 634 (Tenn. 2006), appeal denied, In re D.J.D., — S.W.3d —, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 637 (Tenn. 2006).

Pursuant to T.C.A. § 36-2-302 and T.C.A. § 24-7-112, the biological father was the legal father of the child, absent the termination of his rights, and a best-interests analysis was relevant if an only if termination was appropriate; the evidence did not support the arguments of the mother and her husband that the biological father willfully failed to visit or support the child, as the evidence showed that, inter alia: (1) The mother actively concealed the child's parentage; and (2) The mother declined the biological father's offer of support. In re T.K.Y., 205 S.W.3d 343, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 757 (Tenn. 2006), rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 891 (Tenn. Sept. 19, 2006).

Termination of the mother's rights was in the best interest of the child where, to allow the child to return to the mother, which could not even be considered until she was released from prison, would delay the inevitable and cause more lasting harm to the child. In re S.L.A., 223 S.W.3d 295, 2006 Tenn. App. LEXIS 808 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006), appeal denied, State v. Smith (In re S.L.A.), — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 344 (Tenn. Apr. 2, 2007).

Clear and convincing evidence showed that it was in the children's best interests to terminate their mother's parental rights due to her continued relationship with the man who had sexually abused them because: (1) There was ample evidence that the children had improved upon leaving their mother's custody, were doing well in school, and that their foster mother had made arrangements to adopt them; (2) It was clear that the mother had not made, and was not willing to make, an adjustment of circumstances or conditions so as to make it safe for the children to return home; and (3) It would be harmful for the children to continue a relationship with their mother. R.M.S. v. Orange, 223 S.W.3d 240, 2006 Tenn. App. LEXIS 823 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006), appeal denied, Dep't of Children's Servs. v. Orange (In re R.M.S.), — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 289 (Tenn. 2007).

Several factors warranted a finding that termination of a mother's parental rights was in the best interest of her children where the mother: continued to abuse drugs during the pendency of her permanency plans; tested positive for cocaine and was arrested for attempting to sell drugs; failed to avail herself of training that would have allowed her to properly care for her two youngest children; and failed to visit her children on a regular basis. In re J.C.D., 254 S.W.3d 432, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 741 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2007), appeal denied, In re J. C. D., — S.W.3d —, 2008 Tenn. LEXIS 131 (Tenn. Feb. 25, 2008).

Evidence clearly and convincingly established that it was in the child's best interest for the mother's parental rights to be terminated given the mother's failure to acknowledge the father's child abuse, the mother's inability to complete requirements necessary for reunification, and the child's bond with his foster parents. In re Adoption of D.P.E., 271 S.W.3d 670, 2008 Tenn. App. LEXIS 385 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 3, 2008), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2008 Tenn. LEXIS 719 (Tenn. Sept. 29, 2008).

Termination of father's parental rights was appropriate under T.C.A. § 36-1-113(i) because it was in the child's best interest to do so; child had been in a loving and stable foster home since he was taken into custody over two years before and the father did not have a stable home and had refused to address his obvious need for counseling and therapy. In re R.L.F., 278 S.W.3d 305, 2008 Tenn. App. LEXIS 445 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 31, 2008), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2008 Tenn. LEXIS 788 (Tenn. Oct. 20, 2008).

Where father of two children had not obtained stable employment, had been in and out of jail, and continued to use cocaine, trial court did not err by finding that termination of parental rights was in the best interests of the children under T.C.A. § 36-1-113(i); father did not have the ability to provide a healthy and safe home free of drug activity, and the children were doing well in foster care. In re L.M.W., 275 S.W.3d 843, 2008 Tenn. App. LEXIS 512 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 3, 2008), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2008 Tenn. LEXIS 768 (Tenn. Oct. 6, 2008).

Termination of a mother's parental rights was in the children's best interests because the mother put little or no effort into improving her circumstances and in fact ended up in a worsened situation; by the time of trial, trial court observed that the mother had no home, job, income, transportation, or money, and that criminal charges against her were becoming more frequent and more serious. State v. Estes, 284 S.W.3d 790, 2008 Tenn. App. LEXIS 773 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 30, 2008), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2009 Tenn. LEXIS 151 (Tenn. Mar. 16, 2009).

Termination of the putative father's rights was appropriate under T.C.A. § 36-1-113(c)(2), (i) because he presented little evidence to rebut the evidence that terminating his parental rights was in the children's best interests. The children had been in the custody of the Department of Children's Services, off and on, for almost four years; during the relatively short periods of time when the children were in the putative father's custody, he was unable to care for them; he was unable to provide a safe and appropriate living environment, financial support, and appropriate parental oversight to the children; and the evidence clearly and convincingly showed that the putative father was unable to make such a lasting adjustment in his circumstances that it appeared reasonably possible that the children might be safely returned to him. In re Bernard T., 319 S.W.3d 586,  2010 Tenn. LEXIS 683 (Tenn. Aug. 26, 2010).

Termination of the mother's parental rights on the grounds of abandonment by failure to visit and failure to support was proper pursuant to T.C.A. §§ 36-1-102(1)(A)(i) and 36-1-113(g)(1) because it was in the child's best interest to do so. At the time of the trial, the mother still did not have stable, independent housing or stable employment; further, after the filing of the petition, she was arrested twice, once for possession of narcotics and marijuana and once for public intoxication. Stephen v. Christy C., 384 S.W.3d 731, 2010 Tenn. App. LEXIS 727 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 22, 2010), appeal denied, In re Keri C., — S.W.3d —, 2011 Tenn. LEXIS 120 (Tenn. Feb. 17, 2011).

Judgment finding that it was not in the children's best interest to terminate the mother's rights as a parent of the two children was reversed because the trial court focused on the rights of the mother rather than the rights of the children, as required by the statute and authorities. In re Taylor BW, — S.W.3d —, 2011 Tenn. App. LEXIS 586 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 28, 2011), rev'd, In re B. W., 397 S.W.3d 105, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 199 (Tenn. Feb. 21, 2013).

Clear and convincing evidence supported a trial court's finding that termination of a father's parental rights was in a child's best interest, T.C.A. § 36-1-113(i), despite significant strides made by the father prior to his incarceration and while in prison, because the child had lived with a foster family since he was one year old, the father had no contact with the child for more than a year, and the father's potential for early release from prison was unclear. In re Dominique L.H., 393 S.W.3d 710, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 719 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 11, 2012), appeal denied, In re Dominique H., — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 100 (Tenn. Jan. 16, 2013).

Pursuant to T.C.A. §§ 36-1-113(i) and 36-1-101(d), termination of parents'  rights was in their children's best interests, as the children had been removed from the home years earlier, had not had any visitation with their parents, and had a close and loving bond with the woman whom they were placed with and who hoped to adopt them; further, neither parent made any meaningful effort to be reunited with the children. In re Dakota C.R., 404 S.W.3d 484, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 844 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 7, 2012), appeal denied, In re Dakota R., — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 230 (Tenn. Mar. 6, 2013).

Court properly entered an amended order denying appellee father and stepmother's petition to terminate a mother's parental rights; though the mother had been sentenced to 12 years in prison when children were under eight, T.C.A. § 36-1-113(g)(6), the trial court did not err in finding that none of the nine factors of § 36-1-113(i) supported termination, and that the father failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that termination was in the best interests of the children. In re B. W., 397 S.W.3d 105, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 199 (Tenn. Feb. 21, 2013).

Terminating a father's parental rights was in a child's best interest because the father continued to smoke despite the child's significant breathing issues, the child did not ask about the father or appear to be overly excited to see him, and the father admitted his relationship with the child was “slim.” In re Jacobe M.J., 434 S.W.3d 565, 2013 Tenn. App. LEXIS 790 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 5, 2013), appeal denied, In re Jacobe J., — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 228 (Tenn. Mar. 5, 2014).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was in the child's best interest, as the mother stopped going to counseling sessions, the mother failed to adjust her behavior, mental health, or personality issues in order to provide a stable home for the child, the mother failed to effect a lasting adjustment after receiving services, and there was no meaningful relationship between the mother and the child. In re Carrington H., — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. App. LEXIS 674 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 21, 2014), aff'd, 483 S.W.3d 507, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 49 (Tenn. Jan. 29, 2016).

There was clear and convincing evidence in the record to support the trial court's finding that termination of parental rights was in a child's best interest, as the father had not visited her since June of 2012, and she had a strong bond with her foster family. In re Alexus F., — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. App. LEXIS 727 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 13, 2014), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 200 (Tenn. Mar. 9, 2015).

Clear and convincing evidence supported the trial court's determination that termination of the mother's parental rights was in the best interest of the children where she was facing criminal aggravated child abuse charges, she had not paid any child support while the children were in foster care, her relationship with the children had eroded due to the children's long absence from her, the children were thriving in foster care, and the foster parents wanted to adopt them. In re Austin A., — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. App. LEXIS 736 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 17, 2014), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 136 (Tenn. Feb. 13, 2015).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was in the child's best interest, as the mother's home was not safe, she avoided undergoing a psychological exam, and it appeared that she continued to reside with a man she testified had physically and sexually abused her; furthermore, the child has bonded with her foster parents, and for four and a half months, the mother did not visit the child and had only seen her a total of 24 hours since her birth, and thus the mother did not maintain regular visitation or have a meaningful relationship with the child. In re Shaneeque M., — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. App. LEXIS 757 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 20, 2014), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 128 (Tenn. Feb. 20, 2015).

Clear and convincing evidence existed that termination of the father's parental rights was in the child's best interest, given that the father murdered the child's mother while the child was present, and the court can think of nothing more indicative of a parent's unfitness to care for his child; the father had not had any contact with the child in seven years, and during that time, the child had been placed in a loving family environment and had adjusted very well, and it would not have been in the child's best interest to disrupt his current arrangement. In re Jacob B., — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. App. LEXIS 762 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 25, 2014), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 169 (Tenn. Feb. 18, 2015).

Evidence was sufficient to support the finding that termination of the father's parental rights was in his child's best interests where there was no relationship between the father and the child as they had never met, the father had pleaded guilty to 20 counts of sexual exploitation of a minor and aggravated statutory rape, and the father showed little interest in the child. In re Matthew J., 2014 Tenn. App. LEXIS 835 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 19, 2014).

Termination of the father's parental rights was in the child's best interests because there was no relationship between the father and the child as the father had been incarcerated for the entire time that the child was in the custody of the Department of Children's Services (DCS), and the father had never met his son; the father had pled guilty to 20 counts of sexual exploitation of a minor and one count of aggravated statutory rape, and had received an effective sentence of 16 years; he had shown little to no interest in the child; he did not visit the child before he was incarcerated; and he finally requested a visit with the child only after the child had been in the custody of the DCS for several months. In re Matthew J., 2014 Tenn. App. LEXIS 835 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 19, 2014).

Termination of a mother's and a father's parental rights was in the best interest of an eight-month-old child because the parents: (1) refused to acknowledge their documented history of domestic violence, such that physical abuse remained a concern in the home; (2) were unable to maintain visitation with the child due to a No Contact Order; (3) abused or neglected the child; and (4) currently resided with someone who had been convicted of sodomy and carnal knowledge of a child. In re Jaden W., — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. App. LEXIS 856 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 26, 2014), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 280 (Tenn. Mar. 25, 2015).

There was clear and convincing evidence to establish that termination of the father's parental rights was in his children's best interests where, due to his incarceration, he was unable to provide a stable home, he had not visited the children, he had not maintained a meaningful relationship with them, and he had not paid child support. In addition, the children resided in a safe and stable foster home that expressed a desire to adopt them and the father had abused the mother before the children were born. In re Brian M, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 6, 2015), appeal denied, In re Brian M., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 281 (Tenn. Mar. 26, 2015).

Termination of the father's parental rights was proper and in the children's best interests because the proof at trial gave no indication of a lasting adjustment or change of circumstances on the father's part with respect to his admitted drug abuse; inpatient treatment was not successful and the only proof that the father recently ended his drug use was his uncorroborated testimony; the father's failure to address his drug problem until the eleventh hour left him unable to provide any evidence that he could provide a safe, stable home for the children and an income to support the children's needs; and termination would free the children to find a permanent home. In re T.G.A., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 38 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 29, 2015).

Termination of the father's parental rights was in the child's best interest, as the father had no home and was in prison, continued to commit crimes, did not maintain regular visitation with the child, failed to support the child, and the child had a parent/child relationship with the foster parents, who wished to adopt the child. In re Robert C., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 58 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 3, 2015).

It was in a child's best interest for his mother's parental rights to be terminated, as the mother's inability to sever her ties with drugs posed an unacceptable risk to the welfare of the child, and the presence of drug paraphernalia in the mother's home seriously rendered her home unsuitable for the child. In re Jonathan F., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 79 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 20, 2015).

Evidence was sufficient to support the finding that termination of the father's parental rights was in his children's best interests where by his own admissions the father continued to regularly smoke marijuana for two years after children's removal, declined to meet the requirements of his parenting plan, and failed to pay child support. The children were thriving in their foster care home and their foster family wanted to adopt them. In re K.M.K., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 92 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2015).

There was clear and convincing evidence that termination of the father's rights was in the best interest of the children because the children had been in their grandparents'  custody for four years, and every aspect of their young lives was guided by the grandparents; the father's criminal conduct and lengthy prison term left him unable to demonstrate whether he could achieve lasting change in his conduct and circumstances by exiting the drug scene and providing a proper home for the children. In re S.C.M., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 96 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 2, 2015).

Clear and convincing evidence supported a trial court's finding that termination of a mother's and a father's parental rights was in the best interests of three children because, inter alia, the conditions of the parents'  home continued to be problematic, the parents failed to work toward obtaining sufficient parenting skills, the parents refused to address their mental health issues, and the children had established a strong bond with the foster parents. In re Kim C., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 106 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 6, 2015).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was in the child's best interests because she had not maintained regular visitation or other contact with the child as she had not had any type of contact with him in the past three years; no meaningful relationship had been established between the mother and the child; changing the child's caretaker and physical environment would likely have a negative impact on his emotional and psychological condition as he believed that the stepmother was his mother; the mother's unresolved mental health issues were concerning; and she had not financially supported the child over the years. In re Noah B.B., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 115 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 12, 2015).

Father had not made the adjustment of circumstances necessary to provide a stable home for the children, he failed to visit or even maintain a relationship with them, the children resided in a safe and stable foster home that expressed a desire to adopt them, and the department expended reasonable efforts in attempting to assist the father, who was extremely difficult to locate and never made a sufficient corresponding effort to remedy the conditions; termination was in the children's best interests. In re Agustine R., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 120 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 17, 2015).

Termination of a biological father's parental rights to his child was in the child's best interest, as evidence was introduced indicating that the father continued to display anger, aggression, and violent behavior, and he admitted to physical altercations with his wife in the month prior to trial. In re Anna D., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 132 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 19, 2015).

Evidence was sufficient to support the finding that termination of the mother's parental rights was in the child's best interests where she continued to struggle with substance abuse, she did not attend the termination hearing and failed to maintain contact with the Tennessee Department of Children's Services, her whereabouts, living arrangements, and income were unknown, and the foster parents had bonded with the child and wished to adopt him. In re Malaki E., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 143 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 23, 2015).

Clear and convincing evidence showed termination of a mother's parental rights was in the best interest of the mother's child because (1) the mother made no adjustment of circumstances necessary to provide a stable home for the child as evidenced by a lack of housing and failure to address drug addition, (2) the mother failed to maintain regular visitation with the child, (3) the child lived in a safe and stable foster home with foster parents who desired to adopt the child and were capable of addressing the child's special needs and providing the stability the child needed, (4) questions remained as to whether the mother could provide a safe and stable home as evidenced by the mother's delay in securing housing and obtaining treatment for drug addiction, (5) the mother never paid child support, and (6) the Department of Children's Services made reasonable efforts to assist the mother. In re Brittany M.C., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 182 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 24, 2015), appeal denied, In re Brittany M C, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 522 (Tenn. June 17, 2015).

Father's incarceration and the attendant delay in his ability to care for the child obviously affected the child's best interest, and thus it was proper to consider this factor along with other relevant factors in the context of the best interests determination. In re Jaceton B., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 179 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 30, 2015).

Evidence supported the finding that terminating the father's parental rights was in the child's best interests, given that the incarcerated father was a complete stranger to the child, plus even if the father was released in May 2016, the child would have doubled in age from the time of the termination hearing to the time of release, and the child's foster parents had treated him as a member of the family and wished to adopt him. In re Jaceton B., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 179 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 30, 2015).

Evidence was sufficient to show that termination of the mother's parental rights was in the children's best interests where it showed that for years the mother was content to allow the petitioners to raise the children with no involvement from her until they decided to initiate adoption proceedings, but by then the children had been welcomed into a safe, stable home with loving care provided by the only parents the children had ever known. In re E.G.H., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 216 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 14, 2015), appeal denied, In re Elaina G. H., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 518 (Tenn. June 19, 2015).

It was not error to find termination of a mother's parental rights was in a child's best interest because (1) the court analyzed the factors in T.C.A. § 36-1-113(i), finding the mother had no regular contact or meaningful relationship with the child, changing caretakers would harm the child, and she paid no child support, (2) the child's grandparents were the child's primary caregivers since birth, and (3) the child had not bonded with the mother. In re Alexis B., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 220 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 14, 2015).

Termination of the putative father's parental rights was in the child's best interest because the father had not made the adjustment of circumstances necessary to provide a safe and stable home for the child as he still lived with the mother who continued to abuse drugs; he failed to engage in more than token visitation or to otherwise maintain a relationship with the child; the child resided in a safe and stable foster home; his parental rights had been terminated relative to another child based upon an initial finding of dependency and neglect; he never remitted child support; and the child needed permanency and stability, which she could receive from the foster parents. In re Ayris R., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 236 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 23, 2015).

Termination of a mother's parental rights was in the children's best interest because, inter alia, the mother had not demonstrated an ability to end her criminal activity and drug use in order to establish safe living conditions for the children, and the mother failed to support the children consistent with the child support guidelines; the children had a strong and meaningful relationship with their stepmother. In re D.H.B., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 238 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 23, 2015).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was in the child's best interests because the mother created the extremely dangerous living environment for the child by allowing methamphetamine to be manufactured in their home; and the mother admitted resumption of her use of methamphetamine and would not be able to provide appropriate care for the child on a consistent basis going forward. In re J.R.C., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 255 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 27, 2015).

Termination of a parent's parental rights was in children's best interests because the parent struggled with drugs following the children's removal, had not completed the rehabilitation program in which the parent was participating, and had not maintained a suitable home for the children. The children need permanency in their lives and, although an adoptive placement had not been found, a search for an adoptive home had begun. In re Roger T., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 261 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 27, 2015).

Trial court made extensive findings in holding that termination of the mother's parental rights was in the child's best interest, and the mother did not contest that holding on appeal; the trial court properly considered the statutory factors and the evidence cited clearly and convincingly established that termination was in the child's best interest and would allow her to receive the stability and attention to her medical condition that she needed. In re Eve C., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 279 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 29, 2015).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was shown to be in the child's best interest; not every best interest factor had to apply in order to find termination in a child's best interest, as the mother argued, and she failed to establish a meaningful relationship with the child, who had spent all but a little over 10 weeks of her life with temporary guardians, and the mother showed little inclination or ability to remedy the conditions that led to the removal of the child. In re Destiny W., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 289 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2015).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was in the best interest of the children because, inter alia, the mother failed to take any steps to reunify with the children, to maintain or establish a relationship with the children, and to provide the children with a safe and stable home; and the children were currently in safe, stable, and loving pre-adoptive homes. In re Addison B., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 328 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 13, 2015).

Evidence established that the child's interests were best served by permanently severing the mother's parental ties and allowing the child to achieve permanency in a safe and stable home; in part, the child had medical problems, the mother showed a failure to follow through with plan requirements and had not developed the ability to protect the child, and the best interest decision was affirmed. In re K.G.S., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 347 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 19, 2015).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was in the child's best interests because she did not pay child support consistently; she had shown little or no genuine interest in the welfare of the child; her continued use of controlled substances rendered her consistently unable to care for the child in a safe and stable manner; the physical environment of the mother's home was unhealthy and unsafe for the child due to the mother's drug use and the presence of criminal activity and drug paraphernalia in the home; the child was in a foster home that wished to adopt her; and the child had established a strong bond with the foster parents. In re Faith W., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 360 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 20, 2015).

Termination of the father's rights was in the child's best interests, given that the father sexually abused her and caused her to suffer great difficulties. In re T.L.G., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 369 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 26, 2015).

Clear and convincing evidence did not support a finding that termination of a mother's and a father's parental rights was in the child's best interest because, inter alia: (1) there was no suggestion that the child would never be able to be returned to the care of either parent; (2) other than involvement with illegal drugs, nothing indicated the parents ever failed to meet the child's needs; and (3) the parents made significant efforts to remedy the conditions that led to the child's removal. In re Wesley P., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 400 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 29, 2015).

Clear and convincing evidence supported the finding that termination of a father's parental rights was in the child's best interest because, inter alia, the father ingested drugs, sold drugs, and purchased drugs while in the child's presence, committed acts of domestic violence in the home while the child was present, and another of the father's children had been adjudicated dependent and neglected. In re William B., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 467 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 11, 2015).

Clear and convincing evidence supported the finding that terminating a father's rights was in the best interests of seven children because despite outpatient treatment, in-home services, and counseling for drug and domestic violence issues, the father continued to use drugs while the children were in state custody, continued to engage in criminal behavior, and the children were afraid to return to the father, who had shown brutality, abuse, and/or neglect toward the children. In re Kalob S., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 465 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 12, 2015).

Termination was in the children's best interests, given that the mother continued to struggle with alcoholism, parenting skills, and legal issues, and the father continued to struggle with substance abuse and anger management issues, and they were unable to consistently care for the children. In re Bonnie L., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 477 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 12, 2015).

Clear and convincing evidence supported the finding that termination of a mother's and father's parental rights was in the best interests of two children because, inter alia, the parents were inconsistent with their visitation and often missed visits without explanation, neither parent enjoyed a meaningful relationship with the children, each parent allowed questionable individuals in their home, and neither parent was able to care for the children for short periods of time without prompting. In re Aisha R., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 470 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 15, 2015).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was in the best interest of the child, as, in the two years since the child was removed, the mother failed to demonstrate a level of stability to indicate that she was able to provide a safe and stable home and care for the child on a long-term basis. In re M.P.H., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 475 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 15, 2015).

It was in the child's best interest to terminate the mother's parental rights, and the trial court properly considered the factor of any adjustment made by the mother in her circumstance, conduct, or conditions; the trial court's findings indicated that it weighed certain factors against preserving the mother's parental rights, plus the guardian ad litem recommended that termination was in the child's best interests, as the child had flourished in the grandparents'  care. In re Kayden H., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 493 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 23, 2015).

It was in the child's best interest to terminate the mother's parental rights, and the trial court properly considered the factor of any adjustment made by the mother in her circumstance, conduct, or conditions; the trial court's findings indicated that it weighed certain factors against preserving the mother's parental rights, plus the guardian ad litem recommended that termination was in the child's best interests, as the child had flourished in the grandparents'  care. In re Kayden H., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 493 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 23, 2015).

Record sufficiently supports the trial court's finding by clear and convincing evidence that termination of the father's parental rights was in the child's best interest because the trial court weighed several factors against preserving the father's parental rights; the remaining statutory factors applicable to the action did not weigh in favor of maintaining Father's parental rights. In re Jayden B.T., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 494 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 23, 2015), appeal denied, In re Jayden T., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 818 (Tenn. Sept. 25, 2015).

Trial court did not err in finding clear evidence that termination of the father's parental rights was in the best interest of the children, given in part that he did not demonstrate that he had made it safe for the children to be in his home, and he had failed to address his substance abuse problem; the Department of Children's Services made reasonable efforts to assist the father, but the evidence did not establish that the father exercised regular visitation with the children or whether there existed a meaningful relationship between them. In re Destaney D., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 495 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 23, 2015).

There was clear and convincing evidence that the termination of the father's parental rights was in the son's best interest considering the lack of a relationship between the father and his son, the father's consistent failure to visit and support his son, and the likelihood that the circumstances would not change. In re Gavin G., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 500 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 23, 2015).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was in the best interests of the child because the mother failed to make adjustments in her employment situation, her conduct, or her living conditions to make it safe and in the child's best interest that he is returned to her custody. In re Mason M., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 595 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 17, 2015).

Clear and convincing evidence showed that terminating the mother's rights was in the children's best interest where she relied upon several agencies for her own welfare, she was unable to obtain the kind of extensive support that she required simply for her own care, and there was no evidence that she could provide the children stable emotional and developmental support. In re Domingo W., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 590 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 23, 2015).

Clear and convincing evidence supported the finding that termination of a mother's parental rights was in the child's best interest because the mother failed to support the child, used illegal drugs, had no permanent home, had a criminal history, and admitted that her lifestyle was not an appropriate one for the child; the foster mother and the child had bonded, the foster mother wanted to adopt the child, and it would have been detrimental to remove the child from the foster mother's care. In re Serenity L., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 622 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 31, 2015).

Father was not in a position at the time of trial to provide a safe and stable home for the child, he had cancelled or rescheduled visits often, he had been adjudicated neglectful toward the child, and he had been incarcerated and owed a child support arrearage to the extent that he was incarcerated; termination of his rights was in the child's best interests. In re Alleyanna C., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 642 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 10, 2015).

Mother was not prepared at the time of trial to provide a safe and stable home for the child, the evidence did not preponderate against the finding that the mother failed to maintain a meaningful parent-child relationship, plus she had been adjudicated neglectful, and thus there was clear evidence that termination of her rights was in the child's best interest. In re Alleyanna C., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 642 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 10, 2015).

Mother's lack of follow through on efforts to manage her mental health raised doubts as to her ability to care for the child and his health needs, the evidence showed the mother would struggle to provide a home that was healthy and free of criminal activity and controlled substances, and her inability to provide more than token visitation and her inability to meet full support obligation also weighed against her; the best interest finding was not against the weight of the evidence. In re L.J., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 696 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2015).

Juvenile court properly terminated a father's parental rights to the children where the children had been in a foster home for two months by the time the trial had concluded, the father had continued to engage in criminal behavior while the children were in state custody, had paid no child support, and had not visited with the children for approximately 18 months, and thus, the evidence did not preponderate against a finding by clear and convincing evidence that it was in the children's best interest for the father's parental rights to be terminated. In re Kelsey L., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 731 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 9, 2015).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was in the child's best interests because the mother had not made adjustments to her life sufficient to address the problems which led to the child coming into the custody of the Department of Children's Services (DCS) and that she was unable to care for him; and she testified that she did not have a job and had no source of income, that any money she got went toward the purchase of drugs, that she could not currently be a good and stable mother, and that she had been in rehab three times for her drug abuse since the child was taken into DCS custody and had completed only one program. In re Brayden S., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 735 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 11, 2015).

Clear and convincing evidence showed terminating a mother's parental rights was in the children's best interest because (1) the mother made no adjustment of circumstances so as to make the children's return safe and in the children's best interests, (2) the mother consistently did not make lasting life adjustments to ensure a stable and safe environment, (3) the mother did not visit the children, (4) the mother had no meaningful relationship with the children, (5) removing the children from current caretakers would be detrimental, and (6) the mother's abuse of the children had been found. In re A.C.S., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 767 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 23, 2015).

In light of a parent's substance abuse, criminal history, and repeated incarcerations, the termination of the parent's rights was in the best interests of the parent's children. In re Malina W., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 799 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 29, 2015).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was in the adopted child's best interest because the child suffered and continued to suffer greatly from the abuse she endured; the child's therapist, an expert on child welfare, and a Department of Children's Services social worker both testified that it would never be safe for the child to return to the mother; and any stigma associated with the child's stay in foster care would be far outweighed by the opportunity for her to heal in a healthy and safe home. In re Americus C., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 803 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2015).

Evidence clearly and convincingly supported the finding that termination of a parent's parental rights to a severely disabled child was in the best interest of the child because the parent had failed to undergo the training to care for the child or to provide necessary medication for the child. Furthermore, the foster parent received the necessary training before the child left the hospital to enter the foster home, and, from that time, the condition of the child, who was considered to have been in a hospice situation, had improved. In re Jatavious M., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 807 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 1, 2015).

Rather than working toward the return of the children, it appeared the mother continued to engage in criminal behavior and other misconduct until shortly before the termination petition was filed, and it was questionable whether her current mental health issues would promote the children's well-being if returned to her; termination was in the children's best interests. In re Jaylah W., 486 S.W.3d 537, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 819 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 7, 2015), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 94 (Tenn. Feb. 1, 2016).

Clear and convincing evidence existed to conclude that termination of a mother's parental rights was in the children's best interest because the mother did not have a meaningful relationship with one child, there had been a presence of abuse, violence, and volatility in the mother's home over the years, the mother shifted blame and failed to apprehend the dangers posed to her children, and the mother willfully failed to support the children. In re Nolan G., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 825 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 7, 2015).

Parental rights were terminated because clear and convincing evidence established the grounds of wanton disregard and severe child abuse, the evidence was clear and convincing that termination of parental rights was in the children's best interest, the evidence was clear and convincing that the children were thriving in foster care, and the parent's efforts to make a lasting adjustment in lifestyle came too late. In re Kaedince M., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 849 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 19, 2015).

Determination that termination of the father's parental rights was in the child's best interests was upheld where the child had had no contact with the father in two-and-one-half years, the child was only two years old at the time of removal, the child was attached to the foster mother who was also raising the child's siblings, the father was incarcerated and was not expected to be released until 2017, he testified that he had abused marijuana for his entire adult life, and the child and her siblings had suffered abuse and neglect at her father's hands. In re Abbigail C., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 856 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 21, 2015).

Termination of a father's parental rights was in the child's best interests because the father did not make adjustments of circumstance, conduct, or conditions to make it safe to be in the home, the father did not maintain regular visitation, nor did he show the ability to provide a healthy and safe environment for the child, free of drugs and criminal activity. In re Thomas T., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 907 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 16, 2015).

Trial court's order failed to specifically reference any of the statutory best interest factors, and it would aid appellate review if the trial court would reference the applicable statutory best interest factors and make more detailed findings on this question; the trial court's finding that termination was in the child's best interest was vacated. In re S.S.-G., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 917 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 16, 2015).

Evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's finding that termination of the father's parental rights was in the child's best interest where he testified he had been addicted to drugs since 2006 but did not seek treatment, no meaningful relationship had been established between he and the child, he admitted to numerous criminal acts and arrests for domestic violence, and photographs and testimony depicted an uninhabitable home with no electricity or running water. In re Hope A., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 914 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 17, 2015).

Juvenile court did not err in finding that termination of parent rights was in the child's best interest given the child's serious, debilitating health problems, and the father had not interacted with the child in several years. In re Analilia R., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 932 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 24, 2015), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 168 (Tenn. Feb. 22, 2016).

Termination of parental rights was in a child's best interest because the child's guardian, who had provided a good home for the child for years after the child was approximately three months old, wished to adopt the child and the child was doing well in the guardian's home and was making good grades in school. There was evidence that the child was well-adjusted and had formed a bond with the guardian, while there was no indication that the child had any bond with the parent. In re B.C., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 964 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 11, 2015).

It was in the children's best interests that the father's rights be terminated, given that the father had not made an adjustment to make it safe for the children to be in his home, he presented no evidence that he accomplished the tasks required for him to have the no-contact provisions of prior orders modified to allow contact, he had committed severe abuse toward two children and he had yet to provide them with a safe environment as he remained incarcerated. In re Kyah H., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 986 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 23, 2015).

Termination of the father's parental rights was in the best interest of the children, based on its determination that the father admitted to sexually abusing one of the children, the father was incarcerated and further charges were pending, the father had not made any adjustment of circumstances, conduct, or conditions, the father failed to regularly visit the children, and the children were well adjusted to their foster home, which met their needs. In re Martavious B., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 1001 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 30, 2015).

Termination of the mother's rights was in the child's best interests; the mother was not in a position to provide a safe and stable home for the child, the physical environment of the mother's home was not healthy and safe for the child due to the potential for the presence of controlled substances and the presence of a recent parolee, plus foster parents wanted to adopt the child, who received excellent care. In re Aaliyah E., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 36 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 26, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 315 (Tenn. Apr. 22, 2016).

Termination of the father's rights was in the child's best interests, despite evidence that he wrote the child letters during his incarceration and expressed love for the child. In re Aaliyah E., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 36 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 26, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 315 (Tenn. Apr. 22, 2016).

Department extended reasonable efforts, including providing the mother with a list of available housing and writing a recommendation letter on the mother's behalf to a local housing authority, and the department tried to stay in touch with the mother; the trial court properly declined to weigh an alleged lack of reasonable efforts on the department's part in its analysis of the child's best interest. In re Aaliyah E., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 36 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 26, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 315 (Tenn. Apr. 22, 2016).

It was in the best interest of the children for the mother's parental rights to be terminated; she had not made such an adjustment in her circumstances so that it was safe for the children to return to her home, the mother failed to protect the children from physical abuse in the past, she had not shown that she was able to abstain from the use of drugs, and she failed to complete the recommended mental health and drug treatment. In re Saliace P., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 37 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 26, 2016).

Trial court properly terminated a mother's rights to her child based on abandonment and in the child's best interest because the mother only visited the child twice in five years, neither of which was within the four months preceding the foster parents'  adoption petition, the mother's conduct was willful, there was no evidence that the foster parents significantly restrained and interfered with the mother's efforts to visit the child, the child had been in the foster parents'  home eight years, formed a close bond with the foster parents and their family and, was excelling in school, and removing her from the only home she had ever known would likely have a detrimental effect on her emotional and psychological condition. In re Makendra E., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 49 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 27, 2016).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was in the child's best interests, as the mother had not made an adjustment of circumstances, she suffered from mental illness and behavioral disorders for many years, and these conditions had not improved, despite treatment, the mother had no meaningful relationship with the child and had no contact with him since 2012, and returning the child to the mother's care would have a detrimental effect on him. In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d 507, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 49 (Tenn. Jan. 29, 2016).

Termination of the father's parental rights was proper and was in the best interests of the child because the father had not made a lasting adjustment of circumstances; he had engaged in a pattern of domestic abuse and violence; he had not established a safe home environment; he had not paid child support during the time the child was in foster care; and the child, who was two years old at the time of trial, and had been in foster care since she was two months old, was a normal, very active two year old who had established a bond with the foster family, had been in speech therapy for several months, and had a foster family that wished to adopt her. In re Donna R., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 62 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 29, 2016), review denied and ordered not published, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 250 (Tenn. Mar. 14, 2016).

Termination of the father's parental rights was in the best interest of the child, as the father had no home to which the child could return, the father had not made any adjustment to his circumstances, conduct, or conditions as to make it safe for the child to be in the father's home, the father lacked contact with the child for an extended period of time, and the child had developed a strong parent-child relationship with her resource parents, were cared for her needs. In re Riley C., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 113 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 12, 2016).

Termination of parental rights was appropriate because clear and convincing evidence established that termination of parental rights was in the children's best interest as a parent had not reached a point where the parent could safely parent the children. The parent prioritized the parent's personal work and educational goals over cooperating with an administrative agency such that the parent could be reunited with the children and could not offer the kind of structured environment the children so strongly required. In re Phillip I.P., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 127 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 19, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support the juvenile court's determination that termination of the mother's parental rights was in her children's best interests where it showed that she had not made an adjustment of circumstance, conduct, or conditions to make it safe for the children to be in her home, she missed one-third of her recent visits, she had been difficult to contact, she did not participate in the most recent team meeting, the children did not have a meaningful relationship with her, she had shown brutality and physical abuse neglect toward her children, she continued to self-medicate with marijuana, and she was not mentally healthy enough to take care of her children. In re A'leah M., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 136 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 23, 2016).

Clear and convincing evidence supported the juvenile court's decision that termination of the mother's parental rights was in her child's best interests where despite the diligent efforts of the Tennessee Department of Children's Services workers to assist her the mother's circumstances at the time of trial were virtually identical to those that existed when the child was taken into custody, the mother's inability to obtain transportation for drug screens raised concerns that the child would not continue to get the therapy she needed if placed in the mother's care, and the child had a strong bond with her foster parents who wished to adopt her. In re Candace J., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 186 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 11, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's finding that termination of the father's parental rights was in his child's best interest where it showed that he had not visited the four-and-a-half year old in two and one-half years, his foster parents were closely bonded to him and wished to adopt him, a change in caretakers and physical environment was likely to have a negative effect on the child, the father had been adjudicated neglectful, he was residing in a two-bedroom trailer with his mother, and he had made only one child support payment in over four years. In re Benjamin A., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 187 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 14, 2016).

Termination was in the children's best interests, given in part that the mother failed to demonstrate lasting change in her circumstances that negatively affected the children, she did not appreciate the serious nature of her shortcomings, the children were happy with their foster parents, and changing the children's caretakers at this point would have been detrimental to them. In re Joseph F., 492 S.W.3d 690, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 227 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 377 (Tenn. May 10, 2016).

Termination was in the best interest of the child; the father provided little proof that he substantially changed his circumstances, as he continued to rely on others for housing and transportation, the child has a strong relationship with petitioners, such that breaking the attachment bond would have a severe negative impact on the child's emotional, psychological, and medical condition, plus there was no indication in the record that father has ever provided any support for the child. In re F.N.M., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 274 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 11, 2016).

Termination of parental rights was in a child's best interests as the child's parent and the child had no meaningful relationship due to the parent's incarceration for criminal activity and drug use, the child viewed the child's foster parents who wished to adopt the child as the child's family, and the parent, throughout the parent's time in prison, considered only the parent's interests, rather than the welfare of the child. In re Tristan B., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 301 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 2, 2016).

Termination was in the children's best interests, given that the father had a negligible role in their lives and spent most of his time in and out of prison, the children had struggled and endured setbacks in their journey to a permanent home placement, and they could not afford to wait for permanency, especially with their special needs. In re Aniston M., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 309 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 5, 2016).

Termination of the father's rights was in the best interest of the child, as the father lacked stable housing and had a history of drug abuse and the child had a strong bond with his foster family. In re Jimmy B., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 321 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 11, 2016).

Termination of the father's parental rights was in the children's best interest, as the children had little stability in their lives due, in no small part, to the father's habitual drug abuse and the children were in caring, pre-adoptive homes. In re Kaitlin W., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 332 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 16, 2016).

Although the father did not challenge the best interest finding on appeal, it was considered due to the gravity of the situation, and there was clear evidence to establish that termination of the father's parental rights was in the best interest of the children. In re Charles K., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 344 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 19, 2016).

Mother did address her substance abuse and mental health issues and maintained visitation with the children, but she had not made the adjustment of circumstances necessary to make it safe and in the children's best interest to be in her home; the mother was unable to provide housing or meet the children's basic needs, and the children, who were in a potentially adoptive home, had languished in custody too long to wait any longer for the mother to achieve total rehabilitation, and thus termination was in the children's best interest. In re Charles K., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 344 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 19, 2016).

Because the judgment was vacated and the case was remanded as to the single termination ground remaining, the best interests of the child was not considered. In re Addison P., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 345 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 20, 2016).

There was clear and convincing evidence that termination of a mother's parental rights was in the children's best interest because the mother had not made such an adjustment of circumstance, conduct, or conditions as to make it safe and in the children's best interest to be in her home; the existence of a relationship between the mother and children did not outweigh the other factors favoring termination of the parent-child relationship. In re Malaya B., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 360 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 24, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 527 (Tenn. Aug. 10, 2016).

Termination was in the child's best interest, in part as the father's plans after being released from prison were uncertain, he had not seen the child for almost a year and a half, it was not in the child's best interests to wait any longer, and the child had done well in her pre-adoptive foster homes. In re Navada N., 498 S.W.3d 579, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 367 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 23, 2016).

Termination was in the children's best interest, in part as it was unclear whether the mother would be able to stop abusing drugs, she lacked the ability to prioritize the needs of the children over her own, and the children were doing well in their pre-adoptive foster homes. In re Navada N., 498 S.W.3d 579, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 367 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 23, 2016).

There was clear and convincing evidence that termination of a mother's parental rights was in her child's best interest as required by T.C.A. § 36-1-113(c)(2). When asked by a guardian ad litem whether the child would suffer psychological harm if he were removed from his grandparents'  custody, the therapist testified the child would because he viewed the grandparents as his caretakers and was emotionally bonded to them. In re Trenton W., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 378 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 31, 2016).

Clear and convincing evidence established that termination of parental rights was in the best interest of a child because the parent was then unable to parent the child independently, and the foster parents, who wished to adopt the child, were familiar with the child's special needs and were able and willing to ensure that the child received the care necessary to experience continued improvement. The child had languished in custody for too long and was to be allowed to achieve permanency and stability through adoption with the foster family. In re Hailey S., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 380 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 31, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 156 (Tenn. Mar. 1, 2017).

Termination of parental rights was in the best interest of the children because the parent, prior to incarceration, was not able to provide a suitable home for the children, as the children witnessed drug transactions and domestic violence in the parent's home, the parent repeatedly engaged in criminal activity and used crack cocaine as often as the parent could get it. Moreover, the children, who had been in foster care for 27 months and were making progress and doing well in school, needed a permanent and stable home. In re Jayden L., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 357 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 31, 2016).

Termination was in the children's best interest where the mother had not made the adjustment of circumstances to make it safe for the children to be in the home, Tennessee Department of Children's Services expended more than reasonable efforts in attempting to assist her but that she simply failed to make a lasting adjustment, and the younger children operated independently and did not show signs of attachment to the mother. In re Christian P., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 391 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 6, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's finding that termination of the mother's parental rights was in her son's best interests where it showed that she had used cocaine while pregnant, she did not maintain regular visitation, she did not make it safe for her son to be in her home, she had not paid child support, and no meaningful relationship had been established. In re Jayvien O., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 394 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 7, 2016).

Finding that termination of a mother's rights was in the child's best interest was supported by clear and convincing evidence because the record showed a pattern of drug use and abuse on the mother's part that led to instability, which, in turn, caused her to neglect the child; the mother had not made a lasting adjustment of circumstances, had not regularly visited the child or maintained contact with her, and had not established a meaningful relationship with her. In re Milli L., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 396 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 7, 2016).

Termination of parental rights was in the children's best interests because the children had been in foster care for two years, their parent had failed to make a sufficient adjustment that it would have been safe to return the children to the parent's care, the parent's progress in remedying multiple issues had been erratic, the parent lacked the income to support the children, the parent's ongoing mental health issues adversely affect the parent's ability to parent, and the children's grandparent wished to adopt them. In re Bailey W., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 408 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 10, 2016).

Termination of the mother's rights was in the children's best interests; they had been in foster care most of their lives, the mother had no made an adjustment of the conditions to make it safe to return the children to her, she had no home, she had no meaningful relationship with the children, and she had shown neglect toward them. In re Quadavon H., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 416 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 16, 2016).

Proof did not clearly establish that termination of the mother's parental rights was in the best interest of the children, as there was little to no proof concerning the impact on the children, and it could not be found that the mother would be unable to make a lasting adjustment in the near future, as she took significant steps in the right direction while incarcerated. In re Aiden R., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 420 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 23, 2016).

Termination of a parent's parental rights was in the best interest of children because their parent had not shown an adjustment of circumstance, conduct, or conditions that would make it safe and in the children's best interest to return to the parent's home in the near future, as the parent was just recently released from a half-way house, and because of the repetitive nature of the parent's conduct and failure to sustain sobriety even while in a rehabilitation program. Moreover, the children were then in a safe and stable home. In re Addison E., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 447 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 30, 2016).

Termination of the father's parental rights was in the best interest of the child, as the father admitted that he had not seen the child since she was two years old, did not suggest that anything prevent him from establishing a relationship with the child, and the child had no memory of the father and no desire to have him in her life. In re Tianna B., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 471 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 6, 2016).

Termination was in the children's best interests, given in part that the parents' living conditions continued to be unsanitary and unsafe for the children, who had flourished in their foster home, and to remove them from their stable environment would have likely been detrimental to their well-being. In re Derrick J., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 477 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 8, 2016).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was in the child's best interests because the mother had not made an adjustment of her circumstances, conduct or conditions as to make it safe for the child to be in her home, did not maintain regular visitation or other contact with the child, and had committed brutality, physical, sexual, emotional or psychological abuse or neglect toward other children in the family or household; a change of caretaker and physical environment was likely to have a negative effect on the child's emotional, psychological and/or medical condition; the child was placed in a foster home that wished to adopt him; and the child had established a strong bond with the foster parents. In re Bryson C., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 498 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 18, 2016).

Termination of mother's parental rights was in the children's best interest, as the mother failed to maintain her sobriety and failed two hair follicle drug tests, the children had no meaningful relationship with the mother, despite the fact that the mother maintained regular visitation with the children, and changing caretakers would have a detrimental effect on the children. In re I.E.A., 511 S.W.3d 507, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 503 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 20, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's finding that termination of the father's parental rights was in his child's best interests where he was set to remain in prison until 2020, when he had custody of the child he never had his own housing, the DCS made reasonable efforts to reunite the family, he had not maintained regular contact with nor paid support for the child, and the child had a strong bond with her foster mother and her son. In re A.E.T., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 537 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 26, 2016).

Clear and convincing evidence did not show that termination of the father's parental rights was in his children's best interests where, based on the plain language of this section, the trial court did not err by considering the mother's alcohol addiction, maintaining the father's parental rights would not change custody of the children, and the evidence showed that the father was no longer using drugs or alcohol, he had started his own business, was paying his expenses, had remained involved in AA, and was pursuing the purchase of his own residence. In re Jacqueline G., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 536 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 26, 2016).

Clear and convincing evidence showed termination of a mother's parental rights was in a child's best interest because (1) the mother made no effort to address problems leading to the child's removal from the mother's custody, and (2) the child had lived with loving foster parents for over two years. In re S.D.D., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 532 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 26, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's finding that termination of the mother's parental rights was in the children's best interests where the mother admitted to a previous substance abuse addiction, she was unable to resume custody of her children at the time of trial, three years after custody had been placed with her grandmother, and she did not visit the children for approximately one year prior to her eight-month incarceration. In re Selena L., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 538 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 27, 2016).

Clear and convincing evidence showed termination of a father's parental rights was in a child's best interest because (1) the father did not consistently visit the child, (2) the father was unable to acknowledge the wrongfulness of the father's participation in the child's abuse, (3) the father did not consistently participate in required treatment, and (4) the father's contact with the child led to a deterioration of the child's mental health. In re Daymien T., 506 S.W.3d 461, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 540 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 27, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 752 (Tenn. Oct. 21, 2016).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was in the child's best interests because she had not made changes in her conduct or circumstances that would make it safe for the child to go home; she did not have stable housing and did not have a verifiable legal income; her drug abuse persisted unabated rendering her consistently unable to care for the child in a safe and stable manner; changing caregivers at the current stage in the child's life would have a detrimental effect on the child as the child had lived continuously with his current foster family since leaving the hospital and had never resided with the mother; and the child was well taken care of and happy at his current foster home. In re Joshua C., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 543 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 28, 2016).

Although the trial court found grounds to terminate the mother's parental rights based on abandonment and substantial non-compliance with a permanency plan, termination of the mother's parental rights to her 17-year-old child was improper as the Tennessee Department of Children's Services failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that it was in the child's best interest to terminate her mother's parental rights because the child was 17 years old, was not a candidate for adoption, and intended to maintain a relationship with the mother when she turned 18; and termination of the mother's parental rights would accomplish nothing other than setting the child adrift with no adoptive family. In re Kendra P., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 544 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 28, 2016).

Termination of the father's parental rights was in the children's best interest because the father had not visited the children since he was incarcerated in 2012; since his release from prison, the father had been arrested for public intoxication; and the children had been living with a family friend for three years, the children referred to her as mother, and she was willing to adopt the children. In re Keith W., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 557 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 3, 2016).

While the department's assistance to the mother was far from ideal, it did not outweigh the clear evidence that terminating the mother's parental rights was in the child's best interest; her claim of having overcome her addiction and being drug-free was supported only by her own testimony, the child was doing very well in her foster home, and the family wanted to adopt her, and the mother's ability to meet the child's long-term needs was speculative at best. In re Destiny S., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 559 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 4, 2016).

Evidence supported the trial court's finding that termination of the mother's rights was in the children's best interests where the mother stated that she was not ready for the children to return to her care, she failed to address her mental health issues, she failed to maintain stable housing or employment, she continued to abuse prescription medications, she attempted suicide on several occasions, and the children had flourished in their foster home. In re Rylee R., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 582 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 11, 2016).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was in the child's best interests because the mother had not made the adjustment of circumstances necessary to make it safe and in the child's best interest to be in her home; the Department of Children's Services expended more than reasonable efforts in attempting to assist the mother when she was uncooperative and unresponsive but she simply failed to make a lasting adjustment; the child resided in a safe and stable foster home, and removing her would negatively affect her emotional and psychological condition; and the child had simply languished in custody for far too long and should be allowed to achieve permanency and stability in her current placement. In re Gabriella M., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 587 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 15, 2016).

Evidence did not preponderate against the trial court's finding by clear and convincing evidence that termination of the mother's parental rights was in the child's best interest where the trial court found that the mother was mentally incompetent such that she was unable to safely care for the child, she suffered from delusions and was unwilling to accept her identity or her family at the conclusion of trial, and the child was bonded to her foster parents who wished to adopt her. In re Lillian D., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 626 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 26, 2016).

Termination of the mother's and father's parental rights was in the best interest of the child, as neither parent was able to provide a suitable home for or parent the child, the mother relapsed into using drugs, the father went months without visiting the child, and the child was in a preadoptive home and getting along well with the other children in the home. In re D.R.S., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 631 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 29, 2016).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was in the child's best interests as the child was the victim of horrific and prolonged sexual abuse, which started at an extremely early age while she was in the custody of the mother in Haiti, but the child now resided in a nurturing home for over three years with prospective foster parents who loved and cared for her. In re C.D.,  S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 646 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 30, 2016).

There was clear and convincing evidence that termination of the father's parental rights was in the child's best interest because the father admitted to smoking marijuana and drinking since his release from jail, he failed to maintain visitation with the child, the child's therapist testified about disclosures the child made to her about the father's violence towards the mother and the child's fear of the father, and the father failed to provide any support to the child. In re E.S.L., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 630 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 29, 2016).

Termination of parental rights was in the children's best interest because one of the children suffered serious abuse in the family's home which the other child observed, neither parent ever took any responsibility for the injuries that the one child sustained, and there was little evidence that parents had made an adjustment in circumstances that would have allowed the children to safely return to the home. Moreover, termination provided the children with the best hope of being placed in a permanent, stable, and safe environment. In re Savannah F., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 657 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2016).

Juvenile court properly found that termination of a father's parental rights was in the child's best interests because the father did not maintain regular visitation with the child or provide support of any kind prior to his incarceration, and the father did not show any interest in the child's well-being until after the filing of the petition for termination. In re Braxton R., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 660 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 2, 2016).

Evidence was clear and convincing that it was in the child's best interest for the mother's parental rights to be terminated; the mother had been in and out of jail, abused drugs, and failed to demonstrate an effort to provide the child with the stability he needed. In re Zachariah G., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 665 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 8, 2016).

Termination of the father's parental rights was in the child's best interest, as the evidence showed that the father failed to adjust his circumstances to make it safe for the child to return home, the father lived with his parents and brother, who had a criminal history, and the child resided in a safe and stable foster home that addressed his medical needs and allowed him to maintain a sibling bond with his half-brother. In re Kenneth G., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 674 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 15, 2016).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was in the best interests of the minor children because, despite her history of mental health issues and recognized need for counseling, the mother's medical records evidenced a lack of participation in counseling for over a year after the children were removed, even after she belatedly sought counseling, she did not show up for a number of scheduled appointments, and significant concerns surrounded the mother's ability to care for her children. In re Stormie M., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 675 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 15, 2016).

Termination of the father's rights was in the child's best interests, given in part that the father had an extensive criminal history and an inability to rehabilitate himself outside of a controlled environment, which rendered him unable to care for the child in a safe manner, plus the father had no relationship with the child and petitioners were the only parents the child had known. In re Elizabeth D., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 706 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 23, 2016).

Termination of the parties'  parental rights was in the children's best interest, given in part that when the children were taken from the parties'  home, they had several health problems, the mother did not make an adjustment of circumstances, conduct, or conditions such that it would be safe or in the children's best interest to return them to her home, and to disrupt their healthy and stable lifestyle only to place them back in the custody of their parents would likely have a devastating effect on them. In re C.C., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 701 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 22, 2016).

There was clear evidence that termination of the mother's parental rights was in the children's best interests, in part because the mother had a history of unstable housing and drug use, she committed severe abuse against one child by continuing to use marijuana during her pregnancy, she failed to maintain regular contact with the children, and the foster parents presented the best avenue for a permanent home for the children. In re Envy J., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 705 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 22, 2016), appeal dismissed, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 944 (Tenn. Dec. 16, 2016).

Termination of the mother's rights was in the children's best interests; the mother failed to secure adequate housing for the children, who needed stability and an adequate environment in order to overcome the traumas they had experienced, and given that the children were thriving in their new environment, a change in custody would have been detrimental. In re Jasmine B., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 709 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 22, 2016).

Termination of parental rights was in the best interest of the children, who had been removed from the parents'  care for 33 months, given that the parents had failed to provide a safe and adequate home to which the child could return, the parents failed to address their mental health issues, the mother failed to address her long-term methadone use, and both parents failed to comply with the recommendations of their psychological evaluations. In re Dustin L., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 720 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 28, 2016).

Termination of the father's parental rights was in the best interests of the children, as the father failed to change his conduct or circumstances, his mental or emotional state prevented him from effectively parenting, changing caregivers would be detrimental to the children, and two of children had bonded with their foster parents, who wished to adopt them. In re Dakota H., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 759 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 12, 2016).

Tennessee Department of Children's Services Termination proved that termination of the parental rights of both the mother and father was in the children's best interests because they made little progress and failed to make such an adjustment that it would be safe to return the children to their care; the children developed a strong bond with their foster family, and it would be detrimental to take them away from the structured environment where their physical and emotional needs were met. In re Jason S., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 715 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 23, 2016).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was in the children's best interests, given in part that the children no longer had a meaningful relationship with the mother, the children were thriving with their foster mother, and the finding that the mother was responsible for one child's injuries and the dependency and neglect of the other two children was highly significant part of the analysis in this case. In re Alfonzo E., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 797 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 26, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 76 (Tenn. Jan. 24, 2017).

Terminating a father's parental rights was in the father's children's best interests because (1) the father left the children with the children's abusive mother, (2) the father had little involvement in the children's lives, and (3) the children thrived with the children's foster parents, who intended to adopt the children. In re Jose L., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 814 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 31, 2016).

Clear and convincing evidence supported a trial court's conclusion that terminating a father's parental rights was in the children's best interest because (1) although the father maintained regular supervised visitation with the children, the father did not have a meaningful relationship with them; (2) the father demonstrated an inability to control the father's anger; (3) the father did not pay child support; (4) the foster parents, with whom the children had a strong bond, wished to adopt the children. In re Jeramyah H., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 819 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 31, 2016).

Termination of the parents'  rights was in the best interest of the children, because the parents failed to adjust their circumstances or conditions so as to make it safe for the children to return, the children had been out of the parents'  home for three years and all but one were in preadoptive homes, and reasonable efforts at reunification were made. In re Tamera W., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 856 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 9, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 87 (Tenn. Feb. 9, 2017).

Termination of the father's parental rights was in the child's best interest, in part because the father failed to make such adjustment in his conduct as to make it safe for the child to be in his custody, there was no meaningful relationship between the father and the child, and a change in the child's circumstances would likely have a negative impact on the child's well-being. In re Maddox C., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 860 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 9, 2016).

Evidence was clear and convincing that termination of the mother's parental rights to the child was in the child's best interests where the child was flourishing in foster care, the mother never successfully confronted her prescription drug problem, and fled by the time of trial ended after having refused a drug screen in her last appearance. In re Dillon E., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 872 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 15, 2016).

Terminating the parents'  rights was in the children's best interest, given in part that the father had been incarcerated for all by four of the 27 months the children had been in foster care, and he had been incarcerated for more than 16 years total, such that it was unlikely that he would change to be able to provide a safe environment for the children, and the mother had not made lasting changes after reasonable efforts were made to help her, plus she had not visited the children or called them since May 2015, and the children were doing well with their foster parents. In re Dustin T., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 876 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 17, 2016).

Clear and convincing evidence showed that termination of a father's parental rights was in a child's best interest because the father made little or no adjustment to the father's life after the child entered foster care and it appeared unlikely that the father would make such an adjustment in the near future based on the father's lack of progress and pending criminal charges. Moreover, the child had adjusted well in the foster home and formed a strong bond with the foster family which was eager to adopt the child. In re Mac L., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 883 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 22, 2016).

Termination of a father's parental rights was in the child's best interest where despite knowing of the child and of his duty to support, he failed to pay support at any time, the father did not attempt visitation until the day before trial, and the child had lived in the same foster home for nearly all of his life. In re M.E.T., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 899 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 29, 2016), appeal denied, In re Miguel T., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 152 (Tenn. Mar. 3, 2017).

Although the trial court properly found that the mother had committed severe child abuse against her youngest child, the foster parent's petition to terminate her parental rights was improperly denied as termination was in the child's best interests because the mother's 10-year history of abuse and neglect of her children had been extensive and damaging to the children, and showed that she was not a fit parent; she continued to deny any fault for the youngest child's failure to thrive and insisted that she fed him properly; and she had a long history of complying with requirements of child welfare agencies when necessary before returning to her abusive husband, her illicit drug use, and her patterns of abuse and neglect of her children. In re Chance D., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 902 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2016).

Trial court erred in determining that termination of the mother's parental rights was not in the best interest of the child, as the mother had a history of repeatedly abusing or neglecting her children, of returning to her abusive husband, of relapsing following drug treatment, and failing to disclose her drug history to prescribing physicians and obtaining opiate prescriptions. In re Jude D., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 909 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2016).

Although the trial court properly found that the mother had committed severe child abuse against her youngest child, the foster parent's petition to terminate her parental rights was improperly denied as termination was in the oldest child's best interests because the mother's 10-year history of abuse and neglect of her children had been extensive and damaging to them, and showed that she was not a fit parent; she continued to deny any fault for the youngest child's failure to thrive and insisted that she fed him properly; and she had a long history of complying with requirements of child welfare agencies when necessary before returning to her abusive husband, her illicit drug use, and her patterns of abuse and neglect of her children. In re Gabriella D., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 912 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2016).

Termination of the father's parental rights was in the best interest of the child, as the father failed to show any adjustment of circumstances, the father had no meaningful relationship with the child, the father was incarcerated for eight years for attempted child rape involving the child, and the child had been in a healthy preadoptive home for several months. In re Addison B., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 913 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2016).

Termination was in the children's best interests; the mother had not been able to make lasting changes in her lifestyle or conduct despite reasonable efforts offered to her, illegal drug use and crime was a running theme in the home, and all four children have been placed together in the same pre-adoptive home since they were removed from the mother's home more than two years ago and they were doing well. In re Eddie F., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 924 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 2, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 158 (Tenn. Mar. 2, 2017).

Termination was in the children's best interests, given that the mother displayed significant difficulty in retaining and implementing proper parenting skills, she failed to understand that her lifestyle, including the array of people living in her apartment, threatened the safety of the children, and the mother was unable to comprehend that, by putting her needs before the needs of the children, she endangered them. In re La'Trianna W., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 956 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 15, 2016), appeal denied, In re La'Trianna W., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 174 (Tenn. Mar. 14, 2017).

Clear and convincing evidence showed that terminating a mother's parental rights was in the children's best interest because one child had been in foster care for the majority of the child's life, and the other child expressed fear that the mother would be unable to care for the children if they were returned to the mother and did not want to return to the mother. The evidence suggested that the children were happy in their foster placement, and the foster parents testified that they desired to adopt the children. In re Jakob O., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 959 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 15, 2016).

Termination of a mother's parental rights was in the mother's children's best interest because the mother (1) did not utilize offered assistance to change the mother's circumstances, (2) provided only token support despite an ability to purchase drugs, and (3) had no meaningful relationship with the children. In re Casey C., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 966 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 19, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 80 (Tenn. Jan. 25, 2017).

Termination of the mother's rights was in the child's best interest, as the mother failed to maintain contact or a meaningful relationship with the child, the mother failed to keep appointments with the child's doctor, and removal from the foster parents would be detrimental to the child. In re Lynx C., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 977 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 20, 2016).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was in the child's best interest given the mother's continued issues with drug use and mental health, the mother's return to the father's home despite a history of domestic violence, the mother's failure to secure stable house, and the child's integration into her foster family. In re Linette B., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 983 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 21, 2016).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was in the best interests of the children, as the mother continuously struggled with substance abuse, had multiple criminal convictions relating to drug use, was unable to establish a stable home environment, and was wilfully unemployed and failed to pay child support, and the children were in a safe, stable foster home, from which their removal would be harmful. In re Sophie O., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 985 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 23, 2016).

Termination of a mother's parental rights was in the child's best interest because the mother exposed the child to a known sex offender over a period of years; the child developed a relationship with her foster parents since being placed with them, and removing them from her foster parents'  care would have a negative effect on the child's emotional condition. In re G.L., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 993 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2016).

Given that grounds for termination were not proven, the trial court properly refused to consider whether termination was in the child's best interests, and the denial of the mother's petition to terminate was affirmed. In re Neylan H., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 997 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 29, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 175 (Tenn. Mar. 14, 2017).

Termination of the father's parental rights was in the children's best interest, as the father never successfully addressed his substance abuse issues, rendering him unable to care for the children, and the children were thriving in foster care. In re Yariel S., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 998 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 29, 2016).

Termination of the father's rights was in the child's best interests, given that the father established a pattern of criminal behavior, and even committed crimes while the child was with him, the child was in residential treatment, the father physically abused the child in the past and the child feared him, plus the father never paid any support for the child. In re Cheyanna B., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 1000 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 29, 2016).

While it might be true that failing to terminate the father's parental rights at this time would not delay permanency for the child, who was in a residential treatment facility, the father missed the point, which was to consider the best interest of the child in light of all of the relevant factors. In re Cheyanna B., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 1000 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 29, 2016).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was in the children's best interest, as the mother has not make a lasting adjustment of the circumstances and the children had been in foster care for the last three years, had bonded with the resource parents, and were doing well. In re Renaldo M., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 1003 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 30, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 90 (Tenn. Feb. 7, 2017).

Termination of the mother's rights was in the children's best interests; the mother had not made the adjustment of circumstances necessary to make it safe for the children to return home, the department expended reasonable efforts in attempting to assist her with her substance abuse issues, but that she was unable to make a lasting adjustment, and the children were in a safe and stable foster home willing and able to adopt them, and removing them would negatively affect them. In re Yariel S., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 6, 2017).

There was clear and convincing evidence that termination of a father's parental rights was in the best interest of the children because through the course of his criminal history, the father demonstrated that he could not provide a safe home for the children; the children had been with a foster family for years, and removing them from that family and placing them with the father would likely have a negative effect emotionally and psychologically on the children. In re A.B., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 14 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 11, 2017).

There was clear and convincing evidence that termination of a mother's parental rights was in the children's best interest because the mother failed to make the adjustments that would make it safe for the children to return to her home; the mother continued to abuse drugs and failed to take steps to demonstrate her willingness to make the appropriate changes needed to render her home safe. In re A.B., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 14 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 11, 2017).

Mother's parental rights were terminated for abandonment because her actions prior to her incarceration exhibited a wanton disregard for the welfare of the children; the mother's criminal convictions, probation violations, incarceration, and substance abuse placed her children in danger, and her actions showed a failure to act in the interest of her children on a consistent basis. Termination was in the best interest of the children because the mother continued to use drugs, she was unable to care for the children in a safe and stable manner, and it was difficult for her to maintain a meaningful relationship with the children due to her criminal behavior. In re A.B., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 43 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 24, 2017).

There was clear and convincing evidence that termination was in the children's best interests because the mother had no relationship with children as she failed to visit them following their placement in foster care, she did not show that she had a safe and suitable household for them, and it would likely have a negative effect on the children for them to change caretakers and physical environment. In re S.P., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 41 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 25, 2017).

Termination of the father's parental rights was in the child's best interests because there was no evidence that the father had made an adjustment of his circumstances such that it would be safe for the child to be in whatever home he might establish upon his release from prison. In re Lydia N.-S., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 55 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2017).

Termination of the father's parental rights was in the child's best interests because the record did not support the father's argument that the mother limited or outright prevented the father from visiting the child; there was no proof that the father sought to secure court-ordered visitation; and there was no dispute that the father did not maintain regular visitation with the child during her lifetime or that the failure was due in substantial part to his poor choices and criminal conduct. In re Lydia N.-S., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 55 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2017).

Termination of the father's parental rights was in the child's best interests because the mother testified that the father was mentally abusive, did not make good choices, and was manipulative; she also testified that, in early 2013, he threatened to kill her and her boyfriend; the father admitted that he did not provide more than a few hundred dollars in support for the child; and the mother testified that he did not provide diapers, medicine, or other necessities when all were living in the same city. In re Lydia N.-S., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 55 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2017).

Termination of the father's parental rights was in the child's best interests because a meaningful relationship had not been established between the father and the child as the father had not visited with the child in over three years; the father told the mother to tell the child that he had died; the father argued and fought with the mother rather than developed a relationship with the child; and he failed to provide diapers, formula, medicine, or other necessities for the child. In re Lydia N.-S., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 55 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2017).

Termination of the father's parental rights was in the child's best interests because the child was well cared for, in pre-preschool, and enjoyed her entire family including her cousins; and the evidence clearly and convincingly supported the trial court's finding that the child was a happy, healthy child who was appropriately bonded with her mother, stepfather, and half-brother. In re Lydia N.-S., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 55 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2017).

Termination of the father's parental rights was in the child's best interests as the father could not provide a safe and stable home for the child because the father testified that he planned to rent a room from a man who visited him in prison upon his release to home confinement. In re Lydia N.-S., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 55 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2017).

There was clear and convincing evidence to support the trial court's finding that termination of the parents'  rights was in the children's best interests because it showed that the parents continued to use drugs, they had failed to pay child support, the children had established a strong bond with the foster family that wished to adopt them, and three of the children did not receive proper care during the year they were in their parents'  custody. In re Kayla B., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 66 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 1, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's finding that termination of the father's parental rights was in his children's best interests because it showed that he had failed to visit his children for 6 years, he had not had any relationship with them for an extended period of time, they were well adjusted in their current home, and he had pleaded guilty to sexually abusing his stepdaughter. In re Anna B., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 70 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 1, 2017).

Termination of the father's parental rights was in the child's best interest, as the father had been incarcerated or engaged in criminal conduct for a significant portion of the child's life, the father was incarcerated and his release date unknown, the father failed to forge a meaningful relationship with the child because he engaged in criminal activity and disappeared for nearly three months to avoid being apprehended, and the child expressed a desire to be adopted by his stepfather. In re Colton R., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 88 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 7, 2017).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was in the best interest of the child, as the child did not have a meaningful relationship with the mother, and the child had Oppositional Defiance Disorder and ADHD and needed the structured environment that his foster parents provided. In re John J., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 108 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 17, 2017).

Termination was upheld where the evidence that the mother cited focused on her progress, rather than the best interest of the child; the child had been in foster care longer than she was with her parents due to severe abuse, she was medically fragile, she was thriving in the care of her foster parents, and neither the mother or father could have provided for the child's medical needs. In re Delilah G., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 116 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 22, 2017), appeal dismissed, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 398 (Tenn. June 19, 2017).

Evidence was clear and convincing that termination of a father's parental rights was in the children's best interest because the father had a very limited relationship with the children and was not truly self-sufficient so as to be able to raise them, and he had history of illegal drug use; the children were doing well with their grandfather, and the grandfather was a suitable caregiver. In re Karissa, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 134 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2017), appeal denied, In re Karissa V., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 330 (Tenn. May 24, 2017).

Termination of the father's rights was in the children's best interest where the father was in the same situation he was in when the dependent and neglect proceeding began, he was provided services and failed to take advantage of them, he had no contact with the children, the children were doing well in a pre-adoptive foster home, his encounters with the foster parent showed a tendency to get easily agitated, and he had failed to pay any support for the children In re Promise A., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 177 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 16, 2017).

Termination of the mother's rights was in the child's best interests, given in part that the mother drove under the influence while the child was a passenger in the car, there was no proof that her sobriety was secure, she was unemployed, the child had lived five of his six years with appellees, and there was no indication that he had any bond with the mother. In re Charles A., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 194 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 24, 2017).

Clear and convincing evidence established that termination of a father's parental rights was in a child's best interest because the Tennessee Department of Children's Services made reasonable efforts to assist the father, but drug use and mental health issues in the home remained unaddressed. Moreover, the father had only sporadic visitation and contact with the child, there was no indication that the child had any meaningful relationship with the father, and the child had adjusted well in a foster home where the child's special needs were met. In re Ja'miya T., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 206 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 28, 2017).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was in the child's best interest because the child was doing well in her foster home; and, while there was evidence of a bond of love between the mother and the child, that fact was outweighed by the appropriateness of the child's current placement as opposed to the serious hazards implicit in a return to the mother's care given her ongoing and unresolved mental health issues. In re Lorenda B., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 243 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 19, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's finding that termination of the father's parental rights was in his child's best interest because it showed that she was in a stable home environment with her mother and stepfather and the evidence the father adduced did not outweigh the factors the trial court considered determinative. In re Kira G., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 246 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 18, 2017).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was in the best interests of the child because she had not made an adjustment of circumstance, conduct, or conditions as to make it safe to be in her home; although a meaningful relationship was established between the mother and her child, the child had a very strong bond with the foster parents, and a change in placement would adversely affect him; the mother's home environment was unhealthy and unsafe; she had neglected the child's educational needs, and failed to take responsibility for her role in his truancy; her mental health had rendered her consistently unable to care for the child in a safe and stable manner; and the mother had only provided token support. In re Marterrio H., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 236 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 12, 2017).

It was in a child's best interest to terminate the child's father's parental rights because (1) evidence of the father's self-improvement efforts while in prison and his future plans was not clear and convincing evidence that he had made such an adjustment of his life circumstance as to make it in the child's best interest to be in the father's home, and (2) the father had not established a meaningful relationship with the child. In re Jeremiah N., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 283 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 2, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 432 (Tenn. July 21, 2017).

It was in a child's best interest to terminate the child's father's parental rights because (1) evidence that he had been in prison for the entirety of the child's life and been charged with crimes and disciplinary infractions while in prison showed he had not made an adjustment of his circumstance since being incarcerated, and (2) he had no meaningful relationship with the child. In re Jeremiah N., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 283 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 2, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 432 (Tenn. July 21, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's finding that termination of the mother's parental rights was in the child's best interests where the child was in a stable home with two parents who had taken care of her since she was born, she had a history of relapsing with drugs, she married to an individual who was serving a sentence for conspiracy to distribute and possess methamphetamine, and no meaningful relationship existed between the mother and the child. In re Addison P., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 289 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 8, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's determination that the termination of the father's parental rights was in his child's best interest because it showed that the child was well-adapted to his stable, pre-adoptive home, the father failed to remedy the conditions that led to the child's removal but instead chose to engage in criminal conduct, he was incarcerated at the time of trial, and no meaningful relationship existed between the father and the child. In re Travis H., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 290 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 5, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 468 (Tenn. July 31, 2017).

It was in the best interest of the child under T.C.A. § 36-1-113 that the father's parental rights be terminated; he had not made an adjustment of circumstances to make it safe for the child to return to his home, as the father was currently incarcerated, he had not had visitation with the child since 2015 nor paid any child support, the child was doing well in his foster home, and continuing to be in a position of uncertainty about his placement was not beneficial for the child. In re Wesley P., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 301 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 12, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 400 (Tenn. July 6, 2017).

Termination of a mother's parental rights was in a child's best interest because the father and the stepmother provided the child with a stable environment; the and the stepmother paid for the child's private school education and regularly participated in school and sporting activities with the child who was an Honor Roll student and had many friends at school, church, and in the neighborhood-and the child had an attachment to both the father and the stepmother. In re Colby L., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 352 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 24, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 527 (Tenn. Aug. 15, 2017).

Termination of the mother's rights was in the child's best interests under T.C.A. § 36-1-113(i); removing the child from his foster home, where he had been for about three years, would have been detrimental, a meaningful relationship had not been established between the mother and the child, and the mother did not provide financial support to the child while he was in petitioners'  custody. In re Martese P., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 353 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 24, 2017).

Evidence clearly and convincingly supported the conclusion that termination of a father's parental rights was in the best interests of the father's children because the father's life post-incarceration was punctuated with substance abuse and criminal conduct, and the father did not substantially comply with a permanency plan. Moreover, the father's children were thriving in a structured foster home wherein their significant mental, physical, and emotional needs were met. In re Casyn B., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 361 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 26, 2017).

Termination of the parents'  rights to the child was in the child's best interest, as the mother continued to struggle with mental health issues, the father did not complete the recommendations of his parenting assessment or alcohol and drug assessment, the parties only participated in 21 of 32 parenting educations sessions offered, and the child was doing well in her foster home placement. In re Lena G., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 358 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 26, 2017).

Trial court did not err by determining that termination of the father's parental rights was in the child's best interests because the evidence showed that the child did not know the father, the child had suffered terribly from drug exposure-related aliments and required special care, the father, who was incarcerated, was in no position to provide care, and the child had bonded well with his foster family. In re Jase P., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 411 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 21, 2017).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was in the children's best interests because the mother had struggled to improve her circumstances so as to make it safe for the children to return to her custody as she failed to provide a suitable home for the children, and she failed to remove drugs from her life; the children had done well in their pre-adoptive foster home, and had bonded well with their foster parents; the foster mother stated that she and her husband wished to adopt the children if they became available for adoption; and the children should be allowed to continue to thrive in their pre-adoptive placement with the foster parents with whom the children had bonded and who would like to adopt the children. In re Skylar P., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 417 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 21, 2017).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was in the best interests of the children given that the mother continued to make bad choices as to those she allowed to be around the children, the mother lacked safe and suitable housing, and the children were in a safe and stable pre-adoptive home. In re Rylan G., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 429 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 28, 2017).

Termination of the parents'  rights was in the children's best interest given the mother's continued criminal issues and the father's failure to address drug use. In re C.J.B., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 436 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 28, 2017), appeal denied, In re Chaz B., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 624 (Tenn. Sept. 22, 2017).

Termination of a mother's parental rights under T.C.A. § 36-1-113(g)(3) was in the children's best interest where although the mother and the children had a close and loving bond, the mother consistently admitted to abusing drugs to combat her mental health issues, rather than seeking and completing mental health treatment, making it unclear that she would maintain the mental health treatment that both of the children's therapists testified was necessary to their continued progress, and the home in which the mother lived was not appropriate for the children to return. In re Michael B., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 545 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 3, 2017).

Termination of the father's parental rights on the ground of wanton disregard based on abandonment by an incarcerated parent was in the child's best interests because the father's acts of violence and criminal behavior had already imperiled the child; the child was in a suitable placement; and returning the child to the father would be contrary to the child's best interest. In re Kenya H., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 452 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 5, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's finding that termination of the father's parental rights was in his children's best interests because there was no evidence that the mother's supervised presence in the grandparents'  home posed a risk of harm to the children, the father had engaged in drug use and criminal activity while residing with the mother and one child, he presented no evidence regarding the specific details of where he would reside after being released from prison, he had had no contact with the children since a visit in 2014, and the children had bonded with their grandparents who wished to adopt them. In re Braxton M., 531 S.W.3d 708, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 454 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 5, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 639 (Tenn. Sept. 29, 2017).

Termination was in the child's best interest where the evidence showed that the mother had not made an adjustment of circumstance, conduct, or conditions to make it safe for the child to be in her home, the child was happy and thriving in foster care, and the mother continued to use drugs. In re Zane W., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 453 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 6, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 636 (Tenn. Sept. 25, 2017).

Termination of a mother's parental rights to a child was in the child's best interest because (1) a licensed clinical psychologist testified that the mother was mentally incompetent to care for the child; (2) the foster mother testified that the child had extensive medical needs which were being met in the foster placement, which needs the psychologist testified that the mother could not meet; (3) the child was doing well in foster care; and (4) the foster parents intended to adopt the child. In re Tanya G., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 455 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 7, 2017).

Termination of the parental rights of the mother and both fathers was in the children's best interests under T.C.A. § 36-1-113(i); both fathers were currently in jail, the mother had been in jail and continued to struggle with substance abuse, the parents had not maintained regular visitation or contact with the children, and there was testimony that changing caretakers of the children was likely to have a negative impact. In re Quintin S., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 480 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 13, 2017).

Trial court properly found that termination of parental rights was in the child's best interest because the mother did not made an adjustment of circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it safe for the child to be in her custody; the mother did not maintain regular visitation or other contact with the child or pay child support consistently. In re Mya V., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 511 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 28, 2017).

There was clear and convincing evidence that termination of parental rights was in the best interest of the children because they had been in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Children's Services for several years while the parents failed to meet the requirements of their plans and improve their circumstances; the record clearly reflected they were flourishing in their new home environment with their foster parents. In re Angel M., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 519 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 31, 2017).

Termination of the father's and the mother's parental rights was in the children's best interests as the parents had not visited the children for nearly four years, and had not established a meaningful relationship with the children; the children disclosed that they feared their parents; the parents had shown brutality, physical, emotional, and psychological abuse against the children and against their deceased sibling; the children had resided with the same foster family for three and a half years, they had bonded with them, and the foster parents intended to adopt them; and, even if the children could be returned to the parents'  custody soon, the inherent risk of further abuse or neglect persisted. In re Demarkus T., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 529 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 3, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's determination that termination of the parents'  rights was in the child's best interests because the mother was living with another family and the father was hospitalized for suicidal ideation, a meaningful relationship was not established as evidenced by the contentious nature of the visitations, the child resided in a safe and stable home that was willing to adopt him, and both parents continued to use drugs. In re Brennen T., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 681 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 23, 2017).

Termination of the father's rights was in the children's best interests under T.C.A. § 36-1-113(c)(2), as he had no meaningful relationship with them, he had not shown he had the ability to properly care for them, the children had a strong bond with their foster mother who planned to adopt them, and changing caretakers would likely have a negative effect on the children. In re Miracle M., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 593 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 30, 2017), appeal dismissed, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 845 (Tenn. Nov. 30, 2017).

Termination of the father's parental rights was in the children's best interests where, inter alia, the father had made little effort to contact the children in the last several years, and a change in caretakers would have negatively impacted the children. In re Ian B., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 611 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 13, 2017).

Termination of the parents'  rights was in the children's best interests where they had been in state custody for three years, they had spent a significant portion of their lives in foster care while their parents had been unable to provide a stable and secure environment for them, the parents continued in their detrimental patterns, all of the children had some behavioral and/or physical issue, and the children's behaviors were improving with individual therapy and counseling and the support they received from their foster parents. In re Seth B., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 613 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 14, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 850 (Tenn. Dec. 11, 2017).

There was clear and convincing evidence to support the trial court's determination that termination of a mother's and a father's parental rights was in the best interests of the children because the record contained affidavits of reasonable efforts detailing efforts to assist the mother; the mother did not begin inpatient treatment until after the filing of the termination petition, and the father's efforts to say in touch with th children was not determinative. In re Billy T.W., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 641 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 27, 2017).

Termination of a father's parental rights was in the children's best interest where he had not made changes to his circumstances that would have made it safe for the children to be in his home, he had done very minimal work in addressing the concerns of the therapist and the concerns addressed in the permanency plan, and he failed to stay in contact with the Department of Children's Services or take advantage of the resources the agency offered. In re L.M.H., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 657 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 28, 2017).

Proof was clear and convincing that it was in the best interest of the children that their father's parental rights be terminated because the children both testified that it would be best for them if the father's parental rights were terminated and that they had no interest in maintaining a relationship with him; the trial court properly weighed the statutory best interest factors when terminating the father's parental rights. In re Hailey C., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 658 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 28, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 895 (Tenn. Dec. 21, 2017).

Record on appeal did not contain clear and convincing evidence establishing that termination of the mother's parental rights was in the children's best interests, as the mother obtained and held a job for more than two years, obtained safe and stable housing, the children had lived with the mother for two years were very attached to her, removing the children from the mother would have a detrimental impact on them, and the mother had not failed a drug test for over three years prior to trial. In re Gabriella D., 531 S.W.3d 662, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 573 (Tenn. Sept. 29, 2017).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was in the best interests of the children, as the mother failed to make such an adjustment of circumstances, conduct, or conditions as to make it safe and in the children's best interest to be returned to the mother's home; the mother even admitted she needed more time because she needed more stability as to work and housing. In re Douglas H., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 662 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 29, 2017).

Clear and convincing evidence supported the trial court's determination that termination of parental rights was in the children's best interest because of the parent's criminal conduct, failure to make a lasting adjustment in their lives, failure to maintain regular visitation with the children, and failure to make any child support payments. Furthermore, the children were happy, healthy, and adjusting well with the foster family, which desired to adopt them. In re Isabella G., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 667 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 3, 2017).

Termination of a mother's parental rights was in the child's best interest because the trial court examined the relationship the mother and the stepmother had with the child and determined that the stepmother had a more meaningful relationship with the child, and the evidence did not preponderate against that finding. In re Brantley B., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 720 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 30, 2017).

It was in the children's best interest for the father's parental rights to be terminated; he was in no position to parent the children successfully, he failed to maintain a meaningful relationship with them, he lacked suitable housing, and he never comprehensively addressed his failure to protect the children, who were thriving in foster care. In re Da'Vante M., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 797 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 12, 2017).

Termination of the father's parental rights was in the children's best interests because, while he loved his children, interacted properly with them during visitation, and paid support, he did not change his conduct or circumstances such that his home was a safe environment for the children as he maintained a volatile relationship with the mother; a change in caretakers would have a negative effect, as the children were settled with and bonded to the foster parents and their extended family, the foster parents wished to adopt the four children, and the children had expressed a desire to be adopted by the foster parents; the father was aware of the mother's drug use; and he failed to protect them from exposure to the mother's drug use. In re Alyssa W., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 803 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 14, 2017).

Evidence presented fell far short of that required to show that termination of the mother's parental rights was in the child's best interest, as the Department of Children's Services failed to provide proof that the mother had not made the necessary adjustment of circumstance, conduct, or conditions for it to be safe for the child to be returned to her and failed to show a change of caretakers would be detrimental to the child. In re Brianna T., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 825 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 22, 2017).

Evidence presented fell far short of that required to show that termination of the father's parental rights was in the child's best interest, as there was insufficient proof that the father had not made the necessary adjustment of circumstance, conduct, or conditions for it to be safe for the child to be returned to him or to show a change of caretakers would be detrimental to the child. In re Brianna T., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 826 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 22, 2017).

Trial court properly found that termination of parental rights was in the child's best interest given the father's child abuse convictions against a half sibling, his incarceration, his continued denial of responsibility, and his failure to admit an anger problem. In re Brooke E., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 830 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 22, 2017).

Termination of a mother's parental rights was in the best interest of the mother's children because the mother had failed to locate or attempt to locate safe, clean housing, did not regularly attend mental health sessions, and associated with inappropriate individuals. The change of caretakers and physical environment would likely have had a detrimental impact the children's emotional, psychological, and medical condition, considering how long they had lived with their foster family and how successfully they had thrived in the foster home. In re M.E.N.J., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 835 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 27, 2017).

Termination was in the children's best interests, given that the mother failed to secure suitable housing or a stable job so that she could provide for the children, even with the reasonable efforts made by the department, and it would have been a detriment to the children to remove them from a home where they were receiving safe and stable care. In re B.L., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 846 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 1, 2017).

Juvenile court properly found that termination of a father's right's was in the child's best interest where it issued detailed findings, analyzing each statutory best interest factor, and the the child was in a stable, bonded family unit, and deserved permanence moving forward. In re Ken'Bria B., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 4, 2018).

Clear-and-convincing evidence supported a trial court's conclusion that termination of a father's parental rights was in the best interest of the father's child because the father's past actions--history of incarceration and lack of contact with and support for the child--provided little indication that the father would be capable of being a proper parent at any time in the near future. Furthermore, one of the prospective adoptive parents testified as to the child doing well with them, their love of the child, and their desire to adopt the child. In re Kandace D., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 8, 2018).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was in the children's best interest, as the mother remained homeless three years after the children's removal, her medical issues remained untreated, she had not consistently visited the children, she had no meaningful relationship with the children, and changing caregivers from teh foster parents, with whom the children had bonded, would cause the children to regress. In re Nashay B., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 10, 2018).

Termination of the father's parental rights was in the children's best interests because he failed to maintain regular visitation with the children and had not seen them in over a year; prior to his incarceration, he continued to abuse drugs and was unable to maintain stable housing, even following the removal of the children; a change in caretakers was likely to have a significant effect on the children's emotional, psychological, and medical condition; the children had established a strong bond with the foster family and made great progress since being in the foster family's care; the foster family wished to adopt the children; and the children had no meaningful relationship with the father. In re Aaralyn O., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 14 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 18, 2018).

Facts, as found by the trial court, were supported by the preponderance of the evidence and clearly and convincingly established that termination of a mother's parental rights was in the children's best interest because the children bonded with their foster parents, who intended to adopt them; removing the children from a stable home and placing them with the mother, who failed to demonstrate long-term stability and sobriety, would likely cause the children emotional and possibly physical harm. In re Noah S., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 27 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 23, 2018).

Termination of a mother's parental rights was in the best interest of the mother's child because the child had resided in a foster home for more than three years, the mother had issues with the mother's mental and emotional status, finances, and housing, and there was little likelihood that the mother was soon able to remedy the conditions. Moreover, the foster parents were interested in adopting the child and allowing the relationship to continue threatened the child's chances of early integration into a safe, stable, and permanent home. In re K.Y.H., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 30 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 23, 2018).

There was clear and convincing evidence that it was in the best interest of the children that their parents'  rights be terminated because the mother had been gone from their lives for such a substantial period of time that the children had bonded with their foster family, the mother's behavior had made it unsafe and sometimes impossible for the children to be in her care. The father's child had virtually no relationship with him and it would be harmful for the child to ever be placed in the father's care due to his criminal activities and drug use. In re Ke'Andre C., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 44 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 29, 2018).

Clear and convincing evidence established that termination of a mother's parental rights was in the best interest of the mother's child because the mother did not obtain and maintain stable housing and questions remained concerning the mother's mental and/or emotional status as evidenced by the mother's failure to complete a required psychological assessment. Moreover, the child resided in a safe and stable home, which was willing and able to adopt the child, and removing the child would have negatively affected the child's emotional condition. In re Jabari B., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 60 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 2, 2018).

Clear and convincing evidence supported the trial court's determination that termination of the parents'  rights was in the children's best interests because it showed that the children had been in their foster parents'  home for nearly three years, the children were doing very well, and the parents failed to make an adjustment of circumstances, conduct or conditions to make it safe for the children to return to the parents'  home. Despite reasonable efforts, encouragement, and services the parents continued to live in filth and infestation. In re Mack E., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 71 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 9, 2018).

Termination of father's parental rights was in the best interest of the father's child because, given the bond between the child and the foster parents and the child's special medical needs, removal from the foster home would likely have caused the child emotional, psychological, and/or physical detriment. There also was no evidence that the child knew the father or that there was any bond between them, and the father's recidivism and frequent returns to jail did not bode well for the father's ability to provide a long-term home for the child. In re Victoria H., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 108 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's finding that termination of the mother's parental rights was in the children's best interests because she did not contribute to the children's care, she did not show interest in their welfare, she had a history of drugs, she testified that she was incarcerated for past indictments, and the children were well-adjusted and bonded to their foster mother who wished to adopt them. In re Homer, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 126 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 9, 2018).

Termination of a mother's parental rights was in a child's best interests because the parents failed to make a lasting adjustment of their circumstances–including drug abuse–to make it safe for the child to be placed in their care, the parents did not maintain consistent visitation with the child and had no meaningful relationship with the child, the child was thriving in a loving, pre-adoptive home and had bonded to the foster family, and a change of caretakers and home would have had a highly negative effect on the child. In re Riley W., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 129 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 12, 2018).

Termination of a mother's parental rights was in the children's best interest where the children were doing remarkably well in their foster home, the foster parents wished to adopt all four children, and the mother, despite two years of assistance, had not adjusted her circumstances to provide a safe and stable home for the children. In re Veronica T., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 147 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 21, 2018).

Termination of the father's parental rights was in the child's best interest as he had been out of jail for four months and had not filed any petition nor sought any judicial assistance in seeing or visiting with the child; he and the child did not have a meaningful relationship; and the stepfather was the only father figure the child had ever known. In re Bentley D., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 153 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 21, 2018).

Best interest of the child mandated termination of the mother's and father's parental rights because the child's former therapist explained that the child struggled with trusting and bonding to others due to the trauma he had endured in the past; the Department of Children's Services family service worker testified that the child was doing well in his latest placement with a potential adoptive parent, which she described as a pre-adoptive home. In re Authur R., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 170 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 3, 2018).

There was clear and convincing evidence to establish that termination of a mother's parental rights was in the best interest of her children. Among other things, a thorough examination of the record showed that the mother exposed the children to her abusive relationship with their father and that she repeatedly reunited with him, despite obtaining an order of protection against him. In re Maya R., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 171 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 4, 2018).

Clear and convincing evidence supported a finding that termination of a mother's parental rights was in the child's best interest because the mother had no meaningful relationship with as the mother was incarcerated or otherwise absent for the majority of the child's life, the mother did exhibit an ability to change the mother's lifestyle in a way that would allow the mother to serve as an appropriate caregiver to the child, and the child was doing well in a foster home with foster parents who desired to adopt the child. In re Tegan W., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 184 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 9, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to show that termination of the father's parental rights was in the children's best interests because he had not seen them since he was arrested in April 2010 for severely abusing one child, and he had no relationship with the children because he had been incarcerated for the majority of their lives and had been forbidden from contacting them. In re Roderick R., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 192 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 11, 2018).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was in the children's best interests because nearly three years had passed since they were placed in foster care, she failed to take her medications as prescribed, she repeatedly attempted to mislead the Tennessee Department of Children's Services and the trial court, she lived with one boyfriend who allegedly became abusive, she lived with another boyfriend who was a registered sex offender and conceived a child with him, and her psychological state would be detrimental to the children. In re Roderick R., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 192 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 11, 2018).

Grandparents failed to show that termination of the father's rights was in the child's best interest, as the father maintained visitation with the child, had a meaningful relationship with her, plus the guardian ad litem found that it would not be in the child's best interest to sever only the father's rights in this case. In re Addalyne S., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 225 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 26, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's finding that termination of the parents'  rights was in the children's best interests because it showed that the father had not maintained regular visitation with the children, the foster father testified that the mother had resisted the effort to set up a regimented visitation schedule, the foster parents had provided the only safe, stable home the children had ever known, and the parents could not provide the children stability and permanency. In re Kah'Nyia J., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 238 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2018).

Child's foster parents failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that termination of the parents'  rights was in the child's best interests, because all of the witnesses who had been inside the parents'  home attested to its safe condition, and while the parents'  continued use of a prescribed drug as a part of their drug treatment was a concern, they complied with drug treatment, counseling services, parenting classes, and narcotics anonymous, and they no longer used illegal substances, and both parents had gainful employment. In re Zayne P., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 239 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2018).

Trial court did not err in finding clear and convincing evidence that termination of the mother's parental rights was in the child's best interests because the evidence showed that despite suffering physical violence in the home perpetrated by the father, the mother failed to terminate their relationship so that the child could be returned to her home. The child was in a safe and stable with a foster family who wished to adopt him. In re Isaiah B., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 247 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 8, 2018).

Termination of a mother's parental rights was in the children's best interest because the trial court's findings were fully supported by clear and convincing evidence in the record; the trial court examined each best interest factor, determining which were applicable, and made findings of fact with respect to the applicable factors. In re Emily J., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 254 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 9, 2018).

Termination of parental rights was in the best interest of the parent's children because the parents failed to effectuate a significant adjustment in circumstance, conduct, or conditions, especially pertaining to their drug usage, despite the efforts of the Tennessee Department of Children's Services to help them and failed to take meaningful steps to regain visitation with the children after their visitation rights were suspended. In addition, the children were in a preadoptive home, doing well, and were bonded with their foster family. In re J.T., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 256 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 10, 2018).

Evidence amounted to clear and convincing evidence that termination of a mother's parental rights was in the child's best interest because the mother had not adjusted her lifestyle to make it safe and in the child's best interests to reside in her home; an expert testified that a change of caretakers was likely to have a detrimental effect on the child and that the mother demonstrated inability to provide an environment consistent and free from abuse or neglect. In re D.T., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 292 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 24, 2018).

Termination of the mother's rights was in the child's best interest because the mother exposed the child to drugs in utero, continued to incur criminal charges and use drugs, and failed to achieve sobriety or complete an alcohol and drug program to assist her; there was no bond or meaningful relationship between the mother and the child; the mother had not maintained regular, consistent visitation with the child; changing caretakers would have a detrimental effect on the child; and the child was in an pre-adoptive home and was thriving there. In re Kendall M., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 298 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 29, 2018).

Termination of a father's parental rights was in a child's best interest because the father was either unable or unwilling to adjust the conditions that led to the child's removal and keep the child's mother away from the child until the mother stopped abusing drugs. Furthermore, the father did not appear to have a meaningful relationship with the child and the child appeared to have bonded with the child's foster parents with whom the child had lived for over two years. In re D.T., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 328 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 18, 2018).

Termination of mother's rights was in the children's best interests; the mother had started using illegal drugs again and did not seek additional treatment, she exposed the children to drugs and was unable to provide them with a suitable home or financially take care of them, and the mother's aunt was willing to adopt the children if they became available for adoption. In re Mc, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 332 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 20, 2018).

Termination of the father's parental rights was in the child's best interests because he had failed to make a lasting adjustment in his circumstances that would make it safe and in the child's best interest to be placed in his care despite reasonable efforts made by the Tennessee Department of Children's Services; he remained unemployed and relied on family members to support him; his visitation with the child had not been consistent; the child had developed a close bond with the foster family, who wished to adopt him; and the foster family was the only family the child had ever known, and removing the child from the foster family's home and changing his caretakers would have a highly negative effect on the child. In re Amynn K., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 343 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 20, 2018).

Father had not demonstrated any propensity to care for the child, she called her foster parents “mom” and “dad” and was closely bonded to that family, and a change of caretakers at this point would likely have detrimental effects on this two-year-old girl. In re Kylea K., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 338 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 21, 2018).

Termination of the parental rights of the mother and the father was in the children's best interest, as the parents failed to make an adjustment of circumstances, failed to accept responsibility for the situation, did not take visitation as seriously as they should have, and continued to test positive for illegal drugs, and a change in caregivers and physical environment would be detrimental to the children. In re Damon B., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 352 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 25, 2018).

Termination of a mother's parental rights was in the children's best interest because she failed to maintain regular visitation or contact with the children and no longer had a meaningful relationship with them, and returning the children to her care would likely have an adverse impact on their emotional conditions; the mother was incarcerated and tested positive for drugs, and her mental and emotional status would adversely impact her ability to provide safe and stable care for the children. In re Keilyn O., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 362 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 28, 2018).

Termination of a father's parental rights was in the child's best interests where the father made no child support payments other than the $500.00 he made after he inherited that sum of money, the father, by his own actions, had no relationship with the child whatsoever, and that lack of relationship contrasted sharply with the potential adoptive parents'  deep familial relationship with the child. In re Apex R., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 366 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 29, 2018).

Termination of a mother's rights was in the child's best interests where she had not made an adjustment in circumstances that would have made it safe for the child to return to her home, despite efforts by the Department of Children's Services to help her work toward reunification, she failed to maintain regular visitation with the child, she had been arrested for stabbing the father and a neighbor while the child was present, and a change in caretakers would have had a negative effect on the child. In re Chase L., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 368 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 29, 2018).

Clear and convincing evidence showed it was in a mother's children's best interest to terminate the mother's parental rights because (1) the mother failed to visit or maintain contact with the children, (2) return of the children to the mother would seriously harm the children, (3) the mother's history of domestic violence and drug abuse showed the mother was unable to care for the children in a safe, stable, manner, and (4) the mother did not regularly provide support for the children. In re Jarrett P., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 371 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 29, 2018).

Termination of a father's parental rights was in the best interest of the father's children because the father was incarcerated and, although the children had behavioral problems when they came into the foster parent's home and one child was suffering from ADHD, after living in a stable home for one year and receiving weekly therapy their behavior and school work had improved and the child with ADHD was receiving treatment. In re Arianna Y., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 377 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 2, 2018).

There was clear and convincing proof in the record to support the trial court's finding that termination of a father's parental rights was in the child's best interest because the child had a strong bond with his foster parents, and there was no substantial bond between him and the father; to remove the child from the only stable home he had ever known would be detrimental to his well-being. In re D.N., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 383 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 3, 2018).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was in the children's best interests because, despite the availability of services for more than four years, the mother failed to complete most of the permanency plan's requirements addressing the conditions that caused the children's removal; changing caregivers would have a detrimental effect on the children as they had not been in the mother's custody for more than five years, and they were doing well in foster care; the mother showed neglect toward the children by exposing them to brutality, physical, sexual, emotional or psychological abuse; and she failed to participate in individual therapy, motivational group therapy, and women's recovery to address her substance abuse problem. In re McKenzie O., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 387 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 5, 2018).

Termination of the father's rights was in the child's best interests, in part because the father failed to make an adjustment of conditions to make it safe for the child to be in his home, he did not attend visits with the child for a period of time, there had not been a meaningful relationship between the father and child, the child had been removed from the father for almost two years and was thriving in his foster home with foster parents who wanted to adopted him, and a change of caretaker was likely to have a negative effect on the child. In re Gabriel B., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 413 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 23, 2018).

Termination of the father's parental rights was in the children's best interests because, despite the Tennessee Department of Children's Services'  efforts, he failed to address the underlying psychological issues that caused his violent actions, including his rape of the mother; there was no evidence to suggest that the children had a meaningful relationship with him; the evidence suggested that his presence at visits caused the children emotional upset; the record indicated that the children were doing well in foster care, that they had bonded with their foster parents, and were enjoying stability and love for perhaps the first time in their young lives; and it was clear that a change in caregivers would be detrimental to the children. In re R.S., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 427 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 24, 2018).

Termination of the mother's and the father's parental rights was in the child's best interests because the parents'  home still contained animal urine and feces four years after the child was removed from the home; they did not improve their parenting skills; they severely abused the child; they had displayed, through the over four years since removal of the child, a serious lack of mental and emotional stability; and the child was in an adoptive home and had bonded with the family, and with a child that had become his sibling. In re Charles R., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 425 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 25, 2018).

Termination of the father's parental rights was in his child's best interests because the evidence showed that he failed to maintain regular visitation or contact with the child for nearly three years, and the foster parents had provided the child a safe, stable home for five of the six years of the child's life, and changing caregivers and his physical environment would have had a detrimental effect on him. In re Leroy H., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 446 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 3, 2018).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was in the child's best interest, as the mother had not made an adjustment to her circumstances by addressing her mental health issues, the lack of a psychological evaluation prevented the mother from visiting the child, and the child was well-adjusted in her pre-adoptive home. In re McKenzi W., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 454 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 9, 2018).

Termination of the mother's rights was in the children's best interests; the mother had not made a lasting adjustment in her circumstance, despite reasonable efforts of the department, and she had not completed the recommended inpatient drug therapy, mental health therapy, or domestic violence classes, and showed no clear pathway to consistent and lasting improvement. In re Piper B., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 478 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 17, 2018).

It was in a child's best interests for the father's parental rights to be terminated because the father's visitations with the child were terminated due to the father's aggressive conduct and the father engaged in conduct that resulted in the father being arrested and incarcerated. In re Ava H., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 482 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 20, 2018).

There was clear and convincing evidence to support the trial court's finding that termination of a mother's parental rights was in the child's best interest becuase the mother had a history of drug and alcohol abuse, and the child adjusted to her home with her great aunt and considered the great aunt to be her mother; because the mother's sobriety was unproven, and she lacked gainful employment, it did not appear that the mother would be able to care for the child at any early date. In re Taylor C., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 490 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 21, 2018).

Mother failed to make such an adjustment in her circumstances, conduct that would make it safe and in the child's best interest to be placed in her care, and during the 14 months prior to trial, the mother had not maintained a stable home to which the child could return, she had changed residences repeatedly, and overall, termination of the mother's parental rights was in the best interest of the child. In re Alexis C., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 499 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 28, 2018).

Termination of the father's rights was in the child's best interests, given that the father had not adjusted his circumstances to make it safe for the child to be in his home, the father had not visited or supported the child, he had not established a meaningful relationship with the child, and a change of caretakers would likely have a negative effect on the child. In re Charles T., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 501 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 28, 2018).

Trial court properly determined that termination of a mother's parental rights was in the child's best interest because proof of the mother's efforts to address her longstanding drug and alcohol issues did not preponderate against the trial court's specific findings and its holding that termination of her rights was in the child's best interest. In re Gabriel C., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 516 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 30, 2018).

Termination of the mother's rights was in the children's best interests, as the mother's drug use continued, she failed to exercise more than token visitation, there was no indication that the children had any significant bond with her, she failed to provide even token support for the children, and they were thriving in their current foster placement. In re Romeo T., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 514 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2018).

Termination was in the child's best interest, as drug use and criminal activity prevailed in the home, the mother's environment would pose substantial risk to the child, the mother failed to support and to visit the child, and he was thriving in his current placement. In re Hayden L, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 515 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2018).

Termination of the mother's rights was in the children's best interest, in part as the mother could not provide safe and stable care for the children, largely due to her substance abuse and lack of a permanent home, and she had shown neglect towards both children and abuse towards one; while the department's evidence regarding the children's current circumstances was woefully deficient, the mother's shortcomings were so severe that the best interest factors weighed against her as a result of her own actions. In re Briana H., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 518 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2018).

Clear and convincing evidence was proven that it was in the children's best interests for an incarcerated father's parental rights to be terminated because the father had not made changes that would have made it safe for the children to go home. Further, the children had a strong bond with their foster parents, who wished to adopt them, and a counselor testified that one of the children expressed that the child was scared of the father and did not want to return to the father's home. In re Sophie O., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 521 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 4, 2018).

While the mother failed to maintain a relationship with the child and had not visited the child or remitted child support, she testified concerning her completion of a rehabilitation program and the establishment of a home and continued stable employment; as the trial court failed to properly consider these factors in its best interest analysis, remand was necessary. In re Abagail D., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 536 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 13, 2018).

Termination of a mother's parental rights was in the best interest of the mother's children because of the mother's failure to provide a suitable home and substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan, the mother's inconsistent visitation with the children, the mother's continued display of signs of substance abuse, and the mother's failure to pay the required amount of child support. Moreover, the children were doing well and experienced significant improvement in their foster placement. In re T.R., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 542 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 17, 2018).

Evidence supported the trial court's determination that termination of the father's parental rights was in the child's best interests because it showed that the father did not support any of his 14 children, he did not maintain regular visitation with the child, the father had a history of anger management issues, he did not appear to consider the child's diagnosed attention deficit disorder as a legitimate problem, the child was placed with his prospective adoptive parents when he was three days old and he was four and a half at the time of trial, the child was thriving in his current environment, and the record was clear and convincing that a change in caretakers would be detrimental to him. In re Jaylan W., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 546 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 18, 2018).

Best interest finding was vacated, as one child desired to maintain her relationship with the mother, while the other child, who was near the age of majority, did not, and the mother had taken steps to improve her life and make room for the children and maintained regular visitation when permitted.  — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 745 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 19, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's finding that termination of the mother's parental rights was in the child's best interests because as a result of her incarceration she had not seen the child in over a year, the child was doing well in his foster home, and the mother was guilty of severe child abuse as well as the child's malnutrition. In re E.M., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 564 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 27, 2018).

Termination of a mother's parental rights was in the best interest of the mother's child because (1) the child was doing well in a foster home and had bonded with the foster parents; (2) the mother's ability to care for the child, while maintaining the mother's recovering sobriety, was untested; (3) a doctor opined that to put the child back in an environment where there was a significant risk the child might again be exposed to drugs was simply too great a risk to take; and (4) there did not appear to be a strong bond between the mother. In re Mason C., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 579 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 2, 2018).

Termination of the father's rights was in the child's best interests; he failed to make adjustments necessary to make it safe for the child to return home, as he did not have utility services and he was still using drugs, questions remained concerning his ability to care for the child, and the child, for approximately 20 months, was in a safe and stable home willing and able to adopt her. In re Kaycee M., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 585 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 3, 2018).

Termination of a father's parental rights was in the children's best interest because the father failed to address the father's addiction to drugs and failed to obtain and maintain safe and stable housing, income, and transportation. Furthermore, the children were being very well cared for in a loving home where the foster parents were ensuring that their physical, mental, and emotional needs, which had been neglected in the father's care, were being met. In re Virgil W., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 599 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 11, 2018).

Termination was in the children's best interests; while the mother made positive steps towards making a lasting adjustment in her conduct, she was not ready to care for her children, she had a drug relapse recently, she lived in a halfway house where children were not permitted to live, and she was not prepared to provide housing and other necessities for the children. In re Larry P., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 606 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 15, 2018).

Termination of the mother's rights was in the child's best interests; the mother had still not complied with the requirements of a 2015 order, she had not seen the child since 2015, a change in caretakers would be devastating to the child, and there was no evidence of whether the mother's home was healthy and safe. In re L.U.S., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 613 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 19, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's finding that termination of the mother's parental rights was in the children's best interests because from November 2016 to March 2017 she tested positive on multiple drug screens for methamphetamines and benzodiazepines, she put minimal effort into improving her circumstances following the children's removal, and had not demonstrated that she had become any more capable of providing the children with a safe and stable home. In re Francis R., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 623 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 25, 2018).

Clear and convincing evidence showed terminating a mother's parental rights was in a child's best interest because (1) the mother was unlikely to adjust the mother's circumstances to enable the child's return as she had not tried to address issues leading to the child's removal, and (2) the child's return would harm the child due to the child's attachment to the child's foster mother. In re Colton B., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 634 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 29, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's finding that termination of the father's parental rights was in the child's best interest because the father had not maintained regular visitation, no meaningful relationship existed had been established between them, introducing him into the child's life would disrupt the child's placement and would be detrimental, and the father failed to remit child support. In re Ruger N., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 659 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 9, 2018).

Trial court properly terminated the mother's parental rights to her two oldest children because they were under eight years old at the time she was incarcerated under a sentence of 10 years or more, and it was in their best interests because she was in no position to provide for the children's needs for a significant amount of time; she had not maintained any visitation or other contact relative to the children; a change of caretakers and physical environment would likely have a detrimental effect on the children's emotional, psychological and medical conditions; the acts for which the parents were convicted involved sexual abuse of a child, although the minor victim was not a family member; and the mother had not paid any child support. In re S.D., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 664 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 15, 2018).

Termination of the mother's and the father's parental rights was in the child's best interests because neither parent made an adjustment of circumstances necessary for the child's return or maintained regular visitation with him; the relationship between the parents and the child could not be classified as meaningful when contact was limited to phone calls and video chats; a change of caretakers would be detrimental to the child's emotional condition; and the child had bonded with his foster parents who wished to adopt him. In re Camdon H., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 672 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 21, 2018).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was in the best interest of the child, as the mother had been incarcerated for the entire time span the child had been in foster care, the mother had not maintained regular visitation due to her own conduct, the mother was incarcerated, the mother provided no healthy and safe place for the child to return to, and the child was thriving with the foster parents. In re Savanna I., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 680 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 26, 2018).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was in the children's best interest,as the mother was unable to address her drug issues and did not have a meaningful relationship with the children, who were strongly bonded with the foster parents. In re Karisah N., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 684 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 27, 2018).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was in the children's best interests because a meaningful relationship no longer existed between them; the mother's failure to participate in domestic violence counseling and follow through with outpatient substance abuse treatment might impact her mental and emotional status and ability to provide safe and stable supervision for the children; and the Tennessee Department of Children's Services had exerted reasonable efforts to assist the mother, including rides for her to obtain services or address needs, transportation for children to and from visits, arranging visits to work around her schedule and needs, drug screens, and assistance in setting up classes to comply with the permanency plan. In re Steven W., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 693 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 28, 2018).

Clear and convincing evidence supported a trial court's clear and convincing evidence supported a trial court's finding that termination of a father's parental rights was in the best interest of the father's child because the incarcerated father had yet to establish an adjustment of circumstances necessary for the child's return, to establish a meaningful relationship with the child, and to remit child support. Furthermore, the child had been in a pre-adoptive home for more than three years and had bonded with the foster parents who wished to adopt the child. In re Jeromia W., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 696 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 29, 2018).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was in the best interest of the children because the mother had not made an adjustment of her circumstances that would have made it safe for the children to be placed in her care, the mother had no financial stability, she continued to use drugs, and the children were acclimated in the home of the foster parents. In re Alexis S., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 700 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2018).

Clear and convincing evidence supported the trial court's finding that termination of the mother's parental rights was in the children's best interest because it showed that she had only been in treatment for her drug use for a month and a half, she did not dispute that there was no meaningful relationship between her and the children at the time of trial, the counselor opined that the children would regress if they were returned to the mother's care, the mother could not provide a home for the children because she was living at an inpatient rehabilitation center, and in the year leading up to trial she had incurred multiple criminal charges, was arrested, and violated her probation. In re Michayla T., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 712 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 7, 2018).

Termination of the father's parental rights was in the children's best interests; the father did not make any adjustments of circumstances to make it safe for the children to be in his home, he failed to accept the services the department offered him, he failed to maintain regular contact with the children, he did not support them, and he lacked stable housing, plus a change of caretakers and physical environment would have a negative effect on the children's emotional, psychological, and medical conditions. In re Gaberiel S., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 718 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 11, 2018).

There was clear and convincing evidence to support the trial court's decision that termination of the mother's parental rights was in the child's best interest because it found that the mother's new residence was not a safe, stable home given the mother's abuse of controlled substance, and it found that the mother had competing interests, as she loved her daughter but did not want to give up the medicine that had severely affected her ability to parent. In re Lesley A., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 738 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 18, 2018).

Termination of the father's parental rights was in the best interest of the children, as the father failed to maintain regular visitation with the children and to pay child support toward their care, he did not have a meaningful relationship with the children, a change in the children's caretaker would likely have a detrimental effect on their emotional, psychological, and medical conditions, and the foster parents were willing and able to care for the children and their extensive medical needs. In re Kiara S., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 750 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 20, 2018).

Termination of the father's parental rights was in the child's best interest because the child needed stability, the child and the father had no meaningful relationship, the father had a history of domestic violence involving the mother, and the father had not provided support for the child. In re Mikko B., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 748 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 21, 2018).

Clear and convincing evidence supported the finding that termination of a mother's parental rights was in a child's best interest because the mother's mental challenges prevented the mother from being able to parent the child, the mother showed little to no interest in the child from the time when the child was born, the child was in a stable, loving home environment with a foster family who wanted to adopt the child, and the foster parents were also prepared to address the child's special needs. In re Frederick S., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 756 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 26, 2018).

While it was not necessary that the trial court find that all nine factors weighed in favor of a finding that termination was in the children's best interest, it was important for the reviewing court to understand whether the trial court considered the other factors to be not applicable, neutral, or militating against a holding that termination was in the children's best interest; the best interest determination was vacated and remanded for the trial court to make additional findings as to the other factors. In re Antonio J., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 759 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2018).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was not in the best interest of the children given the mother's attempts to maintain a relationship with the children and petitioners'  interference with the mother's ability to contact the children. In re Johnathan M., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 10 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 8, 2019).

Termination of the mother's rights was in the children's best interest, as she had not made lasting adjustments necessary to make it safe for the children to be returned to her; she had not seen the children for more than a year, she never paid child support, and to remove the children from their foster home would be detrimental to them. In re Gabriella H., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 12 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 8, 2019).

Termination of the mother's parental rights for abandonment by willful failure to visit was proper because her visitation was merely token visitation; and it was in the child's best interest as the mother did not have a job, she had not regularly visited or spoken with the child, she did not provide any support for the child, she and the child did not have a meaningful relationship, and the child was well-cared for by the grandparents and was thriving in their custody. In re Jayla H., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 16 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 14, 2019).

Termination of the father's parental rights for failure to establish paternity was proper and in the child's best interest as he never filed anything to establish paternity, never paid any support for the child, never provided the child with any presents, cards, or letters, never exercised any meaningful visitation with the child, and had no relationship with the child; and the child was thriving in the care of the grandparents. In re Jayla H., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 16 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 14, 2019).

Trial court's determination that termination of the father's parental rights was in the child's best interests was supported by sufficient evidence because it showed that the father failed to visit the child even once during the four months preceding his incarceration, giving up the opportunity to establish any real relationship with the child, the father was twice paroled after the child's birth and made poor decisions that resulted in his re-incarceration, and the mother had voluntarily surrendered her rights in order to allow the child's adoption by her brother and his wife. In re Jeffery D., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 30 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 24, 2019).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was in the children's best interests as her failure to adequately combat her drug issues threatened the children's ability to be raised in a safe environment; and there was ample evidence to suggest that achieving any long-term sobriety was a speculative proposition. In re Mickeal Z., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 29 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 25, 2019).

There was clear and convincing evidence that termination of the parents'  rights was in the child's best interests because the physical environment of their home was unhealthy and unsafe, the child had improved physically and mentally ever since she was removed from the parents'  custody, and a change in caretakers and physical environment would have had a negative effect on the child's emotional, psychological, and medical conditions. In re Savannah M., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 44 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 28, 2019).

There was clear and convincing evidence to establish that the termination of the mother's parental rights was in the child's best interest because the mother had not made an adjustment of circumstances necessary for the child's return or maintained regular visitation with him, she failed to maintain a meaningful relationship with him during her absence, she admitted that she did not wish to regain custody but only wanted to reestablish her relationship with the child, the mother failed to remit child support, and the child had been living with his grandparents for almost four years and a change in caretakers would be detrimental to his emotional condition. In re Ethan M., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 45 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 29, 2019).

Clear and convincing evidence showed termination of a mother's parental rights was in her child's best interest because (1) the mother did not adjust her circumstances to allow the child's safe return, (2) she failed to effect a lasting adjustment to her circumstances after being provided with reasonable assistance such that a lasting change did not reasonably appear possible, (3) her home was unhealthy and unsafe due to criminal activity and drug use; (4) she was consistently unable to care for the child in a safe and stable manner due to her use of alcohol and controlled substances, (5) her mental and/or emotional status would be detrimental to the child, and (6) she paid little to no child support. In re J'Khari F., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 60 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2019).

It was in a child's best interests for the parental rights of the child's mother to be terminated because no meaningful relationship existed between the child and the mother, the child would have suffered emotional and psychological harm if there was a change of caregivers at that point in time, and the child was thriving with and had become fully integrated in and formed a strong and positive bond with a relative's home and family with whom the child had been living for a few years and which wished to adopt the child. In re Melinda N., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 69 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 7, 2019).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was in the best interest of the children given the mother's continued use of drugs and involvement in criminal activity, the mother's belief that an individual she was going to live with was innocent of sexual abuse charges despite his conviction, and the stability the children had with appellants, who wished to adopt them. In re Autumn L., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 73 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 8, 2019).

Terminating the mother's parental rights was not in the child's best interest, because, at the time of trial, the mother was employed, drug free, living in a safe home, participating in drug treatment and mental health therapy, and the child had a relationship with the mother. In re Serenity W., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 75 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 8, 2019).

Termination of a mother's parental rights was in the children's best interest because the mother was not engaged in visitation and often allowed unsafe behavior to take place, there were issues of drug use in the mother's home, the children did not have a particularly meaningful relationship with the mother, the children were bonded with their foster parents who wished to adopt them, the children markedly improved following the suspension of contact with the mother due to allegations of sexual abuse, and the mother had not paid child support. In re H. A., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 78 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 12, 2019).

Clear and convincing evidence showed termination of a mother's parental rights was in a child's best interest because a preponderance of the evidence showed the mother had no bond with the child, due to the mother's persistent failure to have contact with the child. In re Paetyn M., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 81 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 14, 2019).

Trial court properly determined that termination of the father's parental rights was in the children's best interest because the father did not have a home outside of prison, he had been incarcerated for most of one child's life and the entirety of the other child's life, he was serving a 10-year sentence for robbery, he had not established a meaningful relationship with the children, he had a lengthy history of criminal activity and drug and alcohol use, and the children had lived with their foster parents, who wished to adopt them, for either the majority or the entirety of their lives. In re Lailonnii J., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 89 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 19, 2019).

Chancery court properly terminated a father's parental rights as in the best interest of the child because the testimony from both sides was that the child did not have any meaningful relationship with the father, the record showed that the mother and stepfather had raised the child, and had a very strong relationship with the child, and that the stepfather was basically the only father that the child had known. In re Maddox G., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 96 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 25, 2019).

Although a juvenile court may have given insufficient weight to a mother's relationship with the children, there was clear and convincing evidence that termination of both parents'  rights was in the children's best interest because of the parents'  lack of adjustment in circumstances over a two-year period, their inconsistent visitation, and the children's strong bond with the foster family. The parents had substance abuse issues, were repeatedly arrested, and did not show improvement in their parenting skills. In re Julian J., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 99 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 26, 2019).

Termination of a father's parental rights was in the best interest of the father's children because the father's incarceration precluded the father's ability to properly care and provide for the children and substantially inhibited the father's ability to maintain regular visitation or other contact with the children. Moreover, allowing the children to remain with their foster family, with which they were doing well and which wanted to adopt them, provided the children with their best chance for future stability. In re D.V., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 111 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 6, 2019).

Clear and convincing evidence supported the trial court's finding that termination of a father's parental rights was in the best interest of the child because there was no evidence the father made any change in his circumstances such as to make it safe or in the child's best interests to place the child in his home; there was no relationship at all between the child and the father, and it would be detrimental to the child's emotional, psychological and medical condition to change caretakers. In re Rilyn S., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 124 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 12, 2019).

Termination was in the child's best interests because the mother failed to make an appreciable change in her lifestyle and living conditions; she did not visit the child regularly; she did not have a meaningful relationship with the child; returning the child to the mother would have an adverse impact on the child as the foster parent was the only parental figure that the child had known; the father had possessed child pornography and the mother had voluntarily maintained relationships with two abusive men; and the mother was unable to be a safe and stable caregiver. In re Laura F., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 200 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 29, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's determination that termination of the mother's parental rights was in the child's best interests because it showed that despite assistance by DCS, the mother continued to use illegal drugs and had not demonstrated stability such that she could care for the child, the case worker expressed concerns respecting drug use by the grandmother, with whom the mother lived, and the child enjoyed a strong bond with the foster parents, who wished to adopt the child. In re Kaden W., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 230 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 13, 2019).

Termination of the father's parental rights was in the children's best interests because he continued to fail drug screens; he would not return the caseworker's phone calls; the last time he saw his children was nine months prior at a court hearing; it could not be said there was any type of meaningful relationship with the children as he had had literally no contact with them; there were many acts of serious domestic violence in the home between the parents and the children saw it; his drug use made it impossible to safely care for himself much less the children; his criminal conduct continued through the trial of the case; and the children were thriving in their foster home and were doing well in school. In re Trey S., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 303 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 20, 2019).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was in the children's best interests because she continued to struggle with substance abuse to the extent that it was unsafe for the children to be returned to her home; she had not had unsupervised visits or overnight visits since the trial home visit was revoked; it could not be said there was a meaningful relationship with the mother as the foster mother testified the children had asked to be adopted; there were many acts of serious domestic violence in the home between the parents and the children saw it; she had continued to incur criminal charges throughout the pendency of the case; and the children were thriving in their foster home and were doing well in school In re Trey S., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 303 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 20, 2019).

Termination of the mother's rights was in the children's best interests; the children were removed from the mother's care after she was involuntarily hospitalized, the court only had the mother's word that she was adequately managing her mental health issues, and in light of her seeming nonchalance about those issues, there was troubling uncertainty about her prospects for safely parenting the children any time soon. Furthermore, the children were thriving in the foster mother's care. In re Charlie-Lynn P., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 322 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 27, 2019).

Termination of parental rights was in children's best interests because the evidence did not preponderate against findings that (1) the parents'  circumstances had not changed since the children were removed, (2) the parents did not attempt to do anything on a permanency plan, (3) the parents did not visit the children, (4) the children had no relationship with the parents, (5) returning the children to the parents would harm the children, and (6) the parents prevented reasonable efforts to assist the parents by directing the Department of Children's Services to only contact the parents through counsel and then failing to maintain contact with counsel. In re Nicholas C., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 348 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 15, 2019).

Each of the nine statutory best interest factors weighed in favor of a finding that termination of a mother's rights was in the best interest of the child because the mother continued to abuse illegal drugs, and she only visited the child after finding out that a petition to terminate her parental rights had ben filed; the child had not established a meaningful relationship with the mother, and the child had successfully bonded with his foster parents. In re K.S., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 376 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 2, 2019).

Termination of the father's parental rights was in the child's best interest because there was warrant out for the father's arrest, the Department of Children's Services has made efforts to help the father, it would be difficult to say the rather and the child had a meaningful relationship, and the child had bonded with and was doing well in the foster parents'  house. In re Keagan P., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 377 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 5, 2019).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was in the children's best interests because the mother had failed two drug screens while she was incarcerated; the lack of a meaningful relationship between the children and the mother was the mother's fault; and the mother demonstrated that she was unable or unwilling to provide stable care for the children as she had a past practice of letting her mother care for the children, she discontinued her depression medication, and she rekindled a bad romantic relationship. In re Khloe B., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 415 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 26, 2019).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was in the best interests of the child because the mother failed to affect a lasting adjustment for a sufficient period of time to indicate that her lifestyle would change; she had no meaningful relationship with the child; a change in caretakers would cause a detrimental effect on the child as her foster family was the only one she had ever known; and the mother's history of drug abuse, both during and after her pregnancy, indicated an environment that could be abusive to the child and could create an unsafe and unstable home for her. In re Jayda S., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 416 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 26, 2019).

Despite the father's love and concern for the children, his steady employment history, and his willingness to provide for them, termination of the father's parental rights was in the best interest of the children given his failure to obtain suitable housing in the three years since removal, questions regarding whether he was capable of providing a suitable environment, and the fact that the children had bonded with the foster family and were thriving. In re Janiyah J., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 434 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 4, 2019).

Termination of the mother's rights was in the child's best interests; the mother was unable to provide a safe home, she had recently relapsed, whether she could effectively provide safe and stable care for the child was questionable, and the child was bonded to his foster family. In re Josiah T., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 482 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 2, 2019).

Termination of the father's parental rights was in the best interest of the child, as the father was incarcerated for several more years, leaving him unable to care for the child for a significant period of time, the child had bonded with the stepfather and had only ever lived with the mother, and a change of caretakers at this point in the child's life would be detrimental to his emotional condition. In re Brendan G., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 501 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 9, 2019).

There was clear and convincing evidence that termination of a father's parental rights was in the child's best interests because aside from a nine-month period, the mother and the child lived at home with her parents, and the father had no meaningful relationship with the child and had not seen the child since the mother's death. In re Channing M., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 516 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 23, 2019).

Evidence clearly and convincingly supports the finding that termination of the mother's parental rights was in the child's best interest; he had not lived with her and had not had consistent, quality time with her since he was six months old, the child testified that he liked living with his grandparents, and the mother's lifestyle was unstable, as she engaged in drug and other criminal activity. In re Dylan S., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 518 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 23, 2019).

Termination of a father's parental rights was in the children's best interest because the father had failed to make a lasting adjustment to the father's circumstances. The father had a long history of drug use and had not successfully been rehabilitated, had engaged in criminal activity which resulted in a lengthy period of incarceration and rendered the father unable to consistently visit or provide support for the children, and had committed severe child abuse. In re B.A., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 549 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 12, 2019).

Sufficient evidence supported the trial court's determination that termination of the father's parental rights was in the child's best interest because it showed that the no-contact order was quickly superseded by an order permitting the father to visit the child, there was no evidence that the father ever attempted to contact the child after his incarceration, the father's testimony supported the inference that he was out of contact with the child from June 2013 to December 2015, and the practical details of the father's return to society after his incarceration ended were uncertain. In re Travis R., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 557 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 13, 2019).

Termination of a mother's parental rights to the mother's children was in the best interest of the children because the mother had not made changes to the mother's conduct or circumstances—regarding the mother's inability to maintain stable housing and failure to address mental health needs—such that it was safe for the children to return to the mother's custody, no meaningful relationship existed between the children and the mother, and removing the children from the foster home would have been detrimental to their stability and progress. In re Deishun M., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 562 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 18, 2019).

Termination of a mother's parental rights was in the children's best interest because, despite the mother's tardy completion of permanency plan tasks, the evidence proved that it was unlikely that the mother soon would have been able to parent the children. It was not at all evident that the mother had remedied the conditions which led to the mother being unable to care for the children—the mother's housing situation, drug abuse, and lack of income—while the children were happy and had bonded in the foster home. In re Malik G., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 564 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 21, 2019).

Termination of a father's parental rights was in the child's best interests because the father's unfortunate history with illegal drugs had been a serious issue in the case, and the record evidenced that the father made less than satisfactory progress; the child's foster mother testified that the child was doing well and that the child did not talk about the father, and there had been prolonged periods where the father had not seen the child. In re Jayda H., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 571 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 25, 2019).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was in the best interest of the child because the mother failed to address her mental health issues; she had not demonstrated an ability or willingness to parent the child; the child had no bond with the mother; and the child had bonded with her foster parents, who wished to adopt her. In re Draven K., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 7, 2020).

Merely stating that it considered the statutory factors regarding best interest is insufficient for the trial court to discharge its obligation to engage in the necessary inquiry as to whether or not termination of parental rights is in the child's best interest. In re A.W., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 8, 2020).

Termination of the father's parental rights was in the children's best interests because, inter alia, he was incarcerated on a lengthy sentence and could not provide a safe home for the children; he did not broadly participate in the recommendations of the permanency plan or act in a way that would make lasting adjustments appear possible; he had little to no meaningful relationship with the children; a change of caretakers and physical home would have a profoundly negative effect on the children, who were well-adjusted to their foster home; and the father had sexually abused at least one other child who lived in the same household as the children. In re O.W., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2020).

Termination was in the child's best interests where the mother had not made a lasting change, maintained regular visitation, or given up her drug use. In re Emma S., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2020).

Termination of the father's rights was in the best interest of the children since he continued to maintain a relationship with the mother despite her drug use, the continued incidents of domestic violence, and the father failed to complete family counseling. In re Mahaley P., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 10 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2020).

Evidence was insufficient to support the trial court's determination that termination of the mother's parental rights was in the children's best interests because the mother had made no lasting progress in providing a safe and stable home life for the children in the nearly five years that they have been in DCS custody, she missed many visitations, she did not have a meaningful relationship with the children, she made no effort to learn how to take care of her daughter's medical needs, and the children were happy and healthy with their new family, where their emotional and medical needs are provided for. In re Ronon G., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 14 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 16, 2020).

Terminating parents'  parental rights was in children's best interest because (1) the parents refused treatment, (2) reasonable efforts had been made to assist the parents, and (3) the children improved while living with the children's current custodian. In re C.L., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 20 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 21, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's determination that termination of the father's parental rights was in the child's best interest because the father was still incarcerated at the time of the hearing and would not be released for at least another year, the child was bonded with her step-father, and a change of caretakers would be detrimental to her emotional condition when she had not visited with the father since her first birthday and did not know her step-father was not her biological parent. In re Aubrie W., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 21 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 21, 2020).

Termination of mother's parental rights was in the children's best interest because the mother had not been willing and able to make the choices needed to parent the children in the over four years from their removal and appeared unlikely to be willing to take the necessary steps in the near future as the mother lived in a camper, continued to use drugs, and associated with others that did so and the mother's visitation was supervised and minimal. Furthermore, the children were well-provided for in the care of the father and the father's wife. In re Michael W., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 24 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 23, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's determination that termination of the father's parental rights was in the child's best interest because the trial court found that the father knew the child's address but did not send her any gifts, cards, or letters, the trial court found that the relationship between them was destroyed by the three years of no contact between them, the trial court found, based on the child's in-court testimony, that there appeared to be no likelihood of the establishment of a meaningful relationship between the father and the child even if the father's parental rights are not terminated, and the trial court found that forcing the child to have a relationship with the father would be detrimental to her. In re Kelsea L., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 31 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 27, 2020).

Terminating the mother's parental rights was in the child's best interests; the mother had pleaded guilty to child abuse, failed to comply with or complete any permanency plan requirements, failed to show that she could provide a safe physical environment for the child, failed to provide any financial support for the child, and changing caretakers and the child's physical environment would likely have a negative effect on the child. In re Imerald W., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 43 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2020).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was in the children's best interests because she had not made an adjustment of circumstance, conduct, or conditions; she had not effected a lasting adjustment after reasonable efforts made by the Tennessee Department of Children's Services; she had not maintained regular visitation or other contact with the children, resulting in the deterioration in the meaningful bond between the mother and the children; she had shown neglect toward the children; changing caretakers would have a detrimental effect on the children; and all of the children had made positive progress while in protective custody. In re Serenity S., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 45 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2020).

Termination of the mother's rights was in the best interests of the children; the mother had not made a lasting adjustment of circumstances in four years the children have been in department custody, despite being provided assistance, and questioned remained about her ability to provide a safe home. In re Benjamin P., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 54 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 4, 2020).

Trial court properly determined that it was not in a child's best interest for the father's parental rights to be terminated because his failure to visit the child within the statutory four-month period was not willful where his efforts to visit the child were thwarted by the mother, and, while the father did not support or make reasonable payments towards the support of the child, the child was still young enough that the father should be able to establish a meaningful relationship with him. In re Archer R., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 68 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 19, 2020).

Termination of parental rights was in a child's best interest because neither parent was capable of providing a safe environment or safe and stable care for the child as the mother physically abused the child to the point of fracturing the child's ribs and causing hemorrhaging in the child's brain, while the father knew the child was being abused and failed to protect the child. Further, the child was thriving in foster care with parents who wished to adopt the child, while the parents had not provided financial support. In re Kyland F., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 86 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2020).

Termination of a mother's parental rights was in the children's best interest where despite a multitude of help from the Department of Children's Services, she was no closer to providing a safe and stable home for her children at the time of trial as she was at the removal, she had not maintained consistent visitation with the children. the children were currently in a stable home that provided for their needs, and the mother neglected the children and exposed them to drug use in her home. Despite her progress, she simply could not care for the children in any real fashion as she had no permanent home and no reliable method to transport herself and her children where they needed to go. In re Jadarian C., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 87 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2020).

Termination was in the child's best interests; the father acknowledged that the child should remain with petitioners in part because the child did not recognize the father as his father, he failed to attempt to contact the child despite having access to reasonable means to do so, and a change in the child's caretakers and physical environment would likely have a harmful effect on the child's emotional and psychological conditions. In re Bentley Q., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 103 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 11, 2020).

Evidence supported the trial court's determination that termination of the mother's parental rights was in the children's best interest because it showed that she failed to address mental health issues, her involvement with abusive males, or her continuing use of serious, illegal drugs, she failed to maintain regular visitation with one child despite considerable efforts by the service provider, and children fit in with the foster home, who wished to adopt them. In re Gracie H. Y., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 110 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 16, 2020).

Termination of parental rights was in the best interest of the children because the father had not made changes in the father's circumstances that would have made it safe for the children to return home, as the father was using drugs, had not adequately addressed substance abuse or mental health needs, was in and out of incarceration, lacked stable housing, transportation, or income, and had completed none of the requirements of the permanency plan. The children also bonded with their foster family, and the foster parents desired to adopt them. In re Nevaeh B., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 133 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2020).

Sufficient evidence supported the trial court's determination that termination of the mother's parental rights was in the child's best interest because the mother's continued methamphetamine use and inability to complete treatment indicated a failure to make a lasting adjustment of circumstances so as to allow a safe return of the child to the mother's custody, the mother had not seen the child since visitation was suspended nearly one year before the termination hearing and had not maintained a meaningful relationship with him since then, the trial court found that a change in caretakers would likely worsen the child's emotional, psychological, and mental conditions, and the child's health and behavior had improved while living in a pre-adoptive foster home. In re Caydan T., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 143 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 7, 2020).

There was clear and convincing evidence to establish that termination of the father's parental rights was in the best interest of the child because it showed that a meaningful relationship had not been established between him and the child, he did not participate in the child's education, the trial court found that a change of caretakers and physical environment would likely have a negative effect on the child's emotional, psychological, and medical condition, the father's home was not safe for the child, and he failed to make a single child support payment and did not pay his half of the child's outstanding dental bill. In re Zaylee W., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 145 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 9, 2020).

Termination of the mother's and the father's parental rights was in the child's best interest, as the record showed that the mother's home was not a safe place given the criminal records of both parents and the mother's drug abuse and manufacture of methamphetamine, to which the child was exposed. In addition, both parents were incarcerated, which resulted in not developing a relationship with the child, a lack of visitation and failure to provide any sort of support for the child, who deserved the stability, permanence, and safe, loving home. In re Eli S., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 150 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 9, 2020).

Termination of the father's parental rights was in the child's best interest because, although the father had been released from incarceration and there was no evidence his home was unsafe, the father had not paid consistent child support, had not maintained consistent visitation, and did not have any relationship with the child. In re London B., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 155 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 14, 2020).

The best interests of a child were served by terminating the mother's parental rights because the mother was in no position to parent the child at that point given the mother's unresolved drug problem and failure to take any meaningful steps to address the problem until weeks before trial. Furthermore, the evidence indicated that the child was very attached to the child's foster family, which was a preadoptive home. In re Madux F., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 166 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 16, 2020).

Termination of the mother's rights was in the child's best interest; the testimony on which the mother relied on did not preponderate against the trial court's findings, and the evidence showed that the mother neglected the child in her early infancy, the mother failed to provide support for the child and also failed to maintain regular contact or establish a meaningful relationship with the child, and the presence of drugs in the home illustrated that it was not suitable for a child. In re Daisy A., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 167 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 17, 2020).

Termination of both parents'  rights was in the child's best interests as neither parent had made a lasting adjustment of circumstances in the years that the child had been in the Department of Children's Services'  custody; questions remained as to the mother's ability to provide a safe and stable home for the child; the foster parent stated that the child was getting along great; and the child should continue permanency and stability in the home of the foster parent. In re Neveah A., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 168 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 16, 2020).

Termination of a mother's parental rights was in the children's best interests because the mother, despite the reasonable efforts of the Tennessee Department of Children's Services, failed to support the children and to provide suitable housing and continued to use illegal drugs and to engage in criminal activity. Furthermore, the children were thriving in the care of their pre-adoptive foster family, and to remove the children from the only stable home which they had known would likely have caused them great distress. In re Tucker H., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 184 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 24, 2020).

Termination of a mother's parental rights was in the child's best interest because the mother failed to make any lasting adjustment that would allowed for reunification as the mother-who had substance abuse and unstable housing issues-failed to show the likelihood to have provided a healthy and safe physical environment for the child. Furthermore, the child was thriving with the preadoptive foster family and changing caretakers and the child's physical environment likely would have had a negative effect on the child's psychological well-being. In re Kelty F., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 185 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 24, 2020).

Termination of both parents'  rights was in the child's best interests because neither made an adjustment of circumstance, conduct, or conditions so as to make it safe for the child to be in their custody; despite reasonable efforts on the part of the Tennessee Department of Children's Services, the parents were unwilling to engage in the process so as to make the necessary changes at any early date; neither parent had addressed their drug use; neither parent had stable housing or employment; there was no evidence that the child had a bond with either parent; the child's foster mother testified that he had bonded with the foster family; all of the child's needs were met in his current environment; and the foster family wished to adopt him. In re Dustin M., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 191 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 28, 2020).

Clear and convincing evidence supported the trial court's determination that termination of the parents'  rights was in the child's best interest because neither parent had maintained regular visitation or other contact with the child, the trial court found that it would be detrimental to the child to move him from his foster home where he had lived for over a year, and the parents'  use of alcohol and controlled substances rendered them consistently unable to care for the child in a safe and stable manner. In re Boston G., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 194 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 29, 2020).

There was no error in the trial court's best interest analysis because it carefully considered the best interest factors set forth in the termination statute and found that the mother did not have any meaningful relationship with the child; the child was removed from the mother's care and custody shortly after birth, the mother had remained incarcerated throughout the entirety of the child's life, and the child bonded with the grandparents and was thriving in their care. In re C.S., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 197 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 29, 2020).

There was clear and convincing evidence that termination of the father's rights was in the child's best interest because the father had not parented the child since 2014 when he was placed under the no contact order, he has been in and out of incarceration since that time, during the times he was on parole he did not petition to have the no contact order lifted or visitation reinstated, and there was no evidence that he had established a meaningful relationship with her. The child had been placed in a stable home with a family who would like to adopt her should she become available. In re Isabella W., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 200 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 29, 2020).

Termination of the mother's rights was in the child's best interests; the mother incurred multiple criminal charges since the child had been in the grandparents'  custody and she had been incarcerated, plus she continued to reside with a known drug abuser and she had failed to sufficiently remedy her own addiction issues. The grandparents'  home was the only home the child had known, and the child was thriving and happy with them. In re Eli H., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 206 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 8, 2020).

Trial court did not err in finding that termination of the mother's parental rights is in the children's best interest because her improvements came very late, by trial the children had spent five years in the grandparents'  custody. To potentially uproot the children from what, based on the record, was a stable environment and one to which they are attached and place them with the mother would be an enormous gamble with their well-being, notwithstanding the mother's improvements. In re Ava M., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 226 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 20, 2020).

Trial court did not err by finding that it was not in the child's best interests to terminate the mother's parental rights because it found that the mother had admitted her past mistakes, completed drug treatment, obtained her C.N.A. certification, and obtained suitable employment, transportation, and housing. The trial court also found that the mother was no longer associating with inappropriate people, she had been sober since shortly after the child's birth, and petitioners did not present evidence that showed ongoing drug use by the mother after the child was removed. In re Aryana S., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 227 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 21, 2020).

Termination of a father's parental rights was in the children's best interest where he did not currently have a home, he was facing trial on charges that could have led to 10 years'  incarceration, he was mostly absent from the the children's lives because he spent a significant amount of time incarcerated or living in Texas, the children had been living in the are of their maternal aunt and uncle and were thriving, there was physical violence in the home when the children did live with the father, and the father had not paid child support. In re Jessica V., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 275 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 12, 2020).

Termination of the parents'  rights was in the children's best interests; limitations placed on the parents'  visitation were appropriate, their refusal to acknowledge their abuse and its harmful effects on the children prevented them from being afforded the opportunity to demonstrate their progress, their relationships with the children were marred by abuse, control, and manipulation, and a change of caretakers and physical environment would have a negative effect on the children's well-being. In re Shyanne H., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 292 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 25, 2020).

Termination of the father's parental rights was in the child's bests interest where the trial court considered all of the relevant statutory factors, including the factor that the father had not maintained a relationship with the chid and had not seen him for over three years at the time of trial. In re Jaxon W.H., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 304 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 2, 2020).

Termination of parental rights was in the children's best interest where the evidence supported the findings that neither parent had made such an adjustment of circumstances that the children could be safely returned to the custody of either of them, maintained regular visitation, had established a meaningful relationship with the children, or consistently paid child support, and a change of caretakers and physical environment would have had a detrimental emotional and psychological effect on the children. In re Justin D., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 348 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 4, 2020).

Termination of a father's parental rights was in the child's best interests because the father had drug use and anger management issues, the relationship between the father and the child had been damaged beyond repair, a counsel testified that it would have been detrimental to the child to continue with the father's visitation, there was evidence of physical and verbal altercations among the members of the father's family, and the father had a substantial child support arrearage. In re Adalee H., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 356 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 7, 2020).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was in the child's best interest because the mother showed no interest in being part of the child's life; she had no meaningful relationship with the child; and it would be detrimental to the child to move from the father and his wife's home as the child created healthy familial bonds with them and had become accustomed to the physical environment, community, and schedule. In re Aiden M., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 361 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 11, 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's finding that termination of the father's parental rights was in the child's best interest because it showed that the father had been incarcerated since the child was three years old, the mother had stopped the video visits between them when the child began exhibiting anxiety behaviors after the visits, the child had no relationship with the father at the time of trial, and even after the father's release there would be restrictions on his being around other children due to his sex offender status. In re Jackson D., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 366 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 17, 2020).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was in the child's best interests; the mother had not made an adjustment of circumstances that would make it safe for her child to return to her custody, a change in caretakers would be detrimental to the child, and the child was subjected to severe abuse. While the mother's relationship with the child was meaningful, the mother had been unable to parent the child in most of the last five years and her current progress was tempered by her failure to make lasting changes in the past. In re Raylan W., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 375 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 20, 2020).

Trial court's final order denying the petition for termination of the mother's parental rights was deficient because it failed to comply with this section, as it was unclear whether the trial court considered the best interests of both children, as there was no mention of one child in the best interest analysis, and there was no indication that the trial court considered the appropriate best interests factors as to the other child. In re Rukia B., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 383 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 24, 2020).

Termination of the father's parental rights was in the child's best interest; he committed severe child abuse against two of the child's siblings, and that the underlying conduct occurred against the child's siblings did not mean the child somehow would not face comparable danger were she placed in the father's care, as he had not rectified his substance abuse or mental health issues. In re Trinity H., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 388 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 28, 2020).

Evidence supported the trial court's determination that termination of the mother's parental rights was in the child's best interest because the mother's problems in caring for the child persisted even after intervention by DCS, during visits the mother was typically on her phone or otherwise not engaged with the child, and the effect a change in caretakers was likely to have on the child's emotional, psychological, and medical condition was substantial. The child would likely continue to need specialized care and attention, especially regarding her diet, and her needs were being met by her foster parents, who wished to adopt her. In re Katrina S., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 398 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 3, 2020).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was in the child's best interests as the mother had been arrested again in the days before the termination hearing; the child had bonded with those in his foster home and was thriving; a change of caretakers at this point in the child's life would be detrimental to his emotional condition when his adoptive home was the only home he had ever known; questions remained as to the mother's ability to provide a safe and stable home for the child as evidenced by her criminal activity and failure to seek mental health treatment; and she failed to remit child support as required. In re Kash F., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 399 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 4, 2020).

Termination of parental rights was in the child's best interest because the parents failed to make sufficient change to their conduct or circumstances, as the mother continued to use illegal drugs and associate herself with other drug users, the mother required assistance obtaining and paying for housing and other essential items, and the father faced similar issues. In re A.V.N., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 406 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 10, 2020).

25. Permanency Plans.

Court erred in finding that the parents, in a complex, extended dependency and neglect case, were not indigent and finding their seven children dependent and neglected and that the parents had committed severe child abuse; that finding could have led to termination of parental rights and the parents clearly had a right to appointed counsel if they were indigent. The parents were entitled to a thorough hearing in compliance with T.C.A. § 40-14-202 to determine if they were indigent and thus, entitled to appointed counsel under Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 13(d)(2)(B). Tenn. Dep't of Children's Servs. v. David H., 247 S.W.3d 651, 2006 Tenn. App. LEXIS 193 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 21, 2006).

Termination of a father's parental rights for failure to substantially comply with his responsibilities as set out in a permanency plan was proper, as the case worker assigned to his child's case testified that the father had not submitted to a psychological assessment, submitted to drug and alcohol assessment, provided proof of stable housing, or shown proof of employment or income. In re Alexus F., — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. App. LEXIS 727 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 13, 2014), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 200 (Tenn. Mar. 9, 2015).

Mother substantially complied with the responsibilities set forth in the plans, with little to no assistance from the Tennessee Department of Children's Services (DCS) where the mother become drug-free, took an alcohol and drug assessment and drug screens, maintained contact with DCS, obtained legal income, maintained stable housing, and called and visited the child. In re Alysia S., 460 S.W.3d 536, 2014 Tenn. App. LEXIS 834 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 17, 2014), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 254 (Tenn. Mar. 16, 2015).

Father failed to comply with the permanency plan, as he did not attend anger management classes, never provided pills for a pill count, did not participate in alcohol and drug services, and never provided proof of a steady job, transportation, or child care plan. In re Robert C., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 58 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 3, 2015).

Evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's judgment terminating the father's parental rights on the ground of substantial noncompliance with the statement of responsibilities in his permanency plan where it showed that after a year had passed since his receipt of the plan he made no progress, he testified at an earlier hearing that he had no intention of the completing the plan's requirements, and he did not complete portions of the plan until after the petition to terminate had been filed. In re K.M.K., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 92 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2015).

Clear and convincing evidence supported terminating a mother's parental rights on grounds of substantial non-compliance with permanency plans because, inter alia, the mother never fully appreciated the ultimate goal of the plans, which was to ensure a clean, healthy environment, and to give the mother sufficient parenting skills so the children could be safe in her care, and the mother also failed to avail herself of all resources made available to her. In re Kim C., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 106 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 6, 2015).

Clear and convincing evidence supported terminating a father's parental rights on grounds of substantial non-compliance with permanency plans because the father, inter alia, failed to follow medical advice, disputed his diagnoses, insisted he did not need any assistance, failed to master the most basic parenting skills, showed no concern for the condition of the children's hygiene, and allowed the children to be unsupervised and exposed to dangerous conditions. In re Kim C., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 106 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 6, 2015).

Permanency plans were not lengthy or hard to follow, but the father's attempts to comply were sporadic at best; he failed to provide current proof that his home was safe for the children, and the finding that he was in substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans was supported by clear and convincing evidence, such that a statutory ground existed for termination of the father's parental rights. In re Agustine R., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 120 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 17, 2015).

Clear and convincing evidence supported terminating a mother's parental rights for failure to comply with the terms of a permanency plan because (1) the terms of the plan were reasonable and related to the cause of the mother's child's removal from the mother's custody, which was the mother's homelessness and drug addiction, and (2) the mother did not obtain housing, did not follow the recommendations of an alcohol and drug assessment, and failed a drug screen. In re Brittany M.C., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 182 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 24, 2015), appeal denied, In re Brittany M C, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 522 (Tenn. June 17, 2015).

Termination of parental rights was appropriate because the evidence clearly and convincingly established that a parent was in substantial noncompliance with permanency plans due to the parent's failure to complete drug treatment within the time-frames outlined in the permanency plans and the parent's inability to maintain a safe and stable home. In re Roger T., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 261 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 27, 2015).

Trial court found that the requirements under the mother's permanency plan were reasonable and related to remedying the underlying conditions that necessitated the need for the child's foster care, and the evidence showed that the mother understood the plan requirements and the consequences for failure to comply, yet she was not able to acquire and exhibit the skills to take care of the child; thus, the mother was in substantial non-compliance with plan requirements and the termination of her rights was affirmed. In re Eve C., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 279 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 29, 2015).

There was nothing to suggest that the mother had obtained parenting skills that would enable her to provide appropriate care and supervision for the child and the evidence did not preponderate against the finding of the mother's substantial noncompliance with the terms of a permanency plan, such that the trial court did not err in terminating the mother's rights. In re K.G.S., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 347 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 19, 2015).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was proper because she did not contend that she substantially completed the permanency plan requirements or that she had resolved the conditions that led to the child's removal into foster care, nor could she successfully do so as the child was removed from the mother's custody due to drug exposure, and, at trial, the proof established that the mother continued to abuse drugs and associate with known drug abusers. In re Faith W., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 360 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 20, 2015).

Trial court properly found that the parents' responsibilities under the permanency plans were reasonably related to remedying the conditions that necessitate foster care, and therefore substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans could serve as a basis for terminating parental rights. In re Bonnie L., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 477 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 12, 2015).

Despite the parents' cooperation with some aspects of their plans, they failed to complete several requirements, including the mother refraining from drinking alcohol and the father showing the ability manage his anger appropriately; as they failed to substantially comply with the requirements of the permanency plans, the trial court properly concluded that substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans was an appropriate ground for terminating their parental rights. In re Bonnie L., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 477 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 12, 2015).

Trial court properly found that the parents' responsibilities under the permanency plans were reasonably related to remedying the conditions that necessitate foster care, and therefore substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans could serve as a basis for terminating parental rights. In re Bonnie L., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 477 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 12, 2015).

Despite the parents' cooperation with some aspects of their plans, they failed to complete several requirements, including the mother refraining from drinking alcohol and the father showing the ability manage his anger appropriately; as they failed to substantially comply with the requirements of the permanency plans, the trial court properly concluded that substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans was an appropriate ground for terminating their parental rights. In re Bonnie L., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 477 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 12, 2015).

Trial court erred in terminating the mother's parental rights based on substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan, as the plan was not admitted at trial. In re M.P.H., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 475 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 15, 2015).

Father failed to substantially comply with the reasonable responsibilities of his permanency plans; he failed to provide proof of verifiable income, his assertion that domestic violence had to involve actual hitting demonstrated a lack of the understanding the domestic violence course was meant to engender, and termination on this ground was proper. In re Alleyanna C., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 642 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 10, 2015).

Mother failed to substantially comply with her permanency plan; she had not completed the domestic violence course at the time of trial, her insistent denial that she needed domestic violence education did not reflect favorably on her attention to this requirement, and termination on this ground was proper. In re Alleyanna C., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 642 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 10, 2015).

It was error to terminate a mother's parental rights due to substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan because the record did not contain a document that met the definition of a permanency plan, as an order containing conditions the mother had to satisfy for the children to be returned did not meet this definition, nor did the record otherwise contain a document meeting this requirement. In re A.C.S., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 767 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 23, 2015).

Clear and convincing evidence existed to support a finding that a mother did not substantially comply with the terms of the permanency plans because, inter alia, the mother: (1) never provided proof of her attendance at mental health therapy; (2) was discharged more than once for failing to make an appointment with her therapist; (3) never notified the child services agency of changes in her residence; (4) did not provide proof of employment; and (5) failed to pay child support. In re Nolan G., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 825 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 7, 2015).

Ground of abandonment by failing to comply with the permanency plan was not met by clear and convincing evidence where the father attended a parenting class while in Nebraska and provided proof of completion, he testified that he had taken part in several mental health and drug assessments, he obtained a job in prison and had endeavored to pay child support, and although he admitted to being arrested after the creation of the plan he testified that those charges were not pursued. In re Abbigail C., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 856 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 21, 2015).

Juvenile court did not err in finding that clear and convincing evidence failed to establish substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan where the father was left entirely up to his own resources in securing any counseling or treatment available within the perimeters of his home country. In re Analilia R., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 932 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 24, 2015), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 168 (Tenn. Feb. 22, 2016).

Mother failed to substantially comply with the reasonable responsibilities of her permanency plans, and her rights were properly terminated on this ground; while she complied with the visitation and other requirements, she was unemployed, had not paid child support, had a suspended driver's license, and her living situation was too new to be considered stable. In re Aaliyah E., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 36 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 26, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 315 (Tenn. Apr. 22, 2016).

Father failed to substantially comply with the reasonable responsibilities of his permanency plans, and his rights were properly terminated on this ground; he was afforded a real opportunity to comply upon the child's removal into protective custody and prior to committing the actions that led to his subsequent incarceration. In re Aaliyah E., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 36 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 26, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 315 (Tenn. Apr. 22, 2016).

Termination was proper for substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan, as the mother failed to complete various tasks of her plan, including obtaining mental health and drug treatment, stable housing, and financial stability. In re Saliace P., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 37 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 26, 2016).

Termination of the mother's parental rights for noncompliance was supported by evidence the mother failed to abide by court order to keep her children safe and away from a sex offender, failed to address mental health issues, and failed to obtain appropriate housing. In re M.A.P., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 57 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 29, 2016).

Termination of parental rights was appropriate because clear and convincing evidence showed that a parent did not substantially comply with the permanency plan in that the parent displayed a high degree of indifference to the statement of responsibilities in the various permanency plans, the parent's parenting skills did not improve, and witnesses testified to the parent's anger and lack of cooperation with assistance providers. In re Phillip I.P., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 127 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 19, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support the termination of the mother's parental rights for substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan where it showed that she was discharged from therapy for noncompliance, she failed to demonstrate appropriate parenting skills, she continued to deny abusing her children, and she continued using marijuana. In re A'leah M., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 136 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 23, 2016).

Clear and convincing evidence supported the juvenile court's decision to terminate the mother's parental rights for substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan where, although she completed some of the plan's requirements, she failed to obtain safe and stable housing despite the Tennessee Department of Children's Services'  (DCS) efforts to help her do so, she did not comply with the psychologist's recommendations, and she avoided DCS requests for drug screens on numerous occasions. In re Candace J., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 186 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 11, 2016).

Trial court did not err by terminating the father's parental rights based on substantial noncompliance with permanency plans where the evidence showed that his responsibilities under the plans were reasonably related to remedying the conditions that necessitated the child's removal and he failed to substantially comply with his requirements. In re Benjamin A., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 187 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 14, 2016).

Trial court's finding that the parents were substantially noncompliant with the permanency plans was supported by substantial evidence where the requirements that they submit to and test negative on announced and unannounced drug screens, maintain weekly contact with the Department of Children's Services, update the Department when their phone numbers or addresses changed, and submit to announced and unannounced home visits were reasonable, and the father's noncompliance was substantial given that the son was removed from the parents'  care because of his exposure to drugs, the parents'  use of drugs, and the presence of two methamphetamine labs in the home. In re Matthew T., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 272 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 20, 2016).

Termination of parental rights on the ground of substantial noncompliance with permanency plans was appropriate because the parent made no genuine effort to comply with relevant parenting plans by participating in alcohol and drug treatment programs, educational classes, and employment opportunities while incarcerated for criminal activity and drug use that would have satisfied the requirements of the permanency plans. In re Tristan B., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 301 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 2, 2016).

Evidence was speculative as a result of the father's failure to appear at trial, and the department's ability to assist him was hindered by his frequent disappearances; there was clear and convincing evidence to support termination based upon father's substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan requirements. In re Charles K., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 344 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 19, 2016).

Trial court properly terminated a mother's parental rights because clear and convincing evidence established that the mother did not substantially comply with the permanency plan; the proof showed that the mother made no real start to recovery from her addiction until well after she agreed to the permanency plan and that she made no efforts to address her acknowledged mental health issues until after the petition to terminate was filed. In re Malaya B., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 360 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 24, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 527 (Tenn. Aug. 10, 2016).

Tasks as outlined in the permanency plans were exceptionally difficult to be discerned, and due to the department's failure to limit the parent's responsibilities to concrete obligations that at least had the possibility of being accomplished by them, the order finding sufficient proof for termination for substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan was vacated. In re Navada N., 498 S.W.3d 579, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 367 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 23, 2016).

Clear and convincing evidence supported termination of parental rights based upon a parent's substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan requirements because, although the parent asserted that the parent attempted to complete the requirements with little assistance from Tennessee Department of Children's Services, proof of reasonable efforts was not a precondition to termination of the parental rights of the parent. In re Hailey S., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 380 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 31, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 156 (Tenn. Mar. 1, 2017).

Termination of parental rights was appropriate because the permanency plan was reasonable and the parent had well over a year to achieve substantial compliance with the permanency plan. The parent's lack of cooperation with the Tennessee Department of Children's Services evinced an unwillingness to make the necessary changes to resume caring for the parent's children, and, when viewed in the context of the amount of time and resources the parent had available, the parent's progress under the plan fell short of what was necessary. In re Bailey W., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 408 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 10, 2016).

Many of the permanency plan requirements reasonable and related to remedying the conditions that led to the mother's children's removal, including requiring compliance with and passing of random drug screen, refraining from criminal activity, and maintaining appropriate housing; although the mother was credited for her efforts while incarcerated, there was clear evidence that she failed to comply with the reasonable responsibilities contained in the permanency plan, including refraining from criminal activity, obtaining housing an exhibiting appropriate parenting skills. In re Aiden R., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 420 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 23, 2016).

As to the father, the proof did not rise to the level of clear evidence of substantial noncompliance with the requirements of the permanency plans; while he was slow in complying, by the time of the hearing, he had accomplished or begun work on the majority of the requirements, and no proof was presented that his drug use led to removal of the children. In re Aiden R., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 420 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 23, 2016).

Termination of the mother's rights under the ground of substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan was affirmed, given that the mother failed to demonstrate that she had changed her conditions so she could take full responsibility for raising her children in a healthy, safe, stable home; she remained unemployed, there were dangerous and unsanitary conditions throughout the residence, and her efforts fell far short of reaching the overall goal of the permanency plan. In re Derrick J., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 477 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 8, 2016).

Because the requirements that the mother have stable housing and employment only appeared in the permanency plan that was ratified on June 8, 2015, the mother was not given sufficient time to comply with the requirements newly added to the permanency plan; thus, clear and convincing evidence did not show that the mother substantially failed to comply with the statement of responsibilities in the permanency plan, and the order terminating the mother's parental rights to the child for substantial noncompliance with the statement of responsibilities in the permanency plan was reversed. In re Bryson C., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 498 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 18, 2016).

Clear and convincing evidence showed a father's substantial noncompliance with permanency plans because the plans'  reasonable requirements related to the reasons for the child's removal from the father's custody, who did not follow recommendations from a parenting assessment and inconsistently visited the child and participated in required treatment. In re Daymien T., 506 S.W.3d 461, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 540 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 27, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 752 (Tenn. Oct. 21, 2016).

In a termination of parental rights case, the Tennessee Department of Children's Services proved that the mother had not substantial complied with the permanency plan, even though the requirements of the permanency plan were reasonable and related to remedying the conditions that caused the child to be removed from her mother's custody, because the mother failed to obtain and maintain suitable housing, to seek employment, and to be able to provide a safe drug free environment for their children. In re Kendra P., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 544 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 28, 2016).

Evidence supported the finding of substantial noncompliance with the mother's permanency plan, making termination proper; the plan requirements were reasonable and appropriate, as the children were placed in foster care due to the mother's lack of suitable housing and substance abuse, and given the degree of noncompliance and the weight assigned to the requirements, the mother's noncompliance was substantial, as a majority of the requirements she failed to complete were aimed at addressing her substance abuse issues. In re Destiny S., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 559 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 4, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support the termination of the mother's parental rights for substantial noncompliance with the requirements of the permanency plan where it showed that the mother had failed to address her mental health concerns, she failed to provide proof residential stability, she continued to test positive for unprescribed medications, and she failed to follow through with the recommendations of her alcohol and drug assessment. In re Rylee R., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 582 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 11, 2016).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was proper on the grounds of substantial noncompliance with the responsibilities contained in a permanency plan because, although the mother submitted to random drug screens and refrained from incurring additional charges, she completed the parenting assessment with a bonding component only begrudgingly after the termination petition had been filed; and she refused to follow the majority of the recommendations from the assessment as required by the permanency plan. In re Gabriella M., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 587 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 15, 2016).

Termination of the mother's parental rights for substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan was supported by evidence she continued to use drugs and alcohol after leaving a treatment facility, had no suitable housing or transportation and paid no child support. In re D.R.S., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 631 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 29, 2016).

Termination of the father's parental rights for substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan was supported by evidence that the father failed to obtain stable housing, comply with his probation, and resolve his legal issues, and did very little to maintain a relationship with the child in that he failed to consistently provide support or visit. In re D.R.S., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 631 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 29, 2016).

Termination of the mother's rights was proper on the ground of substantial noncompliance with the requirements of the permanency plans; the plans were developed to address the primary concerns of the case, including environmental neglect, sexual abuse perpetrated on the children, and the ongoing inappropriate sexual conduct between them, yet the mother failed to complete therapy, failed to provide a suitable home for the children, and appeared to be unable to meet their basic needs. In re Jasmine B., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 709 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 22, 2016).

Juvenile court properly found that a mother and father failed to comply with the reasonable responsibilities contained in the permanency plan because they did not obtain suitable housing or manage to consistently pass drug screens; the requirements of the permanency plan were reasonably related to reducing the risk of harm to the children so that the children could be safely returned to the parents'  care. In re Jason S., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 715 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 23, 2016).

Terminating a father's parental rights for substantial permanency plan noncompliance did not err because (1) reunification efforts were not required, (2) the father did not comply with the plan's reasonable requirements to submit a transportation plan or prove legal, verifiable, income, and (3) the father did not otherwise comply with the plan. In re Jose L., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 814 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 31, 2016).

Evidence did not support a finding that a father's parental rights were to be terminated based on substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan because, while the father was often uncooperative with the Tennessee Department of Childrens Services (DCS), the father accomplished the majority of the requirements by the time of the final hearing. Furthermore, prior to the final hearing, the father provided the DCS with a budget, sufficient proof of income, and a child care and transportation plan and completed a second anger management course. In re Jeramyah H., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 819 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 31, 2016).

While the evidence supported termination of the father's parental rights based on substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan requirements, it did not support termination of the mother's rights on that basis, as the mother attended parenting classes, received anger management counseling, and submitted to psychological evaluations. In re Tamera W., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 856 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 9, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 87 (Tenn. Feb. 9, 2017).

Ground of substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan was proven by clear and convincing evidence where the mother failed to cease abusing prescription drugs. In re Dillon E., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 872 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 15, 2016).

Trial court properly found that the mother's responsibilities, enumerated in the permanency plan, were reasonably related to remedying the conditions which necessitated the foster care placement; maintaining residential stability was necessary to show she was equipped to care for her children, and other requirements all related to staying within the law, which was a responsibility about which she did not complain. In re Dustin T., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 876 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 17, 2016).

Substantial noncompliance with permanence plans was proven; the father's incarceration prevented him from satisfying most of his responsibilities under the plans, but he could have stayed within the law, and he could have informed the service worker of changes in his location, including his incarceration status, which he has failed to do. In re Dustin T., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 876 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 17, 2016).

With the exception of the trial court's reference to the mother's associations with known drug users in discussing her responsibilities under the plan, the record supported all of the findings; her noncompliance with the plan had been substantial, and termination was proper. In re Dustin T., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 876 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 17, 2016).

Clear and convincing evidence supported terminating a father's parental rights because the father did not substantially comply with the father's reasonable responsibilities in a permanency plan. In re Mac L., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 883 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 22, 2016).

Termination of the father's parental rights based on substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan was improper, as the father engaged in numerous services, there was no indication that the father turned down any services, and the father had suitable housing, and was paying child support while in jail. In re Addison B., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 913 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2016).

Mother's permanency plans were reasonably related to remedying the reasons the children were removed from the home, but the trial court improperly based its conclusion that the mother had not substantially complied with the plans on the fact that the outcome and goals were not reached, rather than on her efforts to comply; although she failed to comply with some requirements, her relapse did not “undo” all of her previous and subsequent attempts to substantially comply, and termination based on this ground was reversed. In re Eddie F., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 924 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 2, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 158 (Tenn. Mar. 2, 2017).

Termination of a mother's parental rights on the ground of substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan was inappropriate because, although there was some testimony indicating that the mother was not in strict compliance with all of the permanency plan requirements, a case manager testified at trial that the mother had completed all of the tasks on the mother's permanency plan. In re Jakob O., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 959 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 15, 2016).

Termination of the mother's parental rights based on substantial non-compliance with permanency plans, was supported by evidence that the mother was homeless, continued to reside with the father despite their history of domestic violence, and, despite some positive efforts, was refusing to comply with drug and alcohol recommendations at the time of the hearing. In re Linette B., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 983 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 21, 2016).

Termination of the mother's parental rights based on substantial non-compliance with a permanency plan was supported by evidence the mother failed to complete substance abuse treatment and incurred new criminal charges and was incarcerated. In re Sophie O., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 985 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 23, 2016).

Mother completed the necessary assessments and maintained regular visitation, but she failed to complete the remainder of the requirements and also refused to follow the recommendations from the assessments as required by the permanency plan; termination for noncompliance was proper. In re Yariel S., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 6, 2017).

Evidence did not preponderate against the trial court's factual findings with respect to a mother's substantial noncompliance with permanency plans because the Department of Children's Services created three separate permanency plans, and the mother ailed to meet the requirements, all of which bore on her ability to provide a stable home for the children. In re A.B., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 14 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 11, 2017).

Trial court was correct in failing to terminate a father's parental rights to his children because the evidence did not clearly and convincingly demonstrate that the father failed to substantially comply with permanency plans; the father made attempts to stay in contact with the children, but there were some barriers to communicating with them. In re A.B., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 14 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 11, 2017).

Trial court did not err by finding clear and convincing evidence to terminate the mother's rights due to her substantial noncompliance with permanency plans because the record showed that she failed to complete many of the tasks in the permanency plans. In re S.P., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 41 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 25, 2017).

There was clear and convincing evidence to support the termination of the parents'  rights for substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan because the father only made token child support payments, he never remedied the hazards of his previous home, DCS was unable to verify that his new home was safe and appropriate, and he failed multiple drugs screens. The mother also failed a drug screen and she continued to live with the father. In re Kayla B., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 66 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 1, 2017).

Evidence supported a finding that a father was in substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans where he was living with the people with whom he was living at the time the dependent and neglect proceeding was initiated and who had been rejected as a potential placement for the children, and he had not paid child support or attended scheduled visitations. In re Promise A., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 177 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 16, 2017).

Chancery court properly terminated the father's rights for substantial noncompliance with his permanency plan under T.C.A. § 36-1-113; he refused to pay any child support, he took three out of the nine drug tests requested of him, he failed two out of those three drug tests, and he failed to avoid further legal problems or abide by the rules of his probation, and this constituted substantial non-compliance with his permanency plans. In re Wesley P., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 301 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 12, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 400 (Tenn. July 6, 2017).

Termination of a father's parental rights was appropriate because clear and convincing evidence showed that the father failed to substantially comply with the requirements of a permanency plan as the father used drugs, did not go to an alcohol and drug assessment, failed drug tests, lived in places that were not suitable for children, and violated the terms of the father's parole. Furthermore, the father failed to participate in all the weekly therapeutic visitation sessions that were set up with the father's youngest child. In re Casyn B., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 361 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 26, 2017).

Termination of the mother's parental rights for substantial non-compliance with the permanency plan was supported by evidence that the mother continued to make dangerous choices of men to be around her children and thus, failed to provide a permanent and safe home. In re Rylan G., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 429 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 28, 2017).

Termination of both parents rights for noncompliance with a permanency plan was proper, as the mother obtained new criminal charges multiple times after the development of the plan and the father failed to complete an alcohol and drug assessment. In re C.J.B., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 436 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 28, 2017), appeal denied, In re Chaz B., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 624 (Tenn. Sept. 22, 2017).

Termination of a mother's parental rights under T.C.A. § 36-1-113(g)(3) was proper where the mother made little to no progress as to her mental health, drug addiction, or improving the home environment. In re Michael B., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 545 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 3, 2017).

Termination based on substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans was improper where finding was based on the desired outcome and goal of the mother remaining drug-free, rather than her efforts to reach that goal, there were no credibility findings as to her attendance at recovery meetings, and she extended some effort to get counseling. In re Zane W., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 453 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 6, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 636 (Tenn. Sept. 25, 2017).

For purposes T.C.A. § 36-1-113(g)(2), the tasks included in the father's permanency plans were reasonably related to the conditions that led to the removal of the child and the father's reunification with him. In re Quintin S., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 480 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 13, 2017).

For purposes T.C.A. § 36-1-113(g)(2), the requirement that the mother resolve her legal issues was reasonably related to returning her children to her care, and thus this requirement was reasonably related to remedying the conditions that necessitated foster care. In re Quintin S., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 480 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 13, 2017).

Father's parental rights were properly terminated for failure to substantially comply with the permanency plan where he continued to engage, with the mother, in a transient lifestyle, he had been unable to maintain stable housing or employment, and he had been unable to refrain from enabling the mother in her drug use or to maintain his efforts to remove himself and the children from her. In re Seth B., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 613 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 14, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 850 (Tenn. Dec. 11, 2017).

Mother's parental rights were properly terminated for failure to substantially comply with the permanency plan where she admitted that she was not engaging in regular treatment for her mental health issues, despite her initial efforts, she did not complete outpatient treatment prior to the hearing on the petition to terminate her parental rights, she continued to incur further criminal charges, and she was unable to maintain employment for any significant length of time. In re Seth B., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 613 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 14, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 850 (Tenn. Dec. 11, 2017).

Termination of a father's parental rights based on a failure to comply with a permanency plan was appropriate where he had allowed the mother who suffered from substance abuse issues to be in the home with the children prior to their removal, he lived in a hotel that was deemed unsafe and inappropriate for the children, he did not take the recommendations from the mental health assessment seriously, and he refused to stay in contact with the Department of Children's Services. In re L.M.H., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 657 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 28, 2017).

Termination of parental rights was appropriate because the parents failed to substantially comply with the permanency plans. Although the parents, after the filing of the petition to terminate parental rights, began completing the tasks on the permanency plans–by obtaining housing, obtaining jobs, buying a car, and completing intensive outpatient programs and parenting classes–responsibilities remained unfinished such as counseling and a psychological assessment. In re Isabella G., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 667 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 3, 2017).

Mother failed to substantially comply with the permanency plan, which supported termination; the responsibilities established in the permanency plan were reasonable and related to the conditions that led to the removal of the children, yet the mother moved from unsuitable home to unsuitable home, never attained safe housing for the children, and she continued to have employment struggles. In re B.L., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 846 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 1, 2017).

Requirements that a mother address her substance abuse problems, obtain stable housing, and obtain stable income were reasonable and related to the basis for the removal of the children from her custody because the trial court specifically found that the children came into custody due to the parents'  intoxication and the instability in the home due to domestic violence. In re Noah S., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 27 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 23, 2018).

Clear and convincing evidence established that the mother failed to substantially comply with the requirements of the permanency plan because the mother did not obtain stable housing, attend parenting classes as recommended, or complete a psychological assessment as recommended. The mother also did not appear for the child's assessments or attend meetings regarding the child's care. In re Jabari B., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 60 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 2, 2018).

Clear and convincing evidence supported the termination of the parents'  rights for substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan because it showed that they failed to maintain and establish a safe and clean home for their children and they failed to provide adequate supervision. At the time of removal, there were significant issues with lice, fleas, bug bites, festering scalp bites, roach infestation, and a significant lack of supervision. In re Mack E., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 71 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 9, 2018).

Clear and convincing evidence supported the termination of the parents'  rights for persistence of conditions because it showed that after nearly three years and after promising to allow an inspection in the final child and family team meeting the parents failed to allow their home to be inspected by the Tennessee Department of Children's Services. In addition the parents continued to have a work schedule that necessitates being away from their children in the evenings until the early morning. In re Mack E., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 71 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 9, 2018).

Grounds for terminating a mother's parental rights to the mother's child for substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan were proven by clear and convincing evidence because the mother did not address the mother's illegal drug use, as the mother failed to follow through with the recommendations of the alcohol and drug assessment, consistently made excuses for the mother's positive drug screens, failed to obtain stable housing, and failed to provide proof of legal, verifiable income. In re Riley W., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 129 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 12, 2018).

Termination for substantial noncompliance with the statement of responsibilities in the permanency plan was appropriate where the record amply supported the finding that the plan clearly communicated the mother's responsibilities. In re Veronica T., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 147 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 21, 2018).

Although a mother completed some of the requirements of the permanency plan by the time of trial, the proof showed that the mother made no real effort at compliance until after the petition to terminate her parental rights was filed. Therefore, there was clear and convincing evidence that the mother did not substantially comply with the permanency plan. In re Maya R., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 171 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 4, 2018).

Clear and convincing evidence did not support the termination of the mother's parental rights based on on substantial noncompliance with permanency plans because she consistently attended visitation and paid child support, maintained employment, and completed every assessment requested. The mother's inability to achieve the outcome of the plans by either removing the father from her life or ensuring that he remedied his own issues, standing alone, was not fatal to her compliance. In re Isaiah B., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 247 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 8, 2018).

It was not proven by clear evidence that the father failed to substantially comply with the responsibilities of his permanency plan; although he failed to complete an inpatient rehabilitation program and he did not resume services with a counselor, which requirements might have been important to ensure he adequately addressed his substance abuse problems, he demonstrated sobriety, obtained a sponsor, and completed various classes, and there was no proof that he abused drugs or alcohol in the year leading up to trial. In re Ayden S., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 306 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 31, 2018).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was improper on the ground of substantial noncompliance with her permanency plan, as she completed every requirement under the plan. In re Ayden S., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 306 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 31, 2018).

Termination of mother's rights based on her substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans was established by clear and convincing evidence; she had not substantially complied with her responsibilities under either of the permanency plans, as she had not sought any further drug and alcohol treatment as required, she worked only sporadically, her visitation with the children was not consistent, and her efforts were too little too late. In re Mc, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 332 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 20, 2018).

Trial court's conclusion that the parental failed to substantially comply with the requirements of the permanency plan was supported by clear and convincing evidence that the parents, in almost two years, had made virtually no progress toward address their issues with domestic violence, mental health, and drug abuse. In re Damon B., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 352 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 25, 2018).

Clear and convincing evidence supported termination on the ground of substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan requirements because the mother admitted that other than completing a drug-treatment program and obtaining a mental health evaluation, she made no effort to comply with her permanency plan responsibilities; the evidence was clear and convincing that the requirements of the permanency plan was reasonable and related to remedying the conditions that necessitated foster care. In re Keilyn O., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 362 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 28, 2018).

Trial court properly found that a mother substantially failed to comply with the permanency plans where although the mother completed the functional parenting assessment, took and passed one drug screen, participated in some mental health treatment, and completed some sessions of domestic violence counseling, she failed to fully comply with the recommendations of the parenting assessment, maintain contact with the Separtment of Children's Services (DCS), submit proof of drug treatment other than passing one drug screen, release her mental health records to DCS, take her prescribed medications, refrain from criminal activity, or demonstrate a period of one year with no domestic disputes given her subsequent conviction for domestic violence. In re Chase L., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 368 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 29, 2018).

Termination of the father's rights for substantial noncompliance with permanency plans was proper; in addition to his missed visits, he failed to verify his employment or financial situation to show he was able to provide for the child, he did not seek required counseling for anger management and domestic abuse, and his refused on some months to be drug tested. In re Gabriel B., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 413 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 23, 2018).

Termination of the mother's rights for noncompliance with the parenting plan was supported by evidence that the mother failed to complete a psychological evaluation. In re McKenzi W., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 454 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 9, 2018).

Termination of the mother's rights for substantial noncompliance with her permanency plan was proper; the requirements of the plans were reasonably related to remedying the conditions that caused the children to be removed, the mother continued to live and interact with abusive men and did not have stable housing, she failed to adequately address her mental health issues, and thus she had not been substantially compliant with the requirements of the permanency plan. In re Piper B., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 478 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 17, 2018).

Termination of the mother's rights due to substantial noncompliance with permanency plans was proper; it was important that the mother address her mental health needs given the domestic violence she suffered, she failed to maintain stable employment and a residence, and given that previous permanency plans were entered into evidence and evidence was presented regarding the mother's progress, her claim the trial court was unable to ascertain her progress without consideration of the fourth plan lacked merit. In re Alexis C., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 499 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 28, 2018).

There was clear and convincing evidence to establish that the father failed to substantially comply with the requirements of the permanency plan; he admittedly failed to comply with most of the plan's requirements, and while the department did attempt to assist him, the father failed to avail himself of the proffered assistance. In re Charles T., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 501 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 28, 2018).

Termination of the mother's rights on the ground of substantial noncompliance with the requirements of the permanency plans was proper; because the conditions of drug use and lack of supervision were the primary problems addressed in the permanency plans, the requirements that the mother pass drug screens and show the ability to properly care for the children were of paramount importance, and she failed to substantially comply with the most necessary requirement of the permanency plan: to be drug free. In re Romeo T., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 514 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2018).

Clear and convincing evidence was proven of grounds to terminate a father's parental rights to the father's children for substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan because the incarcerated father failed to substantially comply with the permanency plan requirements and failed to notify the oversight team of the father's contact with the mother. In addition, the father was incarcerated for a violation of probation and had alcohol related issues. In re Sophie O., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 521 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 4, 2018).

Termination of mother's parental rights on the ground of failure to substantially comply with a permanency plan was appropriate because, although the plan was reasonable and the mother had the ability to understand the requirements, the mother failed to submit to home visits and engaged in deception to present the appearance of stable housing, inconsistently attended mental health counseling, failed to attend most visits with the children, as well as their medical and dental appointments, and refused or was unavailable for many drug screenings. In re T.R., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 542 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 17, 2018).

Tennessee Department of Children's Services did not provide a father with a reasonable amount of time to comply with the permanency plan requirements. Moreover, the record did not contain clear and convincing evidence to terminate the father's rights on the ground of substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan as it was unreasonable to expect the father to comply with the requirements before the final hearing that ratified the plan. In re Nakayia S., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 548 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 18, 2018).

Termination of father's parental rights for failure to comply with a parenting plan was appropriate because the requirements of the plan were reasonable and related to remedying the conditions which necessitated the children's placement in foster care. Further, the father failed to comply with all recommendations from a mental health evaluation and alcohol and drug assessment, incurred new criminal charges, failed to obtain and maintain safe and stable housing, income, and transportation, and failed to pay child support or visit the children. In re Virgil W., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 599 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 11, 2018).

Trial court erred by terminating the father's parental rights based on his substantial noncompliance with the requirements of the permanency plan because he established paternity, participated in the plan, provided DCS with releases and reliable methods of contact, completed a parenting assessment, used in-home services, and permitted walkthroughs of his home. In re Natascha B., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 614 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 23, 2018).

Clear and convincing evidence supported a trial court's termination of a father's parental rights to a minor child based upon a finding of substantial noncompliance by the father with a permanency plan because, although the father attending various programs while incarcerated, the father failed to complete the most important aspects of the plan, namely following the recommendations from an assessment and establishing safe and stable housing. The father also had yet to remit child support. In re Jeromia W., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 696 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 29, 2018).

Father was substantially noncompliant with his responsibilities under the permanency plans; two plans were developed before the department filed the termination petition, yet the father completed nothing under the plans, he had not visited the children for at least 17 months, and he did not provide the department with proof of legal income or suitable housing. In re Gaberiel S., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 718 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 11, 2018).

There was ample testimony from witnesses to support the specific findings, as well as the significance of the mother's failure to comply with the permanency plans, and the record contained evidence that clearly and convincingly established her substantial noncompliance with the plans. In re Antonio J., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 759 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2018).

Notwithstanding the failure of the trial court to make a specific finding of the reasonableness of the mother's responsibilities as part of the order of termination, the court reviewed the issue de novo and found that the requirements of the plan were reasonably related to remedying conditions that necessitated the child placement agency's involvement, particularly those responsibilities that addressed the mother's lack of income and the stability necessary to provide a home for herself and four children, all with special needs. In re Antonio J., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 759 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2018).

Mother failed to substantially comply with the requirements of the permanency plan, which were reasonably related to remedying the conditions that warranted foster care for the children; although the mother did complete an alcohol and drug assessment, she failed to follow any of the recommendations, nor did she obtain appropriate housing, pay child support, or maintain visitation. In re Gabriella H., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 12 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 8, 2019).

Trial court's finding that the mother's post-petition efforts to comply with the permanency plan were late was supported by the evidence, which showed that the mother waited almost two years after the termination petition was filed to address the conditions that prevented reunification. In re Serenity W., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 75 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 8, 2019).

There was clear and convincing evidence to support terminating the parental rights of both parents on the ground of substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan because the plan was reasonable and related to the substance abuse and legal issues that necessitated foster care. The mother did not continue the mother's outpatient therapy, while the father repeatedly violated the father's probation requirements, and neither parent made any progress in demonstrating appropriate parenting despite instruction or paid any child support. In re Julian J., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 99 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 26, 2019).

While the father had executed releases for background checks, termination of his parental rights based on substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan was based on his failure to complete the other requirements including maintaining housing, income, and transportation, obtaining a mental health assessment, and obtaining a parenting assessment. In re Keagan P., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 377 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 5, 2019).

Permanency plan requirements were reasonable and related to remedying the conditions that prevent reunification of the family, and the evidence showed that the mother failed to substantially comply with the plan requirements; she waited six months to start working on her responsibilities and made very little progress until August 2018, but she quickly relapsed, thus triggering the requirement to obtain another alcohol and drug assessment. She never completed a second assessment, withdrew from the drug treatment program, and remained homeless. In re Josiah T., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 482 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 2, 2019).

Evidence was clear and convincing that the mother failed to substantially comply with the permanency plan requirements as she had not completed alcohol, drug, or mental health treatment, appropriate housing remained an issue, she lacked the ability to care for the child, and she failed to maintain regular visitation. In re Emma S., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2020).

Mother had not substantially complied with permanency plans where the evidence showed, inter alia, that the mother missed a substantial number of visits and counseling sessions and continued to allow people into her home who actively used drugs even after the termination petition was filed. In re Jadarian C., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 87 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2020).

Substantial non-compliance with the permanency plan could not serve as a ground to terminate the father's parental rights because the child was never placed in the Department of Children's Services's (DCS) custody, the record contained no permanency plans created by the DCS, and the father had no stated responsibilities under a properly created permanency plan. In re Zaylee W., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 145 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 9, 2020).

Clear and convincing evidence supported the trial court's termination of the parents'  rights based on substantial noncompliance with permanency plans because the mother met very few of the plan requirements and only appeared to take the requirements seriously as the trial approached, and due to his repeated incarcerations, the father completed none of the requirements of the permanency plans. In re Boston G., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 194 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 29, 2020).

26. Reasonable Efforts.

In a parental rights termination case, the mother failed to comply with the state's reasonable efforts where the mother continued to use illegal drugs, she refused to seek drug treatment, she stopped attending psychological counseling, and she moved frequently, sometimes remaining homeless for months at a time. Dep't of Children's Servs. v. S.M.D., 200 S.W.3d 184, 2006 Tenn. App. LEXIS 244 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006), appeal denied, State Dep't of Children's Servs. v. S.M.D., — S.W.3d —, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 634 (Tenn. 2006), appeal denied, In re D.J.D., — S.W.3d —, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 637 (Tenn. 2006).

Court erred in terminating a father's parental rights because the State failed to provide reasonable efforts at rehabilitation; the case manager conceded that no effort was made to communicate with the father in writing, and his third case manager admitted that she had only one face-to-face meeting with the father that occurred when he was incarcerated in the workhouse. On that occasion, the case manager admitted that she failed to provide the father with the written notice of the meeting that she had provided the mother earlier that same day and that she did not offer to make arrangements to provide him services at that time. In re Tiffany B., 228 S.W.3d 148, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 102 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 26, 2007), appeal denied, In re T. B., — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 379 (Tenn. Apr. 23, 2007), appeal denied, In re T. B., — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 531 (Tenn. May 29, 2007).

Court erred in terminating a mother's parental rights because the state failed to provide reasonable efforts at rehabilitation; the case manager conceded that she never attempted to communicate with the mother in writing and that she never had any follow-up conversations with the mother about helping her obtain rehabilitative services. In re Tiffany B., 228 S.W.3d 148, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 102 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 26, 2007), appeal denied, In re T. B., — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 379 (Tenn. Apr. 23, 2007), appeal denied, In re T. B., — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 531 (Tenn. May 29, 2007).

Trial court erred in terminating a father's parental rights because the Department of Children's Services (DCS) was required to make reasonable efforts to assist the father in reunification even when the ground alleged was abandonment by wanton disregard and the trial court made no findings regarding whether DCS exercised reasonable efforts to assist the father. In re Kaliyah S., — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. App. LEXIS 110 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 28, 2014), rev'd, 455 S.W.3d 533, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 14 (Tenn. Jan. 22, 2015).

Clear and convincing evidence supported the finding that the Department of Children's Services (DCS) made reasonable efforts to reunite parents with their eight-month-old child because there was evidence specifically identifying the requirements of the permanency plans and DCS referrals, including potential employers, mental health services, anger management, marriage counseling, but, at the time of trial, the parents had not, with one exception completed any required classes. In re Jaden W., — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. App. LEXIS 856 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 26, 2014), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 280 (Tenn. Mar. 25, 2015).

Because the question of whether the Department of Children's Services made reasonable efforts to assist the father remained only one of the factors considered by the trial court in its best-interest analysis, and the father did not challenge the determination that termination of his parental rights was in the child best interest, that issue was waived, and termination of his parental rights was proper. In re Kaliyah S., 455 S.W.3d 533, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 14 (Tenn. Jan. 22, 2015).

In a termination proceeding, the extent of the efforts made by the State to reunify the parent and child is weighed in the court's best-interest analysis, but the State need not prove that it made reasonable efforts as an essential component of its petition to terminate parental rights; In re C.M.M., 2004 Tenn. App. LEXIS 160, and its progeny are overruled to the extent that those cases require the State to prove reasonable efforts as an essential component of the termination petition. In re Kaliyah S., 455 S.W.3d 533, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 14 (Tenn. Jan. 22, 2015).

Given case law, the reasonableness of the department's efforts was addressed in the best interest analysis. In re Agustine R., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 120 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 17, 2015).

Evidence supported the finding that the Department of Children's Services made reasonable efforts to reunify a mother and a father with their two children because, inter alia: (1) case managers and service providers provided in-depth, hands-on instruction to the parents, both of whom had intellectual limitations; (2) the parents were simply unable to retain information; and (3) the parents often missed opportunities for further instructions by failing to consistently visit with the children. In re Aisha R., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 470 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 15, 2015).

Children's case worker testified that the department paid for homemaker services, clinical assessment, and pest control, plus, in part, provided gas cards and transportation to attend the children's appointments; there was clear proof that the department made reasonable efforts to assist the mother, who failed to avail herself of these opportunities. In re Jasmine B., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 709 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 22, 2016).

Termination of a mother's parental rights for abandonment was proper because the mother did not utilize assistance offered to correct conditions leading to a loss of the mother's children's custody. In re Casey C., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 966 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 19, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 80 (Tenn. Jan. 25, 2017).

In a termination of parental rights case, the judgment was modified to remove the reasonable efforts by available social services agencies as a factor supporting the best interest determination as there was no proof of involvement by any social service agency in the case. In re Lydia N.-S., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 55 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2017).

Termination of a mother's parental rights under T.C.A. § 36-1-113(g)(2) was appropriate where the mother had not completed any tasks set out in the permanency plan, including participation in drug treatment and in-home homemaking services. In re Michael B., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 545 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 3, 2017).

Juvenile court erred in terminating a father's parental rights on the ground of abandonment for failure to provide a suitable home because the Tennessee Department of Children's Services failed to meet its burden of proof on the question of reasonable efforts in that the appellate court was not able to determine from the testimony of a caseworker when the assistance was actually provided and whether the assistance was rendered within the four-month period following removal or some time thereafter. In re Isabella G., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 667 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 3, 2017).

In connection with the termination ground of lack of a suitable home, the department's efforts were found to be reasonable given the circumstances of the case, and thus the termination judgment was not disturbed on the basis of an alleged lack of reasonable efforts by the department. In re Da'Vante M., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 797 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 12, 2017).

Tennessee Department of Children's Services (DCS) made significant efforts to assist a mother because it provided or referred parenting classes, mental-health counseling for the parents, and A&D counseling; the mother failed to complete a drug screen or provide proof of her attendance at her inpatient treatment program or any follow-up care, and she simply did not avail herself of the help DCS provided her to reunify the family. In re Noah S., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 27 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 23, 2018).

Evidence amounted to clear and convincing evidence supporting termination of a mother's parental rights based on failing to manifest an ability and willingness to assume legal and physical custody or financial responsibility of the child because an expert psychologist testified that placing the child in the mother's legal and physical custody would pose a risk of substantial harm to the physical or psychological welfare of the child. In re D.T., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 292 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 24, 2018).

In ordering the child's removal from the mother's custody, the trial court found that the Department of Children's Services was not required to exert reasonable efforts to prevent the child's removal from the home at that time due to the emergency nature of the circumstances; however, in order to satisfy the abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home ground for termination, the department was required to make reasonable efforts to assist the mother in establishing a suitable home. In re Alexis C., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 499 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 28, 2018).

Department of Children's Services put forth reasonable efforts to help the mother, by offering referrals for housing and drug treatment, including programs that would have allowed her to take her children with her, plus mental health treatment was also available to her, although her attendance was inconsistent; while the mother claimed she could not attend due to a lack of transportation, department employees testified that if asked, they would have taken the mother to at least some of her appointments. In re Briana H., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 518 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2018).

While the services offered by the Department of Children's Services (DCS) were not herculean, DCS make reasonable efforts to assist the parents with reunification, including providing funding for the mother's mental health, alcohol and drug, and parenting assessments, offering to drive the mother to treatment, finding a grant for the mother to obtain treatment, attempting to reach the father to help him despite his failure to engage with DCS, and scheduling a clinical mental health assessment, including a drug and alcohol component, for the father while he was incarcerated. In re Joshua S., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 340 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 8, 2019).

27. Appellate Review.

Trial court considered affidavits and, the appellate court assumed, testimony regarding whether the mother had refused to allow the father access to their child, and whether she had refused to allow the father to know the child's whereabouts; the trial court determined the proof did not support a finding of willful abandonment, and in the absence of a trial transcript or statement of the evidence on the part of the mother, the appellate court conclusively presumed the findings of the trial court were correct. In re M.L.D., 182 S.W.3d 890, 2005 Tenn. App. LEXIS 339 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005), appeal denied, In re Adoption of M.L.D., — S.W.3d —, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 779 (Tenn. Sept. 12, 2005).

Statute of repose under T.C.A. § 36-1-113(q) did not deprive the instant court of jurisdiction to review a termination of parental rights; because the one-year limitation under § 36-1-113(q) did not begin to run until the entry of a final order, the language used in the statute did not indicate an intent to affect a parent's ability to timely pursue a direct appeal. In re A.M.H., 215 S.W.3d 793, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 13 (Tenn. Jan. 23, 2007), rehearing denied, 215 S.W.3d 793, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 235 (Tenn. 2007), cert. denied, Baker v. Shao-Qiang He, — U.S.—, — S. Ct. —, — L. Ed. 2d —, 2007 U.S. LEXIS 8357 (U.S. June 25, 2007).

In actions for the termination of parental rights, the appellate court reviews findings of fact by the trial court de novo on the record, with a presumption of correctness of the findings, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. In re B. W., 397 S.W.3d 105, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 199 (Tenn. Feb. 21, 2013).

Mother's motion to set aside an order terminating her parental rights was not barred by the doctrine of laches, despite the mother's absence from the lives of her children for more than 10 years, because the father failed to make diligent efforts to locate the mother before resorting to service by publication, and, as a result, the trial court never acquired jurisdiction prior to terminating the mother's parental rights. Turner v. Turner, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. App. LEXIS 398 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 7, 2014), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 473 S.W.3d 257, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 831 (Tenn. Oct. 21, 2015).

Danger of unnecessary remand in termination cases is largely eliminated where the issue cannot be raised by the parties in any future appeal, but the danger of unnecessary remand cannot be completely eliminated because the Tennessee Supreme Court possesses the same discretion to consider issues not raised on appeal; in this termination case, the court exercised its discretion to review all statutory grounds for the termination of the father's parental rights. In re Bonnie L., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 477 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 12, 2015).

While the father did not raise challenges to certain termination grounds, due to the fundamental constitutional interest involved, these grounds were addressed on appeal. In re Aaliyah E., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 36 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 26, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 315 (Tenn. Apr. 22, 2016).

One ground for termination was vacated; however, because only one ground for termination must exist in order to terminate parental rights, the other grounds asserted were considered. In re Saliace P., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 37 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 26, 2016).

In an appeal from an order terminating parental rights, the Tennessee Court of Appeals must review the trial court's findings as to each ground for termination and as to whether termination is in the child's best interests, regardless of whether the parent challenges these findings on appeal. In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d 507, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 49 (Tenn. Jan. 29, 2016).

Tennessee Supreme Court's refusal to allow parents to repeatedly challenge orders terminating their rights through ineffectiveness claims does not at all negate the ethical obligations all lawyers have to provide competent representation to a client; these ethical obligations apply in all cases, including civil cases and other quasi-criminal cases. In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d 507, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 49 (Tenn. Jan. 29, 2016).

Although two of the three statutory grounds relied on by the trial court in terminating the mother's parental rights were not supported by clear and convincing evidence, only one ground had to be proven and the court proceeded to the best interests analysis. In re Destiny S., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 559 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 4, 2016).

Evidence did not preponderate against the trial court's finding that the mother paid no support during the four-month period preceding the filing of the petition to terminate parental rights, and the issue of whether the failure to support was willful was reviewed de novo, with no presumption of correctness. In re Envy J., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 705 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 22, 2016), appeal dismissed, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 944 (Tenn. Dec. 16, 2016).

No Tennessee Court has ever held that the appellate court must consider whether the trial court erred in finding clear and convincing evidence of severe abuse in an appeal from a dependency and neglect proceeding in spite of the parents'  failure to properly brief the issue; the court does not interpret a termination of parental rights opinion as requiring review of the severe abuse finding at issue in this neglect case. In re Tamera W., 515 S.W.3d 860, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 859 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 10, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 88 (Tenn. Feb. 8, 2017).

Although the trial court erred in relying on the persistent of conditions to terminate the mother's rights, because the ground of abandonment by willful failure to support and visit were proper, the termination ruling was affirmed. In re Charles A., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 194 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 24, 2017).

Mother's appellate brief was deficient because it never mentioned which grounds for termination of parental rights were involved or the best interest factors the trial court relied upon, and the mother cited no caselaw and provided no citations to the record; the court of appeals was obligated to perform a de novo review, although the mother's disregard for the rules did not further the goal of concluding parental termination litigation as rapidly as possible consistent with fairness. In re Mya V., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 511 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 28, 2017).

Request for attorney fees was denied; although only one ground was necessary to support termination of parental rights and one was established, it could not be said that the father's argument regarding the best interest of the child was so utterly devoid of merit as to have been frivolous. In re Kylea K., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 338 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 21, 2018).

Permanence of the child was not materially affected by the delay caused by the failure to file a timely notice of appeal and Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 procedure, and thus the trial court abused its discretion in denying the mother's motion; in light of Tennessee's policy of expediting appeals of termination cases and the fact that the parties fully briefed the substantive merits of this appeal, the court considered the case as if the trial court had entered a new order. In re Raylan W., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 375 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 20, 2020).

28. Termination Proper.

Clear and convincing evidence of severe abuse and the persistence of conditions existed for terminating parental rights where evidence overwhelmingly showed that one child was forced to eat his meals away from the rest of the family and had been dangled from a second story window, a day care worker observed mother beating the younger children with a stick while she cursed and screamed at them, younger children were severely developmentally delayed and parents refused to acknowledge children's problems or parents' shortcomings as parents. In re M.W.A., 980 S.W.2d 620, 1998 Tenn. App. LEXIS 342 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998).

The requirements for termination of parental rights under T.C.A. § 36-1-113(g)(3)(A) were not met where, following initial placement of children in foster care, parent attended therapy on a consistent basis, attended parenting classes, learned coping abilities for stressful situations, became involved in a stable relationship, and demonstrated a strong bond with the children. Stokes v. Arnold, 27 S.W.3d 516, 2000 Tenn. App. LEXIS 61 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000).

Termination of parental rights was supported by clear and convincing evidence, and was in the best interests of the children who faced significant problems that were the result of deficiencies in the mother's ability to provide them with proper parenting. Removing the children from her care and custody presented the children with their best chance at healthy and productive lives. In re C.D.B., 37 S.W.3d 925, 2000 Tenn. App. LEXIS 670 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000), cert. denied, Bagwell v. Tenn. Dep't of Children's Servs., 533 U.S. 921, 121 S. Ct. 2532, 150 L. Ed. 2d 703, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 4616 (2001).

Termination of parental rights was supported by clear and convincing evidence that the parent's mental condition rendered the parent incompetent to adequately provide for children, and that condition was unlikely to be remedied at an early date, and termination was in the children's best interests because the parent made no lasting adjustment and had no meaningful relationship with the children. Tenn. Dep't of Children's Servs. v. Bates, 84 S.W.3d 186, 2002 Tenn. App. LEXIS 26 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002).

The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that mother's parental rights should be terminated pursuant to all three of the statutory criteria found in T.C.A. § 36-1-113(g), and further found that termination of mother's parental rights would be in the child's best interest, due to the mother's cocaine addiction and the child's disability. In re A.D.A, 84 S.W.3d 592, 2002 Tenn. App. LEXIS 76 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002).

In a case where the mother refused to take the medicine prescribed to treat her mental illness, the taking of which was a condition of the mother's permanency plan, the best interests of the mother's two minor children would be served by terminating the mother's parental rights. In re A.W., 114 S.W.3d 541, 2003 Tenn. App. LEXIS 114 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003).

Court's termination of a mother's parental rights was in the children's best interests based on the factors of the mother's unemployment, inadequate financial and residential resources, history of past neglect, and stipulated mental concerns. In re S.Y., 121 S.W.3d 358, 2003 Tenn. App. LEXIS 130 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003).

Mother's parental rights were properly terminated where such other conditions existed so as to create a reasonable probability of continued neglect where the mother lived in a two bedroom home with several other children and the crowded conditions would have worsened if the children were returned to her care. In re S.Y., 121 S.W.3d 358, 2003 Tenn. App. LEXIS 130 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003).

Termination was in the best interest of the children and clear and convincing evidence existed to terminate parental rights where the children had been sexually abused by their father's male relatives, they had been in DCS custody at least three times, the conditions under which the children had been removed from their parents' custody still existed and were unlikely to be remedied, and the parents were unable to care for their children due to mental limitations. M.L.J. v. Johnson, 121 S.W.3d 378, 2003 Tenn. App. LEXIS 305 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003).

Termination of an imprisoned father's parental rights was proper and in the children's best interests where the children were born as a result of incest between the father and his stepdaughter, the father was going to remain in jail for another 20 months, and the father had a long history of violence against family members and drug and alcohol abuse. In re H.E.J., 124 S.W.3d 110, 2003 Tenn. App. LEXIS 443 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003), appeal denied, Beard v. Ass'n for Guidance, Aid, Placement and Empathy, Inc., — S.W.3d —, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 1180 (Tenn. 2003).

Court properly terminated a mother's parental rights where she did not remedy persistent conditions because the children had been in the care of the state for more than six years, the mother had not terminated her relationship with her boyfriend, and the mother had moved 13 times since placing the children in state custody. These were all persistent conditions likely to continue and to put the children in danger of further abuse or neglect. State v. Stewart (In re L.J.C.), 124 S.W.3d 609, 2003 Tenn. App. LEXIS 515 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003), appeal denied, State Dep't of Child's Servs. v. Stewart (In re L.J.C.), — S.W.3d —, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 1288 (Tenn. 2003).

Juvenile court's decision to terminate the parental rights of an incarcerated father who maintained no visitation or phone contact with his minor child was supported by clear and convincing evidence. State v. Butler, 126 S.W.3d 522, 2003 Tenn. App. LEXIS 618 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003), appeal denied, State Dep't of Children's Servs. v. Butler, — S.W.3d —, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 1293 (Tenn. Dec. 22, 2003).

Permanency plans did not address a drug use by the father, and there was nothing in the record indicating that the father was informed that his continued cohabitation with the mother, a cocaine addict, would result in the termination of his parental rights; it was unclear whether there was sufficient evidence to show that persistent conditions existed under T.C.A. § 36-1-113(g)(3)(A) with respect to the father. State v. Calabretta (In re J.J.C.), 148 S.W.3d 919, 2004 Tenn. App. LEXIS 47 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004), appeal denied, In re J.J.C., — S.W.3d —, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 408 (Tenn. May 10, 2004).

Provision regarding parent's incarceration under T.C.A. § 36-1-113(g) manifested an intent that there had to be proof that the parent was incarcerated under a sentence of at least ten years before the mere fact of incarceration would constitute grounds for termination of parental rights; the order terminating her parental rights to the extent that it was based upon that authority was reversed. State v. C.H.K., 154 S.W.3d 586, 2004 Tenn. App. LEXIS 517 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004), appeal denied, In re J.W.P., — S.W.3d —, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 937 (Tenn. Nov. 8, 2004).

There was overwhelmingly clear and convincing evidence of grounds for termination of the parental rights of a mother who suffered from paranoid schizophrenia and bipolar disorder and was “polysubstance” dependant; because of persistent conditions, as she continued to abuse drugs, she remained mentally incompetent to provide care and supervision for the child, she made little effort to address her polysubstance abuse or mental illness, and she did not comply with any requirements of permanency plans. In re S.R.C., 156 S.W.3d 26, 2004 Tenn. App. LEXIS 521 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 1042 (Tenn. Nov. 22, 2004).

Court properly terminated parental rights on the ground of “persistent conditions” where the mother engaged in abusive behavior towards the children, and at the time of trial, the mother had not adequately remedied her anger management problems. In re M.A.R., 183 S.W.3d 652, 2005 Tenn. App. LEXIS 477 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 1048 (Tenn. Nov. 21, 2005).

Trial court did not err in terminating an incarcerated father's parental rights under T.C.A. § 36-1-113(g)(6) because he lived in prison, he continued to use illegal drugs, he had amassed 14 disciplinary violations while incarcerated and decided to conceive a child at time when he knew he was facing almost certain conviction for a heinous crime and would therefore most likely be unavailable to support or care for the child for a large portion of the child's early life. In re Marr, 194 S.W.3d 490, 2005 Tenn. App. LEXIS 716 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005), appeal denied, In re S.A.M., — S.W.3d —, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 348 (Tenn. 2006).

Where children were in the custody of the Tennessee department of children's service well over the six months required by T.C.A. § 36-1-113(g)(3), and the special judge concluded that the mother remained addicted to drugs, the trial court properly terminated the mother's parental rights; there was clear and convincing evidence establishing that the conditions that caused the children to come into custody still persisted. State Dep't of Children's Servs. v. A.M.H., 198 S.W.3d 757, 2006 Tenn. App. LEXIS 156 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006), appeal denied, In re A. B., — S.W.3d —, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 543 (Tenn. June 5, 2006), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 537 (Tenn. 2006).

In a termination of parental rights proceeding, the mother failed to comply with her responsibilities under the permanency plan requiring her to complete an alcohol and drug assessment, maintain appropriate, drug-free housing, participate in a parenting assessment and attend parenting classes, and maintain financial stability by cooperating with public assistance programs and acquiring and maintaining employment for a minimum of six months. State Dep't of Children's Servs. v. A.M.H., 198 S.W.3d 757, 2006 Tenn. App. LEXIS 156 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006), appeal denied, In re A. B., — S.W.3d —, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 543 (Tenn. June 5, 2006), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 537 (Tenn. 2006).

Where the mother's children were in the custody of the Tennessee department of children's services well over the six months required by T.C.A. § 36-1-113(g)(3)(A), the special judge concluded that the mother remained addicted to drugs; thus, mother's parental rights were terminated under T.C.A. § 36-1-113(g)(3)(A) because clear and convincing evidence established that the conditions that caused the children to come into custody still persisted. State Dep't of Children's Servs. v. A.M.H., 198 S.W.3d 757, 2006 Tenn. App. LEXIS 156 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006), appeal denied, In re A. B., — S.W.3d —, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 543 (Tenn. June 5, 2006), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 537 (Tenn. 2006).

Record contained clear and convincing evidence supporting the termination of the parents'  rights under T.C.A. § 36-1-113(g)(3)(A) based on persistence of conditions; the record contained clear and convincing evidence of approximately seven years of abuse and neglect, and most of the same problems reported in 1998 still existed in October 2004: (1) The parents expected their older daughters to care for their younger siblings; (2) The parents continued to be angry with each other and engaged in violent arguments in their children's presence; (3) They continued to use inappropriately severe corporal punishment on their children; and (4) They continued to ignore their children's education. The record also contained the testimony of Tennessee department of children's services'  employees and other service providers demonstrating the department's almost continual efforts over three years to assist the parents in creating a home environment that would enable the safe reunification of the family. In re Giorgianna H., 205 S.W.3d 508, 2006 Tenn. App. LEXIS 192 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006).

Record contained clear and convincing evidence supporting the termination of the parents'  rights under T.C.A. § 36-1-113(g)(4) based on the parents'  sexual abuse of three of their daughters. This evidence included the testimony of a therapist, who recounted two children's statements describing the grossly inappropriate sexual activities in which both parents forced them and their sister to participate; the evidence was corroborated by the two children at trial. In re Giorgianna H., 205 S.W.3d 508, 2006 Tenn. App. LEXIS 192 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006).

Court erred in finding that the parents, in a complex, extended dependency and neglect case, were not indigent and finding their seven children dependent and neglected and that the parents had committed severe child abuse; that finding could have led to termination of parental rights and the parents clearly had a right to appointed counsel if they were indigent. The parents were entitled to a thorough hearing in compliance with T.C.A. § 40-14-202 to determine if they were indigent and thus, entitled to appointed counsel under Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 13(d)(2)(B). Tenn. Dep't of Children's Servs. v. David H., 247 S.W.3d 651, 2006 Tenn. App. LEXIS 193 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 21, 2006).

Court properly terminated a mother's parental rights where the children had been removed from the mother for a period of well over six months, the conditions which led to the removal still persisted, there was little likelihood that those conditions would be remedied at an early date, and the continuation of the relationship between the mother and the children greatly diminished the children's chances of early integration into a safe, stable, and permanent home. The mother failed to maintain any stability in housing or employment, and she continued to use illegal drugs and refused to acknowledge that her drug use was a problem. Dep't of Children's Servs. v. S.M.D., 200 S.W.3d 184, 2006 Tenn. App. LEXIS 244 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006), appeal denied, State Dep't of Children's Servs. v. S.M.D., — S.W.3d —, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 634 (Tenn. 2006), appeal denied, In re D.J.D., — S.W.3d —, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 637 (Tenn. 2006).

Termination of parental rights under T.C.A. § 36-1-113(g)(6) and (i) was affirmed because prior to the child's birth, the father began serving a ten-year prison sentence for felony possession of cocaine and possession with intent to sell, and there was ample evidence supporting the trial court's conclusion that termination of parental rights is in the best interest of the child; the statute was silent as to the possibility of parole, and the appellate court declined to read any intent on the part of the Tennessee legislature to account for a mere possibility of early discharge from prison. Fisher v. Young (In re K.B.H.), 206 S.W.3d 80, 2006 Tenn. App. LEXIS 246 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006), appeal denied, In re Adoption of K. B. H., — S.W.3d —, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 638( Tenn. 2006).

State established by clear and convincing evidence that conditions persisted that prevented the children's safe return to their mother at an early date under T.C.A. § 36-1-113(g)(3)(A) because, inter alia: (1) It was undisputed that at the time of trial the mother was still living with her boyfriend, who had sexually abused the children, was financially dependent on him, and had no intention of severing her relationship with him; (2) Continuing the children's relationship with their mother would greatly diminish the children's chances of integration into a safe, stable, and permanent home; and (3) The mother refused to acknowledge and properly address her children's allegations of abuse. R.M.S. v. Orange, 223 S.W.3d 240, 2006 Tenn. App. LEXIS 823 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006), appeal denied, Dep't of Children's Servs. v. Orange (In re R.M.S.), — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 289 (Tenn. 2007).

Termination of a father's parental rights was proper because the child was six years old when the father was sentenced, if he served his entire sentence she would be twenty-four when he was released, he had never been the child's caretaker, she did not know him, and there was no reason to believe that the father would be able to establish a meaningful relationship with his daughter during the remainder of his incarceration; therefore, termination was in the child's best interests. In re M.L.P., 228 S.W.3d 139, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 58 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 30, 2007), appeal denied, In re M.L.P. v. Ramone, — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 441 (Tenn. Apr. 30, 2007).

Court erred in terminating a father's parental rights because the State failed to provide reasonable efforts at rehabilitation; the case manager conceded that no effort was made to communicate with the father in writing, and his third case manager admitted that she had only one face-to-face meeting with the father that occurred when he was incarcerated in the workhouse. On that occasion, the case manager admitted that she failed to provide the father with the written notice of the meeting that she had provided the mother earlier that same day and that she did not offer to make arrangements to provide him services at that time. In re Tiffany B., 228 S.W.3d 148, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 102 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 26, 2007), appeal denied, In re T. B., — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 379 (Tenn. Apr. 23, 2007), appeal denied, In re T. B., — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 531 (Tenn. May 29, 2007).

Court erred in terminating a mother's parental rights because the state failed to provide reasonable efforts at rehabilitation; the case manager conceded that she never attempted to communicate with the mother in writing and that she never had any follow-up conversations with the mother about helping her obtain rehabilitative services. In re Tiffany B., 228 S.W.3d 148, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 102 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 26, 2007), appeal denied, In re T. B., — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 379 (Tenn. Apr. 23, 2007), appeal denied, In re T. B., — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 531 (Tenn. May 29, 2007).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was proper under T.C.A. § 36-1-113(g)(3) and (i), because the evidence did not preponderate against the findings that the conditions that led to the child's removal from the mother's home still persisted, and that other conditions persisted which in all probability would have caused the child to be subjected to further abuse and neglect; a home visit revealed a continuation of conditions that were unsanitary and unsafe for the child, the mother had taken an order of protection out against an ex-boyfriend, and the mother had received numerous services but failed to show that she changed. State Dep't of Children's Servs. v. B.J.N., 242 S.W.3d 491, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 512 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 8, 2007).

Mother's parental rights were properly terminated on the basis that she failed to substantially comply with her permanency plans because in addition to the mother's failure to lead a drug free lifestyle, she failed to participate in therapy sessions to prepare her to care for two children who both suffered from ongoing medical problems that required extraordinary attention; a case worker testified that it was arranged for the mother to participate in classes, but the service was discontinued because of the mother's noncompliance. In re J.C.D., 254 S.W.3d 432, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 741 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2007), appeal denied, In re J. C. D., — S.W.3d —, 2008 Tenn. LEXIS 131 (Tenn. Feb. 25, 2008).

Mother's parental rights were properly terminated on the basis that the children had been removed from the home for a period of six months, the conditions that led to the children's removal persisted, and there was little likelihood the conditions would be remedied at an early date given the mother's history of relapse. In re J.C.D., 254 S.W.3d 432, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 741 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2007), appeal denied, In re J. C. D., — S.W.3d —, 2008 Tenn. LEXIS 131 (Tenn. Feb. 25, 2008).

Termination of the father's parental rights under T.C.A. § 36-1-113(g)(5) was proper because he was convicted of aggravated sexual battery of one of his children for which he was sentenced to 10 years in prison. In re R.L.F., 278 S.W.3d 305, 2008 Tenn. App. LEXIS 445 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 31, 2008), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2008 Tenn. LEXIS 788 (Tenn. Oct. 20, 2008).

Mother's parental rights were properly terminated on the ground of persistent conditions because at the time this child was removed, the grandmother, who was the custodian of the child at the time, was in jail; mother was in jail, and an aunt who had physical custody of the child but not legal custody was arrested for DUI. State Dep't of Children's Servs. v. V.N., 279 S.W.3d 306, 2008 Tenn. App. LEXIS 645 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 27, 2008), appeal denied, State v. V.N., — S.W.3d —, 2009 Tenn. LEXIS 77 (Tenn. Jan. 16, 2009).

Mother's parental rights were properly terminated for failure to substantially comply with the permanency plan because she failed to follow through with recommendations of the psychological assessment, failed to attend AA or NA meetings, failed to obtain a job, failed to exercise the majority of the visitations offered to her, failed to keep in touch with the state, and continued to engage in illegal activities. State Dep't of Children's Servs. v. V.N., 279 S.W.3d 306, 2008 Tenn. App. LEXIS 645 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 27, 2008), appeal denied, State v. V.N., — S.W.3d —, 2009 Tenn. LEXIS 77 (Tenn. Jan. 16, 2009).

Termination of father's parental rights was proper under T.C.A. § 36-1-113(g)(6) because: (1) He committed a crime and was confined to a correctional facility for 10 or more years and the child was under eight years old when the sentence was imposed; (2) It was unknown when father would be released from prison or when he would be able to care for the child; (3) Father did not maintain regular contact with the child; (4) Child was doing very well in the care of her great-grandmother, and a change of caretakers could have a negative impact on the child's life; (5) Great-grandmother's home was a healthy and safe home for the child; (6) Great-grandmother had a very active role in the child's life; and (7) It was in the child's best interests under T.C.A. § 36-1-113(i). In re T.M.G., 283 S.W.3d 318, 2008 Tenn. App. LEXIS 713 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 25, 2008), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2009 Tenn. LEXIS 86 (Tenn. Feb. 24, 2009).

Termination of the putative father's rights to a fifth child was appropriate under T.C.A. § 36-1-113(g)(9)(A)(iv)-(vi) because the Department of Children's Services (DCS) made reasonable efforts to assist him with regard to the responsibilities and goals in his permanency plans and the efforts on the part of the DCS passed muster with regard to the grounds for termination to four other children under § 36-1-113(g)(2)-(3). Likewise, the efforts of the DCS were thus sufficient for the purpose of § 36-1-113(g)(9)(A)(iv)-(vi). In re Bernard T., 319 S.W.3d 586,  2010 Tenn. LEXIS 683 (Tenn. Aug. 26, 2010).

Termination of the putative father's rights to four children was appropriate under T.C.A. § 36-1-113(g)(2)-(3) because the conditions that required the removal of the children continued without substantial change and there was little likelihood that they would be remedied at an early date; the Department of Children's Services had been providing services and support to the putative father for almost four years. The responsibilities and goals in the putative father's permanency plans were reasonable and he failed to comply substantially with many of those goals. In re Bernard T., 319 S.W.3d 586,  2010 Tenn. LEXIS 683 (Tenn. Aug. 26, 2010).

Judgment terminating the parental rights of the parents was affirmed where: (1) the department of children's services made reasonable efforts to assist the parents in establishing a suitable home but the parents had not made reasonable efforts to establish the home; (2) the father refused to believe there was any abuse by the mother, despite her guilty plea, the marks and bruises on the children, and the children's testimony; and (3) it was in the children's best interest for termination. Kayla M.A. v. R.L.A. (In re Corey N.A.), — S.W.3d —, 2010 Tenn. App. LEXIS 396 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 21, 2010).

Termination of the father's parental rights under T.C.A. § 36-1-113(g)(1) and (g)(6) was appropriate, in part because the grounds did not require reasonable efforts on the part of the Department of Children's Services or a previous finding of dependency and neglect. In re Arteria H., 326 S.W.3d 167, 2010 Tenn. App. LEXIS 486 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 27, 2010), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2010 Tenn. LEXIS 949 (Tenn. Oct. 14, 2010).

Termination of the mother's parental rights on the ground of persistence of conditions under T.C.A. § 36-1-113(g)(3) was appropriate because some of the conditions which led to the child's removal continued to persist. In part, the mother admitted that she had not been employed since 2007; she did not have stable housing and was essentially vagrant; efforts to help and assist the mother were ineffective; and testimony indicated that the mother was unable to meet the child's basic needs. In re Arteria H., 326 S.W.3d 167, 2010 Tenn. App. LEXIS 486 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 27, 2010), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2010 Tenn. LEXIS 949 (Tenn. Oct. 14, 2010).

Termination of the mother's parental rights on the grounds of abandonment by failure to visit and failure to support was proper pursuant to T.C.A. §§ 36-1-102(1)(A)(i) and 36-1-113(g)(1) because the mother's contacts with the child during the pertinent four-month period were of such an infrequent nature or of such short duration as to merely establish minimal or insubstantial contact with the child under T.C.A. § 36-1-102(1)(C). Therefore, the mother engaged in merely token visitation during the four-month period preceding the filing of the termination petition. Stephen v. Christy C., 384 S.W.3d 731, 2010 Tenn. App. LEXIS 727 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 22, 2010), appeal denied, In re Keri C., — S.W.3d —, 2011 Tenn. LEXIS 120 (Tenn. Feb. 17, 2011).

There was no merit to a father's claim in a parental rights termination proceeding pursuant to T.C.A. § 36-1-113(g)(4) that it was error to grant the social service agency's petition because it was filed shortly after it entered into permanency plans that included the goal of reunification, as there was no prior order of abuse by the father, termination was based on multiple instances of abuse, and reliance on case precedents to the contrary was unavailing. In re Keara J., 376 S.W.3d 86, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 26 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 13, 2012), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 274 (Tenn. Apr. 11, 2012).

There was clear and convincing evidence to support the termination of a mother's parental rights over her child based on abuse pursuant to T.C.A. § 36-1-113(g)(4), as she failed to disclose her HIV status to medical providers, which subjected the child to “severe abuse” under T.C.A. § 37-1-102. In re Keara J., 376 S.W.3d 86, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 26 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 13, 2012), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 274 (Tenn. Apr. 11, 2012).

There was clear and convincing evidence to support the termination of a mother and father's parental rights over their child based on abuse pursuant to T.C.A. § 36-1-113(g)(4), as they failed to meet her basic nutritional and physical needs, which resulted in her suffering damage; such conduct constituted “severe abuse” under T.C.A. § 37-1-102. In re Keara J., 376 S.W.3d 86, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 26 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 13, 2012), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 274 (Tenn. Apr. 11, 2012).

Prior order suspending the father's visitation rights did not preclude a finding that the father willfully failed to visit the children, and a preponderance of the evidence supported the conclusion that the father willfully failed to visit his children between July 2003 and July 2005 since although the father filed a petition to reinstate his visitation rights, he took no action to advance the petition, and the father had no reasonable excuse for failing to pursue the petition to reinstate visitation during those two years; therefore, the record contained clear and convincing evidence supporting termination of the father's parental rights on the ground of abandonment based on willful failure to visit under T.C.A. § 36-1-113(g)(1) and T.C.A. § 36-1-102. Because the trial court did not reach the issue of whether termination of the father's parental rights was in the best interests of the children, the court remanded the case for the trial court to consider whether termination of the father's parental rights was in the best interests of the children pursuant to T.C.A. § 36-1-113(c). In re Angela E., 402 S.W.3d 636, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 303 (Tenn. Mar. 13, 2013).

Mother's parental rights were properly terminated based on finding that the mother failed to make an adjustment of circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it safe and in the children's best interest to be in her home, the mother was likely to have a detrimental effect on the child's emotional, psychological, and medical condition, the mother had not paid child support or a reasonable portion of the children's substitute physical care and maintenance, and the child disclosed she was sexually abused by the mother. In re Kayla E., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 16 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2015).

Evidence clearly and convincingly proved the grounds of abandonment by failure to visit and failure to support and persistence of conditions, and termination was in the children's best interest, and thus the termination order was affirmed. In re Olivia C., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 28 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 22, 2015).

Trial court did not err in terminating a father's parental rights because the evidence did not preponderate against its finding that the father abandoned the children by failing to support them in the four months before he went to prison. In re S.C.M., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 96 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 2, 2015).

Clear and convincing evidence existed to terminate a father's parental rights on the ground of abandonment by conduct exhibiting a wanton disregard for the welfare of the children because the father had been absent for all but the first few months of the children's lives, and in the four months before his date of incarceration, he worked but paid nothing for the support of the children. In re S.C.M., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 96 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 2, 2015).

Trial court properly terminated a the mother's parental rights because, inter alia, she substantially failed to comply with the requirements of the permanency plans, abandoned the child by failing to visit and support her, the mother's unkept promises to the child caused her to regress and continue her cycle of self-harm, and the child was ready for adoption and needed a level of care that the mother could not provide. In re Miracle F. H., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 184 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 1, 2015).

Termination of a parent's parental rights to a minor child was appropriate because the parent willfully failed to contact, visit, or support the child during the four-month period preceding the filing of the petition in spite of the parent's assertion that the parent's right to visitation was restrained by a prospective adoptive parent and that the parent counter-petitioned to establish a parenting schedule. In re Jarett M., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 213 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 13, 2015).

Clear and convincing evidence showed that grounds existed to terminate parents'  parental rights to their child and that it was in the child's best interest to terminate the parents'  parental rights because (1) the parents'  repeated drug abuse and ongoing pattern of incurring criminal charges and incarceration, failure to support the child, and token visits with the child demonstrated their inability to parent the child; and (2) the child was in pre-adoptive foster care. In re Autumn L., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 371 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 26, 2015).

Trial court properly terminated the mother's parental rights based on the ground of abandonment by engaging in conduct prior to incarceration that exhibited a wanton disregard for the welfare of the child; the mother's previous failure to address her substance abuse issues and her ongoing criminal behavior and probation violations prior to her most recent incarceration demonstrated a broad pattern of conduct that had rendered her unfit to care for the child. In re Kayden H., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 493 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 23, 2015).

It was not necessary for the grandparents to prove that the child was in immediate risk of substantial harm due to mother's substance abuse in order to prevail on the statutory termination ground of wanton disregard for the child's welfare exhibited prior to incarceration; it was sufficient that the mother's conduct that resulted in her incarceration rendered her an unfit parent. In re Kayden H., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 493 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 23, 2015).

Trial court properly terminated the mother's parental rights based on the ground of abandonment by engaging in conduct prior to incarceration that exhibited a wanton disregard for the welfare of the child; the mother's previous failure to address her substance abuse issues and her ongoing criminal behavior and probation violations prior to her most recent incarceration demonstrated a broad pattern of conduct that had rendered her unfit to care for the child. In re Kayden H., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 493 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 23, 2015).

Evidence that the mother continued to engage in criminal behavior resulting in her incarceration, failed to find and keep steady employment, and failed to demonstrate the desire to create a safe, suitable home for the child supported the trial court's finding that the mother abandoned the child by failure to provide a suitable home. In re Mason M., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 595 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 17, 2015).

Mother abandoned her child through her failure to abide by the law and thus avoid incarceration and her failure to pay support. In re Mason M., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 595 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 17, 2015).

Clear and convincing evidence supported terminating an incarcerated father's parental rights on grounds of failure to manifest the ability and willingness to assume custody, risk of substantial harm, and failure to establish paternity because, inter alia, the father never wrote or called the child, never paid support, did not seek to establish paternity within 30 days after notice of his alleged paternity, and had no relationship with the child; termination was in the child's best interest. In re Serenity L., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 622 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 31, 2015).

Evidence did not preponderate against the finding with respect to the suitable home issue; despite reasonable assistance, the mother failed to find housing for approximately two years after the state removed her children from her home, which showed a lack of concern for her children to such a degree that it was unlikely she would be able to maintain a suitable home, and termination was proper. In re L.J., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 696 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2015).

Clear and convincing evidence supported the finding that the mother was an incompetent parent under T.C.A. § 36-1-113(g)(8)(B)(i) (2014) given the testimony of a psychological examiner that the mother had adult antisocial behavior, a personality disorder, she was of borderline intellectual functioning with an IQ in the 70s, and she had a poor prognosis for treatment and changing her criminal behavior in the near future. In re Brittany D., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 732 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 9, 2015).

Termination of a father's parental rights based upon persistent conditions was proper because the condition that led to removal from custody was illegal drug abuse, the father was provided numerous opportunities to complete drug treatment programs and failed to do so, and the father admitted that his drug use escalated during the time his mother was diagnosed with cancer and before she died. In re Thomas T., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 907 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 16, 2015).

Clear and convincing evidence existed to prove the ground of persistent conditions to terminate a father's parental rights to a child where the evidence showed that the father had a pattern of instability and criminal activity, and he failed to establish an ability to care for the child's serious medical condition. In re Analilia R., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 932 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 24, 2015), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 168 (Tenn. Feb. 22, 2016).

Finding of failure to provide a suitable home was supported by evidence that the mother had been living with the grandmother in a one-bedroom apartment that was too small, smelled of body odor and cat feces, and was infested with roaches, and the mother's signing a new lease the day of the trial court's decision was too late. In re M.A.P., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 57 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 29, 2016).

Termination of the father's parental rights for substantial non-compliance with the permanency plan was supported by evidence that he failed to resolve his drug abuse, failed to provide the Department of Children's Services with proof of legal income, did not provide proof of a stable home, and incurred new criminal charges and was incarcerated for extended periods during the case. In re Riley C., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 113 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 12, 2016).

Termination of the father's parental rights for abandonment due to failure to visit was supported by evidence that he made no attempts to restore visitation for more than seven months after the child's mother died, supporting a finding his failure was willful. In re Riley C., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 113 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 12, 2016).

Father's parental rights were properly terminated due to his wanton disregard for the welfare of his children since the father was involved in criminal behavior, he almost immediately violated his probation, and he committed domestic violence against his pregnant wife; moreover, the father was in substantial noncompliance with the statement of responsibilities in a permanency plan because he did not provide proof of housing or a legal means of income, he did not arrange a psychological evaluation or set up a drug and alcohol assessment, and he did not visit his children. Termination was in the best interest of the children based on the father's history of drugs and violence and the fact that the children were doing well in foster care. In re Lilly C., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 141 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 25, 2016).

Clear and convincing evidence supported the juvenile court's decision to terminate the mother's parental rights for persistent conditions where the child had been removed for the mother's home due to environmental neglect and residential instability, the mother's inability to provide a safe and stable home for the child still persisted, and there was nothing in the record to indicate that it would be remedied in the near future. In re Candace J., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 186 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 11, 2016).

Termination of parental rights was in the child's best interest where he had been removed from the home due to the parents'  drug us and his exposure to drug labs in the home, he had spent most of his life in foster care, the parents had made only token visits, the father had not corrected his drug use, and the child was thriving in foster care. In re Matthew T., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 272 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 20, 2016).

Termination of father's parental rights was supported by evidence father failed to pay child support, failed to avoid criminal activity, was incarcerated, lacked a suitable home for the child, and lacked legal source of income, all of which also supported a finding that termination was in the child's best interest. In re J.M.M., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 375 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 25, 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support the termination of the father's parental rights based on abandonment where it showed that he was incarcerated on December 31, 2011 and remained incarcerated when the petition to terminate his parental rights was filed, and he made only one child support payment in 2011. In re Jacqueline G., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 536 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 26, 2016).

Trial court did not err in terminating the mother's parental rights to the child on the ground of severe abuse by prior order, given that the child was the half-sibling of a child found by prior order to have been severely abused by the mother, and that order was not appealed and was final. In re Zachariah G., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 665 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 8, 2016).

Termination of the parents'  rights on the ground of persistence of conditions and substantial noncompliance with permanency plans was supported by evidence that the work on the parents'  home which needed to be done before the children were returned was not completed and the parents had not completed the recommendations of their assessments or actively participated in services or therapy. In re Dustin L., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 720 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 28, 2016).

Termination of the father's parental rights based on abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home and persistence of conditions, was supported by evidence that he had over five years to understand the children's issues, avail himself of the services offered by the Department of Children's Services in order to obtain and maintain suitable housing, and demonstrate the ability to effectively parent all three children and prevent them from harming themselves or others, but failed to do so. In re Dakota H., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 759 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 12, 2016).

Juvenile court did not err in terminating the father's parental rights after the father received a 12-year sentence one month before the child was born, and termination was found to be in the child's best interest given that the child was in a pre-adoptive foster home and doing well, had never met the father and had no relationship with the father whatsoever, and even if released early, the father would need time before he could possibly be in a position to assume custody of the child. In re Knox C., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 832 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 3, 2016).

Termination of a mother's parental rights was appropriate because the mother abandoned the mother's children as the mother merely made token visits to the children in the four months before the mother's incarceration and engaged in conduct prior to incarceration that exhibited a wanton disregard for the children's welfare, failed to provide a suitable home, and failed to correct persistent conditions. Moreover, termination of parental rights was in the children's best interests as the foster parents wished to adopt the children. In re Jakob O., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 959 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 15, 2016).

Trial court did not err in terminating the parental rights of a mother because there was clear and convincing evidence of the mother's wanton disregard for the child's welfare prior to incarceration; by taking explicit photographs of the child and sending them to a known sex offender, the mother placed the child in danger. In re G.L., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 993 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2016).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was proper as she was not in substantial compliance with the permanency plans, she was mentally incompetent to properly care for the child, and the conditions which precipitated the child's removal still persisted because she failed to make a single payment on her utility bill since 2013, failed to obtain adequate housing, waited until a couple of weeks before trial to begin attending case management services, failed to maintain employment, and denied having mental health issues; and the child was removed from the mother's custody due to educational neglect as she refused to accept responsibility for not sending the child to school for over 100 days. In re Marterrio H., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 236 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 12, 2017).

Termination of the father's parental rights based on the father's incarceration for over 10 years and the young age of the child was proper, because the father was serving an 11-year prison sentence that he received when the child was 20 months old and termination was in the child's best interest, as the child believed her aunt and uncle were her parents and had no memory of the father. In re Brianna B., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 805 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 15, 2017).

Termination of a mother's parental rights was appropriate because the mother failed to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody or responsibility of the mother's children and placing the children in the mother's care would have posed a risk of substantial harm to the physical or psychological welfare of the children given the mother's housing situation and associations with individuals who had histories of violence and drug use. In re M.E.N.J., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 835 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 27, 2017).

Ground of failure to legitimate after 30 days'  notice was proven by clear and convincing evidence where his incarceration, although undeniably imposing hardships, did not excuse him from making at least some attempt to legitimate his child. In re Ken'Bria B., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 4, 2018).

Ground of risk of substantial harm to the psychological welfare of the child should she be placed in the father's custody was proven by clear and convincing evidence where testimony in the record established the strong bond between the child and her foster family, and the father did not dispute this. In re Ken'Bria B., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 4, 2018).

Juvenile court did not err in finding the ground of failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume legal and physical custody of the child where the father only occasionally gave the child minor gifts and engaged in highly limited visitation. In re Ken'Bria B., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 4, 2018).

Juvenile court did not err in finding the ground of failure to seek reasonable visitation with the child where the father had not pursued the available lines of communication to the Tennessee Department of Children's Services. In re Ken'Bria B., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 4, 2018).

Evidence that the children had been in state custody for over three years, the mother had been living at a woman's shelter, the mother was not actively being treated for her mental health issues, and the mother had not sought treatment for the rheumatoid arthritis that kept her from working supported termination of her parental rights based on abandonment due to failure to provide a suitable home and persistence of conditions. In re Nashay B., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 10, 2018).

Department of Children's Services proved by clear and convincing evidence that the parents failed to manifest an ability and willingness to assume legal and physical custody or financial responsibility of the children because at the time of trial both were incarcerated and lacked the ability to assume custody of the children, and each parent had knowingly engaged in repeated criminal conduct that necessitated their re-incarceration and would but the children at physical and/or psychological risk if placed in their custody. In re Ke'Andre C., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 44 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 29, 2018).

Clear and convincing evidence supported the termination of the mother's parental rights because the mother's refusal to make any believable efforts to distance herself from the father and the very real threat of domestic violence posed by him was sufficient to show an inability and unwillingness to assume physical and legal custody of the child. In re Isaiah B., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 247 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 8, 2018).

Clear and convincing evidence supported termination of a mother's parental rights on the ground of failure to assume custody or financial responsibility of the children because the mother refused to cooperate with the Tennessee Department of Children's Services; the mother was incarcerated and had completed virtually none of her permanency plan responsibilities, and she could not provide a safe and stable home for her children, had relapsed, and had failed to address her mental health issues. In re Keilyn O., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 362 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 28, 2018).

Termination of a mother's parental rights was in the children's best interest because the evidence did not preponderate against the juvenile court's findings that she failed to maintain regular visitation or contact with the children, and returning the children to her care would likely have an adverse impact on their emotional conditions; the mother's mental and emotional status would adversely impact her ability to provide safe and stable care for the children. In re Keilyn O., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 362 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 28, 2018).

Clear and convincing evidence was proven of grounds to terminate a father's parental rights to the father's children for a failure to manifest an ability to parent because the father was incarcerated on a violation of probation which resulted from an assault on the mother, the father had alcohol related issues, and a counselor testified that one of the children had expressed that the child was scared of the father and did not want to return to the father's home. In re Sophie O., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 521 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 4, 2018).

Termination of a father's parental rights for failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody was appropriate because the father was unable to assume custody of the father's children in that the father had not addressed the problems inherent in the father's addiction to drugs, nor had the father resolved the father's need for stable housing or transportation. Furthermore, returning the children to the father's custody would have posed a risk of substantial harm to their physical and psychological welfare. In re Virgil W., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 599 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 11, 2018).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was proper based on her failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody of or financial responsibility for the children because she failed to provide a suitable home for the children; her conduct, including substance abuse, led to multiple incarceration episodes; she failed to follow through on outpatient substance abuse treatment, parenting classes, and domestic violence counseling; she only partially participated in a visitation schedule; she failed to document her employment; and placing the children in her custody would pose a risk of substantial harm to the physical and psychological welfare of the children. In re Steven W., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 693 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 28, 2018).

Clear and convincing evidence supported a trial court's termination of a father's parental rights to a minor child based upon a finding of failure to assume custody or financial responsibility because the father failed to give the Tennessee Department of Children's Services a valid address at the time of the child's birth, admitted an unwillingness to admit paternity at first, and failed to evidence any intent of reunification prior to the father's incarceration. In re Jeromia W., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 696 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 29, 2018).

Clear and convincing evidence supported termination of a mother's parental rights based on failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody or financial responsibility of the child because she (1) admitted using drugs, (2) did not obtain or cooperate with treatment, (3) did not support the child, (4) did not maintain consistent contact with the child, and (5) placing the child into the mother's custody would pose a risk of substantial harm to the child's physical and psychological welfare. In re J'Khari F., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 60 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2019).

Clear and convincing evidence supported termination of a mother's parental rights on the ground of failure to manifest a willingness and ability to assume custody because the mother's children were removed from the mother's home and adjudicated dependent and neglected, there were issues concerning drug use, sexual abuse, and a lack of supervision of the children in the mother's home. Moreover, the mother had continued to engage in criminal activity throughout the pendency of the case and generally showed an unwillingness to parent the children. In re H. A., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 78 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 12, 2019).

Clear and convincing evidence supported the trial court's termination of a father's parental rights on the ground of failure to seek to establish paternity because despite having notice of his alleged paternity, the father failed to file a petition to establish paternity within thirty days. In re Rilyn S., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 124 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 12, 2019).

Clear and convincing evidence supported the trial court's determination to terminate a father's parental rights on the ground that placing custody of the child in his custody would pose a risk of substantial harm to the physical or psychological welfare of the child because the father had never met the child and had no relationship with the child; there was a significant bond between the child and his foster parents, and his removal from the foster parents would cause emotional trauma. In re Rilyn S., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 124 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 12, 2019).

Termination of a mother's parental rights was in the child's best interest where visitation had not gone well in the past, continuing that situation for years into the future would not have been a good result for the child, and the mother incurred additional criminal charges, failed to comply with the terms of her probation, failed a drug screen, failed to complete a required drug and alcohol class, and had not maintained visitation or other contact with the child. In re Jaxx M., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 185 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 17, 2019).

Termination of the father's parent rights was proper based on the failure to manifest an ability to parent as the father had failed to demonstrate any ability or willingness to personally assume legal and physical custody or financial responsibility of the children; and placing the children in his legal custody would pose a risk of substantial harm to the children. In re O.M., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 197 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 26, 2019).

Termination of the parental rights of the mother and the father was supported by evidence that the mother and father continued to use illegal drugs, the father continued to engage in criminal activity, the father was accused of violence against the mother, and both parents failed to establish a safe and appropriate home for the child. In re Joshua S., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 340 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 8, 2019).

Father's rights were properly terminated based on his failure to establish or exercise paternity; he admitted his failure to establish paternity of the child, plus he failed to manifest an ability and willingness to assume legal and physical custody of the child, and placing the child in the father's care would pose a risk of substantial harm to the physical or psychological welfare of the child. In re Brendan G., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 501 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 9, 2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support the termination of the father's parental rights based on his exhibiting a wanton disregard for the child's welfare because it was undisputed that he was arrested multiple times in Tennessee after the child's birth and he admitted that he violated the terms of his probation again after being released in 2014. These acts, when coupled with his history of criminal behavior before the child's birth, demonstrated a pattern of conduct that rendered the father unfit to parent the child. In re Travis R., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 557 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 13, 2019).

Because a mother was sentenced to more than two years'  imprisonment for conduct against the child's sibling that met the definition of severe child abuse, the ground for termination set forth in subsection (g)(5) was sufficiently proven. In re C.S., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 197 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 29, 2020).

Clear and convincing evidence showed that termination of a mother's parental rights was in the children's best interest because the mother had made very little progress to remedy her substance abuse issues, the children were doing well in their placements, and returning the children to the mother's custody with her continuing substance abuse would not have been in their best interest. In re Johnathan T., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 281 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 18, 2020).

29. Termination Improper.

There was not clear and convincing evidence to support termination of parent's parental rights on the ground of abandonment merely because the parent willfully murdered children's other parent; the intent to commit murder does not translate into an intent not to visit or support one's children. Graham v. Copeland (In re Copeland), 43 S.W.3d 483, 2000 Tenn. App. LEXIS 221 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000), review or rehearing denied, In re Adoption of Copeland, — S.W.3d —, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 352 (Tenn. Apr. 16, 2001).

The requirements for termination of parental rights under T.C.A. § 36-1-113(g)(3)(A) were not met where, following initial placement of children in foster care, parent attended therapy on a consistent basis, attended parenting classes, learned coping abilities for stressful situations, became involved in a stable relationship, and demonstrated a strong bond with the children. Stokes v. Arnold, 27 S.W.3d 516, 2000 Tenn. App. LEXIS 61 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000).

Permanency plans did not address a drug use by the father, and there was nothing in the record indicating that the father was informed that his continued cohabitation with the mother, a cocaine addict, would result in the termination of his parental rights; it was unclear whether there was sufficient evidence to show that persistent conditions existed under T.C.A. § 36-1-113(g)(3)(A) with respect to the father. State v. Calabretta (In re J.J.C.), 148 S.W.3d 919, 2004 Tenn. App. LEXIS 47 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004), appeal denied, In re J.J.C., — S.W.3d —, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 408 (Tenn. May 10, 2004).

Trial court erred in terminating a father's parental rights to seven children on grounds of failure to provide a suitable home because the child services agency conceded the record did not contain evidence indicating whether the agency's efforts occurred within the first four months after the children's removal. In re Kalob S., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 465 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 12, 2015).

Trial court properly dismissed the grandparents'  petition for termination of the mother's parental rights and adoption of her child because the mother's use of alcohol was not a condition that would probably cause the child to be subjected to further abuse or neglect, the allegations of the mother's failure to maintain a stable home were based on hearsay and speculation, there was no clear and convincing evidence that the conditions that led to the child's removal or other conditions that might prevent his safe return to the mother's care still persisted, and without a ground for termination, there was no reason to consider the grandparents'  argument regarding the child's best interest. In re Christopher M., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 675 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 24, 2015).

No case law was found holding that a person acts with wanton disregard by conceiving the child, regardless of the criminal and social history of the individuals involved, and the trial court's reasoning to the contrary was rejected; the father's actions in committing crimes and failing to send the mother any money were actions that occurred after his incarceration, and wanton disregard considers a parent's conduct prior to incarceration, and his actions then were insufficient to establish that he acted with wanton disregard for the child's welfare. In re F.N.M., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 274 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 11, 2016).

Trial court was correct in failing to terminate a father's rights on putative father grounds because the evidence did not clearly and convincingly demonstrate that the father failed to manifest an ability and willingness to assume legal and physical custody of his child; the evidence did not demonstrate that the father was aware of the Putative Father Registry or had access to the internet to register as the child's putative father. In re A.B., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 14 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 11, 2017).

There was not clear and convincing evidence to support termination of the mother's rights due to a failure to establish a suitable home because the trial court's order did not address any efforts by the Department of Children's Services to assist the mother in establishing a suitable home. In re S.P., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 41 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 25, 2017).

Trial court did not err in separately analyzing the issue of “substantial harm” because it found that the alleged ground for termination had not been proven and that no substantial harm was demonstrated; therefore, the finding of substantial harm was unnecessary In re Sophia P., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 207 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 30, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 394 (Tenn. June 13, 2017).

Trial court erred in terminating the father's parental rights for failing to establish parentage without determining his status as either a legal father or putative father. In re Haley S., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 164 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 29, 2018).

Trial court found that the mother never wanted custody, but the trial court failed to consider the fact that the father was designated the primary residential parent in the parenting plan and the mother was exempted from remitting support pursuant to their agreement; the trial court also failed to issue any findings or conclusions concerning whether placing the children in the mother's care would pose a risk of substantial harm to them, and the ground of termination under T.C.A. § 36-1-113(g)(14) was vacated.  — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 745 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 19, 2018).

Termination of the mother's and the father's parental rights was improper based on the failure to manifest an ability and willingness to personally assume custody or financial responsibility of the children because the trial court failed to make sufficient findings of fact with respect to that ground for termination as nowhere in its discussion did the trial court make findings that placing the children in their respective parents'  legal and physical custody would pose a risk of substantial harm to their physical or psychological welfare, and establishing such a risk of substantial harm was required under the statute. In re Mickeal Z., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 29 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 25, 2019).

Termination of the mother's and the father's parental rights was improper based on the persistence of conditions ground because, although the trial court found that the mother's drug abuse persisted to the date of trial, it made no specific finding regarding the likelihood that such a concern could be remedied at an early date so that the children could be returned to the mother in the near future; and the trial court did not make specific findings regarding each of the elements applicable to the persistence of conditions ground. In re Mickeal Z., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 29 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 25, 2019).

Termination of the father's parental rights was improper based on substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan requirements because, although some conflict still existed between the parents after they had completed the anger management classes required of them, that did not justify a finding of substantial noncompliance considering its overall weight and the degree of the parents'  noncompliance and considering the importance of other requirements with which the trial court took no issue. In re Mickeal Z., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 29 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 25, 2019).

Evidence was insufficient to support the trial court's termination of the mother's parental rights based on a risk of substantial harm because it showed that it was the child's interactions with the grandmother that caused psychological stress. The mother's lie to law enforcement during a May 2018 incident, standing alone, did not constitute clear and convincing evidence that placing the child in the mother's custody posed a risk of substantial harm. In re Alexis S., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 526 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 29, 2019).

30. Preclusion and Effect of Judgments.

As the determination of the best interests of the children in a parental termination proceeding required consideration of a different set of factors than those that were considered in a prior custody and grandparent visitation proceeding, the doctrine of collateral estoppel was inapplicable because the issues in the two cases were not identical. In re B. W., 397 S.W.3d 105, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 199 (Tenn. Feb. 21, 2013).

As prior divorce litigation between a mother and father which was resolved by a parenting plan was a different cause of action than the father and stepmother's petition to terminate the mother's parental rights, res judicata did not bar the termination action. In re B. W., 397 S.W.3d 105, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 199 (Tenn. Feb. 21, 2013).

31. Due Process.

Given the existing procedural safeguards applicable to parental termination proceedings, the Tennessee Supreme Court declines to hold that securing the constitutional right of parents to fundamentally fair procedures requires adoption of an additional procedure, subsequent to or separate from an appeal as of right, by which parents may attack the judgment terminating parental rights based upon ineffective assistance of appointed counsel. In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d 507, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 49 (Tenn. Jan. 29, 2016).

Due process unquestionably requires States to provide parents with fundamentally fair procedures, but it does not require States to ignore the other interests at stake in parental termination proceedings; by refusing to import criminal law post-conviction type remedies, the Tennessee Supreme Court does not at all disregard the well-established constitutional principle precluding the termination of parental rights except upon fundamentally fair procedures. In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d 507, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 49 (Tenn. Jan. 29, 2016).

Because the new requirements were added to the permanency plan shortly before trial, and the evidence showed that the mother was not given sufficient time to complete those newly added requirements, although she did make an effort to complete some of them, terminating her parental rights for failure to complete those requirements would violate due process; thus, the order terminating the mother's parental rights to the child for substantial noncompliance with the statement of responsibilities in the permanency plan was reversed. In re Bryson C., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 498 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 18, 2016).

Termination of an incarcerated father's parental rights was inappropriate because the trial court's application of the missing witness rule and the doctrine of unclean hands-neither of which was applicable-undermined the protections to which the father was entitled under the Due Process Clauses of the Federal and Tennessee Constitutions by virtue of the liberty interest at stake. In re Mattie L., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 152 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 14, 2020).

32. Assistance of Counsel.

Appointed counsel's representation did not deprive the mother of a fundamentally fair termination proceeding; counsel had a strategy, including on cross-examination, and by not filing an answer, which was not required, counsel avoided admitting or denying each allegation of the petition, which may actually have aided the mother. In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d 507, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 49 (Tenn. Jan. 29, 2016).

Although the father was entitled to appointed counsel in the termination of parental rights action, the father did not avail himself of that right because the father knew how to obtain counsel, the father made no appearance before the trial court after being properly served, the father did not show up at trial, and the father appeared and requested counsel only after the trial was complete. In re Yariel S., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 998 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 29, 2016).

Court of appeals rejected a father's argument that he did not receive effective assistance of counsel because the Tennessee Supreme Court held that a parent had not right to effective assistance of appointed counsel; the court of appeals declined the father's invitation to ignore the basic principles of stare decisis. In re Hailey C., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 658 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 28, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 895 (Tenn. Dec. 21, 2017).

33. Placement With Relatives.

By the time a court considered whether to terminate parental rights, it was too late to bring a less drastic alternative before the court, and thus the trial court did not err in failing to place the children in this case with the grandmother. In re Alfonzo E., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 797 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 26, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 76 (Tenn. Jan. 24, 2017).

34. Putative Father.

Father was a putative father for purposes of this section because the Tennessee Department of Children's Services stated in its brief that was the biological father of the child and he had acknowledged his paternity through DNA testing. In re Jase P., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 411 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 21, 2017).

Putative father grounds applied where although he had completed DNA testing, he had not established paternity. In re Ken'Bria B., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 4, 2018).

Evidence was insufficient to support the termination of the father's parental rights based on the failure to establish paternity because the birth certificate afforded the father the status of a putative father, and the version of this statute in effect when the petition was filed could not be used to terminate a child's putative biological father's rights. In re Taya K., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 67 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 6, 2018).

Father was the putative father for purposes of termination of the father's parental rights because the father told the Tennessee Department of Children's Services and others that the father was a child's biological father. Furthermore, there was clear and convincing evidence to support the termination of the father's parental rights because the father, although the father had notice, failed to establish paternity or exercise paternity. In re Victoria H., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 108 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2018).

This section was applicable to the father, as the putative biological father of the child, because he met the criteria set out at T.C.A. § 36-1-117(c)(2), as the parents testified that they were in a relationship and living together when the mother discovered that she was pregnant, they both acknowledged that the father was the child's biological father, and there was no evidence to the contrary of their acknowledgments. In re Kah'Nyia J., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 238 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2018).

Clear and convincing evidence did not support the trial court's decision to terminate a father's parental rights on the ground of failure to support because there was an absence of proof of a regular income for the father; the father stated that he was doing construction work with his brother. In re Rilyn S., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 124 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 12, 2019).

35. Evidence Sufficient.

Evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's finding that termination of the father's parental rights was in his child's best interests because it showed that he continued to engage in illegal activity, he testified he would not be able to pass a drug screen, he willfully failed to visit the child, he failed to fulfill the role of father for the child, he was in jail, and he had an obvious drug and alcohol addiction, and he failed to pay any child support. In re Taya K., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 67 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 6, 2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support the termination of the mother's parental rights based on substantial noncompliance with the requirements of the permanency plans because she did not have stable housing or proof of a stable income, her visits with the children had been suspended, she failed to cooperate with the Tennessee Department of Children's Services, and her testimony showed that she did not comply with the alcohol and drug assessment. In re Homer, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 126 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 9, 2018).

Clear and convincing evidence showed a mother's failure to substantially comply with the reasonable responsibilities set out in permanency plans because, (1) when she claimed the Department of Children's Services did not provide her reasonable assistance to reunify with her child, proof of such reasonable efforts was not a precondition to termination, (2) she did not substantially comply with her permanency plan or obtain treatment, (3) she continued using drugs, and (4) she did not pay reasonable support. In re J'Khari F., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 60 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2019).

36. Recusal of Trial Judge.

In a termination of parental rights case, the trial judge's denial of the motion to recuse was affirmed as the facts did not demonstrate any bias, impropriety, or reliance upon extrajudicial facts by the judge because, although the judge was “friends” with the foster mother on a social media website, the trial judge denied that he had seen the foster mother's posts of pictures of the child on the website; the judge stated that he had between 3,500 and 4,000 “friends” on the website; his only interaction with the foster mother on the website was the two wishing each other a happy birthday; and the judge explained that in trying to maintain a presence in the community, he tried to tell every person on the website “happy birthday.” In re Charles R., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 425 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 25, 2018).

36-1-114. Venue.

The termination or adoption petition may be filed in the county:

  1. Where the petitioners reside;
  2. Where the child resides;
  3. Where, at the time the petition is filed, any respondent resides;
  4. In which is located any licensed child-placing agency or institution operated under the laws of this state having custody or guardianship of the child or to which the child has been surrendered as provided in this part;
  5. Where the child became subject to the care and control of a public or private child-caring or child-placing agency; or
  6. Where the child became subject to partial or complete guardianship or legal custody of the petitioners as provided in this part.

Acts 1951, ch. 202, § 12 (Williams, § 9572.26); T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 36-104; 36-1-104; Acts 1995, ch. 532, § 1; 2008, ch. 1059, § 4; 2018, ch. 875, § 13.

Compiler's Notes. Former § 36-1-114 (Acts 1951, ch. 202, § 12 (Williams, § 9572.26); T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 36-104), concerning surrender of child, was repealed by Acts 1995, ch. 532, § 1, effective January 1, 1996.

Amendments. The 2018 amendment rewrote (3) which read: “(3) Where the child resided when:“(A) The child became subject to the care and control of a public or private child-caring or child-placing agency; or“(B) The child became subject to partial or complete guardianship or co-guardianship pursuant to a surrender proceeding as provided in this part; or;” and added (5) and (6).

Effective Dates. Acts 2018, ch. 875, § 38. July 1, 2018.

Law Reviews.

The Tennessee Court System — Chancery Court (Frederic S. Le Clercq), 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 281 (1978).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Venue Proper.

Venue in a proceeding to terminate a mother's and a father's parental rights was proper in Weakley County because Weakley County was where the child resided at the time he first became subject to the care and control of the child-caring agency in April 2011. In re Wesley P., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 400 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 29, 2015).

2. Venue Improper.

trial court erred in separating grandparents'  termination and adoption actions and transferring only the termination portion of the proceedings to the juvenile court because the Lauderdale County Juvenile Court was an appropriate venue for the grandparents'  termination action, even had the petition been initially been filed in that court; Robertson County was the only available venue because the children over whom the grandparents had custody resided in Robertson County for a number of years. In re Tyler G., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 280 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 3, 2017).

36-1-115. Persons eligible to file adoption petition — Residence requirements — Preference for foster parents.

  1. Any person over eighteen (18) years of age may petition the chancery or circuit court to adopt a person and may request that the adopted person's name be changed.
  2. The petitioners must have physical custody or must demonstrate to the court that they have the right to receive custody of the child sought to be adopted as provided in § 36-1-111(d)(6) at the time the petition is filed, unless they are filing an intervening petition seeking to adopt the child.
  3. If the petitioner has a spouse living, competent to join in the petition, such spouse shall join in the petition; provided, that if the spouse of the petitioner is a legal or biological parent of the child to be adopted, such spouse shall sign the petition as co-petitioner, and this shall be sufficient consent by the legal or biological parent for the petitioner's spouse to adopt the child of the legal or biological parent, and no surrender shall be necessary by such co-petitioning legal or biological parent. Such action by the legal or biological parent shall not otherwise affect the legal relationship between that parent and the child.
  4. The petitioner or petitioners shall live and maintain their regular place of abode in this state when the adoption petition is filed. Nonresidents may also file a petition to adopt a child in this state, if they file such petition in the county where a court granted the nonresidents partial or complete guardianship of the child.
  5. If one (1) or both of petitioners is an active duty service member in the United States military, the service member and any co-petitioner with the service member may file a petition for adoption in this state without actual residency in this state, if the service member has lived, or maintained a regular place of abode, within this state for six (6) consecutive months immediately prior to entering military service or if this state is the service member's state of legal residence as identified to the United States military.
  6. Where the petitioner is seeking to adopt a child that is related, the residency requirement in subsections (d) and (e) shall not apply if the petitioner is an actual resident of this state at the time the petition is filed.
    1. When a child is placed in a foster home by the department or otherwise, and becomes available for adoption due to the termination or surrender of all parental or guardianship rights to the child, those foster parents shall be given first preference to adopt the child if the child has resided in the foster home for twelve (12) or more consecutive months immediately preceding the filing of an adoption petition.
    2. In becoming adoptive parents, the foster parents shall meet all requirements otherwise imposed on persons seeking to adopt children in the custody of the department, and shall be subject to all other provisions of this part.

Acts 1951, ch. 202, §§ 4, 40 (Williams, §§ 9572.18, 9572.52); Acts 1959, ch. 223, § 1; Acts 1961, ch. 150, § 1; 1971, ch. 232, § 1; 1971, ch. 329, § 1; 1972, ch. 612, § 7; impl. am. Acts 1975, ch. 219, § 1; Acts 1976, ch. 481, § 1; 1977, ch. 232, § 1; 1979, ch. 107, § 1; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 36-105; § 36-1-105; Acts 1995, ch. 532, § 1; 2016, ch. 919, § 10; 2018, ch. 875, § 14.

Compiler's Notes. Former § 36-1-115 (Acts 1951, ch. 202, §§ 10, 40 (Williams, §§ 9572.24, 9572.52); T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 36-115), concerning consent of child fourteen years of age or over, was repealed by Acts 1995, ch. 532, § 1, effective January 1, 1996.

Amendments. The 2018 amendment, in (d), in the first sentence, substituted “live and maintain their” for “have lived, or maintained a” preceding “regular place” and “when the adoption petition is filed.” for “or on federal territory within the boundaries or this state for six (6) consecutive months immediately preceding the filing of the adoption petition.”, and in the second sentence substituted “Nonresidents,” for “However, nonresidents”, “where a court” for “in which the court that” preceding “granted”, and deleted “is located” at the end; and, in (e), substituted “If one (1) or both of petitioners is an active duty service member in the United States military, the service member and any co-petitioner with the service member may file a petition for adoption in this state without actual residency in this state, if the service member has” for “If the petitioner is in military service stationed out of the state, but had” and “or if this state is the service member’s state of legal residence as identified to the United States military” for “, the residency requirement in subsection (d) shall not apply” at the end.

Effective Dates. Acts 2018, ch. 875, § 38. July 1, 2018.

Textbooks. Coppock on Tennessee Adoption Law, (1998-99 ed., Coppock).

Tennessee Jurisprudence, 20 Tenn. Juris, Parent and Child, § 21.

Law Reviews.

Adoption Proceedings — Revocation of Surrender Under Tennessee Code Annotated Section 36-1-117 (Bradley E. Trammell), 23 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 293 (1993).

Courts, Legislatures, and Second-Parent Adoptions: On Judicial Deference, Specious Reasoning, and the Best Interests of the Child, 66 Tenn. L. Rev. 1019 (1999).

When One Parent Goes and the Other Parent Stays: The Inconsistency and Inequality of Guaranteeing Absent Parents Permanent Parental Rights (Wendee M. Hilderbrand), 56 Vand. L. Rev. 1907 (2003).

Attorney General Opinions. Adoption statutes do not permit more than two adults jointly to adopt a child and do not allow two adults jointly to adopt a child together if they are not a couple and are not cohabitating in the same home, OAG 07-162, 2007 Tenn. AG LEXIS 162 (12/12/07).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Construction.

The court must give this section a strict construction and determine what the language of the section means. In re Adoption of Mullins, 219 Tenn. 666, 412 S.W.2d 896, 1967 Tenn. LEXIS 379, 33 A.L.R.3d 168 (1967).

Although grandparent petitioners were not required to comply with the physical custody requirement before filing an intervening petition for adoption, T.C.A. §§ 36-1-116(f)(1) and 36-1-120(a)(4) require that petitioners have physical custody or the right to receive custody of the child pursuant to a valid surrender; therefore, notwithstanding this section, the trial court did not err in refusing to allow grandparents to pursue their intervening petition for adoption where it was undisputed that grandparents had neither physical custody of the child nor the right to receive custody. In re M.J.S., 44 S.W.3d 41, 2000 Tenn. App. LEXIS 704 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000).

Where a child's father was incarcerated after having received a death sentence for killing his child's mother and two others and where the child's maternal grandparents and paternal grandparents filed competing adoption petitions, the paternal grandparents did not meet the statutory adoption requirements because they did not have physical custody of the child or the right to receive custody pursuant to a valid surrender, and the court held that their monthly visitation with the child did not amount to physical custody. Although the father had executed a surrender consenting to the adoption of the child by his parents, the surrender was invalid because, to be valid, the father must have had custody of the child when he executed the document and the child was in the custody of her maternal grandparents when the father executed the surrender. Jordan v. Roberson (in re S.E.J.), — S.W.3d —, 2009 Tenn. App. LEXIS 442 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 16, 2009), rev'd, In re Sidney J., 313 S.W.3d 772, 2010 Tenn. LEXIS 433 (Tenn. May 10, 2010).

Requirements of T.C.A. §§ 36-1-116(b)(5) and 36-1-120(a)(4) did not apply when an adoption petition was filed pursuant to the exception to the physical custody requirement for intervening petitioners in T.C.A. § 36-1-115(b); accordingly, parental grandparents'  intervening petition to adopt a child that was in the physical custody of the maternal grandparents could be considered. In re Sidney J., 313 S.W.3d 772, 2010 Tenn. LEXIS 433 (Tenn. May 10, 2010).

Former foster mother and her new husband were not entitled to intervene in an adoption proceeding because they did not meet the requirements for adoption under T.C.A. §§ 36-1-115, 36-1-116, 36-1-120 where they did not have physical custody of the children, no home study had been conducted of their home, and the children had not resided with the new husband at all and had not resided with the former foster mother for more than 12 months. In re Devon W., — S.W.3d —, 2010 Tenn. App. LEXIS 270 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 16, 2010), review denied and ordered not published, In re Devon P.K.C., — S.W.3d —, 2010 Tenn. LEXIS 738 (Tenn. Aug. 25, 2010), cert. denied, Martin-Matera v. Tenn. Dep't of Children's Servs., 563 U.S. 989, 131 S. Ct. 2464, 179 L. Ed. 2d 1212, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 3760, 79 U.S.L.W. 3647 (U.S. 2011).

Construing the language of the adoption and termination statutory scheme, the term “physical custody” as utilized in the statutory sections would be synonymous with having physical possession of a child and would not require a court order or other judicial act; the statutory definition of custody contained in the juvenile court statutory scheme is inapplicable in the context of a termination or adoption proceeding, and physical custody means physical possession of a child, as granted by a parent, guardian, child-placing agency, or court, but physical custody as used in the statutory scheme does not include the unlawful taking of a child. In re Joseph F., 492 S.W.3d 690, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 227 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 377 (Tenn. May 10, 2016).

2. Jurisdiction of Court.

Fact that juvenile court has committed a child to custody of the department of human services (now department of children's services) does not deprive the chancery or circuit court of jurisdiction to entertain a petition for adoption even though such petition is filed by a person not authorized by the department. In re Matthews, 204 Tenn. 155, 319 S.W.2d 69, 1958 Tenn. LEXIS 254 (1958).

Trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over foster parents'  petition to terminate a parent's parental rights and to adopt a child because the filing of an appeal in a previous case brought by a state agency to terminate the parent's parental rights that was pending in a different court had no bearing on the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction. In re Rainee M., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 994 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 30, 2015), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 251 (Tenn. Mar. 16, 2016).

3. Regular Place of Abode.

By use of the language “regular place of abode” the legislature meant one's fixed place of residence for the time being; a place where a person dwells. In re Adoption of Mullins, 219 Tenn. 666, 412 S.W.2d 896, 1967 Tenn. LEXIS 379, 33 A.L.R.3d 168 (1967).

4. Preference to Adopt.

Foster parents had the preference to adopt the children where under T.C.A. § 36-1-115(g)(1), there was no preference for adoption by relatives after the children had been in foster care for one year. It was not in the children's best interest to totally uproot them from the home and care that they had known for the first year of their lives. In re Adoption of A. K. S. R., 71 S.W.3d 715, 2001 Tenn. App. LEXIS 766 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001).

5. Standing.

Stepparent of children was an actual resident of Tennessee when a petition for adoption of the children was filed in Tennessee and had standing to file the petition for adoption of the children in Tennessee because, even though the stepparent had some work obligations in Florida, the stepparent did not have a permanent residence in Florida, but always returned to a house trailer in Tennessee that the stepparent rented with the stepparent's family when the stepparent was working out of state. In re Malina W., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 799 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 29, 2015).

Because the foster parents had physical possession and therefore physical custody of the children at the time of the petition's filing, they had standing to seek termination of the mother's parental rights. In re Joseph F., 492 S.W.3d 690, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 227 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 377 (Tenn. May 10, 2016).

There is no statutory requirement that petitioners must also maintain physical custody throughout the entirety of the adoption proceeding; the foster parents had physical custody and standing at the time of filing of the adoption petition, and the department could not unilaterally defeat their standing to pursue their adoption petition simply by removing the child from their foster home. In re Neveah W., 525 S.W.3d 223, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 77 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 3, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 276 (Tenn. May 9, 2017).

Because the foster parents had physical custody of the child at the time the petition was filed, the foster parents had standing to file and pursue their adoption petition. In re Neveah W., 525 S.W.3d 223, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 77 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 3, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 276 (Tenn. May 9, 2017).

Because the current foster mother was not a party of record in the adoption proceeding, the trial court erred in granting her an adoption. In re Neveah W., 525 S.W.3d 223, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 77 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 3, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 276 (Tenn. May 9, 2017).

Grandmother had standing to seek termination of a father's parental rights because (1) the grandmother received custody of the child through a court order, and (2) the child lived with her all of the child's life. In re Jeremiah N., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 283 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 2, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 432 (Tenn. July 21, 2017).

6. Petition.

Although a biological parent, who married, had no standing to petition for the termination of the parental rights of the other biological parent, the biological parent who married was a necessary party to the stepparent's petition for adoption and had to sign the petition as a co-petitioner. In re Malina W., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 799 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 29, 2015).

36-1-116. Home study — Adoption petition — Order of reference.

    1. Prior to filing a petition for the adoption of a child, the prospective adoptive parents shall, except as otherwise provided by law, contact a licensed child-placing agency, or a licensed clinical social worker, or if indigent under federal poverty guidelines, they shall, except as otherwise provided by law, contact the department, and request a home study or a preliminary home study concerning the suitability of their home and themselves as adoptive parents; provided, that the court may waive this requirement when the child is to be adopted by related persons.
    2. To be valid for use in response to the order of reference issued pursuant to subsection (e), the home study must have been completed or updated within one (1) year prior to the date of the order of reference. The preliminary home study must have been completed within thirty (30) days prior to the filing of the petition.
  1. The petition to adopt may be made upon information and belief, shall be verified, and must:
    1. The full name of the petitioners; however, initials or a pseudonym may be used to promote the safety of the petitioners or of the child, with permission of the court;
    2. The name used for the child in the proceeding. In the petition or other orders related to the custody of the child and the final order of adoption, and in all other documents related to the case, the name selected by the petitioner as the name for the child may be used as the true and legal name of the child, and the original name of the child shall not be necessary. Only in the court report required by law on the investigation of the conditions and antecedents of the child sought to be adopted and on the form requesting the new certificate of birth by adoption shall the original name of the child given by the biological or prior legal parent or parents be necessary;
    3. The birth date, state, and county or country of birth of the child, if known;
    4. The information necessary to show that the court to which the petition is addressed has jurisdiction;
    5. That the petitioners have physical custody of the child or that they meet the requirements of § 36-1-111(d)(6), and from what person or agency such custody was or is to be obtained;
    6. That it is the desire of the petitioners that the relationship of parent and child be established between them and the child;
    7. The desire of the petitioners, if they have such, that the name of the child be changed, together with the new name desired;
    8. The value of the personal and real property owned by the child or in which the child may have some legal or equitable interest;
    9. That the petitioners are fit persons to have the care and custody of the child and that it is in the best interest of the child for this adoption to occur;
    10. That the petitioners are financially able to provide for the child;
    11. That there has been full compliance with the law in regard to surrender of the child to the petitioners, or termination of parental or guardianship rights, or consent to the adoption of the child by the agency with rights to place a child for adoption, or that the petitioner intends to effect compliance with the requirements for termination of parental or guardianship rights or parental consents as part of the adoption proceeding, and how such compliance will be effected. A copy of any orders obtained by the prospective adoptive parents terminating parental or guardianship rights and copies of any surrenders that were executed to the prospective adoptive parents shall be filed with the petition;
      1. Whether the biological parent is giving parental consent for the adoption of the child as defined pursuant to § 36-1-102 and as executed pursuant to § 36-1-117(g), or that the parent is signing the petition pursuant to § 36-1-117(f) and that the parent understands that the child will be adopted by the relatives or stepparent of the child and that, in the case of the adoption by relatives, the parent will have no legal rights to the custody, control, or to visitation with the child in the future;
      2. In the case of a parental consent pursuant to § 36-1-102 and § 36-1-117(g), the petition must state that the parent understands that the entry of an order confirming the parental consent, without revoking the parental consent prior to the entry of such order, will terminate that parent's parental rights to the child forever and that the parent will have no legal rights to the custody, control, or to visitation with the child in the future;
      3. When a parent uses the procedure for a consent in the adoption of an unrelated child the parent shall also complete the information form from § 36-1-111(b)(4) no later than when the petition is signed and such form shall be filed with the court. In order to confirm a parental consent in the adoption of an unrelated child, the surrender form provided at § 36-1-111(b)(2) shall be modified to reflect applicable law and executed by the same procedure provided for execution of a surrender;
        1. That the Tennessee putative father registry has been consulted within ten (10) working days prior to the filing of the petition or will be consulted within ten (10) working days thereafter unless the biological father has been identified through DNA testing as described in § 24-7-112 and that identification is set out in the petition; a copy of the response to this inquiry must be provided to the court immediately upon receipt by the petitioner and prior to finalization of the adoption;
        2. That if the child was born in a state other than Tennessee and that state has a putative father registry or equivalent, that registry has been consulted within ten (10) working days prior to the filing of the petition or will be consulted within ten (10) working days thereafter unless the biological father has been identified through DNA testing as described in § 24-7-112 and that identification is set out in the petition; a copy of the response to this inquiry must be provided to the court immediately upon receipt by the petitioner; if the state of the child's birth has no putative father registry, the petition must include a statement to that effect;
        3. That if the petitioner knows or has reason to believe the mother was living or present in another state at the time of the child's conception and that state has a putative father registry or equivalent, that registry has been consulted within ten (10) working days prior to the filing of the petition or will be consulted within ten (10) working days thereafter; a copy of the response to this inquiry must be provided to the court immediately upon receipt by the petitioner and prior to the finalization of the adoption; if the possible state of the child's conception has no putative father registry, the petition shall include a statement to that effect; and
        4. That if the child is less than thirty (30) days old at the time the petition is filed, whether notice of the filing of the adoption petition has been provided to any registry required by this section;
      1. Whether there are any other persons known to the petitioner or petitioners who are entitled to notice under § 36-1-117 and the identity of such persons;
    12. Whether the child was brought into Tennessee for foster care or adoption, and, if so, that there has been full compliance with the ICPC or, if compliance has not occurred, a statement alleging good cause for such noncompliance. Evidence of compliance in the form of the ICPC Form 100A or other form from the department, if appropriate, or a sworn statement stating why such form is not required shall be included or attached as an exhibit to the petition;
      1. Whether the child was brought into Tennessee for foster care or adoption from a foreign country, and, if so, evidence shall be attached to the petition showing approval of the government or legal authority in the country from which the child was brought that the child's placement with the petitioners was appropriate and that the petitioners have legal authority under that country's law to have the custody of the child;
      2. The petition shall exhibit evidence from the immigration and naturalization service, the department of justice or the department of state that the child has proper authorization to enter the United States;
      3. If a child who was the subject of an adoption decree from the foreign country must be re-adopted under Tennessee law to effect a valid adoption due to any interpretation of the United States government, the petition shall so state and state that this is necessary for the child to be legally adopted in the United States, and the court shall have jurisdiction to enter an order of adoption for this purpose;
      4. If a child is in this country and the provisions of subdivision (b)(15)(A) cannot be met, the petitioners shall file an affidavit and any other available documentary evidence satisfactory to the court that shows why there is no approval available for the child from the foreign government or legal authority in the foreign country concerning the child's placement with the petitioners;
      1. Whether the petitioners have paid, or promised to pay, any money, fees, contributions, or other remuneration or thing of value in connection with the birth, placement or the adoption of the child, and if so, to or from whom, the specific amount, and the specific purpose for which these were paid or promised;
      2. The disclosure required by this subdivision (b)(16) shall specifically include whether any attorney's fees or medical expenses or counseling fees and the other expenses permitted under §§ 36-1-108 and 36-1-109 or any other fees, remuneration, or contribution, were paid or promised in connection with the child's birth, placement, or adoption and if so, to whom, the specific amount and the specific purpose for which they were paid or promised;
      3. The disclosure required by this subdivision (b)(16) shall also specifically include the amount of fees paid to any licensed child-placing agency or licensed clinical social worker in connection with the placement of the child.
  2. The petition must be signed by each petitioner personally and must be verified and must be filed with the clerk of the court, who shall send a certified copy of the petition to the director of adoptions in the state office of the department in Nashville, and to the local office of the department or the licensed child-placing agency or licensed clinical social worker that or who has been directed to answer the order of reference issued in accordance with subsection (e) within three (3) business days after its filing.
  3. If this section requires a putative father registry check in any state other than Tennessee and that state will not permit access to its putative father registry, does not respond within thirty (30) days, or requires a fee determined by the court to be unreasonable, and the court finds that the petitioner has otherwise made diligent efforts to identify the child's biological father, the court may waive this requirement and enter an order of adoption.
    1. Upon filing the adoption petition, the prospective adoptive parents shall notify the court if they have requested a home study or preliminary home study pursuant to subsection (a) and shall file or cause to be filed a copy of the court report based upon the home study or preliminary home study with the court, under seal, unless the court waives the home study or the preliminary home study for prospective adoptive parents who are related to the child.
      1. Upon filing of the petition for adoption, the petitioners also shall inform the adoption court of the name of the court in which the surrender was filed, and the adoption court shall request the court where the surrender was filed to forward a certified copy of the surrender and copies of the medical and social information obtained at the time of the surrender to the adoption court and any court reports based upon home studies that were ordered by the court. This information shall be made a part of the adoption record, but shall be confidential and shall be placed in a sealed envelope within the court file or shall be filed in a protected electronically maintained file and shall remain under seal and shall not be open to inspection by any person or agency other than the department or the licensed child-placing agency or licensed clinical social worker to which the order of reference is issued under this subsection (e), except by written order of the court or as otherwise permitted under this part.
      2. Unless waived by the court in accordance with subdivision (e)(1), the court shall order a licensed child-placing agency or licensed clinical social worker, or the department if the petitioners are indigent under federal poverty guidelines, to conduct a preliminary home study, and a court report based upon such a study must be submitted within fifteen (15) days of the date of the order if, at the time the petition is filed, the petitioners have custody of the child, and the petitioners have not submitted to the court a court report based upon a timely home study or timely preliminary home study with the petition, and the court may enter any orders necessary for the child's care and protection as permitted by subsection (f) pending receipt of the preliminary home study.
    2. If no prior or updated home study of the prospective adoptive parents has been conducted and a court report filed with the court at the time the order of reference is issued and such home study has not been waived in accordance with subdivision (e)(1), then the court, within five (5) days of the date the petition is filed, shall direct the order of reference to a licensed child-placing agency or licensed clinical social worker chosen by the petitioners or, if the petitioners are indigent under federal poverty guidelines or if the child was placed with the petitioners by the department, to the department, to submit a preliminary court report, and any supplemental court reports as may be necessary, and a final court report concerning the circumstances of the child, the child's antecedents, and the proposed adoptive home. Except for good cause shown, the court shall issue the order of reference to the licensed child-placing agency, the licensed clinical social worker, or the department that conducted the home study pursuant to the prospective adoptive parents' request pursuant to subsection (a).
    3. The information in subdivision (e)(2) shall be made available to the licensed child-placing agency or licensed clinical social worker or the department which responds to the order of reference. If the necessary medical and social information was obtained by the court pursuant to  § 36-1-111, it shall not be necessary for the department or the licensed child-placing agency or licensed clinical social worker to have any further contact with the biological parents in response to the order of reference, unless it is believed the information contained in the statements is inaccurate or incomplete, in which case the department, licensed child-placing agency, or the licensed clinical social worker may contact the biological or prior legal parents or the guardian to obtain such information.
      1. A preliminary court report shall be filed by the department, the licensed child-placing agency or the licensed clinical social worker within sixty (60) days of the receipt of the order of reference and may be supplemented from time to time as the licensed child-placing agency, the licensed clinical social worker or the department determines necessary, or as ordered by the court.
      2. A final court report shall be submitted immediately prior to the finalization of the adoption upon fourteen (14) days' notice to the department, the licensed child-placing agency, or the licensed clinical social worker.
    4. Court filings in adoption actions by public or private agencies or parties, offered as proof of parentage, termination of parental rights, or related to establishment or termination of guardianship, may be reviewed by all parties to the case unless the court grants a protective order. If there is no protective order, the agency that made the filing shall, at the time of the filing, send a paper or encrypted electronic copy of the filing to the attorney for the petitioners. Petitioners' counsel and the court must receive the submission at least two (2) business days prior to the scheduled hearing to finalize the adoption. A protective order may be requested by motion of any party or by the agency that made the filing. A protective order shall be granted upon showing of good cause to restrict the information; such cause shall be proven by a preponderance of evidence. The protective order shall be as narrow as possible while still offering the protections that the court found to be warranted.
    1. Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all matters pertaining to the child, including the establishment of paternity of a child pursuant to chapter 2, part 3 of this title, except for allegations of delinquency, unruliness or truancy of the child pursuant to title 37; provided, that, unless a party has filed an intervening petition to an existing adoption petition concerning a child who is in the physical custody of the original petitioners, the court shall have no jurisdiction to issue any orders granting custody or guardianship of the child to the petitioners or to the intervening petitioners or granting an adoption of the child to the petitioners or to the intervening petitioners unless the petition affirmatively states, and the court finds in its order, that the petitioners have physical custody of the child at the time of the filing of the petition, entry of the order of guardianship, or entry of the order of adoption, or unless the petitioners otherwise meet the requirements of § 36-1-111(d)(6).
    2. Except for proceedings concerning allegations of delinquency, unruliness, or truancy of the child under title 37, any proceedings that may be pending seeking the custody or guardianship of the child or visitation with the child who is in the physical custody of the petitioners on the date the petition is filed, or where the petitioners meet the requirement of § 36-1-111(d)(6), shall be suspended pending the court's orders in the adoption proceeding, and jurisdiction of all other pending matters concerning the child and proceedings concerning establishment of the paternity of the child shall be transferred to and assumed by the adoption court; provided, that until the adoption court enters any orders affecting the child's custody or guardianship as permitted by this part, all prior parental or guardian authority, prior court orders regarding custody or guardianship, or statutory authority concerning the child's status shall remain in effect. Actions suspended by this section, regardless of the stage of adjudication, shall not be heard until final adjudication of the action for termination of parental rights or adoption regarding the same child, even if such adjudication of the termination of parental rights or adoption will render the custody, guardianship, or visitation action moot.
    3. If no prior order of guardianship or custody has been entered giving guardianship or legal custody to the petitioners, the court may, upon receipt of a satisfactory preliminary home study or a satisfactory home study, and if the petitioners have physical custody of the child or otherwise meet the requirements of § 36-1-111(d)(6), issue an order of guardianship or custody with the same authority given to the petitioners as is provided pursuant to §§ 36-1-102 and 37-1-140 as the case may be.
    4. If an order of guardianship is entered pursuant to this part, the petitioner or petitioners shall have authority to act as guardian ad litem or next friend of the child in any suit by the child against third parties while the child is in the care and custody of the petitioners.
    1. The court shall order a licensed child-placing agency or licensed clinical social worker, or the department if the parents are indigent under federal poverty guidelines or if the child was placed with the prospective adoptive parents by the department, to provide supervision for the child who is in the home of prospective adoptive parents and to make any necessary reports that the court should have concerning the welfare of the child pending entry of the final order in the case; provided, that the court may waive this requirement when the child is to be adopted by related persons.
    2. Unless they are indigent under federal poverty guidelines, the prospective adoptive parents shall pay the costs of the home study and the supervision required by this subsection (g) and the supervision required by the court.
  4. The filing of a petition for involuntary termination of parental rights with or without an adoption shall be deemed the commencement of a custody proceeding. A petition for adoption, with or without a voluntary termination of parental rights or consent, shall not be deemed the commencement of a custody proceeding for purposes of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), compiled in chapter 6, part 2 of this title.
  5. If the court grants guardianship or custody of the child upon the filing of the petition or at any time thereafter to any person, and the child is possessed of any real or personal property to be administered, the court shall appoint a guardian of the property of the child if no guardian or trustee is currently appointed to care for the child's property.
  6. When the husband and wife are joint petitioners, the death of one (1) spouse shall not result in the dismissal of the petition for adoption for that reason alone, and the court may proceed to grant the adoption to the surviving petitioner.
    1. The department, a licensed child-placing agency, or a licensed clinical social worker shall have the right to intervene in the adoption proceeding at any time to present evidence as to the best interests of the child by filing a sworn complaint in the adoption proceeding.
      1. Subject to subsection (f), the court may make any necessary orders upon its own motion or upon the sworn complaint of the department, a licensed child-placing agency, or a licensed clinical social worker for the protection and welfare of the child, including emergency ex parte orders for the immediate care and protection of the child as permitted pursuant to § 36-1-111(v)(1)(A)-(C).
      2. Any emergency ex parte orders for the protection of the child may be entered if the court finds probable cause to believe that the child's immediate health or safety would be endangered. The ex parte order may direct the removal of the child from the custody of the prospective adoptive parents.
    2. If an ex parte order of protection is entered that removes the child from the custody of the prospective adoptive parents, a preliminary hearing shall be held within five (5) days, excluding Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays, to determine the need for the continuance of such order.
    3. The prospective adoptive parents shall be necessary parties at the preliminary hearing and the court may order the department or the licensed child-placing agency or licensed clinical social worker to provide any necessary information or court reports concerning the welfare of the child as it may require.
    4. If the court determines at the preliminary hearing that there is probable cause to believe that the child's health or safety will be immediately endangered if the child remains in or is returned to the custody of the prospective adoptive parents, or that any other orders must be entered to ensure the health and safety of the child, it shall make such orders as are necessary to protect the child and may continue or place temporary legal custody of the child with the department or a licensed child-placing agency or any other suitable persons approved by the department or a licensed child-placing agency or licensed clinical social worker.
    5. The court shall set a final hearing concerning the allegations involving the prospective adoptive parents within thirty (30) days, except for good cause shown in an order entered by the court.
    6. If the court determines upon clear and convincing evidence at a final hearing that it should make another disposition of the child, it may remove the child from the custody of the prospective adoptive parents and may make any other orders necessary for the child's welfare and best interests, including an alternate custody or guardianship order for the child, and the court may dismiss the adoption petition as provided in § 36-1-118. If the court does not find by clear and convincing evidence that it should make another disposition of the child, it shall dismiss the complaint that had made the allegations concerning the child's best interests and the adoption proceedings shall continue pending further orders of the court.

Acts 1995, ch. 532, § 1; 1996, ch. 1054, §§ 45-52, 112; 1997, ch. 551, §§ 55, 56; 2003, ch. 231, §§ 11-13; 2016, ch. 919, §§ 11, 12, 18, 19; 2018, ch. 875, §§ 8, 15, 16, 18, 34; 2019, ch. 36, §§ 20-22.

Compiler's Notes. Former § 36-1-116 (Acts 1951, ch. 202, § 35 (Williams, § 9572.49); 1953, ch. 171, § 1; impl. am. Acts 1975, ch. 219, § 1; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 36-116), concerning consent of persons eighteen years of age or older, was repealed by Acts 1995, ch. 532, § 1, effective January 1, 1996.

Amendments. The 2018 amendment, in (a)(1), substituted “shall, except as otherwise provided by law” for “may” twice, and added the proviso at the end; in (b)(1), added “however, initials or a pseudonym may be used to promote the safety of the petitioners or of the child, with permission of the court;” at the end; added (b)(12)(c); in (b)(13)(A), substituted “Tennessee putative father registry and the putative father registry of any other state required by § 36-1-113(d)(3)(A) within ten (10) working days” for “putative father registry within ten (10) working days”; and, in (e)(6), substituted “unless the court grants a protective order. If there is no protective order, the agency that made the filing shall, at the time of the filing, send a paper or encrypted electronic copy of the filing to the attorney for the petitioners. Petitioners' counsel and the court must receive the submission at least two (2) business days prior to the scheduled hearing to finalize the adoption. A protective” for “if the adoption court so orders. Such an” following “case”, rewrote the present fourth sentence, which read: “A protective order may be granted as well upon showing, by a preponderance of evidence, of good cause to restrict the information.”, and, in the last sentence, substituted “as narrow as possible while still offering the protections that” for “drawn as narrowly as possible while still offering the protections” following “shall be”.

The 2019 amendment, in (b) substituted “petition to adopt may be made upon information and belief, shall be verified, and must” for “petition to adopt must” in the introductory language; rewrote (b)(13)(A), which read: “That the petitioner has made inquiry to the Tennessee putative father registry and the putative father registry of any other state required by § 36-1-113(d)(3)(A) within ten (10) working days prior to the filing of the petition to determine whether any person claims a paternity interest in the child who is the subject of the proceeding by having entered a claim with the registry, the result of such inquiry, and that, if the child is less than thirty (30) days old at the time the petition is filed, the petitioner provided notice of the filing of the adoption petition to the registry; and”; and rewrote (d), which read: “Any person who files a petition to adopt a child less than thirty (30) days old shall notify the putative father registry maintained by the department of the filing of the petition unless the known biological or legal father has: (1) Executed a surrender or a waiver of interest in accordance with this part; (2) Had parental rights terminated by a court of competent jurisdiction; or (3) Been made a party to the adoption proceedings and has been served notice as required by law.”

Effective Dates. Acts 2018, ch. 875, § 38. July 1, 2018.

Acts 2019, ch. 36, § 35. July 1, 2019.

Cross-References. Confidentiality of public records, § 10-7-504.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Construction.

The trial court did not err in refusing to allow grandparents to pursue their intervening petition for adoption where it was undisputed that grandparents had neither physical custody of the child nor the right to receive custody. In re M.J.S., 44 S.W.3d 41, 2000 Tenn. App. LEXIS 704 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000).

As T.C.A. § 36-1-116(f)(1) included an exception to the physical custody requirement when the petitioners filed an intervening adoption petition and the child sought to be adopted was in the physical custody of the original petitioners, a court of appeals erred in holding that the trial court should not have considered an intervening petition of paternal grandparents who did not have custody of the child sought to be adopted. In re Sidney J., 313 S.W.3d 772, 2010 Tenn. LEXIS 433 (Tenn. May 10, 2010).

Former foster mother and her new husband were not entitled to intervene in an adoption proceeding because they did not meet the requirements for adoption under T.C.A. §§ 36-1-115, 36-1-116, 36-1-120 where they did not have physical custody of the children, no home study had been conducted of their home, and the children had not resided with the new husband at all and had not resided with the former foster mother for more than 12 months. In re Devon W., — S.W.3d —, 2010 Tenn. App. LEXIS 270 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 16, 2010), review denied and ordered not published, In re Devon P.K.C., — S.W.3d —, 2010 Tenn. LEXIS 738 (Tenn. Aug. 25, 2010), cert. denied, Martin-Matera v. Tenn. Dep't of Children's Servs., 563 U.S. 989, 131 S. Ct. 2464, 179 L. Ed. 2d 1212, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 3760, 79 U.S.L.W. 3647 (U.S. 2011).

Construing the language of the adoption and termination statutory scheme, the term “physical custody” as utilized in the statutory sections would be synonymous with having physical possession of a child and would not require a court order or other judicial act; the statutory definition of custody contained in the juvenile court statutory scheme is inapplicable in the context of a termination or adoption proceeding, and physical custody means physical possession of a child, as granted by a parent, guardian, child-placing agency, or court, but physical custody as used in the statutory scheme does not include the unlawful taking of a child. In re Joseph F., 492 S.W.3d 690, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 227 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 377 (Tenn. May 10, 2016).

There is no statutory requirement that petitioners must also maintain physical custody throughout the entirety of the adoption proceeding; the foster parents had physical custody and standing at the time of filing of the adoption petition, and the department could not unilaterally defeat their standing to pursue their adoption petition simply by removing the child from their foster home. In re Neveah W., 525 S.W.3d 223, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 77 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 3, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 276 (Tenn. May 9, 2017).

2. Suspension of Custody Proceedings.

Under T.C.A. § 36-1-116(f)(2), a petition for adoption has priority over a pending custody petition filed by different parties regarding the same children, and the filing of the petition for adoption suspends the pending custody matter. In re K.A.Y., 80 S.W.3d 19, 2002 Tenn. App. LEXIS 163 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002).

3. Particular Cases.

Where a child's father was incarcerated after having received a death sentence for killing his child's mother and two others and where the child's maternal grandparents and paternal grandparents filed competing adoption petitions, the paternal grandparents did not meet the statutory adoption requirements because they did not have physical custody of the child or the right to receive custody pursuant to a valid surrender, and the court held that their monthly visitation with the child did not amount to physical custody. Although the father had executed a surrender consenting to the adoption of the child by his parents, the surrender was invalid because, to be valid, the father must have had custody of the child when he executed the document and the child was in the custody of her maternal grandparents when the father executed the surrender. Jordan v. Roberson (in re S.E.J.), — S.W.3d —, 2009 Tenn. App. LEXIS 442 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 16, 2009), rev'd, In re Sidney J., 313 S.W.3d 772, 2010 Tenn. LEXIS 433 (Tenn. May 10, 2010).

Requirements of T.C.A. §§ 36-1-116(b)(5) and 36-1-120(a)(4) did not apply when an adoption petition was filed pursuant to the exception to the physical custody requirement for intervening petitioners in T.C.A. § 36-1-115(b); accordingly, parental grandparents'  intervening petition to adopt a child that was in the physical custody of the maternal grandparents could be considered. In re Sidney J., 313 S.W.3d 772, 2010 Tenn. LEXIS 433 (Tenn. May 10, 2010).

4. Jurisdiction.

Trial court erred in ordering direct placement of the child in the legal custody of the Department of Children's Services, as nothing in the adoption statute, T.C.A. § 36-1-116(f), conferred any additional power on the chancery court to direct such placement. In re Neveah W., 470 S.W.3d 807, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 197 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 2, 2015).

Pursuant to the statute, the chancery court obtained exclusive jurisdiction of all matters pertaining to the child upon the filing of the foster parents'  adoption petition in 2014, and any proceedings seeking guardianship of the child were to be suspended pending the court's orders in the adoption proceeding. In re Neveah W., 525 S.W.3d 223, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 77 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 3, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 276 (Tenn. May 9, 2017).

Chancery court had exclusive jurisdiction over all matters pertaining to the child due to the filing of the adoption petition in 2014, and pursuant to the adoption statute, any separate proceedings seeking guardianship of the child should have been suspended pending orders in the adoption proceeding and should not have been heard until final adjudication of the adoption; the chancery court was not authorized to enter the order awarding guardianship of child to the department in the context of the surrender proceeding. In re Neveah W., 525 S.W.3d 223, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 77 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 3, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 276 (Tenn. May 9, 2017).

Trial court erred in separating grandparents'  termination and adoption actions and transferring only the termination portion of the proceedings to the juvenile court because once the grandparents filed their adoption and termination petition, the trial court acquired exclusive jurisdiction over the matter to the exclusion of all other courts, including the juvenile court. In re Tyler G., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 280 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 3, 2017).

5. Guardianship Orders.

Guardianship order pursuant to the surrender statute cannot be entered when an adoption court has previously assumed exclusive jurisdiction and any guardianship actions were thereby suspended pursuant to the adoption statute; the court interprets the surrender statute as authorizing the entry of a guardianship order only in the absence of a suspension due to a pending adoption petition, and the surrender statute entitles Tennessee Department of Children's Services to obtain the entry of an order of guardianship only in the absence of any existing suspension of guardianship proceedings pursuant to the adoption statute. In re Neveah W., 525 S.W.3d 223, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 77 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 3, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 276 (Tenn. May 9, 2017).

36-1-117. Parties to proceedings — Termination of rights of putative father — Consent of parent or guardian — Service of process.

  1. Unless the legal parent, guardian, or any putative father of the child has surrendered parental or guardianship rights to the child, executed a parental consent, or waived the person's rights pursuant to § 36-1-111(w) or (x), or unless the person's rights have been terminated by court order, such person must be made a party to the adoption proceeding or to a separate proceeding seeking termination of those rights and those rights must be terminated prior to entry of an order of adoption.
    1. If a petition has been filed to establish paternity of the child who is the subject of the adoption proceeding, the adoption court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide any paternity petition filed in the adoption proceeding or that has been transferred to it pursuant to § 36-2-307.
    2. The paternity petition shall be heard and concluded prior to any action by the adoption court to determine whether to grant the petition for adoption.
      1. The petition shall be granted if it is shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the person alleged to be the father of the child is the father of the child; provided, that the entry of such an order shall not prevent the filing and consideration of a petition pursuant to § 36-1-113.
      2. If the petition to establish paternity is granted, then the parental rights of the legal father must be terminated as provided by § 36-1-113 or as otherwise provided by law, or the legal father must execute a surrender under § 36-1-111, file a parental consent, or the legal father must co-sign the petition for adoption pursuant to subsection (f) before the court may be authorized to order an adoption of the child.
    3. If grounds for termination of parental rights do not exist, then the child's legal father shall be granted custody of the child, unless the court determines, upon clear and convincing evidence, that the legal father is unable currently to provide proper custodial care for the child, in which case the court shall make such orders as may be necessary for the child's care and supervision pursuant to § 37-1-140; or unless the child's mother's rights have not been previously terminated, in which case the court shall make a determination of the custodial status of the child between the legal father and the mother, and the court may make such other orders as are necessary to provide for the child's care and supervision. If the court determines that neither parent is suitable to provide for the care of the child, it shall make such other orders as it may determine are necessary for the child's care and supervision.
    4. If the petition to establish paternity is not granted by the court after a hearing and determination based upon subdivision (3), then the court may enter an order to that effect specifying the basis for the determination, and may proceed with the adoption proceeding without further need to terminate the rights of that putative father.
    5. The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), compiled in chapter 6, part 2 of this title, shall govern jurisdiction of the adoption court in this state if a paternity proceeding has been filed by the putative father in another state, territory, or foreign country.
  2. The parental rights of the putative father of a child who has not filed a petition to establish paternity of the child or who has not established paternity of the child who is the subject of an adoption proceeding and who meets any of the following criteria shall be terminated by surrender, parental consent, termination of parental rights pursuant to § 36-1-113, or by waiver of interest, before the court may enter an order of adoption concerning that child:
    1. The biological father of a child has filed with the putative father registry, pursuant to § 36-2-318, as described in § 36-1-113(d)(3)(A), a statement of an intent to claim paternity of the child at any time prior to or within thirty (30) days after the child's birth and has notified the registry of all address changes;
    2. [Deleted by 2018 amendment.]
    3. The biological father has claimed to the child's biological mother, or to the petitioners or their attorney, or to the department, a licensed child-placing agency, or a licensed clinical social worker who or that is involved in the care, placement, supervision, or study of the child that the biological father believes that the biological father is the father of the child; provided, that if the biological father has previously notified the department of the biological father's claim to paternity of the child pursuant to the putative father registry, § 36-2-318(e)(3), the biological father shall be subject to all the requirements for waiver of notice provisions of § 36-2-318(f)(2) and to all requirements for filing a paternity petition;
    4. The biological father is recorded on the child's birth certificate as the father of the child;
    5. The biological father is openly living with the child at the time the adoption proceeding is commenced and is holding himself out as the father of the child; provided, that if custody of the child has been removed from the biological mother by court order, notice shall be given to any man who was openly living with the child at time of the initiation of the custody or guardianship proceeding that resulted in the removal of the custody or guardianship of the child from the biological mother or biological father, if the man held himself out to be the father of the child at the time of the removal; or
    6. The biological father has entered a permanency plan under title 37, chapter 2, part 4, or under similar provisions of any other state or territory in which the biological father acknowledges paternity of the child.
    1. Other biological or legal relatives of the child or the adult are not necessary parties to the proceeding and shall not be entitled to notice of the adoption proceedings unless they are the guardian or custodian of the child or the conservator of the adult at the time the petition is filed.
    2. The legal custodian of the child or any person or entity appointed guardian of the person or property of the child pursuant to an order that does not specifically include the right to adopt or consent to the adoption of the child and that was not entered as a result of a surrender, parental consent, termination of parental rights, or finding that the child is without any living person entitled to notice pursuant to subsection (a) may only receive notice of the proceeding and may only present evidence as to the child's best interests.
  3. Any public or private agency that may have custody or complete or partial guardianship of the child and that has not given consent as provided under this part shall be made a defendant and given notice of the filing of the adoption or termination of parental or guardian rights petition filed under this part or under title 37, and shall be permitted to assert its rights to custody or guardianship of the child.
  4. When the child is related to one (1) of the petitioners or is the stepchild of the petitioner, and the legal or biological parent or parents or guardian or guardians of the child signs the adoption petition as a co-petitioner for the specific purpose, as stated in the petition, of giving consent to the adoption, no further surrender, parental consent, or termination of parental rights shall be required as to that parent or guardian, as the act of joining in the adoption petition shall be deemed a complete surrender, notwithstanding subsection (g), and no further notice or service of process need be made to that person; provided, that where the stepparent of a stepchild seeks to adopt a stepchild, the co-signing of the petition by the child's parent who is the spouse of the petitioner shall not affect the existing parent/child legal relationship between that parent and the parent's child who is the subject of the adoption petition by the stepparent of the child.
    1. A parent may sign a petition for adoption as provided by § 36-1-102 for the purpose of giving parental consent to the adoption of the parent's child by unrelated persons. The petition must state that the parent understands that the entry of an order confirming the parental consent, without revoking the parental consent prior to the entry of such order, will terminate that parent's parental rights to the child forever and that the parent will have no legal rights to custody or control of the child in the future.
    2. It is specifically and expressly declared that the act of signing the adoption petition shall not terminate the parental rights of such parent until the court where the adoption petition is filed has entered an order confirming the parental consent and until the court shall have required such parent to answer, under oath, each of the questions required of parents pursuant to § 36-1-111(b)(4).
    3. The parent signing the petition for the purpose of giving parental consent shall be provided ten (10) calendar days' written notice by the court of the appearance date for the required response to the court pursuant to § 36-1-111 before entry of the order confirming the parental consent is entered by the court. Unless the parent is disabled or the parent's appearance is impracticable as determined by the court, that parent must personally attend the hearing before the court in chambers. If the parent is disabled or the parent's appearance is impracticable as determined by the court, the answers shall be taken under oath at the parent's location by the court or by any person appointed by an order of the court to do so. If the parent executing the parental consent cannot be found or does not appear at the time of such hearing, the court may terminate that parent's rights upon any grounds available pursuant to § 36-1-113.
    4. Following the satisfactory completion of such questions, which shall be recorded on the forms required pursuant to § 36-1-111, the court shall enter an order that confirms the parental consent, and the court shall then, and only then, be authorized to enter an order terminating such parent's rights to the child who is the subject of the adoption petition; provided, that a parental consent may be revoked at any time prior to the entry of an order of confirmation of the parental consent by the court by executing a revocation form as provided in § 36-1-112, and such revocation shall negate and void the parental consent executed pursuant to this subsection (g).
    5. The death of the consenting parent or termination of parental rights of such parent by a validly executed surrender or by court action prior to the entry of the adoption order will make any requirements for the parental consent contained herein unnecessary.
    6. Upon entry of the order of confirmation, the clerk shall send certified copies of the order to the adoptions unit in the state office of the department in Nashville.
  5. The department, through any authorized person, or the executive head of such licensed child-placing agency may give consent to the adoption of the child by the petitioners for whom it holds complete or partial guardianship.
    1. When the child who is the subject of the adoption is fourteen (14) years of age or older at any time before the granting of the petition, the adoption court must receive the sworn, written consent of such child to the adoption, which shall be filed with the record, and the consent of such minor shall be recited in the order of adoption. The court shall receive the consent and testimony from the child in chambers with only the child and a guardian ad litem if required and appointed by the court for the child present.
    2. If the child is mentally disabled, the court shall appoint a guardian ad litem to give or withhold consent for the child to the adoption and the court shall follow the procedure of subdivisions (j)(2)(B) and (C).
    1. When the person sought to be adopted is eighteen (18) years of age or older, only the sworn, written consent of the person sought to be adopted shall be required and no order of reference or any home studies need be issued.
      1. If the adult person to be adopted has been adjudicated incompetent, then the written consent of the adult person's conservator shall be required.
      2. If the person is without a conservator and the court has reason to believe that the person is incompetent to give consent, then the court shall appoint a guardian ad litem who shall investigate the person's circumstances and that guardian ad litem shall give or withhold consent.
      3. The guardian ad litem shall file a written report stating the basis for the decision and the court shall afford a hearing to all parties to present evidence as to the best interests of the person, and if the court determines upon clear and convincing evidence that the decision to withhold consent by the guardian ad litem is arbitrary and is not in the best interests of the incompetent person, it may proceed to make any other orders it deems necessary for the person's welfare, including granting the adoption petition.
    2. In all other situations under this subsection (j) for adult persons who are the subject of an adoption petition, no order of reference, social investigation, report to the court by a licensed child-placing agency or licensed clinical social worker or the department, or the waiting period under § 36-1-119 shall be required.
  6. When the child has been surrendered or parental rights have been relinquished to an agency operating under the laws of another state, territory, or foreign country, or such agency has received guardianship or the right to place a child for adoption pursuant to the laws of its jurisdiction, the surrender or relinquishment, or any order terminating parental rights, and the written consent of the agency pursuant to the laws of its jurisdiction or pursuant to its procedures shall be filed with the adoption petition and shall be sufficient for the purposes of providing the necessary consent required by this part.
  7. If a person has surrendered that parent's parental rights or guardianship rights, if a person has filed a parental consent and the consent has been confirmed as provided herein, if a person has executed a waiver of interest pursuant to this part, if a person or agency has consented to the adoption of the child who is the subject of the adoption proceeding, or if a person's parental or guardianship rights to the child have been properly terminated, no notice of the adoption proceeding or service of process shall be made to that person or agency.
    1. Service of process for adoption proceedings and termination proceedings in chancery and circuit courts pursuant to this part shall be made pursuant to the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure and the statutes governing substituted service.
    2. Service of process for proceedings to terminate parental rights in juvenile court shall be pursuant to the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, unless a finding is made pursuant to Tennessee Rules of Juvenile Procedure Rule 1 that the interests of justice require otherwise, the statutory requirements of title 37, chapter 1, part 1, where not otherwise in conflict with this part, and the statutes governing substituted service.
    3. Any motion for an order for publication in these proceedings shall be accompanied by an affidavit of the petitioners or their legal counsel attesting, in detail, to all efforts to determine the identity and whereabouts of the parties against whom substituted service is sought.
    4. Service of process for juvenile court proceedings may be completed by any individual authorized to serve process under the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure or the Tennessee Rules of Juvenile Procedure, including, but not limited to, a sheriff, constable, or private process server.
  8. The court may enter a default judgment against any party to the adoption or termination proceeding upon a finding that service of process has been validly made against that party in accordance with the Tennessee Rules of Civil or Juvenile Procedure and the statutes concerning substituted service; however, in termination proceedings, proof must be presented as to legal grounds and best interest pursuant to § 36-1-113.
  9. The response or answer to a petition for termination of parental rights shall be signed by the respondent personally, sworn to and verified, and filed with the clerk of the court.

Acts 1951, ch. 202, § 7 (Williams, § 9572.21); Acts 1955, ch. 320, § 2; 1955, ch. 345, § 1; 1959, ch. 223, § 3; 1961, ch. 150, § 2; impl. am. Acts 1975, ch. 219, § 1; 1976, ch. 455, § 1; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 36-108; § 36-1-108; Acts 1995, ch. 532, § 1; 1996, ch. 1054, §§ 53-56, 113; 1997, ch. 551, §§ 57-65; 1998, ch. 1098, §§ 5-7; 2003, ch. 231, § 14; 2007, ch. 199, §§ 1, 2; 2008, ch. 1059, § 5; 2008, ch. 1162, § 1; 2010, ch. 842, § 2; 2010, ch. 849, § 1; 2016, ch. 636, § 3; 2016, ch. 919, § 13; 2018, ch. 535, § 1; 2018, ch. 875, §§ 19, 20, 32; 2019, ch. 36, §§ 29, 32-34; 2020, ch. 525, §§ 8, 9.

Compiler's Notes. Former § 36-1-117, concerning revocation of surrender, was transferred to § 36-1-112.

Amendments. The 2018 amendment by ch. 535 added (m)(4).

The 2018 amendment by ch. 875, in (c)(1), inserted “, as described in § 36-1-113(d)(3)(A)” following “pursuant to § 36-2-318”; deleted (c)(2) which read: “The biological father has been specifically identified to the petitioners or their attorney, or to the department, the licensed child-placing agency, or the licensed clinical social worker involved in the care, placement, supervision, or study of the child as the child's father by the child's biological mother in a sworn, written statement or by other information that the court determines to be credible and reliable;”; and, at the end of (g)(2), substituted “pursuant to § 36-1-111(b)(4)” for “pursuant to § 36-1-111(k), including the question regarding the contact veto required by § 36-1-111(k)(3)”.

The 2019 amendment, in (a), substituted “guardian, or any” for “or the, guardian, or, as provided in subsections (b) and (c), the”, substituted “consent, or waived” for “consent that has been confirmed by the court, has waived”, substituted “terminated by court order, such person must be made a party to the adoption proceeding or to a separate proceeding seeking termination of those rights and those rights must be terminated prior to entry of an order of adoption.” for “terminated by the order of a court of competent jurisdiction, the legal parents, guardian of the person of the child or of an adult, the biological mother, and the established father or putative father of the child must be made parties to the adoption proceeding or to a separate proceeding seeking the termination of those rights, and their rights to the child must be terminated by a court to authorize the court to order the adoption of the child or adult by other persons.”; in (d)(1), substituted “the guardian or custodian of the child or the conservator of the adult” for “legal guardians as defined in § 36-1-102 or legal custodians of the person of the child or adult”; in (j), substituted “conservator” for “guardian or conservator of the person” in (j)(2)(A); and deleted “guardian or” following “if the person is without a” in (j)(2)(B).

The 2020 amendment inserted “or any person or entity appointed guardian of the person or property of the child pursuant to an order that does not specifically include the right to adopt or consent to the adoption of the child and that was not entered as a result of a surrender, parental consent, termination of parental rights, or finding that the child is without any living person entitled to notice pursuant to subsection (a)” in (d)(2); and substituted “the parent will have no legal rights to custody or control of the child in the future” for “the parent will have no legal rights to the custody, control, or to visitation with the child in the future” in the second sentence of (g)(1).

Effective Dates. Acts 2018, ch. 535, § 3. March 7, 2018.

Acts 2018, ch. 875, § 38. July 1, 2018.

Acts 2019, ch. 36, § 35. July 1, 2019.

Acts 2020, ch. 525, § 13. March 6, 2020.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 20 Tenn. Juris., Parent and Child, §§  1, 5, 20, 21; 5 Tenn. Juris., Children out of Wedlock, § 6.

Law Reviews.

Tennessee Civil Disabilities: A Systemic Approach (Neil P. Cohen), 41 Tenn, L. Rev. 253 (1974).

When One Parent Goes and the Other Parent Stays: The Inconsistency and Inequality of Guaranteeing Absent Parents Permanent Parental Rights (Wendee M. Hilderbrand), 56 Vand. L. Rev. 1907 (2003).

Attorney General Opinions. Termination of putative father's parental rights before adoption, OAG 99-212, 1999 Tenn. AG LEXIS 186 (10/20/99).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

Even subjected to the strictest scrutiny, this section is valid because it furthers the state's compelling interest to care for minor children by removing the right to withhold consent to their adoption from parents incompetent to care for them when adoption is in the best interest of the child. State Dep't of Human Services v. Ogle, 617 S.W.2d 652, 1980 Tenn. App. LEXIS 400 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980).

The classifications drawn by this section as to who may consent to an adoption do not discriminate against persons with psychiatric illnesses, but are grounded upon competency to care for the child and the child's best interest. State Dep't of Human Services v. Ogle, 617 S.W.2d 652, 1980 Tenn. App. LEXIS 400 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980).

The requirements under this section of a showing that the parent is so incompetent and likely to so remain, as to be unable to assume the care and responsibility of their minor child and that the vesting of consensual authority in a guardian is in the best interest of the child satisfy procedural due process requirements. State Dep't of Human Services v. Ogle, 617 S.W.2d 652, 1980 Tenn. App. LEXIS 400 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980).

The standard that this section establishes for when a trial judge may vest in a guardian ad litem the authority to consent to an adoption is not unconstitutionally vague, but is as explicit as possible without making the determination rest solely upon some arbitrarily selected manifestations of competency or indications of what is in the best interest of the child; the scope of the judge's discretion is appropriate for achieving a just and proper result; no impermissible conduct is encouraged nor permissible conduct discouraged by the breadth of the trial judge's discretion; the standard is proper for carrying out the state's duty to protect minor children without unnecessarily infringing upon the rights of the parent. State Dep't of Human Services v. Ogle, 617 S.W.2d 652, 1980 Tenn. App. LEXIS 400 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980).

2. Compliance.

Juvenile court erred in terminating a father's parental rights because no permanency plan was admitted into evidence upon which the court could find that the father failed to substantially comply, the father's standing as a putative biological father precluded the application of the statutory ground of failure to legitimate one of his children, and the juvenile court had personal and subject matter jurisdiction where the father was properly served with the termination petition, he and the children were domiciled in Tennessee, he made a voluntary general appearance in order to defend the suit on the merits, and he claimed at all times to be the children's biological father. In re Cloey R., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 23 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 21, 2015).

3. Consent.

As this section was amended in 1955, it is not necessary to file a consent with the petition when the parents or guardian is made a party of record to the proceedings. In re Matthews, 203 Tenn. 161, 310 S.W.2d 185, 1957 Tenn. LEXIS 470, 1958 Tenn. LEXIS 288 (1957).

Where guardian ad litem and general guardian of incompetent father withheld consent to adoption of child, court was without authority to permit adoption of child. Adoption of Edman, 48 Tenn. App. 375, 348 S.W.2d 345, 1961 Tenn. App. LEXIS 80 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1961).

Where a child's father was incarcerated after having received a death sentence for killing his child's mother and two others and where the child's maternal grandparents and paternal grandparents filed competing adoption petitions, the paternal grandparents did not meet the statutory adoption requirements because they did not have physical custody of the child or the right to receive custody pursuant to a valid surrender, and the court held that their monthly visitation with the child did not amount to physical custody. Although the father had executed a surrender consenting to the adoption of the child by his parents, the surrender was invalid because, to be valid, the father must have had custody of the child when he executed the document and the child was in the custody of her maternal grandparents when the father executed the surrender. Jordan v. Roberson (in re S.E.J.), — S.W.3d —, 2009 Tenn. App. LEXIS 442 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 16, 2009), rev'd, In re Sidney J., 313 S.W.3d 772, 2010 Tenn. LEXIS 433 (Tenn. May 10, 2010).

Mother effectively consented to termination of her parental rights and her child's adoption because she signed and executed a notarized acknowledgment showing her intent to have her parental rights terminated and waiving her right to notice for any additional proceedings. In re Jeremiah N., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 283 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 2, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 432 (Tenn. July 21, 2017).

4. Parties.

Where child becomes a ward of, and becomes subject to, the guardianship of the department of human services (now department of children's services), it is unnecessary to make the parents parties to the proceedings and the department is the only necessary respondent to the petition. In re Matthews, 203 Tenn. 161, 310 S.W.2d 185, 1957 Tenn. LEXIS 470, 1958 Tenn. LEXIS 288 (1957).

Trial court erred in terminating a mother's parental rights where, with the exception of a stepparent, T.C.A. § 36-1-113(g)(11) unambiguously stated that the rights of both parents had to be terminated before a third party became eligible to adopt the child, the grandmother was not a stepparent under T.C.A. § 36-1-117(f), and under T.C.A. § 36-1-113(b)(1), the father and grandmother lacked standing to file an adoption petition without first terminating the rights of both parents. In re Lyric A., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 690 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 12, 2017).

5. Notice.

Natural grandparents are not entitled to notice of adoption. In re Adoption of Taylor, 678 S.W.2d 69, 1984 Tenn. App. LEXIS 2978 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984).

Under T.C.A. § 36-1-117(a) and (d), the former foster parents of children who were the subjects of an adoption petition were not entitled to notice of that petition. In re K.A.Y., 80 S.W.3d 19, 2002 Tenn. App. LEXIS 163 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002).

In a termination of parental rights proceeding, given the absence of information regarding steps taken to identify the father, an adoption agency did not carry its burden of demonstrating the diligent inquiry required by T.C.A. § 21-1-203(a) in order to use service by publication, as simply asking the birth mother if she knew the name of the father and then giving up was not sufficient; the location of the party, the name of the host of the party, the names of attendees of the party, and the type of vehicle in which the child was conceived were all obvious areas of inquiry. Adoption Place, Inc. v. Doe, 273 S.W.3d 142, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 750 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 5, 2007), appeal denied, The Adoption Place, Inc. v. Doe, — S.W.3d —, 2008 Tenn. LEXIS 90 (Tenn. Feb. 4, 2008).

6. Intervention.

There is nothing in this section that provides for the intervention of grandparents as a matter of right; however, the court would not deny a grandparent, or even a stranger, the right to intervene in a proceeding if the welfare of the child required it. In re Adoption of Taylor, 678 S.W.2d 69, 1984 Tenn. App. LEXIS 2978 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984).

Child's maternal grandparents did not establish an interest sufficient to permit intervention by right in a proceeding to terminate the parental rights of the child's parents. Despite having lived with the child, the grandparents were neither the guardian nor custodian of the child at the time the termination petition was filed. In re C.H., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 57 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2017).

7. Legal Father.

Trial court did not err in declining to terminate the father's parental rights under any of the grounds contained in this section because, based on the Tennessee Supreme Court's holding in the Bernard case, the grounds contained in this section not apply where the defendant parent was a putative biological father, as the father was in the instant case. In re Ashton B., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 188 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 15, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 512 (Tenn. July 6, 2016).

Father does not fall within any of the various meanings of the statutory words legal parent; an intent to claim paternity filed with the Putative Father Registry is not the same as a voluntary acknowledgement of paternity, and instead these are words of art, separate concepts with different meanings. In re F.N.M., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 274 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 11, 2016).

Certain grounds for termination apply to any person who is not the legal parent of such child or who is described in the statute, as in this case; when the petition to terminate his rights was filed, father was not the child's legal parent, as he filed a petition to establish paternity after the child was the subject of an adoptive proceeding, and he had not established paternity at that time and he filed an intent to claim paternity a few weeks before the child's birth, In re F.N.M., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 274 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 11, 2016).

Statute expressly provides that the termination language is not applicable to a legal parent of a child; rather, it is only applicable to a father who is described in the putative father statute. In re F.N.M., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 274 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 11, 2016).

Evidence supported the trial court's findings that a guardian was provided with enough information to qualify a father as a putative father because the mother specifically named the father in a previous court proceeding with the guardian present and gave the city and state where he lived; the guardian made no further attempt to diligently inquire into the father's whereabouts so as to provide him with service and include him in the adoption proceeding. In re Gabrielle W., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 465 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 11, 2017), review denied and ordered not published, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 737 (Tenn. Nov. 29, 2017).

8. Service by Publication.

Tennessee statutes authorize dispensing with personal service of process in a proceeding to terminate parental rights only if the defendant's residence is unknown and cannot be ascertained upon diligent inquiry, and the plaintiff has asked for an order authorizing constructive service by publication and has supported the request with an affidavit, and only when the residence of the defendant cannot be obtained through diligent inquiry may a party resort to constructive service by publication. Turner v. Turner, 473 S.W.3d 257, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 831 (Tenn. Oct. 21, 2015).

Record contained neither a motion from the father requesting an order authorizing constructive service by publication nor an affidavit describing the diligent inquiries that were made to locate the mother's whereabouts or her residence, and there was no order from the trial court authorizing constructive service by publication; the father's failure to comply with the statutory requirements necessary for resorting to constructive service by publication deprived the trial court of personal jurisdiction over the mother, and the judgment terminating the mother's parental rights was void. Turner v. Turner, 473 S.W.3d 257, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 831 (Tenn. Oct. 21, 2015).

Because the Department of Children's Services initially represented that the putative father lived at a specific address, never indicated it attempted to serve him there, and it was found that he lived at that address, constructive service by publication was not permissible. In re Stormie M., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 675 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 15, 2016).

Because a guardian failed to follow the statutory requirements of constructive service by publication, the guardian failed to properly serve a father and, therefore, deprived the trial court of personal jurisdiction over the father. In re Gabrielle W., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 465 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 11, 2017), review denied and ordered not published, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 737 (Tenn. Nov. 29, 2017).

9. Construction.

Word “putative” is not defined anywhere in this statutory scheme; therefore, the court interprets it according to its plain and ordinary meaning: regarded as such: supposed, and assumed to exist or to have once existed. In re F.N.M., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 274 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 11, 2016).

10. Putative Father.

Trial court properly found the father to be a putative father of the children because he did not file a paternity petition concerning either of the children and the trial court properly found that he was not a legal parent because he presented no evidence that he executed an unrevoked and sworn acknowledgement of paternity. He was recorded as the father on the children's birth certificates. In re Braxton M., 531 S.W.3d 708, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 454 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 5, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 639 (Tenn. Sept. 29, 2017).

Putative father for purposes of termination of parental rights was established because the putative father told the Tennessee Department of Children's Services and others that the putative father was a child's biological father. In re Victoria H., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 108 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2018).

T.C.A. § 36-1-113(g)(9)(A) was applicable to the father, as the putative biological father of the child, because he met the criteria set out at this section, as the parents testified that they were in a relationship and living together when the mother discovered that she was pregnant, they both acknowledged that the father was the child's biological father, and there was no evidence to the contrary of their acknowledgments. In re Kah'Nyia J., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 238 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2018).

Clear and convincing evidence supported the trial court's termination of a father's parental rights on the ground of failure to seek to establish paternity because despite having notice of his alleged paternity, the father failed to file a petition to establish paternity within thirty days. In re Rilyn S., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 124 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 12, 2019).

Father fell under subsection (c)(2) because, as established by an exhibit introduced at trial, the mother completed a sworn declaration days after the child's birth identifying the father as the child's likely biological father. In re Rilyn S., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 124 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 12, 2019).

11. Applicability.

Adoption statute had no application in this case because although the end goal was adoption of the child, the only remedy sought by the department was the termination of the mother's rights, and the department could be afforded complete relief without the father's participation; his rights were terminated before this trial, he had no interest to protect, and the mother failed to show that the father had to be joined. In re Josiah T., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 482 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 2, 2019).

36-1-118. Dismissal of adoption proceedings and guardianship orders — Revocation of surrender by court — Notice — Disposition of child.

  1. If at any time between the surrender of a child directly to prospective adoptive parents or a licensed child-placing agency and the filing of an adoption petition or at any time between the filing of an adoption petition and the issuance of the final order of the adoption, it is made known to the court on the basis of clear and convincing evidence that circumstances are such that the child should not be adopted, the court may dismiss the adoption proceedings or, if no adoption proceedings have been commenced, the court may order the surrender or parental consent to prospective adoptive parents to be revoked and may modify or dismiss any order of guardianship previously entered, and may order the reinstatement of parental rights, all in consideration of the best interests of the child.
  2. If it is made known to the court where the surrender of a child directly to adoptive parents was executed or filed and that, in accordance with § 36-1-111(r), has jurisdiction of the child, that the prospective adoptive parents to whom the child had been surrendered have not filed a petition to adopt the child within thirty (30) days of the date of execution of the surrender, or if the court where the adoption petition determines that the prospective adoptive parents do not have, or have not obtained, an order of guardianship or an order of legal custody for the child who is the subject of the adoption petition within thirty (30) days of the date of the filing of the petition, the court shall set a hearing for the purpose of determining if any surrender to the prospective adoptive parents should be ordered revoked, if any order of guardianship should be modified or dismissed, if an order of custody or guardianship should be entered, if parental rights should be reinstated, or if some other disposition should be made for the child in the child's best interests.
    1. Before entering an order pursuant to subsection (a) or (b) directing that the surrender directly to prospective adoptive parents or a licensed child-placing agency be revoked or that the parental consent to prospective adoptive parents be disallowed, or that the order of guardianship be modified or dismissed, that an order of custody or guardianship be entered, or that parental rights be reinstated, or before dismissing the adoption proceedings, the court must give written notice of not less than five (5) days, excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays, of its intent to do so.
    2. The notice shall be given to the persons or entity to whom the child was surrendered and for whom an order of guardianship was entered, to any petitioners and other parties to the proceeding, and to the department or licensed child-placing agency, or licensed clinical social worker that or who placed the child or conducted any studies involving the placement of the child in the home, and to the parent whose rights were terminated, but only if the court will consider reinstatement of that parent's rights.
    1. Following the hearing, the court may order the revocation of the surrender or any parental consent, modify or dismiss the order of guardianship, may enter an order of custody or guardianship, may order reinstatement of parental rights, or may dismiss the petition if it determines upon clear and convincing evidence that such action is in the child's best interests.
    2. The court may reinstate parental rights only with the consent of the parent whose rights were terminated.
    1. After the court's dismissal of the petition or after the order of revocation by the court of a surrender or parental consent, if the child had been in the legal custody or guardianship of the department or a licensed child-placing agency prior to the surrender, the parental consent, the entry of a guardianship order, or the filing of the adoption petition, the court shall enter an order directing that the child shall be placed in the guardianship of the department or the licensed child-placing agency that had legal custody or guardianship of the child immediately before the placement was made with the prospective adoptive parents or immediately before the surrender was executed or parental consent was filed or before the prior order giving guardianship to the prospective adoptive parent was entered.
    2. In all other cases in which the child was not in the legal custody or guardianship of the department or a licensed child-placing agency prior to the revocation by the court of the surrender or parental consent to prospective adoptive parents or prior to the dismissal of the guardianship order, or prior to the dismissal of the adoption proceeding by the court, or when the agency that had had custody or guardianship of the child prior to the child's placement or prior to the revocation of the surrender by the court, or dismissal of the petition cannot or will not resume guardianship or custody of the child, the child shall remain a ward of the court, which shall have jurisdiction to award the child's guardianship or legal custody according to the best interest of the child.
    3. The court shall continue to have jurisdiction of the child to make such further orders as are necessary until another adoption petition is filed, at which time jurisdiction over the child shall transfer to the court where the new adoption petition may be filed; provided, the juvenile court shall retain jurisdiction of the child for allegations of delinquency, unruliness, and truancy pursuant to title 37, chapter 1, part 1.
      1. Unless the child's custody or guardianship is required to be returned to the custody of the department or a licensed child-placing agency, or unless the court must return jurisdiction of the child to a court with prior jurisdiction, then, after entry of an order revoking the surrender or parental consent, dismissing the order of guardianship, after entry of an order of custody or guardianship, or after dismissing the petition for adoption, the court may, in its discretion, by order entered in the record, transfer all jurisdiction and wardship of the child to the juvenile court of the county of the child's residence.
        1. After the clerk has transferred to the department the information required under this part, certified copies of any records of the child needed by the juvenile court from the court where the surrender was revoked, the guardianship order was dismissed, the custody or guardianship order was entered, or the adoption petition was dismissed, shall be transferred to the juvenile court and the clerk of the court that had taken action pursuant to subsection (d) and subdivision (e)(4) shall maintain the original of the records in that court's files.
        2. Except as otherwise provided by this part, all such records shall remain confidential in the files of the juvenile court and shall not be open to any person except the child's legal custodian or legal guardian, or pursuant to a written order of the court, or to the department that may be investigating a report of child abuse or neglect or that may be responding to an order of reference by the juvenile court, or to a law enforcement agency investigating a report of child abuse or neglect or that is investigating any crime involving the child.
    4. Any order of guardianship or legal custody entered pursuant to this subsection (e) shall continue until modified by the court to which the jurisdiction is transferred or by the court where a new adoption petition is filed.
    5. If guardianship is awarded pursuant to this section, the court shall, in addition to the authority under § 37-1-140, give authority to place the child for adoption and to consent to adoption, or to adopt the child, or may give authority to surrender the child for that purpose.
    6. The department or the licensed child-placing agency receiving guardianship of the child under this section shall have authority to make another placement of the child for adoption and to consent to the adoption by new adoptive parents without further approval of the court.
    7. For purposes of this section, legal custody awarded by the court shall vest the legal custodian with the authority to provide the care and control of the child as set forth in § 37-1-140, but does not, by itself, without entry of an order of guardianship pursuant to this part, authorize the legal custodian to place the child for adoption or to consent to the adoption.
    8. Prior to entering an order establishing a permanent plan for the child who is not returned to the department or a licensed child-placing agency as provided in subdivision (e)(1), the court shall order the department or a licensed child-placing agency or licensed clinical social worker to investigate and report to the court within sixty (60) days regarding a suitable permanent plan for the child. Subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court for allegations of delinquency, unruliness, or truancy against the child pursuant to title 37, the court may make further orders of custody or guardianship upon receipt of the report.

Acts 1995, ch. 532, § 1; 2016, ch. 919, §§ 14, 15.

Compiler's Notes. Former § 36-1-118 (Acts 1951, ch. 202, § 16 (Williams, § 9572.30); 1959, ch. 223, § 7; 1961, ch. 150, § 4; 1961, ch. 264, § 1; 1971, ch. 286, § 1; impl. am. Acts 1975, ch. 219, § 1; Acts 1978, ch. 611, §§ 3, 4; 1983, ch. 435, § 6; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 36-118; Acts 1986, ch. 767, § 8; 1988, ch. 560, § 12; 1991, ch. 158, § 1), concerning investigation by the human services department or agency, was repealed by Acts 1995, ch. 532, § 1, effective January 1, 1996.

Cross-References. Confidentiality of public records, § 10-7-504.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 20 Tenn. Juris., Parent and Child, § 22.

Law Reviews.

Domestic Relations — 1959 Tennessee Survey (William J. Harbison), 12 Vand. L. Rev. 1183 (1959).

Storied Anna Mae He Decision Clarifies Law But Leaves Unanswered Questions (Christina A. Zawisza), 38 U. Mem. L. Rev. 637 (2008).

36-1-119. Final order of adoption — When entered.

  1. Unless the child is related to the petitioners, no final order of adoption shall be entered before the home study has been filed with the court and before the petition has been on file at least six (6) months and before a final court report is filed with the court, except when the order is based upon a petition for readoption pursuant to § 36-1-106.
  2. If the child is related to the petitioners, the court may, in its discretion, waive the six-month waiting period, the orders of reference, the preliminary home study and home study, the order of guardianship or custody, and the final court report and may proceed to immediately grant an order of adoption.
  3. If the child has already resided in the home of the petitioners for six (6) months, the court has received the final court report concerning the circumstances of the child and the petitioners, and is satisfied that the adoption will be in the best interest of the child, the court may waive the six-month waiting period after the filing of the adoption petition and may enter an order of adoption.
  4. If no appeal has been taken from any order of the court, the court must complete or dismiss the adoption proceeding by entering a final order within one (1) year of the filing of the petition, unless the petitioner shows good cause why such final order should not be entered.
  5. If an appeal is taken from an order of the court, the proceeding must be completed by the court by entering a final order of adoption or a final order dismissing the proceeding within nine (9) months from the final judgment upon appeal, except for good cause shown by the petitioner.

Acts 1951, ch. 202, § 21 (Williams, § 9572.35); Acts 1955, ch. 320, § 4; 1959, ch. 223, § 9; 1961, ch. 150, § 5; impl. am. Acts 1975, ch. 219, § 1; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 36-124; Acts 1989, ch. 229, § 1; 1992, ch. 994, § 1; T.C.A., § 36-1-124; Acts 1995, ch. 532, § 1; 1996, ch. 1054, § 57; 2006, ch. 890, § 3.

Compiler's Notes. Former § 36-1-119 (Acts 1951, ch. 202, § 17 (Williams, § 9572.31); T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 36-119), concerning interlocutory decrees, was repealed by Acts 1995, ch. 532, § 1, effective January 1, 1996.

Acts 2006, ch. 890, § 1 provided that the provisions of the act may be collectively known as the “Child Protection Act of 2006.”

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 20 Tenn. Juris., Parent and Child, § 22.

Law Reviews.

When One Parent Goes and the Other Parent Stays: The Inconsistency and Inequality of Guaranteeing Absent Parents Permanent Parental Rights (Wendee M. Hilderbrand), 56 Vand. L. Rev. 1907 (2003).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Nature and Construction of Statute.

This section must be complied with in order to effect a legal adoption. Clements v. Morgan, 201 Tenn. 94, 296 S.W.2d 874, 1956 Tenn. LEXIS 470 (1956).

The provision that no final decree shall be entered for six months after filing the petition for adoption does not apply to adoptions under subsection (c). In re Adoption of Jackson, 211 Tenn. 289, 364 S.W.2d 906, 1963 Tenn. LEXIS 350 (1963).

A final order of adoption is subject to the provisions of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 that provide that fraud or undue influence are good grounds for vacating an adoption order; however, the physical and emotional welfare of all parties requires assurance of the finality of the adoption order. Therefore, after a final adoption order is entered, a natural parent who consented to the adoption must present clear and convincing evidence in order to set aside the adoption order. In re Bishop, 678 S.W.2d 471, 1984 Tenn. App. LEXIS 2925 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984).

2. Failure to Enter Final Order Within Statutory Period.

Where final order of adoption was not entered within two years of the filing of the petition for adoption, adoption was properly denied and custody of child could be awarded to department of welfare (now department of children's services) on intervening petition. Clements v. Morgan, 201 Tenn. 94, 296 S.W.2d 874, 1956 Tenn. LEXIS 470 (1956).

Circuit court erred in dismissing a petition filed by a maternal aunt and uncle (petitioners) for adoption and termination of parental rights because although the adoption proceeding was not completed within one year of the filing of the petition, the petitioners showed good cause why the petition should not be dismissed inasmuch as they took steps to have the case set for trial within one year of the filing of the petition, the purported father insisted upon a setting of three consecutive days, which impacted the dates upon which trial could be set, and the trial was delayed two other times, again through no fault of the petitioners. In re Halley M., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 633 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 19, 2017).

36-1-120. Final order of adoption — Contents — Report of foreign birth.

  1. The final order of adoption must state:
    1. The full name of the child used in the proceeding;
    2. The full names of the petitioners and their county of residence and whether the petitioner is a stepparent of the adopted person;
    3. The fact and date of the filing of the petition;
    4. The date when the petitioners acquired physical custody of the child and from what person or agency or by which court order;
    5. The fact and date of the filing of a guardianship order, if such order has been entered;
      1. That all persons entitled to notice of the proceedings have been served with process and the status of those persons in the proceedings and that all necessary parties were properly before the court;
      2. That the time for answering the petition has expired;
      3. That termination of all parental or guardian rights to the child by court order or surrenders or parental consents that are necessary to proceed with the adoption have occurred; and
      4. That orders reflecting the termination of parental rights pursuant to actions filed by the prospective adoptive parents, orders confirming parental consents, or the consents of the department or a licensed child-placing agency with authority to place and consent to the child's adoption, the consent of the child who is over fourteen (14) years of age, the consent of the guardian ad litem of an incompetent adult or mentally disabled child, or of any other person or entity required by law have been filed in the court record;
    6. That if the child has been brought into Tennessee from another state or foreign country, there has been compliance with the ICPC, if applicable, or with the requirements of the foreign government or legal authorities in the foreign country for the petitioners to have custody of the child and with all requirements of the United States government for the immigration of the child to this country, unless good cause has been shown to excuse such compliance;
    7. That the child's adoption is in compliance with or is not subject to the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.);
    8. Whether the child has been the subject of an adoption decree in a foreign country in which the petitioners were given the child in adoption by such decree and whether this adoption is a readoption for the purpose of complying with the requirements of the United States government for the purposes of the child's immigration or naturalization;
    9. That the petitioners are fit persons to have the care and custody of the child;
    10. That the petitioners are financially able to provide for the child;
    11. That the child is a suitable child for adoption; and
    12. That the adoption is for the best interest of the child.
  2. Before the entry of the final order, there shall be filed with the proposed order:
    1. An affidavit by the attorney for the petitioners detailing the fees charged for any services rendered in the placement of the child or for legal services, and any fees paid by the attorney to any other person or entity for services rendered in securing the placement of the child or for providing any services related to securing any home studies to secure a surrender or adoption of the child; and
    2. An affidavit by the licensed child-placing agency or licensed clinical social worker that or who placed the child with the petitioners regarding the fees charged by such agency or social worker to the adoptive parents for the placement of the child and for any home studies and supervision of the placement conducted by the licensed child-placing agency or by the licensed clinical social worker.
  3. The court shall review the affidavits required in subsection (b) and shall determine whether all fees set forth therein are reasonable. The court shall retroactively approve such fees or order reimbursement of any fees it determines to be unreasonable.
  4. The court shall, if satisfied that all the requirements necessary for the adoption of the child are present, thereupon decree the adoption of the child by the petitioners and shall order that the name of the child be changed to that requested by the petitioners.
  5. The clerk of the court shall furnish the department a certified copy of all final orders of adoption and the affidavits required under subsection (b) or final orders dismissing the adoption proceedings, and the department shall record pertinent information from the order, and the department shall maintain a copy of the order with all other information in the sealed adoption record.
    1. All final orders of adoption shall be reported by the clerk to the division of vital records of the department of health by sending a certified copy of the order or a certified certificate of adoption, and by reporting the information required by that division for a new certificate of birth or for a Report of Foreign Birth for the child to the registrar of the division of vital records for preparation of a new certificate of birth by adoption or for a Report of Foreign Birth as provided in §§ 68-3-310 — 68-3-313.
    2. The court clerk shall supply the registrar of the division of vital records the following information for the preparation of a Report of Foreign Birth if the child who has been adopted was born in a foreign country:
      1. The full adoptive name of the child;
      2. The adopted child's date of birth;
      3. The adopted child's sex;
      4. The city, province and country of the adopted child's birth;
      5. The full name of the adoptive father;
      6. The full maiden name of the adoptive mother; and
      7. The legal residence of the adoptive parents.
  6. Costs for furnishing certified copies under subsections (e) and (f) shall be taxed to the petitioners.
  7. Notwithstanding the sealing and confidentiality of adoption records pursuant to this part, the clerk of the court in which adoption proceedings have occurred, upon being furnished verification of the identity of the requesting person, shall furnish to the adopted person, adoptive parents or their attorney or attorneys, upon their request at any time, certified copies of the final order of adoption or readoption or final orders dismissing such adoption proceedings. Nothing other than certified copies of the final order of adoption or readoption or final order dismissing such adoption proceedings shall be released pursuant to this subsection (h).

Acts 1951, ch. 202, § 22 (Williams, § 9572.36); Acts 1959, ch. 223, § 10; impl. am. Acts 1975, ch. 219, § 1; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 36-125; § 36-1-125; Acts 1995, ch. 532, § 1; 1996, ch. 1054, § 128; 2003, ch. 231, § 15.

Compiler's Notes. Former § 36-1-120 (Acts 1951, ch. 202, § 18 (Williams, § 9572.32); T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 36-120.), concerning disposition of a child following an interlocutory decree, was repealed by Acts 1995, ch. 532, § 1, effective January 1, 1996.

Cross-References. Confidentiality of public records, § 10-7-504.

Law Reviews.

When One Parent Goes and the Other Parent Stays: The Inconsistency and Inequality of Guaranteeing Absent Parents Permanent Parental Rights (Wendee M. Hilderbrand), 56 Vand. L. Rev. 1907 (2003).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Construction.

Former foster mother and her new husband were not entitled to intervene in an adoption proceeding because they did not meet the requirements for adoption under T.C.A. §§ 36-1-115, 36-1-116, 36-1-120 where they did not have physical custody of the children, no home study had been conducted of their home, and the children had not resided with the new husband at all and had not resided with the former foster mother for more than 12 months. In re Devon W., — S.W.3d —, 2010 Tenn. App. LEXIS 270 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 16, 2010), review denied and ordered not published, In re Devon P.K.C., — S.W.3d —, 2010 Tenn. LEXIS 738 (Tenn. Aug. 25, 2010), cert. denied, Martin-Matera v. Tenn. Dep't of Children's Servs., 563 U.S. 989, 131 S. Ct. 2464, 179 L. Ed. 2d 1212, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 3760, 79 U.S.L.W. 3647 (U.S. 2011).

Statutory scheme requires that the final order of adoption state the date the petitioners acquired physical custody and from what person or agency or by which court order; the use of the disjunctive word “or” suggests that physical custody can occur by virtue of an order of the court but that a court order is not required. In re Joseph F., 492 S.W.3d 690, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 227 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 377 (Tenn. May 10, 2016).

Construing the language of the adoption and termination statutory scheme, the term “physical custody” as utilized in the statutory sections would be synonymous with having physical possession of a child and would not require a court order or other judicial act; the statutory definition of custody contained in the juvenile court statutory scheme is inapplicable in the context of a termination or adoption proceeding, and physical custody means physical possession of a child, as granted by a parent, guardian, child-placing agency, or court, but physical custody as used in the statutory scheme does not include the unlawful taking of a child. In re Joseph F., 492 S.W.3d 690, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 227 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 377 (Tenn. May 10, 2016).

2. Physical Custody.

Although grandparent petitioners were not required to comply with the physical custody requirement before filing an intervening petition for adoption, T.C.A. §§ 36-1-116(f)(1) and 36-1-120(a)(4) require that petitioners have physical custody or the right to receive custody of the child pursuant to a valid surrender; therefore, notwithstanding T.C.A. § 36-1-120, the trial court did not err in refusing to allow grandparents to pursue their intervening petition for adoption where it was undisputed that grandparents had neither physical custody of the child nor the right to receive custody. In re M.J.S., 44 S.W.3d 41, 2000 Tenn. App. LEXIS 704 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000).

Requirements of T.C.A. §§ 36-1-116(b)(5) and 36-1-120(a)(4) did not apply when an adoption petition was filed pursuant to the exception to the physical custody requirement for intervening petitioners in T.C.A. § 36-1-115(b); accordingly, parental grandparents'  intervening petition to adopt a child that was in the physical custody of the maternal grandparents could be considered. In re Sidney J., 313 S.W.3d 772, 2010 Tenn. LEXIS 433 (Tenn. May 10, 2010).

3. Particular Cases.

Evidence did not preponderate against a trial court's findings that a child's paternal grandparents were fit, that they were capable of providing for the child financially, and that the child's best interests would be served by granting their petition to adopt her pursuant to T.C.A. § 36-1-120(a)(10), (11), (13); the best interests of the child were considered based on the statutory factors pursuant to T.C.A. § 36-6-106(a). In re Sidney J., 313 S.W.3d 772, 2010 Tenn. LEXIS 433 (Tenn. May 10, 2010).

Dismissal of maternal grandparents'  complaint was appropriate because, although the grandparents were allowed to intervene when a parent surrendered parental rights to the parent's minor child to adoptive parents, the grandparents failed to present clear and convincing evidence that the child's best interest was served by taking the child away from the adoptive parents. In re R.S.M., 466 S.W.3d 766, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 93 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2015), appeal denied, In re Rebecca M., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 479 (Tenn. June 11, 2015).

Parties referenced no authority that reversible error existed relative to a trial court's entry of the order granting adoption concomitant with entry of the order terminating parental rights. In re Joseph F., 492 S.W.3d 690, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 227 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 377 (Tenn. May 10, 2016).

36-1-121. Effect of adoption on relationship.

  1. The signing of a final order of adoption terminates any existing guardianship orders and establishes from that date the relationship of parent and child between the adoptive parent or parents and the adopted child as if the adopted child had been born to the adoptive parent or parents and the adopted child shall be deemed the lawful child of such parent or parents, the same as if the child had been born to the parent or parents, for all legal consequences and incidents of the biological relation of parents and children.
  2. The adopted child and the child's descendants shall be capable of inheriting and otherwise receiving title to real and personal property from the adoptive parents and their descendants, and of succeeding to the rights of either such parent or such parent's descendants in such property, whether created by will, by other instrument or by law, including, but not limited to, taking as a beneficiary of a remainder interest following a life interest or estate in either such parent or such parent's ancestor or descendant. The adopted child shall have the same such rights as to lineal and collateral kindred of either adoptive parent and the ancestors or descendants of such kindred, as the adoptive child has as to such parent, and the lineal and collateral kindred of either adoptive parent and the descendants of such kindred shall have the same such rights as to the adopted child and the child's descendants, but only as to property of the adopted child acquired after the child's adoption.
  3. In the construction of any instrument, whether will, deed, or otherwise, whether executed before or after August 24, 1995, and whether the testator or other party creating an interest by such instrument died before or after August 24, 1995, or before or after an adoption, a child so adopted and the descendants of such child are deemed included within the class created by any limitation contained in such instrument restricting a devise, bequest or conveyance to the lawful heirs, issue, children, descendants, or the like, as the case may be, of the adoptive parent, or of an ancestor or descendant of one (1) of them, and such adopted child shall be treated as a member of such class unless a contrary intention clearly shall appear by the terms of such instrument or unless the particular estate so limited shall have vested in interest and in possession in and as to the person or persons entitled thereto on August 24, 1995; provided, that this sentence shall not apply in the construction of any instrument as to any child who is over twenty-one (21) years of age at the time of such child's adoption.
  4. “Contrary intention clearly shall appear,” as set forth in this section, shall not be found by any court to exist by use in such instrument of such terms as “issue,” “children” or similar legal terms, unless the instrument specifically states that adopted children are to be excluded from such class.
  5. An adopted child shall not inherit real or personal property from a biological parent or relative thereof when the relationship between them has been terminated by final order of adoption, nor shall such biological parent or relative thereof inherit from the adopted child. Notwithstanding subsection (a), if a parent of a child dies without the relationship of parent and child having been previously terminated and any other person thereafter adopts the child, the child's right of inheritance from or through the deceased biological parent or any relative thereof shall be unaffected by the adoption.
  6. A final order of adoption of a child cannot require the adoptive parent to permit visitation by any other person, nor can the final order of adoption place any conditions on the adoption of the child by the adoptive parent. This statute does not prohibit the entry of an order enforcing or modifying a contract for post-adoption contact pursuant to § 36-1-145.
  7. The adoption of a child shall have no effect upon arrearages owed by an obligor of child support for that child that existed prior to the termination of parental rights or to that child's adoption and that are owed by an obligor to any person or any governmental agency, nor shall it affect any other financial obligations of a person that may be related to the care of the adopted child prior to a surrender, termination of parental rights, or adoption involving that child.

Acts 1951, ch. 202, § 23 (Williams, § 9572.37); Acts 1955, ch. 302, §§ 1, 2; 1957, ch. 345, § 1; 1968, ch. 406, § 1; 1976, ch. 751, § 1; 1983, ch. 432, §§ 1-4; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 36-126; Acts 1992, ch. 994, § 4; 1995, ch. 532, § 1; 2019, ch. 35, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Former § 36-1-121 (Acts 1951, ch. 202, § 19 (Williams, § 9572.33); T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 36-121; Acts 1988, ch. 560, § 12; 1991, ch. 158, § 2), concerning supervision of children in adoptive homes, was repealed by Acts 1995, ch. 532, § 1, effective January 1, 1996.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment, in (f), in the first sentence, substituted “A final order of adoption of a child cannot require the adoptive parent to permit” for “The adoptive parents of a child shall not be required by any order of the adoption court to permit”, substituted “nor can the final order of adoption place” for “nor shall the order of the adoption court place”, and deleted “parents” from the end; and rewrote the second sentence, which read: “Any provision in an order of the court or in any written agreement or contract between the parent or guardian of the child and the adoptive parents requiring visitation or otherwise placing any conditions on the adoption shall be void and of no effect whatsoever; provided, that nothing under this part shall be construed to prohibit “open adoptions” where the adoptive parents permit, in their sole discretion, the parent or guardian of the child who surrendered the child or whose rights to the child were otherwise terminated, or the siblings or other persons related to the adopted child, to visit or otherwise continue or maintain a relationship with the adopted child; and provided further, that the permission or agreement to permit visitation or contact shall not, in any manner whatsoever, establish any enforceable rights in the parent or guardian, the siblings or other related persons.”

Effective Dates. Acts 2019, ch. 35, § 4. March 22, 2019.

Textbooks. Pritchard on Wills and Administration of Estates (5th ed., Phillips and Robinson), § 838.

Tennessee Jurisprudence, 20 Tenn. Juris., Parent and Child, §§ 20, 23–25; 25 Tenn. Juris., Wills, §§  103, 112; 9 Tenn. Juris., Descent and Distribution, § 11.

Law Reviews.

Decedent's Estates: The Rights of Adopted Persons Under Tennessee's Descent and Distribution and Adoption Statutes to Take by Intestate Succession or by Will or Trust, 22 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 339 (1992).

New-Age Babies and Age-Old Laws: The Need for an Intent-Based Approach in Tennessee to Preserve Parent-Child Succession for Children of Assisted Reproductive Technology (Jane Marie Lewis), 43 U. Mem. L. Rev. 479 (2012).

Siblings in Law (Jill Elaine Hasday), 65 Vand. L. Rev. 897 (2012).

When One Parent Goes and the Other Parent Stays: The Inconsistency and Inequality of Guaranteeing Absent Parents Permanent Parental Rights (Wendee M. Hilderbrand), 56 Vand. L. Rev. 1907 (2003).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Construction.

The adoption statutes are in derogation of common law and must be strictly construed. Delamotte v. Stout, 207 Tenn. 406, 340 S.W.2d 894, 1960 Tenn. LEXIS 472 (1960); Black v. Washam, 57 Tenn. App. 601, 421 S.W.2d 647, 1967 Tenn. App. LEXIS 250 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1967).

A final decree of adoption that affirmatively denies to the adoptive parents the same custody and control of the child possessed of natural parents and grants visitation rights to the natural parents is not only violative of the letter of the law embodied in the statutes heretofore mentioned, but is also violative of the primary purpose of the chapter as set forth in T.C.A. § 36-1-101(a). In re Adoption of Dearing, 572 S.W.2d 929, 1978 Tenn. App. LEXIS 309 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1978).

The result contemplated by statute is that when an adoption is granted, the natural parent is reduced to the role of a complete stranger and has no rights, parental, visitation or other insofar as the child is concerned. In re Adoption of Dearing, 572 S.W.2d 929, 1978 Tenn. App. LEXIS 309 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1978).

Pursuant to T.C.A. § 36-6-306(d)(1), in spite of the adoption statute, T.C.A. § 36-1-121, if a relative or stepparent adopts the child, then the grandparent visitation statute, T.C.A. § 36-6-306, as opposed to the adoption statute, is the controlling statute. Lovlace v. Copley, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 74 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 3, 2012), rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 136 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 22, 2012), rev'd, 418 S.W.3d 1, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 718 (Tenn. Sept. 6, 2013).

Appellate court erred by reversing a judgment granting a set of grandparents visitation because they had standing to bring suit as they met the definition of a grandparent under T.C.A. § 36-6-306(e) and the adoption of the child did not extinguish their previously granted visitation rights. Lovlace v. Copley, 418 S.W.3d 1, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 718 (Tenn. Sept. 6, 2013).

2. Constitutional Rights.

Adoptive parents are entitled to the same constitutional protection of parenting decisions as natural parents. Simmons v. Simmons, 900 S.W.2d 682, 1995 Tenn. LEXIS 271 (Tenn. 1995).

3. “Or the Like.”

The expression “bodily issue” is not included in the statutory words, “or the like” because “bodily issue” is not synonymous or “ejusdem generis” or “sui generis” with the words, “lawful heirs,” “issue,” “children” or “descendants” mentioned in the statute. Third Nat'l Bank v. Stevens, 755 S.W.2d 459, 1988 Tenn. App. LEXIS 246 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988).

4. Conflicts of Law.

Child adopted under laws of Missouri could not inherit real and personal property in Tennessee from deceased sister of adopting parent even though Missouri statute so provided. Delamotte v. Stout, 207 Tenn. 406, 340 S.W.2d 894, 1960 Tenn. LEXIS 472 (1960).

5. Rights Under Federal Employer's Liability Act.

Where divorce decree awarded weekly sum for care, support and maintenance of minor child, the subsequent adoption of such child by the second husband of the wife ended the force of such decree and therefore motion to have such child share in proceeds received under Federal Employer's Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § 51, upon decease of first husband was overruled. Smelser v. Southern R. Co., 148 F. Supp. 891, 1956 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2359 (D. Tenn. 1956), aff'd, Meadors v. Smelser, 244 F.2d 719, 1957 U.S. App. LEXIS 3146 (6th Cir. Tenn. Mar. 22, 1957).

6. Inheritance by Adopted Child.

Where member of a class took a vested interest in land upon death of testator under T.C.A. § 32-3-104 but died during lifetime of life tenant, adopted son of such member took father's share from father even though not himself a member of class. Walker v. Applebury, 218 Tenn. 91, 400 S.W.2d 865, 1965 Tenn. LEXIS 510, 1966 Tenn. LEXIS 551 (1965), overruled in part, Rutherford County v. Wilson, 121 S.W.3d 591, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 1023 (Tenn. 2003).

The act of adoption does not make the person adopted the “next of kin or heir” to relatives of the adopting parents. Black v. Washam, 57 Tenn. App. 601, 421 S.W.2d 647, 1967 Tenn. App. LEXIS 250 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1967).

In the absence of an intent to the contrary, the word “issue” does not include a child adopted after the death of the testator. Banovic v. Davis, 642 S.W.2d 153, 1982 Tenn. App. LEXIS 426 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982), superseded by statute as stated in, Calhoun v. Campbell, 763 S.W.2d 744, 1988 Tenn. LEXIS 270 (Tenn. 1988).

As the testator intended that his will should be construed under the law prevailing at the time of his death in 1939, the terms of his testamentary trust did not include, as “lineal descendants,” adopted children of collateral relatives of the testator who were the primary beneficiaries. Calhoun v. Campbell, 763 S.W.2d 744, 1988 Tenn. LEXIS 270 (Tenn. 1988).

Absent an adoption statute to the contrary in effect at the time of a deed, adopted children are not included in the words, “bodily heirs.” Third Nat'l Bank v. Stevens, 755 S.W.2d 459, 1988 Tenn. App. LEXIS 246 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988).

The use by testator of the words “bodily issue” so clearly excluded adopted children that the “contrary intent” against inclusion of adopted children clearly appeared by the terms of the instrument. Third Nat'l Bank v. Stevens, 755 S.W.2d 459, 1988 Tenn. App. LEXIS 246 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988).

Court of appeals rejected representatives attempt to disparage a daughter on the ground that she was adopted and not born to the decedent because any attempt to question the daughter's ability to inherit from the decedent as a result of her adoption was misplaced and in derogation of established law in the State. In re Estate of Aslinger, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 271 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 17, 2018).

7. Inheritance from Adoptive Child.

Collateral heirs of an adoptive parent could not inherit from adoptive child who died without surviving wife, child or blood kin. Black v. Washam, 57 Tenn. App. 601, 421 S.W.2d 647, 1967 Tenn. App. LEXIS 250 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1967).

8. Statutes Governing Inheritance.

Adoption statutes in force at time of death of intestate and not those in force at time of the adoption governed relative to the question of descent and distribution. Black v. Washam, 57 Tenn. App. 601, 421 S.W.2d 647, 1967 Tenn. App. LEXIS 250 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1967).

9. Wrongful Death Actions.

The adoptive mother of a minor, whose adoptive father predeceased him, is a legal beneficiary of such minor in an action for his wrongful death. Harmon v. Wolfe, 253 F. Supp. 577, 1965 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6906 (E.D. Tenn. 1965).

10. Effect of Adoption on Other Proceedings.

Maternal grandmother's appeal of an order denying her petition for custody of three minor children was dismissed where although she had parented the children for a significant period of time, she never possessed any constitutional rights to the children, the children had since been adopted, and thus, any issues related to the petition for custody were rendered moot. In re Michael B.M., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 51 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 29, 2016).

36-1-122. Binding effect of adoption.

  1. When a child is adopted pursuant to this part, the adoptive parents shall not thereafter be deprived of any rights in the child, at the insistence of the child's biological or prior legal parents or guardian of the child or any other person or agency except in the same manner and for the same causes as are applicable in proceedings to deprive biological or legal parents or guardians of their children or wards as provided by law.
    1. After the final order of adoption is entered, no party to an adoption proceeding, nor anyone claiming under such party, may later question the validity of the adoption proceeding by reason of any defect or irregularity therein, jurisdictional or otherwise, but shall be fully bound by the order, except for such appeal as may be allowed by law.
    2. In no event, for any reason, shall an adoption be overturned by any court or collaterally attacked by any person or entity after one (1) year from the date of entry of the final order of adoption by a court of competent jurisdiction. This provision is intended as a statute of repose.
    3. The failure of the clerk of the court, the department, a licensed child-placing agency, or a licensed clinical social worker to perform any of the duties or acts with the time requirements of this part shall not affect the validity of any adoption proceeding.

Acts 1951, ch. 202, §§ 27, 30 (Williams, §§ 9572.41, 9572.44); impl. am. Acts 1975, ch. 219, § 1; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 36-127; § 36-1-127; Acts 1995, ch. 532, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Former § 36-1-122 (Acts 1951, ch. 202, § 29 (Williams, § 9572.43); T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 36-122), concerning guardians, was repealed by Acts 1995, ch. 532, § 1, effective January 1, 1996.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 20 Tenn. Juris., Parent and Child, §§ 21, 22.

Law Reviews.

A Critical Survey of Developments in Tennessee Family Law in 1976-77, V. Children (Neil P. Cohen), 45 Tenn. L. Rev. 451 (1978).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Purposes of Section.

The policy behind this provision is clearly expressed in § 36-1-101. Brown v. Raines, 611 S.W.2d 594, 1980 Tenn. App. LEXIS 407 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980).

2. Validity of Decree.

A final decree of adoption that affirmatively denies to the adoptive parents the same custody and control of the child possessed of natural parents and grants visitation rights to the natural parents is not only violative of the letter of the law embodied in the statutes heretofore mentioned, but is also violative of the primary purpose of the part as set forth in § 36-1-101(a). In re Adoption of Dearing, 572 S.W.2d 929, 1978 Tenn. App. LEXIS 309 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1978).

3. Right of Natural Parent.

The result contemplated by statute is that when an adoption is granted, the natural parent is reduced to the role of a complete stranger and has no rights, parental, visitation or other insofar as the child is concerned. In re Adoption of Dearing, 572 S.W.2d 929, 1978 Tenn. App. LEXIS 309 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1978).

4. Compliance with Statutory Requirements.

The supreme court has established the requirement of strict compliance with the adoption statutes in the context of the appellate review of the action of the lower courts. This requirement does not apply, however, when a final decree of adoption, no longer subject to appeal, is attacked either collaterally or by an independent action in equity for relief from a judgment. Brown v. Raines, 611 S.W.2d 594, 1980 Tenn. App. LEXIS 407 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980).

5. —Effect of Failure to Comply.

A final adoption decree is res judicata, notwithstanding failure to strictly comply with the requirements of this section. Brown v. Raines, 611 S.W.2d 594, 1980 Tenn. App. LEXIS 407 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980).

6. Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction.

T.C.A. § 36-1-122(b)(1) does not bar an attack on an adoption order entered by a court lacking subject matter jurisdiction. In re Hatcher, 16 S.W.3d 792, 1999 Tenn. App. LEXIS 832 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999).

Under T.C.A. § 36-1-122(b)(2), if the court does not have subject matter jurisdiction, the order may be attacked even beyond the one year period; this result is more consistent with the traditional view that a judgment rendered without subject matter jurisdiction may be attacked at any time. In re Hatcher, 16 S.W.3d 792, 1999 Tenn. App. LEXIS 832 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999).

36-1-123. Biological parents illegally obtaining custody of a child — Custodial interference — Survival of existing restraining order.

  1. Any biological or prior legal parents or guardian whose rights to a child have been terminated by order of any court under this part or any other title or by the laws of any other state or territory, or foreign country, or by a surrender, parental consent, or waiver of interest, and who shall, otherwise than by legal process, obtain custody of the child shall be in violation of and shall be subject to prosecution pursuant to § 39-13-306.
  2. A restraining order or order of protection that restrains any person from contacting or otherwise interfering with a child and that is entered prior to the finalization of the adoption shall survive the adoption of the child unless such order is expressly set aside by the court that entered the order or the court hearing the adoption. Actions to enforce such order post-adoption may be brought in the court that issued the order or in the court hearing the adoption.

Acts 1951, ch. 202, § 32 (Williams, § 9572.46); T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 36-133; § 36-1-132; Acts 1995, ch. 532, § 1; 2016, ch. 919, § 17.

Compiler's Notes. Former § 36-1-123 (Acts 1951, ch. 202, § 20 (Williams, § 9572.34); 1959, ch. 223, § 8; impl. am. Acts 1975, ch. 219, § 1; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 36-123), concerning dismissal of adoption proceedings, was repealed by Acts 1995, ch. 532, § 1, effective January 1, 1996.

Cross-References. Kidnapping, title 39, ch. 13, part 3.

Missing Children Recovery Act, title 37, ch. 10, part 2.

36-1-124. Contested terminations of parental rights and adoptions — Appeals — Expedited schedule.

  1. In all cases where the termination of parental rights or adoption of a child is contested by any person or agency, the trial court shall, consistent with due process, expedite the contested termination or adoption proceeding by entering such scheduling orders as are necessary to ensure that the case is not delayed, and such case shall be given priority in setting a final hearing of the proceeding and shall be heard at the earliest possible date over all other civil litigation other than child protective services cases arising under title 37, chapter 1, parts 1, 4 and 6.
  2. In all cases that are appealed from the decision of a trial court, the appellate court shall, consistent with its rules, expedite the contested termination of parental rights or adoption case by entering such scheduling orders as are necessary to ensure that the case is not delayed, and such case shall be given priority over all other civil litigation in reaching a determination on the status of the adoption, other than child protective services cases arising under title 37, chapter 1, parts 1, 4 and 6.
  3. It is the intent of the general assembly that the permanency of the placement of a child who is the subject of a termination of parental rights proceeding or an adoption proceeding not be delayed any longer than is absolutely necessary consistent with the rights of all parties, but that the rights of the child to permanency at the earliest possible date be given priority over all other civil litigation other than child protective services cases arising under title 37, chapter 1, parts 1, 4 and 6.
  4. [Deleted by 2018 amendment.]

Acts 1995, ch. 532, § 1; 2016, ch. 919, § 16; 2018, ch. 875, § 35.

Compiler's Notes. Former § 36-1-124, concerning final orders of adoption, was transferred to § 36-1-119.

Amendments. The 2018 amendment deleted former (d) which read: “Any notice of appeal filed in a termination of parental rights action shall be signed by the appellant.”

Effective Dates. Acts 2018, ch. 875, § 38. July 1, 2018.

Law Reviews.

Storied Anna Mae He Decision Clarifies Law But Leaves Unanswered Questions (Christina A. Zawisza), 38 U. Mem. L. Rev. 637 (2008).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Delay in Preparation of Record.

In a termination of parental rights case, juvenile court did not abuse discretion when it denied mother a continuance because appellate court was unable to review the record on appeal regarding mother's motion for continuance to determine what specific grounds were raised in the motion, and mother admitted in her brief that her current counsel had 45 business days prior to trial to prepare. State Dep't of Children's Servs. v. V.N., 279 S.W.3d 306, 2008 Tenn. App. LEXIS 645 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 27, 2008), appeal denied, State v. V.N., — S.W.3d —, 2009 Tenn. LEXIS 77 (Tenn. Jan. 16, 2009).

2. Denial of Continuance Appropriate.

Termination of the mother's parental rights was appropriate because, given no specifics as to what the mother had expected or had even hoped to achieve by further delaying the termination hearing, the evidence did not preponderate against the denial of the mother's motion to continue the hearing below. In re Ashley M., — S.W.3d —, 2009 Tenn. App. LEXIS 649 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 29, 2009).

In proceedings to terminate a mother's parental rights, a juvenile court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the mother's motion for a continuance because although the mother left a message telling her attorney that she was in a hospital emergency room when the trial commenced, the mother's attorney and the juvenile court were unable to verify the mother's excuse for her failure to appear, and the mother failed to provide any proof in support of her claimed excuse. In re Zacharias T. M., 403 S.W.3d 212, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 791 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 13, 2012), appeal denied, In re Zacharias M., — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 306 (Tenn. Mar. 12, 2013).

In light of the Tennessee Legislature's specific instruction to expedite termination proceedings, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a parent's attempts to continue the proceeding. In re Hailey S., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 380 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 31, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 156 (Tenn. Mar. 1, 2017).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied a mother's motion for a second continuance because the legislature's clear directive was to expedite contested parental termination proceedings, and the trial court granted the mother an initial continuance for nearly eight months; the record indicated nothing that would have prevented the mother from attending trial. In re D.T., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 292 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 24, 2018).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a mother's motion for a continuance of a termination of parental rights proceeding because, although the mother claimed to have been sexually assaulted before the hearing, the court properly followed its statutory obligation to expedite termination proceedings in a manner that was consistent with due process. Furthermore, the court, with the benefit of hearing the mother's testimony and observing the mother's demeanor, found the mother to be coherent and able to participate in the proceeding. In re T.R., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 542 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 17, 2018).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion by proceeding with termination of parental rights proceedings against a parent, despite the pendency of related criminal charges against the parent, so as to prevent the parent's children from languishing in foster care unnecessarily. In re Deishun M., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 562 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 18, 2019).

3. Judicial Notice.

On appeal in an action involving the termination of parental rights, over the Department of Children's objective, the supreme court decided to take judicial notice of the juvenile court's November 9, 1998 order involving the putative father's parentage for three reasons. First, consideration of the order aided the supreme court's appellate jurisdiction and the discharge of the supreme court's obligation under T.C.A. § 36-1-124 (b), (c) to expedite the final resolution of cases involving the termination of parental rights; second, the order was entered by the same court in which the termination of parental rights proceeding was pending; third, there was no question regarding the genuineness of the copy of the order appended to the putative father's brief because the juvenile court clerk had certified it as a true and correct copy of the order entered on the minutes of the juvenile court. In re Bernard T., 319 S.W.3d 586,  2010 Tenn. LEXIS 683 (Tenn. Aug. 26, 2010).

4. Termination of Parental Rights And Adoption.

Trial court erred in separating grandparents'  termination and adoption actions and transferring only the termination portion of the proceedings to the juvenile court because once the grandparents filed their adoption and termination petition, the trial court acquired exclusive jurisdiction over the matter to the exclusion of all other courts; if the termination petition was adjudicated as a separate matter, it could result in two separate appeals on the grandparents'  single petition. In re Tyler G., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 280 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 3, 2017).

Court of appeals did not have jurisdiction over a father's appeal because the father failed to sign his notice of appeal; thus, his appeal was dismissed. In re Mya V., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 511 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 28, 2017).

While language contained in the judgment might satisfy the requirement of an express direction for the entry of judgment, the judgment lacked a finding that there was no just reason for delay; despite this, the court found good cause to exercise jurisdiction, given the grave nature of the termination proceedings and the importance that statutes placed on expeditious resolution of these matters. In re Josiah T., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 482 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 2, 2019).

5. Notice of Appeal.

Prematurely filed notice of appeal in a termination of parental rights case was timely filed because the parent filled out the notice of appeal form and the parent's handwritten name in the blank space on the notice of appeal form designated for the name of the person taking the appeal indicated a desire to have the termination of the parent's rights reviewed. In re Tanya G., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 455 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 7, 2017).

In a case terminating the mother's parental rights, the mother's appeal was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because, although the mother filed a timely notice of appeal, which was signed by her attorney, the notice of appeal was not signed by the mother; the lack of the mother's signature on her notice of appeal was fatal as the language in this statute that the appeal “shall be signed by the appellant” was mandatory; and, in the absence of full compliance with the statutory requirements, the appellate court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over the appeal. In re Nevaeh B., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 558 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 14, 2017).

Appellate court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate a mother's appeal of an order terminating her parental rights because she failed to sign the original and first amended notice of appeal, although her second amended notice of appeal did contain her signature, it was filed more than 30 days after the entry of the trial court's judgment, and the appellate court had no authority to expand or waive the 30-day time limitation. In re Homer D., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 572 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 22, 2017).

In a termination of parental rights case, because this statute does not require the appellant to sign “personally” the notice of appeal and does not distinguish the appellant from his or her attorney, the word “appellant” includes an attorney specifically authorized to file a notice of appeal on the appellant's behalf. Because nothing in the record overcame the presumption that the father's attorney had specific authority to initiate the appeal on his behalf, the notice of appeal signed by the father's attorney satisfied the signature requirement, and was not subject to dismissal. In re Bentley D., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 728 (Tenn. Nov. 22, 2017).

Father's counsel signed his notice of appeal, which was sufficient under T.C.A. § 36-1-124(d) [repealed], and thus the notice of appeal was not jurisdictionally deficient. In re Da'Vante M., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 797 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 12, 2017).

Mother timely filed her amended notice of appeal because her original notice of appeal complied with the demands of the statute; both the original notice of appeal and the amended notice of appeal were filed before the trial court entered a final judgment, and thus, the court of appeals treated the mother's original notice of appeal as timely filed, which allowed it to exercise jurisdiction over the case. In re T.W., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 847 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 17, 2017).

Father's appeal from a judgment terminating his parental rights to two children was not subject to dismissal simply because the father's timely notice of appeal was signed by the father's attorney rather than by the father personally. In re Addison E., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 13 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 17, 2018).

6. Signature of Guardian.

Guardian's appeal of an order declaring a final order of adoption void was dismissed because based on the language of the statute, the absence of the guardian's signature on the notice of appeal was a jurisdictional default; neither in the Tennessee Code Annotated nor in the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure was there a safety valve or means of waiver for the requirement of the guardian's signature. In re Gabrielle W., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 465 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 11, 2017), review denied and ordered not published, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 737 (Tenn. Nov. 29, 2017).

7. Signature of Appellant.

Appellate court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over a father's appeal of the termination of his parental rights because his initial notice of appeal lacked the father's statutorily-required signature and his amended notice of appeal was filed more than 30 days following entry of the trial court's final judgment. In re Catherine J., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 494 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 24, 2017).

Although the Tennessee Department of Children's Services asserted that a parent, rather than merely the parent's counsel, was to sign a notice of appeal, the ambiguous statutory language was not be read to require the personal signature of the parent. In re Colton B., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 829 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 22, 2017).

Father's appeal of the termination of his parental rights was not subject to dismissal simply because his timely notice of appeal was signed by his attorney rather than by the father personally. In re Catherine J., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 54 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 30, 2018).

Notice of appeal was not jurisdictionally deficient when a mother whose parental rights were terminated did not sign the notice of appeal because the mother's counsel signed the notice of appeal based upon the mother's specific instructions as counsel of record in the termination proceeding. In re Jabari B., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 60 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 2, 2018).

Mother did not fail to strictly comply with subsection (d) by failing to personally sign the initial notice of appeal because the signature of the mother's counsel on the initial notice of appeal complied with subsection (d) as a matter of law. In re D.T., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 292 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 24, 2018).

8. Failure to Sign Notice.

Failure of the mother and the father to sign their notices of appeal rendered the appeal deficient and required dismissal. In re Jayden R., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 544 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 11, 2017).

Court of appeals had jurisdiction to adjudicate a mother's appeal of an order terminating her parental right because although the mother did not sign the notice of appeal, her attorney did. In re Noah S., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 27 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 23, 2018).

36-1-125. Confidentiality of records — Penalties for unauthorized disclosure — Protected orders.

  1. All adoption records, sealed adoption records, or sealed records held by a court, the department, a licensed child-placing agency, a licensed clinical social worker or any other person, and not yet under seal, or any sealed adoption records or sealed records that have been unsealed for any reason, any post-adoption records, and any adoption assistance records are confidential and shall not be subject to disclosure except as provided in this part.
  2. Adoption records, home studies or preliminary home studies may be utilized by the judge of the court, by the clerk of the court, or by the department, or by a licensed child-placing agency or a licensed clinical social worker, in any act consistent with the litigation of the adoption, custody or guardianship proceedings involving a person in any court, or for the placement, study, or supervision of a person for whom an adoption or custody or guardianship proceeding is pending in any court, and which records may be necessary to carry out such judge's, clerk's, department's, agency's, or social worker's duties consistent with the law.
  3. If any adoption records, sealed adoption records, sealed records, post-adoption records, adoption assistance records, home studies, preliminary home studies or information obtained in connection therewith are required by court order under this part to be disclosed for any legal proceeding other than the adoption proceeding or termination of parental rights proceedings, the court in which they are to be utilized shall enter a protective order to restrict their further disclosure or dissemination. Such records, studies, or information shall not become a public record in any legal proceeding.
  4. Unauthorized disclosure of any records, studies or information protected as confidential under this part is a Class A misdemeanor. Unauthorized disclosure of such records for personal gain or for a malicious purpose is a Class E felony.

Acts 1995, ch. 532, § 1; 1996, ch. 1054, §§ 58-62.

Compiler's Notes. Former § 36-1-125, concerning contents of the final order of adoption, was transferred to § 36-1-120.

Cross-References. Confidentiality of public records, §§ 10-7-503, 10-7-504.

Penalty for Class A misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

Penalty for Class E felony, § 40-35-111.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

Biological and adoptive parents and an adoption agency had standing to bring an action challenging the constitutionality of statutes allowing disclosure of previously confidential adoption records. Doe v. Sundquist, 943 F. Supp. 886, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19778 (M.D. Tenn. 1996), aff'd, dismissed, 106 F.3d 702, 1997 FED App. 51P, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 2178 (6th Cir. 1997).

Legislation allowing the disclosure of previously confidential adoption records does not violate the familial right of privacy, right to reproductive privacy, and right to nondisclosure of personal matters under the fourteenth amendment. Doe v. Sundquist, 943 F. Supp. 886, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19778 (M.D. Tenn. 1996), aff'd, dismissed, 106 F.3d 702, 1997 FED App. 51P, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 2178 (6th Cir. 1997).

Legislation allowing the disclosure of previously confidential adoption records does not discriminate between women who opt for abortion and those who choose to carry a pregnancy to term for equal protection purposes. Doe v. Sundquist, 943 F. Supp. 886, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19778 (M.D. Tenn. 1996), aff'd, dismissed, 106 F.3d 702, 1997 FED App. 51P, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 2178 (6th Cir. 1997).

2. Disclosure of Information.

Because all of the electronically stored information data from the Tennessee Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities'  and the Department of Children's Services'  incident reporting data and another database contained highly relevant information on defendants'  violation of federal law and plaintiffs'  federal constitutional rights and because an appropriate protective order for discovery and trial could avoid disclosures of the identities of the children, doctors and other protected persons, under Fed. R. Evid. 501, the state law privileges under T.C.A. §§ 37-1-409(a)(2), 37-1-615(b), 37-5-107, 37-1-612, 37-2-408, 36-1-125, 36-1-126, 36-1-138 did not bar discovery. John B. v. Goetz, 879 F. Supp. 2d 787, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8821 (M.D. Tenn. Jan. 28, 2010).

36-1-126. Record kept under seal — Confidential records — Access to certain records — Preservation of records.

    1. After the entry of the final order of adoption;
    2. After entry of the final order dismissing the adoption;
    3. After entry of an order revoking the surrender or parental consent;
    4. After entry of an order dismissing a termination of parental rights proceeding filed in conjunction with an adoption proceeding; or
    5. Upon conclusion of all termination of parental rights proceedings that were filed in conjunction with an adoption proceeding;

      all adoption records, court reports, home studies, preliminary home studies, other reports or other documents or papers or other information concerning the placement or attempted placement of a person for adoption, or other information concerning the litigation of the adoption or attempted adoption of a person, which information is in the office of the judge or clerk of the court where the adoption was filed or where the surrender or confirmation of parental consent or revocation of a surrender or parental consent was taken, or any such records, reports, or documents in the offices of a licensed child-placing agency, a licensed clinical social worker, or in the county, regional or state offices of the department of health, or in the county, district, and state offices of the department of children's services, shall be placed and remain under seal, except as provided herein or in § 36-1-118(e)(4), or in title 68, and shall be confidential and shall be disclosed only as provided in this part.

    1. Upon the granting or dismissal of an adoption petition, or after entry of the final order dismissing the adoption or revoking the surrender or the parental consent or upon conclusion of all termination of parental rights proceedings that were filed in conjunction with an adoption proceeding, all records and reports, home studies, and preliminary home studies or other information described in subsection (a) relating to the adoption proceeding and all records, reports and other documents related to the child's placement with the department or the licensed or chartered child-placing agency or licensed clinical social worker and with the adoptive or prospective adoptive family that are in the offices of the department or in the offices of any Tennessee licensed child-placing agency or licensed clinical social worker, shall be forwarded by the county and district offices of the department's social services division and by the licensed child-placing agency or licensed clinical social worker involved in any such proceedings to the state office of the department, which shall place the records under seal and ensure their safekeeping; provided, that copies of any records that relate to a child who is placed or retained in the custody or guardianship of the department or a licensed child-placing agency after the dismissal of an adoption proceeding without further adoption of the child by any person or pursuant to any guardianship or other order of the court pursuant to this part shall be retained as confidential foster care records pursuant to title 37, chapter 2, part 4 and shall be utilized by the department or licensed child-placing agency for the care, supervision, protection, and treatment of that child as may be necessary.
    2. The licensed child-placing agency, chartered child-placing agency or licensed clinical social worker shall, however, maintain a limited record that indicates the child's date of birth, the date the agency received the child for placement, from whom the child was received and their last known address, with whom the child was placed and their last known address, and the court in which the adoption proceeding was filed and the date the adoption order was entered or the adoption petition dismissed.
    3. The information in the limited record shall be confidential and not open to inspection by any person, except as provided in this part. These records shall be maintained in a locked file or other secure depository by the agency or by the licensed clinical social worker or, if kept in electronic media, shall be maintained in a method that restricts access only to authorized agency personnel or the licensed clinical social worker. The limited record shall only be accessible to authorized agency personnel or the licensed clinical social worker or to authorized personnel of the department in the performance of its duties under this part or for inspection under the department's licensing duties, or as otherwise authorized by this part.
    4. Upon entry of an order of adoption or dismissal of a petition for adoption or dismissal of termination proceedings that were filed in conjunction with an adoption proceeding, or upon revocation of a surrender or parental consent, or modification of an order of guardianship, the clerk of the court where the adoption or surrender proceedings were initiated or filed shall forward a certified copy of the orders to the adoptions unit in the state office of the department in Nashville.
      1. Any licensed child-placing agency or licensed clinical social worker that or who plans to cease conducting its activities related to the adoptive placement of children, the conduct of home studies, or any other such adoption-related services, shall notify the adoptions unit of the state office of the department in Nashville by certified mail, return receipt requested, thirty (30) days in advance, and shall forward all records related to any adoption-related services it has performed to the department.
      2. The department is specifically authorized to file a complaint and seek any necessary court orders, including injunctive relief of any kind, from any chancery or circuit court to preserve those records from loss or destruction and to obtain possession of those records for their preservation.
      3. Upon receipt of the records, reports, home studies and other information, the department shall take any necessary steps to preserve the records, reports, home studies and other information in accordance with this part. These records, reports, home studies and other information shall be filed as a sealed adoption record or sealed record, and all such records shall be confidential, and shall be otherwise subject to the provisions for access as provided pursuant to this part.
      1. The clerks of the courts of this state are specifically authorized to undertake efforts to locate in any public building in their respective counties any records of adoptions or attempted adoptions of any person by any court, including former county courts or any court that previously had adoption jurisdiction, which records may be in the control or possession of any person or entity. Upon location of these records, if it is determined that the information therein was the result of an adoption that was filed or consummated and the clerk has no prior record of the adoption, the clerk shall record the existence of this adoption record in a special docket book for this purpose, shall maintain the adoption petition, consents or surrenders, and the order in a file for that purpose under this part, and shall transmit to the department certified copies of the adoption petition, the surrenders and consents and the order of adoption, and the originals of any remaining documents in the record that have been located.
      2. Upon receipt of the record, the department shall take any necessary steps to preserve the record, and the record shall be treated as sealed adoption records pursuant to this part.
    1. The sealed adoption record shall be registered by the department in such a manner as to record the names of the adopted person, the adopted person's birth name, the person's date of birth and social security number, the names of the adoptive parents, and, if possible, any information concerning the names of birth parents of the child that is readily accessible to the department, the court where the adoption was filed, the docket number of the court proceeding, and the date of the adoption decree or the order of dismissal of the adoption petition, the order revoking the surrender, or the order dismissing the order of guardianship; provided that sealed records may continue to be registered and maintained under prior departmental procedures. The department may record such other information as it shall deem necessary to maintain adequate information concerning the location of the sealed adoption record or sealed record and the means by which to locate such record.
    2. Such registration record shall be maintained in a secure manner so that no unauthorized persons may obtain access to the records. The sealed adoption record shall be placed in a separate sealed folder or in a suitable electronic media format wherein the record can be held under a separate file name, and shall be stored with the division of records management of the department of state, which shall carefully protect and preserve the sealed adoption records or sealed records and shall maintain proper security for the confidentiality of the sealed adoption records or sealed records.
    3. If electronic methods of recording the information contained in the sealed adoption records or sealed records are employed, the departments of children's services and general services shall utilize any necessary methods to ensure the preservation and confidentiality of the electronic records.
    1. The department may open the adoption records, the sealed adoption records, sealed records, or post-adoption records, adoption assistance records, or limited records in subsection (b) in order to perform any duties required under this part, and any specific provision for access to such records contained herein shall not be construed as a limitation on the ability of the department to access such records for such purposes.
    2. Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, including § 68-3-313, the department shall, upon its request, be granted access to and shall be provided a copy of the original birth certificate or any order or record of adoption of the adopted person in the custody of the division of vital records.
    3. For purposes related to any federal or state audit relative to an adoption assistance program or an adoption assistance grant, the department may open any record for the sole and limited purpose of complying with the audit requirements of the federal or state program.
    4. For purposes related to the determination of eligibility of any child for adoption assistance, the departments of children's services and finance and administration, or any successor agencies responsible for the care of children in state custody or guardianship or for administration of the finances for children in state custody or guardianship, may open any adoption record, sealed adoption record, sealed record, post-adoption record, sealed home study records, or adoption assistance record for that limited purpose and may utilize any information in such records in any manner necessary for eligibility determination or adjudication of a claim for such assistance.
      1. For purposes related to the determination of eligibility of any adopted person or any person placed for adoption for any federal or state benefit or any other benefits to which they may be entitled, or to provide to a Title IV-D child support office information necessary to verify the status of an adoption for purposes of determining a current or past child support obligation or for terminating a future obligation for child support, the departments of children's services and finance and administration, or any successor agencies responsible for the care of children in state custody or guardianship or for administration of the finances for children in state custody or guardianship, may open any adoption record, sealed adoption record, sealed record, post-adoption record, sealed home study records or any adoption assistance record and disclose any information contained in those records that may be necessary to permit determination of:
        1. Eligibility for or correction of payments made to or on behalf of an adopted person; or
        2. The status of current, past or future child support obligations that are, or may be, due on behalf of any adopted person.
      2. Any information released for any purpose of this subdivision (d)(5) shall be used only for the purposes stated in this subdivision (d)(5), and shall otherwise remain confidential in any agency or court records in which it may appear; and the information shall not be open to the public, except as otherwise provided by this part.
    5. The department may open or utilize for any purpose the adoption record, sealed adoption record, sealed record or the post-adoption record at any time in order to obtain any information concerning any person who may be placed in the custody or guardianship of the department or any other agency of the state or service provider of the state by any court or by the adopted person's parents, or who may be placed with the department or any other agency of the state or service provider of the state due to any resurrender of the adopted person to the department by the adopted person's adoptive parents or the person's prospective adoptive parents.
    6. The department may open the sealed adoption record or sealed record when a birth certificate in the adopted name was not issued and it becomes necessary to open the sealed adoption record to provide any information to the office of vital records to complete the birth certificate.
    7. The department, the department of general services, or their specifically authorized agents, may open the sealed adoption records, sealed records, or post-adoption records at any time it becomes necessary to perform any tasks related to the preservation of the records, and each department is specifically authorized to utilize any methodology that now exists or that may be developed in the future for the permanent preservation of a sealed adoption record, sealed record or post-adoption record, and they may open the records for the limited purpose of undertaking these preservation methods. This subdivision (d)(8) shall not authorize the release of any information contained in the records to any other person or entity except as specifically authorized by this part, or as may be directly related to the preservation of the records.
    8. After use of the records pursuant to this subsection (d), they shall be resealed and returned to storage.
  1. In the event of an appeal from any ruling of the trial court in the adoption proceeding, the clerk shall place the court's record of the adoption proceedings in a sealed file in a locked file or other secure depository or, in the event of the use of electronic storage, the records shall be maintained in a secure method of storage that restricts access only to the clerk and other persons authorized by the court. These records shall remain confidential and shall not be open to inspection by anyone other than the trial or appellate courts, the clerk, the parties to the proceeding, or the licensed child-placing agencies, or the licensed clinical social worker, or the department or other governmental agencies that have been involved in the case, except by order of the court.

Acts 1951, ch. 202, § 24 (Williams, § 9572.38); 1975, ch. 280, § 1; modified; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 36-130; § 36-1-129; Acts 1995, ch. 532, § 1; 1996, ch. 1054, §§ 63-79; 1996, ch. 1079, § 69; 2008, ch. 1162, § 2; 2013, ch. 207, § 11.

Compiler's Notes. Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, referred to in this section, is compiled in 42 U.S.C. § 651 et seq.

Former § 36-1-126, concerning effect of adoption on relationship, was transferred to § 36-1-121.

Cross-References. Confidentiality of public records, § 10-7-504.

Law Reviews.

Adoption and Custody: Current Trends in Tennessee Family Law: Tennessee's New Adoption Contact Veto is Cold Comfort to Birth Parents, 27 U. Mem. L. Rev. 843 (1997).

New Reproductive Technologies: The Legal Problem and a Solution, 49 Tenn. L. Rev. 303 (1982).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Disclosure of Information.

Because all of the electronically stored information data from the Tennessee Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities'  and the Department of Children's Services'  incident reporting data and another database contained highly relevant information on defendants'  violation of federal law and plaintiffs'  federal constitutional rights and because an appropriate protective order for discovery and trial could avoid disclosures of the identities of the children, doctors and other protected persons, under Fed. R. Evid. 501, the state law privileges under T.C.A. §§ 37-1-409(a)(2), 37-1-615(b), 37-5-107, 37-1-612, 37-2-408, 36-1-125, 36-1-126, 36-1-138 did not bar discovery. John B. v. Goetz, 879 F. Supp. 2d 787, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8821 (M.D. Tenn. Jan. 28, 2010).

36-1-127. Availability of records to adopted persons and certain other persons for adoptions finalized or attempted prior to certain dates.

    1. On March 16, 1951, Chapter 202 of the Public Acts of 1951 became effective. As a result, all records related to persons who had been adopted, all records concerning a person for whom any records were maintained and that may have related to an adoption or attempted adoption and that were treated by the department of human services, the former department of public welfare, the courts, the department of health, or any other information sources as a sealed record or sealed adoption record involving an adoption or attempted adoption of a person, became confidential, nonpublic records that were not made readily available to persons about whom the records were kept.
    2. It is the intent of the general assembly that all adoption records, court records, sealed records, or sealed adoption records, and post-adoption records and other records or information, except as may otherwise be provided in this part, and that are contained in any information source on and after January 1, 1996, and that were in existence on March 16, 1951, be made available to eligible persons as provided in this part, and that to that end this is remedial legislation.
    3. It is the further intent of the general assembly, in view of the testimony before the adoption study commission established by Senate Joint Resolution 17 of the Ninety-Eighth General Assembly (1993 session), which testimony demonstrated the great concern by many persons regarding the practices of certain Tennessee adoption agencies in earlier years, that any adoption records, sealed records, sealed adoption records or post-adoption records, or other records maintained at any time by the Tennessee children's home society or its branches or divisions, chartered on June 24, 1913, and authorized under Chapter 113 of the Public Acts of 1919; and any branch or division thereof, including an organization known as the Tennessee children's home society-Shelby County division, which was referenced in the report of the Tennessee department of public welfare to Governor Gordon Browning dated June 12, 1951, shall also be made available to eligible persons in accordance with this part, whether such records were completed or sealed before, on, or after March 16, 1951, and whether any persons subject to the care and supervision of such agency or its branches were ever actually adopted, and to that end this is remedial legislation.
  1. Effective January 1, 1996, pursuant to the requirements of subsections (g) and (h), and subject to the restrictions in the following sections or subsections:
      1. All adoption records, sealed records, sealed adoption records, post-adoption records, home studies, or any other records or papers, existing prior to March 16, 1951, and relating to the adoption or attempted adoption of a person, which adoption was finalized by completion of the adoption by the entry of an order of adoption or an order of dismissal of the adoption proceeding prior to March 16, 1951; or which adoption was otherwise never completed due to the abandonment, prior to March 16, 1951, of any further necessary activity related to the completion of the adoption, and which records were sealed or closed by the court before that date, or where the record or other evidence demonstrates that a person was surrendered for adoption prior to March 16, 1951; or
      2. Any adoption records, sealed records, sealed adoption records, post-adoption records, or any other records or papers, existing prior to March 16, 1951, and relating to the adoption or attempted adoption of a person that before the effective date of Chapter 532 of the Public Acts of 1995 [see Compiler's Notes], have been treated as, or have been determined by the department or any other information source to be, cases of adoptions finalized by the completion of the adoption by the entry of an order of adoption or by entry of an order of dismissal of the adoption prior to March 16, 1951; or that have been treated by or are determined by the department as finalized adoptions due to the abandonment, prior to March 16, 1951, of any further necessary activity related to the completion of the adoption, or where the record or other evidence demonstrates that a person was surrendered for adoption prior to March 16, 1951; or
    1. All adoption records, sealed records, sealed adoption records, post-adoption records, or any other papers or records, existing either before or after March 16, 1951, concerning a person who was subject to the care and supervision, or subject to placement for foster care or adoption, by any agency described in subdivision (a)(3), or which records were maintained by any child care or child-placing agency that had, either before or after March 16, 1951, subsequently assumed the care and supervision of a child who had previously been subject to the care and control of an agency described in subdivision (a)(3), whether or not the adoption of such person was the plan, whether the person was placed for the purpose of adoption or whether the adoption was finalized by entry of an order of adoption or by order of dismissal of the adoption, whether the adoption was attempted, or was otherwise never completed due to failure to file an adoption petition or due to the abandonment of any further necessary activity related to the completion of the adoption, either before or after March 16, 1951; and
    2. Which records are in the office of the clerk of the adoption court, in the offices of the department of health, in the office of any child-placing agency, whether or not it is chartered or licensed, in the state, district, or county offices of the department of children's services, or in any other information source, shall be made available to the following eligible persons:
      1. An adopted person or a person subject to subdivision (b)(1) and (2) who is twenty-one (21) years of age or older for whom an adoption record, sealed record, sealed adoption record, post-adoption record, or other record or paper is, nevertheless, maintained;
      2. The parents of any person described in subdivision (b)(3)(A);
      3. The siblings of any person described in subdivision (b)(3)(A);
      4. The lineal descendants, twenty-one (21) years or older, of any person described in subdivision (b)(3)(A);
      5. The lineal ancestors of a person described in subdivision (b)(3)(A); or
      6. The legal representatives of the person described in subdivisions (b)(3)(A)-(E).
  2. Effective July 1, 1996, pursuant to the requirements of subsections (g) and (h), and subject to the restrictions in the following sections or subsections:
      1. All adoption records, sealed records, sealed adoption records, post-adoption records, or any other records or papers for a person relating to the adoption or attempted adoption of a person, which adoption was finalized by the completion of the adoption by the entry of an order of adoption or an order of dismissal of the adoption proceeding on or after March 16, 1951, or which records relate to an adoption or attempted adoption where the adoption petition was filed on or after March 16, 1951, or that was otherwise never completed, due to the abandonment, as determined by the department, on or after March 16, 1951, of any further necessary activity related to the completion of the adoption, and which records are in the office of the clerk of the adoption court, in the offices of the department of health, in the office of any child-placing agency, whether or not it is chartered or licensed, in the state, district, or county offices of the department of children's services, or in any other information source, shall be made available to the following eligible persons:
        1. An adopted person or a person subject to subdivision (c)(1)(A) who is twenty-one (21) years of age or older on whom an adoption record, sealed record, sealed adoption record, post-adoption record, or other record or paper is maintained;
        2. The legal representative of a person described in subdivision (c)(1)(A)(i);
      2. Information from any records of an adopted person, or any person otherwise subject to subdivision (c)(1)(A) for whom records are otherwise maintained, shall be released by the department or any other information source only to the parents, siblings, lineal descendants, or lineal ancestors, of the adopted person or of a person for whom records are maintained as described in subdivision (c)(1)(A), and only with the express written consent given to the department by the adopted person or of a person for whom records are maintained as described in subdivision (c)(1)(A), twenty-one (21) years of age or older, or such person's legal representative, and, notwithstanding any other of the following provisions of this part to the contrary, the adopted person or a person for whom records are maintained as described in subdivision (c)(1)(A), such person's legal representative shall, under no circumstances, be required to take any affirmative action pursuant to the contact veto provisions of this part to protect the confidentiality of such identifying information; provided, that nothing herein shall be construed to prevent access to identifying information in the records of the adopted person as otherwise permitted or required pursuant to §§ 36-1-125, 36-1-126 and 36-1-138;
      3. If an adopted person or a person for whom records are maintained as described in subdivision (c)(1)(A) is deceased or is disabled as defined for purposes of appointment of a conservator under title 34, the lineal descendants of such person may petition the court pursuant to § 36-1-138(c)(7), to be given access to the records of such person. A lineal descendant given access pursuant to this subdivision (c)(1)(C) is subject to all the requirements of the contact veto process;
    1. Notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, §§ 36-1-139 and 36-1-141 as such sections existed immediately prior to January 1, 1996, shall be revived and shall continue in full force and effect from May 15, 1996, and shall expire on July 1, 1996, to provide a method for contact with siblings and biological parents as provided therein until the effective date of the contact veto process;
    2. On July 1, 1996, the contact veto registry process and records access procedure established pursuant to subdivision (c)(1) and subsections (d)-(h) and other sections of this part shall become effective for access to records and contact by eligible persons under this part as set forth in subdivision (c)(1) and any other provisions of this part;
    3. Effective January 1, 1996, the basis for judicially-ordered opening of all records pursuant to this part shall be the provisions set forth in § 36-1-138 and any other relevant provisions of this part.
  3. No contact, whether by personal contact, correspondence, or otherwise, shall be made in any manner whatsoever by those requesting persons who are subject to subsection (c), or any agent or other person acting in concert with those requesting persons, with any person or persons eligible to file a contact veto under §§ 36-1-128 — 36-1-131, except as permitted pursuant to those sections.
    1. Except in cases arising pursuant to subsection (b) or § 36-1-138, no access to identifying information in any adoption record, sealed record, sealed adoption record, post-adoption record or adoption assistance record shall be granted:
      1. To any parent, preadoptive guardian, sibling, lineal descendant or lineal ancestor of a person under twenty-one (21) years of age; or
      2. At any time to any parent or preadoptive guardian, or to a sibling, lineal ancestor, or spouse or legal representative of the person whose rights were involuntarily terminated for cause in a termination of parental rights proceeding; or
      3. To any persons whom the sealed record, sealed adoption record or the post adoption record indicates were guilty of a crime of violence or neglect involving the person who was placed for adoption or who was the subject of the termination of parental rights by court action or by surrender or parental consent.
    2. Notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, no identifying information from the sealed records, sealed adoption records or post adoption records shall be released without the written consent of the biological parent if such records indicate that, with respect to the adopted person, the biological parent was the victim of rape or incest. If a biological parent for whom records contain such information is deceased or if a conservator of the person and property of such person has been appointed under title 34, the lineal descendants of such person may petition the court pursuant to the same procedures established pursuant to § 36-1-138(c)(7) to be given access to identifying information of the biological parent. A lineal descendant given access pursuant to this subsection (e) is subject to all requirements of the contact veto process.
  4. The adoption record, sealed adoption record, sealed record, or post-adoption record requested by the persons stated in subsection (c) shall be made available only after completion by the requesting party of a sworn statement agreeing that such person or persons shall not contact or attempt to contact in any manner, by themselves or in concert with any other persons or entities, any of the persons eligible to file a contact veto pursuant to § 36-1-128, until the department has completed the search of the contact veto registry as provided in § 36-1-130 or pursuant to § 36-1-131, and that such person or persons understand the legal remedies for violation of the contact veto. The sworn statement shall contain language, which shall be acknowledged by the requesting party, concerning the existence of the contact veto procedure and the legal remedies for breach of the contact veto.
    1. Access by any eligible person under any subsection of this section to any records held by the department, the court, the department of general services or health, or any licensed child-placing agency or licensed clinical social worker may only be had after verification of the identity of the requesting party and written authorization by the department is received by those information sources from the department.
    2. If the department does not have a sealed record, sealed adoption record, or post-adoption record, and if the person seeking information concerning the history of an adopted person has a copy of the order of adoption from a Tennessee court, or in cases where the adoption was handled by any agency described in subdivision (a)(3), a copy of an order of adoption from any other court and/or any other proof of the person's care, supervision, or placement for adoption by any agency described in subdivision (a)(3), and any other proof of the adoption of the person in Tennessee, any of which, in the discretion of the department is satisfactory to prove that the person is an eligible person, the department may issue a statement to that person permitting that person to obtain access to any records held by any other information source.
    1. A request for access to an adoption record, sealed adoption record, sealed record, or a post-adoption record, pursuant to this section, shall be made in writing to the department.
    2. The writing shall include the following information:
      1. The name, date of birth, address, and telephone number of the person requesting the access;
      2. Information, including legal documents or affidavits, if available, that establish the person's legal relationship to any person under this section or that otherwise establishes the person's right to request access;
      3. Any other information that the department requires to establish the person's identity, to locate records involving the requesting parties or the persons with whom contact may be sought, and to establish the person's right to request access; and
      4. Identification of any person or persons or class of persons, if any, with whom the requesting party seeks contact; provided, that this provision shall not apply to persons seeking information pursuant to subsection (b).
    3. If the information in the written request does not establish the person's right to have access to the records, the department will search the sealed adoption and post-adoption records, including those of other alleged siblings, if available, for information that may establish the person's right to have such access.

Acts 1995, ch. 532, § 1; 1996, ch. 1054, §§ 80-83, 86, 129; 1996, ch. 1068, § 2; 1996, ch. 1079, § 69.

Compiler's Notes. Former § 36-1-127, concerning the binding effect of adoption, was transferred to § 36-1-122, effective January 1, 1996.

Acts 1995, ch. 532, referred to in (b)(1)(B), became effective July 1, 1995, for purposes of implementing the access to adoption records prior to March 16, 1951, and for persons affected by the adoptive placements through the Tennessee children's home society pursuant to (b), as enacted by § 1 of that act.

Acts 1996, ch. 1079, § 184 provided:

“Any provision of this act, or the application thereof, which is inconsistent with federal law, rule or regulation shall be deemed to be construed as being consistent with federal law, rule or regulation.”

Cross-References. Confidentiality of public records, § 10-7-504.

Law Reviews.

Adoption and Custody: Current Trends in Tennessee Family Law: Tennessee's New Adoption Contact Veto is Cold Comfort to Birth Parents, 27 U. Mem. L. Rev. 843 (1997).

Family Law — Adoption — Retrospective and Prospective Opening of Adoption Records to Adopted Persons Twenty-One Years of Age or Older, 67 Tenn. L. Rev. 1019 (2000).

The Sixth Circuit Year in Review — Leading Cases of 1997 (Judge Alice M. Batchelder, J. Clegg Ivey III, Rebecca C. Lutsko), 28 U. Mem. L. Rev. 345 (1998).

Attorney General Opinions. Constitutionality of release of pre-1952 adoption records or records of Tennessee children's home society, OAG 95-085, 1995 Tenn. AG LEXIS 96 (8/15/95).

Constitutionality of 1995 amendment, OAG 96-002, 1996 Tenn. AG LEXIS 3 (1/12/96).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

This section does not violate a federal constitutional right of familial privacy, if such a right exists, nor does it unduly burden the adoption process, nor violate any right to avoid disclosure of confidential information. Doe v. Sundquist, 106 F.3d 702, 1997 FED App. 51P, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 2178 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, Doe v. Sundquist, 522 U.S. 810, 118 S. Ct. 51, 139 L. Ed. 2d 16, 1997 U.S. LEXIS 4618 (1997).

Birth parents who surrendered their children for adoption under former law had no reasonable expectation that adoption records were permanently sealed; thus, this section is merely procedural in nature and does not create any new right nor allow access to any records that previously were not to be released, and the retroactive application is not a violation of Tenn. Const. Art. I, § 20. Doe v. Sundquist, 2 S.W.3d 919, 1999 Tenn. LEXIS 429 (Tenn. 1999).

Disclosure of adoption records does not invade the rights of familial privacy by impeding a birth parent's freedom to determine whether to raise a family and disrupting both biological and adoptive families by releasing identifying information previously sealed. Doe v. Sundquist, 2 S.W.3d 919, 1999 Tenn. LEXIS 429 (Tenn. 1999).

2. Legislative Intent.

This section, read in conjunction with T.C.A. § 36-1-130, reflects the legislature's view that the disclosure of adoption records is in the best interest of the adopted person and the public, but also balances disclosure by allowing the birth parent or related individual a “veto” that prevents contact with the adopted person. Doe v. Sundquist, 2 S.W.3d 919, 1999 Tenn. LEXIS 429 (Tenn. 1999).

The disclosure of adoption records in accord with this section does not violate the constitutional right to privacy; it does not impede a birth parent's freedom to determine whether to raise a family, nor does it disrupt both biological and adoptive families by releasing identifying information previously unavailable. Doe v. Sundquist, 2 S.W.3d 919, 1999 Tenn. LEXIS 429 (Tenn. 1999).

36-1-128. Contact veto registry — Persons eligible to have names entered.

  1. The department shall establish and maintain a contact veto registry for the purposes of permitting registration of the willingness or unwillingness of the persons or classes of persons named herein for contact with persons eligible to have access to any records covered by this part; provided, that the contact veto registry shall not be applicable to records requested pursuant to § 36-1-127(b).
  2. The following persons may have their names entered in the registry either to file a contact veto or to give consent to contact:
    1. A parent, sibling, spouse, lineal ancestor, or lineal descendant of an adopted person or a person for whom records are maintained as described in § 36-1-127(c)(1)(A), either before or after such persons reach twenty-one (21) years of age;
    2. The legal representative of any person described in subdivision (b)(1).
  3. The registry shall contain the following information:
    1. The name of each person who has duly filed a contact veto or who has given consent for further contact;
    2. The address given by the person as the address at which any personal, postal, or telephone contact shall be made by the department;
    3. The date and place of birth of the person, if known;
    4. Any persons whom the person who files a contact veto wishes to exclude from the application of the contact veto pursuant to § 36-1-130(a)(6)(A)(i);
    5. The name, address, and telephone number of the person requesting contact so as to be notified in the event that the contact veto is withdrawn or varied;
    6. The method of contact, if any, to which the person consents, including contact through one (1) or more third parties; and
    7. Any other information that eligible parties wish to release to the other eligible parties.
  4. Within ninety (90) days of January 1, 1996, and periodically thereafter on at least an annual basis, through the use of public service announcements and other forms of media coverage as may be available without cost, the department shall announce the existence of the registry and its services.

Acts 1995, ch. 532, § 1; 1996, ch. 1054, §§ 84, 85, 114.

Code Commission Notes.

Acts 1996, ch. 1054, § 85 purported to amend language in (c)(1); however, (c)(1) was rewritten by § 114 of that act, and, as a result, the amendment by § 85 has not been given effect.

Compiler's Notes. Former § 36-1-128 (Acts 1951, ch. 202, § 28 (Williams, § 9572.42); 1974, ch. 412, § 1; 1975, ch. 217, §§ 1, 2; impl. am. Acts 1975, ch. 219, § 1; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 36-128), concerning reports of adoptions and new birth certificates, was repealed by Acts 1995, ch. 532, § 1, effective January 1, 1996.

Law Reviews.

Adoption and Custody: Current Trends in Tennessee Family Law: Tennessee's New Adoption Contact Veto is Cold Comfort to Birth Parents, 27 U. Mem. L. Rev. 843 (1997).

Siblings in Law (Jill Elaine Hasday), 65 Vand. L. Rev. 897 (2012).

36-1-129. Procedures for filing contact veto or giving consent.

    1. A person eligible to file a contact veto or give consent for further contact may notify the department in writing on a form supplied by the department that such person does or does not object to contact being made with such person by any person or group of persons who are eligible to establish contact. The department shall supply the necessary form upon request of any persons eligible to have their names entered on the registry.
    2. A contact veto is not effectively filed or consent properly given unless the person provides the department with satisfactory proof of such person's identity and completes and files with the department a form from the department containing the relevant information in § 36-1-128(c) and pays any necessary fees.
  1. As part of the surrender under § 36-1-111 or as part of a parental consent, a biological parent or guardian shall indicate in the appropriate place on the surrender or parental consent document whether or not such person wishes to file a contact veto or give consent for further contact, and shall complete the information requirements for registration on the contact veto registry on a form supplied by the department containing the relevant information in § 36-1-128(c). A contact veto is not effectively filed or consent properly given unless the person surrendering or giving a parental consent completes such form at the time of the surrender or parental consent or properly files the form with the department at a later time; provided, that no fee for filing a contact veto or consent to contact shall be required if the veto or consent is completed at the time of the surrender or parental consent. If, for any reason, the person failed to complete a consent for contact or a veto at the time of the surrender or parental consent, the person may do so at a later time after compliance with all provisions for filing, including the payment of all necessary fees.
  2. By filing a contact veto that complies with the requirements of this section, a person is entitled to notification of any inquiry requesting contact with the filing person.
  3. Forms for filing consents for contact or for filing contact vetoes shall be made available by the department in the offices of the clerks of courts with adoption jurisdiction and in the department's state office and county offices.

Acts 1995, ch. 532, §§ 1, 19; 1996, ch. 1054, §§ 97, 115.

Compiler's Notes. Former subsection (e) was deleted by the code commission as obsolete in 2001.

Former § 36-1-129, concerning keeping of records under seal, was transferred to § 36-1-126.

Law Reviews.

Adoption and Custody: Current Trends in Tennessee Family Law: Tennessee's New Adoption Contact Veto is Cold Comfort to Birth Parents, 27 U. Mem. L. Rev. 843 (1997).

Siblings in Law (Jill Elaine Hasday), 65 Vand. L. Rev. 897 (2012).

36-1-130. Access to records — Search of registry — Restrictions on contact.

    1. When a request is made for access to an adoption record, sealed adoption record, sealed record or a post-adoption record by a person eligible to have access, that person shall identify in writing on the form supplied by the department, the persons or classes of persons who are eligible under § 36-1-128 to refuse or allow contact with whom the person wishes to establish contact, if any, and shall submit the sworn statement required by § 36-1-127(f).
    2. Upon submission of the sworn statement and after proper identification of the requesting party, the department shall grant access to the records requested. Notwithstanding § 68-3-313, upon receipt of a copy of the sworn statement required by § 36-1-127 or upon notification from the department, the division of vital records of the department of health shall grant access to a copy of an adopted person's original or amended birth certificate.
    3. No person requesting access to the records, whether acting alone or in concert with any other person, persons or entities, shall at anytime contact or attempt contact with any person or persons who are eligible to file a contact veto until the completion of the search by the department pursuant to this section and § 36-1-131. A violation of this prohibition shall make the requesting party, the party's agents, or any person or persons acting in concert with them subject to the legal remedies pursuant to § 36-1-132.
    4. If the person eligible to request access to the records does state on the form a desire to contact any person who is eligible to file a contact veto, then the department shall search the contact veto registry to determine whether a contact veto has been filed or whether consent has been given for further contact with the person who is sought.
    5. The department shall only search for those persons with whom the requesting party seeks contact.
        1. If a person files a contact veto in conformity with this part, the contact veto shall, in addition, automatically protect and apply to the person's spouse, siblings or future siblings, lineal descendants and lineal ancestors and any spouses of those other persons, but may exclude from such protection and application, by specific reference, any such relatives or spouses where permission is given to the department in writing by the person filing the contact veto. If, because contact vetoes or consents are filed on the same date, the department is unable to determine which was filed first, the contact veto shall be deemed to be the first filed.
        2. The person filing the automatic veto or giving consent to contact may vary or withdraw the automatic veto or consent that has been given upon satisfactory proof of identity and by making such request in writing to the department.
        3. If a request is made by an adopted person or person for whom records are maintained as described in § 36-1-127(c)(1)(A), or such person's legal representative, to have contact with a person to whom the automatic veto under subdivision (a)(6)(A)(i) applies or to have contact with a person who is otherwise eligible to file a contact veto, the department shall attempt to contact those persons for whom a contact request is made who are listed on the registry or, if not listed on the registry, shall attempt contact pursuant to the search requirements of § 36-1-131.
        4. If a request is made under this part to have contact with an adopted person or a person for whom records are maintained as described in § 36-1-127(c)(1)(A) by a parent, sibling, lineal descendant, lineal ancestor of such person, or the legal representative of the requesting party, the department shall make a diligent effort to contact the adopted person or the person for whom records are maintained as described in § 36-1-127(c)(1)(A), or such person's legal representatives, based upon information contained in any records that it maintains pursuant to this part or based upon other information that it is given by the parent, sibling, lineal descendant, lineal ancestor or the legal representative of such persons.
        5. In the circumstances described in subdivision (a)(6)(A)(iii) or (a)(6)(A)(iv), the department shall determine if any of these persons wish to consent to contact with the requesting party or whether they wish to confirm, alter, vary or withdraw a contact veto, or in the case of an adopted person or a person for whom records are maintained as described in § 36-1-127(c)(1)(A), whether they wish to release any identifying information.
        6. If the adopted person or person for whom records are maintained as described in § 36-1-127(c)(1)(A), is twenty-one (21) years of age or older, or such person's legal representative, wishes to permit contact or wishes to release identifying information, such person may give written direction to the department relative to the desire for contact or the extent of identifying information such person wishes to release; provided, that notwithstanding any other provisions of this part to the contrary, they shall not be under any affirmative duty to use any of the procedures for filing any contact veto pursuant to this part to prevent contact or to prevent the release of any identifying information from any record subject to this part, and no identifying information from any record shall be made available to any other persons without the written consent to the department by an adopted person or person for whom records are maintained as described in § 36-1-127(c)(1)(A), or such person's legal representative; provided, that nothing herein shall be construed to prevent access to identifying information in the records of the adopted person as otherwise permitted or required pursuant to §§ 36-1-125, 36-1-126 and 36-1-138. If written direction is given by an adopted person or person for whom records are maintained as described in § 36-1-127(c)(1)(A), or such person's legal representative, to permit contact or the release of certain identifying information, the department shall require the requesting party to sign a sworn statement similar to that required under § 36-1-127(f), acknowledging the restrictions on contact or use of any identifying information permitted or allowed under this subdivision (a)(6)(A)(vi).
        7. The spouse of the person filing an automatic veto and the siblings, lineal descendants and lineal ancestors and any spouses of those persons, or the legal representatives of any persons eligible to file a contact veto, may also give written consent to the department for release from the automatic veto that may have been filed prior to such person's filing with the contact veto registry, and the person, or the person's legal representative, may alter or vary the automatic veto as it applies specifically to that person, and, if contacted by the department pursuant to this part in response to a search request, may agree to contact.
      1. The restrictions of § 36-1-132 shall apply to the persons enumerated in subdivision (a)(6)(A)(i) or their agents or persons acting on their behalf.
      2. If a person who is contacted pursuant to this part agrees to contact before any other person files a contact veto pursuant to this part, subdivision (a)(6)(A)(i) shall not apply to that person.
    1. If a contact veto has been filed, the department shall notify the person with whom contact has been sought of the inquiry concerning the request for contact. Such person shall have the opportunity to confirm the veto, vary it, or withdraw it.
    2. If a contact veto that has been filed with the department remains intact or is filed as a result of a search pursuant to § 36-1-131, or if a consent to contact is altered to withdraw the ability to have contact, the department shall notify the requesting party of this fact and the requesting party shall not be permitted contact with the person sought.
    3. If the contact veto remains intact, or if the adopted person or a person for whom records are maintained as described in § 36-1-127(c)(1)(A), or such person's legal representative, refuses contact or refuses to release identifying information, the person making the request for contact or information may place such person's name, address and telephone number in the registry to request notification from the department should the contact veto be varied, altered or withdrawn or permission for release of identifying information be given, or such requesting person may, in writing, permit the department to release such person's name, address and telephone number to the person who had entered the contact veto or who had denied contact or who had denied the release of identifying information, and that person may contact the requesting person at such person's discretion without further involvement of the department.
  1. If consent for contact is shown from the registry records or is given by the person with whom contact is sought either by withdrawing or varying the veto, or if the adopted person or a person for whom records are maintained as described in § 36-1-127(c)(1)(A), or such person's legal representative, gives permission for contact or for release of identifying information, the department shall, in conformity with the consent or the varied or altered veto, notify the person making the original request of this fact and shall provide such information as may be available to establish contact or shall provide such identifying information as may be released from any record in conformity with this part by the adopted person or a person for whom records are maintained as described in § 36-1-127(c)(1)(A), or such person's legal representative.
  2. If the persons or classes of persons who are the subject of the search were not located on the registry or could not be notified at the address designated in the registry, the department shall follow the procedures under § 36-1-131.

Acts 1995, ch. 532, § 1; 1996, ch. 1054, §§ 87, 116-118.

Compiler's Notes. Former § 36-1-130 (Acts 1951, ch. 202, § 25 (Williams, § 9572.39); T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 36-131), concerning the impoundment of papers during appeal, was repealed by Acts 1995, ch. 532, § 1, effective January 1, 1996.

Law Reviews.

Adoption and Custody: Current Trends in Tennessee Family Law: Tennessee's New Adoption Contact Veto is Cold Comfort to Birth Parents, 27 U. Mem. L. Rev. 843 (1997).

Siblings in Law (Jill Elaine Hasday), 65 Vand. L. Rev. 897 (2012).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Legislative Intent.

This section, read in conjunction with T.C.A. § 36-1-127, reflects the legislature's view that the disclosure of adoption records is in the best interest of the adopted person and the public, but also balances disclosure by allowing the birth parent or related individual a “veto” that prevents contact with the adopted person. Doe v. Sundquist, 2 S.W.3d 919, 1999 Tenn. LEXIS 429 (Tenn. 1999).

36-1-131. Search of sealed adoption record, sealed record or post-adoption records — Opportunity to veto contact.

  1. If, after a search has been made of the registry, then either no person with whom contact was requested was located on the registry or the person named on the registry could not be notified at the address designated in the registry, then the department shall search the sealed adoption record, sealed record or the post-adoption records in its possession for information concerning the location of the person who is the subject of the search and shall conduct a diligent search for such person.
    1. Upon locating such person whose relationship to the requesting party is confirmed by the person sought or whose relationship to the requesting party is or has been confirmed by other evidence satisfactory to the department, the department shall notify such person of the inquiry and of the department's determination of relationship to the requesting party.
      1. Such person whose relationship to the requesting party is confirmed as provided in subdivision (b)(1), or that person's legal representative, may file a written consent with the registry.
      2. If the person wishes to veto contact, the person must, unless such person is an adopted person or a person for whom records are maintained as described in § 36-1-127(c)(1)(A) or a person for whom an automatic veto applies pursuant to § 36-1-130(a)(6)(A)(i), file a contact veto pursuant to §§ 36-1-128 and 36-1-129 and must pay any necessary fees, within ninety (90) days of the date the department gives oral or written notice of that time period for filing a contact veto. If the contact veto is timely and effectively filed pursuant to this part, then the department shall notify the requesting party in writing and no contact shall be permitted with that person with whom contact was sought. If the contact veto is not timely and effectively filed, the department shall notify the person requesting the search, and that person shall be permitted to attempt contact with the person or persons sought unless such person is an adopted person or a person for whom records are maintained as described in § 36-1-127(c)(1)(A), or unless such person is a person for whom an automatic veto applies pursuant to § 36-1-130(a)(6)(A)(i). Written notice shall be effective upon the date the notice is sent.
  2. If the person who is the subject of the search whose relationship to the requesting party has been confirmed by evidence satisfactory to the department cannot be located after diligent search, including the sending of notice to the last known mailing address of such person, and, unless such person is an adopted person or a person for whom records are maintained as described in § 36-1-127(c)(1)(A) or unless such person is a person for whom an automatic veto applies pursuant to § 36-1-130(a)(6)(A)(i), the department shall inform the person requesting the search of this fact in writing, and that person shall be under no further restrictions pursuant to § 36-1-130 against contact with the person who has been sought.

Acts 1995, ch. 532, § 1; 1996, ch. 1054, § 88.

Compiler's Notes. Former § 36-1-131, concerning disclosure of information upon court order, was transferred to § 36-1-138, effective January 1, 1996.

Law Reviews.

Adoption and Custody: Current Trends in Tennessee Family Law: Tennessee's New Adoption Contact Veto is Cold Comfort to Birth Parents, 27 U. Mem. L. Rev. 843 (1997).

Essay: Siblings in Law, 65 Vand. L. Rev. 897 (2012).

Siblings in Law (Jill Elaine Hasday), 65 Vand. L. Rev. 897 (2012).

36-1-132. Violation of contact veto a misdemeanor — Injunction and damages — Attorney's fees — Using information to injure persons whose names were obtained.

  1. Any person who has filed a contact veto pursuant to this part or the adopted person or a person for whom records are maintained as described in § 36-1-127(c)(1)(A), or such person's legal representative, shall have a cause of action in the circuit or chancery court for injunctive relief and for compensatory and punitive damages against any person or entity who or that has violated the provisions of the contact veto or for violation of any restrictions on contact with the adopted person or a person for whom records are maintained as described in § 36-1-127(c)(1)(A).
  2. Venue for such action shall be in the county of the residence of the plaintiff, or, if the plaintiff resides out of state, in the county where the adoption petition was originally filed, or if no petition was filed, or if its venue is unknown, in the chancery or circuit court of any county with a population of one hundred thousand (100,000) or greater as established by the federal census of 1990 or any subsequent census.
  3. A certified copy of the sworn statement that was signed pursuant to § 36-1-127(f) or § 36-1-130(a)(6)(A)(vi), by the person against whom the action is brought for violation of the contact veto shall be admissible in the action under this section as conclusive evidence of that person's knowledge of the restrictions imposed by a contact veto or the restrictions imposed by § 36-1-130.
  4. Any person who has filed a contact veto or an adopted person or a person for whom records are maintained as described in § 36-1-127(c)(1)(A), or such person's legal representative, who has prevailed in an action under subsection (a) shall be entitled to recover attorney's fees and all costs of the proceeding from the opposing party or parties.
  5. Any action under this section shall be brought within three (3) years of any contact or attempted contact or violation of other restrictions on contact in violation of this part.
  6. Any person who, after obtaining information under this part, uses such information to cause injury to the person whose name was obtained under this part, commits a Class A misdemeanor. Further, any person who has been injured pursuant to this subsection (f) shall have a cause of action in the circuit or chancery court for injunctive relief and damages, including both compensatory and punitive damages, against any person who uses the information in violation of this subsection (f).
  7. Any person who, in violation of this part, contacts or causes to be contacted a person with respect to whom the contacting person or person causing the contact knows a contact veto has been filed pursuant to this part commits a Class B misdemeanor.

Acts 1995, ch. 532, § 1; 1996, ch. 1054, § 119; 1996, ch. 1068, § 1; 1998, ch. 1002, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Former § 36-1-132, concerning natural parents illegally obtaining repossession of children, was transferred to § 36-1-123, effective January 1, 1996.

For table of U.S. decennial populations of Tennessee counties, see Volume 13 and its supplement.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class A,  Class B misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

Law Reviews.

Adoption and Custody: Current Trends in Tennessee Family Law: Tennessee's New Adoption Contact Veto is Cold Comfort to Birth Parents, 27 U. Mem. L. Rev. 843 (1997).

36-1-133. Release of nonidentifying information concerning biological or legal family.

  1. Upon written request of an adopted person eighteen (18) years of age or older or of the adoptive parents or guardian of an adopted person under eighteen (18) years of age, the biological or legal relatives of an adopted person, the lineal descendants of the adopted person, or the legal representatives of such persons, the department shall provide to such persons, upon proper identification of such persons by the department, nonidentifying information about the adopted person and such person's biological or legal relatives as may be contained in the adopted person's sealed adoption record, sealed record or post-adoption record.
  2. The information that may be released shall include only the following; provided, that nothing in this section shall be construed to authorize or require the release of any information from a sealed adoption record, sealed record or post-adoption record if such information would lead to the discovery of the identity or whereabouts of the biological or legal relatives of the adopted person, if those biological or legal relatives have not registered their consent as provided under §§ 36-1-128 — 36-1-131, or unless § 36-1-138 is applicable:
    1. The date and time of the birth of the adopted person and such person's weight and other physical characteristics at birth;
    2. The age of the adopted person's biological relatives at the time of such person's birth;
    3. The nationality, ethnic background, race and religious preference of the biological or legal relatives;
    4. The educational level of the biological or legal relatives, general occupation and any talents or hobbies;
    5. A general physical description of the biological or legal relatives, including height, weight, color of hair, color of eyes, complexion and other similar information;
    6. Whether the biological or legal parent had any other children, and if so, any available nonidentifying information about such children; and
    7. Available health history of the adopted person, and the person's biological or legal relatives, including specifically, any psychological or psychiatric information that would be expected to have any substantial effect on the adopted person's mental or physical health.
  3. Whenever the department releases information pursuant to this section and it appears from the record that the adopted person who has sought information has been adopted two (2) or more times, the department shall specify whether the information released pertains to the adopted person's birth parents or to any intervening adoptive parent or parents.

Acts 1982, ch. 668, § 1; T.C.A., § 36-141; § 36-1-140; Acts 1995, ch. 532, § 1; 1996, ch. 1054, §§ 89, 90, 120; 2003, ch. 231, § 16; 2015, ch. 199, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Former § 36-1-133 (Acts 1951, ch. 202, § 37 (Williams, § 9572.51); T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 36-134; Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 112), concerning penalties for violation of the part, was repealed by Acts 1995, ch. 532, § 1, effective January 1, 1996.

Law Reviews.

Adoption and Custody: Current Trends in Tennessee Family Law: Tennessee's New Adoption Contact Veto is Cold Comfort to Birth Parents, 27 U. Mem. L. Rev. 843 (1997).

36-1-134. Transmission of information between affected parties — Access to records of deceased or disabled persons — Updating of information to allow contact.

    1. The department, or a licensed child-placing agency or the licensed clinical social worker that has had a prior relationship with the persons stated in § 36-1-133(a) through placement of a child or through a home study process and that maintains a limited record or post-adoption record, shall, subject to the written consent of each party and only in any situation where contact has been sought, transmit between an adopted person twenty-one (21) years of age or older or a person for whom records are maintained as described in § 36-1-127(c)(1)(A), or such person's legal representative, and such person's parent, sibling, lineal ancestor or lineal descendant any written, photographic, video or audio communication that such entity may have, and that is not contained in the records of the department, the licensed child-placing agency or the licensed clinical social worker, even if no direct contact is permitted or desired.
    2. If an adopted person or a person for whom records are maintained as described in § 36-1-127(c)(1)(A) is deceased, or is disabled as defined for purposes of appointment of a conservator under title 34, the lineal descendants of such person may petition the court pursuant § 36-1-138(c)(7), to be given access to the records of such person, and to transmit or receive the information permitted by this section. A lineal descendant given access to records under this subdivision (a)(2) is subject to the requirements of the contact veto process.
  1. The adopted person or other persons for whom records are maintained as described in § 36-1-127(c)(1)(A), or such person's legal representative, or a person eligible to file a contact veto may, in writing from time-to-time to the department, a licensed child-placing agency, or the licensed clinical social worker, update such person's personal information, addresses, and telephone numbers in order to allow periodic contact by the department for subsequent search requests, or for other contact by the department or the licensed child-placing agency or the licensed clinical social worker.
  2. The licensed child-placing agency or licensed clinical social worker receiving any updated information pursuant to this section shall provide such information to the department to be included in the post-adoption record for future reference.

Acts 1995, ch. 532, § 1; 1996, ch. 1054, § 98.

Compiler's Notes. Former § 36-1-134, concerning entities authorized to place children for adoption, was transferred to § 36-1-108.

36-1-135. Updated medical information in records — Searches for persons affected.

  1. The department shall update its post-adoption records with any medical, psychological or psychiatric information provided by an adopted person or a person for whom records are maintained, as described in § 36-1-127(c)(1)(A), eighteen (18) years of age or older, or such person's legal representative, or by such person's adoptive or legal parent if the adopted person or a person for whom records are maintained as described in § 36-1-127(c)(1)(A) is under eighteen (18) years of age, or which information is provided by any biological or legal relative of an adopted person or a person for whom records are maintained, as described in § 36-1-127(c)(1)(A), or such person's legal representative, which information concerns any of those persons; provided, that such information shall be provided in the form of a letter or other written evidence from a licensed health care professional or from a licensed health care facility that explains the health care status of persons who may be affected and why the transmission of such information to other persons is necessary.
  2. Upon receipt of the information under subsection (a), the department shall, at no charge to any of the persons listed under subsection (a), conduct a diligent search for the person or persons who may be affected and, if located, shall notify them, their parents, if applicable, or their legal representatives, if applicable, of the availability of and the nature of this information and those persons may request that the information be provided to them. In any case, copies of all such updated information shall be maintained in the post-adoption record for future use.
  3. If any of the persons listed in subsection (a) seek additional or updated information for a medically established need as determined by written evidence from a licensed health care professional or a licensed health care facility pursuant to the requirements of subsection (a), the department shall, at no charge, contact the persons who have access to or who have or may have knowledge of such information, and shall request the persons so contacted to provide such information to the department for transmittal to the treating professionals or health care facility of the requesting party. Such information shall be provided to the department by means of a specific release for a stated purpose and the release shall be time limited.
  4. Any notification required to be made by the department as part of a search and information request or transmittal pursuant to this section with an adopted person or with a person for whom records are maintained, as described under § 36-1-127(c)(1)(A), who is under eighteen (18) years of age shall be made with such person's adoptive or legal parent, or with the legal representative of the adopted person or person for whom records are maintained as described under § 36-1-127(c)(1)(A), or with the parents or with the legal representative of the minor biological or legal relative of the adopted person or person for whom records are maintained as described under § 36-1-127(c)(1)(A), and such parents or legal representatives shall make any decisions relative to release of information or provision of information pursuant to this section.

Acts 1995, ch. 532, § 1; 1996, ch. 1054, § 121.

Compiler's Notes. Former § 36-1-135, concerning illegal payments in connection with placing a child, was transferred to § 36-1-109, effective January 1, 1996.

36-1-136. Notification made as part of search, contact or identifying requests.

    1. Any notification required to be made as part of a search or a contact or an identifying request pursuant to this part for an adopted person or a person for whom records are maintained as described under § 36-1-127(c)(1)(A), shall be made with such persons who are twenty-one (21) years of age or older, except as otherwise provided by § 36-1-135, or with the legal representative of such persons;
    2. Any notification for search or contact requests involving the biological or legal relative, who is under twenty-one (21) years of age, of the adopted person or person for whom records are maintained as described under § 36-1-127(c)(1)(A), shall be with the parents or legal representative of such biological or legal relative; and
    3. Any notification involving any other persons who are subject to contact for search requests or contact requests under this part shall be made with those persons who are twenty-one (21) years of age or older or with the known legal representative of any such persons.
  1. Any decision to permit contact or to permit the disclosure of information authorized by this part to be disclosed under subsection (a) shall be made, as the case may be:
    1. By the adopted person or a person for whom records are maintained as described under § 36-1-127(c)(1)(A) and in subdivision (a)(1), twenty-one (21) years of age or older, or such person's legal representative, except as otherwise provided by § 36-1-135;
    2. By the parents or by the legal representative of the biological or legal relative in subdivision (a)(2), who is under twenty-one (21) years of age, of the adopted person or person for whom records are maintained as described under § 36-1-127(c)(1)(A); or
    3. By those other persons in subdivision (a)(3) who are twenty-one (21) years of age or older or by the known legal representative of any such persons.

Acts 1995, ch. 532, § 1; 1996, ch. 1054, § 122.

Compiler's Notes. Former § 36-1-136 (Acts 1951, ch. 202, § 33 (Williams, § 9572.47); T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 36-136; Acts 1978, ch. 704, § 2; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 36-137), concerning the legality of adoptions ordered prior to March 16, 1951, was repealed by Acts 1995, ch. 532, § 1, effective January 1, 1996.

36-1-137. Inability of department to verify adoptive status of relationships — Waiting period to request further searches — Limitations on searches.

  1. If, after reviewing the sealed adoption records, the sealed records or the post-adoption records, and any other credible evidence, and after conducting a diligent search and making any other reasonable inquiries as to the adoptive status of a requesting party or the relationship of the biological or legal relatives to the adopted person or any person for whom records are maintained as described in § 36-1-127(c)(1)(A), or of the adopted person or any person for whom records are maintained as described in § 36-1-127(c)(1)(A), to a biological or legal relative, as the case may be, the department is unable to verify the requesting party's adoptive status or the legal, biological, or sibling relationships of the persons seeking to establish contact to the persons sought or the status of any legal representatives, then the department shall notify the requesting party of this fact and the basis for the inability to verify the relationship, but shall not provide access to any record to the requesting party, or otherwise authorize contact with the person sought or transmit information between any parties.
  2. No additional searches shall be required to be made pursuant to this part in an effort to establish relationships, status or contact for a period of six (6) months from the date of the department's response to the requesting party unless satisfactory evidence is presented to the department in the interim to justify additional searches or unless, in the department's discretion, circumstances warrant such further attempts.
  3. The department shall not attempt further contact with the person sought if that person specifically requests that no further contact be made unless that person or the person's legal representative withdraws such request in writing; provided, that if the person's relationship to the requesting party is confirmed by the person sought or by other evidence satisfactory to the department, the department shall notify such person of the requirement for filing of a contact veto pursuant to §§ 36-1-128, 36-1-129, and 36-1-131(b)(2), and that failure to file the contact veto pursuant to those sections shall permit the requesting party to establish contact.
  4. No more than two (2) records search or contact attempts shall be required to be made by the department, unless, in the department's discretion, circumstances warrant further attempts.

Acts 1995, ch. 532, § 1; 1996, ch. 1054, § 91.

Compiler's Notes. Former § 36-1-137, concerning readoption, was transferred to § 36-1-106.

36-1-138. Court orders for the release of information from adoption and sealed records.

    1. Any necessary information in the files or the record of an adoption proceeding or in an adoption record, sealed adoption record, sealed record, post-adoption record or adoption assistance record may be disclosed pursuant to the requirements of subsection (c), to the party requiring it, upon a written, sworn motion before the court of original jurisdiction of the adoption proceeding, or, where the adoption proceeding is not yet filed, in the chancery or circuit court of the county where the record is located, or in the chancery or circuit court of any county that has a population of one hundred thousand (100,000) or greater, according to the 1990 federal census or any subsequent census.
    2. Jurisdiction for motions filed pursuant to subdivision (c)(5) shall be in the chancery court for Davidson County.
    3. If the court that had original jurisdiction was a county court or is a court that no longer exists, the chancery court for the county in which such court was established shall have jurisdiction to hear the motion, in addition to the circuit or chancery courts in counties with a population of one hundred thousand (100,000) or more, as established by the 1990 federal census or any subsequent census.
    4. The department, licensed child-placing agency or licensed clinical social worker shall, upon request of the party seeking such information, disclose to the party the court in which such proceeding was filed and the docket number, if known to the department, or the licensed child-placing agency, or the licensed clinical social worker, or shall disclose the county in which the adoption record, sealed adoption record, or sealed record is located.
  1. The motion must be served upon the commissioners of children's services and health by certified mail, return receipt requested, or by personal service upon the commissioners or a duly designated agent of either commissioner. The hearing shall not be held sooner than fifteen (15) days after the return receipt is dated or the date of personal service. Failure to obtain service on both commissioners, or any hearing held prior to the expiration of the fifteen-day service period, shall result in the order entered in the proceeding being void and of no effect whatsoever. Each commissioner shall be permitted to file a response and may appear through counsel to respond in writing or orally, and may appeal any resulting order.
  2. The record of the adoption proceeding, the adoption record, sealed adoption record, sealed record, post-adoption record or adoption assistance record may be opened, under whatever conditions the court shall determine necessary, if the court finds, for good cause shown, that the best interests of the adopted person or of the public require such disclosure, and that one (1) or more of the following requirements are met:
    1. The movant must show that information is needed for purposes of treating or preventing a physical, psychological or psychiatric condition affecting any person, which is clearly and specifically described by testimony or affidavit of a qualified treatment professional. For purposes of this section, “qualified treatment professional” means a person licensed by any state or federal authority or the duly authorized licensing body of any other government to provide treatment for physical, psychological or psychiatric conditions;
    2. The movant must show that the information is needed for purposes of establishing legal status or standing for inheritance or for property rights determinations or for the determination of legal relationships for third parties;
    3. The movant must show that the information is necessary for the movant to prosecute or defend a legal proceeding and that alternative information sources or other means of accomplishing this end are not available;
    4. The movant is any public agency that requires the disclosure of the information in such record for purposes directly related to its authorized duties and that such information cannot be obtained by any other method, or that further delay in obtaining information that may be contained in such record may result in harm to the adopted person, the adopted person's biological parent or parents or biological or legal relatives, or to the public;
    5. The movant is an individual who has sought disclosure under §§ 36-1-127 — 36-1-131, 36-1-133, 36-1-134 and 36-1-135, and claims to have been improperly denied access to the information so requested by the departments of children's services or health pursuant to those sections;
    6. The movant is an individual who alleges wrongful denial of access pursuant to § 36-1-127(e)(1)(B) or (C); or
    7. The movant is a lineal descendant of a deceased adopted person or a person for whom records are maintained as described in § 36-1-127(c)(1)(A) or is the lineal descendant of such a person who is disabled as defined for purposes of appointment of a conservator under title 34. The effect of any order permitting the lineal descendant who is permitted to have access pursuant to this subdivision (c)(7) shall be to make the lineal descendant subject to the contact veto process.
  3. In determining whether to order disclosure of information contained in the sealed adoption record, sealed record or the post-adoption record, the court shall conduct an in camera inspection of the records and shall permit disclosure of only such information as shall be necessary to fulfill the requirements of subsection (c).
  4. The departments of children's services or health may consent to the release of any sealed adoption records, sealed records or post-adoption records or records of birth under this section by an agreed order that is approved by the court if any of the conditions of subdivisions (c)(1) — (4) have been met or if the departments determine that they have been in error in refusing to release requested information pursuant to §§ 36-1-127 — 36-1-131, 36-1-133, 36-1-134 and 36-1-135.
    1. The court may, upon notice to the department of children's services pursuant to subsection (b), order the department to attempt to establish contact with any person or entity for the purpose of obtaining any updated medical information necessary to assist in the treatment of the adopted person or the adopted person's biological or legal relatives or any person who has filed a motion under this section.
    2. If the department obtains the information sought under this subsection (f), it will report this fact to the court and shall send such information directly to the qualified treatment professional who is providing care and treatment for the person who sought the information, unless the court, for good cause entered in the record, shall order otherwise.
    1. No contact by a party receiving information pursuant to this section who is eligible to request a search under this part for any other person who is or may be protected by a contact veto of any kind, or who is an adopted person or a person for whom records are maintained as described under § 36-1-127(c)(1)(A), shall be permitted unless the provisions of §§ 36-1-130 and 36-1-131 have been completed and contact is permissible pursuant to those sections.
    2. The department's response to the court shall inform the court if any person is subject to the protection of a contact veto or if any person is an adopted person or a person for whom records are maintained as described under § 36-1-127(c)(1)(A).
  5. This section is supplemental to the previous provisions of this part permitting access to records by eligible persons without court orders and shall not be construed to be restrictive of those provisions.

Acts 1951, ch. 202, § 26 (Williams, § 9572.40); T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 36-132; Acts 1985, ch. 40, §§ 1-3; 1989, ch. 533, § 1; T.C.A., § 36-1-131; Acts 1995, ch. 532, § 1; 1996, ch. 1054, §§ 92-96, 99, 123, 124; 1996, ch. 1079, § 69.

Compiler's Notes. Former § 36-1-138, concerning adoption of adults, was transferred to § 36-1-103.

For tables of U.S. decennial populations of Tennessee counties, see Volume 13 and its supplement.

Law Reviews.

Adoption and Custody: Current Trends in Tennessee Family Law: Tennessee's New Adoption Contact Veto is Cold Comfort to Birth Parents, 27 U. Mem. L. Rev. 843 (1997).

Attorney General Opinions. Authority to release copies of final adoption orders to adoptive parents, OAG 97-020, 1997 Tenn. AG LEXIS 14 (3/5/97).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Disclosure of Information.

Because all of the electronically stored information data from the Tennessee Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities'  and the Department of Children's Services'  incident reporting data and another database contained highly relevant information on defendants'  violation of federal law and plaintiffs'  federal constitutional rights and because an appropriate protective order for discovery and trial could avoid disclosures of the identities of the children, doctors and other protected persons, under Fed. R. Evid. 501, the state law privileges under T.C.A. §§ 37-1-409(a)(2), 37-1-615(b), 37-5-107, 37-1-612, 37-2-408, 36-1-125, 36-1-126, 36-1-138 did not bar discovery. John B. v. Goetz, 879 F. Supp. 2d 787, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8821 (M.D. Tenn. Jan. 28, 2010).

36-1-139. Penalty for providing false information related to information requests.

Any person who or entity that knowingly provides false information to the department, a licensed child-placing agency or licensed clinical social worker, or the court in connection with any of the provisions of §§ 36-1-12536-1-138 or § 36-1-141, or the rules and regulations of the department that establish procedures for search requests or access to records, commits a Class E felony.

Acts 1995, ch. 532, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Former § 36-1-139 (Acts 1979, ch. 360, § 1; T.C.A., § 36-140; Acts 1989, ch. 507, § 2), concerning the reuniting of siblings after adoption, was repealed by Acts 1995, ch. 532, § 1, effective January 1, 1996.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class E felony, § 40-35-111.

Law Reviews.

Adoption and Custody: Current Trends in Tennessee Family Law: Tennessee's New Adoption Contact Veto is Cold Comfort to Birth Parents, 27 U. Mem. L. Rev. 843 (1997).

36-1-140. Immunity for actions in good faith by department personnel and immunity of certain other persons.

  1. The actions of the personnel of the department, or the departments of health, finance and administration, and general services, or their successors, undertaken in the performance of their duties pursuant to §§ 36-1-125 — 36-1-138 or pursuant to § 36-2-318, or those actions of a licensed child-placing agency or licensed clinical social worker when acting pursuant to § 36-1-134, within the scope of its authority shall be presumed to be undertaken in good faith and the personnel of these departments or licensed child-placing agencies or the licensed clinical social worker and the officers and agents of the state shall thereby be entitled to absolute immunity from any liability, civil or criminal, that might otherwise be incurred or imposed. The presumption shall only be overcome by clear and convincing evidence that the actions were malicious or were for personal gain.
  2. The absolute immunity of subsection (a) shall extend to information provided by any of the entities, their officers, personnel or agents under subsection (a) that is obtained from another source and that is either incorrect or false.
  3. No information that is released pursuant to this part concerning a biological or legal parent or guardian who voluntarily surrendered or consented to adoption of a child shall be the basis for any civil liability of the biological or legal parent or guardian.

Acts 1995, ch. 532, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Former § 36-1-140, concerning release of information about the adoptee's biological family, was transferred to § 36-1-133.

Law Reviews.

Adoption and Custody: Current Trends in Tennessee Family Law: Tennessee's New Adoption Contact Veto is Cold Comfort to Birth Parents, 27 U. Mem. L. Rev. 843 (1997).

36-1-141. Fees for searches, registration of contact vetoes, and copies — Promulgation of rules — Forms.

      1. The department shall, by rules promulgated pursuant to the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, compiled in title 4, chapter 5, part 2, establish fees or charges for conducting any search or record disclosure, except for those pursuant to § 36-1-135, and for transmission of any data in connection with such searches, for:
        1. Providing any nonidentifying information;
        2. Registering requests for contact vetoes;
        3. Registering requests with the advance notice of registry; or
        4. Providing copies of documents.
      2. The rules shall provide for waiver of any fees or charges based upon a person's ability to pay.
    1. Any fees or charges received by the department pursuant to this part shall be deposited with the state treasurer in accordance with § 9-4-301.
  1. The department shall, by rules promulgated pursuant to the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, establish forms that shall be required for use by all Tennessee courts, agencies, and persons for:
    1. Surrenders and parental consents;
    2. Medical and social history information required by § 36-1-111;
    3. Revocation of surrenders and parental consents;
    4. Consents by minors or guardians ad litem required by § 36-1-117;
    5. Certifications of completion of counseling and the criteria for counseling and certifications of the completion of legal service required by § 36-1-111;
    6. Disclosure forms required pursuant to this part;
    7. Contact veto forms used in the surrender or parental consents pursuant to any other requirements of this part, or sworn statement forms required for access to records pursuant to any requirements of this part; and
    8. Releases of information.
    1. The forms required by subsection (b) shall be promulgated pursuant to the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, and shall be mandatory forms, and shall, notwithstanding any law to the contrary, be effective as emergency rules on the dates any of the sections of this part necessitating their promulgation become effective as provided by this part; provided, that the provisions of the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, related to promulgation of such forms as permanent rules must be followed.
      1. Unless otherwise specifically directed by the general assembly, no provision of Acts 1996, ch. 1054, or any other law that may necessitate the modification of any of the mandatory forms that may be required by this part or any other title of Tennessee Code Annotated at any time shall require the modification of any existing form or use of any new form until the department or its successor agency providing adoption services under this part pursuant to any executive order or pursuant to any other legislation promulgates such form as a permanent rule and such rule is effective, or unless it is determined by the department or its successor agency providing adoption services under this part pursuant to any executive order or pursuant to any other legislation that such change must be made under any requirements of § 4-5-209.
      2. No surrender, revocation, adoption or any other activity requiring the use of any form promulgated pursuant to this part shall be defective, void or invalid because it is undertaken using any form that is in effect as a promulgated and effective rule of the department or its successor agency providing adoption services under this part pursuant to any executive order or pursuant to any other legislation on the date of such action, whether or not any new or amended provision of Acts 1996, ch. 1054, or any law has been enacted prior to the date of such action, until such form has been promulgated and is effective as a permanent rule, or as otherwise required by § 4-5-209. It is the intent of the general assembly to preclude in any manner questions concerning the validity of any adoption or related proceeding or procedure due to the failure or inability of the department or its successor agency providing adoption services under this part pursuant to any executive order or pursuant to any other legislation to make timely changes to such mandatory forms.
    2. Notwithstanding the provisions of the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, or any other provision of Acts 1996, ch. 1054, to the contrary, any forms promulgated by the department, or its successor state agency providing adoption services under this part pursuant to any executive order or pursuant to any other legislation, which forms are related to any provisions of this part for the implementation of the contact veto or consent to contact or release of identifying information process involving the access to records pursuant to this part, shall be effective as emergency rules, following approval of such emergency rules by the attorney general and reporter, upon the date of the filing of such rules with the secretary of state; provided, that the provisions of the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, relative to the promulgation of such rules as permanent rules must be followed.
  2. Any other rules required by the departments of children's services, health, and general services to effect implementation of this part upon the effective dates of any sections in this part, including rules establishing fees and charges for services, shall, notwithstanding any law to the contrary, be effective as emergency rules on the date of filing such rules; provided, that the provisions of the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, related to promulgation of such rules as permanent rules must be followed.
  3. The departments of children's services, health, and general services shall be authorized to promulgate such other rules pursuant to the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, as may be necessary for the implementation of this part.
  4. The departments of children's services, health and general services shall make master copies of all forms necessary for compliance with Acts 1995, ch. 532, available to all clerks of courts with adoption or surrender jurisdiction, to the administrative office of the courts, to the department of children's services' county offices, to all licensed child-placing agencies and to any persons requesting them. Such master copies may then be duplicated and such exact duplicates shall be valid for any use required by this part. Master copies may, in addition, be provided to the clerks, the administrative office of the courts, the department of children's services' county offices, to all licensed child-placing agencies and to any persons requesting them by any suitable electronic medium as is deemed suitable to each of the departments for its purposes. Electronic facsimile copies of the forms prescribed under this section shall be valid for use as may be required.

Acts 1995, ch. 532, § 1; 1996, ch. 1054, §§ 100, 101, 126; 1996, ch. 1079, § 69; 1998, ch. 1022, § 2; 2009, ch. 566, § 12.

Compiler's Notes. Former § 36-1-141 (Acts 1995, ch. 285, §§ 1, 2; 1986, ch. 767, § 10; 1989, ch. 507, §§ 1, 3-5), concerning disclosure of adoption records, was repealed by Acts 1995, ch. 532, § 1, effective January 1, 1996.

Acts 1995, ch. 532, referred to in (f), rewrote this part and amended several sections in titles 37, 68 and 71. For codification of this act, see the Session Laws Disposition Table in Volume 13 of the Tennessee Code Annotated.

Acts 1996, ch. 1054, referred to throughout (c), amended numerous sections in this chapter. See the Session Laws Disposition Table in Volume 13 of the Tennessee Code Annotated.

Former subdivision (c)(2)(A) was deleted as obsolete, and former subdivisions (c)(2)(B) and (c)(2)(C) were redesignated as subdivisions (c)(2)(A) and (c)(2)(B) by the code commission in 2001.

Acts 2009, ch. 566, § 12 provided that the Tennessee code commission is directed to change all references to public necessity rules, wherever such references appear in this code, to emergency rules, as sections are amended and volumes are replaced.

Law Reviews.

Adoption and Custody: Current Trends in Tennessee Family Law: Tennessee's New Adoption Contact Veto is Cold Comfort to Birth Parents, 27 U. Mem. L. Rev. 843 (1997).

36-1-142. Voluntary delivery of infant to facility, revocation of voluntary delivery, and termination of parental rights.

  1. Notwithstanding any other law to the contrary and without complying with the surrender provisions of this part, any facility, as defined by § 68-11-255, shall receive possession of an infant aged two (2) weeks or younger upon the voluntary delivery of the infant by the infant's mother, pursuant to § 68-11-255.
  2. The facility, any facility employee or any member of the professional medical community at such facility shall notify the department of children's services as soon as reasonably possible and no later than twenty-four (24) hours after taking possession of an infant under this section. The department or the department's authorized designee shall immediately assume the care, custody and control of such infant and shall petition the appropriate court for legal custody of such child.
  3. Voluntary delivery of an infant pursuant to § 68-11-255 and failure of the mother voluntarily delivering such child to visit or seek contact with such infant for a period of thirty (30) days after the date of delivery, and failure to seek contact with the infant through the department or to revoke the voluntary delivery within thirty (30) days after notice was completed pursuant to this section, which shall cumulatively be no less than ninety (90) days from the date such child was voluntarily delivered to such facility, shall be a basis for termination of parental rights pursuant to this part.
    1. A mother who voluntarily delivers an infant pursuant to § 68-11-255 may revoke such voluntary delivery by applying to a court that is qualified to receive a surrender pursuant to § 36-1-111 no later than thirty (30) days after notice was completed under subsection (e).
    2. After such thirty (30) days, no voluntary delivery pursuant to § 68-11-255 shall be set aside except upon clear and convincing evidence of duress, fraud or intentional misrepresentation.
    1. Within ten (10) days of receipt of an infant under this section, the department shall give notice once a week for four (4) consecutive weeks in a newspaper or other publication of general circulation in the county in which such voluntary delivery occurred. The department shall also give such notice in any other county for which there are any facts known to the department that reasonably indicate the infant's mother or father may be so located. The notice shall include information to provide an opportunity for the putative father to claim paternity and for the mother to revoke voluntary delivery. Such notice shall describe the infant, identify where and when voluntary delivery occurred, specify how and who to contact for follow up and provide any other relevant information.
    2. The notice shall specify that failure to seek contact with the infant through the department or to revoke the voluntary delivery within thirty (30) days of the date of the last publication of notice shall constitute abandonment of the infant and of the mother's interest.
    3. The notice shall specify that any father of such infant who fails to claim paternity by contacting the department or registering with the putative father registry pursuant to § 36-2-318 within thirty (30) days of the last publication shall be barred from thereafter bringing or maintaining any action to establish paternity of the infant. It shall also specify that such failure shall constitute abandonment of any right to notice of, or to a hearing in, any judicial proceeding for the adoption of such infant and that consent of such putative father shall not be required for adoption of the infant.
  4. The department shall designate one (1) or more persons to serve as a contact in the event the mother requires additional information, including but not limited to the legal effect of voluntary delivery of the infant, revocation of voluntary delivery, availability of relevant social services and follow-up inquiries once the mother has left the facility. The department shall provide all facilities designated to receive infants under this section with the name, phone number and other necessary information regarding such contact person.

Acts 2001, ch. 388, § 2; 2020, ch. 684, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2001, ch. 388, § 8 provided that the departments of children's services and health are authorized to promulgate rules and regulations pursuant to the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, compiled in title 4, chapter 5, as necessary to effectuate the provisions of this section.

Acts 2001, ch. 388, § 9 provided that the department of health, in conjunction with the department of children's services, shall encourage and support, to the extent of existing resources, community programs to raise public awareness of the incidence of infant abandonment and to provide information and intervention services for parents of unwanted infants.

Acts 2001, ch. 388, § 11 provided that nothing in the act shall be construed to be an appropriation of funds and no funds shall be obligated or expended pursuant to the act unless such funds are specifically appropriated by the General Appropriations Act.

Amendments. The 2020 amendment, in (a), substituted “two (2) weeks” for “seventy-two (72) hours”.

Effective Dates. Acts 2020, ch. 684, § 4. June 15, 2020.

Attorney General Opinions. T.C.A. § 36-1-142 is constitutionally defensible against a facial challenge, OAG 02-027, 2002 Tenn. AG LEXIS 28 (3/7/02).

36-1-143. Post-adoption services to support permanency in adoption.

  1. The department shall provide post-adoption services in order to reduce the risk of adoption dissolution and to support the goal of permanency in adoption.
  2. The department shall provide the following post-adoption services either directly or through purchase of service providers:
    1. Crisis intervention, including the provision of immediate assessment and time limited treatment in volatile situations and connecting families to long-term adoption sensitive treatment providers;
    2. Family and individual counseling, including the provision of mental health counseling to families and children to address issues challenging family communication, integration and other issues that may be threatening the family unit;
    3. Support groups for parents and children, including educational and recreational group experiences that bring families and children together who share the experience of the adoption process and are family strength focused;
    4. Advocacy, including information and referral services to assist families in navigating and accessing services through the community, educational, mental health and medical provider systems;
    5. Respite, including services that provide temporary, nonthreatening relief to families and children undergoing challenging circumstances and those in crisis;
    6. Case management services to stabilize volatile family situations, to develop short-term intervention plans and to connect the family with ongoing services and support systems; and
    7. Networking of families and community providers, including the provision of educational experiences that build a more adoption sensitive provider community to be aware of and responsive to families created through adoption.
  3. Post-adoption services are available to:
    1. Families who have adopted children for whom the department had legal responsibility immediately preceding the adoption; and
    2. Biological families of children adopted through the department.
  4. Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent access to records of the adopted person as otherwise permitted or required by this part.
  5. It is the legislative intent that this section shall be carried out subject to the availability of funds with which to do so and that this section shall not be implemented beyond budgetary limitations.

Acts 2009, ch. 521, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2009, ch. 521, § 2 provided that the commissioner of children's services is authorized to promulgate rules and regulations to effectuate the purposes of this section. The rules and regulations shall be promulgated in accordance with the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, compiled in title 4, chapter 5.

36-1-144. Categories of information to be provided to adoptive family.

  1. To provide full disclosure about a child to be adopted from the department's guardianship, the department shall provide to the adoptive family the following categories of information, to the extent that they are available:
    1. Historical and current health information;
    2. Historical and current educational information;
    3. Historical and current mental and behavioral health information;
    4. Nationality, ethnic background, race, and religious preference;
    5. Other information required for the adoptive family to evaluate its ability to provide appropriate care for the child, including daily routine, social and emotional well-being, and personality;
    6. Relevant information about the child's experience in foster care and reasons for coming into care;
    7. Pertinent prenatal and birth information, including birth date, time of birth, weight, and other physical characteristics at birth; and
    8. A general physical description, including height, weight, hair color, eye color, and any other information related to the child's physical appearance.
  2. The department shall also provide the following categories of nonidentifying information about the child's biological or legal family, to the extent that they are available:
    1. Historical and current health information;
    2. Historical and current educational and occupational information;
    3. Historical and current mental and behavioral health information;
    4. Nationality, ethnic background, race, and religious preference; and
    5. A general physical description, including height, weight, hair color, eye color, and any other information related to the physical appearance of the child's biological or legal family.
  3. Nothing in this section shall be construed to authorize or require the release of information that may lead to the discovery of the identity or location of the biological or legal relatives of the child to be adopted.

Acts 2015, ch. 199, § 2.

36-1-145. Written contract for post-adoption contact between certain parties — Requirements — Enforcement — Modification — Termination.

  1. A prospective adoptive parent or an adoptive parent and a biological parent; or a prospective adoptive parent or an adoptive parent, a biological parent, and a child who is fourteen (14) years of age or older who is being adopted or who has been adopted, may voluntarily enter into a written contract for post-adoption contact that permits continued contact between legal relatives and the child. Unless expressly designated as a moral agreement only and that the agreement is not intended to be legally enforceable, a written agreement executed in accordance with this section is a contract for post-adoption contact, and is enforceable pursuant to this section. A subject child fourteen (14) years of age or older is a necessary party to a contract for post-adoption contact and is deemed to have the capacity to enter into a contract for purposes of this section.
  2. A contract for post-adoption contact may provide for privileges regarding an adopted child, including, but not limited to, visitation with the child, contact with the child, sharing of information about the child, or sharing of information about biological parents or adoptive parents.
  3. A contract for post-adoption contact must be in writing and signed by all parties to the agreement and is enforceable pursuant to this section. A verbal agreement or written statement not signed by all parties is not enforceable under this section. A provision of a contract for post-adoption contact permitting contact between an adopted child and a person legally restrained from contact with the child, or with children generally, is not enforceable under this section. A contract for post-adoption contact becomes enforceable under this section upon finalization of the anticipated adoption. Unless the parties state otherwise in the contract, a contract for post-adoption contact may be enforceable until the child being adopted reaches eighteen (18) years of age.
  4. As used in this section, “parties” means the prospective adoptive parent or adoptive parent, the biological parent, and the child if the child is fourteen (14) years of age or older at the time of the contract, but excludes any third-party beneficiary to the contract.
  5. A contract for post-adoption contact must contain the following warnings in at least fourteen (14) point boldface type:
    1. After the entry of an order of adoption, an adoption cannot be set aside due to the failure of an adoptive parent, a biological parent, or the child to follow the terms of this contract or a later change to this contract; and
    2. A disagreement between the parties or litigation brought to enforce or modify this contract shall not affect the validity of the adoption and cannot serve as a basis for orders affecting the custody of the child.
  6. Except as otherwise provided in subdivision (j)(5), the court issuing the order of adoption has continuing jurisdiction over enforcement or modification of a contract for post-adoption contact.
  7. A party to a contract for post-adoption contact may file the original contract with the court having jurisdiction over the adoption if the contract provides for court enforcement or if the contract is silent as to the issue of enforcement. A contract filed with the adoption court must be filed in the adoption action, unless an action to enforce the contract is filed. An action to enforce the contract is a new and independent action.
  8. A contract for post-adoption contact may be modified or terminated by voluntary execution of a modification or termination agreement by all living parties to the original contract. A modified contract for post-adoption contact may be filed with the court if the contract provides for court enforcement or the contract is silent as to enforcement.
  9. A court shall not set aside an order of adoption, rescind a waiver of interest or surrender, or modify an order terminating parental rights due to the failure of a party to comply with any or all the original terms of, or subsequent modifications to, a contract for post-adoption contact.
  10. A biological parent shall not petition the court for modification of a contract for post-adoption contact. Only the adoptive parent or the child may petition the court to modify a contract for post-adoption contact. For purposes of this section, a petition to terminate a post-adoption contract will be considered a petition for modification of the contract. Any party may petition the court for enforcement of a contract for post-adoption contact. Enforcement or modification of an enforceable contract for post-adoption contact must be initiated by an appropriate party as follows:
    1. By delivering a letter, by certified mail or personal service, to all other parties to the contract stating with reasonable particularity the enforcement or modification sought and the reason for such request;
    2. The party against whom enforcement or modification is sought has thirty (30) days after receipt of the letter to provide a response;
    3. If no response is received within thirty (30) days, or the response is not satisfactory to the party initiating enforcement or modification, the adoptive parent must seek and obtain, at the parent's own expense, a written opinion from a licensed psychological professional holding a certification equal to or greater than that of clinical social worker as to the child's best interests on the issue or issues raised and a recommendation as to whether any or all of the requested enforcement or modification should occur, including any other recommendations based on the child's best interests regarding the child's relationship to the parties. The opinion of the psychological professional must be completed and provided to the other parties by the adoptive parents within ninety (90) days of the delivery of the initial notice;
    4. If the professional recommendation does not result in a resolution of the issues, or if the adoptive parent fails to obtain the opinion of a psychological professional within the time provided, the parties shall attend mediation within thirty (30) days of the release of the written recommendation or within one hundred twenty (120) days of the delivery of the initial notice. The parties may agree on a mediator, or a party otherwise authorized to do so under this section may file a petition for modification or enforcement of the contract before the court that issued the order of adoption and request appointment of a mediator. The adoptive parent is responsible for the mediation costs; and
    5. If the issues raised are not resolved after two (2) mediation sessions, the mediation reaches an impasse as determined by the mediator, or the opposing party refuses to participate in mediation, a party, if permitted under this section, may petition the court that issued the order of adoption for relief. If the court that issued the order of adoption is not a Tennessee court and a biological parent residing in Tennessee is seeking enforcement of a contract for post-adoption contact, then the biological parent may petition for enforcement of the contract in a court with adoption jurisdiction in the county where the biological parent resides. If at that time no party resides in this state, the petition may be filed in a court with adoption jurisdiction where the child resides. Tennessee law applies to enforcement of contracts made pursuant to this section regardless of where the action is filed. The burden of proof is on the party seeking enforcement or modification. The standard of proof is a preponderance of the evidence. The best interests of the child must be the court's primary test for determining whether the contract should be modified or enforced, but the good faith of all parties, any change in circumstances since the contract was executed, and each party's compliance with the contract to date, are also relevant considerations. The court may consider such other evidence as is appropriate to reach an equitable resolution.
  11. Any further requests for enforcement or modification based on the same or similar allegations made by the same party must be filed at the expense of the moving party directly in the court that granted the order for adoption. A party determined by the court to be noncompliant must overcome a presumption of bad faith.
  12. Court costs and attorney fees incurred by any party to the contract and the fees of any attorney for the child incurred under subsection (j)(5) may be taxed to all or any parties. The good faith and means of each party are to be primary considerations for apportionment of fees and expenses.
  13. Should an adoptive parent lose legal custody of the child, the process in this section to enforce a contract for post-adoption contact must be suspended until such time as custody is restored. However, a subsequent custodian may choose to comply with the contract as a moral agreement.
    1. A guardian ad litem appointed for the subject child in a contested termination of parental rights is not a necessary party to a contract for post-adoption contact. Parties to a proposed agreement shall offer the guardian ad litem an opportunity to participate in the negotiation of the agreement and to review the final agreement before it is executed, and shall provide to the guardian ad litem a copy of the contract for post-adoption contact after it is executed.
    2. If the contract for post-adoption contact is part of an agreed resolution to a contested termination of parental or guardianship rights action, then the child's guardian ad litem shall advocate for the best interest of the child before the execution of the agreement. The guardian ad litem may request a hearing before the court, prior to resolution of the termination of parental or guardianship rights action, to offer evidence regarding whether the contract for post-adoption contact serves the child's best interest. The court may consider the terms of a contract for post-adoption contact in determining whether termination of parental or guardianship rights is in the best interest of the child.
    3. A contract for post-adoption contact may not expand or extend the duties of the guardian ad litem after the final resolution of the case in which the guardian ad litem is appointed. If a court determines that a child requires a guardian ad litem in an action to enforce or modify a contract for post-adoption contact, the court may make a new guardian ad litem appointment.

Acts 2019, ch. 35, § 2; 2020, ch. 525, §§ 10, 11.

Amendments. The 2020 amendment inserted the second sentence in (j)(5) and added (n).

Effective Dates. Acts 2019, ch. 35, § 4. March 22, 2019.

Acts 2020, ch. 525, § 13. March 6, 2020.

36-1-146. Rebuttable presumption that guardian ad litem's fees divided equally between parties.

If a court appoints a guardian ad litem in a pending adoption proceeding, there will be a rebuttable presumption that the guardian ad litem's fees shall be divided equally between the parties, excluding the person being adopted; provided, that if a party is found by the court to be indigent, the guardian ad litem shall charge that party's portion of the fees to the state through the administrative office of the courts claims and payment system, and bill the remaining parties at the same hourly rate as paid by the administrative office of the courts claims and payment system.

Acts 2019, ch. 409, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. For Preamble to the act concerning the best interests of children and encouragement of adoption, see Acts 2019, ch. 409.

Effective Dates. Acts 2019, ch. 409, § 2. May 21, 2019.

36-1-147. Private licensed child-placing agencies.

  1. To the extent allowed by federal law, no private licensed child-placing agency shall be required to perform, assist, counsel, recommend, consent to, refer, or participate in any placement of a child for foster care or adoption when the proposed placement would violate the agency's written religious or moral convictions or policies.
  2. To the extent allowed by federal law, the department of children's services shall not deny an application for an initial license or renewal of a license or revoke the license of a private child-placing agency because of the agency's objection to performing, assisting, counseling, recommending, consenting to, referring, or participating in a placement that violates the agency's written religious or moral convictions or policies.
  3. To the extent allowed by federal law, a state or local government entity shall not deny to a private licensed child-placing agency any grant, contract, or participation in a government program because of the agency's objection to performing, assisting, counseling, recommending, consenting to, referring, or participating in a placement that violates the agency's written religious or moral convictions or policies.
  4. Refusal of a private licensed child-placing agency to perform, assist, counsel, recommend, consent to, refer, or participate in a placement that violates the agency's written religious or moral convictions or policies shall not form the basis of a civil action for either damages or injunctive relief.

Acts 2020, ch. 514, § 1.

Effective Dates. Acts 2020, ch. 514, § 2. January 24, 2020.

Part 2
Interstate Compact on Adoption and Medical Assistance

36-1-201. Terms of compact.

The Interstate Compact on Adoption and Medical Assistance is hereby enacted into law and entered into with all other jurisdictions legally joining therein in form substantially as follows:

INTERSTATE COMPACT ON ADOPTION AND MEDICAL ASSISTANCE

Article I. Findings

The party states find that:

  1. In order to obtain adoptive families for children with special needs, prospective adoptive parents must be assured of substantial assistance (usually on a continuing basis) in meeting the high costs of supporting and providing for the special needs and services required by such children;
  2. The states have a fundamental interest in promoting adoption for children with special needs because the care, emotional stability and general support and encouragement required by such children to surmount their physical, mental or emotional conditions can be best, and often only, obtained in family homes with a normal parent-child relationship;
  3. The states obtain advantages from providing adoption assistance because the customary alternative is for the state to defray the entire cost of meeting all the needs of such children;
  4. The special needs involved are for the emotional, physical maintenance of the child, and medical support and services; and
  5. The necessary assurance of adoption assistance for children with special needs, in those instances where children and adoptive parents are in states other than the one undertaking to provide the assistance, is to establish and maintain suitable substantive guarantees and workable procedures for interstate payments to assist with the necessary child maintenance, procurement of services, and medical assistance.

Article II. Purposes

The purposes of this compact are to:

  1. Strengthen protections for the interest of the children with special needs on behalf of whom adoption assistance is committed to be paid, when such children are in or move to states other than the one committed to make adoption assistance payments; and
  2. Provide substantive assurances and procedures which will promote the delivery of medical and other services on an interstate basis to children through programs of adoption assistance established by the laws of the party states.

Article III. Definitions

As used in this compact, unless the context clearly requires a different construction:

  1. “Adoption assistance” means the payment or payments for maintenance of a child, which payment or payments are made or committed to be made pursuant to the adoption assistance program established by the laws of a party state;
  2. “Adoption assistance state” means the state that is signatory to an adoption assistance agreement in a particular case;
  3. “Child with special needs” means a minor who has not yet attained the age at which the state normally discontinues children's services or twenty-one (21) years of age, where the state determines that the child's disabilities warrant the continuation of assistance, for whom the state has determined the following:
    1. That the child cannot or should not be returned to the home of the child's parents;
    2. That there exists with respect to the child a specific factor or condition (such as the child's ethnic background, age, or membership in a minority or sibling group, or the presence of factors such as medical condition or disabilities) because of which it is reasonable to conclude that such child cannot be placed with adoptive parents without providing adoption assistance;
    3. That, except where it would be against the best interests of the child because of such factors as the existence of significant emotional ties with prospective adoptive parents while in the care of such parents as a foster child, a reasonable, but unsuccessful, effort has been made to place the child with appropriate adoptive parents without providing adoption assistance payments;
  4. “Parents” means either the singular or plural of the word “parent;”
  5. “Residence state” means the state of which the child is a resident by virtue of the residence of the adoptive parents; and
  6. “State” means a state of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, or a territory or possession of the United States.

Article IV. Adoption Assistance

  1. Each state shall determine the amounts of adoption assistance and other aid which it will give to children with special needs and their adoptive parents in accordance with its own laws and programs. The adoption assistance and other aid may be made subject to periodic reevaluation of eligibility by the adoption assistance state in accordance with its laws. The provisions of this Article and of Article V are subject to the limitation set forth in this paragraph.
  2. The adoption assistance and medical assistance services and benefits to which this compact applies are those provided to children with special needs and their adoptive parents from the time of the final decree of adoption or the interlocutory decree of adoption, as the case may be, pursuant to the laws of the adoption assistance state. In addition to the content required by subsequent provisions of this Article for adoption assistance agreements, each such agreement shall state whether the initial adoption assistance period thereunder begins with the final or interlocutory decree of adoption. Aid provided by party states to children with special needs during the preadoptive placement period or earlier shall be under the foster care or other programs of the states and, except as provided in paragraph 3 of this Article, shall not be governed by the provisions of this compact.
  3. Every case of adoption assistance shall include an adoption assistance agreement between the adoptive parents and the agency of the state undertaking to provide the adoption assistance. Every such agreement shall contain provisions for the fixing of actual or potential interstate aspects of the adoption assistance, as follows:
    1. An express commitment that the adoption assistance shall be payable without regard for the state of residence of the adoptive parents, both at the outset of the agreement period and at all times during its continuance;
    2. A provision setting forth with particularity the types of child care and services toward which the adoption assistance state will make payments;
    3. A commitment to make medical assistance available to the child in accordance with Article V of this compact; and
    4. An express declaration that the agreement is for the benefit of the child, the adoptive parents and the state and that it is enforceable by any or all of them.
  4. Any services or benefits provided by the residence state and the adoption assistance state for a child may be facilitated by the party states on each other's behalf. To this end, the personnel of the child welfare agencies of the party states will assist each other and beneficiaries of adoption assistance agreements with other party states in implementing benefits expressly included in adoption assistance agreements. However, it is recognized and agreed that in general children to whom adoption assistance agreements apply are eligible for benefits under the child welfare, education, rehabilitation, mental health and other programs of their state of residence on the same basis as other resident children.
  5. Adoption assistance payments, when made on behalf of a child in another state, shall be made on the same basis and in the same amounts as they would be made if the child were in the state making the payments.

Article V. Medical Assistance

  1. Children for whom a party state is committed in accordance with the terms of an adoption assistance agreement to make adoption assistance payments are eligible for medical assistance during the entire period for which such payments are to be provided. Upon application therefor by the adoptive parents of a child on whose behalf a party state's duly constituted authorities have entered into an adoption assistance agreement, the adoptive parents shall receive a medical assistance identification made out in the child's name. The identification shall be issued by the medical assistance program of the residence state and shall entitle the child to the same benefits, pursuant to the same procedures, as any other child who is a resident of the state and covered by medical assistance, whether or not the adoptive parents are eligible for medical assistance.
  2. The identification shall bear no indication that an adoption assistance agreement with another state is the basis for issuance. However, if the identification is issued on account of an outstanding adoption assistance agreement to which another state is a signatory, the records of the issuing state and the adoption assistance state shall show the fact, shall contain a copy of the adoption assistance agreement and any amendment or replacement therefor, and all other pertinent information. The adoption assistance and medical assistance programs of the adoption assistance state shall be notified of the identification issuance.
  3. A state which has issued a medical assistance identification pursuant to this compact, which identification is valid and currently in force, shall accept, process and pay medical assistance claims thereon as on any other medical assistance eligibilities of residents.
  4. An adoption assistance state which provides medical services or benefits to children covered by its adoption assistance agreements, which services or benefits are not provided for those children under the medical assistance program of the residence state, may enter into cooperative arrangements with the residence state to facilitate the delivery and administration of such services and benefits. However, any such arrangements shall not be inconsistent with this compact nor shall they relieve the residence state of any obligation to provide medical assistance in accordance with its laws and this compact.
  5. A child whose residence is changed from one (1) party state to another party state shall be eligible for medical assistance under the medical assistance program of the new state of residence.

Article VI. Joinder and Withdrawal

  1. This compact shall be open to joinder by any state. It shall enter into force as to a state when its duly constituted and empowered authority has executed it.
  2. In order that the provisions of this compact may be accessible to and known by the general public and so that its status as law in each of the party states may be fully implemented the full text of the compact, together with a notice of its execution, shall be caused to be published by the authority which has executed it in each party state. Copies of the compact shall be made available upon request made of the executing authority in any state.
  3. Withdrawal from this compact shall be by written notice sent by the authority which executed it to the appropriate officials of all other party states, but no such notice shall take effect until one (1) year after it is given in accordance with the requirements of this paragraph.
  4. All adoption assistance agreements outstanding and to which a party state is signatory at the time when its withdrawal from this compact takes effect shall continue to have the effects given to them pursuant to this compact, until they expire or are terminated in accordance with their provisions. Until such expiration or termination, all beneficiaries of the agreements involved shall continue to have all rights and obligations conferred or imposed by this compact and the withdrawing state shall continue to administer the compact to the extent necessary to accord and implement fully the rights and protections preserved hereby.

Acts 1985, ch. 35, § 1; 2011, ch. 47, §§ 27, 28.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2011, ch. 47, § 107 provided that nothing in the legislation shall be construed to alter or otherwise affect the eligibility for services or the rights or responsibilities of individuals covered by the provision on the day before the date of enactment of this legislation, which was July 1, 2011.

Acts 2011, ch. 47, § 108 provided that the provisions of the act are declared to be remedial in nature and all provisions of the act shall be liberally construed to effectuate its purposes.

36-1-202. Amount of assistance.

The amounts of adoption assistance and other aid that Tennessee will provide to children with special needs in accordance with Article IV of the Interstate Compact on Adoption and Medical Assistance shall be determined in accordance with § 37-5-106(a)(13).

Acts 1985, ch. 35, § 2.

36-1-203. Documentation of eligibility.

For the purpose of determining eligibility for any benefit under this part from the state of Tennessee, the adoptive parents of any child on whose behalf benefits are sought shall annually furnish the department of children's services documentation establishing that the adoption assistance agreement continues in force or has been renewed.

Acts 1985, ch. 35, § 3; 1996, ch. 1079, § 69.

36-1-204. Applicability of part.

This part shall apply only to medical assistance for children under adoption assistance agreements from states that have entered into a compact with this state under which the other state provides medical assistance to children with special needs under adoption assistance agreements made by this state. Eligibility of all other children for assistance pursuant to adoption assistance agreements entered into by this state shall be determined in accordance with the laws and regulations applicable thereto.

Acts 1985, ch. 35, § 4.

36-1-205. Violations — Penalties.

Whoever knowingly obtains, or attempts to obtain, or aids, or abets any person to obtain, by means of a willfully false statement or representation or by impersonation, or other fraudulent device, any assistance on behalf of a child or other person pursuant to the Interstate Compact on Adoption Assistance and Medical Assistance to which such child or other person is not entitled or assistance greater than such child or other person is entitled, commits a Class E felony.

Acts 1985, ch. 35, § 5; 1989, ch. 591, § 32.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class E felony, § 40-35-111.

36-1-206. Construction — Compliance with federal laws.

This compact shall, insofar as practical, be construed to be in compliance with all federal laws governing adoption assistance and payment for medical assistance. In the event subsequent changes in federal law or regulations necessitate changes in the text of the compact, the commissioner of children's services is authorized to promulgate such regulations as may be necessary to alter the terms of the compact to comply with federal law or regulations.

Acts 1985, ch. 35, § 6; 1996, ch. 1079, § 69.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 1996, ch. 1079, § 184 provided:

“Any provision of this act, or the application thereof, which is inconsistent with federal law, rule or regulation shall be deemed to be construed as being consistent with federal law, rule or regulation.”

Part 3
Adoption Contact Veto Registry

36-1-301. Advance notice system.

The object of this part is to establish an advance notice system that enables an eligible person to request the department to provide advance notification prior to the release of adoption records, sealed records, sealed adoption records, post-adoption records, or any other records or papers under § 36-1-127(c) that have information regarding such person in order to give the person requesting advance notification the opportunity to prepare for the release and any impact this might have on the person or the person's family or associates. If the department has received such a request, it shall delay the release of the adoption records, sealed records, sealed adoption records, post-adoption records, or any other records or papers to another person during the advance notice period.

Acts 1998, ch. 1022, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

9. Visitation Improper.

Trial court properly found that the father had physically or emotionally abused the children, giving it express statutory authority to prohibit visitation until there was no reasonable likelihood that such abuse would recur because the court previously upheld the trial court's determination that the father committed sexual abuse against the child. In re Emmalee O., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 321 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 13, 2018).

36-1-302. “Advance notice period” defined.

As used in this part, unless the context otherwise requires, “advance notice period” means the fifteen-day period from the date of mailing a notice regarding the impending release of adoption records, sealed records, sealed adoption records, post-adoption records, or any other records or papers to a person who has requested that the department provide advance notice prior to releasing the information.

Acts 1998, ch. 1022, § 1.

36-1-303. Persons entitled to file a request for advance notice.

  1. A person is entitled to file a request to be given advance notice before any adoption record, sealed record, sealed adoption record, post-adoption record, or any other records or papers with information regarding that person is released to another person if the person seeking to file the request is otherwise eligible to receive such information pursuant to this part.
  2. An eligible person desiring to place that person's name on the advance notice registry shall notify the department in writing on a form provided by the department, provide satisfactory proof of identity, and pay any necessary fees. The department shall supply the registration form upon request.

Acts 1998, ch. 1022, § 1.

36-1-304. Advance notice registry.

  1. The department shall establish and maintain an advance notice registry. Notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, the advance notice registry shall not be considered part of the post-adoption record or any other record or paper subject to release under § 36-1-127(c), and the information contained in the advance notice registry shall be confidential.
  2. The advance notice registry shall include, but not be limited to, the following information:
    1. Name of each person who has duly filed an advance notice request;
    2. Address given by the person as the mailing address at which any postal contact by the department with the person should be made;
    3. Date and place of birth of the person filing with the advance notice registry;
    4. Persons or class of persons affected by the request; and
    5. Advance notice period.
  3. A person whose name is entered in the advance notice registry shall advise the department of any change in the person's address.

Acts 1998, ch. 1022, § 1.

Cross-References. Confidentiality of public records, § 10-7-504.

36-1-305. Promulgation of necessary rules and regulations.

The department is authorized to promulgate necessary rules and regulations to facilitate the implementation of this part in accordance with the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, compiled in title 4, chapter 5, part 2.

Acts 1998, ch. 1022, § 1.

Chapter 2
Parentage

Part 1
[Reserved]

Part 2
[Reserved]

Part 3
Parentage and Legitimation

36-2-301. Statement of purpose.

This chapter provides a single cause of action to establish parentage of children other than establishment by adoption pursuant to chapter 1 of this title, or by acknowledgement of parentage pursuant to §§ 68-3-203(g), 68-3-302 or 68-3-305(b).

Acts 1997, ch. 477, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 1997, ch. 477, § 2 provides that any petition for legitimation filed prior to July 1, 1997, shall be adjudicated based upon the law in effect prior to July 1, 1997. Any order that results from a petition for legitimation in such circumstance shall be effective to establish all rights and responsibilities arising under the provisions of title 36, chapter 2, part 2 as it existed prior to July 1, 1997, whether the order is entered on or after July 1, 1997.

Acts 1997, ch. 477, § 2 further provides that nothing in this chapter shall be construed to alter or disturb any rights that accrued to any person or responsibilities assumed by any person pursuant to title 36, chapter 2, part 2 prior to July 1, 1997, including the authority of the state registrar to issue certificates of birth pursuant to the provisions of title 68, chapter 3, part 3 for children who have been the subject of orders of legitimation pursuant to court orders entered before or after July 1, 1997, that are based upon petitions filed prior to July 1, 1997, and which petitions resulted in orders of legitimation for those children.

Law Reviews.

Family Support and Supporting Families, 68 Vand. L. Rev. En Banc 153   (2015).

Federal Employees' Liability Act — Recovery For Wrongful Death By Illegitimate Child, 31 Tenn. L. Rev. 521 (1964).

Legal Rights and Issues Surrounding Conception, Pregnancy and Birth, 39 Vand. L. Rev. 597 (1986).

The Cradle Will Rock: Intentional Misrepresentation of Paternity, 49 Tenn. B.J. 12 (2013).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Standing.

Non-biological parent was not a biological parent, legal parent, or step parent, and she did not seek to adopt the child; thus, she did not fit within any of these statutory definitions of a parent, rendering her without standing to pursue a parentage action or visitation with the child. Pippin v. Pippin, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 220 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 14, 2020).

2. Construction.

Substituting “comparable feminine terms” for the words like “man” or “father,” as the non-biological parent proposed, goes beyond allowing words written in one gender be construed, where necessary, to apply to the other, and exceeds the purpose of the parentage statute; no rights or relationships are created by the parentage statutes, only a procedure by which the father is able to establish parentage and as such, recourse to T.C.A. § 1-3-104(b) for other purposes is not warranted. Pippin v. Pippin, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 220 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 14, 2020).

36-2-302. Chapter definitions.

As used in this chapter, unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “Child born out of wedlock” means a child born to parents who are not married to each other when the child was born;
  2. “Court” means the juvenile court or any trial court with general jurisdiction;
  3. “Father” means the biological father of a child born out of wedlock;
  4. “Mother” means the biological mother of a child born out of wedlock;
  5. “Parent” means the biological mother or biological father of a child, regardless of the marital status of the mother and father; and
  6. “Father,” “mother,” and “parent” do not include a biological parent whose parental rights have been terminated for a child whose parentage is at issue.

Acts 1997, ch. 477, § 1.

Law Reviews.

Family Law – Who is a Mother? Determining Legal Maternity in Surrogacy Arrangements in Tennessee (Christen Blackburn), 39 U. Mem. L. Rev. 349 (2009).

New-Age Babies and Age-Old Laws: The Need for an Intent-Based Approach in Tennessee to Preserve Parent-Child Succession for Children of Assisted Reproductive Technology (Jane Marie Lewis), 43 U. Mem. L. Rev. 479 (2012).

Note: You Are Not the Father! — Parental Liabilities and Rights of Sperm Donors in Tennessee, 47 U. Mem. L. Rev. 597 (2016).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Applicability.

Pursuant to T.C.A. § 36-2-302 and T.C.A. § 24-7-112, the biological father was the legal father of the child, absent the termination of his rights, and a best-interests analysis was relevant if an only if termination was appropriate; the evidence did not support the arguments of the mother and her husband that the biological father willfully failed to visit or support the child, as the evidence showed that, inter alia: (1) The mother actively concealed the child's parentage; and (2) The mother declined the biological father's offer of support. In re T.K.Y., 205 S.W.3d 343, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 757 (Tenn. 2006), rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 891 (Tenn. Sept. 19, 2006).

2. Parent.

Indictment charging defendant with especially aggravated kidnapping was valid and, thus, the summary dismissal of defendant's second petition for habeas corpus relief was warranted, because the victim was defendant's stepchild, and, as such, defendant was not a “parent” as statutorily defined, and the Goodman allegations were not required in the indictment; even if defendant was a “parent,” the superseding indictment included the language articulated in Goodman of “force, threat, or fraud.” Mitchell v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 876 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 29, 2015), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 226 (Tenn. Mar. 22, 2016).

Inasmuch as the Legislature has defined “father,” the court cannot give a gender-neutral meaning to that term for purposes of T.C.A. § 36-2-304; to do so would extend both statutes'  meanings beyond that set forth in the chapter. Statutes governing parentage contemplate a biological or genetic connection between the child and the putative parent, and as the non-biological parent did not have a biological connection to the child, she could not fit this definition. Pippin v. Pippin, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 220 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 14, 2020).

36-2-303. Custody with mother absent an order of custody.

Absent an order of custody to the contrary, custody of a child born out of wedlock is with the mother.

Acts 1997, ch. 477, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Sole Custodian.

Mother was the custodian of the child and had no obligation to notify the father of her intent to move with the child to another state, as there was no custody order or parenting plan establishing the father's custodial rights; his acknowledgment of paternity did not vest in him any custodial rights as a legal father, the point of the proceedings below was to establish him as the legal father, and until such an order was entered, there was no legal relationship between them, plus irreparable harm was not shown that justified an injunction changing custody. Milton v. Harness, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 154 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 3, 2017).

36-2-304. Presumption of parentage.

  1. A man is rebuttably presumed to be the father of a child if:
    1. The man and the child's mother are married or have been married to each other and the child is born during the marriage or within three hundred (300) days after the marriage is terminated by death, annulment, declaration of invalidity, or divorce;
    2. Before the child's birth, the man and the mother have attempted to marry each other in compliance with the law, although the attempted marriage is or could be declared illegal, void and voidable;
    3. After the child's birth, the man and the mother have married or attempted to marry each other in compliance with the law although such marriage is or could be declared illegal, void, or voidable; and:
      1. The man has acknowledged his paternity of the child in a writing filed under the putative father registry established by the department of children services, pursuant to § 36-2-318;
      2. The man has consented in writing to be named the child's father on the birth certificate; or
      3. The man is obligated to support the child under a written voluntary promise or by court order;
    4. While the child is under the age of majority, the man receives the child into the man's home and openly holds the child out as the man's natural child; or
    5. Genetic tests have been administered as provided in § 24-7-112, an exclusion has not occurred, and the test results show a statistical probability of parentage of ninety-five percent (95%) or greater.
    1. Except as provided in subdivision (b)(2), a presumption under subsection (a) may be rebutted in an appropriate action.
      1. If the mother was legally married and living with her husband at the time of conception and has remained together with that husband through the date a petition to establish parentage is filed and both the mother and the mother's husband file a sworn answer stating that the husband is the father of the child, any action seeking to establish parentage must be brought within twelve (12) months of the birth of the child. In the event that an action is dismissed based upon the filing of such a sworn answer, the husband and wife who filed such sworn answer shall be estopped to deny paternity in any future action.
      2. A petition to establish parentage may be brought under this part if a dismissal of a petition under the prior legitimization statutes was based upon the mother's marriage to another man at the time of conception or upon the petitioner's lack of standing. In such cases, the requirements of subdivision (b)(2)(A) requiring a petition to be filed within twelve (12) months of the birth of the child shall not apply. It is the intent of the general assembly that putative fathers who filed a cause of action under this chapter prior to the July 1, 1997, effective date of Acts 1997, ch. 477, and whose action was so dismissed, shall have an opportunity to prosecute a single cause of action under this part. Thus, the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel shall not bar such new or pending action, nor shall any statute of limitation that may have run bar such new or pending action. It is the clear and unequivocal intent of the general assembly that this provision shall be applied retroactively to such petitions to establish parentage. No such retroactive application shall, however, abrogate § 36-1-122.
    2. The standard of proof in an action to rebut paternity shall be by preponderance of the evidence.
    3. In any case, except terminations of parental rights or adoptions under this title or title 37, in which the paternity of a child is at issue and an agreed order or divorce decree has been entered finding that an individual is not the parent of the child, the finding shall not be entitled to preclusive effect unless the finding was based upon scientific tests to determine parentage that excluded the individual from parentage of the child in question.
  2. All prior presumptions of parentage established by the previous paternity and legitimation statutes and cases are abolished.

Acts 1997, ch. 477, § 1; 1998, ch. 1098, § 8; 1999, ch. 339, § 1; 2000, ch. 922, § 4.

Law Reviews.

Family Law – Who is a Mother? Determining Legal Maternity in Surrogacy Arrangements in Tennessee (Christen Blackburn), 39 U. Mem. L. Rev. 349 (2009).

Note: You Are Not the Father! — Parental Liabilities and Rights of Sperm Donors in Tennessee, 47 U. Mem. L. Rev. 597 (2016).

The Cradle Will Rock: Intentional Misrepresentation of Paternity, 49 Tenn. B.J. 12 (2013).

Attorney General Opinions. Statute of limitations in paternity proceedings, OAG 99-099, 1999 Tenn. AG LEXIS 99 (5/4/99).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

T.C.A. § 36-2-304 does not impermissibly interfere with familial privacy interests, or with the rights and interests of the husband of a woman whose child's parentage is disputed; accordingly, T.C.A. § 36-2-304 is constitutional on its face. State ex rel. Cihlar v. Crawford, 39 S.W.3d 172, 2000 Tenn. App. LEXIS 566 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000).

2. Custody and Kidnapping.

Under T.C.A. §§ 39-13-301 and 39-13-302(a), removal or confinement is not “unlawful” if it is accomplished with the consent of a “parent,” and thus defendant, the minor child's father, could not be prosecuted under T.C.A. § 39-13-305(a)(2) of especially aggravated kidnapping because the indictment failed to allege that defendant removed or confined the child by force, threat, or fraud, and the removal or confinement was not accomplished without the consent of a parent because defendant was the child's father. T.C.A. § 36-2-304 did not control the resolution of this issue even though defendant and the child's mother were never married; because defendant's motion to dismiss this count, filed pursuant to Tenn. R. Crim. P. 12(b), required the interpretation of the statute and the application of that interpretation to stipulated, undisputed facts, the matter was capable of resolution without determination of the general issue of defendant's guilt or innocence, and the dismissal of the count against defendant was proper. State v. Goodman, 90 S.W.3d 557, 2002 Tenn. LEXIS 547 (Tenn. 2002).

3. Illustrative Cases.

Pursuant to T.C.A. § 36-2-302 and T.C.A. § 24-7-112, the biological father was the legal father of the child, absent the termination of his rights, and a best-interests analysis was relevant if an only if termination was appropriate; the evidence did not support the arguments of the mother and her husband that the biological father willfully failed to visit or support the child, as the evidence showed that, inter alia: (1) The mother actively concealed the child's parentage; and (2) The mother declined the biological father's offer of support. In re T.K.Y., 205 S.W.3d 343, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 757 (Tenn. 2006), rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 891 (Tenn. Sept. 19, 2006).

Although the juvenile court erred in taking judicial notice of a paternity test report previously entered as an exhibit in proceedings before a magistrate, the error was harmless because the mother's copy of the report was admissible; because the report showed a statistical probability of paternity of ninety-nine percent or greater, the putative father had an extremely high burden of proof to rebut the statutory presumption of paternity, but he failed to meet that burden. In re Michael J., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 52 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2018).

Substituting “comparable feminine terms” for the words like “man” or “father,” as the non-biological parent proposed, goes beyond allowing words written in one gender be construed, where necessary, to apply to the other, and exceeds the purpose of the parentage statute; no rights or relationships are created by the parentage statutes, only a procedure by which the father is able to establish parentage and as such, recourse to T.C.A. § 1-3-104(b) for other purposes is not warranted. Pippin v. Pippin, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 220 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 14, 2020).

4. Construction.

Inasmuch as the Legislature has defined “father,” the court cannot give a gender-neutral meaning to that term for purposes of T.C.A. § 36-2-304; to do so would extend both statutes'  meanings beyond that set forth in the chapter. Statutes governing parentage contemplate a biological or genetic connection between the child and the putative parent, and as the non-biological parent did not have a biological connection to the child, she could not fit this definition. Pippin v. Pippin, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 220 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 14, 2020).

36-2-305. Agreement to establish parentage — Complaint to establish parentage — Parties — When action may be brought — Order of protection.

  1. The court may enter an order of parentage upon the agreement of the mother and father unless the court on its own motion orders genetic testing. In any such agreement, the mother and father must affirmatively acknowledge their parentage of the child. Any agreement under this part shall comply with the requirements of § 36-2-311.
    1. Absent an agreement or an acknowledgement of parentage as prescribed by § 68-3-203(g), § 68-3-302, or § 68-3-305(b), a complaint to establish parentage may be filed. Except as hereinafter provided, Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure shall govern all actions under this subsection (b).
    2. A complaint to establish parentage of a child may be filed by:
      1. The child, if the child has reached the age of majority, or if the child is a minor, the child through a guardian or next friend;
      2. The child's mother, or if the mother is a minor, the mother's personal representative, parent, or guardian;
      3. A man claiming to be the child's father, or if the man is a minor, the man's parent, guardian, or personal representative;
      4. The department of human services or its contractor.
    3. One (1) man or several men may be named as the father. The naming of one (1) man as father does not preclude a later suit against another man if the court finds that the first man is not the father of the child.
    4. If an action under this section is brought before the birth of the child, all proceedings may be stayed until after the birth, except service of process, the taking of depositions to preserve testimony, and the performance of genetic testing.
    5. If the alleged father threatens or attempts to harm the complainant in any manner, the court may enter an order of protection pursuant to chapter 3, part 6 of this title. Nothing in this subsection (b) shall be construed to alter or increase the jurisdiction of the juvenile courts to issue orders of protection except when the parties are before the court in connection with a complaint filed pursuant to this chapter.
    6. The action may be commenced by service of a summons as in civil cases and tried as a civil action. In the alternative, notice of the filing of the complaint shall be delivered to the defendant or the defendant's representative or shall be sent to the defendant at the defendant's last known address. If the defendant fails to make an appearance or file an answer to the complaint, the court may proceed as in civil cases or may issue a warrant for the apprehension of the defendant, directed to any officer in this state authorized to execute warrants, commanding such officer without delay to apprehend the defendant and bring the defendant before the court for the purpose of having an adjudication as to the paternity of the child, and such warrant may be issued to any county of this state.

Acts 1997, ch. 477, § 1; 2001, ch. 447, § 1.

Cross-References. Putative father registry, § 36-2-318.

Textbooks. Pritchard on Wills and Administration of Estates (5th ed., Phillips and Robinson), §§ 315, 462.

Law Reviews.

Constitutional Law — Constitutionality of Statutes of Limitations in Paternity Actions, 13 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 263 (1983).

Family Law – Who is a Mother? Determining Legal Maternity in Surrogacy Arrangements in Tennessee (Christen Blackburn), 39 U. Mem. L. Rev. 349 (2009).

Attorney General Opinions. Personal jurisdiction in paternity cases, OAG 92-42, 1992 Tenn. AG LEXIS 38 (5/6/92).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

T.C.A. § 36-2-305 does not impermissibly interfere with familial privacy interests, or with the rights and interests of the husband of a woman whose child's parentage is disputed; accordingly, T.C.A. § 36-2-305 is constitutional on its face. State ex rel. Cihlar v. Crawford, 39 S.W.3d 172, 2000 Tenn. App. LEXIS 566 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000).

2. Presumption.

In a dispute between two men who are presumptively a child's father, a parent's interest and ability to provide monetary and parental support are relevant. State ex rel. Cihlar v. Crawford, 39 S.W.3d 172, 2000 Tenn. App. LEXIS 566 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000).

Although the juvenile court erred in taking judicial notice of a paternity test report previously entered as an exhibit in proceedings before a magistrate, the error was harmless because the mother's copy of the report was admissible; because the report showed a statistical probability of paternity of ninety-nine percent or greater, the putative father had an extremely high burden of proof to rebut the statutory presumption of paternity, but he failed to meet that burden. In re Michael J., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 52 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2018).

3. Jurisdiction.

Juvenile court had subject matter jurisdiction over paternity and child support claims where the State clearly had standing to bring suit to establish the child's paternity, and an initial child-support order, including retroactive support, was required once paternity was established. State ex rel. Schrita O. v. Robert T., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 750 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 16, 2017).

4. Standing.

Father's argument that a mother lacked standing to bring a suit to establish a child's paternity and for retroactive support was rejected where she was the child's mother, and, as established by the evidence, she was the child's physical caretaker. State ex rel. Schrita O. v. Robert T., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 750 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 16, 2017).

36-2-306. Statute of limitations.

An action to establish the parentage of a child may be instituted before or after the birth of the child and until three (3) years beyond the child's age of majority. This chapter shall not affect the relationship of parent and child as established in § 31-2-105.

Acts 1997, ch. 477, § 1.

Code Commission Notes.

Former subsection (b), concerning bringing of paternity actions under this chapter on August 16, 1984, was deleted as obsolete by the code commission in 2005.

Attorney General Opinions. Statute of limitations in paternity proceedings, OAG 99-099, 1999 Tenn. AG LEXIS 99 (5/4/99).

36-2-307. Jurisdiction — Venue.

    1. The juvenile court or any trial court with general jurisdiction shall have jurisdiction of an action brought under this chapter; provided, that, in any county having a population not less than eight hundred twenty-five thousand (825,000) nor more than eight hundred thirty thousand (830,000), according to the 1990 federal census or any subsequent federal census, only the juvenile court shall have jurisdiction of an action brought under this chapter.
    2. The court shall have statewide jurisdiction over the parties involved in the case.
  1. Any minimum contact relevant to a child's being born out of wedlock that meets constitutional standards shall be sufficient to establish the jurisdiction of the courts of Tennessee over the parents for an action under this chapter. Any conduct in Tennessee that results in conception of a child born out of wedlock shall be deemed sufficient contact to submit the parents to the jurisdiction of the courts of Tennessee for action under this chapter.
    1. The complaint may be filed in the county where the father resides or is found, the county where the mother resides or is found, or the county in which the child resides or is present when the application is made. However, a man who seeks to establish parentage of a child who is the subject of a pending petition for adoption pursuant to chapter 1, part 1 of this title, must file this petition in the court where the adoption petition is filed.
    2. Any complaint to establish parentage that may be filed or that is pending in any court subsequent to the filing of an adoption petition involving the same child shall be transferred for any further proceedings to the court where the adoption proceedings are pending on motion of any party to the paternity complaint or the adoption petition, on the court's own motion, or upon the request of the court in which an adoption petition is pending.
    3. The adoption court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to determine the issues relating to the parentage of the child.
    4. Any order of parentage entered by any court other than the adoption court subsequent to the date of the adoption petition is filed shall be void, unless the adoption petition is denied or dismissed.

Acts 1997, ch. 477, § 1; 1998, ch. 1098, § 9.

Compiler's Notes. For table of U.S. decennial populations of Tennessee counties, see Volume 13 and its supplement.

Attorney General Opinions. Dismissal of paternity suit for failure to prosecute, OAG 99-099, 1999 Tenn. AG LEXIS 99 (5/4/99).

Transfer of a parentage action properly initiated a juvenile court to a circuit or chancery court, OAG 07-099, 2007 Tenn. AG LEXIS 101 (7/9/07).

Jurisdiction over parentage actions in Shelby county.  OAG 10-91, 2010 Tenn. AG LEXIS 97 (8/9/10).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Jurisdiction.

To the extent that T.C.A. §§ 36-2-307(a)(1) and 37-1-103 are inconsistent regarding where actions to establish paternity must be filed, former § 36-2-307 amended § 37-1-103 such that the juvenile court no longer has exclusive jurisdiction over paternity matters. P.E.K. v. J.M., 52 S.W.3d 653, 2001 Tenn. App. LEXIS 232 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001).

In a paternity and child support action, appellant's presence in court, coupled with his admission, under oath, that he was the child's biological father were actions inconsistent with a lack of personal jurisdiction claim. Accordingly, the trial court properly exercised jurisdiction over the parties. In re Lucius H., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 817 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 31, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 71 (Tenn. Jan. 19, 2017).

Juvenile court had subject matter jurisdiction over paternity and child support claims where the State clearly had standing to bring suit to establish the child's paternity, and an initial child-support order, including retroactive support, was required once paternity was established. State ex rel. Schrita O. v. Robert T., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 750 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 16, 2017).

36-2-308. Conduct of trial — Expedited hearings.

  1. The trial shall be without a jury.
  2. Hearings under this section shall be expedited on the court's civil docket.
  3. Upon proper motion, default judgment shall be entered against the defendant upon showing of service of process on the defendant where the defendant has failed to answer or make an appearance within thirty (30) days of service of process.
  4. Bills for the mother's care during pregnancy and childbirth and genetic testing shall be admissible without requiring third party foundation testimony and shall constitute prima facie evidence of amounts incurred for such services or for testing on behalf of the child.

Acts 1997, ch. 477, § 1.

Cross-References. Expedited process for support, title 36, ch. 5, part 4.

Termination of Acts 1985, ch. 477, which amended this section, § 36-5-110.

Law Reviews.

Civil Procedure — Flowers v. Dyer County: The Death of the Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction, 23 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 409 (1993).

36-2-309. Tests to determine parentage.

  1. Tests for parentage in actions arising pursuant to this part or in any actions to determine parentage shall be conducted pursuant to § 24-7-112.
  2. The state of Tennessee, its officers, employees, agents or contractors shall not be liable to any person for, nor be ordered to refund to any person, any moneys received pursuant to an order entered pursuant to this part that is subsequently set aside by the court due to a finding of nonpaternity of the person previously adjudicated as the child's father. Nothing in this subsection (b) shall preclude the issuance of a judgment against the mother or actual biological father of the child or children in favor of the person subsequently found not to be the father of a child or children.

Acts 1997, ch. 477, § 1; 1998, ch. 1098, § 10.

Law Reviews.

Constitutional Law — Constitutionality of Statutes of Limitations in Paternity Actions, 13 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 263 (1983).

The Cradle Will Rock: Intentional Misrepresentation of Paternity, 49 Tenn. B.J. 12 (2013).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Genetic Test.

Although the juvenile court erred in taking judicial notice of a paternity test report previously entered as an exhibit in proceedings before a magistrate, the error was harmless because the mother's copy of the report was admissible; because the report showed a statistical probability of paternity of ninety-nine percent or greater, the putative father had an extremely high burden of proof to rebut the statutory presumption of paternity, but he failed to meet that burden. In re Michael J., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 52 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2018).

36-2-310. Temporary order of support.

The court shall, upon motion of the party, enter a temporary order of child support pending the final determination of paternity upon a showing of clear and convincing evidence of parentage on the basis of genetic tests.

Acts 1997, ch. 477, § 1.

Attorney General Opinions. Authority to award child support in the absence of a divorce or separation decree. OAG 12-42, 2012 Tenn. AG LEXIS 42 (3/21/12).

36-2-311. Order of parentage.

  1. Upon establishing parentage, the court shall make an order declaring the father of the child. This order shall include the following:
    1. Full names and residential and mailing addresses of the mother, father and child, if known;
    2. Dates of birth and social security numbers of the mother, father and the child, if known;
    3. Father's place of birth, if known;
    4. Home telephone number of the mother and the father, if known;
    5. Driver license numbers of mother and father, if known;
    6. Name, address and telephone number of mother and father's employers, if known;
    7. Availability of health insurance to cover the child, if known;
    8. Determination of the child's name on the child's birth certificate;
    9. Determination of the custody of the child pursuant to chapter 6 of this title;
    10. Determination of visitation or parental access pursuant to chapter 6 of this title;
      1. Determination of child support pursuant to chapter 5 of this title. When making retroactive support awards pursuant to the child support guidelines established pursuant to this subsection (a), the court shall consider the following factors as a basis for deviation from the presumption in the child support guidelines that child and medical support for the benefit of the child shall be awarded retroactively to the date of the child's birth:
        1. The extent to which the father did not know, and could not have known, of the existence of the child, the birth of the child, his possible parentage of the child or the location of the child;
        2. The extent to which the mother intentionally, and without good cause, failed or refused to notify the father of the existence of the child, the birth of the child, the father's possible parentage of the child or the location of the child; and
        3. The attempts, if any, by the child's mother or caretaker to notify the father of the mother's pregnancy, or the existence of the child, the father's possible parentage or the location of the child;
      2. In cases in which the presumption of the application of the guidelines is rebutted by clear and convincing evidence, the court shall deviate from the child support guidelines to reduce, in whole or in part, any retroactive support. The court must make a written finding that application of the guidelines would be unjust or inappropriate in order to provide for the best interests of the child or the equity between the parties;
      3. Deviations shall not be granted in circumstances where, based upon clear and convincing evidence:
        1. The father has a demonstrated history of violence or domestic violence toward the mother, the child's caretaker or the child;
        2. The child is the product of rape or incest of the mother by the father of the child;
        3. The mother or caretaker of the child, or the child has a reasonable apprehension of harm from the father or those acting on his behalf toward the mother, the child's caretaker or the child; or
        4. The father or those acting on his behalf, have abused or neglected the child;
      4. Nothing in this subdivision (a)(11) shall limit the right of the state of Tennessee to recover from the father expenditures made by the state for the benefit of the child, or the right, or obligation, of the Title IV-D child support agency to pursue retroactive support for the custodial parent or caretaker of the child where appropriate;
      5. Any amounts of retroactive support ordered that have been assigned to the state  pursuant to § 71-3-124 shall be subject to the child support distribution requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 657. In such cases, the court order shall contain any language necessary to allow the state to recover the assigned support amounts;
      6. In making any deviations from awarding retroactive support, the court shall make written findings of fact and conclusions of law to support the basis for the deviation, and shall include in the order the total amount of retroactive support that would have been paid retroactively to the birth of the child, had a deviation not been made by the court;
        1. In any action for retroactive child support filed on or after July 1, 2017, retroactive child support shall not be awarded for a period of more than five (5) years from the date the action for support is filed unless the court determines, for good cause shown, that a different award of retroactive child support is in the interest of justice. The burden to show that a longer time period of retroactive support is in the interest of justice is on the custodial parent. Good cause includes, but is not limited to, the following:
          1. The noncustodial parent deliberately avoided service or knowingly impeded or delayed the imposition of a support obligation;
          2. The noncustodial parent used threats, intimidation, or force to prevent or delay the imposition of a support obligation; or
          3. The custodial parent reasonably feared that the establishment of parentage would result in domestic abuse, as defined in § 36-3-601;
        2. The court may award retroactive child support for less than the five-year-period required by subdivision (a)(11)(i) if the court determines, for good cause shown, that a different award of retroactive child support is in the interest of justice. The burden to show that a shorter time period of retroactive support is in the interest of justice is on the noncustodial parent;
        3. Upon a finding of good cause in accordance with this subdivision (a)(11)(G), the court may order retroactive support from the date the court determines to be equitable and just;
        4. The presumption that child support for the benefit of the child be awarded retroactively to the date of the child's birth contained in the child support guidelines shall not apply to any action in which this subdivision (a)(11)(G) is applicable;
        5. Nothing in this subdivision (a)(11)(G) limits any claim for retroactive child support owed to the department of human services;
    11. Determination of liability for funeral expense to either or both parties, if the child is deceased;
    12. Determination of liability for a mother's reasonable expenses for her pregnancy, confinement and recovery to either or both parties; and
    13. Determination of the liability for counsel fees to either or both parties after consideration of all relevant factors.
  2. This order may include the following:
    1. An order of protection; and
    2. Any provision determined to be in the best interests of the child.
  3. All provisions of chapter 5 of this title that relate to child support and § 50-2-105 shall apply to support orders issued in any action under this chapter.
      1. When the court enters an order in which the paternity of a child is determined or support is ordered, enforced or modified for a child, each individual who is a party to any action pursuant to this part shall be immediately required to file with the court and, if the case is a Title IV-D child support case, shall immediately file with the local Title IV-D child support office, for entry into the state registry of support cases, and shall update, as appropriate, the parties' and, for subdivisions (d)(1)(A)(i)-(iii), the child's or children's:
        1. Full name and any change in name;
        2. Social security number and date and place of birth;
        3. Residential and mailing addresses;
        4. Home telephone numbers;
        5. Driver license number;
        6. The name, address, and telephone number of the person's employer;
        7. The availability and cost of health insurance for the child; and
        8. Gross annual income.
      2. The requirements of this subdivision (d)(1) may be included in the court's order.
    1. Each individual who is a party must update changes in circumstances of the individual for the information required by subdivision (d)(1) within ten (10) days of the date of such change. At the time of the entry of the first order pertaining to child support after July 1, 1997, clear written notice shall be given to each party of the requirements of this subsection (d), procedures for complying with this subsection (d) and a description of the effect or failure to comply. Such requirement may be noted in the order of the court.
    2. In any subsequent child support enforcement action, the delivery of written notice as required by Rule 5 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure to the most recent residential or employer address shown in the court's records or the Title IV-D agency's records as required in subdivision (d)(1) shall be deemed to satisfy due process requirements for notice and service of process with respect to that party if there is a sufficient showing and the court is satisfied that a diligent effort has been made to ascertain the location and whereabouts of the party.
  4. Upon motion of either party, upon a showing of domestic violence or the threat of such violence, the court may enter an order to withhold from public access the address, telephone number, and location of the alleged victim or victims or threatened victim or victims of such circumstances. The clerk of the court shall withhold such information based upon the court's specific order but may not be held liable for release of such information.

Acts 1997, ch. 477, § 1; 1998, ch. 1098, § 11; 2003, ch. 361, § 1; 2017, ch. 419, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, referred to in this section, is compiled in 42 U.S.C. § 651 et seq.

Acts 2003, ch. 361, § 4 provided that the act shall apply to any pending case in which the judgment of the trial court has not become final by June 17, 2003.

Amendments. The 2017 amendment added (a)(11)(G).

Effective Dates. Acts 2017, ch. 419, § 3. July 1, 2017.

Cross-References. Expedited process for support, title 36, ch. 5, part 4.

Termination of Acts 1985, ch. 477, which amended this section, § 36-5-110.

Attorney General Opinions. Authority to award child support in the absence of a divorce or separation decree. OAG 12-42, 2012 Tenn. AG LEXIS 42 (3/21/12).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Liability for Support.

It would be inequitable to require the biological father to pay retroactive child support to his child's mother during the time that she and her husband actively prevented the biological father from establishing his paternity and taking responsibility for supporting the child; the mother and her husband obtained a restraining order against the biological father and he was rebuffed in his attempt to send the child a birthday present. In re T.K.Y., 205 S.W.3d 343, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 757 (Tenn. 2006), rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 891 (Tenn. Sept. 19, 2006).

Juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by denying a father's request for a deviation from the presumption in the child support guidelines that he was responsible for child support back to the date of the child's birth because it applied the correct legal standard; the juvenile court specifically cited subsection (a)(11)(B), and it found that the father failed to establish that the equity between the parties justified a deviation from the guidelines. Parrish v. Griggs, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 350 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 25, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 644 (Tenn. Oct. 5, 2017).

2. Appeal.

Issue of back child support could not be raised for the first time on appeal when the mother did not afford the trial court the opportunity to rule on the issue; the mother had the opportunity to present proof at trial in support of her claim, but she failed to introduce any evidence from which it could be found that any support was owed. In re Jayden C., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 142 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 23, 2015).

Based on appellant's admission of paternity, the trial court properly established appellant's paternity. In re Lucius H., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 817 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 31, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 71 (Tenn. Jan. 19, 2017).

3. Knowledge.

Even if a mother did recant her statement that her child was the father's child, the father should have known, or strongly suspected, that he was likely the child's father because he had been in a relationship with the other for five years and was frequently visiting the mother in Tennessee around the time the child was conceived; in the months following the child's birth, both parents held her out as the father's child, Parrish v. Griggs, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 350 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 25, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 644 (Tenn. Oct. 5, 2017).

4. Jurisdiction.

Father's claim that the juvenile court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter a support order lacked merit where the court had established the child's paternity and thus was required by T.C.A. § 36-2-311(a)(11)(A) to enter an initial support order. State ex rel. Schrita O. v. Robert T., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 750 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 16, 2017).

5. Parentage.

Although the juvenile court erred in taking judicial notice of a paternity test report previously entered as an exhibit in proceedings before a magistrate, the error was harmless because the mother's copy of the report was admissible; because the report showed a statistical probability of paternity of ninety-nine percent or greater, the putative father had an extremely high burden of proof to rebut the statutory presumption of paternity, but he failed to meet that burden. In re Michael J., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 52 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2018).

6. Findings.

Vacating of a trial court's award of a deviation of child support was appropriate because the trial court did not make the findings required by statute and the Tennessee Child Support Guidelines. As such, the appropriate remedy was to remand to the trial court to reconsider whether a deviation was warranted, and, if the trial court did find that a father was entitled to a deviation with regard to retroactive child support and uncovered medical expenses, the trial court was to make explicit findings Knipper v. Enfinger, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 393 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2020).

36-2-312. Custody and visitation issues.

  1. In any case that is brought by the department of human services or its contractors, the Title IV-D child support office shall have no authority to represent the state of Tennessee on issues of custody or parental access. The fact that custody and parental access are sought in a petition that is filed by the department or its contractors to comply with this part, or that the court orders the department or its contractors to enter the finding of fact or the conclusions of law of the court relative to a custody or parental access determination in its order, shall not be deemed to make the department or its contractors responsible for presenting any evidence on these issues or to have any continuing duty to present evidence on these issues in any subsequent hearing. The department or its contractors shall have the duty to inform the individuals in the Title IV-D case that the department or its contractors will not provide legal assistance relative to custody or parental access and that the individual has a right to independent counsel for such representation.
  2. The department may apply for and utilize any federal grants for the purpose of implementing a pilot project for access and visitation programs. The department may contract with other persons or entities to establish the pilot projects that will be administered by the department; provided, that in establishing any such pilot project through contract, the department shall give preference to existing family preservation services programs, family resource centers, headstart programs and other established programs for children.

Acts 1997, ch. 477, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, referred to in this section, is compiled in 42 U.S.C. § 651 et seq.

36-2-313. Inheritance of child from father — Information to commissioner of health — Recovery of fees paid by the department of health — New birth certificates.

  1. When, under this chapter, the relationship of father and child is established, the child shall be entitled to inherit from the father as if born to the father in wedlock.
  2. When an order of parentage has been entered, the clerk of the court shall transmit to the commissioner of health, on a form prescribed by the commissioner, a written notification as to such order, together with such other facts as may assist in identifying the birth record of the child whose parentage is at issue. The form shall contain at a minimum the information required by § 36-2-311(a)(1)-(8). If such order shall be abrogated by a later judgment or order of the same or a higher court, that fact shall be immediately communicated in writing to the commissioner, on a form prescribed by the commissioner, by the clerk of the court that entered such order, if the information is available in the court records.
  3. The court shall include in each order of parentage an order that the nonprevailing party or, if parentage was not contested, the person who is being confirmed as the father of the child by the order of parentage, pay into the court an amount equal to the sum of any fees required to be paid by the department of health, or any successor to the department, for the processing or issuance of a birth certificate. Any money paid into court pursuant to this subsection (c) shall be received by the clerk and paid out by the clerk as required by subsection (d).
  4. When an order of parentage has been entered, the clerk of the court shall immediately transmit a certified copy of the order and the completed application for a new certificate of birth by parentage to the registrar of vital records, who shall issue a new certificate of birth by parentage in conformity with the rules and regulations of the department of health. Upon receipt of the fee required by the department of health, the clerk shall transmit the fee to the registrar of vital records. Notwithstanding any law or regulation to the contrary, the registrar shall not be required to issue a new certificate of birth until the fee is paid.

Acts 1997, ch. 477, § 1; 1998, ch. 1098, § 73; 2007, ch. 138, § 1.

Cross-References. Registrar of vital records, § 68-3-104.

Textbooks. Pritchard on Wills and Administration of Estates (5th ed., Phillips and Robinson), § 849.

36-2-314. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former § 36-2-314 (Acts 1997, ch. 477, § 1), concerning clerk's fees, was repealed by Acts 2005, ch. 429, § 1, effective January 1, 2006.

36-2-315. Appeals.

An appeal from any final order of parentage as provided for in this chapter may be taken to the court of appeals pursuant to the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Acts 1997, ch. 477, § 1.

Law Reviews.

The Tennessee Court System — Court of Appeals (Frederic S. Le Clercq), 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 219 (1978).

36-2-316. Discrimination against children born out of wedlock — Penalty.

  1. No child born out of wedlock shall be deprived of any civil benefit afforded to other citizens by law.
  2. Any person, including any employee or official of any governmental agency, who deprives any person of any civil benefit afforded to other citizens by law, by reason of the child being born out of wedlock, commits a Class C misdemeanor.

Acts 1997, ch. 477, § 1.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class C misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

Textbooks. Pritchard on Wills and Administration of Estates (5th ed., Phillips and Robinson), § 849.

Law Reviews.

The Rhetoric of Equality (Neal Devins), 44 Vand. L. Rev. 15 (1991).

36-2-317. Official references to illegitimacy.

No explicit references shall be made to illegitimacy in any legal proceeding, record, certificates or other papers except the departments of human services and health may keep records of out-of-wedlock births.

Acts 1997, ch. 477, § 1.

Textbooks. Pritchard on Wills and Administration of Estates (5th ed., Phillips and Robinson), § 849.

Law Reviews.

Illegitimacy — Legitimation by Intermarriage of Parents, 21 Tenn. L. Rev. 453 (1950).

36-2-318. Putative father registry.

  1. The department of children's services shall establish a putative father registry, which shall be maintained by the department's adoptions unit in the department's state office in Nashville.
  2. The registrar of the division of vital records of the department of health shall notify the department's registry of all orders of parentage received by the registrar pursuant to § 36-2-311, or of any acknowledgements of parentage received by the registrar pursuant to § 68-3-203(g), § 68-3-302 or § 68-3-305(b), on a form or by any electronic information exchange method agreed upon by the commissioners of children's services and health. Such notification shall occur on a daily basis in order to update the putative father registry on a current basis.
  3. The registry shall contain the names of the persons listed in subdivision (e)(3) and any other information required in subdivisions (e)(1)-(3).
    1. Those persons contained on the registry must be given notice by the petitioners in proceedings for the adoption of a child and, except as they may waive their rights under subsection (f), must have their parental rights to the child terminated prior to entry of an adoption order, as may be required pursuant to chapter 1, part 1 of this title, unless they have executed a surrender, waiver of interest, or parental consent as provided in chapter 1, part 1 of this title.
    2. Nothing in this section shall be construed to eliminate the requirement to terminate the parental rights of any person if such person meets all of the requirements of a legal or biological parent pursuant to § 36-1-117, even if such person is not registered.
  4. The registry shall contain the names of the following persons:
    1. Those persons, their addresses, if available, the name of the child, and the name of the biological mother of the child, if available, for whom the registrar of the division of vital records has a record that an order of parentage has been entered involving any person and those persons for whom the registrar has a record of any acknowledgement of parentage executed under § 68-3-203(g), § 68-3-302 or § 68-3-305(b), and their addresses, if available, the name of the child, and the name of the biological mother of the child appearing on the acknowledgment;
    2. Those persons who have filed with the registry a certified copy of a court order from this state or any other state or territory of the United States or any other country that adjudicates such person to be a father of a child born out of wedlock, and those persons who have filed with the registry a copy of a sworn acknowledgement of parentage executed pursuant to the law of this state or pursuant to the law of any other state or territory or any other country; or
    3. Those persons who have filed only a written notice of intent to claim paternity of a child with the putative father registry either prior to, or within thirty (30) days after, the birth of such child.
    1. Those persons who have filed only a written notice of intent to claim parentage of a child pursuant to subdivisions (e)(2) and (3) shall include with such notice of such person's name, current address and current telephone number, if any, and, if filed under subdivision (e)(3), shall include the name of the child, if known, for whom such person claims parentage and the name of the child's biological mother and the current legal or physical custodian, and their address and telephone number, if known, any other information that may identify the child and the child's whereabouts. This information shall be maintained on the registry.
    2. The person filing written notice of intent to claim parentage pursuant to subdivision (e)(3) shall be responsible for notifying the registry of any change of address and telephone number within ten (10) days of that change. Failure to do so within the ten-day period shall constitute a waiver of any right to notice of any proceedings for the adoption of the child for whom the person seeks to claim parentage, unless such person is otherwise entitled to notice pursuant to § 36-1-117(b) or (c).
  5. A person who has filed a notice of intent to claim parentage under subdivision (e)(3) may revoke the notice at any time in writing to the registry, and upon receipt of such notification by the registry, the notice of intent to claim parentage shall be deemed a nullity as of the date it is filed.
  6. Any notice of intent to claim parentage filed under subsection (e), whether revoked or still in effect, may be introduced in evidence by any other party, other than the person who filed such notice, in any proceeding in which the parentage of a child may be relevant, including proceedings seeking payment of child support, medical payments on behalf of the child, or any other payments, or that may involve the payment of damages involved in connection with such parentage.
  7. Any person listed on the registry pursuant to subdivisions (e)(1)-(3) by the department shall be notified by the department, based upon the information filed with the registry, of any proceedings for the adoption of any child or the termination of parental rights of any child of which the department's state office adoption unit has actual notice of filing and for whom the registrant has made a claim of parentage, unless the person has previously executed an unrevoked surrender of the child or waiver of interest pursuant to § 36-1-111, or has consented to the child's adoption in accordance with chapter 1, part 1, of this title, or unless the person's parental rights have been terminated by court action.
  8. A person listed on the registry and entitled to notice of pending adoption or termination proceedings under subdivision (e)(3) shall have thirty (30) days from the receipt of such notice to file a complaint for parentage or to intervene in the adoption proceedings or termination of parental rights proceedings for the purpose of establishing a claim to parentage of the child or to present a defense to the termination or adoption case. The failure of such person to file a petition to intervene shall be sufficient cause for the court where the adoption proceedings or termination proceedings are pending to terminate the parental rights, if any, of such person pursuant to § 36-1-113(g)(9)(A)(vi).
  9. At the time a person files a written notice of intent to claim paternity under subsection (e), the registry shall notify such person of the provisions of §§ 68-11-255, 36-1-142, 36-1-102(1)(A)(v), and [former] 37-2-402(1)(A)(v), concerning abandoned infants and shall inform such person that it is the duty of such person to make appropriate inquiries concerning any possibly relevant birth.

Acts 1997, ch. 477, § 1; 2001, ch. 388, § 6; 2019, ch. 36, § 30.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment, in (d)(1), substituted “registry must be given” for “registry shall be given”, and deleted “or for the termination of parental rights involving a child, and they shall be necessary parties to the proceedings,” preceding “and, except as they may waive their rights”.

Effective Dates. Acts 2019, ch. 36, § 35. July 1, 2019.

Cross-References. Child born out of wedlock, notice to putative father registry, § 36-1-111.

Prepetition home study, §  36-1-116.

Presumption of parentage, §  36-2-304.

Termination of parental rights, §  36-1-113.

Termination of rights of putative father, §  36-1-117.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Definitions.

Father does not fall within any of the various meanings of the statutory words legal parent; an intent to claim paternity filed with the Putative Father Registry is not the same as a voluntary acknowledgement of paternity, and instead these are words of art, separate concepts with different meanings. In re F.N.M., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 274 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 11, 2016).

2. Establishing Paternity.

Clear and convincing evidence supported the trial court's termination of a father's parental rights on the ground of failure to seek to establish paternity because despite having notice of his alleged paternity, the father failed to file a petition to establish paternity within thirty days. In re Rilyn S., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 124 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 12, 2019).

36-2-319. Enrollment of child in supporting party's health care plan.

  1. In any case in which the court enters an order of support in a case enforced under Title IV-D of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. § 651 et seq.), the court shall enter an order providing for health care coverage to be provided for the child or children.
  2. Section 36-5-501(a)(3) shall apply with respect to enrollment of a child in the noncustodial parent's employer-based health care plan.

Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 23; 2001, ch. 447, § 2.

36-2-320. License revocation requests.

In establishing paternity or enforcing any provision of child support, if the party seeking to establish paternity or to enforce an order of support specifically prays for revocation of a license, or if the court determines on its own motion or on motion of the party seeking to establish paternity or seeking to enforce an order of support that an individual party has failed to comply with a subpoena or a warrant in connection with the establishment of paternity or enforcement of an order of support, the court may invoke the provisions of § 36-5-101(f)(5).

Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 26.

36-2-321. Limitations period for child support payment orders.

Judgments for child support payments for each child subject to the order for child support pursuant to this part shall be enforceable without limitation as to time.

Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 46.

36-2-322. Payment of overdue support for children receiving assistance.

In any case in which a child is receiving assistance under a state program funded under the Social Security Act, Title IV-A (42 U.S.C. § 601 et seq.), including, but not limited to, temporary assistance as provided under title 71, chapter 3, part 1, and the payment of support for such child is overdue, then, the department of human services may issue an administrative order, directing an individual who owes overdue support to such a child to pay the overdue support in accordance with a plan for payment of all overdue support or to engage in work activities, as otherwise required and defined by § 36-5-113.

Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 49; 1998, ch. 1098, § 12.

Part 4
Parentage of Children Born of Donated Embryo Transfer

36-2-401. Single means of establishing parentage — Legislative intent.

This chapter provides a single means to establish parentage of children born of donated embryo transfer to recipient intended parent. It is intended to promote the interests of children who may be born as a result of donated embryo transfer. It is the intent that no adoption pursuant to chapter 1 of this title or no parentage pursuant to chapter 3 of this title shall be required to create parentage in recipient intended parent pursuant to this part.

Acts 2013, ch. 309, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Standing.

Non-biological parent was not a biological parent, legal parent, or step parent, and she did not seek to adopt the child; thus, she did not fit within any of these statutory definitions of a parent, rendering her without standing to pursue a parentage action or visitation with the child. Pippin v. Pippin, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 220 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 14, 2020).

36-2-402. Part definitions.

As used in this part:

  1. “Embryo” or “human embryo” means an individual fertilized ovum of the human species from the single-cell stage to eight-week development;
  2. “Embryo parentage” means the acceptance of rights and responsibilities for an embryo by a recipient intended parent;
  3. “Embryo relinquishment” or “legal transfer of rights to an embryo” means the relinquishment of rights and responsibilities by the person or persons who hold the legal rights and responsibilities for an embryo;
  4. “Embryo transfer” means the medical procedure of physically placing an embryo into the uterus of a female recipient intended parent;
  5. “Legal embryo custodian” means the person or entity, including an embryo transfer clinic, who hold the legal rights and responsibilities for a human embryo and who relinquishes said embryo to another person; and
  6. “Recipient intended parent” means a person or persons who receive a relinquished embryo and who accepts full legal rights and responsibilities for such embryo and any child that may be born as a result of embryo transfer.

Acts 2013, ch. 309, § 1.

36-2-403. Establishing embryo parentage — Relinquishment of rights and responsibilities.

    1. A legal embryo custodian may relinquish all rights and responsibilities for an embryo prior to embryo transfer. A written contract shall be entered into as appropriate when establishing embryo parentage prior to embryo transfer for the legal transfer of rights to an embryo and to any child that may result from the embryo transfer:
      1. Between legal embryo custodians and the embryo transfer clinic; or
      2. Between a legal embryo custodian and each recipient intended parent.
    2. The contract shall be signed, as appropriate, by each legal embryo custodian for such embryo, by the embryo transfer clinic or by each recipient intended parent in the presence of a notary public. Initials or other designations may be used if the individuals desire anonymity.
  1. If the embryo was created using donor gametes, the sperm or oocyte donors who irrevocably relinquished their rights in connection with in vitro fertilization shall not be entitled to any notice of the embryo relinquishment, nor shall their consent to the embryo relinquishment be required.
  2. Upon embryo relinquishment by each legal embryo custodian pursuant to subsection (a), the legal transfer of rights to an embryo shall be considered complete at the time of thawing or to such other time as the parties may agree, and the embryo transfer shall be authorized.
  3. A child born to a recipient intended parent as the result of embryo relinquishment pursuant to subsection (a) shall be presumed to be the legal child of the recipient intended parent; provided, that each legal embryo custodian and each recipient intended parent has entered into a written contract pursuant to this part.
  4. Any and all prior legal embryo custodians whose donation of an embryo has resulted in the birth of a child to a recipient intended parent pursuant to subsection (a) shall have no rights or responsibilities with such child and of the child to them.

Acts 2013, ch. 309, § 1.

Chapter 3
Marriage

Part 1
License

36-3-101. Prohibited degrees of relationship.

Marriage cannot be contracted with a lineal ancestor or descendant, nor the lineal ancestor or descendant of either parent, nor the child of a grandparent, nor the lineal descendants of husband or wife, as the case may be, nor the husband or wife of a parent or lineal descendant.

Code 1858, § 2436 (deriv. Acts 1829, ch. 23, § 18); Shan., § 4185; Code 1932, § 8408; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 36-401.

Cross-References. Incest, criminal penalty, § 39-15-302.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 18 Tenn. Juris., Marriage, § 3.

Law Reviews.

Due Process and Equal Protection: A Constitutional Approach To Same-Sex Marriage, 5 Tenn. J. L. & Pol'y 71 (2009).

Family Support and Supporting Families, 68 Vand. L. Rev. En Banc 153   (2015).

Informal Marriages in Tennessee — Marriage by Estoppel, by Prescription, and by Ratification, 3 Vand. L. Rev. 610 (1950).

The Paradox of Family Privacy, 53 Vand. L. Rev. 527 (2000).

Attorney General Opinions. Performance of ceremony by judge not judicial act, OAG 97-011, 1997 Tenn. AG LEXIS 21 (2/6/97).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Marriage Void.

This statute is expressive of settled public policy in this state regarding public morals and good order in society, and a marriage entered into in violation of the statute is void in Tennessee regardless of whether the marriage was entered into in Tennessee or in another state where the marriage would be valid. Rhodes v. McAfee, 224 Tenn. 495, 457 S.W.2d 522, 1970 Tenn. LEXIS 348 (1970).

36-3-102. Second marriage before dissolution of first prohibited — Effect of absence for five years.

A second marriage cannot be contracted before the dissolution of the first. But the first shall be regarded as dissolved, for this purpose, if either party has been absent five (5) years, and is not known to the other to be living.

Code 1858, § 2438 (deriv. Acts 1829, ch. 23, § 16); Shan., § 4188; Code 1932, § 8411; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 36-404.

Cross-References. Absence of five years as defense to prosecution for bigamy, § 39-15-301.

Remarriage after absence of two years, dissolution of final or second marriage, § 36-4-128.

Textbooks. Gibson's Suits in Chancery (7th ed., Inman), § 516.

Law Reviews.

Use of Presumptions in Proving the Existence of Marriage Relationships in Tennessee (Richard T. Doughtie), 5 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 409 (1975).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Engagement of Married Person.

A marriage engagement is illegal, and will not sustain an action for the breach, where the plaintiff was a married woman at the time of the engagement, and the same was made within five years after the disappearance of the plaintiff's husband who had deserted her, and was not known to be living. Johnson v. Iss, 114 Tenn. 114, 85 S.W. 79, 1904 Tenn. LEXIS 76, 108 Am. St. Rep. 891 (1904).

The illegality of the engagement of a married person is not cured by the fact that the marriage was not to take place until after the five years prescribed by statute had expired, or until plaintiff had procured a divorce from her husband. Such contracts are immoral and against public policy. Johnson v. Iss, 114 Tenn. 114, 85 S.W. 79, 1904 Tenn. LEXIS 76, 108 Am. St. Rep. 891 (1904).

2. Presumption of Dissolution of Marriage.

Where a man, a resident of Tennessee, celebrated a second marriage in Arkansas, stating at the time that he was a resident of the state of Ohio, the court records of states other than that of Tennessee need not be searched, in order to rebut the presumption that there was a divorce. Payne v. Payne, 142 Tenn. 320, 219 S.W. 4, 1919 Tenn. LEXIS 61 (1920).

The presumption of divorce in favor of the legality of a second marriage is not for the benefit of the parties, or intended to allow the bigamous wife or the bigamous husband to prevail over a legal spouse, or a legal marriage. Payne v. Payne, 142 Tenn. 320, 219 S.W. 4, 1919 Tenn. LEXIS 61 (1920).

The presumption in favor of the legality of a second marriage that the person celebrating the marriage has obtained a divorce is one of fact, and may be rebutted. Payne v. Payne, 142 Tenn. 320, 219 S.W. 4, 1919 Tenn. LEXIS 61 (1920).

Requestor was not entitled to a declaratory judgment that the marriage between the requestor's deceased father and stepmother was void ab initio because the requestor failed to submit sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption of the validity of the decedent's divorce from the requestor's mother and marriage to the stepmother. The searches of records that were performed were insufficient to establish no record of a divorce and the decedent advised both the requestor and the stepmother that the decedent obtained a divorce. Fowlkes v. Fowlkes, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 474 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 16, 2018).

3. —Rumor of Death or Divorce.

Honest belief with respect to divorce and death of former spouse may not be rested on mere rumor, but should be based on investigation of the report. White v. State, 157 Tenn. 446, 9 S.W.2d 702, 1928 Tenn. LEXIS 207 (1928).

4. Marriage Within Five Years.

Second marriage within five-year period under honest belief that divorce had been granted is no defense to bigamy charge. Moody v. T. H. Hays & Sons, 189 Tenn. 666, 227 S.W.2d 20, 1950 Tenn. LEXIS 406 (1950).

5. Marriage After Five Years.

Where a wife had not heard from her husband for eight years and knew nothing of his whereabouts for that time, she could contract a legal second marriage. Hall v. Hall, 13 Tenn. App. 683, — S.W.2d —, 1931 Tenn. App. LEXIS 112 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1931).

Second marriage after lapse of five-year period is not consummated at peril, if whereabouts of spouse during five-year period is unknown. Moody v. T. H. Hays & Sons, 189 Tenn. 666, 227 S.W.2d 20, 1950 Tenn. LEXIS 406 (1950).

Surviving spouse was not barred from compensation for death of second husband who she married after seven years of absence by first husband even though she made no investigation to determine first husband's whereabouts. Moody v. T. H. Hays & Sons, 189 Tenn. 666, 227 S.W.2d 20, 1950 Tenn. LEXIS 406 (1950).

6. Estoppel.

Application of marriage by estoppel to a void, bigamous marriage would result in the court's recognition of a void marriage that the parties cannot ratify; furthermore, application of the doctrine would contravene T.C.A. § 36-3-102 and T.C.A. § 36-3-306 and the public policy of Tennessee by condoning the bigamous marriage. Guzman v. Alvares, 205 S.W.3d 375, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 605 (Tenn. July 11, 2006).

7. Child Support.

Although the parties' marriage was void because it was bigamous, that did not affect the legitimacy of the parties four children; however, the trial court did not specify in its order whether the ten thousand one hundred seventy-six dollars constituted net income or gross income and did not explain how it computed the father's income and his child support obligation. Guzman v. Alvares, 205 S.W.3d 375, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 605 (Tenn. July 11, 2006).

8. Miscellaneous.

Civil statutes rendering bigamous marriages void ab initio such as O.C.G.A. § 19-3-2(a)(3) and T.C.A. § 36-3-102 do not exonerate defendants charged with bigamy, nor do they shield defendants from prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 1015(a) for failing to disclose overlaps in marital relations on citizenship applications or to officers of the United States government. United States v. Ali, 557 F.3d 715, 2009 FED App. 73P, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 4029 (6th Cir. Feb. 27, 2009).

Marriage between the decedent and the woman he lived with for over 41 years was bigamous, void, and could not be made valid by the doctrine of estoppel, as they two were wed before the decedent's first marriage was dissolved and Tennessee does not recognize common law marriage. Lewis v. Lewis, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 256 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 27, 2015).

36-3-103. License required — County of issuance.

  1. Before being joined in marriage, the parties shall present to the minister or officer a license under the hand of a county clerk in this state, directed to such minister or officer, authorizing the solemnization of a marriage between the parties. Such license shall be valid for thirty (30) days from its issuance by the clerk.
  2. All existing marriages that occurred before March 24, 1986, are validated if a marriage certificate was signed by the county clerk either from a county in which the female did not reside or from a county where the marriage was not solemnized.
    1. The county clerk issuing a marriage license is hereby authorized to record and certify any license used to solemnize a marriage that is properly signed by the officiant when such license is returned to the issuing county clerk. The issuing county clerk shall forward the record to the office of vital records to be filed and registered with such office. If a license issued by a county clerk in Tennessee is used to solemnize a marriage outside Tennessee, such marriage and parties, their property and their children shall have the same status as if the marriage were solemnized in this state. A county clerk is prohibited from issuing a license for a marriage that is prohibited in this state.
    2. All existing marriages occurring prior to May 2, 1989, by the authority of a Tennessee license, properly signed and certified by the officiant, are validated and the issuing clerk is authorized to record such license when it is returned to the issuing county clerk and to forward the record to the office of vital records to be filed and registered with such office.

Code 1858, § 2441 (deriv. Acts 1778, ch. 7, §§ 2, 3); Shan., § 4191; Code 1932, § 8414; Acts 1976, ch. 539; § 1; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 36-405; Acts 1986, ch. 582, §§ 1, 2; 1989, ch. 224, § 1; 1996, ch. 1031, § 2.

Cross-References. License fees, § 8-21-701.

Privilege tax on marriage license, § 67-4-502.

Law Reviews.

Selected Tennessee Legislation of 1986, 54 Tenn. L. Rev. 457 (1987).

Attorney General Opinions. Constitutionality of 1996 amendment, OAG 96-016, 1996 Tenn. AG LEXIS 11 (2/13/96).

Legality of marriage without a Tennessee license, OAG 06-110, 2006 Tenn. AG LEXIS 119 (7/12/06).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Ceremony Outside County Where License Issued.

Marriage should not be annulled and held void because the ceremony was, through ignorance and mistake, performed in a county adjoining that in which the license was issued. Douglas v. Douglas, 6 Tenn. App. 12, — S.W. —, 1927 Tenn. App. LEXIS 112 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1927).

2. Invalid License.

Alleged license issued by a former deputy clerk was invalid where parties to marriage were informed that person issuing license was no longer a deputy clerk. Horn v. Shelton, 6 Tenn. Civ. App. (6 Higgins) 530 (1916).

3. Signatures.

The statutes governing marriage licenses do not required either the bride's or the groom's signature on the marriage license. Aghili v. Saadatnejadi, 958 S.W.2d 784, 1997 Tenn. App. LEXIS 415 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997).

4. Estoppel.

Plaintiffs could not proceed with a loss of consortium claim as a result of an accident pursuant to T.C.A. § 25-1-106 because they were not legally married in that they had no valid license as required under T.C.A. §§ 36-3-103 and 36-3-109, a common law marriage was not recognized in Tennessee, and marriage by estoppel was not established. Becker v. Judd, 646 F. Supp. 2d 923, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73684 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 19, 2009).

5. Mental Capacity.

Although there was evidence that appellant's marriage to appellees'  father was conducted in accordance with T.C.A. § 36-3-103, there was substantial material evidence to support the jury's finding that the marriage was void due to the father's mental incapacity; the father's mental acuity had been slipping for some time, he was completely unable to conduct business in the last several months of his life, and the father was unable to communicate the day before the wedding and remained non-communicative (reversed on grounds of admission of prejudicial evidence)Smallman v. Caraway (In re Estate of Smallman), — S.W.3d —, 2011 Tenn. App. LEXIS 659 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 12, 2011), rev'd, In re Estate of Smallman, 398 S.W.3d 134, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 213 (Tenn. Feb. 26, 2013).

36-3-104. Conditions precedent to issuance of license.

    1. No county clerk or deputy clerk shall issue a marriage license until the applicants make an application in writing, stating the names, ages, addresses and social security numbers of both the proposed male and female contracting parties and the names and addresses of the parents, guardian or next of kin of both parties. The application shall be sworn to by both applicants. Should either individual be incarcerated, the inmate shall not be made to appear but shall submit a notarized statement containing the name, age, current address and a name and address of the individual's parents, guardian or next of kin. If an applicant has a disability that prevents the applicant from appearing, the applicant may submit a notarized statement containing the person's name, age, current address and the names and address of the parents, guardian or next of kin.
      1. If an applicant is a member of the armed forces of the United States stationed in another country in support of combat or another military operation, the applicant shall submit:
        1. A notarized statement containing the applicant's name, age, address in the United States, if applicable, and the names and addresses of the applicant's parents, guardian, or next of kin;
        2. A certified copy of the applicant's deployment orders; and
        3. An affidavit from the battalion, ship, or squadron commander, as applicable, notarized by the judge advocate stating that the applicant is deployed.
      2. A person submitting a statement under subdivision (a)(2)(A) who intends to appear for the marriage ceremony via video conferencing pursuant to § 36-3-302(b) must indicate such intention in the statement.
  1. [Deleted by 2019 amendment.]

Acts 1937, ch. 81, § 2; C. Supp. 1950, § 8414.2; modified; Acts 1959, ch. 124, § 1; 1965, ch. 59, §§ 1, 2; 1971, ch. 60, §§ 1, 2; 1976, ch. 755, § 1; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 36-406; Acts 1993, ch. 418, § 2; 1994, ch. 639, § 1; 1995, ch. 241, §§ 1, 2; 1997, ch. 551, § 30; 2017, ch. 397, § 1; 2019, ch. 93, § 3.

Amendments. The 2017 amendment added (a)(2).

The 2019 amendment deleted (b) which read: “(b)(1)  If either applicant is under eighteen (18) years of age, the application shall remain on file, open to the public, in the office of the county clerk for three (3) full days before issuance of the license. No waiting period shall apply if both parents, the guardian or the next of kin of any minor applicant join in the application. No waiting period shall apply if both applicants are eighteen (18) years of age or over.“(2)  If either applicant is under eighteen (18) years of age, immediately upon filing of the application, the county clerk shall cause to be sent by registered mail to the parents, guardian or next of kin of any minor applicant, a notice of the application. This subdivision (b)(2) shall not apply if both parents, the guardian or the next of kin of any minor applicant join in the application.“(3)  The parents, guardian or next of kin of an applicant may join in the application either by personal appearance before the county clerk or deputy county clerk, or by submitting a sworn and notarized affidavit.”

Effective Dates. Acts 2017, ch. 397, § 3. May 18, 2017.

Acts 2019, ch. 93, § 4. July 1, 2019.

Cross-References. Certified mail in lieu of registered mail, § 1-3-111.

Exceptions from provisions of section, § 36-3-107.

Law Reviews.

Polygamy and the Right to Marry: New Life for an Old Lifestyle (G. Keith Nedrow), 11 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 303 (1981).

Attorney General Opinions. Requirement of social security number on application, OAG 98-005, 1998 Tenn. AG LEXIS 5 (1/9/98).

Public access to social security numbers on marriage license applications, OAG 98-065, 1998 Tenn. AG LEXIS 65 (3/17/98).

36-3-105. Minimum age of applicant for license.

  1. It is unlawful for any county clerk or deputy clerk in this state to issue a marriage license to any person where:
    1. Either of the contracting parties is under seventeen (17) years of age; or
    2. One (1) of the contracting parties is at least seventeen (17) years of age but less than eighteen (18) years of age and the other contracting party is at least four (4) years older than the minor contracting party.
  2. Any marriage contracted in violation of subsection (a) may be annulled upon proper proceedings therefor by such person or any interested person acting in the person's behalf.

Acts 1937, ch. 81, § 1; C. Supp. 1950, § 8414.1; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 36-407; Acts 2018, ch. 1049, § 3.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2018, ch. 1049, § 9 provided that the act, which amended this section, shall apply only to licenses issued for applications submitted on or after May 21, 2018.

Amendments. The 2018 amendment added (a)(2); and, in present (a)(1), substituted “seventeen (17) years of age; or” for “sixteen (16) years of age, except as provided in this part.”

Effective Dates. Acts 2018, ch. 1049, § 9. May 21, 2018.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 18 Tenn. Juris., Marriage, § 4.

Law Reviews.

Common-Law Marriage in Tennessee, 19 Tenn. L. Rev. 83 (1947).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Validity of Marriage.

Marriage in violation of this section is valid until set aside by the court. Keith v. Pack, 182 Tenn. 420, 187 S.W.2d 618, 1945 Tenn. LEXIS 236, 159 A.L.R. 101 (1945).

2. Discretion as to Annulment.

The use of the word “may” in this section obviously commits to the court a certain discretion as to annulment of such marriages and the provision is not imperative. Keith v. Pack, 182 Tenn. 420, 187 S.W.2d 618, 1945 Tenn. LEXIS 236, 159 A.L.R. 101 (1945).

3. Foreign Marriage.

Marriage consummated in Georgia between residents of Tennessee wherein girl was only 13 could not be set aside by father in proceeding under this section where parties cohabited after girl reached age of 14, the age of consent in Georgia, where Georgia law made marriage valid if cohabitation after age of 14. Keith v. Pack, 182 Tenn. 420, 187 S.W.2d 618, 1945 Tenn. LEXIS 236, 159 A.L.R. 101 (1945).

36-3-106. Consent of parent, guardian, next of kin, agency or custodian — “Parent” defined.

  1. When either applicant is under eighteen (18) years of age, the parents, guardian, next of kin or party having custody of the applicant shall join in the application, under oath, stating that the applicant is seventeen (17) years of age or over and that the applicant has such person's consent to marry.
  2. If the applicant is in the legal custody of any public or private agency or is in the legal custody of any person other than a parent, next of kin or guardian, then such person or the duly authorized representative of such agency shall join in the application with the parent, guardian or next of kin stating, under oath, that the applicant is seventeen (17) years of age but less than eighteen (18) years of age and that the applicant has such person's consent to marry. This subsection (b) does not apply to applicants who are in the legal custody of the department of mental health and substance abuse services or the department of intellectual and developmental disabilities.
  3. The parents, guardian, next of kin, other person having custody of the applicant, or duly authorized representative of a public or private agency having legal custody of the applicant shall join in the application either by personal appearance before the county clerk or deputy county clerk, or by submitting a sworn and notarized affidavit.
  4. The consent of the applicant's parents, guardian, next of kin, other person having custody of the applicant, or duly authorized representative of a public or private agency having legal custody of the applicant is not required if the applicant is emancipated at the time of the application.
  5. Marriage shall remove the disabilities of minority. A minor emancipated by marriage shall be considered to have all the rights and responsibilities of an adult, except for specific constitutional or statutory age requirements, including voting, the use of alcoholic beverages, and other health and safety regulations relevant to the minor because of the minor's age.
  6. A minor shall be advised of the rights and responsibilities of parties to a marriage and of emancipated minors. The minor shall be provided with a fact sheet on these rights and responsibilities to be developed by the administrative office of the courts. The fact sheet shall include referral information for legal aid agencies in this state and national hotlines for domestic violence and sexual assault.
  7. As used in this section, “parent” or “parents” means a person or persons listed as a parent on the child's birth certificate or who have been adjudicated to be the legal parent of the child by a court of competent jurisdiction.

Acts 1937, ch. 81, § 3; C. Supp. 1950, § 8414.3; modified; Acts 1959, ch. 124, § 2; 1972, ch. 545, § 1; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 36-408; Acts 1987, ch. 131, § 1; 2000, ch. 947, § 6; 2010, ch. 1100, § 46; 2012, ch. 575, § 1; 2018, ch. 1049, § 4; 2019, ch. 93, §§ 1, 2.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2010, ch. 1100, § 153 provided that the commissioner of mental health and developmental disabilities, the commissioner of mental health, the commissioner of intellectual and developmental disabilities, and the commissioner of finance and administration are authorized to promulgate rules and regulations to effectuate the purposes of the act. All such rules and regulations shall be promulgated in accordance with the provisions of the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, compiled in title 4, chapter 5.

Acts 2018, ch. 1049, § 9 provided that the act, which amended this section,  shall apply only to licenses issued for applications submitted on or after May 21, 2018.

Amendments. The 2018 amendment added (c)-(f).

The 2019 amendment substituted “seventeen (17) years of age” for “sixteen (16) years of age” in (a) and (b); and added (g).

Effective Dates. Acts 2018, ch. 1049, § 9. May 21, 2018.

Acts 2019, ch. 93, § 4. July 1, 2019.

36-3-107. [Repealed.]

Acts 1937, ch. 81, § 3; C. Supp. 1950, § 8414.3; impl. am. Acts 1978, ch. 934, §§ 22, 36; Acts 1981, ch. 159, § 1; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 36-409; Acts 1984, ch. 939, § 1; 1990, ch. 894, § 1; 1992, ch. 941, §§ 1-6; 2003, ch. 90, § 2; repealed by Acts 2018, ch. 1049, § 5, effective May 21, 2018.

Compiler's Notes. Former § 36-3-107 concerned waiver of age requirements and waiting period for marriage license.

36-3-108. Forced marriage prohibited — Civil action.

  1. Marriage, at any age, that is entered into without valid, freely-given consent from both parties is contrary to the public policy of this state and shall be void and unenforceable in this state.
  2. A person who is forced, whether by violence, threats, or coercion, to marry another shall have a cause of action against any party who forced the person to marry. A claim under this section shall not be based on parental or familial guidance motivated by the person's best interest, which is expressed in a reasonable manner.
  3. Damages for a claim under this section shall include:
    1. Liquidated damages of two hundred fifty thousand dollars ($250,000);
    2. Reasonable attorneys' fees; and
    3. Court costs.
  4. Upon a finding of forced marriage, the court shall order the marriage in question void.
  5. Notwithstanding § 28-3-104, an action under this section must be commenced within ten (10) years after the cause of action accrues by solemnization of marriage.

Acts 2018, ch. 1049, § 8.

Code Commission Notes.

Acts 2018, ch. 1049, §  8 purported to enact this section as §  36-3-201; however, this section was codified as §  36-3-108 by authority of the code commission.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2018, ch. 1049, § 9 provided that the act, which enacted this section,  shall apply only to licenses issued for applications submitted on or after May 21, 2018.

Effective Dates. Acts 2018, ch. 1049, § 9. May 21, 2018.

36-3-109. Issuance of license to drunks, insane persons or imbeciles forbidden.

No license shall be issued when it appears that the applicants or either of them is at the time drunk, insane or an imbecile.

Acts 1937, ch. 81, § 3; C. Supp. 1950, § 8414.3; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 36-411.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 18 Tenn. Juris., Marriage, § 4.

Law Reviews.

Use of Presumptions in Proving the Existence of Marriage Relationships in Tennessee (Richard T. Doughtie), 5 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 409 (1975).

Attorney General Opinions. Constitutionality and limiting construction, OAG 98-011, 1998 Tenn. AG LEXIS 11 (1/9/98).

Constitutionality of provision denying marriage license to applicant appearing insane, OAG 98-011, 1998 Tenn. AG LEXIS 11 (1/9/98).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Effect of Noncompliance.

Disregard of this section does not render a marriage void, but merely voidable after an appropriate proceeding. Bryant v. Townsend, 188 Tenn. 630, 221 S.W.2d 949, 1949 Tenn. LEXIS 381 (1949); Hunt v. Hunt, 56 Tenn. App. 683, 412 S.W.2d 7, 1965 Tenn. App. LEXIS 235 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1965).

Plaintiffs could not proceed with a loss of consortium claim as a result of an accident pursuant to T.C.A. § 25-1-106 because they were not legally married in that they had no valid license as required under T.C.A. §§ 36-3-103 and 36-3-109, a common law marriage was not recognized in Tennessee, and marriage by estoppel was not established. Becker v. Judd, 646 F. Supp. 2d 923, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73684 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 19, 2009).

2. Right to Set Aside Marriage.

Brothers and sisters of deceased could not set aside his marriage consummated six weeks prior to his death where they alleged that deceased was known to be insane several years prior to his death where they had made no attempt to have him declared insane or to appoint a guardian for his property. Bryant v. Townsend, 188 Tenn. 630, 221 S.W.2d 949, 1949 Tenn. LEXIS 381 (1949).

36-3-110. Contest of issuance.

Any interested person shall have the right to contest the issuance of the marriage license, which contest shall be filed, heard and determined by the judge of the probate court, or judge of the juvenile court, or any judge or chancellor; provided, that such contest shall not be filed without the filing of a cost bond in the sum of at least fifty dollars ($50.00) with solvent sureties executed by the contestant, conditioned as in civil cases, and the cost of such contest shall be adjudged against the losing party.

Acts 1937, ch. 81, § 4; C. Supp. 1950, § 8414.4; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 36-412.

Law Reviews.

Polygamy and the Right to Marry: New Life for an Old Lifestyle (G. Keith Nedrow), 11 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 303 (1981).

36-3-111. County clerk violating law — Penalty.

Any county clerk or deputy clerk who issues a marriage license without compliance with the last sentence in § 36-3-103(c)(1), §§ 36-3-104  — 36-3-106, § 36-3-109, § 36-3-110, or § 36-3-113, and not in good faith, commits a Class C misdemeanor.

Acts 1937, ch. 81, § 5; C. Supp. 1950, § 8414.5; Acts 1959, ch. 124, § 3; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 36-413; Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 113; 1996, ch. 1031, § 3; 2018, ch. 1049, § 6.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2018, ch. 1049, § 9 provided that the act, which amended this section,  shall apply only to licenses issued for applications submitted on or after May 21, 2018.

Amendments. The 2018 amendment substituted “§§ 36-3-104  — 36-3-106,” for “§§ 36-3-104  — 36-3-107,”.

Effective Dates. Acts 2018, ch. 1049, § 9. May 21, 2018.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class C misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

Attorney General Opinions. Constitutionality of § 36-3-109, OAG 98-011, 1998 Tenn. AG LEXIS 11 (1/9/98).

36-3-112. Fraudulently signing or using false documents — Misdemeanor.

Fraudulently signing or knowingly using any false document purporting to be one provided for in § 36-3-104(a) or § 36-3-106 is a Class C misdemeanor.

Acts 1937, ch. 81, § 7; C. Supp. 1950, § 8414.7; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 36-414; Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 113.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class C misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

36-3-113. Marriage between one man and one woman only legally recognized marital contract. [See Compiler's Note.]

  1. Tennessee's marriage licensing laws reinforce, carry forward, and make explicit the long-standing public policy of this state to recognize the family as essential to social and economic order and the common good and as the fundamental building block of our society. To that end, it is further the public policy of this state that the historical institution and legal contract solemnizing the relationship of one (1) man and one (1) woman shall be the only legally recognized marital contract in this state in order to provide the unique and exclusive rights and privileges to marriage.
  2. The legal union in matrimony of only one (1) man and one (1) woman shall be the only recognized marriage in this state.
  3. Any policy, law or judicial interpretation that purports to define marriage as anything other than the historical institution and legal contract between one (1) man and one (1) woman is contrary to the public policy of Tennessee.
  4. If another state or foreign jurisdiction issues a license for persons to marry, which marriages are prohibited in this state, any such marriage shall be void and unenforceable in this state.

Acts 1996, ch. 1031, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. In Obergefell, et al. v. Hodges , — U.S. —, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 192 L. Ed. 2d 609, 2015 U.S. LEXIS 4250 (U.S. 2015), the United States Supreme Court declared this section to be invalid to the extent that it excludes same-sex couples from civil marriage on the same terms and conditions as opposite sex couples, holding that same-sex couples have a fundamental right to marry in all states and that there is no lawful basis for a state to refuse to recognize a lawful same-sex marriage performed in another state on the ground of its same-sex character.

Law Reviews.

Deviant to Dignified: From Campbell v. Sundquist to Tanco v. Haslam — The Progression of LGBT Rights & Marital Equality in Tennessee, 83 Tenn. L. Rev. 371 (2016).

Does Tennessee's Constitution Require Permitting Same-Gender Marriages? (J. Ammon Smartt), 36 U. Mem. L. Rev. 413 (2006).

Due Process and Equal Protection: A Constitutional Approach To Same-Sex Marriage, 5 Tenn. J. L. & Pol'y 71 (2009).

Equal Justice for Same-Sex Married Couples: Reflections by a Tennessee Lawyer Who Helped Achieve National Marriage Equality, 46 U. Mem. L. Rev. 175 (2015).

The Legal Regulation of Gay and Lesbian Families as Interstate Immigration Law, 65 Vand. L. Rev. En Banc 11 (2012).

The Marrying Kind, 83 Tenn. L. Rev. 83 (2015).

Attorney General Opinions. Constitutionality, OAG 96-016, 1996 Tenn. AG LEXIS 11 (2/13/96).

T.C.A. § 36-3-113 precludes recognition of same-sex domestic partnerships or civil unions granted by another state or foreign jurisdiction for the purpose of bestowing the rights, benefits and privileges of marriage in Tennessee, OAG 04-066, 2004 Tenn. AG LEXIS 69 (4/19/04).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

The right to marry is a fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the person, and under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment couples of the same-sex may not be deprived of that right and that liberty. Same-sex couples may exercise the fundamental right to marry.  Tenn. Const. art. XI, § 18 is held invalid to the extent it excludes same-sex couples from civil marriage on the same terms and conditions as opposite-sex couples.  Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 192 L. Ed. 2d 609, 2015 U.S. LEXIS 4250, 83 U.S.L.W. 4592 (U.S. 2015).

Part 2
[Reserved]

Part 3
Ceremony

36-3-301. Persons who may solemnize marriages.

    1. All regular ministers, preachers, pastors, priests, rabbis and other spiritual leaders of every religious belief, more than eighteen (18) years of age, having the care of souls, and all members of the county legislative bodies, county mayors, judges, chancellors, former chancellors and former judges of this state, former county executives or county mayors of this state, former members of quarterly county courts or county commissions, the governor, the speaker of the senate and former speakers of the senate, the speaker of the house of representatives and former speakers of the house of representatives, members of the general assembly who have filed notice pursuant to subsection (l ), law enforcement chaplains duly appointed by the heads of authorized state and local law enforcement agencies, members of the legislative body of any municipality in this state, the county clerk of each county, former county clerks of this state who occupied the office of county clerk on or after July 1, 2014, and the mayor of any municipality in the state may solemnize the rite of matrimony. For the purposes of this section, the several judges of the United States courts, including United States magistrates, United States bankruptcy judges, and federal administrative law judges, who are citizens of Tennessee are deemed to be judges of this state. The amendments to this section by Acts 1987, ch. 336, which applied provisions of this section to certain former judges, do not apply to any judge who has been convicted of a felony or who has been removed from office.
    2. In order to solemnize the rite of matrimony, any such minister, preacher, pastor, priest, rabbi or other spiritual leader must be ordained or otherwise designated in conformity with the customs of a church, temple or other religious group or organization; and such customs must provide for such ordination or designation by a considered, deliberate, and responsible act. Persons receiving online ordinations may not solemnize the rite of matrimony.
    3. If a marriage has been entered into by license issued pursuant to this chapter at which any minister officiated before July 1, 2019, the marriage must not be invalid because the requirements of the preceding subdivision (a)(2) have not been met.
  1. The traditional marriage rite of the Religious Society of Friends (Quakers), whereby the parties simply pledge their vows one to another in the presence of the congregation, constitutes an equally effective solemnization.
  2. Any gratuity received by a county mayor, county clerk, members of the county legislative body, or municipal mayor for the solemnization of a marriage, whether performed during or after such person's regular working hours, shall be retained by such person as personal remuneration for such services, in addition to any other sources of compensation such person might receive, and such gratuity shall not be paid into the county general fund or the treasury of such municipality.
  3. If any marriage has been entered into by license regularly issued at which a county mayor officiated prior to April 24, 1981, such marriage shall be valid and is hereby declared to be in full compliance with the laws of this state.
  4. For the purposes of this section, “retired judges of this state” is construed to include persons who served as judges of any municipal or county court in any county that has adopted a metropolitan form of government and persons who served as county judges (judges of the quarterly county court) prior to the 1978 constitutional amendments.
  5. If any marriage has been entered into by license regularly issued at which a retired judge of this state officiated prior to April 13, 1984, such marriage shall be valid and is hereby declared to be in full compliance with the laws of this state.
  6. If any marriage has been entered into by license issued pursuant to this chapter at which a judicial commissioner officiated prior to March 28, 1991, such marriage is valid and is declared to be in full compliance with the laws of this state.
  7. The judge of the general sessions court of any county, and any former judge of any general sessions court, may solemnize the rite of matrimony in any county of this state. Any marriage performed by any judge of the general sessions court in any county of this state before March 16, 1994, shall be valid and declared to be in full compliance with the laws of this state.
  8. All elected officials and former officials, who are authorized to solemnize the rite of matrimony pursuant to subsection (a), may solemnize the rite of matrimony in any county of this state.
  9. If any marriage has been entered into by license issued pursuant to this chapter at which a county mayor officiated outside such mayor's county prior to May 29, 1997, such marriage is valid and is declared to be in full compliance with the laws of this state.
  10. The judge of the municipal court of any municipality, whether elected or appointed, shall have the authority to solemnize the rite of matrimony in any county of the state.
  11. In order to solemnize the rite of matrimony pursuant to subdivision (a)(1), a member of the general assembly must first opt in by filing notice of the member's intention to solemnize the rite of matrimony with the office of vital records.

Code 1858, § 2439 (deriv. Acts 1778, ch. 7, § 2; 1845-1846, ch. 145, § 7); Acts 1879, ch. 98, § 1; 1889, ch. 134, § 1; Shan., § 4189; Code 1932, § 8412; Acts 1949, ch. 251, § 4; C. Supp. 1950, § 8412; Acts 1970, ch. 440, § 1; 1973, ch. 66, § 3; impl. am. Acts 1978, ch. 934, § 7; Acts 1979, ch. 87, § 1; 1981, ch. 211, §§ 1, 2; 1983, ch. 331, §§ 1, 2; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 36-415; Acts 1984, ch. 516, § 1; 1987, ch. 146, § 1; 1987, ch. 336, §§ 4, 5; 1988, ch. 471, §§ 1, 2; 1991, ch. 86, § 1; 1992, ch. 911, § 1; 1993, ch. 50, § 1; 1994, ch. 619, § 1; 1995, ch. 94, § 1; 1995, ch. 128, § 1; 1997, ch. 295, §§ 1, 2; 1998, ch. 745, §§ 1, 2; 1999, ch. 526, § 1; 2003, ch. 90, § 2; 2003, ch. 376, § 3; 2005, ch. 21, § 1; 2012, ch. 677, § 1; 2014, ch. 747, § 1; 2015, ch. 159, § 1; 2017, ch. 288, § 1; 2019, ch. 415, §§ 1-4.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2003, ch. 90, § 2, directed the code commission to change all references from “county executive” to “county mayor” and to include all such changes in supplements and replacement volumes for the Tennessee Code Annotated.

Amendments. The 2017 amendment substituted “, United States bankruptcy judges, and federal administrative law judges”  for “and United States bankruptcy judges” in the second sentence of (a)(1).

The 2019 amendment by ch. 415, effective May 21, 2019, in (a)(1), substituted “members of the general assembly who have filed notice pursuant to subsection (l), law enforcement chaplains duly appointed by the heads of authorized state and local law enforcement agencies, members of the legislative body of any municipality in this state, the county clerk of each county” for “the county clerk of each county”; and added (l).

The 2019 amendment by ch. 415, effective July 1, 2019, added the second sentence to (a)(2), and in (a)(3), substituted “a” for “any” preceding “marriage”, substituted “July 1, 2019, the” for “June 1, 1999, such”, substituted “must” for “shall”, and substituted “(a)(2)” for “(2)”.

Effective Dates. Acts 2017, ch. 288, § 2. May 4, 2017.

Acts 2019, ch. 415, § 5. May 21, 2019; July 1, 2019.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 18 Tenn. Juris., Marriage,  §§ 3, 5.

Law Reviews.

Domestic Relations — Void Marriages — Applicability of Estoppel Doctrine, 22 Tenn. L. Rev. 432 (1953).

Attorney General Opinions. Validity of marriage performed by minister ordained by Universal Life Church, Inc., OAG 97-138, 1997 Tenn. AG LEXIS 171 (10/09/97).

Authority of county clerks to examine qualifications of persons who solemnize marriages, OAG 97-139, 1997 Tenn. AG LEXIS 172 (10/09/97).

Authority to solemnize marriages in any Tennessee county, OAG 98-049, 1998 Tenn. AG LEXIS 49 (2/23/98).

Territory in which an appointed judge may solemnize marriages, OAG 99-048, 1999 Tenn. AG LEXIS 51 (3/2/99).

An elected city judge may perform a marriage in any county in Tennessee, while an appointed city judge has authority to solemnize a marriage only within the city where the judge holds office, OAG 02-112, 2002 Tenn. AG LEXIS 116 (10/10/02).

A federal administrative law judge does not have authority under this section to perform a marriage, OAG 04-147, 2004 Tenn. AG LEXIS 156 (9/02/04).

A police chaplain who is not ordained as a minister, preacher, pastor, priest, rabbi or other spiritual leader of a religious belief does not have authority under this section to perform a marriage, OAG 04-157, 2004 Tenn. AG LEXIS 169 (10/25/04).

A Jewish cantor who is not ordained does not have authority under T.C.A. § 36-3-301 to perform a marriage, OAG 07-122, 2007 Tenn. AG LEXIS 122 (8/16/07).

T.C.A.§ 36-3-301(c): legality of compensation for performing marriages.  OAG 11-18, 2011 Tenn. AG LEXIS 20 (2/22/11).

Authority of certain religious leaders to perform weddings. OAG 14-90, 2014 Tenn. AG LEXIS 93 (9/30/14).

Qualifications of ministers who may solemnize weddings. OAG 15-14, 2015 Tenn. AG LEXIS 14 (2/6/15).

A current or former elected official meeting the requirements of T.C.A. § 36-3-301(a) may not solemnize a wedding ceremony outside Tennessee when executing a license issued by a Tennessee county clerk.  OAG 15-47, 2015 Tenn. AG LEXIS 50  (6/3/15).

Prior to the enactment of Public Chapter 415, spiritual leaders who had received their ordinations online were authorized to solemnize marriages in Tennessee as long as they satisfied the requirements of T.C.A. § 36-3-301(a)(1), (2). After the effective date of Public Chapter 415 (July 1, 2019), spiritual leaders who receive their ordinations online will no longer be among those individuals who are authorized to solemnize marriages in Tennessee. OAG 19-08, 2019 Tenn. AG LEXIS 7 (6/20/2019).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Nature and Effect of Statutes.

The statutes requiring parties proposing to marry to procure a license and make their contract in the presence of certain officers or a minister of the gospel are mandatory, abrogate the common-law mode of constituting marriages, and provide a new and exclusive manner in which such contracts shall be made, and render common-law marriages illegal and void. Bashaw v. State, 9 Tenn. 176, 9 Tenn. 177, 1829 Tenn. LEXIS 36 (1829); Grisham v. State, 10 Tenn. 589, 1831 Tenn. LEXIS 23 (1831), criticized, Andrews v. Page, 50 Tenn. 653, 1871 Tenn. LEXIS 122 (1871), questioned, Johnson v. Johnson, 41 Tenn. 626, 1860 Tenn. LEXIS 116 (1860); Smith v. North Memphis Sav. Bank, 115 Tenn. 12, 89 S.W. 392, 1905 Tenn. LEXIS 42 (1905).

2. Presumption from Regular Solemnization.

Where a marriage was regularly solemnized, the law presumes validity and casts the burden of proof upon defendant to show the contrary. Gamble v. Rucker, 124 Tenn. 415, 137 S.W. 499, 1911 Tenn. LEXIS 55 (1911); Hall v. Hall, 13 Tenn. App. 683, — S.W.2d —, 1931 Tenn. App. LEXIS 112 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1931).

The trial court erred granting husband's summary judgment motion for an annulment by finding the Islamic marriage void ab initio, because the officiant was qualified to perform the marriage under Islamic law, and the fact that the officiant failed to file the marriage license within the legally prescribed time did not invalidate the marriage where a second marriage license was filed that contained the information required by law. Aghili v. Saadatnejadi, 958 S.W.2d 784, 1997 Tenn. App. LEXIS 415 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997).

36-3-302. Formula not required.

  1. No formula need be observed in such solemnization, except that the parties shall respectively declare, in the presence of the minister or officer, that they accept each other as husband and/or wife.
  2. For the purposes of satisfying the requirement in subsection (a) that each party must make a declaration in the presence of a minister or officer, a member of the armed forces of the United States may appear at the marriage ceremony via video conferencing if:
    1. The member of the armed forces is stationed in another country in support of combat or another military operation;
    2. A commissioned officer is present with, and confirms the identity of, the member of the armed forces;
    3. A person authorized to solemnize marriages pursuant to § 36-3-301 is present with, and confirms the identity of, the person who is marrying the member of the armed forces; and
    4. The person who is marrying the member of the armed forces is present in this state.

Code 1858, § 2440; Shan., § 4190; Code 1932, § 8413; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 36-416; Acts 2017, ch. 397, § 2.

Amendments. The 2017 amendment added (b).

Effective Dates. Acts 2017, ch. 397, § 3. May 18, 2017.

Law Reviews.

Common-Law Marriage in Tennessee, 19 Tenn. L. Rev. 83 (1947).

Informal Marriages in Tennessee — Marriage by Estoppel, by Prescription and by Ratification, 3 Vand. L. Rev. 610 (1950).

36-3-303. Return of license to clerk — Penalty for failure to return — Society of Friends.

  1. One authorized by § 36-3-301 who solemnizes the rite of matrimony shall endorse on the license the fact and time of the marriage, and sign the license, and return it to the county clerk within three (3) days from the date of marriage. Every person who fails to make such return of the license commits a Class C misdemeanor.
  2. The functions, duties and liabilities of the party solemnizing marriage as set forth in this part shall, in the case of marriages solemnized among the Religious Society of Friends, be incumbent upon the clerk of the congregation, or in the clerk's absence, the clerk's duly designated alternate.

Code 1858, § 2443 (deriv. Acts 1815, ch. 47, § 1); Acts 1879, ch. 98, § 2; 1889, ch. 134, § 2; 1915, ch. 109, §§ 1, 2; Shan., § 4193; mod. Code 1932, § 8421; Acts 1963, ch. 68, § 1; 1970, ch. 440, § 2; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 36-417; Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 113.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class C misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

Law Reviews.

Common-Law Marriage in Tennessee, 19 Tenn. L. Rev. 83 (1947).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Failure to File Within Legally Prescribed Time.

Fact that the officiant failed to file the marriage license within the legally prescribed time did not invalidate the marriage where a second marriage license was filed that contained the information required by law. Aghili v. Saadatnejadi, 958 S.W.2d 784, 1997 Tenn. App. LEXIS 415 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997).

36-3-304. Form of certificate.

The clerk shall, on each license, place the following form of certificate, to be signed by the person solemnizing the marriage:

“I solemnize the rite of matrimony between the above (or within) named parties on the  day of  ,  .”

Code 1858, § 2444; Shan., § 4194; mod. Code 1932, § 8422; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 36-418.

36-3-305. Solemnizing marriage between incapable persons — Misdemeanor.

Any such minister or officer who knowingly joins together in matrimony two (2) persons not capable thereof commits a Class C misdemeanor and shall also forfeit and pay the sum of five hundred dollars ($500), to be recovered by action of debt, for the use of the person suing.

Code 1858, § 2446 (deriv. Acts 1778, ch. 7, § 5); Shan., § 4196; mod. Code 1932, § 8423; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 36-419; Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 113.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class C misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

Law Reviews.

Family Mediation in Tennessee (Judge Marietta Shipley), 26 U. Mem. L. Rev. 1085 (1996).

36-3-306. Marriage consummated by ceremony not invalidated by failure to comply with law — Restriction.

Failure to comply with the requirements of §§ 36-3-10436-3-106, 36-3-10936-3-111 shall not affect the validity of any marriage consummated by ceremony. No marriage shall be valid, whether consummated by ceremony or otherwise, if the marriage is prohibited in this state.

Acts 1937, ch. 81, § 6; C. Supp. 1950, § 8414.6; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 36-420; Acts 1996, ch. 1031, § 4; 2018, ch. 1049, § 7.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2018, ch. 1049, § 9 provided that the act, which amended this section,  shall apply only to licenses issued for applications submitted on or after May 21, 2018.

Amendments. The 2018 amendment substituted “§§ 36-3-10436-3-106,” for “§§ 36-3-10436-3-107,”.

Effective Dates. Acts 2018, ch. 1049, § 9. May 21, 2018.

Law Reviews.

Informal Marriages in Tennessee — Marriage by Estoppel, by Prescription and by Ratification, 3 Vand. L. Rev. 610 (1950).

Attorney General Opinions. Constitutionality of 1996 amendment, OAG 96-016, 1996 Tenn. AG LEXIS 11 (2/13/96).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Construction with Other Sections.

Although the parties' marriage was void because it was bigamous, that did not affect the legitimacy of the parties four children; however, the trial court did not specify in its order whether the ten thousand one hundred seventy-six dollars constituted net income or gross income and did not explain how it computed the father's income and his child support obligation. Guzman v. Alvares, 205 S.W.3d 375, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 605 (Tenn. July 11, 2006).

2. Purpose.

Evidently the general assembly thought that public morals would be better subserved by recognizing in this section the validity of a marriage consummated by ceremony even though it was contracted in violation of the provisions of § 36-3-105. Keith v. Pack, 182 Tenn. 420, 187 S.W.2d 618, 1945 Tenn. LEXIS 236, 159 A.L.R. 101 (1945).

3. Common-Law Marriages.

Although Tennessee does not recognize as valid common-law marriages contracted within the state, the courts do recognize as valid a common-law marriage contracted in a state where such marriage is valid. Troxel v. Jones, 45 Tenn. App. 264, 322 S.W.2d 251, 1958 Tenn. App. LEXIS 125 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1958); Lightsey v. Lightsey, 56 Tenn. App. 394, 407 S.W.2d 684, 1966 Tenn. App. LEXIS 230 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1966); Shelby County v. Williams, 510 S.W.2d 73, 1974 Tenn. LEXIS 500 (Tenn. 1974).

4. Estoppel.

Trial court erred in declaring a marriage by estoppel because the husband had rebutted the presumption that the parties'  marriage was valid by presenting evidence sufficient to establish that their marriage was bigamous. Guzman v. Alvares, 205 S.W.3d 375, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 605 (Tenn. July 11, 2006).

Application of marriage by estoppel to a void, bigamous marriage would result in the court's recognition of a void marriage that the parties cannot ratify; furthermore, application of the doctrine would contravene T.C.A. § 36-3-102 and T.C.A. § 36-3-306 and the public policy of Tennessee by condoning the bigamous marriage. Guzman v. Alvares, 205 S.W.3d 375, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 605 (Tenn. July 11, 2006).

36-3-307. Nickname in license does not invalidate marriage.

Any marriage that may have been or may be celebrated between persons, by license regularly issued, is valid, and the issue thereof is declared legitimate, although the baptismal name of either party may be omitted in the license, or a nickname be used instead thereof; provided, that the parties have consummated the marriage by cohabitation, and can be identified as the persons between whom such marriage was solemnized.

Acts 1870-1871, ch. 100, § 1; Shan., § 4200; mod. Code 1932, § 8425; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 36-421.

36-3-308. Marriages during War Between the States validated.

All marriages contracted and entered into during the War Between the States (1861-1865) and duly solemnized, are declared valid, and the issue of these marriages are declared legitimate.

Acts 1865-1866, ch. 58, § 1; Shan., § 4199; mod. Code 1932, § 8424; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 36-422.

Part 4
Breach of Marriage Contract

36-3-401. Proof of contract.

In all actions for damages for the breach of promise or contract of marriage that may hereafter be tried in the courts of this state, unless there is written evidence of such contract, signed by the party against whom the action is brought, the alleged contract must be proved by at least two (2) disinterested witnesses before any recovery may be allowed.

Acts 1949, ch. 161, § 3; C. Supp. 1950, § 8462.3 (Williams, § 9720.7); T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 36-701.

Cross-References. Limitation of action, § 28-3-104.

Law Reviews.

Domestic Relations — Breach of Promise Actions, 21 Tenn. L. Rev. 451 (1950).

36-3-402. Plaintiff's testimony — Corroboration required.

In any suit for damages for breach of promise or contract of marriage that may hereafter be tried in the courts of this state, the unsupported testimony of the plaintiff shall not be sufficient to prove such contract, and proof of the association of the parties shall not be sufficient corroboration.

Acts 1949, ch. 161, § 2; C. Supp. 1950, § 8462.2 (Williams, § 9720.6); T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 36-702.

36-3-403. Questions considered in determining damages.

In all suits for damages for breach of promise or contract of marriage that may hereafter be tried in the courts of this state, the judge hearing the case shall instruct the jury to take into consideration the age and experience of the parties and whether the plaintiff has been previously married. Any previous marriage on the part of such plaintiff shall be considered by the court and jury in mitigation of the damages that might otherwise be allowed.

Acts 1949, ch. 161, § 1; C. Supp. 1950, § 8462.1 (Williams, § 9720.5); T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 36-703.

36-3-404. Measure of damages when defendant over sixty (60) years of age.

In all suits for damages for breach of promise or contract of marriage that may be tried in the courts of this state, where the defendant is more than sixty (60) years of age at the time the case is tried, proof of damages shall be limited to the actual financial loss of the plaintiff up to the date of the trial and no punitive damages shall be allowed.

Acts 1949, ch. 161, § 4; C. Supp. 1950, § 8462.4 (Williams, § 9720.8); T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 36-704.

36-3-405. Joinder with other actions prohibited.

No action for the breach of promise of marriage can be joined or tried with any other action for damages.

Acts 1949, ch. 161, § 5; C. Supp. 1950, § 8462.5 (Williams, § 9720.9); T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 36-705.

Part 5
Property Rights of Spouses

36-3-501. Enforcement of antenuptial agreements.

Notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, except as provided in § 36-3-502, any antenuptial or prenuptial agreement entered into by spouses concerning property owned by either spouse before the marriage that is the subject of such agreement shall be binding upon any court having jurisdiction over such spouses and/or such agreement if such agreement is determined, in the discretion of such court, to have been entered into by such spouses freely, knowledgeably and in good faith and without exertion of duress or undue influence upon either spouse. The terms of such agreement shall be enforceable by all remedies available for enforcement of contract terms.

Acts 1980, ch. 492, § 1; T.C.A., § 36-606.

Textbooks. Pritchard on Wills and Administration of Estates (5th ed., Phillips and Robinson), § 832.

Law Reviews.

Covenant Marriage: Should Tennessee Join the Noble Experiment?, 29 U. Mem. L. Rev. 397 (1999).

Family law — Cary v. Cary: Antenuptial Agreements Waiving or Limiting Alimony in Tennessee, 27 U. Mem. L. Rev. 1041 (1997).

Family Law — Randolph v. Randolph: Tennessee Requires Full Disclosure or Independent Knowledge for Antenuptial Agreements To Be Valid, 27 U. Mem. L. Rev. 1021 (1997).

Marital Property in Tennessee: An Evolution, Not a Revolution (Sheryl S. Scheible), 15 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 475 (1985).

Protection Against Spousal Disinheritance: A Critical Analysis of Tennessee's New Forced Share System, 28 U. Mem. L. Rev. 561 (1998).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. In General.

This section makes no explicit reference to the requirement in Baker v. Baker, 24 Tenn. App. 220, 142 S.W.2d 737, 1940 Tenn. App. LEXIS 28 (Tenn. 1940) that, where the provision for the wife in an antenuptial agreement is wholly disproportionate to the husband's wealth, a full disclosure of the nature, extent and value of the husband's property is required to sustain the validity of the agreement; however, numerous factual scenarios could occur in which the failure to make a full disclosure of assets, liabilities and values would breach the statutory requirement that the contract was entered into freely, knowledgeably and in good faith. Kahn v. Kahn, 756 S.W.2d 685, 1988 Tenn. LEXIS 163 (Tenn. 1988).

Antenuptial agreements regarding marital property do not violate public policy. Perkinson v. Perkinson, 802 S.W.2d 600, 1990 Tenn. LEXIS 487 (Tenn. 1990), rehearing denied, — S.W.2d —, 1991 Tenn. LEXIS 57 (Tenn. Feb. 4, 1991).

Binding prenuptial agreement under T.C.A. § 36-3-501 when read as a whole is not ambiguous; trial court properly ordered reimbursement to a former wife where its determination that the wife's payments did not constitute “debts or mortgages” under another section of the agreement was one of fact, and there was nothing to preponderate against trial court's findings on the nature of these expenditures. Ruder v. Ruder, — S.W.3d —, 2008 Tenn. App. LEXIS 555 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 26, 2008).

Because the source of tax refunds were traced to the decedent's separate property, under the plain language of the antenuptial agreement, the tax refunds remained the decedent's separate property; under T.C.A. § 36-3-501, the trial court was bound to enforce the terms of the agreement, which allowed the decedent and his wife to file joint income tax returns as husband and wife without the joint filing affecting the provisions of the agreement concerning separate and marital property. Estate of Hunt v. Hunt, 389 S.W.3d 755, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 172 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 15, 2012), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 563 (Tenn. Aug. 20, 2012).

2. Property Acquired After Marriage.

A $25,000 award to plaintiff wife based on the appreciation of assets that resulted through the joint efforts of the parties during the period of the marriage, where plaintiff had contributed to the appreciation of the parties' assets by furnishing them with a residence during the marriage, offering her services in the family business, and perhaps contributing some personal moneys for the accumulation of joint assets, constituted a division of jointly-held property acquired after marriage, and did not violate antenuptial agreement regarding division of the parties' property. Duncan v. Duncan, 652 S.W.2d 913, 1983 Tenn. App. LEXIS 545 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983), overruled, Cary v. Cary, 937 S.W.2d 777, 1996 Tenn. LEXIS 362 (Tenn. 1996).

By construing the antenuptial agreement as a whole, for purposes of T.C.A. § 36-3-501, all property acquired after the marriage was to remain separate property unless the property was acquired jointly or in both parties'  names; the trial court properly found that personal services income acquired after the marriage was separate property rather than marital property. Seifert v. Seifert, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 325 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 17, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 689 (Tenn. Oct. 3, 2017).

3. Alimony.

A provision in antenuptial agreement that purports to limit a spouse's liability for alimony is conducive to divorce and, therefore, void. The same rule applies to attorney fees that are normally considered as part of a spouse's alimony. Duncan v. Duncan, 652 S.W.2d 913, 1983 Tenn. App. LEXIS 545 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983), overruled, Cary v. Cary, 937 S.W.2d 777, 1996 Tenn. LEXIS 362 (Tenn. 1996).

The invalidity of a provision limiting alimony does not invalidate the remainder of the antenuptial agreement. Kahn v. Kahn, 756 S.W.2d 685, 1988 Tenn. LEXIS 163 (Tenn. 1988).

A voluntary and knowing waiver or limitation of alimony in an antenuptial agreement is not per se void and unenforceable as contrary to public policy, and such provisions will be fully enforced, unless enforcement will render one spouse a public charge. Cary v. Cary, 937 S.W.2d 777, 1996 Tenn. LEXIS 362 (Tenn. 1996).

4. Reconciliation Agreements.

Reconciliation agreements are in the nature of prenuptial or antenuptial agreements and should be generally governed by the same principles. Gilley v. Gilley, 778 S.W.2d 862, 1989 Tenn. App. LEXIS 486 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989).

Reconciliation agreements are generally governed by the same principles as prenuptial or antenuptial agreements, which are to be interpreted and enforced as any other contract. Minor v. Minor, 863 S.W.2d 51, 1993 Tenn. App. LEXIS 206 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993).

A period in excess of 12 years is not a reasonable time for the enforcement of a reconciliation agreement. Minor v. Minor, 863 S.W.2d 51, 1993 Tenn. App. LEXIS 206 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993).

Even though marriage in and of itself would not be sufficient consideration, the couple's waiver of rights to each other's estate was sufficient to support a postnuptial agreement. In re Estate of Wiseman, 889 S.W.2d 215, 1994 Tenn. App. LEXIS 508 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994).

5. Relevance of Duration of Marriage.

The length of time that the marriage lasted was not relevant to the fairness of the antenuptial agreement. The circumstances that existed at the time the agreement was executed determined if it violated any condition of the statute. Perkinson v. Perkinson, 802 S.W.2d 600, 1990 Tenn. LEXIS 487 (Tenn. 1990), rehearing denied, — S.W.2d —, 1991 Tenn. LEXIS 57 (Tenn. Feb. 4, 1991).

6. Enforceable Agreement.

Antenuptial agreement was enforceable where the purpose for which the agreement was executed was clearly stated, that purpose was lawful, and the parties freely, knowledgeably, in good faith and without exertion of duress or undue influence by either, determined the terms of the agreement. Perkinson v. Perkinson, 802 S.W.2d 600, 1990 Tenn. LEXIS 487 (Tenn. 1990), rehearing denied, — S.W.2d —, 1991 Tenn. LEXIS 57 (Tenn. Feb. 4, 1991).

Enforcement of a prenuptial agreement would not change living expenses into a species of marital property subject to division, the absence of a prenuptial agreement so providing; agreements waiving or limiting alimony are enforceable, so long as the prenuptial agreement was entered into freely and knowledgeably, with adequate disclosure. Soloman v. Murrey, 103 S.W.3d 431, 2002 Tenn. App. LEXIS 734 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002).

Court erred in finding that a wife signed an antenuptial agreement under duress where the wife was represented by independent legal counsel throughout the process, her attorney had a draft of the antenuptial agreement six weeks before the wedding, and he went over it with her line by line in his office three weeks before the wedding. Boote v. Shivers, 198 S.W.3d 732, 2005 Tenn. App. LEXIS 661 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005), appeal denied, In re Estate of Boote v. Shivers, — S.W.3d —, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 354 (Tenn. 2006).

Court erred in finding that a wife did not enter into an antenuptial agreement knowingly because the decedent prepared a financial disclosure statement for attachment to the antenuptial agreement to the wife's lawyer six days before she signed the antenuptial agreement, and the knowledge of the wife's lawyer of the contents of the disclosure statement could be properly imputed to the wife. Boote v. Shivers, 198 S.W.3d 732, 2005 Tenn. App. LEXIS 661 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005), appeal denied, In re Estate of Boote v. Shivers, — S.W.3d —, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 354 (Tenn. 2006).

Trial court did not err in upholding an antenuptial agreement that a widow had entered into freely and the fact that there was no value listed for one particular asset of the husband's, even though it was significant, did not invalidate the agreement. The widow did not avail herself of the opportunity to ask her husband the value of the stock or make any independent investigation, and she had not had her counsel investigate. Reece v. Elliott, 208 S.W.3d 419, 2006 Tenn. App. LEXIS 441 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 1123 (Tenn. 2006).

There was no basis upon which to declare a divorce decree void because the divorce court maintained general jurisdiction over the subject matter, including how to interpret and whether to enforce the parties'  antenuptial agreement, and it had the authority to find that the parties'  antenuptial agreement could be enforced. In re Estate of Lewis, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 120 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 18, 2016).

Trial court properly determined that the issue of enforceability of an antenuptial agreement had been previously litigated and ruled upon in the divorce action because the divorce court exercised proper jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matte; the divorce court's determination that the antenuptial agreement would be enforced as written became final, no action for relief from the judgment was ever filed in the divorce court, and the determination was not appealed. In re Estate of Lewis, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 120 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 18, 2016).

Divorce court was enforcing the parties'  antenuptial agreement as written by recognizing that the wife was entitled to life insurance benefits, and thus, it was not punishing the decedent for contempt; because the divorce court's judgment regarding the antenuptial agreement and its life insurance provision was never appealed and became final, the trial court properly enforced it by allowing the wife to file a claim against the decedent's estate. In re Estate of Lewis, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 120 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 18, 2016).

In a divorce case, a former wife's disclosure of her assets provided a former husband with an essentially accurate understanding of her financial holdings, and the husband knowledgeably entered into a prenuptial agreement; the husband's primary argument was that the trial court should not have reversed its earlier ruling that the prenuptial agreement was not valid without providing notice of this to the parties until after the close of evidence. However, when the trial court entered its earlier order in July 2014 finding that the parties'  prenuptial agreement was not valid, the court had not heard all of the parties'  evidence. Yates v. Yates, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 144 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 24, 2016).

7. Unenforceable Agreement.

Antenuptial agreement entered into by the wife and the decedent was invalid and unenforceable because the evidence presented by the executors was insufficient to establish that the wife had the requisite independent knowledge of the full nature, extent, and value of the decedent's assets at the time she entered into the agreement as required by T.C.A. § 36-3-501. The evidence only showed that the wife was aware of the nature of the decedent's business affairs and had a general knowledge of his financial assets. In re Estate of Baker v. King, 207 S.W.3d 254, 2006 Tenn. App. LEXIS 294 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006), appeal denied, In re Estate of Baker, — S.W.3d —, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 930 (Tenn. 2006).

Husband unilaterally procured the antenuptial agreement and presented it to the wife either the day before or the day of the wedding ceremony, with no prior discussion, and although the husband knew the wife could not speak or read English, he did not provide her with a Spanish version; the wife did not enter into the agreement knowledgeably, in good faith, or have adequate knowledge of the marital property, and thus the agreement was invalid and unenforceable. Hollar v. Hollar, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 944 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2015).

Trial court properly found that the antenuptial agreement was unenforceable because the husband did not enter it knowledgeably, as he first saw this agreement one day before the wedding, he did not have the independent advice of counsel, and while the husband was aware that the wife had greater earning capacity than he did, this kind of general knowledge did not satisfy the statutory requirement that agreements be entered knowledgeably. In re Estate of Hillis, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 148 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 25, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 479 (Tenn. June 23, 2016).

Because a husband failed to prove an antenuptial agreement was entered into in good faith as required, the agreement was unenforceable; the evidence did not preponderate against the trial court's finding that at the time the antenuptial agreement was negotiated and executed, the husband knew he owned a condominium with his former girlfriend and deliberately withheld that fact from the wife. Walker v. Walker, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 47 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2020).

Because a husband failed to prove an antenuptial agreement was entered into in good faith as required, the agreement was unenforceable since the husband failed to disclose a condominium he owned with his former girlfriend before execution of the antenuptial agreement; assuming that ratification applied, the conduct did not evidence ratification because none of the wife's actions evidenced an intent to affirm the antenuptial agreement. Walker v. Walker, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 47 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2020).

8. Duty to Disclose Extent of Estate.

Where husband did not disclose full extent of his estate prior to executing ante-nuptial agreement, the agreement was ineffective and widow was entitled to take elective share as surviving spouse. Williams v. Williams, 868 S.W.2d 616, 1992 Tenn. App. LEXIS 609 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992).

The knowledge element of this section means that the spouse seeking to enforce an antenuptial agreement must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, either that a full and fair disclosure of the nature, extent, and value of his or her holdings was provided to the spouse seeking to avoid the agreement, or that disclosure was unnecessary because the spouse seeking to avoid the agreement had independent knowledge of the full nature, extent, and value of the proponent spouse's holdings. Randolph v. Randolph, 937 S.W.2d 815, 1996 Tenn. LEXIS 541 (Tenn. 1996).

Disclosure or full knowledge is required in all cases, not just those which involve an agreement in which the provision for one spouse is wholly disproportionate to the means of the other spouse. Randolph v. Randolph, 937 S.W.2d 815, 1996 Tenn. LEXIS 541 (Tenn. 1996).

Husband's disclosure of his holdings was sufficient where, even though he inadvertently omitted two assets comprising ten to fifteen percent of the total value, the omission was partially offset by his mistaken overvaluation of other assets. Wilson v. Moore, 929 S.W.2d 367, 1996 Tenn. App. LEXIS 264 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996).

Where widow had received list of decedent's property before signing the prenuptial agreement, but did not bother to carefully read the list, it could not be said that the extent of the decedent's assets were not disclosed to her. Cantrell v. Estate of Cantrell, 19 S.W.3d 842, 1999 Tenn. App. LEXIS 873 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999).

Trial court erred by determining that an antenuptial agreement executed by a widow was valid and governed by Florida law, because despite the generally applicable lex loci rule of contracts, Tennessee law applies under circumstances where the law of another jurisdiction contravenes Tennessee public policy and enforcing the widow's antenuptial agreement would violate Tennessee public policy requiring full disclosure. The court noted that under Florida law, a distinction is made as to antenuptial agreements made in a marriage dissolution versus a probate context; however, in Tennessee, no such distinction is made and full and fair disclosure is required in both contexts as provided in T.C.A. § 36-3-501. In re Estate of Davis, 184 S.W.3d 231, 2004 Tenn. App. LEXIS 585 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004), cert. denied, Davis v. Davis, 126 S. Ct. 550, 163 L. Ed. 2d 460, 546 U.S. 977, 2005 U.S. LEXIS 7873 (U.S. Oct. 31, 2005).

Probate court erred in finding that a wife had made a full and fair disclosure of her substantial assets and holdings to her husband prior to their entering into a pre-T.C.A. § 36-3-501 antenuptial agreement because, inter alia, the wife's list of assets could not be located and, assuming the list had existed, the appellate court could not determine if it had been sufficiently detailed and knowledge could not be imputed to the husband. In re Estate of Davis, 213 S.W.3d 288, 2006 Tenn. App. LEXIS 532 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 1217 (Tenn. 2006).

9. Appreciation of Separate Property.

Although antenuptial agreement provided that property owned “partially or wholly” by either party would not be subject to division, that phrase in an antenuptial agreement cannot overcome the statutory definition of marital property, which includes the increase in value of separate property during the marriage if each party substantially contributed to its preservation and appreciation. Wilson v. Wilson, 987 S.W.2d 555, 1998 Tenn. App. LEXIS 612 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998), rehearing denied, 987 S.W.2d 555, 1998 Tenn. App. LEXIS 630 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998), rev'd, 984 S.W.2d 898, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 744 (Tenn. 1998).

30. Illustrative Cases.

Because a husband failed to prove an antenuptial agreement was entered into in good faith as required, the agreement was unenforceable; the evidence did not preponderate against the trial court's finding that at the time the antenuptial agreement was negotiated and executed, the husband knew he owned a condominium with his former girlfriend and deliberately withheld that fact from the wife. Walker v. Walker, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 47 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2020).

36-3-502. Creditor's rights.

  1. No marriage settlement or other marriage contract shall be good against creditors, where a greater value is secured to the intended wife, and the children of the marriage, or either of them, than the portion actually received with the wife in marriage, and such estate as the husband at the time of the husband's marriage shall be possessed of, after deducting the just debts by the husband then due and owing.
  2. In case of any suit upon any such marriage contract, where any creditor is a party, the burden of proof lies upon the person claiming under such marriage contract.
  3. In such case, any legacy given to the wife in general words, and not in trust, or any distributive share in an estate during coverture, shall be taken as a part of the portion received with the wife, and secured to those claiming under the marriage contract, to make up any deficiency created by the claims of creditors on the property conveyed in the marriage contract.

Code 1858, §§ 1767, 1768 (deriv. Acts 1785, ch. 12, § 2); Shan., §§ 3157, 3158; Code 1932, §§ 7839, 7840; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 36-605.

Cross-References. Registration of marriage contracts or agreements, §§ 66-24-105, 66-24-106.

Statute of frauds, § 29-2-101.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 14 Tenn. Juris., Husband and Wife, §§ 2, 18; 18 Tenn. Juris., Marriage Contracts and Settlements, §§ 3, 11.

Law Reviews.

Family Law — Randolph v. Randolph: Tennessee Requires Full Disclosure or Independent Knowledge for Antenuptial Agreements To Be Valid, 27 U. Mem. L. Rev. 1021 (1997).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. In General.

While marriage is a valuable consideration under this statute, the wife cannot hold, under such settlement, as against existing creditors, property of greater value than the portion actually brought with her in marriage, or property of greater value than her husband's estate after deducting his existing debts, for this statute requires a reservation of sufficient property by the husband to pay his debts, but the inquiry is limited to his circumstances at the time of the execution of the conveyance. Weaver v. Hawley, 2 Shan. 176 (1876); Lippman v. Boals, 84 Tenn. 283, 1886 Tenn. LEXIS 97 (1886).

2. Application.

The provision manifestly has reference to a conveyance executed by the husband, only. Baldwin v. Baldwin, 21 Tenn. 473, 1841 Tenn. LEXIS 49 (1841).

3. Antenuptial Release or Settlement.

The intended husband may exclude all his marital rights in the property or estate of the intended wife, even after the death of the wife, by language plainly meaning that he absolutely and entirely releases such rights. Hamrico v. Laird, 18 Tenn. 222, 1836 Tenn. LEXIS 125 (1836); Brown's Adm'rs v. Brown's Adm'rs, 25 Tenn. 127, 1845 Tenn. LEXIS 42 (1845); Loftus v. Penn, 31 Tenn. 445, 1852 Tenn. LEXIS 138 (1852); Goodrich v. Bryant, 37 Tenn. 325, 1858 Tenn. LEXIS 8 (1857); Gamble v. Nunn, 37 Tenn. 465, 1858 Tenn. LEXIS 38 (1858); Gardenhire v. Hinds, 38 Tenn. 402, 1858 Tenn. LEXIS 202 (Tenn. Dec. 1858); Pearson v. Davis, 48 Tenn. 593, 1870 Tenn. LEXIS 119 (1870); Carter v. Dale, Ross & Co., 71 Tenn. 710, 1879 Tenn. LEXIS 135 (1879); Key v. Collins, 145 Tenn. 106, 236 S.W. 3, 1921 Tenn. LEXIS 75 (1921).

Antenuptial settlements are favored by the law, but rights of a husband must, in order to be cut off, be clearly provided by contract's terms. Key v. Collins, 145 Tenn. 106, 236 S.W. 3, 1921 Tenn. LEXIS 75 (1921).

4. —Conveyance of Property Before Marriage.

Where rights of wife are cut off by antenuptial contract, husband's conveyance of the property before marriage is not a fraud on the wife's marital rights. McCulley v. Hardeman, 143 Tenn. 1, 223 S.W. 146, 1920 Tenn. LEXIS 1 (1920).

5. —Burden of Proof.

The statute throws the burden of proof upon the person claiming under the antenuptial settlement, but where there is no pretense of fraud in fact, the only presumption is in favor of creditors existing at the date of the marriage, when the settlement went into effect, for the marriage settlement is only voidable at the instance of existing creditors prejudiced thereby, and a creditor must show that the debt claimed was owing to him by the grantor at the time of the settlement, in order to cast the burden on the person so claiming. Weaver v. Hawley, 2 Shan. 176 (1876); Lippman v. Boals, 84 Tenn. 283, 1886 Tenn. LEXIS 97 (1886).

6. —Effect on Right of Survivorship.

An antenuptial contract settling the wife's property upon her, to be and remain her property, and “subject to her control and disposal forever,” will not deprive the husband of his marital rights in such property as may remain undisposed of at the death of the wife. Brown's Adm'rs v. Brown's Adm'rs, 25 Tenn. 127, 1845 Tenn. LEXIS 42 (1845); Hays v. Bright, 58 Tenn. 325, 1872 Tenn. LEXIS 266 (1872); Mitchell v. Chattanooga Sav. Bank, 126 Tenn. 669, 150 S.W. 1141, 1912 Tenn. LEXIS 83 (1912).

If the contract does not clearly exclude the husband's marital rights beyond the period of coverture, he will be entitled, by marital right, to his predeceased wife's personalty. Loftus v. Penn, 31 Tenn. 445, 1852 Tenn. LEXIS 138 (1852); Mitchell v. Chattanooga Sav. Bank, 126 Tenn. 669, 150 S.W. 1141, 1912 Tenn. LEXIS 83 (1912).

Separate estate created by husband's gift of money to his wife entitles him to same rights as in other personalty left by intestate wife, unless he cuts off his right of survivorship by a clear and distinct expression. Mitchell v. Chattanooga Sav. Bank, 126 Tenn. 669, 150 S.W. 1141, 1912 Tenn. LEXIS 83 (1912); Key v. Collins, 145 Tenn. 106, 236 S.W. 3, 1921 Tenn. LEXIS 75 (1921).

7. —Postnuptial Release or Settlement.

The relinquishment of all the husband's marital rights in the estate of his wife, during the coverture and after her death, may be made by a postnuptial settlement, or by a penal bond made by him upon their separation. Mayberry v. Neely, 24 Tenn. 337, 1844 Tenn. LEXIS 70 (1844); Goodrich v. Bryant, 37 Tenn. 325, 1858 Tenn. LEXIS 8 (1857).

8. —Settlement of Wife's Reversionary Interest.

A postnuptial settlement, upon the wife, of personal property in which she has only a reversionary interest, dependent upon an existing life estate, which is surrendered by the life tenant is good against the creditors of the husband. Smith v. Greer, 22 Tenn. 118, 1842 Tenn. LEXIS 41 (1842).

9. —Consideration.

The husband's sale or conveyance to his wife for the consideration of her relinquishment of her rights of property is valid as against his creditors and subsequent voluntary grantees or donees. Powell v. Powell, 28 Tenn. 477, 1848 Tenn. LEXIS 108 (1848).

Prior advances to a husband out of the wife's property will not constitute a consideration for his subsequent settlement on her, when such consideration is not mentioned in the settlement, unless there was an agreement, at the time the advances were made, to secure her a settlement. There must be an intentional connection between the previous advances and the subsequent deed. While such advances are not sufficient to establish a consideration for the subsequent settlement, yet that fact goes far to explain the execution of it, and is persuasive of the good faith of the parties. Perkins v. Perkins, 1 Cooper's Tenn. Ch. 537 (1874). This case was affirmed on appeal, see 2 Cooper's Tenn. Ch. 785.

Mere parol promises, not based upon a consideration passing at the time, are wholly insufficient to support subsequent deed or settlement on wife. Cheatham v. Hess, 2 Cooper's Tenn. Ch. 763 (1877).

10. —Debts Invalidating Postnuptial Settlement.

To invalidate a postnuptial settlement, the husband must not only be indebted, but he must be indebted at the time to an amount sufficient to have the effect of delaying and defeating creditors. Smith v. Greer, 22 Tenn. 118, 1842 Tenn. LEXIS 41 (1842); White v. Bettis, 56 Tenn. 645, 1872 Tenn. LEXIS 184 (1872). See Ricketts v. McCully, 54 Tenn. 712, 1872 Tenn. LEXIS 108 (1872).

36-3-503. Antenuptial debts of wife — Nonliability of husband.

No husband shall be liable for the debts, contracts or obligations of the wife incurred by the wife previous to marriage.

Acts 1877, ch. 79, § 1; Shan., § 4238; mod. 1932, § 8459; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 36-604.

36-3-504. Disabilities of coverture removed from married women — Statute of limitations.

  1. Married women are fully emancipated from all disability on account of coverture, and the common law as to the disability of married women and its effects on the rights of property of the wife, is totally abrogated, except as set out in § 36-3-505, and marriage shall not impose any disability or incapacity on a woman as to the ownership, acquisition or disposition of property of any sort, or as to the wife's capacity to make contracts and to do all acts in reference to property that the wife could lawfully do, if the wife were not married, but every woman now married, or hereafter to be married, shall have the same capacity to acquire, hold, manage, control, use, enjoy and dispose of, all property, real and personal, in possession, and to make any contract in reference to it, and to bind herself personally, and to sue and be sued with all the rights and incidents thereof, as if the wife were not married.
  2. All of the statutes of limitation that apply in favor of or against a feme sole, and the feme sole's property, shall apply and operate in favor of or against married women and their property.

Acts 1913, ch. 26, § 1; 1919, ch. 126, §§ 1, 3; Shan. Supp., §§ 4249a4, 4249a4½, 4249a6; mod. Code 1932, §§ 8460, 8462; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), §§ 36-601, 36-603.

Cross-References. Acknowledgments of married person, § 66-22-109.

Actions by and against deserted wife, § 20-1-104.

Competency of spouses as witnesses, § 24-1-201.

Marriage settlements eligible for registration, § 66-24-101.

Power to obligate spouse's land for cost of improvements, § 66-11-103.

Tenancy by entireties, see notes to § 36-3-505.

Textbooks. Pritchard on Wills and Administration of Estates (5th ed., Phillips and Robinson), §§ 85, 304, 455, 542, 643.

Tennessee Jurisprudence, 14 Tenn. Juris., Husband and Wife, §§ 2, 20, 21, 28; 18 Tenn. Juris., Limitations of Actions, § 34; 18 Tenn. Juris., Mechanics' Liens, § 4; 18 Tenn. Juris., Minors, § 6; 22 Tenn. Juris., Res Judicata, § 11; 24 Tenn. Juris., Trusts and Trustees, § 14; 25 Tenn. Juris., Wills, § 137; 25 Tenn. Juris., Witnesses, § 13.

Law Reviews.

Family Law—Bratton v. Bratton: The Tennessee Supreme Court Considers Postnuptial Agreements and Allows Married Parties to Agree That They May Eventually Disagree, (Paul Brewer), 35 U. Mem. L. Rev. 579 (2005).

Family Law — Tennessee Courts — Retroactive Abolition of the Common Law Tort of Criminal Conversation,  Hanover v. Ruch, 809 S.W.2d 893, 1991 Tenn. LEXIS 156 (Tenn.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 381, 116 L. Ed. 2d 332, 502 U.S. 942, 1991 U.S. LEXIS 6263, 60 U.S.L.W. 3342 (1991) (No. 91-525), 59 Tenn. L. Rev. 159 (1991).

Stealing Love in Tennessee: The Thief Goes Free, 56 Tenn. L. Rev. 629 (1989).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

This statute is not unconstitutional as destroying vested rights of the husband in his wife's property, though the marriage occurred before the passage of the act, and though the property was acquired by the wife before the marriage; and she may recover the rent of her such land, for the husband's right as to future rents was of a contingent nature. The general assembly had the power to interfere, as it did by this act, before the contingency had ceased, and the right had developed into a vested right in praesenti. Parlow v. Turner, 132 Tenn. 339, 178 S.W. 766, 1915 Tenn. LEXIS 27 (1915).

2. Construction.

The provisions of this statute contravene the common law, and the court will not unnecessarily extend the terms thereof by construction. Mayo v. Bank of Gleason, 140 Tenn. 423, 205 S.W. 125, 1918 Tenn. LEXIS 52 (1918).

3. Application.

This statute is not confined in its application to property, real and personal, in the possession of such women. Moffat v. Schenck, 141 Tenn. 305, 210 S.W. 157, 1918 Tenn. LEXIS 91 (1919).

The common law as to disabilities of married women and its effect on the rights of the property of the wife is totally abrogated by the former Married Women's Emancipation Act except as to exceptions provided by the statute. Preston v. Smith, 41 Tenn. App. 222, 293 S.W.2d 51, 1955 Tenn. App. LEXIS 121 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1955).

4. Effect of Statute on Conjugal Relationship.

This section does not deprive either the husband or the wife of the conjugal relationship, with its duties and rights. Chattanooga v. Carter, 132 Tenn. 609, 179 S.W. 127, 1915 Tenn. LEXIS 53 (1915).

5. Domicile of Wife.

Since married women may now freely contract with their husbands, a wife may, with the acquiescence or consent of the husband, acquire a separate domicile from that of the husband. Younger v. Gianotti, 176 Tenn. 139, 138 S.W.2d 448, 1939 Tenn. LEXIS 109, 128 A.L.R. 1413 (1940).

Where the wife with the acquiescence and consent of the husband removed from the residence of the husband in Nebraska to Tennessee with the intention of making Tennessee her permanent residence and lived there 21 years until her death, she acquired a separate domicile in Tennessee so that the laws of Tennessee governed the distribution of her personalty and not the laws of Nebraska. Younger v. Gianotti, 176 Tenn. 139, 138 S.W.2d 448, 1939 Tenn. LEXIS 109, 128 A.L.R. 1413 (1940).

The domicile of the wife is presumed to be that of her husband. Clothier v. Clothier, 33 Tenn. App. 532, 232 S.W.2d 363, 1950 Tenn. App. LEXIS 113 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1950), superseded by statute as stated in, Moore v. Moore, — S.W.2d —, 1991 Tenn. App. LEXIS 869 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 1, 1991).

6. Right of Wife to Contract.

The statute gives a married woman the right to contract and bind herself personally as if a feme sole. Baird v. Lebeck Bros., 7 Tenn. Civ. App. (7 Higgins) 225 (1916); Jefferson County Bank v. Hale, 152 Tenn. 648, 280 S.W. 408, 1925 Tenn. LEXIS 109 (1926).

7. —Conveyance of Realty.

A married woman may convey her realty as if she were unmarried. Jefferson County Bank v. Hale, 152 Tenn. 648, 280 S.W. 408, 1925 Tenn. LEXIS 109 (1926).

Wife has the same right to convey realty to husband, as the husband has to convey realty to wife. Howell v. Davis, 196 Tenn. 334, 268 S.W.2d 85, 1954 Tenn. LEXIS 385, 1954 Tenn. LEXIS 386 (1954).

8. — —Privy Examination of Wife.

Acts 1913, ch. 26 did not dispense with the necessity of a married woman's privy examination in alienating her homestead under Shannon's Code, § 3753. Roach v. Francisco, 138 Tenn. 357, 197 S.W. 1099, 1917 Tenn. LEXIS 41, 1 A.L.R. 1074 (1917).

Since the enactment of Acts 1913, ch. 26 a married woman may contract with reference to her general estate in the manner of a feme sole, and the contract of a married woman to convey lands is binding without privy examination. Little v. Hickey, 8 Tenn. Civ. App. 303 (1918).

The privy examination was dispensed with entirely by § 66-22-109. Cunningham v. Moore, 161 Tenn. 128, 29 S.W.2d 654, 1929 Tenn. LEXIS 40 (1930); Granger v. Webster, 162 Tenn. 459, 36 S.W.2d 883, 1930 Tenn. LEXIS 109 (Dec. 1930).

The reference in Roach v. Francisco (1917), 138 Tenn. 357, 197 S.W. 1099, 1917 Tenn. LEXIS 41, 1 A.L.R. 1074 to a constitutional prohibition against the alienation of the homestead without the privy examination of the wife was evidently an inadvertence and such reference should have been to the statutory prohibition that was dispensed with by Acts 1919, ch. 48. Cunningham v. Moore, 161 Tenn. 128, 29 S.W.2d 654, 1929 Tenn. LEXIS 40 (1930).

9. — —Covenants.

Where wife joins as grantor with husband in conveying property covenanting against encumbrance, she is bound on the covenants. Oral testimony is incompetent to contradict or vary the instrument, reformation not being sought. Watts v. Ramsey, 156 Tenn. 463, 2 S.W.2d 409, 1927 Tenn. LEXIS 142 (1928).

10. —Renting Lands.

Under this statute, a married woman has the right to rent out her lands, and to collect the rents accruing therefrom. Henderson Grocery Co. v. Johnson, 141 Tenn. 127, 207 S.W. 723, 1918 Tenn. LEXIS 73 (1918).

11. —Mechanics' Liens.

Since the statute, there enters into every contract of a married woman for the improvement of her real property, a stipulation that subcontractors and materialmen shall be treated as vested with the same rights as to liens as if the owner had been a man. Gould v. Frost, 138 Tenn. 467, 196 S.W. 949, 1917 Tenn. LEXIS 57 (1917); Carey v. Harrison, 8 Tenn. Civ. App. 50 (1918).

12. Liability for Debt.

Since emancipation, a wife who is furnished goods for herself and family, credit being extended to her alone, and not as agent of her husband, is liable personally therefor, though she lives with her husband. Baird v. Lebeck Bros., 7 Tenn. Civ. App. (7 Higgins) 225 (1916).

13. Liability of Wife's Property for Her Debts.

Under this statute, a married woman holds property in the same manner as a feme sole and all her property to which she has title is subject to her debts, and the husband holds no interest therein so as to defeat sale for such debts. Henderson Grocery Co. v. Johnson, 141 Tenn. 127, 207 S.W. 723, 1918 Tenn. LEXIS 73 (1918).

14. Rights of Husband as to Wife's Property.

A husband can only acquire his wife's personalty during coverture by purchase or gift. Tellico Bank & Trust Co. v. Loomis, 147 Tenn. 158, 246 S.W. 21, 1922 Tenn. LEXIS 28 (1922).

A husband cannot during coverture reduce to his possession the wife's personalty. Priest v. Williamson County Banking & Trust Co., 148 Tenn. 87, 251 S.W. 904, 1922 Tenn. LEXIS 79 (1922); Walker v. Walker, 2 Tenn. App. 279, — S.W. —, 1925 Tenn. App. LEXIS 106 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1925); Justice v. Henley, 27 Tenn. App. 405, 181 S.W.2d 632, 1944 Tenn. App. LEXIS 87 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1944).

Since the enactment of this section, if a husband comes into possession of his wife's property, he is treated as her agent in dealing therewith. Robertson v. Wade, 17 Tenn. App. 457, 68 S.W.2d 487, 1933 Tenn. App. LEXIS 80 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1933); Justice v. Henley, 27 Tenn. App. 405, 181 S.W.2d 632, 1944 Tenn. App. LEXIS 87 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1944).

The only right of the husband to control the wife's lands or collect rents is by her consent. Robertson v. Wade, 17 Tenn. App. 457, 68 S.W.2d 487, 1933 Tenn. App. LEXIS 80 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1933).

15. —Earnings of Wife.

Earnings of a wife are a part of her separate personal estate and belong to her to the exclusion of common-law rights of her husband. Hull v. Hull Bros. Lbr. Co., 186 Tenn. 53, 208 S.W.2d 338, 1948 Tenn. LEXIS 517 (1948).

16. —Husband in Possession of Wife's Lands.

The word “owner,” as used in former §§ 54-13-30154-13-303 [repealed], conferring upon the “owner” of land constituting the bank of a navigable river the preferential right to establish and operate a ferry across the river, applied to a husband in possession of land of his incompetent wife, by virtue of the marriage relation. McCrary v. Harrell, 166 Tenn. 431, 62 S.W.2d 566, 1932 Tenn. LEXIS 152 (1933).

A deed by the husband to his wife without reservations or restrictions either in the deed or by private agreement or understanding was not rendered less absolute by the fact that the husband continued to occupy the property with his wife as their home and it formed no part of his estate after his death. Union Planters Nat'l Bank v. United States, 361 F.2d 662, 1966 U.S. App. LEXIS 5837 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1966).

17. —Husband's Sale of Wife's Property.

Although the former Married Women's Emancipation Act gives her the right to own and control her own property free from any rights of the husband, the very relation of husband and wife warrants the husband in taking more liberties with his wife's property than with the property of strangers. The wife's consent will be more readily implied than in other cases. She may be precluded from urging that her husband was without authority to sell or mortgage the automobile by failing to object to many acts of his concerning it. Commercial Credit Co. v. Farrar, 14 Tenn. App. 318, — S.W.2d —, 1931 Tenn. App. LEXIS 42 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1931).

A husband cannot dispose of his wife's interest in an estate owned as by the tenants by the entirety, and cannot sell or encumber anything but his own interest. Irwin v. Dawson, 197 Tenn. 314, 273 S.W.2d 6, 1954 Tenn. LEXIS 488 (1954).

18. —Proceeds from Sale of Real Estate.

The fact that a wife permitted her husband to receive a cash payment for her real estate and notes payable to himself, and to use the proceeds, does not create a presumption of gift. City Nat'l Bank v. Harle, 7 Tenn. App. 286, — S.W.2d —, 1928 Tenn. App. LEXIS 41 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1928).

19. —Resulting Trust.

Where the husband comes into possession of the wife's property and manages or invests it with her consent, and purchases land with the wife's money and takes title in himself, a trust will result to the principal. Walker v. Walker, 2 Tenn. App. 279, — S.W. —, 1925 Tenn. App. LEXIS 106 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1925).

Where a married woman used her own money to pay for land but her husband had the deed made to himself and her, and she did not know until his will was probated that he claimed any interest in the land, there was a resulting trust in favor of the wife as to the one half interest standing in the husband's name. Justice v. Henley, 27 Tenn. App. 405, 181 S.W.2d 632, 1944 Tenn. App. LEXIS 87 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1944).

20. —Suit for Injury to Wife's Property.

Since the statute, if husband and wife own an estate in common, the husband cannot recover for injury to wife's share. Gardner v. Quinn, 154 Tenn. 167, 289 S.W. 513, 1926 Tenn. LEXIS 112 (1926).

21. Suit by Wife for Personal Injuries.

22. —Joinder of Husband.

The joinder of the husband in the wife's suit is unnecessary. She may prosecute a suit for injuries received in an automobile accident, without the joinder of her husband, because the recovery will be distinctly her own. Knoxville R. & L. Co. v. Vangilder, 132 Tenn. 487, 178 S.W. 1117, 1915 Tenn. LEXIS 39, L.R.A. (n.s.) 1916A1111 (1915).

Under this statute, joinder of husband in wife's suit to recover damages for personal injuries was unnecessary. Whitehurst v. Howell, 20 Tenn. App. 314, 98 S.W.2d 1071, 1936 Tenn. App. LEXIS 28 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1936).

23. —Reimbursement in Part to Husband for Medical Expenses.

Where husband filed claim with United States for wife's medical expenses up to certain date and claim stated that wife was to pay thereafter, the wife was not barred from suing government for damages and recovering for medical expenses incurred by her. Phillips v. United States, 102 F. Supp. 943, 1952 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4826 (D. Tenn. 1952).

24. Suits for Alienation of Affection and Criminal Conversation.

Although formerly a wife could not have maintained a suit for the alienation of her husband's affections based upon a cause of action occurring prior to desertion, under this statute this disability was removed. Wilson v. Bryant, 167 Tenn. 107, 67 S.W.2d 133, 1933 Tenn. LEXIS 12 (1934).

Disability of wife at common law from suing for criminal conversation of husband with another woman was removed by emancipation act. Scates v. Nailling, 196 Tenn. 508, 268 S.W.2d 561, 1954 Tenn. LEXIS 413 (1954).

25. Suits for Loss of Services.

This statute does not affect the legal rights and duties of the relationship of husband and wife further than to emancipate the wife from the disability of coverture. It does not affect her marital duties, so that the husband, as at common law, may recover for the loss of the services of his wife by reason of personal injuries sustained by her. Chattanooga v. Carter, 132 Tenn. 609, 179 S.W. 127, 1915 Tenn. LEXIS 53 (1915); Johnston v. Southern Ry., 155 Tenn. 639, 299 S.W. 785, 1926 Tenn. LEXIS 94, 55 A.L.R. 932 (1926).

Wife did not have the right to maintain common-law action for loss of services and consortium of husband against employer of husband on the basis of the emancipation act where employer was operating under Workers' Compensation Law (title 50, ch. 6) as that remedy was exclusive. Napier v. Martin, 194 Tenn. 105, 250 S.W.2d 35, 1952 Tenn. LEXIS 356 (1952).

The common-law right of action in the husband for loss of his wife's services was not taken away by the former Married Women's Emancipation Act but still persists in the husband. Dunn v. Alabama Oil & Gas Co., 42 Tenn. App. 108, 299 S.W.2d 25, 1956 Tenn. App. LEXIS 117 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1956); Rush v. Great American Ins. Co., 213 Tenn. 506, 376 S.W.2d 454, 1964 Tenn. LEXIS 418 (1964), superseded by statute as stated in, Kilbourne v. Hanzelik, 648 S.W.2d 932, 1983 Tenn. LEXIS 774 (Tenn. 1983).

Wife did not have cause of action at common law for loss of consortium resulting from personal injury of husband and it was not within the province of the court to create such an action where it was unknown at common law and had not been provided by statute. Rush v. Great American Ins. Co., 213 Tenn. 506, 376 S.W.2d 454, 1964 Tenn. LEXIS 418 (1964), superseded by statute as stated in, Kilbourne v. Hanzelik, 648 S.W.2d 932, 1983 Tenn. LEXIS 774 (Tenn. 1983).

26. Wrongful Death.

An action for wrongful death against one spouse may be maintained when it is predicated upon an intentional tort to the other spouse during marriage, such act resulting in the termination of the marriage by death. Luna v. Clayton, 655 S.W.2d 893, 1983 Tenn. LEXIS 656 (Tenn. 1983).

27. Duties and Liabilities Between Spouses.

Husband is still the head of the marital household and the wife is required to render services in the home that the law presumes to be gratuitous. Hull v. Hull Bros. Lbr. Co., 186 Tenn. 53, 208 S.W.2d 338, 1948 Tenn. LEXIS 517 (1948).

Wife of one of the partners in a partnership who took place of former employee and thereafter rendered the same services as bookkeeper of the partnership was entitled to recover from firm on quantum meruit for services rendered, since evidence overcame presumption that services of wife were voluntary. Hull v. Hull Bros. Lbr. Co., 186 Tenn. 53, 208 S.W.2d 338, 1948 Tenn. LEXIS 517 (1948).

This statute does not affect the common-law duty of the husband to support the wife during her lifetime and to pay her funeral expenses after her death. In re Estate of Deskins, 214 Tenn. 608, 381 S.W.2d 921, 1964 Tenn. LEXIS 512 (1964).

28. Right to Contract with Other Spouse.

Although the statute does not expressly authorize the wife to contract with the husband, it is broad enough to confer on her the right to contract to render services to a business in which he has an interest. Hull v. Hull Bros. Lbr. Co., 186 Tenn. 53, 208 S.W.2d 338, 1948 Tenn. LEXIS 517 (1948).

The effect of the Act of 1913 as amended by the Act of 1919 was to dissolve the “oneness” of the married state and to empower one spouse to contract with the other as with a stranger. Howell v. Davis, 196 Tenn. 334, 268 S.W.2d 85, 1954 Tenn. LEXIS 385, 1954 Tenn. LEXIS 386 (1954).

29. —Reconciliation Property Settlement.

Agreement between husband and wife for reconciliation and containing property settlement binding in the future was not promotive or conducive of separation of the parties and was valid. Hoyt v. Hoyt, 213 Tenn. 117, 372 S.W.2d 300, 1963 Tenn. LEXIS 474 (1963) (overruling Copeland v. Boaz, 68 Tenn. 223, 1877 Tenn. LEXIS 24 (1877)).

30. —Land Owned Jointly.

A wife and her husband could enter into an agreement to divide proceeds of sale of land held by them jointly, and both the husband and his creditors were bound thereby. Masillon Engine Co. v. Shoemaker, 6 Tenn. Civ. App. (6 Higgins) 277 (1915).

31. —Deed by Wife to Husband Before Statute.

Deed executed by wife to husband before enactment of this section was void and could not be ratified. Jenkins v. Jenkins, 11 Tenn. App. 142, — S.W.2d —, 1929 Tenn. App. LEXIS 82 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1929).

32. Suit Against Other Spouse.

Neither this statute nor former § 39-2-105 (see now T.C.A. § 39-13-101) making the husband's assault and battery upon his wife a misdemeanor, abrogated the fundamental doctrine of the unity of husband and wife under the common law, nor the correlative duties of the husband and wife to each other, nor the common-law rule that one spouse cannot sue the other for a tort committed during the marriage. Lillienkamp v. Rippetoe, 133 Tenn. 57, 179 S.W. 628, 1915 Tenn. LEXIS 73, L.R.A. (n.s.) 1916B881 (1915).

Although under this section a spouse may not sue another in a tort action, a wife could sue her husband's estate in a Tennessee federal court for damages resulting from a motor vehicle accident in North Carolina in which her husband was driving, where North Carolina laws permit tort action against spouse, since the laws of the place of the accident determine the rights of the parties. Franklin v. Wills, 217 F.2d 899, 1954 U.S. App. LEXIS 3214 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1954).

Wife could not maintain personal injury action against husband for injuries resulting from his alleged negligence in operation of automobile in Tennessee. Prince v. Prince, 205 Tenn. 451, 326 S.W.2d 908, 1959 Tenn. LEXIS 382 (1959), overruled in part, Davis v. Davis, 657 S.W.2d 753, 1983 Tenn. LEXIS 723 (Tenn. 1983). But see Lucas v. Phillips, 205 Tenn. 444, 326 S.W.2d 905, 1957 Tenn. LEXIS 472 (1957), wherein injury occurred in Arkansas and recovery was permitted against husband's employer where Arkansas statute permitted personal injury action against husband for his torts.

Fact that husband carried automobile liability policy indemnifying him against loss did not entitle wife to maintain personal injury action against him for injuries sustained in automobile driven by him since there would be nothing to indemnify where action could not be maintained. Prince v. Prince, 205 Tenn. 451, 326 S.W.2d 908, 1959 Tenn. LEXIS 382 (1959), overruled in part, Davis v. Davis, 657 S.W.2d 753, 1983 Tenn. LEXIS 723 (Tenn. 1983); Hance v. Haun, 216 Tenn. 176, 391 S.W.2d 621, 1965 Tenn. LEXIS 570 (1965), overruled, Luna v. Clayton, 655 S.W.2d 893, 1983 Tenn. LEXIS 656, 1983 Tenn. LEXIS 788 (Tenn. 1983).

One spouse cannot maintain an action against the other for an alleged tort that occurred in this state during coverture because there is no civil right to be redressed. Prince v. Prince, 205 Tenn. 451, 326 S.W.2d 908, 1959 Tenn. LEXIS 382 (1959), overruled in part, Davis v. Davis, 657 S.W.2d 753, 1983 Tenn. LEXIS 723 (Tenn. 1983); Gordon v. Pollard, 207 Tenn. 45, 336 S.W.2d 25, 1960 Tenn. LEXIS 406 (1960), overruled in part, Davis v. Davis, 657 S.W.2d 753, 1983 Tenn. LEXIS 723 (Tenn. 1983); Hance v. Haun, 216 Tenn. 176, 391 S.W.2d 621, 1965 Tenn. LEXIS 570 (1965), overruled, Luna v. Clayton, 655 S.W.2d 893, 1983 Tenn. LEXIS 656, 1983 Tenn. LEXIS 788 (Tenn. 1983); Wooley v. Parker, 222 Tenn. 104, 432 S.W.2d 882, 1968 Tenn. LEXIS 415 (1968).

The common-law rule on interspousal immunity was not abrogated by the former Married Women's Emancipation Act. Gordon v. Pollard, 207 Tenn. 45, 336 S.W.2d 25, 1960 Tenn. LEXIS 406 (1960), overruled in part, Davis v. Davis, 657 S.W.2d 753, 1983 Tenn. LEXIS 723 (Tenn. 1983); Wooley v. Parker, 222 Tenn. 104, 432 S.W.2d 882, 1968 Tenn. LEXIS 415 (1968).

Next of kin of wife has no cause of action against spouse for wrongful death of wife. Hance v. Haun, 216 Tenn. 176, 391 S.W.2d 621, 1965 Tenn. LEXIS 570 (1965), overruled, Luna v. Clayton, 655 S.W.2d 893, 1983 Tenn. LEXIS 656, 1983 Tenn. LEXIS 788 (Tenn. 1983).

Wife could not maintain action against estate of husband for personal injuries arising out of automobile accident wherein husband was driver and wife passenger in the automobile in which husband was killed and wife injured. Wooley v. Parker, 222 Tenn. 104, 432 S.W.2d 882, 1968 Tenn. LEXIS 415 (1968).

Denial of right of wife to sue husband for personal injuries did not constitute denial of due process or equal protection of the law under U.S. Const., amend. 14 or Tenn. Const., art. I, §§ 8, 17. Fischer v. Fischer, 477 S.W.2d 513, 1972 Tenn. LEXIS 392 (Tenn. 1972).

A spouse may maintain a negligence action for personal injuries against the other spouse for an antenuptial tort. Childress v. Childress, 569 S.W.2d 816, 1978 Tenn. LEXIS 631 (Tenn. 1978).

Interspousal tort immunity is totally abolished in this state and all decisions to the contrary are overruled. Davis v. Davis, 657 S.W.2d 753, 1983 Tenn. LEXIS 723 (Tenn. 1983).

The wife was not permitted to bring action against husband for intentional tort resulting in mental and physical disability that arose before but was not pending at the time of the decision in Luna v. Clayton, 655 S.W.2d 893 (Tenn. 1983). Lazarov v. Lazarov, 731 S.W.2d 928, 1987 Tenn. App. LEXIS 2561 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987).

33. —Voidable Marriage.

Annulment of voidable marriage did not render marriage void ab initio for purpose of permitting one party to maintain an action for tort against the other that occurred during the period when the status of the parties was man and wife. Gordon v. Pollard, 207 Tenn. 45, 336 S.W.2d 25, 1960 Tenn. LEXIS 406 (1960), overruled in part, Davis v. Davis, 657 S.W.2d 753, 1983 Tenn. LEXIS 723 (Tenn. 1983).

34. —Unlawful Detainer Against Husband.

Under the authority of an emancipation act such as this section a wife may successfully maintain an action in unlawful detainer against her husband for her separate real estate. Hall v. Hall, 193 Tenn. 74, 241 S.W.2d 919, 1951 Tenn. LEXIS 325 (1951).

35. —Criminal Prosecution of Husband by Wife.

The husband is subject to criminal libel of the wife, upon her complaint, where she is living apart from the husband. State v. Kirby, 167 Tenn. 307, 69 S.W.2d 886, 1934 Tenn. LEXIS 1 (1934).

In criminal actions, a wronged wife may become prosecutrix in indictment against her husband. The rule denying her the right to complain of husband's tort does not apply. State v. Kirby, 167 Tenn. 307, 69 S.W.2d 886, 1934 Tenn. LEXIS 1 (1934).

36. Torts of Wife.

Under this statute, the common-law liability of a husband for the voluntary torts of his wife is abrogated, so far as those torts are connected with her separate property, and, therefore, a husband is not liable for the damages caused by his wife's negligence in operating an automobile that was her separate property. Foster v. Ingle, 147 Tenn. 217, 246 S.W. 530, 1922 Tenn. LEXIS 34, 27 A.L.R. 1214 (1923); Forman v. Washington, 3 Tenn. App. 567, 1926 Tenn. App. LEXIS 132 (1926).

37. Criminal Liability of Married Woman.

There is no longer a presumption that the wife in committing a criminal act did so under husband's duress. Morton v. State, 141 Tenn. 357, 209 S.W. 644, 1918 Tenn. LEXIS 96, 4 A.L.R. 264 (1919).

Since the enactment of the married women's emancipation legislation, a married woman is as capable of and as responsible for crime as if she were single, and she is to be regarded as an independent entity. Johnson v. State, 152 Tenn. 184, 274 S.W. 12, 1925 Tenn. LEXIS 60 (1925), superseded by statute as stated in, State v. Durso, 645 S.W.2d 753, 1983 Tenn. LEXIS 768 (Tenn. 1983).

38. Taxation of Costs of Suit Against Married Woman.

A married woman may be taxed with the costs of a frivolous and malicious prosecution. State v. Kirby, 167 Tenn. 307, 69 S.W.2d 886, 1934 Tenn. LEXIS 1 (1934).

39. Estoppel Against Married Woman.

Responsibilities are coupled with the privileges conferred, and, even if a married woman was protected by coverture from the application of the doctrine of estoppel in pais previously, the enactment destroyed the protection. Smith v. Smith, 8 Tenn. Civ. App. 322 (1913).

40. Guardianship of Minor Female.

Under this statute, the marriage of a minor female does not terminate her guardianship. Mayo v. Bank of Gleason, 140 Tenn. 423, 205 S.W. 125, 1918 Tenn. LEXIS 52 (1918).

41. Restraints on Alienation.

While this statute practically makes the estates of married women separate estates, it does not interfere with the creation or operation of the equitable separate estates so long and so beneficially enforced and protected in courts of chancery; and, therefore, parents and others, desiring to provide for wives or children, may, by restraints on alienation in such settlements, still throw around them the safeguards devised by the wisdom of the great equity judges. Indeed the necessity for such protection by the creation of separate estates, with restraints on alienation, was increased rather than diminished by the removal of the disability of coverture from married women. Travis v. Sitz, 135 Tenn. 156, 185 S.W. 1075, 1915 Tenn. LEXIS 192, L.R.A. (n.s.) 1917A671 (1915).

42. Liability of Husband for Burial of Wife.

This section does not relieve husband of his common-law obligation for burial of his wife. Simpson v. Drake, 150 Tenn. 84, 262 S.W. 41, 1923 Tenn. LEXIS 65 (1924).

43. Personalty of Wife Dying Intestate.

Inasmuch as the emancipation statute neither expressly nor by necessary implication makes any disposition of the property of a married woman after her death, in the event of her failure to dispose of it, her personal property, upon her death, without such disposition, passes, jus mariti, to her husband. It is immaterial that the wife was under the age of 21 years, at the time of the marriage and during the continuance thereof to the time of her death. Baker v. Dew, 133 Tenn. 126, 179 S.W. 645, 1915 Tenn. LEXIS 79 (1915).

44. Personalty of Wife Dying Testate.

Where wife left a will from which her husband dissented, his rights were determined by the common-law principle that the marriage amounted to an absolute gift by the wife to the husband of her personal estate had no application, such principle having been abrogated by this section. Elliott v. Markland, 26 Tenn. App. 222, 170 S.W.2d 662, 1942 Tenn. App. LEXIS 37 (1942).

45. Cause of Action Arising Prior to Statute.

Where alleged threats causing destruction of wife's business occurred prior to Acts 1913, wife could not bring suit without joinder of husband even though such suit was brought after the effective date of the statute. Snyder v. Jett, 138 Tenn. 211, 197 S.W. 488, 1917 Tenn. LEXIS 21 (1917).

46. Possession by Husband and Wife.

A husband and wife may occupy the position of joint tenants, that is, tenants by the entirety or tenants in common, and the possession of the husband and wife together does not necessarily mean the possession of the husband alone. Preston v. Smith, 41 Tenn. App. 222, 293 S.W.2d 51, 1955 Tenn. App. LEXIS 121 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1955).

47. —Adverse Possession.

Where husband and wife commenced possession of land before the enactment of the former Married Women's Emancipation Act but such possession did not ripen into title under 20 years' adverse possession without color of title until after the date of the statute, the law as it existed at the time possession was perfected and title passed controlled rather than the law as it existed at the beginning of the adverse possession. Preston v. Smith, 41 Tenn. App. 222, 293 S.W.2d 51, 1955 Tenn. App. LEXIS 121 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1955).

Where proof of case and record as a whole showed that adverse possession of land for 20 years was by husband and wife jointly and was not considered by them to be the exclusive possession of the husband, title so acquired was not in husband alone but in husband and wife as tenants in common. Preston v. Smith, 41 Tenn. App. 222, 293 S.W.2d 51, 1955 Tenn. App. LEXIS 121 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1955).

Where husband and wife acquired title to land by 20 years' continuous adverse possession without color of title the estate acquired was a tenancy in common and not a tenancy by the entirety. Preston v. Smith, 41 Tenn. App. 222, 293 S.W.2d 51, 1955 Tenn. App. LEXIS 121 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1955).

48. Coverture.

The application of the common-law disability of coverture to tenancies by the entirety involves an invidious and suspect classification based upon sex and marital status without any rational basis, and deprives married women of their property without due process of law and denies them the equal protection of the laws in violation of U.S. Const., amends. 5 and 14 and Tenn. Const., art. I, § 8. Robinson v. Trousdale County, 516 S.W.2d 626, 1974 Tenn. LEXIS 452 (Tenn. 1974).

The common-law disability of coverture, as it has been applied to tenancy by the entireties under this section and § 36-3-505, was eradicated completely by Acts 1913, ch. 26 and was not in any way restored by Acts 1919, ch. 126. Robinson v. Trousdale County, 516 S.W.2d 626, 1974 Tenn. LEXIS 452 (Tenn. 1974).

49. Tenancy by Entireties.

Since all vestiges of the common-law disability of coverture have been removed in Tennessee, each tenant in a tenancy by the entireties has a joint right to the use, control, incomes, rents, profits, usufructs and possession of the property so held and neither may sell, encumber, alienate or dispose of any portion thereof, except his or her right of survivorship, without the consent of the other and any unilateral attempt to do so will be wholly and utterly void at the instance of the aggrieved tenant, and any prospective purchaser, transferee, lessee or mortgagee acts at his peril. Robinson v. Trousdale County, 516 S.W.2d 626, 1974 Tenn. LEXIS 452 (Tenn. 1974).

The abolition in Tennessee of the common-law disability of coverture does not abolish the estate of tenancy by the entirety, but does strip it of the common-law restrictions on and deprivation of the rights of married women. Robinson v. Trousdale County, 516 S.W.2d 626, 1974 Tenn. LEXIS 452 (Tenn. 1974).

1918 deed to a predecessor in interest and his wife created a tenancy in common, not a tenancy by the entireties, because estates by the entireties was abolished by T.C.A. § 36-3-504(a), and, although estates by the entireties was re-established by T.C.A. § 36-3-505, there was a hiatus in tenancy by the entireties from January 1, 1914, to April 16, 1919, which affected the operative deed. Roberts v. Bailey, 338 S.W.3d 540, 2010 Tenn. App. LEXIS 696 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 9, 2010), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2011 Tenn. LEXIS 214 (Tenn. Mar. 9, 2011).

50. Condemnation.

Where a husband and wife, tenants by the entirety, sued the county in an inverse condemnation suit for the value of land taken to widen a public road, and the county asserted that they were both barred by reason of a conveyance of the land condemned to the county by the husband alone, the court held that, since all vestiges of the common-law disability of coverture have been removed in Tennessee, only the husband was barred from recovery and the wife was entitled to immediate payment of an amount representing the value of the land taken. Robinson v. Trousdale County, 516 S.W.2d 626, 1974 Tenn. LEXIS 452 (Tenn. 1974).

36-3-505. Tenancies by entirety unaffected.

Nothing in § 36-3-504 shall be construed as abolishing tenancies by the entirety.

Acts 1919, ch. 126, § 2; Shan. Supp., § 4249a5; mod. Code 1932, § 8461; Acts 1976, ch. 529, § 20; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 36-602.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 1913, ch. 26 was held in Gill v. McKinney, 140 Tenn. 549, 205 S.W. 416 (1918) and Kellar v. Kellar, 142 Tenn. 524, 221 S.W. 189 (1920) to abolish tenancy by the entireties. Acts 1913 took effect January 1, 1914. Acts 1919, ch. 126 whose effect was to reestablish tenancy by the entireties took effect April 16, 1919. Therefore, there is a hiatus in the estate of tenancy by the entireties, which extends from January 1, 1914, to April 16, 1919, and affects deeds executed in that period. See Hicks v. Sprankle, 149 Tenn. 310, 257 S.W. 1044 (1923).

Cross-References. Conveyance to spouse of interest in entirety, § 66-1-110.

Creation of estate by entirety, § 66-1-109.

Textbooks. Pritchard on Wills and Administration of Estates (5th ed., Phillips and Robinson), § 455.

Tennessee Jurisprudence, 25 Tenn. Juris., Wills, § 137.

Law Reviews.

Davis v. Davis: The End of Interspousal Tort Immunity Tips the Scales on the Last Intrafamilial Immunity Stronghold, 14 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 270 (1984).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Purpose of Statute.

It was the purpose of this act to restore the disability of the wife in reference to estate held by her and her husband as estate by the entirety. Stegall v. Chattanooga, 16 Tenn. App. 124, 66 S.W.2d 266, 1932 Tenn. App. LEXIS 41 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1932).

2. Tenancy by Entireties.

Tenancy by the entirety still exists in Tennessee with all its common-law attributes as defined by the supreme court of that state. Connecticut Fire Ins. Co. v. McNeil, 35 F.2d 675, 1929 U.S. App. LEXIS 3045 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1929).

In a deed to husband and wife and the latter's “heirs and assigns forever,” the estate granted was neither enlarged nor diminished by the quoted words and they may be treated as surplusage. The deed created a tenancy by the entireties. Bost v. Johnson, 175 Tenn. 232, 133 S.W.2d 491, 1939 Tenn. LEXIS 34 (1939).

Where deed was executed after enactment of Acts 1913, ch. 26, and prior to the enactment of Acts 1919, ch. 126, conveying realty to husband and wife and another deed was executed by the same grantor after the 1919 act conveying the same property to the husband and wife and subsequently in two deeds of trust husband and wife referred to the second deed as their source of title, both became charged with notice of the existence and legal effect of the second deed that was to create in them an estate by the entirety. Wilson v. Clark, 40 Tenn. App. 38, 288 S.W.2d 740, 1954 Tenn. App. LEXIS 94 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1954).

A tenancy by the entirety confers upon the husband the right to possession and control of the property involved, together with the use and profit therefrom for which he is not required to make an accounting to his wife. In re Guardianship of Plowman, 217 Tenn. 487, 398 S.W.2d 721, 1966 Tenn. LEXIS 655 (1966), overruled in part, Robinson v. Trousdale County, 516 S.W.2d 626, 1974 Tenn. LEXIS 452 (Tenn. 1974).

While wife who owned land with husband as tenant by the entirety had a right to protect her interest in the land such right did not defeat husband's right to use the land and contract validly as to such use. Mitchell v. Sinclair Refining Co., 221 Tenn. 516, 428 S.W.2d 299, 1968 Tenn. LEXIS 481 (1968).

The interest of a husband in a tenancy by the entirety is alienable and thus subject to judgment lien. Weaks v. Gress, 225 Tenn. 593, 474 S.W.2d 424, 1971 Tenn. LEXIS 329 (1971), overruled in part, Robinson v. Trousdale County, 516 S.W.2d 626, 1974 Tenn. LEXIS 452 (Tenn. 1974).

Since all vestiges of the common-law disability of coverture have been removed in Tennessee, each tenant in a tenancy by the entireties has a joint right to the use, control, incomes, rents, profits, usufructs and possession of the property so held, and neither may sell, encumber, alienate or dispose of any portion thereof, except his or her right of survivorship, without the consent of the other, and any unilateral attempt to do so will be wholly and utterly void at the behest of the aggrieved tenant, and any prospective purchaser, transferee, lessee or mortgagee acts at his peril. Robinson v. Trousdale County, 516 S.W.2d 626, 1974 Tenn. LEXIS 452 (Tenn. 1974).

The abolition in Tennessee of the common-law disability of coverture does not abolish the estate of tenancy by the entirety, but does strip it of the common-law restrictions on and deprivation of the rights of married women. Robinson v. Trousdale County, 516 S.W.2d 626, 1974 Tenn. LEXIS 452 (Tenn. 1974).

3. —Abolition and Reestablishment.

Acts 1913, ch. 26 abolished tenancies by the entireties. Gill v. McKinney, 140 Tenn. 549, 205 S.W. 416, 1918 Tenn. LEXIS 55 (1918), overruled in part, Robinson v. Trousdale County, 516 S.W.2d 626, 1974 Tenn. LEXIS 452 (Tenn. 1974), superseded by statute as stated in, Third Nat'l Bank v. Knobler, — S.W.2d —, 1988 Tenn. App. LEXIS 655 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 21, 1988); Kellar v. Kellar, 142 Tenn. 524, 221 S.W. 189, 1920 Tenn. LEXIS 55 (1920); Justice v. Henley, 27 Tenn. App. 405, 181 S.W.2d 632, 1944 Tenn. App. LEXIS 87 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1944).

Where, during the period between the passage of the former Married Women's Emancipation Act of 1913 and Acts 1919, ch. 126, spouses agreed that land be deeded to them so as to create an estate by the entirety and were advised by counsel that conveyance to them jointly would create such estate, whereas they were only made tenants in common thereby, equity will reform the deed so as to create estate by entirety. Alexander v. Shapard, 146 Tenn. 90, 240 S.W. 287, 1921 Tenn. LEXIS 7 (1921).

By Acts 1913, ch. 26, tenancy by entireties was abolished, but by Acts 1919, ch. 126, it was reestablished. A deed to husband and wife during the intervening period vested an estate in the two as tenants in common. Pattison v. Baker, 148 Tenn. 399, 255 S.W. 710, 1923 Tenn. LEXIS 27, 29 A.L.R. 1334 (1923); Cobb v. Sanders, 1 Tenn. App. 326, — S.W. —, 1925 Tenn. App. LEXIS 52 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1925); Harris v. Fourth & First Joint Stock Land Bank, 8 Tenn. App. 301, 1928 Tenn. App. LEXIS 142 (1928); Watts v. Stanton, 28 Tenn. App. 381, 190 S.W.2d 617, 1945 Tenn. App. LEXIS 79 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1945).

Acts 1913, ch. 26 removed the legal unity from which the estate by entirety was implied. Such estates were thereby abolished until restored by Acts 1919, ch. 126. Hicks v. Sprankle, 149 Tenn. 310, 257 S.W. 1044, 1923 Tenn. LEXIS 101 (1924); Bost v. Johnson, 175 Tenn. 232, 133 S.W.2d 491, 1939 Tenn. LEXIS 34 (1939).

Doctrine of tenancy by the entireties was not in effect between the effective date of Acts 1913, ch. 26, and the effective date of Acts 1919, ch. 126, and where real property was conveyed to husband and wife during that period and wife subsequently died without further conveyance, her undivided interest in the property descended to her heirs. Moore v. Cole, 200 Tenn. 43, 289 S.W.2d 695, 1956 Tenn. LEXIS 375 (1956).

Acts 1913, ch. 26 had the effect of abolishing estates by the entirety but Acts 1919, ch. 126, reestablished estates by the entirety and consequently reestablished the disability of the wife with respect to such estates. Mitchell v. Sinclair Refining Co., 221 Tenn. 516, 428 S.W.2d 299, 1968 Tenn. LEXIS 481 (1968).

Acts 1919, ch. 126 reestablished tenancies by the entirety after their abolishment by the former Married Women's Emancipation Act (Acts 1913, ch. 26) exactly as such tenancies existed prior to the emancipation act so that the common-law primacy of the husband exists at the present time. Weaks v. Gress, 225 Tenn. 593, 474 S.W.2d 424, 1971 Tenn. LEXIS 329 (1971), overruled in part, Robinson v. Trousdale County, 516 S.W.2d 626, 1974 Tenn. LEXIS 452 (Tenn. 1974).

1918 deed to a predecessor in interest and his wife created a tenancy in common, not a tenancy by the entireties, because estates by the entireties was abolished by T.C.A. § 36-3-504(a), and, although estates by the entireties was re-established by T.C.A. § 36-3-505, there was a hiatus in tenancy by the entireties from January 1, 1914, to April 16, 1919, which affected the operative deed. Roberts v. Bailey, 338 S.W.3d 540, 2010 Tenn. App. LEXIS 696 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 9, 2010), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2011 Tenn. LEXIS 214 (Tenn. Mar. 9, 2011).

4. —Coverture.

The application of the common-law disability of coverture to tenancies by the entirety involves an invidious and suspect classification based upon sex and marital status, without any rational basis, and deprives married women of their property without due process of law and denies them equal protection of the laws in violation of U.S. Const., amends. 5 and 14 and Tenn. Const., art. I, § 8. Robinson v. Trousdale County, 516 S.W.2d 626, 1974 Tenn. LEXIS 452 (Tenn. 1974).

The common-law disability of coverture, as it has been applied to tenancy by the entirety under this section and § 36-3-504, was eradicated completely by Acts 1913, ch. 26 and was not in any way restored by Acts 1919, ch. 126. Robinson v. Trousdale County, 516 S.W.2d 626, 1974 Tenn. LEXIS 452 (Tenn. 1974).

5. —Effect of Statute on Common-Law Rule.

The husband in estates of tenancy by entireties, under the common law had a measure of domination by reason of the rule of jus mariti, which rule has been changed by § 36-3-504, so that he no longer dominates. Alfred v. Bankers' & Shippers' Ins. Co., 167 Tenn. 278, 68 S.W.2d 941, 1933 Tenn. LEXIS 37 (1934). Contra, see Stegall v. Chattanooga, 16 Tenn. App. 124, 66 S.W.2d 266, 1932 Tenn. App. LEXIS 41 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1932).

6. —Creation of Estate.

7. — —Estate by Descent.

An estate by the entireties may arise by both husband and wife succeeding to property as heirs of the same decedent. Tindell v. Tindell, 37 S.W. 1105, 1896 Tenn. Ch. App. LEXIS 58 (1896).

8. — —Delivery of Deed.

The estate by entireties arises where there is a grant to husband and wife that is in fieri at time of marriage and thereafter completed by livery of seisin or allotment during conversion. Tindell v. Tindell, 37 S.W. 1105, 1896 Tenn. Ch. App. LEXIS 58 (1896).

9. —Value of Estate.

Tenancy by entireties in realty is of less value than sole ownership, from insurance standpoint. Alfred v. Bankers' & Shippers' Ins. Co., 167 Tenn. 278, 68 S.W.2d 941, 1933 Tenn. LEXIS 37 (1934).

10. —Transfer of Wife's Interest to Husband.

Where husband and wife held title to realty as tenants by entirety a deed by wife to husband reserving life estate and transferring any other interest she might have in realty at time of her death to her husband, and to take effect on her death transferred the fee simple title to husband subject to her life estate. Howell v. Davis, 196 Tenn. 334, 268 S.W.2d 85, 1954 Tenn. LEXIS 385, 1954 Tenn. LEXIS 386 (1954).

Deed of wife to husband transferring her interest other than her life estate in realty held by tenancy by the entireties was a deed and not a will. Howell v. Davis, 196 Tenn. 334, 268 S.W.2d 85, 1954 Tenn. LEXIS 385, 1954 Tenn. LEXIS 386 (1954).

11. —Parties.

A court is without jurisdiction to adjudge an equitable vendor's lien where both tenants are not made defendants and where the bill sought to fix the lien on the land itself and not on the interest of the single tenant brought before the court. Gaylor v. Miller, 166 Tenn. 45, 59 S.W.2d 502, 1932 Tenn. LEXIS 110 (1933).

Where husband signed agreement for rental of service station equipment on land held as tenants by the entirety, which agreement exonerated lessor oil company from liability for damage to property, wife was bound by contract during coverture and was not entitled to bring suit for damages to well, water softening equipment and surface of land resulting from leaking gasoline tank. Mitchell v. Sinclair Refining Co., 221 Tenn. 516, 428 S.W.2d 299, 1968 Tenn. LEXIS 481 (1968).

12. — —Foreclosure of Lien on Property.

In suit to foreclose an equitable vendor's lien against the husband alone, sale under decree is void as against one not a party who acquired the title before suit was commenced, the pleadings not seeking to have interest of husband subjected, but the land itself and the decree being in accord. Since the title so acquired was not brought before the court, such a lien did not come into existence. Gaylor v. Miller, 166 Tenn. 45, 59 S.W.2d 502, 1932 Tenn. LEXIS 110 (1933).

13. —Liability on Joint Notes.

Joint note of husband and wife, executed for purchase money of an estate by entireties, upon the death of either tenant does not become the primary obligation of the survivor, but remains a joint obligation of the survivor. Newson v. Shackleford, 163 Tenn. 358, 43 S.W.2d 384, 1931 Tenn. LEXIS 123 (1931).

Upon the death of either tenant the notes of both for unpaid purchase money remain the obligations of the survivor and of the decedent's estate and do not become the primary obligations of the survivor. Contribution is enforceable. Newson v. Shackleford, 163 Tenn. 358, 43 S.W.2d 384, 1931 Tenn. LEXIS 123 (1931).

14. —Estate in Personalty.

An estate by the entireties may exist in personal property. A bequest to a husband and wife jointly of a sum of money, entitled the wife on husband's death to the sum as against his son. Campbell v. Campbell, 167 Tenn. 77, 66 S.W.2d 990, 1933 Tenn. LEXIS 7 (1934), disapproving Scholze v. Scholze, 2 Tenn. App. 80, 1925 Tenn. App. LEXIS 96 (1925).

Where a sum of money was bequeathed to husband and wife jointly, they were tenants by the entirety, and the husband has no power by marital right to dispose of the fund as against the right of the wife. The wife holds such personalty as a feme sole. Campbell v. Campbell, 167 Tenn. 77, 66 S.W.2d 990, 1933 Tenn. LEXIS 7 (1934).

A tenancy by the entirety may be created in this state in personal property and this without regard to the source of the property so held. First American Nat'l Bank v. Evans, 220 Tenn. 393, 417 S.W.2d 778, 1967 Tenn. LEXIS 421 (1967).

15. —Termination.

16. — —Joint Conveyance.

The relationship of tenants by the entirety may be terminated by joint conveyance of the husband and wife. McGhee v. Henry, 144 Tenn. 548, 234 S.W. 509, 1921 Tenn. LEXIS 55, 18 A.L.R. 103 (1921).

17. — —Divorce.

An estate by the entireties is converted into an estate in common by the divorce of husband and wife. Brown v. Brown, 160 Tenn. 685, 28 S.W.2d 350, 1929 Tenn. LEXIS 142 (1930).

18. —Disposition of Crops on Husband's Death.

While growing crops of a farm held by entireties do not, on the death of the husband pass to the husband's administrator, nothing appearing in the conveyance or any subsequent contract to the contrary, but instead pass with the estate to the surviving wife, ownership of crops gathered before the husband's death, nothing appearing to the contrary, belong to both as joint occupants, the wife's claim thereto not to exceed an equal moiety of such crops, the administrator being awardable the other one half. Newson v. Shackleford, 163 Tenn. 358, 43 S.W.2d 384, 1931 Tenn. LEXIS 123 (1931).

19. Curtesy.

The requisites of tenancy by the curtesy (formerly part of this section) were (1) marriage, (2) seizure of the wife, (3) birth of a child alive and capable of inheriting from the mother, and (4) death of the wife in the lifetime of her husband. Day v. Burgess, 139 Tenn. 559, 202 S.W. 911, 1918 Tenn. LEXIS 6, L.R.A. (n.s.) 1918E692 (1918).

The word “curtesy” had reference to tenancy by the curtesy consummate, not initiate. Pattison v. Baker, 148 Tenn. 399, 255 S.W. 710, 1923 Tenn. LEXIS 27, 29 A.L.R. 1334 (1923).

This statute did not reach beyond the period of coverture, nor give wife power to destroy by will husband's right of curtesy in her land on her decease. Schaffler v. Handwerker, 152 Tenn. 329, 278 S.W. 967, 1925 Tenn. LEXIS 75 (1926).

20. Adverse Possession Under Deed to Husband and Wife.

Where deed was executed after the enactment of Acts 1913, ch. 26, and prior to the enactment of Acts 1919, ch. 126, conveying realty to husband and wife and another deed was executed by the same grantor after the enactment of Acts 1919, ch. 126, conveying such realty to husband and wife and both deeds were duly registered, upon the death of the husband the interest of the wife ripened into a fee based on more than seven years' adverse possession by husband and wife under registered color of title under the second deed. Wilson v. Clark, 40 Tenn. App. 38, 288 S.W.2d 740, 1954 Tenn. App. LEXIS 94 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1954).

21. Condemnation.

Where a husband and wife, tenants by the entirety, sued the county in an inverse condemnation suit for the value of land taken for the widening of a public road, and the county asserted that they were both barred by reason of a conveyance of the land condemned to the county by the husband alone, the court held that, since all vestiges of the common-law disability of coverture have been removed in Tennessee, only the husband was barred from recovery and the wife was entitled to immediate payment of an amount representing the value of the land taken. Robinson v. Trousdale County, 516 S.W.2d 626, 1974 Tenn. LEXIS 452 (Tenn. 1974).

22. —Prior to 1919.

It was held, prior to passage of the 1919 Act, where, at the date of the passage of Acts 1913, ch. 26 emancipating married women, the husband had only an estate initiate, which under the statutes was only a contingent estate, and his wife was then living, the legislature could pass such an act that prevented the accrual of curtesy consummate on the death of the wife. Day v. Burgess, 139 Tenn. 559, 202 S.W. 911, 1918 Tenn. LEXIS 6, L.R.A. (n.s.) 1918E692 (1918).

Acts 1913, ch. 26 did not of itself abolish the estate of tenancy by the curtesy consummate, which was only subject to be defeated by the act of the wife in making or suffering a disposition of her property in her lifetime. Hull v. Hull, 139 Tenn. 572, 202 S.W. 914, 1918 Tenn. LEXIS 7 (1918).

A deed to husband and wife after the effective date of Acts 1913, ch. 26 but before the effective date of Acts 1919, ch. 126 vested one half of the estate in each, but the wife's interest was subject to curtesy initiate that would vest as curtesy consummate upon her death prior to the husband without disposing of the property by deed or will. Cobb v. Sanders, 1 Tenn. App. 326, — S.W. —, 1925 Tenn. App. LEXIS 52 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1925).

Part 6
Domestic Abuse

36-3-601. Part definitions.

As used in this part, unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “Abuse” means inflicting, or attempting to inflict, physical injury on an adult or minor by other than accidental means, placing an adult or minor in fear of physical harm, physical restraint, malicious damage to the personal property of the abused party, including inflicting, or attempting to inflict, physical injury on any animal owned, possessed, leased, kept, or held by an adult or minor, or placing an adult or minor in fear of physical harm to any animal owned, possessed, leased, kept, or held by the adult or minor;
  2. “Adult” means any person eighteen (18) years of age or older, or who is otherwise emancipated;
    1. “Court,” in counties having a population of not less than two hundred sixty thousand (260,000) nor more than eight hundred thousand (800,000), according to the 1980 federal census or any subsequent federal census, means any court of record with jurisdiction over domestic relation matters;
    2. Notwithstanding subdivision (3)(A), “court,” in counties with a metropolitan form of government with a population of more than one hundred thousand (100,000), according to the 1990 federal census or any subsequent federal census, means any court of record with jurisdiction over domestic relation matters and the general sessions court. In such county having a metropolitan form of government, a judicial commissioner may issue an ex parte order of protection. Nothing in this definition may be construed to grant jurisdiction to the general sessions court for matters relating to child custody, visitation, or support;
    3. “Court,” in all other counties, means any court of record with jurisdiction over domestic relation matters or the general sessions court;
    4. “Court” also includes judicial commissioners, magistrates and other officials with the authority to issue an arrest warrant in the absence of a judge for purposes of issuing ex parte orders of protection when a judge of one of the courts listed in subdivisions (3)(A), (3)(B) or (3)(C) is not available;
    5. In counties having a population in excess of eight hundred thousand (800,000), according to the 1990 federal census or any subsequent federal census, “court” means any court of record with jurisdiction over domestic relations matters or the general sessions criminal court. In such counties, “court” also includes judicial commissioners, magistrates and other officials with the authority to issue an arrest warrant in the absence of a judge for purposes of issuing any order of protection pursuant to this part when a judge of one of the courts listed in subdivisions (3)(A), (3)(B) or (3)(C) is not available. Nothing in this definition may be construed to grant jurisdiction to the general sessions court, both criminal and civil, for matters relating to child custody, visitation, or support;
    6. Any appeal from a final ruling on an order of protection by a general sessions court or by any official authorized to issue an order of protection under this subdivision (3) shall be to the circuit or chancery court of the county. Such appeal shall be filed within ten (10) days and shall be heard de novo;
  3. “Domestic abuse” means committing abuse against a victim, as defined in subdivision (5);
  4. “Domestic abuse victim” means any person who falls within the following categories:
    1. Adults or minors who are current or former spouses;
    2. Adults or minors who live together or who have lived together;
    3. Adults or minors who are dating or who have dated or who have or had a sexual relationship. As used herein, “dating” and “dated” do not include fraternization between two (2) individuals in a business or social context;
    4. Adults or minors related by blood or adoption;
    5. Adults or minors who are related or were formerly related by marriage; or
    6. Adult or minor children of a person in a relationship that is described in subdivisions (5)(A)-(E);
  5. “Firearm” means any weapon designed, made or adapted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive or any device readily convertible to that use;
  6. “Petitioner” means the person alleging domestic abuse, sexual assault or stalking in a petition for an order for protection;
  7. “Preferred response” means law enforcement officers shall arrest a person committing domestic abuse unless there is a clear and compelling reason not to arrest;
  8. “Respondent” means the person alleged to have abused, stalked or sexually assaulted another in a petition for an order for protection;
  9. “Sexual assault victim” means any person, regardless of the relationship with the perpetrator, who has been subjected to, threatened with, or placed in fear of any form of rape, as defined in § 39-13-502, § 39-13-503, § 39-13-506 or § 39-13-522, or sexual battery, as defined in § 39-13-504, § 39-13-505, or § 39-13-527;
  10. “Stalking victim” means any person, regardless of the relationship with the perpetrator, who has been subjected to, threatened with, or placed in fear of the offense of stalking, as defined in § 39-17-315; and
  11. “Weapon” means a firearm or a device listed in § 39-17-1302(a)(1)-(7).

Acts 1979, ch. 350, § 1; T.C.A., § 36-1201; Acts 1988, ch. 925, §§ 1, 2; 1991, ch. 380, § 1; 1994, ch. 764, § 1; 1995, ch. 507, § 3; 1996, ch. 684, § 1; 1997, ch. 96, § 1; 1997, ch. 211, § 1; 1997, ch. 459, §§ 1, 2; 1998, ch. 887, §§ 1, 2; 2001, ch. 96, §§ 1-3; 2002, ch. 646, §§ 1, 2; 2005, ch. 381, §§ 1, 2; 2007, ch. 348, § 1; 2007, ch. 352, § 1; 2019, ch. 433, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. For table of U.S. decennial populations of Tennessee counties, see Volume 13 and its supplement.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment substituted “two hundred sixty thousand (260,000)” for “two hundred thousand (200,000)” in definition “Court”.

Effective Dates. Acts 2019, ch. 433, § 2. May 21, 2019.

Cross-References. Assault upon spouse, misdemeanor, § 39-13-102.

Confidentiality of public records, § 10-7-504.

Domestic violence training, § 4-24-111.

Family violence shelter and child abuse prevention services, title 71, ch. 6, part 2.

Victims of crime state coordinating council, title 40, ch. 38, part 4.

Law Reviews.

Selected Tennessee Legislation of 1986, 54 Tenn. L. Rev. 457 (1987).

Attorney General Opinions. Constitutionality of provision authorizing magistrates to issue ex parte protection orders, OAG 96-139, 1996 Tenn. AG LEXIS 164 (11/26/96).

Appeals from grant or denial of order of protection, OAG 98-043, 1998 Tenn. AG LEXIS 43 (2/17/98).

Constitutionality of Public Chapter 128, OAG 00-021, 2000 Tenn. AG LEXIS 21 (2/15/00).

A judge “is not available” within the meaning of the statute when the judge cannot carry out the duties of office due to illness, disability, or other cause, when the judge is away from office, or when the judge is engaged in the performance of other judicial duties such that the judge would not be able to address the application for an order of protection within a reasonable amount of time, OAG 00-120, 2000 Tenn. AG LEXIS 122 (7/17/00).

The issuance of a protection order in cases of domestic abuse does not require a prior determination by a law enforcement officer of the “primary aggressor;” protection orders are available to any individual who has suffered, or who is at risk of suffering, domestic abuse subject only to the statutory relationship limitations and a court's determination of good cause, OAG 01-033, 2001 Tenn. AG LEXIS 33 (3/12/01).

Issuance of ex parte order of protection; discretion to order respondent to vacate residence shared with petitioner pending hearing.  OAG 10-06, 2010 Tenn. AG LEXIS 6 (1/19/10).

Confidentiality of orders of protection.  OAG 11-9, 2011 Tenn. AG LEXIS 9 (1/18/11).

An appeal from a general sessions court's order of protection is properly taken to the circuit or chancery court. OAG 14-69, 2014 Tenn. AG Lexis 71 (7/8/14).

A district attorney general has no authority to represent a petitioner seeking a protective order. State statutes and local ordinances do not authorize a public defender to represent an individual defending against a petition for an order of protection; however, the ordinances governing the Shelby County's Public Defender's Office do not prohibit the Shelby County Public Defender from doing so. OAG 16-06, 2016 Tenn. AG LEXIS 4 (2/10/2016).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Jurisdiction.

Circuit court's reliance upon the 1998 attorney general opinion concerning its lack of jurisdiction to entertain an appeal was misplaced given the adoption of T.C.A. § 36-3-601(3)(F), and thus respondents were permitted to lodge an appeal with the circuit court within a period of 10 days. Baxley v. Baxley, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 958 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 9, 2015).

2. Domestic Violence.

Father failed to substantially comply with the reasonable responsibilities of his permanency plans; he failed to provide proof of verifiable income, his assertion that domestic violence had to involve actual hitting demonstrated a lack of the understanding the domestic violence course was meant to engender, and termination on this ground was proper. In re Alleyanna C., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 642 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 10, 2015).

Extension of an order of protection against a husband was appropriate because the husband's wife proved the wife's allegations of domestic abuse by a preponderance of the evidence as the wife testified that both the wife and the parties'  child were afraid of the husband, that the wife had difficulties sleeping, and that their child was angry and suffering from nightmares. The wife attributed the wife's fear to one incident in particular and previous incidents involving the husband's actions in severely disciplining their child. Honeycutt ex. rel. Alexander H. v. Honeycutt, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 457 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 30, 2016).

Preponderance of the evidence supported the trial court's findings regarding the husband's alleged abuse because it weighed the facts before finding that there was no abuse by the husband; the wife committed against the husband actions similar to ones that she asserted were abuse when committed by the husband. Potts v. Potts, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 69 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 8, 2018).

Trial court erred in declining to extend an order of protection where it credited petitioner's testimony, thereby establishing that respondent had threatened petitioner and her mother while brandishing a cocked and loaded handgun and that respondent's actions placed petitioner in fear of physical harm, the trial court's statements indicated that it disbelieved respondent's assertion that she did not post a message about trying out the firearm to her social media account, and thus, contrary to its legal interpretation of T.C.A. §§ 36-3-601 and 36-3-602, the facts found by the trial court provided a legal basis for the extension of the order of protection in petitioner's favor. Mullins v. Hernandez, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 107 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2018).

Sufficient evidence supported an order of protection because the trial court's statement of evidence, which controlled over a husband's contrary statement, showed the husband committed domestic abuse against a wife. Purswani v. Purswani, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 147 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 26, 2019).

3. Permanent Order of Protection.

Trial court's grant of a permanent order of protection was reversed as void because such remedy was unavailable pursuant to the statutory scheme regarding orders of protection; therefore, the order was modified to grant the wife an injunction that restrained the husband from harassing, threatening, assaulting, or abusing the wife. Swonger v. Swonger, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 297 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 28, 2016).

Permanent order of protection was vacated, and the trial court's temporary injunction prohibiting the husband from harassing, threatening, assaulting, or abusing the wife was reinstated because the trial court's findings and conclusions were not set out in its order. Swonger v. Swonger, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 297 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 28, 2016).

4. Appeal.

Father's petition challenged both the grant of the orders of protection and the award of attorney fees, and although the errors of fact were improperly raised in the writ of error, the chancery court did not lack subject matter jurisdiction; the absence of a timely appeal was immaterial, the father properly filed the writ of appeal in chancery court, and under the order of protection statutes, appeals were to the circuit or chancery court of the county. New v. Dumitrache, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 174 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 12, 2019).

Dismissal of a parent's untimely appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when the parent failed to file an appeal within ten days of the general sessions court's order of protection, as required by statute, was appropriate because the writ of error which the parent filed after the expiration of the time limit was no longer a viable method of appeal in the State of Tennessee. New v. Dumitrache, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. LEXIS 264 (Tenn. June 29, 2020).

5. Order Dismissed.

Trial court's dismissal of an order of protection was affirmed because (1) the court did not exceed the court's discretion in limiting testimony in support of the petitions, as additional testimony was unnecessary to determine if protective orders continued to be necessary, and, (2) deferring to the trial court's assessment of the witnesses'  credibility, the evidence did not preponderate against dismissal. Todd Goldman v. Griffin, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 609 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 18, 2019).

36-3-602. Petition — Venue.

  1. Any domestic abuse victim, stalking victim or sexual assault victim who has been subjected to, threatened with, or placed in fear of, domestic abuse, stalking, or sexual assault, may seek relief under this part by filing a sworn petition alleging domestic abuse, stalking, or sexual assault by the respondent.
  2. Any petition filed by an unemancipated person under eighteen (18) years of age shall be signed by one (1) of that person's parents or by that person's guardian. The petition may also be signed by a caseworker at a not-for-profit organization that receives funds pursuant to title 71, chapter 6, part 2 for family violence and child abuse prevention and shelters; provided, however, that a petition signed by a caseworker may not be filed against the unemancipated minor's parent or legal guardian. In such case, unless the court finds that the action would create a threat of serious harm to the minor, a copy of the petition, notice of hearing and any ex parte order of protection shall also be served on the parents of the minor child, or if the parents are not living together and jointly caring for the child, upon the primary residential parent. In cases before the juvenile court where the department of children's services is a party or where a guardian ad litem has been appointed for the child by the juvenile court, the petition may be filed on behalf of the unemancipated person by the department or the guardian ad litem.
  3. [Deleted by 2018 amendment.]
  4. Venue for a petition for an order of protection, and all other matters relating to orders of protection, shall be in the county where the respondent resides or the county in which the domestic abuse, stalking or sexual assault occurred. If the respondent is not a resident of Tennessee, the petition may be filed in the county where the petitioner resides.

Acts 1979, ch. 350, §§ 3, 16; T.C.A., § 36-1203; Acts 1987, ch. 270, § 1; 1997, ch. 211, § 2; 1997, ch. 459, § 2; 2002, ch. 646, § 3; 2005, ch. 75, § 2; 2005, ch. 257, § 1; 2005, ch. 381, § 3; 2006, ch. 871, § 1; 2007, ch. 348, § 2; 2016, ch. 906, § 2; 2018, ch. 586, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2016, ch. 906, § 1 provided that the act, which amended this section, shall be known and may be cited as the “Public Safety Act of 2016.”

Amendments. The 2018 amendment deleted (c) which read: “(c)(1)  A temporary order of protection shall be issued against a respondent pursuant to § 36-3-605 if, at the respondent's initial appearance following an arrest for a crime involving domestic abuse, the court finds there is probable cause to believe the respondent either:“(A)  Caused serious bodily injury, as defined in § 39-11-106, to the alleged domestic abuse victim; or“(B)  Used or displayed a deadly weapon, as defined in § 39-11-106.“(2)  The alleged domestic abuse victim does not need to be present at the time the temporary order of protection is issued.“(3)  A hearing on whether the temporary order of protection should be dissolved, extended, or modified shall be held within fifteen (15) days of service of the temporary order of protection upon the respondent. The domestic abuse victim shall have the right to notice of the hearing and the right to be present at the hearing. The procedures set forth in § 36-3-605 shall apply.“(4)  The temporary order of protection may include any relief available under an ex parte order of protection issued pursuant to § 36-3-605.”

Effective Dates. Acts 2018, ch. 586, § 4. July 1, 2018.

Cross-References. Victims of Crime State Coordinating Council, title 40, ch. 38, part 4.

Law Reviews.

GPS Monitoring of Domestic Violence Offenders in Tennessee: Generating Problems Surreptitiously (Natalie Fox Malone), 43 U. Mem. L. Rev. 171 (2012).

Monitoring of Domestic Violence Offenders in Tennessee: Generating Problems Surreptitiously, 43 U. Mem. L. Rev. 171 (2012).

Attorney General Opinions. The issuance of a protection order in cases of domestic abuse does not require a prior determination by a law enforcement officer of the “primary aggressor;” protection orders are available to any individual who has suffered, or who is at risk of suffering, domestic abuse subject only to the statutory relationship limitations and a court's determination of good cause, OAG 01-033, 2001 Tenn. AG LEXIS 33 (3/12/01).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Facts Provided Legal Basis.

Trial court erred in declining to extend an order of protection where it credited petitioner's testimony, thereby establishing that respondent had threatened petitioner and her mother while brandishing a cocked and loaded handgun and that respondent's actions placed petitioner in fear of physical harm, the trial court's statements indicated that it disbelieved respondent's assertion that she did not post a message about trying out the firearm to her social media account, and thus, contrary to its legal interpretation of T.C.A. §§ 36-3-601 and 36-3-602, the facts found by the trial court provided a legal basis for the extension of the order of protection in petitioner's favor. Mullins v. Hernandez, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 107 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2018).

2. Standing.

Biological parent had standing as a parent to petition for an order of protection against a relative on behalf of the parent's children, despite the parent's lack of legal or physical custody of the children who were in foster care. Gibson v. Bikas, 556 S.W.3d 796, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 110 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 28, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 421 (Tenn. July 18, 2018).

36-3-603. Duration of protection order — Petition for protection order in divorce action.

  1. If an order of protection is in effect at the time either the petitioner or respondent files a complaint for divorce, the order of protection shall remain in effect until the court to which the divorce action is assigned:
    1. Modifies the order;
    2. Dissolves the order; or
    3. Makes the order part of the divorce decree.
  2. If the court modifies the order or makes the order of protection part of the divorce decree, the court shall issue a separate order of protection.
  3. The clerk shall immediately forward a copy of any order of protection issued and any subsequent modifications to the petitioner, respondent, and the local law enforcement agencies having jurisdiction in the area where the petitioner resides in the manner provided by § 36-3-609(e).
  4. Nothing in this section shall prohibit a petitioner from requesting relief under this part in a divorce action.

Acts 1979, ch. 350, § 2; T.C.A., § 36-1202; Acts 1986, ch. 715, § 1; 2017, ch. 241, § 1.

Amendments. The 2017 amendment rewrote (a) which read: “If an order of protection is ordered by a court and either the petitioner or respondent files a complaint for divorce, the order of protection shall remain in effect until the court in which the divorce action lies modifies or dissolves the order.”; added (b) and (c); redesignated former (b) as present (d); and substituted “this part” for “this section” in present (d).

Effective Dates. Acts 2017, ch. 241, § 2.  July 1, 2017.

Law Reviews.

Enjoining Abuse: The Case for Indefinite Domestic Violence Protection Orders, 67 Vand. L. Rev. 1015 (2014).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Permanent, Open-Ended Order.

Trial court erred in modifying an order of protection against a husband to a permanent order because it lacked statutory authority to issue a permanent, open-ended order of protection; construing the statutory scheme concerning orders of protection so that its component parts are consistent and reasonable and avoiding an interpretation that would render one section of the act repugnant to another, no authority provides for the issuance of a permanent, open-ended order of protection. Swonger v. Swonger, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 297 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 28, 2016).

2. Restraining Orders and Injunctions.

Trial court the trial court erred in relying on the rule as authorizing the issuance of an order of protection because it did not consider the time restraints set forth in the statutes establishing the time periods of orders of protection; by its own terms, the rule is subordinate to the statutory scheme establishing the time periods of orders of protection. Swonger v. Swonger, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 297 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 28, 2016).

36-3-604. Forms.

    1. The office of the clerk of court shall provide forms that may be necessary to seek a protection order under this part. These forms shall be limited to use in causes filed under this part and they shall be made available to all who request assistance in filing a petition. The clerk may obtain the most current forms by printing them from the website of the administrative office of the courts.
    2. The petitioner is not limited to the use of these forms and may present to the court any legally sufficient petition in whatever form. The office of the clerk shall also assist a person who is not represented by counsel by filling in the name of the court on the petition, by indicating where the petitioner's name shall be filled in, by reading through the petition form with the petitioner, and by rendering any other assistance that is necessary for the filing of the petition. All such petitions that are filed pro se shall be liberally construed procedurally in favor of the petitioner.
  1. The administrative office of the courts, in consultation with the domestic violence coordinating council, shall develop a petition for orders of protection form, an amended order of protection form, an ex parte order of protection form and other forms that are found to be necessary and advisable. These forms shall be revised as the laws relative to orders of protection and ex parte orders of protection are amended by the general assembly. To the extent possible, the forms shall be uniform with those promulgated by surrounding states so that Tennessee forms may be afforded full faith and credit.
  2. The administrative office of the courts shall revise the petition for an order of protection form to fully advise the respondent of this part in language substantially similar to the following:
    1. If the order of protection is granted in a manner that fully complies with 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8), the respondent is required to terminate physical possession by any lawful means, such as transferring possession to a third party who is not prohibited from possessing firearms, of all firearms that the respondent possesses within forty-eight (48) hours of the granting of the order;
    2. It is a criminal offense for a person subject to an order of protection that fully complies with 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8), to possess a firearm while that order is in effect; and
    3. The issuance of an order of protection may terminate or, at least, suspend the individual's right to purchase or possess a firearm.
  3. These forms shall be used exclusively in all courts exercising jurisdiction over orders of protection.

Acts 1979, ch. 350, § 4; 1982, ch. 935, § 1; T.C.A., § 36-1204; Acts 1987, ch. 270, §§ 2-5; 1995, ch. 410, § 2; 1995, ch. 456, § 6; 1996, ch. 684, § 5; 1997, ch. 211, § 3; 1998, ch. 715, § 1; 1999, ch. 344, § 3; 2000, ch. 638, § 2; 2001, ch. 319, § 1; 2009, ch. 455, § 1; 2010, ch. 959, § 2.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 1999, ch. 344, § 6 provided that for the purpose of the preparation of a standardized affidavit form for directors of rape crisis centers and domestic violence shelters for use as a protection document by Tennessee task force against domestic violence, the act would take effect on June 14, 1999; however, for all other purposes, the act would take effect on July 1, 1999.

Acts 2000, ch. 638, § 3 provided that the Order of Protection forms in existence on April 10, 2000, may continue to be used provided the change required by the 2000 amendment to this section is made on the form prior to its use. All Order of Protection forms printed after April 10, 2000, shall reflect the changes made by the amendment to this section by the act, as well as the new century.

Acts 2001, ch. 319, § 2, provided that, for the purposes of the supreme court consulting and promulgating the specified forms, this section shall take effect May 30, 2001, and that any forms so promulgated shall take effect as provided in the supreme court rule.

The “Petition for Orders of Protection” form, “Amended Order of Protection” form, and “Ex Parte Order of Protection” form, referred to in subsection (b), have been revised. Copies may be obtained through the Administrative Office of the Courts, Suite 600, Nashville City Center, 511 Union Street, Nashville, TN 37243-0607; Phone: (615) 741-2687; Fax: (615) 532-9818; (http://www.tsc.state.tn.us).

Cross-References. Confidentiality of public records, § 10-7-504.

36-3-605. Ex parte protection order — Hearing — Extension.

  1. Upon the filing of a petition under this part, the courts may immediately, for good cause shown, issue an ex parte order of protection. An immediate and present danger of abuse to the petitioner shall constitute good cause for purposes of this section.
  2. Within fifteen (15) days of service of such order on the respondent under this part, a hearing shall be held, at which time the court shall either dissolve any ex parte order that has been issued, or shall, if the petitioner has proved the allegation of domestic abuse, stalking or sexual assault by a preponderance of the evidence, extend the order of protection for a definite period of time, not to exceed one (1) year, unless a further hearing on the continuation of such order is requested by the respondent or the petitioner; in which case, on proper showing of cause, such order may be continued for a further definite period of one (1) year, after which time a further hearing must be held for any subsequent one-year period. Any ex parte order of protection shall be in effect until the time of the hearing, and, if the hearing is held within fifteen (15) days of service of such order, the ex parte order shall continue in effect until the entry of any subsequent order of protection issued pursuant to § 36-3-609. If no ex parte order of protection has been issued as of the time of the hearing, and the petitioner has proven the allegation of domestic abuse, stalking or sexual assault by a preponderance of the evidence, the court may, at that time, issue an order of protection for a definite period of time, not to exceed one (1) year.
  3. The court shall cause a copy of the petition and notice of the date set for the hearing on such petition, as well as a copy of any ex parte order of protection, to be served upon the respondent at least five (5) days prior to such hearing. An ex parte order issued pursuant to this part shall be personally served upon the respondent. However, if the respondent is not a resident of Tennessee, the ex parte order shall be served pursuant to §§ 20-2-215 and 20-2-216. Such notice shall advise the respondent that the respondent may be represented by counsel. In every case, unless the court finds that the action would create a threat of serious harm to the minor, when a petitioner is under eighteen (18) years of age, a copy of the petition, notice of hearing and any ex parte order of protection shall also be served on the parents of the minor child, or in the event that the parents are not living together and jointly caring for the child, upon the primary residential parent, pursuant to the requirements of this section.
  4. Within the time the order of protection is in effect, any court of competent jurisdiction may modify the order of protection, either upon the court's own motion or upon motion of the petitioner. If a respondent is properly served and afforded the opportunity for a hearing pursuant to § 36-3-612, and is found to be in violation of the order, the court may extend the order of protection up to five (5) years. If a respondent is properly served and afforded the opportunity for a hearing pursuant to § 36-3-612, and is found to be in a second or subsequent violation of the order, the court may extend the order of protection up to ten (10) years. No new petition is required to be filed in order for a court to modify an order or extend an order pursuant to this subsection (d).

Acts 1979, ch. 350, § 5; T.C.A., § 36-1205; Acts 1987, ch. 270, § 6; 1997, ch. 459, §§ 2, 4, 5; 1998, ch. 715, § 2; 2004, ch. 588, § 2; 2005, ch. 75, § 1; 2005, ch. 381, § 4; 2006, ch. 676, § 1; 2006, ch. 871, § 2; 2007, ch. 348, § 4.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2004, ch. 588, § 3 provided that, for the purpose of changing any forms necessary to implement the provisions of the act, the act shall take effect May 3, 2004; for all other purposes, it shall take effect on July 1, 2004.

Cross-References. Confidentiality of public records, § 10-7-504.

Law Reviews.

Enjoining Abuse: The Case for Indefinite Domestic Violence Protection Orders, 67 Vand. L. Rev. 1015 (2014).

GPS Monitoring of Domestic Violence Offenders in Tennessee: Generating Problems Surreptitiously (Natalie Fox Malone), 43 U. Mem. L. Rev. 171 (2012).

Attorney General Opinions. Judicial commissioners, magistrates, or other officials with the authority to issue an arrest warrant may not conduct a hearing or issue an extended order of protection, OAG 01-027, 2001 Tenn. AG LEXIS 27 (2/27/01).

The issuance of a protection order in cases of domestic abuse does not require a prior determination by a law enforcement officer of the “primary aggressor;” protection orders are available to any individual who has suffered, or who is at risk of suffering, domestic abuse subject only to the statutory relationship limitations and a court's determination of good cause, OAG 01-033, 2001 Tenn. AG LEXIS 33 (3/12/01).

An ex parte order of protection issued under T.C.A. § 36-3-605 is not a type of protective order whose violation is a Class A misdemeanor under T.C.A. § 36-3-612, OAG 05-183, 2005 Tenn. AG LEXIS 185 (12/22/05).

Issuance of ex parte order of protection; discretion to order respondent to vacate residence shared with petitioner pending hearing.  OAG 10-06, 2010 Tenn. AG LEXIS 6 (1/19/10).

Confidentiality of orders of protection.  OAG 11-9, 2011 Tenn. AG LEXIS 9 (1/18/11).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Hearing on Ex Parte Order.

The time limit for holding a hearing on the ex parte order contained in subection (b) is merely a limitation on the duration of the ex parte order and not a limitation on the court's jurisdiction. Kite v. Kite, 22 S.W.3d 803, 1997 Tenn. LEXIS 284 (Tenn. 1997).

2. Right to Jury Trial.

There is no right to a jury trial prior to the issuance of an order of protection issued under T.C.A. § 36-3-605. Clark v. Crow, 37 S.W.3d 919, 2000 Tenn. App. LEXIS 492 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000).

3. Order Granted.

In a case in which a husband appealed from the trial court's grant of an order of protection under T.C.A. § 36-3-605, the appellate court concluded the case was moot. Because the order of protection from which the husband appealed had expired, the appellate court could provide no relief to the husband. Honeycutt ex rel. Alexander H. v. Honeycutt, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 169 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 2, 2016).

4. Extension.

Trial court erred in extending an ex parte order of protection for five years because it did not make sufficient and relevant findings of fact and conclusions of law by showing how the respondent violated the existing order of protection, rather it merely adopted the facts as stated by the applicant in her initial filing in the general sessions court and those facts were not relevant to the question of whether the respondent violated an existing order of protection. Roney v. Nordhaus, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 999 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 30, 2015).

Extension of an order of protection against a husband was appropriate because the husband's wife proved the wife's allegations of domestic abuse by a preponderance of the evidence as the wife testified that both the wife and the parties'  child were afraid of the husband, that the wife had difficulties sleeping, and that their child was angry and suffering from nightmares. The wife attributed the wife's fear to one incident in particular and previous incidents involving the husband's actions in severely disciplining their child. Honeycutt ex. rel. Alexander H. v. Honeycutt, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 457 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 30, 2016).

Trial court did not err in granting an extension of an order of protection because a parent proved that the parent and the parent's children were in need of protection from a relative in that following the entry of a prior order of protection the relative had stalked the parent and followed through on previous threats to seek custody of the children. The court also found that the relative had sexually abused one of the children when the child was in the relative's custody and thereby presented an ongoing threat to the safety of the children. Gibson v. Bikas, 556 S.W.3d 796, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 110 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 28, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 421 (Tenn. July 18, 2018).

Appellate court was unable to determine if the trial court erred in declining to enter a one-year order of protection against a husband following a bench trial because the record was inadequate and the trial court made no findings of fact or conclusions of law regarding the order of protection other than an introductory statement reflecting the date of the petition's filing and the date of hearing, the trial court included no reasoning concerning its decision to extend the ex parte order of protection or determine if the wife proved the allegations of domestic abuse by a preponderance of the evidence. Westfall v. Westfall, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 234 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 2, 2018).

5. Modification.

Trial court erred in modifying an order of protection against a husband to a permanent order because it lacked statutory authority to issue a permanent, open-ended order of protection; construing the statutory scheme concerning orders of protection so that its component parts are consistent and reasonable and avoiding an interpretation that would render one section of the act repugnant to another, no authority provides for the issuance of a permanent, open-ended order of protection; Swonger v. Swonger, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 297 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 28, 2016).

6. Restraining Orders and Injunctions.

Trial court the trial court erred in relying on the rule as authorizing the issuance of an order of protection because it did not consider the time restraints set forth in the statutes establishing the time periods of orders of protection; by its own terms, the rule is subordinate to the statutory scheme establishing the time periods of orders of protection. Swonger v. Swonger, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 297 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 28, 2016).

7. Construction.

Fifteen-day limit for ex parte orders of protection is designed to protect a respondent and not a petitioner and there is no barrier under the Domestic Abuse Act to a respondent requesting that the hearing be put off for some limited period so he can request discovery, with the proviso that the ex parte order of protection remains in place until that hearing; the 15-day limit to an ex parte order of protection may not be used offensively to ambush a respondent. Luker v. Luker, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 508 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 30, 2018).

Nothing supports the proposition that discovery under the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure is prohibited in order of protection cases. Luker v. Luker, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 508 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 30, 2018).

Tennessee Court of Appeals disagrees that a trial court is forced into choosing to either conduct a hearing within 15 days, ready or not, or delay the hearing beyond 15 days and let the ex parte order dissolve leaving the alleged domestic abuse victim with no court-ordered protection. Luker v. Luker, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 508 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 30, 2018).

8. Discovery.

Trial court erred in denying categorically respondent's request for discovery under the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure; respondent's counsel had two hours before the hearing to review a one and a half hour recording, along with call logs, which was simply was not meaningful discovery, and on remand, the trial court was to exercise its discretion to determine the parameters of discovery. Luker v. Luker, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 508 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 30, 2018).

9. Order Dismissed.

Trial court's dismissal of an order of protection was affirmed because (1) the court did not exceed the court's discretion in limiting testimony in support of the petitions, as additional testimony was unnecessary to determine if protective orders continued to be necessary, and, (2) deferring to the trial court's assessment of the witnesses'  credibility, the evidence did not preponderate against dismissal. Todd Goldman v. Griffin, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 609 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 18, 2019).

36-3-606. Scope of protection order.

  1. A protection order granted under this part to protect the petitioner from domestic abuse, stalking or sexual assault may include, but is not limited to:
    1. Directing the respondent to refrain from committing domestic abuse, stalking or sexual assault or threatening to commit domestic abuse, stalking or sexual assault against the petitioner or the petitioner's minor children;
    2. Prohibiting the respondent from coming about the petitioner for any purpose, from telephoning, contacting, or otherwise communicating with the petitioner, directly or indirectly;
    3. Prohibiting the respondent from stalking the petitioner, as defined in § 39-17-315;
    4. Granting to the petitioner possession of the residence or household to the exclusion of the respondent by evicting the respondent, by restoring possession to the petitioner, or by both;
    5. Directing the respondent to provide suitable alternate housing for the petitioner when the respondent is the sole owner or lessee of the residence or household;
    6. Awarding temporary custody of, or establishing temporary visitation rights with regard to, any minor children born to or adopted by the parties;
    7. Awarding financial support to the petitioner and such persons as the respondent has a duty to support. Except in cases of paternity, the court shall not have the authority to order financial support unless the petitioner and respondent are legally married. Such order may be enforced pursuant to chapter 5 of this title;
    8. Directing the respondent to attend available counseling programs that address violence and control issues or substance abuse problems. A violation of a protection order or part of such order that directs counseling pursuant to this subdivision (a)(8) may be punished as criminal or civil contempt. Section 36-3-610(a) applies with respect to a nonlawyer general sessions judge who holds a person in criminal contempt for violating this subdivision (a)(8);
    9. Directing the care, custody, or control of any animal owned, possessed, leased, kept, or held by either party or a minor residing in the household. In no instance shall the animal be placed in the care, custody, or control of the respondent, but shall instead be placed in the care, custody or control of the petitioner or in an appropriate animal foster situation;
    10. Directing the respondent to immediately and temporarily vacate a residence shared with the petitioner, pending a hearing on the matter, notwithstanding any provision of this part to the contrary;
    11. Directing the respondent to pay the petitioner all costs, expenses and fees pertaining to the petitioner's breach of a lease or rental agreement for residential property if the petitioner is a party to the lease or rental agreement and if the court finds that continuing to reside in the rented or leased premises may jeopardize the life, health and safety of the petitioner or the petitioner's children. Nothing in this subdivision (a)(11) shall be construed as altering the terms of, liability for, or parties to such lease or rental agreement; or
    12. Ordering a wireless service provider to transfer the billing responsibility for and rights to the wireless telephone number or numbers to a petitioner pursuant to § 36-3-621.
  2. Relief granted pursuant to subdivisions (a)(4)-(8) shall be ordered only after the petitioner and respondent have been given an opportunity to be heard by the court.
  3. Any order of protection issued under this part shall include the statement of the maximum penalty that may be imposed pursuant to § 36-3-610 for violating such order.
  4. No order of protection made under this part shall in any manner affect title to any real property.
  5. An order of protection issued pursuant to this part shall be valid and enforceable in any county of this state.
  6. An order of protection issued pursuant to this part that fully complies with 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) shall contain the disclosures set out in § 36-3-625(a).

Acts 1979, ch. 350, §§ 6-8; T.C.A., §§ 36-1206 —36-1208; Acts 1987, ch. 270, §§ 7, 12; 1991, ch. 380, § 4; 1995, ch. 507, § 4; 1996, ch. 684, § 2; 1996, ch. 734, § 1, 2; 1997, ch. 459, §§ 2, 3; 2001, ch. 352, § 2; 2005, ch. 381, § 5; 2007, ch. 352, § 2; 2009, ch. 455, § 2; 2010, ch. 959, § 1; 2010, ch. 981, § 1; 2011, ch. 253, § 1; 2011, ch. 402, § 2; 2016, ch. 865, § 1; 2018, ch. 729, § 2.

Amendments. The 2018 amendment added (a)(12).

Effective Dates. Acts 2018, ch. 729, § 3. April 18, 2018.

Cross-References. Civil contempt, title 29, ch. 9.

Criminal contempt, Tenn. R. Crim. P. 42.

Law Reviews.

Safe Haven Conundrum: The Use of Special Bailments To Keep Pets Out of Violent Households, 12 Tenn. J. L. & Pol'y 79 (2017).

Attorney General Opinions. The domestic violence state coordinating council does not have authority to assess fees to offenders who are ordered by the courts to attend a batterers' intervention program, OAG 00-080, 2000 Tenn. AG LEXIS 83 (5/1/00).

Issuance of ex parte order of protection; discretion to order respondent to vacate residence shared with petitioner pending hearing.  OAG 10-06, 2010 Tenn. AG LEXIS 6 (1/19/10).

Confidentiality of orders of protection.  OAG 11-9, 2011 Tenn. AG LEXIS 9 (1/18/11).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Domestic Violence Counseling.

By issuing a new order of protection, the trial court's requirement that defendant undergo counseling for domestic abuse fell within T.C.A. § 36-3-606(a)(8). Although the legislature has not authorized domestic violence counseling as a sentence for criminal contempt, the trial court properly imposed such a requirement as part of a new order of protection. Cable v. Clemmons, 36 S.W.3d 39, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 1 (Tenn. 2001).

36-3-607. Bond not required.

The court shall not require the execution of a bond by the petitioner to issue any order of protection under this part.

Acts 1979, ch. 350, § 9; T.C.A., § 36-1209.

36-3-608. Duration of protection order — Modification.

  1. All orders of protection shall be effective for a fixed period of time, not to exceed one (1) year.
  2. The court may modify its order at any time upon subsequent motion filed by either party together with an affidavit showing a change in circumstances sufficient to warrant the modification.

Acts 1979, ch. 350, § 10; T.C.A., § 36-1210.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Permanent, Open-Ended Order.

Trial court erred in modifying an order of protection against a husband to a permanent order because it lacked statutory authority to issue a permanent, open-ended order of protection; construing the statutory scheme concerning orders of protection so that its component parts are consistent and reasonable and avoiding an interpretation that would render one section of the act repugnant to another, no authority provides for the issuance of a permanent, open-ended order of protection. Swonger v. Swonger, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 297 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 28, 2016).

2. Restraining Orders and Injunctions.

Trial court the trial court erred in relying on the rule as authorizing the issuance of an order of protection because it did not consider the time restraints set forth in the statutes establishing the time periods of orders of protection; by its own terms, the rule is subordinate to the statutory scheme establishing the time periods of orders of protection. Swonger v. Swonger, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 297 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 28, 2016).

36-3-609. Effectiveness of order of protection — Service.

  1. If the respondent has been served with a copy of the petition, notice of hearing, and any ex parte order issued pursuant to § 36-3-605(c), any subsequent order of protection shall be effective when the order is entered. For purposes of this section, an order shall be considered entered when such order is signed by:
    1. The judge and all parties or counsel;
    2. The judge and one party or counsel and contains a certificate of counsel that a copy of the proposed order has been served on all other parties or counsel; or
    3. The judge and contains a certificate of the clerk that a copy has been served on all other parties or counsel.
  2. As used in subsection (a), service upon a party or counsel shall be made by delivering to such party or counsel a copy of the order of protection, or by the clerk mailing it to the party's last known address. In the event the party's last known address is unknown and cannot be ascertained upon diligent inquiry, the certificate of service shall so state. Service by mail is complete upon mailing. In order to complete service of process in a timely manner on a party who lives outside the county where the order was issued, the clerk may transmit the order to the sheriff in the appropriate county by facsimile or other electronic transmission.
  3. Notwithstanding when an order is considered entered under subsection (a), if the court finds that the protection of the petitioner so requires, the court may order, in the manner provided by law or rule, that the order of protection take effect immediately.
  4. If the respondent has been served with a copy of the petition, notice of hearing, and any ex parte order issued pursuant to § 36-3-605(c), an order of protection issued pursuant to this part after a hearing shall be in full force and effect against the respondent from the time it is entered regardless of whether the respondent is present at the hearing.
  5. A copy of any order of protection and any subsequent modifications or dismissal shall be issued to the petitioner, the respondent, the local law enforcement agencies having jurisdiction in the area where the petitioner resides, and any court other than the issuing court in which the respondent and petitioner are parties to an action. The petitioner and respondent shall notify the judge of any such court. Upon receipt of the copy of the order of protection or dismissal from the issuing court or clerk's office, the local law enforcement agency shall take any necessary action to immediately transmit it to the national crime information center.

Acts 1979, ch. 350, § 11; T.C.A., § 36-1211; Acts 1987, ch. 270, § 8; 1993, ch. 484, § 2; 2000, ch. 638, § 1; 2000, ch. 781, § 1; 2004, ch. 588, § 1; 2011, ch. 39, § 1; 2014, ch. 993, § 1; 2016, ch. 720, § 2.

Code Commission Notes.

The former last sentence of subsection (e), concerning the elimination of protective orders from the Tennessee bureau of investigation database and the transfer of such orders to the national crime information center order of protection file by April 5, 2013, was deleted as obsolete by the code commission in 2014.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2000, ch. 638, § 3 provided that the Order of Protection forms in existence on April 10, 2000, may continue to be used provided the change required by the 2000 amendment to § 36-3-604 is made on the form prior to its use. All Order of Protection forms printed after April 10, 2000, shall reflect the changes made to former § 36-3-604(b)(3) by the act, as well as the new century.

Acts 2004, ch. 588, § 3 provided that, for the purpose of changing any forms necessary to implement the provisions of the act, the act shall take effect May 3, 2004; for all other purposes, it shall take effect on July 1, 2004.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Effective Date.

Order of protection, served on defendant that was accompanied by a notice that a hearing on the order was to take place and was extended to remain in effect for one year, was entered and became effective on that year earlier date. State v. Armstrong, 256 S.W.3d 243, 2008 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 77 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 24, 2008).

2. Appellate Jurisdiction.

Husband's notice of appeal of an order extending a protective order was premature where although the order was signed by the judge, the certificate of service section was never completed, and thus, a final order for purposes of appeal was never entered. Baxley v. Baxley, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 958 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 9, 2015).

36-3-610. Violation of order or consent agreement — Civil or criminal contempt — Financial penalty.

  1. Upon violation of the order of protection or a court-approved consent agreement, the court may hold the defendant in civil or criminal contempt and punish the defendant in accordance with the law. A judge of the general sessions court shall have the same power as a court of record to punish the defendant for contempt when exercising jurisdiction pursuant to this part or when exercising concurrent jurisdiction with a court of record. A judge of the general sessions court who is not a licensed attorney shall appoint an attorney referee to hear charges of criminal contempt.
    1. In addition to the authorized punishments for contempt of court, the judge may assess any person who violates an order of protection or a court-approved consent agreement a civil penalty of fifty dollars ($50.00). The judge may further order that any support payment made pursuant to an order of protection or a court-approved consent agreement be made under an income assignment to the clerk of court.
    2. The judge upon finding a violation of an order of protection or a court-approved consent order shall require a bond of the respondent until such time as the order of protection expires. Such bond shall not be less than two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500) and shall be payable upon forfeit as provided. Bond shall be set at whatever the court determines is necessary to reasonably assure the safety of the petitioner as required. Any respondent for whom bond has been set may deposit with the clerk of the court before which the proceeding is pending a sum of money in cash equal to the amount of the bond. The clerk of the court may deposit funds received in lieu of bonds, or any funds received from the forfeiture of bonds, in an interest bearing account. Any interest received from such accounts shall be payable to the office of the clerk. Failure to comply with this subsection (b) may be punished by the court as a contempt of court as provided in title 29, chapter 9.
    3. If a respondent posting bond under this subsection (b) does not comply with the conditions of the bond, the court having jurisdiction shall enter an order declaring the bond to be forfeited. Notice of the order of forfeiture shall be mailed forthwith by the clerk to the respondent at the respondent's last known address. If the respondent does not within thirty (30) days from the date of the forfeiture satisfy the court that compliance with the conditions of the bond was met, the court shall enter judgment for the state against the defendant for the amount of the bond and costs of the court proceedings. The judgment and costs may be enforced and collected in the same manner as a judgment entered in a civil action.
    4. Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit or affect any remedy in effect on July 1, 2010.
  2. Upon collecting the civil penalty imposed by subsection (b), the clerk shall, on a monthly basis, send the money to the state treasurer who shall deposit it in the domestic violence community education fund created by § 36-3-616.
  3. The proceeds of a judgment for the amount of the bond pursuant to this section shall be paid quarterly to the administrative office of the courts. The quarterly payments shall be due on the fifteenth day of the fourth month of the year; the fifteenth day of the sixth month; the fifteenth day of the ninth month; and on the fifteenth day of the first month of the next succeeding year. The proceeds shall be allocated equally on an annual basis as follows:
    1. To provide legal representation to low-income Tennesseans in civil matters in such manner as determined by the supreme court as described in § 16-3-808(c); provided, that one-fourth (¼) of such funds shall be allocated to an appropriate statewide nonprofit organization capable of providing continuing legal education, technology support, planning assistance, resource development and other support to organizations delivering civil legal representation to indigents. The remainder shall be distributed to organizations delivering direct assistance to clients with Legal Services Corporation funding as referenced in the Tennessee State Plan for Civil Legal Justice approved in March, 2001, by the Legal Services Corporation;
    2. To the domestic violence state coordinating council, created by title 38, chapter 12;
    3. To the Tennessee Court Appointed Special Advocates Association (CASA); and
    4. To Childhelp.

Acts 1979, ch. 350, § 12; T.C.A., § 36-1212; Acts 1989, ch. 297, § 1; 1994, ch. 858, § 1; 1995, ch. 127, § 1; 2010, ch. 1094, §§ 1, 2.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 1994, ch. 858, § 3 provided that (b) and (c) shall apply to violations of orders of protection or court-approved consent agreements occurring on or after July 1, 1994.

For the Preamble to the act concerning violations of orders of protection, please refer to Acts 2010, ch. 1094.

Attorney General Opinions. Contribution of candidate's personal funds during legislative session, OAG 98-061, 1998 Tenn. AG LEXIS 61 (3/9/98); OAG 98-062, 1998 Tenn. AG LEXIS 62 (3/9/98).

The 2005 revision of T.C.A. § 36-3-612 did not repeal by implication T.C.A. § 36-3-610, or any other statute in Title 36, Chapter 3. OAG 05-183, 2005 Tenn. AG LEXIS 185 (12/22/05).

Dual convictions for (1) criminal contempt of court for violating an order of protection under T.C.A. § 36-3-610 and (2) the Class A misdemeanor offense for knowingly violating a protective order under T.C.A. § 36-3-612 could be constitutionally supported, OAG 06-085, 2006 Tenn. AG LEXIS 94 (5/9/06).

When the defendant has knowledge of or has been served with the order at the time of the violation, and when the violation would not itself be a crime, punishment for violating an ex parte order of protection can include civil or criminal contempt and a civil penalty of $50.00, OAG 06-094, 2006 Tenn. AG LEXIS 103 (5/22/06).

Assessment of civil penalty for violation of order of protection.  OAG 10-44, 2010 Tenn. AG LEXIS 44 (4/6/10).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

Trial court did not err in requiring a father to post a $2,500 bond because he waived the issues presented on appeal, including his constitutional challenge to the bond statute by failing to present them to the trial court, the challenged statute was not so obviously unconstitutional on its face as to obviate the necessity for any discussion, and the father failed to notify the Tennessee Attorney General of his challenge. Lee v. Eskridge, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 145 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 26, 2016).

2. Construction.

The term “the court” in T.C.A. § 36-3-610(a) includes courts other than the one that issued the order. State v. Gray, 46 S.W.3d 749, 2000 Tenn. App. LEXIS 677 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000).

36-3-611. Arrest for violation of protection order.

  1. An arrest for violation of an order of protection issued pursuant to this part may be with or without warrant. Any law enforcement officer shall arrest the respondent without a warrant if:
    1. The officer has proper jurisdiction over the area in which the violation occurred;
    2. The officer has reasonable cause to believe the respondent has violated or is in violation of an order for protection; and
    3. The officer has verified whether an order of protection is in effect against the respondent. If necessary, the police officer may verify the existence of an order for protection by telephone or radio communication with the appropriate law enforcement department.
  2. No ex parte order of protection can be enforced by arrest under this section until the respondent has been served with the order of protection or otherwise has acquired actual knowledge of such order.

Acts 1979, ch. 350, § 13; T.C.A., § 36-1213; Acts 1987, ch. 270, §§ 9, 10.

Attorney General Opinions. A law enforcement officer, having observed the commission of a felony, may choose not to arrest or charge the offending party, except when the officer has probable cause to believe that a suspect has violated an order of protection, OAG 01-119, 2001 Tenn. AG LEXIS 110 (7/27/01).

A law enforcement officer can arrest a defendant without a warrant if the defendant violates an ex parte order of protection and if the requirements of T.C.A.§ 36-3-611 have been met, OAG 06-094, 2006 Tenn. AG LEXIS 103 (5/22/06).

36-3-612. Contempt hearing.

  1. A person arrested for the violation of an order of protection issued pursuant to this part or a restraining order or court-approved consent agreement, shall be taken before a magistrate or the court having jurisdiction in the cause without unnecessary delay to answer a charge of contempt for violation of the order of protection, restraining order or court-approved consent agreement, and the court shall:
    1. Notify the clerk of the court having jurisdiction in the cause to set a time certain for a hearing on the alleged violation of the order of protection, restraining order or court-approved consent agreement within ten (10) working days after arrest, unless extended by the court on the motion of the arrested person;
    2. Set a reasonable bond pending the hearing on the alleged violation of the order of protection, restraining order or court-approved consent agreement; and
    3. Notify the person to whom the order of protection, restraining order or court-approved consent agreement was issued to protect and direct the party to show cause why a contempt order should issue.
  2. Either the court that originally issued the order of protection or restraining order or a court having jurisdiction over orders of protection or restraining orders in the county where the alleged violation of the order occurred shall have the authority and jurisdiction to conduct the contempt hearing required by subsection (a). If the violation is of a court-approved consent agreement, the same court that approved the agreement shall conduct the contempt hearing for any alleged violation of it. If the court conducting the contempt hearing is not the same court that originally issued the order of protection or restraining order, the court conducting the hearing shall have the same authority to punish as contempt a violation of the order of protection or restraining order as the court originally issuing the order.

Acts 1979, ch. 350, § 14; T.C.A., § 36-1214; Acts 1987, ch. 270, § 11; 1999, ch. 482, § 1; 2005, ch. 394, § 1; 2006, ch. 920, § 2.

Attorney General Opinions. The 2005 revision of T.C.A. § 36-3-612 did not repeal by implication T.C.A. § 36-3-610, authorizing a trial court to hold a respondent to an order of protection in civil or criminal contempt, or any other statute in Title 36, Chapter 3. OAG 05-183, 2005 Tenn. AG LEXIS 185 (12/22/05).

An ex parte order of protection issued under T.C.A. § 36-3-605 is not a type of protective order whose violation is a Class A misdemeanor under T.C.A. § 36-3-612, OAG 05-183, 2005 Tenn. AG LEXIS 185 (12/22/05).

The 2005 revision of T.C.A. § 36-3-612 in no way modifies the authority of a trial court to punish the violation of a bail condition under the language of T.C.A. § 40-11-150(i), OAG 05-183, 2005 Tenn. AG LEXIS 185 (12/22/05).

Dual convictions for (1) criminal contempt of court for violating an order of protection under T.C.A. § 36-3-610 and (2) the Class A misdemeanor offense for knowingly violating a protective order under T.C.A. § 36-3-612 could be constitutionally supported, OAG 06-085, 2006 Tenn. AG LEXIS 94 (5/9/06).

Enforcement of out-of-state and ex parte orders of protection. OAG 14-101, 2014 Tenn. AG LEXIS 104 (11/26/14).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Purpose.

The amendment to T.C.A. § 36-3-612(b) was designed to ensure that a protection order could be enforced wherever a violation occurred. State v. Gray, 46 S.W.3d 749, 2000 Tenn. App. LEXIS 677 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000).

36-3-613. Leaving residence or use of necessary force — Right to relief unaffected.

  1. The petitioner's right to relief under this part is not affected by the petitioner's leaving the residence or household to avoid domestic abuse, stalking or sexual assault.
  2. The petitioner's right to relief under this part is not affected by use of such physical force against the respondent as is reasonably believed to be necessary to defend the petitioner or another from imminent physical injury, domestic abuse, or sexual assault.

Acts 1979, ch. 350, § 15; T.C.A., § 36-1215; Acts 1997, ch. 459, § 2; 2005, ch. 381, § 6.

36-3-614. Effect of failure to contest parentage — Order of protection pending parentage tests and comparisons.

  1. Failure of a respondent to contest paternity in any proceeding commenced pursuant to this part shall not be construed as an admission of paternity by such respondent, nor shall such failure to contest be admissible as evidence against the respondent at any pending or subsequent paternity proceeding.
  2. Where paternity is contested in a proceeding commenced pursuant to this part, if the court orders the parties to submit to any tests and comparisons to determine parentage authorized by § 24-7-112, the court may grant an order of protection pending the outcome of any such tests and comparisons.

Acts 1991, ch. 380, § 2.

36-3-615. Notification to victim that family or household member arrested for assault may be released on bond.

  1. After a person has been arrested for assault pursuant to § 39-13-101, aggravated assault pursuant to § 39-13-102, against a victim as defined in § 36-3-601, domestic assault pursuant to § 39-13-111, or violation of a protective order pursuant to § 39-13-113, the arresting officer shall inform the victim that the person arrested may be eligible to post bond for the offense and be released until the date of trial for the offense.
  2. Subsection (a) is solely intended to be a notification provision, and no cause of action is intended to be created thereby.

Acts 1993, ch. 436, §§ 1, 2; 1997, ch. 211, § 4; 2001, ch. 352, § 1; 2006, ch. 920, § 3.

36-3-616. Domestic violence community education fund.

  1. There is hereby established a general fund reserve to be allocated through the general appropriations act, which shall be known as the domestic violence community education fund. Moneys from the fund shall be expended to fund activities authorized by this section. Any revenues deposited in this reserve shall remain in the reserve until expended for purposes consistent with this section, and shall not revert to the general fund on any June 30. Any excess revenues or interest earned by such revenues shall not revert on any June 30, but shall remain available for appropriation in subsequent fiscal years. Any appropriation from such reserve shall not revert to the general fund on any June 30, but shall remain available for expenditure in subsequent fiscal years.
  2. The general assembly shall appropriate, through the general appropriations act, moneys from the domestic violence community education fund to the department of human services. Such appropriations shall be specifically earmarked for the purposes set out in this section.
  3. All moneys appropriated from the domestic violence community education fund shall be used exclusively by the department to provide grants to the Tennessee task force against domestic violence. The commissioner of human services shall promulgate rules and regulations in accordance with the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, compiled in title 4, chapter 5, for the distribution and use of the grant funds provided by it. Such grants shall be for the purpose of providing education, training and technical assistance to communities on domestic violence.

Acts 1994, ch. 858, § 2.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 1994, ch. 858, § 3 provided that this section shall apply to violations of orders of protection or court-approved consent agreements occurring on or after July 1, 1994.

36-3-617. Protection order — Filing costs and assistance.

    1. Notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, no domestic abuse victim, stalking victim or sexual assault victim shall be required to bear the costs, including any court costs, filing fees, litigation taxes or any other costs associated with the filing, issuance, registration, service, dismissal or nonsuit, appeal or enforcement of an ex parte order of protection, order of protection, or a petition for either such order, whether issued inside or outside the state. If the court, after the hearing on the petition, issues or extends an order of protection, all court costs, filing fees, litigation taxes and attorney fees shall be assessed against the respondent.
    2. If the court does not issue or extend an order of protection, the court may assess all court costs, filing fees, litigation taxes and attorney fees against the petitioner if the court makes the following finding by clear and convincing evidence:
      1. The petitioner is not a domestic abuse victim, stalking victim or sexual assault victim and that such determination is not based on the fact that the petitioner requested that the petition be dismissed, failed to attend the hearing or incorrectly filled out the petition; and
      2. The petitioner knew that the allegation of domestic abuse, stalking, or sexual assault was false at the time the petition was filed.
    1. The clerk of the court may provide order of protection petition forms to agencies that provide domestic violence assistance.
    2. Any agency that meets with a victim in person and recommends that an order of protection be sought shall assist the victim in the completion of the form petition for filing with the clerk.
    3. No agency shall be required to provide this assistance unless it has been provided with the appropriate forms by the clerk.

Acts 1995, ch. 410, § 3; 1997, ch. 459, § 4; 2002, ch. 666, § 1; 2007, ch. 348, § 3; 2008, ch. 1074, § 1; 2009, ch. 263, § 1; 2011, ch. 402, § 1.

Attorney General Opinions. Applicability of court costs to petitioner, OAG 96-062, 1996 Tenn. AG LEXIS 65 (4/8/96).

Preparation of petitions for orders of protection, OAG 06-108, 2006 Tenn. AG LEXIS 117 (7/5/06).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Assessment of Costs Prohibited.

Appellate costs were not taxed to a wife under T.C.A. § 36-3-617(a), although a husband was the prevailing party, as the order of protection was so lacking in clarity that the husband could not have violated it; due to that same lack of clarity, there was not clear and convincing evidence that the wife knew her allegation of domestic abuse was false when she filed her motion for contempt. Furlong v. Furlong, 370 S.W.3d 329, 2011 Tenn. App. LEXIS 559 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 14, 2011), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 278 (Tenn. Apr. 11, 2012).

Mother sought an award of her attorney fees incurred on appeal but the father limited this appeal to the question of attorney fees awarded to the mother and he did not appeal the dismissal of his writ of error, which challenged the orders of protection; thus, an award of attorney fees under the statute would be inappropriate, as this appeal did not contest the issuance or extension of an order of protection. New v. Dumitrache, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 174 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 12, 2019).

2. Cost and Fees Awarded.

Because an appellate court affirmed a trial court's extension of an order of protection the party which petitioned for the order was entitled to an award of attorneys'  fees on appeal. Honeycutt ex. rel. Alexander H. v. Honeycutt, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 457 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 30, 2016).

Because the entry of the order of protection was affirmed, plaintiff was entitled to attorney's fees and costs in defending the appeal. Purifoy v. Mafa, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 644 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 28, 2017).

Statute's authority extended to an appeal of the issuance or extension of an order of protection, but the chancery court awarded attorney fees based on all fees incurred by the mother and the minor child; thus, the award of attorney fees was vacated and the case was remanded for a determination of the fees related solely to the defense of the writ of error. New v. Dumitrache, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 174 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 12, 2019).

T.C.A. § 36-3-617(a)(1) authorized the chancery court to award the mother and the minor child their attorney's fees incurred in defense of the writ of error, but the statute did not authorize an award of fees incurred in defense of the petition to enroll a foreign judgment. New v. Dumitrache, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 174 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 12, 2019).

Mother was entitled to attorney's fees for defending against a father's pleading, including appeal, when the chancery court properly dismissed the father's action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to the untimely filing of an appeal from the issuance of an order of protection. The mother was entitled to an award of attorney's fees incurred defending against the father's pleadings in their entirety as all issues raised in the father's petition and writ of error ultimately related to the general sessions court's order of protection. New v. Dumitrache, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. LEXIS 264 (Tenn. June 29, 2020).

36-3-618. Purpose — Legislative intent.

The purpose of this part is to recognize the seriousness of domestic abuse as a crime and to assure that the law provides a victim of domestic abuse with enhanced protection from domestic abuse. A further purpose of this chapter is to recognize that in the past law enforcement agencies have treated domestic abuse crimes differently than crimes resulting in the same harm but occurring between strangers. Thus, the general assembly intends that the official response to domestic abuse shall stress enforcing the laws to protect the victim and prevent further harm to the victim, and the official response shall communicate the attitude that violent behavior is not excused or tolerated.

Acts 1995, ch. 507, § 2.

Law Reviews.

GPS Monitoring of Domestic Violence Offenders in Tennessee: Generating Problems Surreptitiously (Natalie Fox Malone), 43 U. Mem. L. Rev. 171 (2012).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Construction.

The language of the Domestic Abuse Act, compiled in T.C.A. § 36-3-601 et seq., clearly conveys the legislature's intent to provide a swift and efficient summary proceeding that requires only a hearing in front of a judge, not a jury trial; this clear legislative intent expressly excepts the Act from a statutory right to a jury trial. Clark v. Crow, 37 S.W.3d 919, 2000 Tenn. App. LEXIS 492 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000).

2. Attorney's Fees.

Mother was entitled to attorney's fees for defending against a father's pleading when the chancery court properly dismissed the father's action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to the untimely filing of an appeal from the issuance of an order of protection. Furthermore, the mother was entitled to an award of attorney's fees incurred defending against the father's pleadings in their entirety because all issues raised in the father's petition and writ of error ultimately related to the general sessions court's order of protection. New v. Dumitrache, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. LEXIS 264 (Tenn. June 29, 2020).

36-3-619. Officer response — Primary aggressor — Factors — Reports — Notice to victim of legal rights — Ex parte protection order.

  1. If a law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe that a person has committed a crime involving domestic abuse, whether the crime is a misdemeanor or felony, or was committed within or without the presence of the officer, the preferred response of the officer is arrest.
  2. If a law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe that two (2) or more persons committed a misdemeanor or felony, or if two (2) or more persons make complaints to the officer, the officer shall try to determine who was the primary aggressor. Arrest is the preferred response only with respect to the primary aggressor. The officer shall presume that arrest is not the appropriate response for the person or persons who were not the primary aggressor. If the officer believes that all parties are equally responsible, the officer shall exercise such officer's best judgment in determining whether to arrest all, any or none of the parties.
  3. To determine who is the primary aggressor, the officer shall consider:
    1. The history of domestic abuse between the parties;
    2. The relative severity of the injuries inflicted on each person;
    3. Evidence from the persons involved in the domestic abuse;
    4. The likelihood of future injury to each person;
    5. Whether one (1) of the persons acted in self-defense; and
    6. Evidence from witnesses of the domestic abuse.
  4. A law enforcement officer shall not:
    1. Threaten, suggest, or otherwise indicate the possible arrest of all parties to discourage future requests for intervention by law enforcement personnel; or
    2. Base the decision of whether to arrest on:
      1. The consent or request of the victim; or
      2. The officer's perception of the willingness of the victim or of a witness to the domestic abuse to testify or participate in a judicial proceeding.
  5. When a law enforcement officer investigates an allegation that domestic abuse occurred, the officer shall make a complete report and file the report with the officer's supervisor in a manner that will permit data on domestic abuse cases to be compiled. If a law enforcement officer decides not to make an arrest or decides to arrest two (2) or more parties, the officer shall include in the report the grounds for not arresting anyone or for arresting two (2) or more parties.
  6. Every month, the officer's supervisor shall forward the compiled data on domestic abuse cases to the administrative director of the courts.
  7. When a law enforcement officer responds to a domestic abuse call, the officer shall:
    1. Offer to transport the victim to a place of safety, such as a shelter or similar location or the residence of a friend or relative, unless it is impracticable for the officer to transport the victim, in which case the officer shall offer to arrange for transportation as soon as practicable;
    2. Advise the victim of a shelter or other service in the community; and
    3. Give the victim notice of the legal rights available by giving the victim a copy of the following statement:

      IF YOU ARE THE VICTIM OF DOMESTIC ABUSE, you have the following rights:

      1. You may file a criminal complaint with the district attorney general (D.A.).

      2. You may request a protection order. A protection order may include the following:

      1. An order preventing the abuser from committing further domestic abuse against you;
      2. An order requiring the abuser to leave your household;
      3. An order preventing the abuser from harassing you or contacting you for any reason;
      4. An order giving you or the other parent custody of or visitation with your minor child or children;
      5. An order requiring the abuser to pay money to support you and the minor children if the abuser has a legal obligation to do so; and
      6. An order preventing the abuser from stalking you.

        The area crisis line is

        The following domestic abuse shelter/programs are available to you:

    4. Offer to transport the victim to the location where arrest warrants are issued in that city or county and assist the victim in obtaining an arrest warrant against the alleged abuser.
    1. For good cause shown, the court may issue an ex parte order of protection pursuant to § 36-3-605 upon a sworn petition filed by a law enforcement officer responding to an incident of domestic abuse who asserts in the petition reasonable grounds to believe that a person is in immediate and present danger of abuse, as defined in § 36-3-601, and that the person has consented to the filing in writing; provided, that the person on whose behalf the law enforcement officer seeks the ex parte order of protection shall be considered the petitioner for purposes of this part.
    2. The law enforcement officer may seek on behalf of the person the ex parte order regardless of the time of day and whether or not an arrest has been made.
    3. If an ex parte order is issued pursuant to this section outside of the issuing court's normal operating hours:
      1. The law enforcement officer, judge, or judicial official shall cause the petition and order to be filed with the court as soon as practicable after issuance, but no later than two (2) business days after issuance; and
      2. The law enforcement officer shall use reasonable efforts to notify the person on whose behalf the petition was filed and provide the person with a copy of the ex parte order as soon as practicable after issuance.
    4. The court shall cause a copy of the petition, a notice of the date set for the hearing, and a copy of the ex parte order of protection to be served upon the respondent in accordance with § 36-3-605(c). A hearing on whether or not the ex parte order of protection should be dissolved, extended, or modified shall be held within fifteen (15) days of service of the order on the respondent. The person who consented to the filing shall be given notice of the hearing and the right to be present at the hearing. The procedures set forth in § 36-3-605 shall apply.
    5. Law enforcement officers shall not be subject to civil liability under this section for failure to file a petition or for any statement made or act performed in filing the petition, if done in good faith.

Acts 1995, ch. 507, § 5; 1996, ch. 684, §§ 3, 4; 2016, ch. 906, § 3.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2016, ch. 906, § 1 provided that the act, which amended this section, shall be known and may be cited as the “Public Safety Act of 2016.”

Attorney General Opinions. Duration of probable cause to make warrantless domestic abuse arrest, OAG 98-0169, 1998 Tenn. AG LEXIS 169 (8/28/98).

Authority of law enforcement officers to make misdemeanor arrests, OAG 00-048, 2000 Tenn. AG LEXIS 48 (3/16/00).

The issuance of a protection order in cases of domestic abuse does not require a prior determination by a law enforcement officer of the “primary aggressor;” protection orders are available to any individual who has suffered, or who is at risk of suffering, domestic abuse subject only to the statutory relationship limitations and a court's determination of good cause, OAG 01-033, 2001 Tenn. AG LEXIS 33 (3/12/01).

T.C.A. § 36-3-619(a) authorizes an officer to arrest an offender who the officer has probable cause to believe has maliciously damaged any personal property in which the abused party has an ownership interest, OAG 02-116, 2002 Tenn. AG LEXIS 121 (10/18/02).

36-3-620. Seizure of weapons in possession of alleged domestic abuser.

    1. If a law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe that a criminal offense involving domestic abuse against a victim, as defined in § 36-3-601, has occurred, the officer shall seize all weapons that are alleged to have been used by the abuser or threatened to be used by the abuser in the commission of a crime.
    2. Incident to an arrest for a crime involving domestic abuse against a victim, as defined in § 36-3-601, a law enforcement officer may seize a weapon that is in plain view of the officer or discovered pursuant to a consensual search, if necessary for the protection of the officer or other persons; provided, that a law enforcement officer is not required to remove a weapon such officer believes is needed by the victim for self defense.
  1. The provisions of § 39-17-1317, relative to the disposition of confiscated weapons, shall govern all weapons seized pursuant to this section that were used or threatened to be used by the abuser to commit the crime; provided, that if multiple weapons are seized, the court shall have the authority to confiscate only the weapon or weapons actually used or threatened to be used by the abuser to commit the crime. All other weapons seized shall be returned upon disposition of the case. Also, the officer shall append an inventory of all seized weapons to the domestic abuse report that the officer files with the officer's supervisor pursuant to § 36-3-619(e).
  2. The officer's supervisor shall include the appended information on seized weapons in the compilation of data that the officer's supervisor forwards to the administrative director of the courts pursuant to § 36-3-619(f).

Acts 1995, ch. 507, § 6; 1997, ch. 211, § 5; 1997, ch. 459, § 2.

36-3-621. Wireless telephone service for victims of domestic violence.

  1. A petitioner may, at the time of filing a petition for an order of protection, request that the court issue an order directing a wireless telephone service provider to transfer the billing responsibility for and rights to the wireless telephone number or numbers to the petitioner if the petitioner:
    1. Is not the account holder; and
    2. Proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the petitioner and any minor children in the petitioner's care are the primary users of the wireless telephone numbers that will be ordered transferred by a court under this subsection (a).
    1. An order transferring the billing responsibility for and rights to the wireless telephone number or numbers to a petitioner under subsection (a) must be a separate order that is directed to the wireless telephone service provider.
    2. The order must list:
      1. The name and billing telephone number of the account holder;
      2. The name and contact information of the petitioner to whom the telephone number or numbers will be transferred; and
      3. Each telephone number to be transferred to the petitioner.
    3. The court shall ensure that the petitioner's contact information is not provided to the account holder in proceedings held under this section.
    4. The order must be served on the wireless telephone service provider's agent for service of process.
    5. The wireless service provider shall notify the requesting party if the wireless telephone service provider cannot operationally or technically effectuate the order due to certain circumstances, including when:
      1. The account holder has already terminated the account;
      2. Differences in network technology prevent the functionality of a device on the network; or
      3. There are geographic or other limitations on network or service availability.
    1. Upon a wireless telephone service provider's transfer of billing responsibility for and rights to a wireless telephone number or numbers to a petitioner under subsection (b), the petitioner shall assume:
      1. Financial responsibility for the transferred wireless telephone number or numbers;
      2. Monthly service costs; and
      3. Costs for any mobile device associated with the wireless telephone number or numbers.
    2. A transfer ordered under subsection (b) does not preclude a wireless telephone service provider from applying any routine and customary requirements for account establishment to the petitioner as part of the transfer of billing responsibility for a wireless telephone number or numbers and any devices attached to that number or numbers, including, but not limited to, identification, financial information, and customer preferences.
  2. This section does not affect the ability of the court to apportion the assets and debts of the parties as provided for in law, or the ability to determine the temporary use, possession, and control of personal property under this chapter.
  3. Notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, no cause of action shall lie in any court nor shall any civil, criminal, or administrative proceeding be commenced by a governmental entity against any wireless telephone service provider, or its directors, officers, employees, agents, or vendors, for:
    1. Action taken in compliance with an order issued under this section;
    2. A failure to process an order issued under this section, unless the failure is the result of gross negligence, which must be shown by clear and convincing evidence; or
    3. Providing in good faith call location information or other information, facilities, or assistance in accordance with subsection (a) or any rules promulgated under this section.
  4. If an order of protection is issued, but a separate order under § 36-3-606(a)(12) did not issue at the time of the order, or if the order of protection was issued prior to the availability of the relief under § 36-3-606(a)(12), a petitioner may, at any time, petition the court issuing the order of protection to modify the order and require a wireless service provider to transfer the billing responsibility for and rights to the wireless telephone number or numbers to the petitioner pursuant to this section.

Acts 2018, ch. 729, § 1.

Code Commission Notes.

Acts 2018, ch. 729,  § 1 purported to enact this section as § 36-3-627; however, this section was redesignated as § 36-3-621 by authority of the code commission.

Compiler's Notes. Former § 36-3-621 concerned the reporting, by health care practitioners, of injuries indicating domestic violence or domestic abuse.

Effective Dates. Acts 2018, ch. 729, § 3. April 18, 2018.

36-3-622. Out-of-state protection orders.

  1. Any valid protection order related to abuse, domestic abuse, or domestic or family violence, issued by a court of another state, tribe or territory shall be afforded full faith and credit by the courts of this state and enforced as if it were issued in this state.
    1. A protection order issued by a state, tribal or territorial court related to abuse, domestic abuse or domestic or family violence shall be deemed valid if the issuing court has jurisdiction over the parties and matter under the law of the issuing state, tribe or territory. There shall be a presumption in favor of validity where an order appears authentic on its face.
    2. For a foreign protection order to be valid in this state, the respondent must have been given reasonable notice and the opportunity to be heard before the order of the foreign state, tribe or territory was issued; provided, that in the case of ex parte orders, notice and opportunity to be heard must have been given as soon as possible after the order was issued, consistent with due process.
    3. Failure to provide reasonable notice and the opportunity to be heard shall be an affirmative defense to any charge or process filed seeking enforcement of a foreign protection order.
  2. A petitioner may present a certified copy of a foreign order of protection to a court having jurisdiction of orders of protection in the county in which the petitioner believes enforcement may be necessary. The clerk of such court shall receive the certified copies of any foreign order of protection and any supporting documents used to show the validity of such order and shall maintain such orders, along with any submitted documents. No costs, fees or taxes shall be charged by the clerks for this service. If an enforcement action is instituted in the court pursuant to any such order, the clerk shall file the order and shall otherwise treat the enforcement action as a case, except that all court costs, fees and litigation taxes shall be taxed by the judge at the adjudication of the enforcement action. It shall be a defense to any action taken for the enforcement of such order that the order is not valid as provided in subsection (b) or (d). No person shall present a foreign order of protection to a clerk that the person knows to no longer be in effect. A foreign order of protection shall continue in effect for the period of time specified in the order, and, if no time limitation is so specified, then the order shall continue in effect for a period of one (1) year from the date on which it is first presented to a Tennessee court pursuant to subsection (c); provided, that a continuation of any such order may be granted by the court subject to the requirements set forth in § 36-3-605.
  3. A protection order entered against both the petitioner and respondent shall not be enforceable against the petitioner in a foreign jurisdiction unless:
    1. The respondent filed a cross- or counter-petition, or a complaint or other written pleading was filed seeking such a protection order; and
    2. The issuing court made specific findings of domestic or family violence against the petitioner.
  4. The clerk shall be under no obligation to make a determination as to the validity of such orders or documentation, but shall forward a copy of the foreign protection order and any supporting documentation filed with the order to the local police or sheriff's office, as provided for in § 36-3-609.
  5. Upon request, the clerk shall provide a copy of the order to the person offering the same showing proof of receipt by the clerk's office.
  6. Regardless of whether a foreign order of protection has been filed in this state pursuant to this section, a law enforcement officer may rely upon a copy of any such protection order that has been provided to the officer by any source and may also rely upon the statement of any person protected by a foreign order that the order remains in effect. A law enforcement officer acting in good faith shall be immune from civil and criminal liability in any action in connection with a court's finding that the foreign order was for any reason not enforceable.

Acts 1997, ch. 250, § 1; 2011, ch. 39, §§ 2, 3.

Attorney General Opinions. Enforcement of out-of-state and ex parte orders of protection. OAG 14-101, 2014 Tenn. AG LEXIS 104 (11/26/14).

36-3-623. Confidentiality of records of shelters, centers, providers.

  1. The records of domestic violence shelters, rape crisis centers, and human trafficking service providers shall be treated as confidential by the records custodian of such shelters, centers, or providers unless:
    1. The individual to whom the records pertain authorizes their release; or
    2. A court approves a subpoena for the records, subject to such restrictions as the court may impose, including in camera review.
  2. As used in this section, “human trafficking service providers” means agencies or groups that are incorporated as a not-for-profit organization for at least six (6) months, are tax-exempt under § 501 of the Internal Revenue Code (26 U.S.C. § 501), and that have provided services to victims of human trafficking.

Acts 1999, ch. 344, § 5; 2005, ch. 226, § 1; 2018, ch. 613, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 1999, ch. 344, § 6 provided that for the purpose of the preparation of a standardized affidavit form for directors of rape crisis centers and domestic violence shelters for use as a protection document by Tennessee task force against domestic violence, the act would take effect on June 14, 1999; however, for all other purposes, the act would take effect on July 1, 1999.

Amendments. The 2018 amendment added (b); and, in the introductory language of (a), substituted “domestic violence shelters, rape crisis centers, and human trafficking service providers” for “domestic violence shelters and rape crisis centers” and substituted “shelters, centers, or providers” for “shelters or centers,”.

Effective Dates. Acts 2018, ch. 613, § 4. July 1, 2018.

Cross-References. Confidentiality of public records, § 10-7-504.

36-3-624. Death review teams established — Protocol — Composition of teams — Disclosure of communications — Authority to subpoena.

  1. A county may establish an interagency domestic abuse death review team to assist local agencies in identifying and reviewing domestic abuse deaths, including homicides and suicides, and facilitating communication among the various agencies involved in domestic abuse cases.
  2. For purposes of this section, “domestic abuse” has the meaning set forth in § 36-3-601.
  3. A county may develop a protocol that may be used as a guideline to assist coroners and other persons who perform autopsies on domestic abuse victims in the identification of domestic abuse, in the determination of whether domestic abuse contributed to death or whether domestic abuse had occurred prior to death but was not the actual cause of death, and in the proper written reporting procedures for domestic abuse, including the designation of the cause and mode of death.
  4. County domestic abuse death review teams may be comprised of, but not limited to, the following:
    1. Experts in the field of forensic pathology;
    2. Medical personnel with expertise in domestic violence abuse;
    3. Coroners and medical examiners;
    4. Criminologists;
    5. District attorneys general and city attorneys;
    6. Domestic abuse shelter staff;
    7. Legal aid attorneys who represent victims of abuse;
    8. A representative of the local bar association;
    9. Law enforcement personnel;
    10. Representatives of local agencies that are involved with domestic abuse reporting;
    11. County health department staff who deal with domestic abuse victims' health issues;
    12. Representatives of local child abuse agencies; and
    13. Local professional associations of persons described in subdivisions (d)(1)-(10), inclusive.
  5. An oral or written communication or a document shared within or produced by a domestic abuse death review team related to a domestic abuse death is confidential and not subject to disclosure or discoverable by a third party. An oral or written communication or a document provided by a third party to a domestic abuse death review team is confidential and not subject to disclosure or discoverable by a third party. Notwithstanding the foregoing, recommendations of a domestic abuse death review team upon the completion of a review may be disclosed at the discretion of a majority of the members of a domestic abuse death review team.
  6. To complete a review of a domestic abuse death, whether confirmed or suspected, each domestic abuse death review team shall have access to and subpoena power to obtain all records of any nature maintained by any public or private entity that pertain to a death being investigated by the team. Such records include, but are not limited to, police investigations and reports, medical examiner investigative data and reports, and social service agency reports, as well as medical records maintained by a private health care provider or health care agency. Any entity or individual providing such information to the local team shall not be held liable for providing the information.

Acts 2000, ch. 788, § 1.

Cross-References. Confidentiality of public records, § 10-7-504.

36-3-625. Dispossession of firearms.

  1. Upon issuance of an order of protection that fully complies with 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8), the order shall include on its face the following disclosures:
    1. That the respondent is required to dispossess the respondent by any lawful means, such as transferring possession to a third party who is not prohibited from possessing firearms, of all firearms the respondent possesses within forty-eight (48) hours of the issuance of the order;
    2. That the respondent is prohibited from possessing a firearm for so long as the order of protection or any successive order of protection is in effect, and may reassume possession of the dispossessed firearm at such time as the order expires or is otherwise no longer in effect; and
    3. Notice of the penalty for any violation of this section and § 39-17-1307(f).
  2. The court shall then order and instruct the respondent:
    1. To terminate the respondent’s physical possession of the firearms in the respondent's possession by any lawful means, such as transferring possession to a third party who is not prohibited from possessing firearms, within forty-eight (48) hours;
    2. To complete and return the affidavit of firearm dispossession form created pursuant to subsection (e), which the court may provide the respondent or direct the respondent to the administrative office of the courts' website; and
    3. That if the respondent possesses firearms as business inventory or that are registered under the National Firearms Act (26 U.S.C. §§ 5801 et seq.), there are additional statutory provisions that may apply and shall include these additional provisions in the content of the order.
  3. Upon issuance of the order of protection, its provisions and date and time of issuance shall be transmitted to the sheriff and all local law enforcement agencies in the county where the respondent resides.
  4. When the respondent is lawfully dispossessed of firearms as required by this section, the respondent shall complete an affidavit of firearms dispossession form created pursuant to subsection (e) and return it to the court issuing the order of protection.
  5. The affidavit of firearms dispossession form shall be developed by the domestic violence state coordinating council, in consultation with the administrative office of the courts. Upon completion, the form shall be posted on the website of the administrative office of the courts where it can be copied by respondents or provided to them by the court or the court clerk.
  6. In determining what a lawful means of dispossession is:
    1. If the dispossession, including, but not limited to, the transfer of weapons registered under the National Firearms Act (26 U.S.C. §§ 5801 et seq.), that requires the approval of any state or federal agency prior to the transfer of the firearm, the respondent may comply with the dispossession requirement by having the firearm or firearms placed into a safe or similar container that is securely locked and to which the respondent does not have the combination, keys or other means of normal access;
    2. If the respondent is licensed as a federal firearms dealer or a responsible party under a federal firearms license, the determination of whether such an individual possesses firearms that constitute business inventory under the federal license shall be determined based upon the applicable federal statutes or the rules, regulations and official letters, rulings and publications of the bureau of alcohol, tobacco, firearms and explosives. The order of protection shall not require the surrender or transfer of the inventory if there are one (1) or more individuals who are responsible parties under the federal license who are not the respondent subject to the order of protection.
  7. A firearm subject to this section shall not be forfeited as provided in § 39-17-1317, unless the possession of the firearm prior to the entry of the order of protection constituted an independent crime of which the respondent has been convicted or the firearms are abandoned by the respondent.
    1. It is an offense for a person subject to an order of protection that fully complies with 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) to knowingly fail to surrender or transfer all firearms the respondent possesses as required by this section.
    2. A violation of subdivision (h)(1) is a Class A misdemeanor and each violation shall constitute a separate offense.
    3. If the violation of subdivision (h)(1) also constitutes a violation of § 39-13-113(h) or § 39-17-1307(f), the respondent may be charged and convicted under any or all such sections.

Acts 2009, ch. 455, § 3.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class A misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

36-3-626. Authorization to carry handgun after order of protection granted and while application for temporary handgun permit pending. [Contingent effective date — See Compiler's Notes.]

  1. A person who petitions the court and is granted an order of protection, ex parte or otherwise, pursuant to this part is authorized to, for twenty-one (21) calendar days after that order of protection is granted, carry any handgun, as defined in § 39-17-1319, that the person legally owns or possesses so long as the person has in the person's possession at all times while carrying the handgun a copy of the order of protection.
  2. A person who does not apply for a temporary handgun carry permit under § 39-17-1365 within the time period set forth in § 39-17-1365(a) shall not be authorized to carry a handgun under subsection (a) once that time period has expired.
  3. A person who has applied for a temporary handgun carry permit under § 39-17-1365 may continue to carry a handgun after the time period in this subsection (a) has expired while that application is pending, so long as the person has in the person's possession at all times while carrying the handgun both a copy of the temporary handgun carry permit application receipt as provided by the department and a copy of the order of protection.

Acts 2017, ch. 468, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2017, ch. 468, § 4 provided that, for the purpose of initiating the process of implementing the requirements of the act, including any programming changes, the act took effect on May 26, 2017. For the purpose of implementing the requirements of the act, the act shall take effect thirty (30) days after the date upon which the commissioner of safety provides written notification to the secretary of state and the executive secretary of the Tennessee code commission that the department of safety's “A-list” driver license program is capable of implementing the new requirements of the act or on January 1, 2018, whichever is earlier.

Acts 2017, ch. 468, § 4 provided further that the commissioner shall cause the notification to be published on the website of the department contemporaneously with delivery to the secretary of state and executive secretary of the Tennessee code commission.

Effective Dates. Acts 2017, ch. 468, § 4. Contingent [See Compiler’s Notes.].

Part 7
Alienation of Affections

36-3-701. Tort action abolished.

The common law tort action of alienation of affections is hereby abolished.

Acts 1989, ch. 517, § 1.

Cross-References. Property tort actions, statutory liabilities, § 28-3-105.

Textbooks. Tennessee Law of Evidence (2nd ed., Cohen, Paine and Sheppeard), § 405.4.

Law Reviews.

Family Law — Tennessee Courts — Retroactive Abolition of the Common Law Tort of Criminal Conversation,  Hanover v. Ruch, 809 S.W.2d 893, 1991 Tenn. LEXIS 156 (Tenn.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 381, 116 L. Ed. 2d 332, 502 U.S. 942, 1991 U.S. LEXIS 6263, 60 U.S.L.W. 3342 (1991) (No. 91-525), 59 Tenn. L. Rev. 159 (1991).

Stealing Love in Tennessee: The Thief Goes Free, 56 Tenn. L. Rev. 629 (1989).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Retroactive Application.

This section, abolishing the tort of alienation of affections by legislative action, would have no retroactive application. However, because the reasons for the cause of action no longer exist, and because the public policy of the state, as expressed by the general assembly, is offended by alienation of affections actions, the common-law tort of alienation of affections is retroactively abolished. Dupuis v. Hand, 814 S.W.2d 340, 1991 Tenn. LEXIS 168 (Tenn. 1991).

Although this section, which repeals the common law action for alienation of affections, did not affect claims that had accrued before the act's effective date, the supreme court has retroactively abolished the common law tort of alienation of affections. Alexander v. Inman, 825 S.W.2d 102, 1991 Tenn. App. LEXIS 718 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991).

Chapter 4
Divorce and Annulment

36-4-101. Grounds for divorce from bonds of matrimony.

  1. The following are causes of divorce from the bonds of matrimony:
    1. Either party, at the time of the contract, was and still is naturally impotent and incapable of procreation;
    2. Either party has knowingly entered into a second marriage, in violation of a previous marriage, still subsisting;
    3. Either party has committed adultery;
    4. Willful or malicious desertion or absence of either party, without a reasonable cause, for one (1) whole year;
    5. Being convicted of any crime that, by the laws of the state, renders the party infamous;
    6. Being convicted of a crime that, by the laws of the state, is declared to be a felony, and sentenced to confinement in the penitentiary;
    7. Either party has attempted the life of the other, by poison or any other means showing malice;
    8. Refusal, on the part of a spouse, to remove with that person's spouse to this state, without a reasonable cause, and being willfully absent from the spouse residing in Tennessee for two (2) years;
    9. The woman was pregnant at the time of the marriage, by another person, without the knowledge of the husband;
    10. Habitual drunkenness or abuse of narcotic drugs of either party, when the spouse has contracted either such habit after marriage;
    11. The husband or wife is guilty of such cruel and inhuman treatment or conduct towards the spouse as renders cohabitation unsafe and improper, which may also be referred to in pleadings as inappropriate marital conduct;
    12. The husband or wife has offered such indignities to the spouse's person as to render the spouse's position intolerable, and thereby forced the spouse to withdraw;
    13. The husband or wife has abandoned the spouse or turned the spouse out of doors for no just cause, and has refused or neglected to provide for the spouse while having the ability to so provide;
    14. Irreconcilable differences between the parties; and
    15. For a continuous period of two (2) or more years that commenced prior to or after April 18, 1985, both parties have lived in separate residences, have not cohabited as man and wife during such period, and there are no minor children of the parties.
  2. A complaint or petition for divorce on any ground for divorce listed in this section must have been on file for sixty (60) days before being heard if the parties have no unmarried child under eighteen (18) years of age, and must have been on file at least ninety (90) days before being heard if the parties have an unmarried child under eighteen (18) years of age. The sixty-day or ninety-day period shall commence on the date the complaint or petition is filed.

Code 1858, § 2448 (deriv. Acts 1819, ch. 20, § 2; 1835-1836, ch. 26, §§ 1, 2; 1841-1842, ch. 133, § 3; 1843-1844, ch. 176, § 1); Acts 1867-1868, ch. 63, § 1; 1867-1868, ch. 68, § 1; Shan., § 4201; mod. Code 1932, § 8426; Acts 1961, ch. 168, § 1; 1972, ch. 679, § 1; 1977, ch. 107, § 1; 1978, ch. 577, § 1; 1981, ch. 311, § 1; 1981, ch. 420, § 1; 1981, ch. 532, § 1; 1982, ch. 853, § 2; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 36-801(I); Acts 1985, ch. 178, § 1; 1989, ch. 393, § 1; 1998, ch. 1059, § 1; 2007, ch. 519, § 1.

Cross-References. Adultery, defenses, § 36-4-112.

Conviction of crime, proof, § 36-4-118.

Effect of divorce or annulment upon wills or inter vivos trust agreements, § 32-1-202.

Irreconcilable differences, procedure, § 36-4-103.

Prosecution in forma pauperis, § 20-12-127.

Spouse's refusal to relocate, proof, § 36-4-117.

Testimony of spouses as to marital relations, § 24-1-201.

Textbooks. Gibson's Suits in Chancery (7th ed., Inman), §§ 513, 524.

Tennessee Jurisprudence, 9 Tenn. Juris., Divorce and Alimony, § 2, 8, 9, 12, 13; 18 Tenn. Juris.,  Marriage , § 11.

Law Reviews.

Covenant Marriage: Should Tennessee Join the Noble Experiment?, 29 U. Mem. L. Rev. 397 (1999).

Family law — Cary v. Cary: Antenuptial Agreements Waiving or Limiting Alimony in Tennessee, 27 U. Mem. L. Rev. 1041 (1997).

Family Support and Supporting Families, 68 Vand. L. Rev. En Banc 153   (2015).

Six Months or Six Days: When Can You File For Divorce in Tennessee?, 50 Tenn. B.J. 24 (2014).

The Paradox of Family Privacy, 53 Vand. L. Rev. 527 (2000).

1985 Tennessee Survey: Selected Developments in Tennessee Law, 53 Tenn. L. Rev. 373 (1986).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Divorces in General.

A divorce may be obtained on the grounds of irreconcilable differences, without a showing of fault on the part of either party. Cary v. Cary, 937 S.W.2d 777, 1996 Tenn. LEXIS 362 (Tenn. 1996).

Although the record contained proof that both parties contributed to the downfall of the marriage, the evidence did not preponderate against the trial court's decision to award one spouse the divorce on the grounds of inappropriate marital conduct; the trial court found that the other spouse abused alcohol and used illegal drugs, the other spouse's conduct was intentionally designed to hurt the spouse and was inappropriate in public, and the other spouse had an affair. Eldridge v. Eldridge, 137 S.W.3d 1, 2002 Tenn. App. LEXIS 583 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 247 (Tenn. Mar. 10, 2003).

Partial default judgment was not “a final judgment” because it did not resolve all the issues in the case; because the partial default judgment did not include a permanent parenting plan, it was a temporary or interlocutory order that the trial court could modify, and as a consequence, the partial default judgment that was entered 16 days before the 90-day period expired did not violate subsection (b). Pack v. Pack, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 206 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2019).

2. —Causes Statutory.

In this state, the causes for divorce are prescribed by statute, and the courts have no authority to grant a divorce except for causes thus prescribed. Stargel v. Stargel, 21 Tenn. App. 193, 107 S.W.2d 520, 1937 Tenn. App. LEXIS 20 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1937).

Divorce from the bonds of matrimony can be granted only for the causes denounced by the statute and the court cannot by judicial fiat add an additional ground for divorce. Perrin v. Perrin, 201 Tenn. 354, 299 S.W.2d 19, 1957 Tenn. LEXIS 433 (1957); Mount v. Mount, 46 Tenn. App. 30, 326 S.W.2d 493, 1959 Tenn. App. LEXIS 86 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1959).

Where one of the grounds provided by statute does not exist the court cannot grant a divorce even though there may be no possibility of reconciliation. Greene v. Greene, 48 Tenn. App. 636, 349 S.W.2d 186, 1960 Tenn. App. LEXIS 134 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1960).

3. —Courts' Duty Under Statutes.

Although the courts may doubt the policy of our statutes in allowing so many causes of divorce, nevertheless, they are constrained to give effect to these laws so long as they remain upon the statute books, and Tenn. Const., art. XI, § 4, expressly confers upon the legislature the power to enact them. Lanier v. Lanier, 52 Tenn. 462, 1871 Tenn. LEXIS 280 (1871).

4. —Nature of Proceedings.

While a divorce suit is in the nature of an equity suit, it is sui generis and controlled by statute. The pleading and practice differ in many particulars from those in equity. Lingner v. Lingner, 165 Tenn. 525, 56 S.W.2d 749, 1932 Tenn. LEXIS 80 (1933).

Divorce cases are in the nature of chancery suits and proceedings in them are according to the courts of practice in chancery except for a difference made by statute. Rutledge v. Rutledge, 41 Tenn. App. 158, 293 S.W.2d 21, 1953 Tenn. App. LEXIS 132 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1953).

All divorce cases, even though tried in circuit court, are treated as chancery cases. Lansing v. Lansing, 53 Tenn. App. 72, 378 S.W.2d 786, 1963 Tenn. App. LEXIS 130 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1963).

5. —Presumptions.

The presumption of legality of marriage is one of the strongest in the law and one asserting the invalidity of the marriage must overcome such presumption by cogent and convincing evidence. Rutledge v. Rutledge, 41 Tenn. App. 158, 293 S.W.2d 21, 1953 Tenn. App. LEXIS 132 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1953).

6. —Continuing and Noncontinuing Grounds for Divorce.

Under this and the following section some of the grounds for divorce are noncontinuing in the sense that once the fault has occurred the act is complete and the cause of action exists then and there without further repetition; for example, knowingly entering into a second marriage while the first is subsisting, or one act of adultery, or conviction of an infamous crime, or an attempt on the life of the other by poison or other malicious means, or pregnancy by another at the time of marriage, or cruelty such as renders cohabitation impossible and improper, or indignities to the person rendering the condition intolerable and forcing a withdrawal. Holman v. Holman, 35 Tenn. App. 273, 244 S.W.2d 618, 1951 Tenn. App. LEXIS 71 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1951).

Certain of the grounds for divorce are continuing in character in the sense that once the fault has arisen it continues to exist through mere passivity of the wrongdoer; for example that one of the parties at the time of the marriage was and still is naturally impotent and incapable of procreation, or desertion for two years, or refusal of the wife without reasonable cause to remove with the husband to this state and an absence for two years, or habitual drunkenness contracted after the marriage, or abandonment or nonsupport. Holman v. Holman, 35 Tenn. App. 273, 244 S.W.2d 618, 1951 Tenn. App. LEXIS 71 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1951).

7. —Proof.

Cases discussing the sufficiency of facts in proof, too detailed for analysis, are: Sharp v. Sharp, 34 Tenn. 496, 1855 Tenn. LEXIS 87 (1855); Shell v. Shell, 34 Tenn. 716, 1855 Tenn. LEXIS 124 (1855); Rutledge v. Rutledge, 37 Tenn. 554, 1858 Tenn. LEXIS 61 (1858); Thomas v. Thomas, 42 Tenn. 123, 1865 Tenn. LEXIS 28 (1865); McAllister v. McAllister, 57 Tenn. 345, 1872 Tenn. LEXIS 431 (1872); Horne v. Horne, 1 Cooper's Tenn. Ch. 259 (1853).

The burden is on the complainant to prove by a preponderance of evidence his grounds for divorce as provided by statute. Greene v. Greene, 48 Tenn. App. 636, 349 S.W.2d 186, 1960 Tenn. App. LEXIS 134 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1960).

8. — —Testimony by Wife.

There is no rule of public policy that would prevent the wife, in her divorce suit, from testifying as to the facts constituting the grounds of divorce. E. W. M. v. J. C. M., 2 Tenn. Ch. App. 463 (1897).

9. — —Privileged Communications.

A sealed letter written by the husband to the wife after her withdrawal from him, and delivered to her by a messenger, is not inadmissible on the ground of privileged communication under the protection of the marital relation, if it be found to contain matters of such character as would constitute, by its writing and delivery to her, an act or acts of cruelty and indignity. E. W. M. v. J. C. M., 2 Tenn. Ch. App. 463 (1897).

10. —Conduct After Bill Filed.

The conduct of the defendant husband subsequent to the filing of a divorce bill by his wife may be considered and its effect legally, morally, physically, and socially upon the status and prospective rights and duties of the participants may be determined. Anderson v. Anderson, 3 Tenn. Civ. App. (3 Higgins) 423 (1912).

11. — —Condonation.

Where the wife, after filing her bill for divorce under this section, has condoned the offenses of her husband, her bill will be dismissed, and the divorce refused. Phillips v. Phillips, 73 Tenn. 451, 1880 Tenn. LEXIS 161 (1880).

12. —Defensive Proof.

Testimony to bar relief must reach that degree of proof that is requisite to establish a matrimonial offense that would entitle a defendant to affirmative relief had such been prayed. Douglas v. Douglas, 156 Tenn. 655, 4 S.W.2d 358, 1927 Tenn. LEXIS 163 (1928).

While it is true that if the conduct of both parties has been such as to furnish grounds for divorce neither party is entitled to relief, nevertheless, to bar a petitioning husband's right to relief the defending wife must prove a marital offense on the part of her husband that would have entitled her to divorce if she had asked for it. Schwalb v. Schwalb, 39 Tenn. App. 306, 282 S.W.2d 661, 1955 Tenn. App. LEXIS 71 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1955), superseded by statute as stated in, Moore v. Moore, — S.W.2d —, 1991 Tenn. App. LEXIS 869 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 1, 1991).

A defendant in a divorce action asserting insanity as a defense to the commission of acts of cruelty must prove that at the time of such conduct, as a result of mental disease or defect, he or she lacked sufficient capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his or her conduct or the volition to control his or her acts. Simpson v. Simpson, 716 S.W.2d 27, 1986 Tenn. LEXIS 788, 67 A.L.R.4th 261 (Tenn. 1986).

In cases where a spouse seeks to excuse his or her own misconduct by misconduct of the complaining spouse, the relative times of the misconduct of the spouses may be material. Perry v. Perry, 765 S.W.2d 776, 1988 Tenn. App. LEXIS 755 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988).

13. —Pleadings Questioned upon Assignment of Error.

Where defendant made no question as to the sufficiency of the pleadings until assignment of errors were filed with the court of appeals, any doubt as to the sufficiency of the pleadings was resolved in favor of the sufficiency of the complaint. Clothier v. Clothier, 33 Tenn. App. 532, 232 S.W.2d 363, 1950 Tenn. App. LEXIS 113 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1950), superseded by statute as stated in, Moore v. Moore, — S.W.2d —, 1991 Tenn. App. LEXIS 869 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 1, 1991).

14. Impotency.

Divorce for impotency will not be granted, unless it appear that the party was impotent not only at the time of the separation, but also at the time of the marriage, and party was incurably so. Temporary impotency or impotency that is curable, or impotency occurring after the marriage, cannot be made the basis for annulling the marriage, unless it appears that the impotent party refuses to submit to treatment or operation. Williams v. Williams, 1 Tenn. Civ. App. (1 Higgins) 538 (1911).

Burden of proof is upon the party suing for divorce upon the ground of impotency to prove the charge by a clear preponderance of the evidence, and uncorroborated evidence is not sufficient to establish its existence, where the husband positively denies the charge, and is corroborated in his testimony by the circumstances. Williams v. Williams, 1 Tenn. Civ. App. (1 Higgins) 538 (1911); Reed v. Reed, 26 Tenn. App. 690, 177 S.W.2d 26, 1943 Tenn. App. LEXIS 112 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1943).

Impotency in the law of divorce means the want of potentia copulandi power to perform the sexual act and not merely incapacity to procreate and is an incapacity that admits neither copulation nor procreation. Williams v. Williams, 1 Tenn. Civ. App. (1 Higgins) 538 (1911); Reed v. Reed, 26 Tenn. App. 690, 177 S.W.2d 26, 1943 Tenn. App. LEXIS 112 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1943).

15. —Physical Examination.

The court having jurisdiction to grant a divorce also has power to direct a proper physical examination, but such court should not order such an examination unless the proof is clear and convincing that it is necessary to determine the truth. Reed v. Reed, 26 Tenn. App. 690, 177 S.W.2d 26, 1943 Tenn. App. LEXIS 112 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1943).

16. Marriage During Subsisting Marriage.

A marriage where either party is already lawfully married to another is void, ipso facto, from the beginning, and the property rights of the respective parties are not affected by such void marriage, which must be considered as though it had never taken place. Sellars v. Davis, 12 Tenn. 503, 1833 Tenn. LEXIS 86 (1833).

The provision of subdivision (2) is intended for the relief of one who has innocently entered into an apparent second marriage, rather than for the protection of the other spouse of the existing marriage, since the latter is adequately protected by subdivision (3), making adultery a ground for divorce. Moore v. Moore, 102 Tenn. 148, 52 S.W. 778, 1898 Tenn. LEXIS 15 (1899).

It is of practical importance to the injured party that a marriage with a married person should be judicially declared to be void, for the public records give evidence of the marriage and it is desirable that one equally as public should contain the decree pronouncing its invalidity. Moore v. Moore, 102 Tenn. 148, 52 S.W. 778, 1898 Tenn. LEXIS 15 (1899).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion granting divorce to husband who found after 20 years that wife had subsisting prior marriage where wife alleged that husband prior to divorce proceeding had left her for another woman, since husband was entitled to leave woman to whom he was not legally married. Pewitt v. Pewitt, 192 Tenn. 227, 240 S.W.2d 521, 1951 Tenn. LEXIS 397 (1951).

Where wife filed bill seeking divorce from husband and husband in cross bill sought to have the marriage annulled on ground that he had a previous marriage still subsisting, testimony of husband under such circumstances required very rigid and strict corroboration before being accepted as the truth. Rutledge v. Rutledge, 41 Tenn. App. 158, 293 S.W.2d 21, 1953 Tenn. App. LEXIS 132 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1953).

The fact that a person formerly married was not divorced before purporting to marry another is established prima facie by evidence that no divorce decree is disclosed by the records of the courts having jurisdiction in any of the counties in which the parties to the first marriage or either of them resided from the time of that marriage through the time of the second attempted marriage of one of the parties to another person. Rutledge v. Rutledge, 41 Tenn. App. 158, 293 S.W.2d 21, 1953 Tenn. App. LEXIS 132 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1953).

Where wife was married at time of ceremonial marriage to husband in Georgia in 1942 although she believed herself divorced at the time and wife obtained divorce from first husband in 1948 upon learning that she was not divorced and parties continued to live together in Georgia so as to consummate a valid common law marriage under the laws of that state, husband was not entitled to a divorce on grounds of prior subsisting marriage of wife at time of ceremonial marriage. Lightsey v. Lightsey, 56 Tenn. App. 394, 407 S.W.2d 684, 1966 Tenn. App. LEXIS 230 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1966).

17. —Annulment of Marriage.

Chancery court had jurisdiction of suit to annul marriage based on prior marriage of defendant from which there had been no divorce notwithstanding fact that plaintiff had not been a resident of the state for two years prior to institution of suit. Estes v. Estes, 194 Tenn. 96, 250 S.W.2d 32, 1952 Tenn. LEXIS 355, 32 A.L.R.2d 730 (1952).

18. Adultery.

A husband may not obtain a divorce under subdivision (3) where the record convicts him of a violation of his own marital vows. Moore v. Moore, 102 Tenn. 148, 52 S.W. 778, 1898 Tenn. LEXIS 15 (1899).

When the husband depends upon circumstances to make out a charge of adultery, it is not sufficient that the circumstances tend to show guilt, for the circumstances should be of such cogency as to exclude, logically and naturally, the hypothesis of innocence. Anderson v. Anderson, 3 Tenn. Civ. App. (3 Higgins) 423 (1912).

Mere suspicion or circumstances of suspicion will not justify decree of divorce on ground of adultery. Russell v. Russell, 3 Tenn. App. 232, — S.W. —, 1926 Tenn. App. LEXIS 97 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1926).

Adultery may be established by circumstantial evidence, and need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Sutton v. Sutton, 3 Tenn. App. 333, — S.W. —, 1926 Tenn. App. LEXIS 107 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1926).

Where suit for divorce charges adultery and fails to prove it, only an extraordinary case will warrant a decree for divorce on the same testimony for cruel and inhuman treatment. Miller v. Miller, 6 Tenn. App. 668, — S.W. —, 1927 Tenn. App. LEXIS 179 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1927).

The adultery of the husband is not a bar to his obtaining a divorce on the ground the parties have lived at separate residence for more than three years, without cohabiting as man and wife during the period, and have no minor children. Harwell v. Harwell, 762 S.W.2d 140, 1988 Tenn. App. LEXIS 507 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988).

Post-separation adultery may be a ground for divorce. Perry v. Perry, 765 S.W.2d 776, 1988 Tenn. App. LEXIS 755 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988).

Adultery and bigamy are no longer complete bars to a spouse's right to seek a divorce on one of the grounds in this section. Thompson v. Thompson, 797 S.W.2d 599, 1990 Tenn. App. LEXIS 273 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990).

In an action in which the husband appealed the circuit court for Rutherford County's division of marital property, the amount of the award of rehabilitative alimony to the wife, and the grant of divorce to the wife based on the husband's adultery, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting the wife a divorce based upon the husband's adultery where, inter alia, the husband testified that he had been dating another woman for two years prior to the divorce and that he and this woman had engaged in sexual relations since the fall of 2003. Jekot v. Jekot, 232 S.W.3d 744, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 3, 2007), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 475 (Tenn. May 14, 2007).

Mother admitted that she had sexual relationships with other men, and although she and the father were physically separated when these acts occurred, they were not legally separated pursuant to a court order; therefore, the trial court did not err in awarding a divorce to the father based on the mother's adultery, as well as inappropriate marital conduct. King v. Daily, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 699 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2018).

19. —Allegations and Proof.

The bill need not use the word “adultery,” if it states facts that necessarily imply the act, and names the person with whom it is alleged to have been committed; and a charge of adultery, with a person named, through a series of years, is sufficient, especially where the defendant himself treats it as sufficient by filing an answer, and not demurring to the bill. Lishey v. Lishey, 2 Cooper's Tenn. Ch. 1 (1873), aff'd, 74 Tenn. 418, 1880 Tenn. LEXIS 269 (1880).

A charge that the defendant “has lately and repeatedly been guilty of adultery” with a person named, will be sufficient where the evidence satisfactorily establishes the adultery with all the “circumstances of time and place.” There is no designation of place, but inasmuch as there was no demurrer, and no default by defendant, but a vigorous defense, and the evidence clearly establishes the adultery with the person charged with all the “circumstances of time and place,” the bill was sustained and the divorce was granted. Horne v. Horne, 1 Cooper's Tenn. Ch. 259 (1853).

Charging that the defendant “has been guilty of divers acts of adultery with divers women,” whose names she does not know, is insufficient. Horne v. Horne, 1 Cooper's Tenn. Ch. 259 (1853).

In alleging adultery, it was sufficient to allege the commission of the act with named person, in named city in Tennessee, on certain date, without alleging the street and number in the named city. Evans v. Evans, 57 S.W. 367, 1900 S.W. 30, 1900 Tenn. Ch. App. LEXIS 30 (1900).

Allegation that defendant had taken up with another woman with whom he was living in adultery but not naming the woman and making no particular averment as to time or place was not sufficient to meet the requirements of the statute. Plantt v. Plantt, 28 Tenn. App. 79, 186 S.W.2d 338, 1944 Tenn. App. LEXIS 65 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1944).

Adultery may be proved by circumstantial evidence. Canning v. Canning, 59 Tenn. App. 678, 443 S.W.2d 502, 1968 Tenn. App. LEXIS 363 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1968), overruled on other grounds in Fox v. Fox, 676 S.W.2d 956, 1984 Tenn. LEXIS 849 (Tenn. 1984).

20. — —Sufficiency of Evidence.

Evidence of adultery secured by a detective agency, together with that of prostitutes, when denied by a defendant of veracity, is insufficient to support a decree. Hickerson v. Hickerson, 52 S.W. 1019, 1899 Tenn. Ch. App. LEXIS 50 (1899).

21. —Defenses.

If the cause assigned for divorce be adultery, condonation by admitting the defendant to conjugal society and embraces, after knowledge of the adultery, is a valid and complete defense to the suit upon the ground of adultery. Thomas v. Thomas, 42 Tenn. 123, 1865 Tenn. LEXIS 28 (1865); McClanahan v. McClanahan, 104 Tenn. 217, 56 S.W. 858, 1899 Tenn. LEXIS 30 (1900).

22. Desertion.

In order to obtain the divorce, it is not required that the complainant show an endeavor to induce the defendant to live with him. Lanier v. Lanier, 52 Tenn. 462, 1871 Tenn. LEXIS 280 (1871); Bailey v. Bailey, 6 Tenn. App. 272, — S.W. —, 1927 Tenn. App. LEXIS 139 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1927). See Early v. Early, 6 Tenn. App. 189, — S.W. —, 1927 Tenn. App. LEXIS 128 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1927).

Willful desertion or willful absence, without a reasonable cause, for two years (now one year), is a sufficient ground for divorce, regardless of the existence of malice in fact. McBride v. McBride, 111 Tenn. 616, 69 S.W. 781, 1902 Tenn. LEXIS 23 (1902).

Untidiness, slovenness, and laziness in wife does not justify husband's abandonment of her, and where he has abandoned her for such alleged grounds, for more than two years (now one year), she is entitled to an absolute divorce. Brandon v. Brandon, 3 Tenn. Civ. App. (3 Higgins) 517 (1912).

Wife's mistreatment of husband forcing him to leave the home and remain away was such as to entitle him to divorce on ground of desertion. There may be desertion upon the part of a spouse who has never left the domicile. Green v. Green, 7 Tenn. Civ. App. (7 Higgins) 588 (1916).

Rejection of offer of reconciliation is desertion. Early v. Early, 6 Tenn. App. 189, — S.W. —, 1927 Tenn. App. LEXIS 128 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1927).

Where wife's testimony did not show such misconduct on the part of her husband as would render it impossible to continue the matrimonial cohabitation with safety, health and self-respect, her leaving him was not justified and after two years (now one year) would constitute grounds for his suit for divorce. Bailey v. Bailey, 6 Tenn. App. 272, — S.W. —, 1927 Tenn. App. LEXIS 139 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1927).

Where wife was living apart from husband pursuant to valid court decree for separate maintenance her alleged desertion of husband was a legal impossibility. Perrin v. Perrin, 201 Tenn. 354, 299 S.W.2d 19, 1957 Tenn. LEXIS 433 (1957).

Where the wife is living separate and apart from her husband under a decree of separate maintenance, she commits no wrong against the marital relation by refusing a reconciliation. Perrin v. Perrin, 201 Tenn. 354, 299 S.W.2d 19, 1957 Tenn. LEXIS 433 (1957).

Where husband who procured divorce on grounds of desertion misrepresented date of adjudication of insanity of wife, which in fact occurred before the statutory period specified as ground for desertion had expired, divorce was void ab initio. Knight v. Knight, 62 Tenn. App. 70, 458 S.W.2d 803, 1970 Tenn. App. LEXIS 254 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1970).

23. —Allegations and Proof.

The cause must be well averred in the petition in words fully equal to the words of the statute, and definite in their meaning. If this is not done, the proof becomes irrelevant and useless, and no decree for divorce can be made. Thus, the allegation that the defendant abandoned complainant's home “without any just or probable cause,” without alleging that the desertion or absence was willful or malicious, without reasonable cause, for two whole years (now one year), will not sustain a decree for divorce under subdivision (4). Stewart v. Stewart, 32 Tenn. 591, 1853 Tenn. LEXIS 87 (1853); Rutledge v. Rutledge, 37 Tenn. 554, 1858 Tenn. LEXIS 61 (1858); De Armond v. De Armond, 92 Tenn. 40, 20 S.W. 422, 1892 Tenn. LEXIS 49 (1892); McBride v. McBride, 111 Tenn. 616, 69 S.W. 781, 1902 Tenn. LEXIS 23 (1902).

It is not necessary that a complainant, seeking a divorce on the grounds of willful or malicious desertion for two whole years (now one year), prove malice. It is sufficient that the complainant prove that the alleged desertion was willful, and continued for a period of two whole years (now one year). Bailey v. Bailey, 6 Tenn. App. 272, — S.W. —, 1927 Tenn. App. LEXIS 139 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1927).

Where a petition for divorce is based on willful or malicious desertion under subdivision (4) it must be charged and proved that such desertion was intended and willful. Page v. Turcott, 179 Tenn. 491, 167 S.W.2d 350, 1942 Tenn. LEXIS 46 (1943).

24. —Time of Absence.

The two years' (now one year) absence must have expired before the commencement of the suit. If the suit for the divorce is commenced for other causes before the expiration of the two years' (now one year) absence, a supplemental bill for a divorce on the ground of such absence, though filed after the expiration of the two years (now one year), cannot be maintained. The defendant cannot be expected to return during the litigation. Thomas v. Thomas, 42 Tenn. 123, 1865 Tenn. LEXIS 28 (1865).

The period is not suspended by pendency of a divorce suit for which petitioner is not responsible. Douglas v. Douglas, 156 Tenn. 655, 4 S.W.2d 358, 1927 Tenn. LEXIS 163 (1928).

A suit, brought within two years (now one year) after dismissal of a former suit by same party, but dismissed on ground that statutory period has not elapsed since date of desertion alleged, is not premature though brought within two years (now one year) of such dismissal. Douglas v. Douglas, 156 Tenn. 655, 4 S.W.2d 358, 1927 Tenn. LEXIS 163 (1928).

A divorce for willful or malicious desertion cannot be granted if defendant becomes insane prior to lapse of two-year (now one-year) period. Quinn v. Quinn, 169 Tenn. 173, 83 S.W.2d 269, 1935 Tenn. LEXIS 26 (1935).

Where in order to get the full two-year (now one-year) period required by subdivision (a)(4) it was necessary to count the time and there was pending a former divorce suit between the same parties, which suit had resulted in a nonsuit, the divorce was denied since it is unreasonable to expect the parties to live together while they are in litigation against each other, and if such suit had not been pending they might have affected a reconciliation within the two-year (now one-year) period. Hodges v. Hodges, 27 Tenn. App. 547, 182 S.W.2d 749, 1944 Tenn. App. LEXIS 94 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1944).

Where the wife's first suit for divorce was dismissed with prejudice, that dismissal, unappealed from, being a judicial finding that the wife had no cause for divorce and therefore no just cause for ordering the husband from the home prior to that suit; the wife subsequently filed a second suit, in which the husband answered specifically raising the defense of res judicata and filed a counterclaim for divorce; and the trial judge dismissed the wife's suit and granted the husband a divorce on grounds of desertion, the time of the earlier pending divorce suit could be included in the computation of the statutory period of desertion. Daves v. Daves, 576 S.W.2d 4, 1978 Tenn. App. LEXIS 323 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1978).

25. —Collateral Attack on Decree.

Where the petition charges desertion but fails to charge that it was without reasonable cause, the decree thereon is not void or subject to collateral attack, such missing allegation not being jurisdictional. Rush v. Moore, 48 S.W. 90, 1897 Tenn. Ch. App. LEXIS 141 (1897).

26. Conviction of Felony.

A sentence to serve time in the penitentiary imposed for a felony conviction constituted grounds for absolute divorce. Pendergrass v. Neil, 338 F. Supp. 1198, 1971 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13925 (M.D. Tenn. 1971), modified, 456 F.2d 469, 1972 U.S. App. LEXIS 11030 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1972).

Issue is whether a spouse engaged in inappropriate marital conduct during the marriage, not whether a spouse was convicted of a crime for engaging in that conduct. Watt v. Watt, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 295 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 27, 2016).

27. —Conviction in Another State.

Under subdivision (a)(6) prior to its modification by the Code of 1932, the other spouse's conviction of a felony and sentence to confinement in the penitentiary in another state was no cause for divorce here. Klutts v. Klutts, 37 Tenn. 423, 1858 Tenn. LEXIS 28 (1858).

Legislature in enacting Code of 1932 changed clause “by the laws of this state” in subdivision (a)(6) to read “by the laws of the state” hence it intended by such change to declare that conviction of a felony in any state was ground for divorce in Tennessee. Kimbro v. Kimbro, 191 Tenn. 316, 232 S.W.2d 354, 1950 Tenn. LEXIS 575, 19 A.L.R.2d 1045 (1950).

28. Refusal of Wife to Remove to State.

Where suit for divorce was brought under subdivision (a)(8) it was not necessary for husband to allege that he did not move from the state where wife resided for the purpose of obtaining a divorce since the requirements to that effect in § 36-4-117 relate to the proof and not to the pleadings and the bill was sufficient where it alleged the grounds set out in subdivision (a)(8). Baeyertz v. Baeyertz, 171 Tenn. 190, 101 S.W.2d 689, 1936 Tenn. LEXIS 79 (1937).

Testimony that husband had made one isolated telephone call several years prior to time of trial and asked his wife to come to Memphis was not sufficient to establish a refusal to remove to this state without reasonable cause especially where there was evidence of failure of husband to support his wife and child and of failure to visit them under circumstances where it would have been possible to have done so. Greene v. Greene, 48 Tenn. App. 636, 349 S.W.2d 186, 1960 Tenn. App. LEXIS 134 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1960).

29. Pregnancy at Time of Marriage.

A husband cannot invoke subdivision (a)(9) relating to pregnancy of the wife at the time of the marriage by another man, where he himself had sexual relations with her prior to the marriage before which connection she was chaste. He stands on no higher plane than she. Taylor v. Taylor, 15 Tenn. App. 563, — S.W.2d —, 1932 Tenn. App. LEXIS 125 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1932).

Where the evidence disclosed that the child was born 321 days after the husband had sexual intercourse with the wife, and the wife testified that she had no intercourse with another man, the court, considering expert professional testimony, refused to find that the child was not the husband's. Taylor v. Taylor, 15 Tenn. App. 563, — S.W.2d —, 1932 Tenn. App. LEXIS 125 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1932).

30. Habitual Drunkenness or Drug Abuse.

The charge of habitual drunkenness is not made out by the proof, where all that the evidence shows is that the defendant spouse has been frequently intoxicated. Testimony that the defendant is an “habitual drunkard,” is insufficient, for this is a conclusion of law. The facts shown must justify such opinion. Horne v. Horne, 1 Cooper's Tenn. Ch. 259 (1853).

If the state of drunkenness existed, to the knowledge of the complainant, before the marriage, she would not be entitled to a divorce on that ground. Hickerson v. Hickerson, 52 S.W. 1019, 1899 Tenn. Ch. App. LEXIS 50 (1899).

The term “habitual” implies growth through various and increasing stages, until drunkenness becomes a fixed habit. Until this degree is reached, it is not a ground for divorce. McClanahan v. McClanahan, 104 Tenn. 217, 56 S.W. 858, 1899 Tenn. LEXIS 30 (1900).

Assignment of error based on finding of lower court that wife was not guilty of habitual drunkenness contracted after marriage was overruled although there was much evidence in the record to that effect where the husband testified that wife “did not get stupid, or drunk, but she continuously sipped on alcoholic beverages and she kept — if she didn't finish a highball she would keep it in the icebox or refrigerator and every so often she would go back and get it,” and where court of appeals had already sustained two of husband's assignments of error either of which would entitle him to a decree of divorce. Schwalb v. Schwalb, 39 Tenn. App. 306, 282 S.W.2d 661, 1955 Tenn. App. LEXIS 71 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1955), superseded by statute as stated in, Moore v. Moore, — S.W.2d —, 1991 Tenn. App. LEXIS 869 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 1, 1991).

31. Attempt on Life of Spouse.

Malice is implied where the act is committed deliberately and is likely to be attended with dangerous circumstances. Schwalb v. Schwalb, 39 Tenn. App. 306, 282 S.W.2d 661, 1955 Tenn. App. LEXIS 71 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1955), superseded by statute as stated in, Moore v. Moore, — S.W.2d —, 1991 Tenn. App. LEXIS 869 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 1, 1991).

Act of wife in deliberately attempting to drive her automobile into husband's automobile at a high rate of speed in such a manner that husband had to turn his automobile out of the street and into a yard constituted an attempt on husband's life by a means showing malice. Schwalb v. Schwalb, 39 Tenn. App. 306, 282 S.W.2d 661, 1955 Tenn. App. LEXIS 71 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1955), superseded by statute as stated in, Moore v. Moore, — S.W.2d —, 1991 Tenn. App. LEXIS 869 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 1, 1991).

32. Religious Belief.

Divorce cannot be based on divergence of religious beliefs but conduct growing out of religious beliefs may constitute grounds for divorce. Mollish v. Mollish, 494 S.W.2d 145, 1972 Tenn. App. LEXIS 274 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1972).

33. Foreign Decrees.

While Tennessee is not required to grant comity to a foreign decree, a divorce granted in the Dominican Republic that fully satisfied the laws of that foreign state could be accepted by a Tennessee court. Hyde v. Hyde, 562 S.W.2d 194, 1978 Tenn. LEXIS 699 (Tenn. 1978).

34. Separation.

Trial judge was acting within his statutory discretion when he elected to decree a separation even though the ground stated and proved is found only in this section, “the absolute divorce statute.” Hutton v. Hutton, 584 S.W.2d 670, 1979 Tenn. App. LEXIS 316 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1979), superseded by statute as stated in, Sanders v. Sanders, — S.W.2d —, 1987 Tenn. App. LEXIS 3147 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 30, 1987).

35. Cruel and Inhuman Treatment.

Evidence of cruel and inhuman treatment was sufficient to grant divorce to husband and dismiss wife's suit for divorce. Strickland v. Strickland, 618 S.W.2d 496, 1981 Tenn. App. LEXIS 503 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981).

A court can grant a divorce on the ground of cruel and inhuman treatment notwithstanding the fact that both parties committed adultery. Stanfill v. Stanfill, 742 S.W.2d 267, 1987 Tenn. App. LEXIS 2937 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987).

The court should have found that both parties engaged in an inappropriate course of conduct over many months that rendered continued cohabitation as husband and wife unacceptable pursuant to T.C.A. § 36-4-129(b) rather than “cruel and inhuman treatment” pursuant to T.C.A. § 36-4-101(a)(11), where the parties' relationship had disintegrated and their love and affection had been extinguished. Earls v. Earls, 42 S.W.3d 877, 2000 Tenn. App. LEXIS 356 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000), rehearing denied, 42 S.W.3d 877, 2000 Tenn. App. LEXIS 398 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000).

Trial court properly granted one spouse a divorce on the grounds of inappropriate marital conduct under T.C.A. § 36-4-101(a)(11) where the other spouse's actions in pursuing their child with a firearm ultimately caused the child's death; although the other spouse's actions were directed primarily at the child, the actions constituted cruel and inhuman treatment toward the spouse. Bolin v. Bolin, 99 S.W.3d 102, 2002 Tenn. App. LEXIS 590 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002), review or rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2002 Tenn. LEXIS 587 (Tenn. Dec. 2, 2002).

In a divorce action, where the mother testified to the father's cursing, rages, and throwing of personal property in front of the mother and her daughter by a previous marriage, the father did not testify at trial, and the trial court in its opinion noted that it was in the best position to evaluate the credibility of the parties, a judgment granting a divorce to the mother due to the father's inappropriate marital behavior under T.C.A. § 36-4-101(a)(11) was affirmed on appeal. Buss-Flinn v. Flinn, 121 S.W.3d 383, 2003 Tenn. App. LEXIS 351 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 1032 (Tenn. 2003).

Decision to grant divorce to the wife based on the husband's inappropriate marital conduct under T.C.A. § 36-4-101(a)(11) was supported by ample evidence in the record, which showed that the husband and his mother, with whom the couple lived, combined first to indoctrinate the wife in their religious beliefs and then to methodically humiliate, ostracize, and subjugate her. The mother was encouraged not to see her family, was punished for failing to comply with the rules set by the husband and his mother, and was eventually isolated in another house on the property and was not permitted to see her daughter. Chaffin v. Ellis, 211 S.W.3d 264, 2006 Tenn. App. LEXIS 200 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 867 (Tenn. 2006).

36. Inappropriate Marital Conduct.

Although the husband claimed that the trial court could not have granted the wife a divorce based on a felony conviction that occurred after she filed her complaint, it was clear that the trial court granted the wife a divorce based on the husband's inappropriate marital conduct. Watt v. Watt, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 295 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 27, 2016).

Trial court did not find the husband's unsupported testimony sufficient to establish that he was less at fault than the wife; the husband's testimony that he did not file for divorce because he took an oath on the Bible stood in stark contrast to his convictions for rape and sexual assault and was so outrageous and incredible as to have rendered all of his testimony untrustworthy, and the record supported the trial court decision to grant the divorce to the wife. Watt v. Watt, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 295 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 27, 2016).

Probate and family court erred in denying a husband's motion to set aside a judgment that granted the wife a default judgment on the ground of inappropriate marital conduct because the court was statutorily required to hear proof of the facts alleged before granting a divorce, on any ground other than irreconcilable differences, in the absence of a valid stipulation between the parties and the court failed to do so inasmuch as there was no transcript of the hearing or evidence in the record to evaluate, and the wife did not deny or contradict the husband's assertions that the trial court heard no proof at the hearing. Slagle v. Slagle, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 252 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 24, 2019).

Trial court correctly awarded the wife a divorce, finding that the wife was the prevailing party, because the wife produced evidence through the wife's testimony and medical records that more likely than not the wife was a battered spouse and received medical treatment for injuries and there was no clear and convincing evidence to contradict that the husband hit the wife. The court chose to rely on the text messages between the parties to establish the abuse and inappropriate marital conduct. Hunt-Carden v. Carden, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 91 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 3, 2020).

36-4-102. Legal separation.

  1. A party who alleges grounds for divorce from the bonds of matrimony may, as an alternative to filing a complaint for divorce, file a complaint for legal separation. Such complaint shall set forth the grounds for legal separation in substantially the language of § 36-4-101 and pray only for legal separation or for such other and further relief to which complainant may think to be entitled. The other party may deny the existence of grounds for divorce but, unless the other party specifically objects to the granting of an order of legal separation, the court shall declare the parties to be legally separated.
  2. If the other party specifically objects to legal separation, the court may, after a hearing, grant an order of legal separation, notwithstanding such objections if grounds are established pursuant to § 36-4-101. The court also has the power to grant an absolute divorce to either party where there has been an order of legal separation for more than two (2) years upon a petition being filed by either party that sets forth the original order for legal separation and that the parties have not become reconciled. The court granting the divorce shall make a final and complete adjudication of the support and property rights of the parties. However, nothing in this subsection (b) shall preclude the court from granting an absolute divorce before the two-year period has expired.
  3. Legal separation shall not affect the bonds of matrimony but shall permit the parties to cease matrimonial cohabitation. The court may provide for matters such as child custody, visitation, support and property issues during legal separation upon motion by either party or by agreement of the parties.
  4. Notwithstanding this section, a party who can establish grounds for divorce from the bonds of matrimony pursuant to § 36-4-101 shall be entitled to an absolute divorce pursuant to this chapter.

Code 1858, § 2449 (deriv. Acts 1835-1836, ch. 26, § 19; 1841-1842, ch. 133, § 1); Shan., § 4202; Acts 1919, ch. 70, § 1; mod. Code 1932, § 8427; Acts 1963, ch. 283, § 1; 1967, ch. 284, § 1; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 36-802; Acts 1989, ch. 489, § 1; 1998, ch. 1059, § 2.

Cross-References. Defenses and decree of court in action brought under this section, § 36-4-120.

Stipulated grounds for divorce, § 36-4-129.

Textbooks. Gibson's Suits in Chancery (7th ed., Inman), §§ 514, 520.

Law Reviews.

Divorce — Wife's Cruel and Inhuman Treatment, 18 Tenn. L. Rev. 719 (1944).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Construction.

This section as amended is construed in pari materia with other sections relating to divorce. Abney v. Abney, 222 Tenn. 160, 433 S.W.2d 847, 1968 Tenn. LEXIS 419 (1968).

The 1963 amendment granting trial court authority to grant absolute divorce where there has been a final decree of divorce from bed and board or separate maintenance for two years is to be construed as if it has always been a part of the section and the amended section is to be construed as a whole. Abney v. Abney, 222 Tenn. 160, 433 S.W.2d 847, 1968 Tenn. LEXIS 419 (1968).

2. Policy of Law.

The policy of the law is to discourage the granting of either kind of divorce incautiously, but in all doubtful cases, the courts should grant a divorce from bed and board rather than an absolute divorce. Rutledge v. Rutledge, 37 Tenn. 554, 1858 Tenn. LEXIS 61 (1858). See McAllister v. McAllister, 57 Tenn. 345, 1872 Tenn. LEXIS 431 (1872).

Unless the case is one of great aggravation, the relief should not, under this section, go beyond a separation from bed and board, either indefinitely or for a limited term. Rutledge v. Rutledge, 37 Tenn. 554, 1858 Tenn. LEXIS 61 (1858).

The public policy of this state favors divorces for the ground stated in this section, and there is no rule of public policy that would prevent the wife, in her divorce suit, from testifying as to the facts constituting the grounds of divorce under this section. E. W. M. v. J. C. M., 2 Tenn. Ch. App. 463 (1897).

3. Discretion of Court.

Court could properly grant absolute divorce to wife, even though she only sought divorce from bed and board, where the circumstances of the case required it. Lingner v. Lingner, 165 Tenn. 525, 56 S.W.2d 749, 1932 Tenn. LEXIS 80 (1933) (disapproving Merritt v. Merritt, 10 Tenn. App. 369, 1929 Tenn. App. LEXIS 44 (1929), overruled, Lingner v. Lingner, 165 Tenn. 525, 56 S.W.2d 749, 1932 Tenn. LEXIS 80 (1933); Plantt v. Plantt, 28 Tenn. App. 79, 186 S.W.2d 338, 1944 Tenn. App. LEXIS 65 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1944).

It was not an abuse of discretion under this section for the court to decree an absolute divorce to a woman who was pregnant as to so hold would be to read an exception into the divorce law that is no part of the statute. Schneider v. Schneider, 37 Tenn. App. 1, 260 S.W.2d 290, 1952 Tenn. App. LEXIS 142 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1952).

The appellate court will not interfere with the trial court's exercise of its discretion as to the granting of divorce a mensa et thoro or from the bonds of matrimony unless such discretion is abused. Bennett v. Bennett, 40 Tenn. App. 416, 292 S.W.2d 202, 1954 Tenn. App. LEXIS 167 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1954).

4. Divorce from Bed and Board.

A divorce from bed and board leaves the marriage relation intact. The only effect of such divorce is the cessation of the matrimonial cohabitation for a definite or indefinite time. It deprives the wife of none of the rights belonging to that relation, in the event of a reconciliation, or in the event of her surviving her husband. Chenault v. Chenault, 37 Tenn. 248, 1857 Tenn. LEXIS 116 (1856); Howell v. Thompson, 95 Tenn. 396, 32 S.W. 309, 1895 Tenn. LEXIS 107 (1895). See Boggers v. Boggers, 65 Tenn. 299, 1873 Tenn. LEXIS 349 (1873); Jarnigan v. Jarnigan, 80 Tenn. 292, 1883 Tenn. LEXIS 170 (1883).

Where husband filed suit for absolute divorce and wife filed cross bill asking for divorce from bed and board and where husband's bill was dismissed and wife's bill for divorce from bed and board was granted, the husband who did not appeal was not entitled to have wife's divorce made absolute one year later. Riggs v. Riggs, 181 Tenn. 633, 184 S.W.2d 9, 1944 Tenn. LEXIS 285 (1944).

5. —Absolute Divorce After Divorce from Bed and Board.

It is not mandatory that court grant absolute divorce where decree of separation had existed more than two years without reconciliation and such question still addressed itself to the judgment and sound discretion of the trial court in light of the record before him. Horlacher v. Horlacher, 58 Tenn. App. 242, 429 S.W.2d 438, 1967 Tenn. App. LEXIS 219 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1968).

The provisions of the statute relative to authority of court to grant absolute divorce where decree of separation has existed more than two years without reconciliation was not sufficient alone to predicate a decree of absolute divorce in absence of pleading and proof of other grounds than the existence of the earlier decree for more than two years. Horlacher v. Horlacher, 58 Tenn. App. 242, 429 S.W.2d 438, 1967 Tenn. App. LEXIS 219 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1968). But see Abney v. Abney, 222 Tenn. 160, 433 S.W.2d 847, 1968 Tenn. LEXIS 419 (1968).

The 1963 amendment granting trial court authority to grant absolute divorce where there has been a final decree of divorce from bed and board or separate maintenance for two years in effect creates another ground or cause for divorce and authorizes the trial court having divorce jurisdiction to grant an absolute divorce on that basis. Abney v. Abney, 222 Tenn. 160, 433 S.W.2d 847, 1968 Tenn. LEXIS 419 (1968).

Absolute divorce granted on basis of existence of final decree of divorce from bed and board or separate maintenance for more than two years must be granted to the same person as obtained the limited decree but either party may petition for absolute divorce on such ground. Abney v. Abney, 222 Tenn. 160, 433 S.W.2d 847, 1968 Tenn. LEXIS 419 (1968).

Upon granting an absolute divorce two years after divorce from bed and board the trial court is empowered to adjust the support and property rights of the parties. Abney v. Abney, 222 Tenn. 160, 433 S.W.2d 847, 1968 Tenn. LEXIS 419 (1968).

Trial court could grant absolute divorce upon petition of husband based on ground that final decree of divorce from bed and board had been in effect for more than two years even though wife who had obtained limited divorce opposed absolute divorce since the desires of the party without fault are considered but are not controlling. Abney v. Abney, 222 Tenn. 160, 433 S.W.2d 847, 1968 Tenn. LEXIS 419 (1968).

The intent of this provision is that the trial court consider the entire case ab initio including pleadings and evidence at former hearings in deciding whether to grant the supplemental petition for divorce. Abney v. Abney, 61 Tenn. App. 531, 456 S.W.2d 364, 1970 Tenn. App. LEXIS 300 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1970).

Trial court could properly refuse to hear petition of husband for absolute divorce based on more than two years legal separation where husband's previously adjudged and unpurged contempt of court in failing to pay support was unexplained. Abney v. Abney, 61 Tenn. App. 531, 456 S.W.2d 364, 1970 Tenn. App. LEXIS 300 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1970).

6. —Temporary Retention of Cause.

Retention of cause as to alimony pending separation, or until husband becomes willing, in good faith, to live with his wife again and perform the duties of husband, when the payments of alimony shall cease. Rutledge v. Rutledge, 37 Tenn. 554, 1858 Tenn. LEXIS 61 (1858); Cureton v. Cureton, 117 Tenn. 103, 96 S.W. 608, 1906 Tenn. LEXIS 35 (1906).

Where there is any probability of a reconciliation, a divorce from bed and board may be granted, and the cause retained in court to grant an absolute divorce, if a reconciliation should not be made in a reasonable time. This is authorized by a fair construction of § 36-4-120. McAllister v. McAllister, 57 Tenn. 345, 1872 Tenn. LEXIS 431 (1872).

7. Separate Maintenance.

Chancery has power, independent of statute, to grant separate maintenance to the wife without application for divorce, though the bill shows ground for divorce, where the wife has not been resident in this state long enough to apply for divorce. Cureton v. Cureton, 117 Tenn. 103, 96 S.W. 608, 1906 Tenn. LEXIS 35 (1906).

A court of equity may decree a separate maintenance to the wife though the husband's dereliction or neglect causing the wife to live apart from him was not such as to justify a decree for divorce. Chapman v. Chapman, 3 Tenn. Civ. App. (3 Higgins) 3 (1912).

8. Separation Agreement.

A separation agreement, and the fact that complainant and defendant were living apart, is not a bar to a divorce on ground of cruelty. Russell v. Russell, 3 Tenn. App. 232, — S.W. —, 1926 Tenn. App. LEXIS 97 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1926).

Divorce on grounds of abandonment and desertion was not justified where parties were living apart by agreement. Russell v. Russell, 3 Tenn. App. 232, — S.W. —, 1926 Tenn. App. LEXIS 97 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1926).

Where wife was living apart from husband pursuant to valid court decree for separate maintenance her alleged desertion of husband was a legal impossibility. Perrin v. Perrin, 201 Tenn. 354, 299 S.W.2d 19, 1957 Tenn. LEXIS 433 (1957).

9. —Refusal of Reconciliation.

Where wife is living separate and apart from her husband under a decree of separate maintenance, she commits no wrong against the marital relation by refusing a reconciliation. Perrin v. Perrin, 201 Tenn. 354, 299 S.W.2d 19, 1957 Tenn. LEXIS 433 (1957).

10. Indignities and Cruel and Inhuman Treatment.

Cruel and inhuman treatment may be shown by an actual physical lack of safety, danger, and indignity to the wife or husband and it may be accomplished in subtle and insidious ways through continuous mistreatment and indignity of a much more refined character. Harwell v. Harwell, 612 S.W.2d 182, 1980 Tenn. App. LEXIS 371 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980).

A court can grant a divorce on the ground of cruel and inhuman treatment notwithstanding the fact that both parties committed adultery. Stanfill v. Stanfill, 742 S.W.2d 267, 1987 Tenn. App. LEXIS 2937 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987).

11. —Construction of Statute.

Former subdivision (1) was not to be given a fundamentally different construction or application when invoked by the one or the other spouse. Parks v. Parks, 158 Tenn. 91, 11 S.W.2d 680, 1928 Tenn. LEXIS 127 (1928).

The language “to the wife's person” in former subdivision (2) meant the infliction of corporal pain, or at least, an attempt to do so. Garvey v. Garvey, 29 Tenn. App. 291, 203 S.W.2d 912, 1946 Tenn. App. LEXIS 107 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1946).

12. —Cruelty Defined.

Cruelty is the willful, persistent causing of unnecessary suffering, whether in realization or apprehension, whether of body or mind, in such a way as to render cohabitation dangerous or unendurable. Russell v. Russell, 3 Tenn. App. 232, — S.W. —, 1926 Tenn. App. LEXIS 97 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1926).

Cruelty as a cause for divorce is the willful, persistent causing of unnecessary suffering, whether in realization or apprehension, whether of body or mind, in such a way as to render cohabitation dangerous and unendurable. Schwalb v. Schwalb, 39 Tenn. App. 306, 282 S.W.2d 661, 1955 Tenn. App. LEXIS 71 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1955), superseded by statute as stated in, Moore v. Moore, — S.W.2d —, 1991 Tenn. App. LEXIS 869 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 1, 1991); Stone v. Stone, 56 Tenn. App. 607, 409 S.W.2d 388, 1966 Tenn. App. LEXIS 240 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1966).

13. —Cruel and Inhuman Treatment.

False and malicious charges of adultery against a wife by her husband may amount to such cruel and inhuman treatment as to render her cohabitation with him unsafe and improper. Watson v. Watson, 25 Tenn. App. 28, 149 S.W.2d 953, 1940 Tenn. App. LEXIS 88 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1940).

Cruel and inhuman treatment is not confined to acts of physical violence. Meeks v. Meeks, 27 Tenn. App. 279, 179 S.W.2d 189, 1943 Tenn. App. LEXIS 141 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1943).

Husband's association with woman by whom it appeared that he had a child, which association became objectionable to wife, constituted cruel and inhuman treatment. Plantt v. Plantt, 28 Tenn. App. 79, 186 S.W.2d 338, 1944 Tenn. App. LEXIS 65 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1944).

Action of wife in holding gun on husband and threatening to kill him under such circumstances that he was justified in believing that she intended to kill him constituted cruel and inhuman treatment or conduct even though the gun contained blanks. Schwalb v. Schwalb, 39 Tenn. App. 306, 282 S.W.2d 661, 1955 Tenn. App. LEXIS 71 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1955), superseded by statute as stated in, Moore v. Moore, — S.W.2d —, 1991 Tenn. App. LEXIS 869 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 1, 1991).

Cruel and inhuman treatment, within the meaning of the Tennessee divorce laws, is not confined to acts of physical violence. Schwalb v. Schwalb, 39 Tenn. App. 306, 282 S.W.2d 661, 1955 Tenn. App. LEXIS 71 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1955), superseded by statute as stated in, Moore v. Moore, — S.W.2d —, 1991 Tenn. App. LEXIS 869 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 1, 1991); Murrell v. Murrell, 45 Tenn. App. 309, 323 S.W.2d 15, 1958 Tenn. App. LEXIS 129 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1958).

A systematic and continued use by one spouse of profane and unkind language toward the other, causing mental suffering and threatening permanent injury to his or her health, entitles the offended spouse to a divorce on ground of cruel and inhuman treatment, where the offended spouse is a person of refinement and emotional sensibilities, especially when coupled with misconduct. Schwalb v. Schwalb, 39 Tenn. App. 306, 282 S.W.2d 661, 1955 Tenn. App. LEXIS 71 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1955), superseded by statute as stated in, Moore v. Moore, — S.W.2d —, 1991 Tenn. App. LEXIS 869 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 1, 1991).

Cruelties warranting a divorce may result from a continuing course of abusive and humiliating treatment of one spouse by another as in the case of conduct calculated to torture the complaining spouse's mental or emotional health and affecting his or her bodily health. Elrod v. Elrod, 41 Tenn. App. 540, 296 S.W.2d 849, 1956 Tenn. App. LEXIS 98 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1956), rehearing denied, 201 Tenn. 54, 296 S.W.2d 856, 1956 Tenn. LEXIS 464 (1956).

Where some or even most of the actions complained of as cruel and inhuman treatment occurred outside the state of Tennessee but some of such actions were alleged to have occurred in Tennessee, trial court, on proper proof, was authorized to grant a decree of divorce from bed and board and, within its discretion, from the bonds of matrimony. Murrell v. Murrell, 45 Tenn. App. 309, 323 S.W.2d 15, 1958 Tenn. App. LEXIS 129 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1958).

False charges of adultery constitute cruel and inhuman treatment as a ground for divorce. Reitano v. Reitano, 52 Tenn. App. 289, 373 S.W.2d 213, 1963 Tenn. App. LEXIS 98 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1963).

Cruel and inhuman treatment is often not evidenced by public assaults and beatings but is accomplished by more subtle ways and is best determined by the trial judge whose decision should not be overturned unless there is a clear preponderance of evidence to the contrary. Newberry v. Newberry, 493 S.W.2d 99, 1973 Tenn. App. LEXIS 310 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1972).

Proof of adultery is admissible in a divorce action charging cruel and inhuman treatment and may form the basis for a decree resting upon cruel and inhuman treatment. Farrar v. Farrar, 553 S.W.2d 741, 1977 Tenn. LEXIS 589 (Tenn. 1977).

14. —Indignities.

Where the wife is an educated, refined Christian woman, and never gave her husband cause to mistreat her, but the husband, though a sober and industrious man, had frequently called her a liar in her presence and in the presence of others; accused her of adultery, and, at the time one of her children was born, he, in the presence of others, accused her of being unfaithful to him, and charged that the child was another man's, naming him; and had on one occasion used personal violence; and habitually indulged in such conduct and indignities toward her as rendered her condition intolerable, and drove her from him, an absolute divorce will be granted to her. Lyle v. Lyle, 86 Tenn. 372, 6 S.W. 878, 1887 Tenn. LEXIS 55 (1888); McClanahan v. McClanahan, 104 Tenn. 217, 56 S.W. 858, 1899 Tenn. LEXIS 30 (1900).

False and malicious charges of adultery against the wife by her husband may constitute such indignities on her person as to render her condition intolerable and justify her withdrawal. Watson v. Watson, 25 Tenn. App. 28, 149 S.W.2d 953, 1940 Tenn. App. LEXIS 88 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1940).

15. —Particular Matters Warranting Divorce.

Wife was entitled to divorce from bonds of matrimony where at the family altar husband prayed that the Lord would get rid of his wife for him, used violent language, and slapped and choked her. Payne v. Payne, 23 Tenn. 500, 1844 Tenn. LEXIS 150 (1844).

Undisputed facts in a divorce action by a husband that his wife nagged him, that she told him she had no affection for him and did not love him, that she left home for long intervals, that she had questionable relations with other men, and that finally she moved from the home, were sufficient to grant the husband a divorce for cruel and inhuman treatment. Meeks v. Meeks, 27 Tenn. App. 279, 179 S.W.2d 189, 1943 Tenn. App. LEXIS 141 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1943).

16. — —Accusations of Adultery.

Deliberate and repeated accusations of adultery against the wife by her husband, without grounds, constitute a sufficient cause for an absolute divorce. Sharp v. Sharp, 34 Tenn. 496, 1855 Tenn. LEXIS 87 (1855); Lyle v. Lyle, 86 Tenn. 372, 6 S.W. 878, 1887 Tenn. LEXIS 55 (1888); McClanahan v. McClanahan, 104 Tenn. 217, 56 S.W. 858, 1899 Tenn. LEXIS 30 (1900); Parks v. Parks, 158 Tenn. 91, 11 S.W.2d 680, 1928 Tenn. LEXIS 127 (1928).

17. — —Series of Acts.

Divorce for aggregated acts of cruelty for three years, when considered as a series of breaches of marital peace and comfort, although the several acts taken singly do not constitute the basis of a decree of absolute divorce. Anderson v. Anderson, 3 Tenn. Civ. App. (3 Higgins) 423 (1912).

18. — —Abnormal Relations.

Compelling the wife to submit to abnormal sexual intercourse is a ground for divorce. Gardner v. Gardner, 104 Tenn. 410, 58 S.W. 342, 1900 Tenn. LEXIS 10, 78 Am. St. Rep. 924 (1900), overruled, Jackson v. Jackson, 186 Tenn. 337, 210 S.W.2d 332, 1948 Tenn. LEXIS 554 (1948).

When the husband refused to consummate the marriage by normal sexual intercourse with his wife when she was willing, but indulged in abnormal sexual practices in her presence, he was guilty of the offenses denounced in former subdivisions (1) and (2) entitling the wife to an absolute divorce. 4 Tenn. Civ. App. (4 Higgins) 503 (1913).

19. —Particular Matters Not Warranting Divorce.

Ill temper, occasional reproaches, rude language, threats of violence when none is done, or want of congeniality in taste, temper, and habits, or mutual dislike, resulting from that or any other cause, constitute no ground for divorce. Shell v. Shell, 34 Tenn. 716, 1855 Tenn. LEXIS 124 (1855).

Violence by a husband to his wife is not warranted by her nervous excitement, petulance, and irritability, but slight blows inflicted under great provocation do not constitute grounds for divorce, though violence to any extent is not justified by the courts. McAllister v. McAllister, 57 Tenn. 345, 1872 Tenn. LEXIS 431 (1872).

It is not sufficient for grant where it is shown that both spouses were guilty of coarseness and inexcusable roughness in treatment or temper. Saillard v. Saillard, 2 Tenn. Ch. App. 396 (1896).

Where proof only showed outburst of ill temper and passion, in which “names were called” by husband, the proof was not sufficient to show cruel and inhuman treatment. Hagood v. Hagood, 48 S.W. 122, 1897 Tenn. Ch. App. LEXIS 148 (1897).

Evidence in a divorce action indicating jealousy, suspicion, rudeness and ill temper on the part of the husband was not sufficient to have actually caused the wife such suffering in mind and body as to render her cohabitation with him unsafe and improper since mere acerbity of temper, occasional reproaches, rude language by a husband toward the wife and even threats of violence where none is attempted, do not constitute ground for divorce under Tennessee statutes. Watson v. Watson, 25 Tenn. App. 28, 149 S.W.2d 953, 1940 Tenn. App. LEXIS 88 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1940).

Admission by defendant in Tennessee of adultery that occurred in another state and uncorroborated was insufficient to show a ground for divorce. Baber v. Baber, 205 Tenn. 681, 330 S.W.2d 307, 1959 Tenn. LEXIS 407 (1959).

Action of wife in swearing out warrant against husband for bigamy did not constitute cruel and inhuman treatment where it was not denied that husband did enter into a bigamous ceremony with another woman. Greene v. Greene, 48 Tenn. App. 636, 349 S.W.2d 186, 1960 Tenn. App. LEXIS 134 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1960).

20. —Allegations and Proof.

An allegation that the husband's “treatment has been cruel and inhuman in the extreme,” without averring that it is such as “renders it unsafe and improper for her to cohabit with him, and (under a former provision) be under his dominion and control,” is not sufficient, especially where the acts relied on to sustain the charge are detailed without “any circumstances of time and place,” and scattered over a married life of 17 years. Horne v. Horne, 1 Cooper's Tenn. Ch. 259 (1853).

Charging the defendant husband with “intolerable treatment” of the complainant wife, without specification of time, place, or circumstances, is insufficient. Lishey v. Lishey, 2 Cooper's Tenn. Ch. 1 (1873), aff'd, 74 Tenn. 418, 1880 Tenn. LEXIS 269 (1880).

The allegations of cruelty must show an element of physical unsafety, danger, or indignity along with other elements. Saillard v. Saillard, 2 Tenn. Ch. App. 396 (1896); Loy v. Loy, 25 Tenn. App. 99, 151 S.W.2d 178, 1941 Tenn. App. LEXIS 78 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1941).

It is insufficient to charge “cruel and inhuman treatment or conduct” in language of statute without setting forth the specific acts or conduct of defendant complained of, with circumstances of time and place. Beard v. Beard, 3 Tenn. App. 392, — S.W. —, 1926 Tenn. App. LEXIS 114 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1926); Stargel v. Stargel, 21 Tenn. App. 193, 107 S.W.2d 520, 1937 Tenn. App. LEXIS 20 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1937); Loy v. Loy, 25 Tenn. App. 99, 151 S.W.2d 178, 1941 Tenn. App. LEXIS 78 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1941).

Where suit for divorce charges adultery and fails to prove it, only an extraordinary case will warrant a decree for divorce on the same testimony for cruel and inhuman treatment. Miller v. Miller, 6 Tenn. App. 668, — S.W. —, 1927 Tenn. App. LEXIS 179 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1927).

Cause of divorce within contemplation of this section was stated in petition alleging that defendant would curse complainant, that she would call him at work and abuse him on phone, that landlord asked complainant to give up room because defendant disturbed occupants of house with nagging and fussing and would not keep apartment clean, and that defendant constantly rides around in automobile with another man and tells complainant's friends she would marry other man if she had divorce. Stargel v. Stargel, 21 Tenn. App. 193, 107 S.W.2d 520, 1937 Tenn. App. LEXIS 20 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1937).

The allegation of cruelty must show an element of physical unsafety, danger or indignity along with other elements. Loy v. Loy, 25 Tenn. App. 99, 151 S.W.2d 178, 1941 Tenn. App. LEXIS 78 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1941).

Allegations in bill for divorce were sufficient where they charged a course of conduct showing many little things done by defendant to plaintiff over period of time. Garvey v. Garvey, 29 Tenn. App. 291, 203 S.W.2d 912, 1946 Tenn. App. LEXIS 107 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1946).

There is room for serious doubt as to whether allegation of cruel and inhuman treatment “in the extreme” is not equivalent to “cruel and inhuman treatment as renders cohabitation unsafe and improper.” Clothier v. Clothier, 33 Tenn. App. 532, 232 S.W.2d 363, 1950 Tenn. App. LEXIS 113 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1950), superseded by statute as stated in, Moore v. Moore, — S.W.2d —, 1991 Tenn. App. LEXIS 869 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 1, 1991).

Where trial court expressly adjudicated that husband was not guilty of cruel and inhuman treatment, evidence as to husband's beating wife 16 months previously would not bar the granting of divorce to husband by court of appeals upon review of decree of trial court. Schwalb v. Schwalb, 39 Tenn. App. 306, 282 S.W.2d 661, 1955 Tenn. App. LEXIS 71 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1955), superseded by statute as stated in, Moore v. Moore, — S.W.2d —, 1991 Tenn. App. LEXIS 869 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 1, 1991).

Where bill entitled “Petition for Separate Maintenance and Support” alleged cruel and inhuman treatment in the language of this section, specified circumstances in support of same with reasonable certainty as required by § 36-4-106 and bill was verified as provided in § 36-4-107, trial court upon proper proof was justified in granting decree for absolute divorce especially where bill had been amended to pray for absolute divorce. Murrell v. Murrell, 45 Tenn. App. 309, 323 S.W.2d 15, 1958 Tenn. App. LEXIS 129 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1958).

21. — —Proof Not Supported by Pleadings.

A divorce will not be granted upon evidence of an instance of cruel treatment not mentioned in the pleadings. Clardy v. Clardy, 23 Tenn. App. 608, 136 S.W.2d 526, 1939 Tenn. App. LEXIS 66 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1939).

22. —Defenses.

Condonation is not a valid defense to the wife's suit for divorce on account of cruel and inhuman treatment by the husband. McClanahan v. McClanahan, 104 Tenn. 217, 56 S.W. 858, 1899 Tenn. LEXIS 30 (1900).

Although cruel and inhuman treatment as a ground for divorce cannot be condoned in the same sense as adultery and thereby in legal contemplation wiped out, nevertheless it may be forgiven and cannot thereafter be used as a ground for divorce, except upon some revival or new act that brings back to life the former misconduct previously forgiven. Schwalb v. Schwalb, 39 Tenn. App. 306, 282 S.W.2d 661, 1955 Tenn. App. LEXIS 71 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1955), superseded by statute as stated in, Moore v. Moore, — S.W.2d —, 1991 Tenn. App. LEXIS 869 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 1, 1991).

Where wife continued to live with husband after his beating her, she forgave or condoned his action. Schwalb v. Schwalb, 39 Tenn. App. 306, 282 S.W.2d 661, 1955 Tenn. App. LEXIS 71 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1955), superseded by statute as stated in, Moore v. Moore, — S.W.2d —, 1991 Tenn. App. LEXIS 869 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 1, 1991).

Cruel and inhuman treatment may be forgiven and cannot thereafter be relied upon as a ground for divorce except upon some revival or new act that brings back into life the former misconduct previously forgiven. Elrod v. Elrod, 41 Tenn. App. 540, 296 S.W.2d 849, 1956 Tenn. App. LEXIS 98 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1956), rehearing denied, 201 Tenn. 54, 296 S.W.2d 856, 1956 Tenn. LEXIS 464 (1956).

Where husband and wife agreed to effect a reconciliation after occurrence of alleged acts of wife amounting to cruel and inhuman treatment but agreement was never consummated, the husband had the right to change his mind on the matter and having changed his mind could rely on such conduct in a suit for divorce. Elrod v. Elrod, 41 Tenn. App. 540, 296 S.W.2d 849, 1956 Tenn. App. LEXIS 98 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1956), rehearing denied, 201 Tenn. 54, 296 S.W.2d 856, 1956 Tenn. LEXIS 464 (1956).

Acts constituting cruel and inhuman treatment, even though forgiven, are not wiped out but may be revived by some new act of cruel and inhuman treatment. Murrell v. Murrell, 45 Tenn. App. 309, 323 S.W.2d 15, 1958 Tenn. App. LEXIS 129 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1958).

23. — —Defense to Action by Spouse.

Conduct of wife that would have entitled husband to divorce on ground of cruel and inhuman treatment except for the fact the court did not have jurisdiction was nevertheless a valid defense to wife's cross bill for separate maintenance based on the same grounds. Elrod v. Elrod, 41 Tenn. App. 540, 296 S.W.2d 849, 1956 Tenn. App. LEXIS 98 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1956), rehearing denied, 201 Tenn. 54, 296 S.W.2d 856, 1956 Tenn. LEXIS 464 (1956).

As defined in § 36-4-120, the defense to an action brought pursuant to this section is not a defense of recrimination per se, since the ill conduct of the complainant may constitute a defense to the complaint only if such ill conduct is shown to be a justifiable cause for the conduct complained of in the action. Chastain v. Chastain, 559 S.W.2d 933, 1977 Tenn. LEXIS 655 (Tenn. 1977).

Where plaintiff's adultery was committed after the defendant husband had abandoned her and turned her out of doors and refused or neglected to provide for her, her ill conduct could not have been a justifiable cause for the alleged abandonment on the part of the defendant, and therefore plaintiff's adultery was not a defense to the divorce action. Chastain v. Chastain, 559 S.W.2d 933, 1977 Tenn. LEXIS 655 (Tenn. 1977).

Adultery and bigamy are no longer complete bars to a spouse's right to seek a divorce on one of the grounds in this section. Thompson v. Thompson, 797 S.W.2d 599, 1990 Tenn. App. LEXIS 273 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990).

24. —Raising Sufficiency of Allegations on Appeal.

The question of insufficient allegation of cruel and inhuman treatment may be raised for the first time in the appellate court. Beard v. Beard, 3 Tenn. App. 392, — S.W. —, 1926 Tenn. App. LEXIS 114 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1926).

25. Abandonment, Turning Out and Failure to Provide.

Where the husband failed to comply with the terms of articles of separation, in not paying to his wife any part of the stipulated instalments, and refused to support his wife, and to permit her to come upon the place and occupy and enjoy the home inherited from her father, which he had arrogated to himself to control, thus materially aggravating the situation, and she was thereby reduced to great want and destitution, even to insufficiency of clothing, and made entirely dependent upon charity, during her pregnancy, it is held that his conduct amounted to an abandonment of his wife, within the meaning of the statute, and the wife is entitled to a divorce from bed and board, with suitable relief as to property. McAllister v. McAllister, 57 Tenn. 345, 1872 Tenn. LEXIS 431 (1872).

Where husband had always provided for his wife up until a month before bill for divorce was filed at which time she commenced to charge groceries to her son but even after this time was not prohibited from charging necessities to her husband, failure to provide was not shown. Saillard v. Saillard, 2 Tenn. Ch. App. 396 (1896).

Where husband left home on Saturday after an extended quarrel taking his clothes and stating that he was leaving but returned on the following Tuesday, there was no abandonment. Saillard v. Saillard, 2 Tenn. Ch. App. 396 (1896).

Where during the course of a long distance telephone call a husband in California told his wife in Tennessee that he would no longer support her and wanted her to get a divorce, the acts of abandonment and nonsupport occurred in Tennessee and since these acts are continuing in nature the fact that the husband later came to Tennessee and repeated his statements was immaterial. Holman v. Holman, 35 Tenn. App. 273, 244 S.W.2d 618, 1951 Tenn. App. LEXIS 71 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1951).

26. —Solicitation of Reconciliation.

It is not required that the abandoned spouse solicit a reconciliation where the abandonment was willful. Bailey v. Bailey, 6 Tenn. App. 272, — S.W. —, 1927 Tenn. App. LEXIS 139 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1927).

27. —Allegations and Proof.

The charge in a divorce bill that the defendant husband made a brutal assault upon the complainant, and by his conduct compelled her to withdraw is a sufficient allegation of turning out of doors. E. W. M. v. J. C. M., 2 Tenn. Ch. App. 463 (1897).

Allegations of refusal or neglect to provide for wife were insufficient where the allegations do not show an intended and premeditated abandonment and refusal and neglect altogether to provide. E. W. M. v. J. C. M., 2 Tenn. Ch. App. 463 (1897).

Allegations that defendant became drunk; that he cursed complainant and her family; that he left her at the home of her parents, saying that he would not return, being sober at the time; that he accused her of lying, when she told him that she had inadvertently opened a letter of his only by mistake, and threatened to report her to the postal authorities; that he finally left complainant at the home of her parents, and went to his own home in another state, and had not returned to her; that he had contributed nothing to the support of complainant and their child; and that he had published notices in the newspapers where she lived that he would not be responsible for her debts, giving her maiden name as well as her married name, are allegations of cruel treatment and failure to provide sufficient to justify a divorce from bed and board at least, under this section. Fitzpatrick v. Fitzpatrick, 131 Tenn. 54, 173 S.W. 444, 1914 Tenn. LEXIS 84 (1915).

There is no necessity that a petition for divorce based on the charge of abandonment and refusal or neglect under former subsection (3) charge that such abandonment and neglect was premeditated, intended or willful. Page v. Turcott, 179 Tenn. 491, 167 S.W.2d 350, 1942 Tenn. LEXIS 46 (1943).

Petition for divorce that alleged that husband left the wife on a specified date and had not been back to live with her or contributed anything to her support, that she was forced to support herself and her child, that he had abandoned her and turned her out of doors, and had neglected and refused to provide for her, that such abandonment was without reasonable cause and occurred in a specified county of the state, was sufficient to support a divorce decree under former subsection (3). Page v. Turcott, 179 Tenn. 491, 167 S.W.2d 350, 1942 Tenn. LEXIS 46 (1943).

Evidence that wife had been forced to work for a period of years to support herself and children, that the husband failed to support her and that the parties had not lived together since their separation was sufficient to support a decree granting an absolute divorce for abandonment and nonsupport even though husband testified that he had attempted to persuade her to return home. Bennett v. Bennett, 40 Tenn. App. 416, 292 S.W.2d 202, 1954 Tenn. App. LEXIS 167 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1954).

Where wife was previously granted temporary divorce from bed and board and upon petition to have the same made final trial court first announced that the petition would be granted but the entry of the final decree was delayed without knowledge of the wife and the petition subsequently dismissed, wife's testimony as to events prior to such divorce proceedings was admissible in subsequent suit for divorce for abandonment and nonsupport. Bennett v. Bennett, 40 Tenn. App. 416, 292 S.W.2d 202, 1954 Tenn. App. LEXIS 167 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1954).

The wife failed to carry the burden of proof in establishing that she was not adequately supported for 21 days following the dismissal of her first divorce suit and the filing of her second suit. Daves v. Daves, 576 S.W.2d 4, 1978 Tenn. App. LEXIS 323 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1978).

28. — —Corroboration of Testimony.

Where plaintiff wife testified as to facts showing abandonment and refusal or neglect to provide, but that respecting abandonment was not corroborated, a divorce should not have been granted. This rule may be varied in a case where it is impossible to procure corroboration. Fulford v. Fulford, 156 Tenn. 640, 4 S.W.2d 350, 1927 Tenn. LEXIS 160 (1928).

36-4-103. Irreconcilable differences — Procedure.

    1. In all divorces sought because of irreconcilable differences between the parties, if the defendant is a nonresident, personal service may be effectuated by service upon the secretary of state pursuant to § 20-2-215.
    2. In lieu of service of process, the defendant may enter into a written notarized marital dissolution agreement with plaintiff that makes specific reference to a pending divorce by a court and docket number, or states that the defendant is aware that one will be filed in this state and that the defendant waives further service and waives filing an answer to the complaint. Such waiver of service shall be valid for a period of one hundred eighty (180) days from the date the last party signs the agreement. The agreement may include the obligation and payment of alimony, in solido or in futuro, to either of the parties, any other law notwithstanding. The signing of such an agreement shall be in lieu of service of process for the period such waiver is valid and shall constitute a general appearance before the court and answer that shall give the court personal jurisdiction over the defendant, and constitute a default judgment for the purpose of granting a divorce on the grounds of irreconcilable differences.
    3. No divorce heretofore granted shall be invalid because the agreement was signed and notarized or acknowledged prior to filing under prior law before the action was filed.
  1. No divorce shall be granted on the ground of irreconcilable differences unless the court affirmatively finds in its decree that the parties have made adequate and sufficient provision by written agreement for the custody and maintenance of any children of that marriage and for the equitable settlement of any property rights between the parties. If the court does not affirmatively find that the agreement is sufficient or equitable, the cause shall be continued by the court to allow further disposition by the petitioner. If both parties are present at the hearing, they may, at that time, ratify any amendments the court may have to the agreement. The amended agreement shall then become a part of the decree. The agreement shall be incorporated in the decree or incorporated by reference, and such decree may be modified as other decrees for divorce. Approval of the agreement by the court satisfies the requirements of Rule 52.01 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, and the court is not required to make written findings of fact and conclusions of law as to whether the parties' agreed amendment makes adequate and sufficient provisions for the custody and maintenance of any children of that marriage or whether the agreement is in the best interest of the parties' children.
    1. Bills for divorce on the ground of irreconcilable differences must have been on file for sixty (60) days before being heard if the parties have no unmarried child under eighteen (18) years of age, and must have been on file at least ninety (90) days before being heard if the parties have an unmarried child under eighteen (18) years of age. The sixty-day or ninety-day period bills for divorce must be on file shall commence on the date the original bill was filed and not on the date the bill was amended to include the ground of irreconcilable differences.
    2. A divorce decree or order issued prior to March 22, 1996, in which the hearing for such divorce occurred before the specified time periods required by this subsection (c), shall remain valid and the parties shall remain divorced. Likewise, all other issues resolved in the divorce decree, order or agreement, such as distribution of marital property, alimony, child support and custody, shall remain valid and in full force and effect.
    1. A bill of complaint for divorce where the respondent has been personally served or acknowledged as set out in subsection (a), which includes the ground of irreconcilable differences, may be taken as confessed and a final decree entered thereon, as in other cases and without corroborative proof or testimony, §§ 36-4-107 and 36-4-114 to the contrary notwithstanding.
    2. For purposes of this section, “without corroborative proof or testimony” means that the petitioner shall not be required to testify as to the material facts constituting irreconcilable differences or any attempts to reconcile such differences.
  2. If there has been a contest or denial of the grounds of irreconcilable differences, no divorce shall be granted on the grounds of irreconcilable differences. However, a divorce may be granted on the grounds of irreconcilable differences where there has been a contest or denial, if a properly executed marital dissolution agreement is presented to the court.
  3. Irreconcilable differences may be asserted as a sole ground for divorce or as an alternate ground for divorce with any other cause for divorce set out in § 36-4-101 or § 36-4-102.
  4. Notwithstanding any law to the contrary requiring mediation, the filing with the court of a properly executed marital dissolution agreement and, if there are minor children of the marriage, a properly executed parenting plan shall serve to remove any requirement that the parties shall attend mediation. If the court does not approve either the marital dissolution agreement or the parenting plan, then any requirement to attend mediation shall be reinstated as of the date of the court's rejection of either agreement.

Code 1858, § 2448 (deriv. Acts 1819, ch. 20, § 2; 1835-1836, ch. 26, §§ 1, 2; 1841-1842, ch. 133, § 3; 1843-1844, ch. 176, § 1); Acts 1867-1868, ch. 63, § 1; 1867-1868, ch. 68, § 1; Shan., § 4201; mod. Code 1932, § 8426; Acts 1961, ch. 168, § 1; 1972, ch. 679, § 1; 1977, ch. 107, § 1; 1978, ch. 577, § 1; 1981, ch. 311, § 1; 1981, ch. 420, § 1; 1981, ch. 532, § 1; 1982, ch. 853, § 2; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 36-801(II); Acts 1987, ch. 390, §§ 3, 4; 1989, ch. 489, §§ 2, 3; 1991, ch. 234, § 1; 1996, ch. 655, § 2; 1998, ch. 1059, § 4; 2008, ch. 868, § 1; 2020, ch. 520, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 1996, ch. 655, § 3, which added (c)(2), provides that the provisions of that act are remedial in nature and that the provisions shall be liberally construed to effectuate its purposes.

Amendments. The 2020 amendment added the last sentence to (b).

Effective Dates. Acts 2020, ch. 520, § 6. March 6, 2020.

Textbooks. Gibson's Suits in Chancery (7th ed., Inman), § 514.

Law Reviews.

Covenant Marriage: Should Tennessee Join the Noble Experiment?, 29 U. Mem. L. Rev. 397 (1999).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Retroactive Application.

This section, as amended by Acts 1996, ch. 655, by its very language applies to decrees entered prior to the act's effective date. Gentry v. Gentry, 924 S.W.2d 678, 1996 Tenn. LEXIS 425 (Tenn. 1996).

2. Affirmative Finding by Court.

Trial court did affirmatively find in its decree that the parties made adequate and sufficient provision by written agreement for the equitable settlement of any property rights between the parties. Brown v. Brown, 863 S.W.2d 432, 1993 Tenn. App. LEXIS 469 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993).

T.C.A. § 36-4-103(b) and (c) do not require a formal hearing unless the court finds that the parties have not made adequate and sufficient provisions for the custody and the maintenance of their children and the equitable settlement of any property rights; therefore, the affirmative findings made by the judge were adequate, and once the gavel went down, the marital dissolution agreement merged into a final order. Vaccarella v. Vaccarella, 49 S.W.3d 307, 2001 Tenn. App. LEXIS 81 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001).

3. Ninety-Day Filing Prerequisite.

The requirement of this section that a complaint for divorce be on file ninety days before being heard does not mean necessarily that a decree entered upon a hearing held less that ninety days subsequent to the filing is void; moreover, even if voidable, the decree cannot be reversed through a collateral attack by the children of the parties to the divorce suit. Gentry v. Gentry, 924 S.W.2d 678, 1996 Tenn. LEXIS 425 (Tenn. 1996).

4. Formal Hearing Not Required.

There is no requirement that there be a hearing prior to irreconcilable differences divorce where the parties have signed a marital dissolution agreement, nor is the court required to make an independent investigation prior to signing the parties' divorce decree. Vaccarella v. Vaccarella, 49 S.W.3d 307, 2001 Tenn. App. LEXIS 81 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001).

5. Antenuptial Agreement.

While the husband was free to argue that the parties' marital dissolution agreement's disposition of the marital property was fair and equitable under T.C.A. § 36-4-103(b), the trial court was free to come up with its own equitable division of the marital estate based on the facts; the record showed no evidence of detrimental reliance on the agreement by either party, and thus the trial court did not err by refusing to enforce the property settlement provisions in the agreement after the wife unequivocally repudiated it. Altman v. Altman, 181 S.W.3d 676, 2005 Tenn. App. LEXIS 207 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 1016 (Tenn. Oct. 31, 2005).

6. Compliance.

Final divorce decree based on the grounds of irreconcilable differences was not declared void because it satisfied the requirements of the statute; a signed, notarized marital dissolution agreement and a signed, written agreed parenting plan were executed even though the parenting plan was designated as temporary Rigsby v. Rigsby, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 929 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 25, 2015).

In the final divorce decree, the trial court incorporated by reference the property settlement agreement (PSA) filed with the trial court and affirmatively found that the parties made adequate and sufficient provisions by the PSA for the equitable settlement of the property rights between the parties; a copy of the PSA bore the purported signatures of the husband and wife, and thus the judgment did not appear void on its face. Yarbrough v. Yarbrough, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 259 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 11, 2018).

7. Improper Ground.

Trial court erred in granting the husband a divorce on the ground of irreconcilable differences because the divorce was contested and fault was at issue. Norris v. Norris, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 673 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 24, 2015).

36-4-104. Residence requirements.

  1. A divorce may be granted for any of the causes referenced in § 36-4-101 if the acts complained of were committed while the plaintiff was a bona fide resident of this state or if the acts complained of were committed out of this state and the plaintiff resided out of the state at the time, if the plaintiff or the defendant has resided in this state six (6) months next preceding the filing of the complaint.
  2. For the purposes of this section, any person in the armed services of the United States, or the spouse of any such person, who has been living in this state for a period of not less than one (1) year shall be presumed to be a resident of this state, and the presumption of residence shall be overcome only by clear and convincing evidence of a domicile elsewhere.

Code 1858, § 2450 (deriv. Acts 1799, ch. 19, § 7; 1835-1836, ch. 26, § 1; 1839-1840, ch. 54, § 1; 1845-1846, ch. 67, § 1); Shan., § 4203; Code 1932, § 8428; Acts 1957, ch. 274, § 1; 1971, ch. 363, § 1; 1973, ch. 219, § 1; 1976, ch. 548, § 1; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 36-803.

Textbooks. Gibson's Suits in Chancery (7th ed., Inman), §§ 514, 518.

Law Reviews.

Divorces in Tennessee (Harold C. Warner), 14 Tenn. L. Rev. 588 (1936).

Six Months or Six Days: When Can You File For Divorce in Tennessee?, 50 Tenn. B.J. 24 (2014).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Jurisdiction.

Where husband who resided in South Carolina brought suit in South Carolina for divorce and wife who at time was residing in Tennessee appeared specially in the South Carolina action to contest jurisdiction alleging she was resident of Tennessee, the determination of the South Carolina court as to residency on the date of such determination was res judicata in Tennessee, but where wife charged a specific act of cruel and inhuman treatment occurring after such date in Tennessee, wife could bring divorce action in Tennessee regardless of an allegation of residence for six months. Atchley v. Atchley, 585 S.W.2d 614, 1978 Tenn. App. LEXIS 358 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1978).

Verified answer and counterclaim filed by plaintiff in Texas in which she asserted that she resided in Texas did not mean that Tennessee was without jurisdiction, since subject matter jurisdiction was not based upon the wife's domicile, but upon the fact that the defendant was a domicile of Tennessee for six months preceding the filing of the plaintiff's complaint in Tennessee. Vermillion v. Vermillion, 892 S.W.2d 829, 1994 Tenn. App. LEXIS 352 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994), appeal denied, — S.W.2d —, 1994 Tenn. LEXIS 284 (Tenn. Oct. 3, 1994).

Trial court properly concluded that it had jurisdiction over a divorce action because the evidence did not preponderate against its ruling that the father was domiciled in Tennessee; the only reason the parties relocated to Scotland was for the father to participate in a masters program at the university, and there was no evidence that either of the mother or the father intended to establish a new domicile in Scotland. Hagans v. Hagans, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 178 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 5, 2018).

Trial court had subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate a divorce because the husband, in the husband's complaint for divorce, stated that the husband had resided in Tennessee for more than six months, and the grounds for divorce arose while the husband was a bona fide resident of the county where the proceeding was commenced. Because this statement was undisputed in the record, the appellate court concluded that the six-month residency requirement was met. Singh v. Singh, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 334 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 3, 2019).

36-4-105. Venue.

  1. The bill or petition may be filed in the proper name of the complainant, in the chancery or circuit court or other court having divorce jurisdiction, in the county where the parties reside at the time of their separation, or in which the defendant resides, if a resident of the state; but if the defendant is a nonresident of the state or a convict, then in the county where the applicant resides.
  2. Any divorce granted prior to May 4, 1967, will not be deemed void solely on the ground that the parties to the divorce action were residents of a county or counties other than the county in which the divorce decree was entered.

Code 1858, § 2451 (deriv. Acts 1835-1836, ch. 26, § 3); Acts 1859-1860, ch. 88; Shan., § 4204; Code 1932, § 8429; Acts 1961, ch. 180, § 1; 1963, ch. 153, § 1; 1967, ch. 185, § 1; 1971, ch. 363, § 2; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 36-804.

Cross-References. Jurisdiction of courts, §§ 16-10-108, 16-11-110.

Textbooks. Gibson's Suits in Chancery (7th ed., Inman), §§ 121, 515.

Law Reviews.

Venue — Localizing Transitory Actions in Tennessee Civil Proceedings, 35 Tenn. L. Rev. 520.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Construction.

The provision as to the place where the bill is to be filed is mandatory, and not merely directory, for the word “may” has the same force and meaning as the word “shall.” Walton v. Walton, 96 Tenn. 25, 33 S.W. 561, 1895 Tenn. LEXIS 4 (1896).

Any authority given to the chancery court by this section to carry out the provisions of §§ 36-4-120, 36-5-101 is likewise necessarily given the circuit court since this section gives identical authority to both courts. Browder v. Browder, 188 Tenn. 488, 221 S.W.2d 526, 1949 Tenn. LEXIS 364 (1949).

The word “resident” as used in this section means resident of the state, so that the final clauses of the section are to be read as follows: “… or in which the defendant resides, or is found, if a resident (of the state); but if a nonresident (of the state) or convict, then in the county where the applicant resides.” Williams v. Williams, 193 Tenn. 133, 244 S.W.2d 995, 1951 Tenn. LEXIS 336 (1951).

2. Nature of Proceedings.

Divorce suits, whether in the chancery court or in the circuit court, are in their essential nature and to all intents and purposes chancery proceedings. Francis v. Francis, 3 Tenn. Civ. App. (3 Higgins) 469 (1912).

3. Jurisdiction.

Circuit court did not acquire jurisdiction in suit for divorce brought by soldier where it appeared that wife was domiciled in another state and that husband was only temporarily stationed in Tennessee and did not intend to make this state his home. Tyborowski v. Tyborowski, 28 Tenn. App. 583, 192 S.W.2d 231, 1945 Tenn. App. LEXIS 97 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1945).

Circuit court has jurisdiction of suit by wife seeking support for herself and child although she did not pray for either limited or absolute divorce, since authority to decree separation, divorce and support is vested in both circuit and chancery courts under this section. Browder v. Browder, 188 Tenn. 488, 221 S.W.2d 526, 1949 Tenn. LEXIS 364 (1949).

Where trial judge granted divorce it must be treated by court of appeals on appeal as a finding of fact that either the plaintiff, or the defendant, or both were domiciled in the county and if either or both were so domiciled the court had jurisdiction. Bernardi v. Bernardi, 42 Tenn. App. 282, 302 S.W.2d 63, 1956 Tenn. App. LEXIS 128 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1956).

Trial court did not obtain personal jurisdiction over the father through the attempted service by publication because the record contained no statement made under oath or by affidavit that service of process had been attempted on the father at his usual place of abode or last known residence and that delineated facts supporting the allegation that he was no longer in the State; therefore, any portion of the trial court's judgment related to child support was void ab initio. State ex rel. Catalano v. Woodcock, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 469 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 5, 2016).

4. —Pleading and Proof.

Where the jurisdiction of the court depends upon the fact of the nonresidence of the defendant, the fact must be clearly established by the evidence. Majors v. Majors, 1 Cooper's Tenn. Ch. 264 (1873).

In divorce cases, facts that warrant notice by publication are jurisdictional and must appear on the face of the petition; and a decree of divorce granted on a petition defective in that respect is void. Copeland v. Green, 4 Tenn. App. 463, — S.W. —, 1927 Tenn. App. LEXIS 200 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1927).

There is no necessary inconsistency in failure to allege residence in first petition for divorce and alleging residence in Shelby County, Tennessee in the second petition. Bernardi v. Bernardi, 42 Tenn. App. 282, 302 S.W.2d 63, 1956 Tenn. App. LEXIS 128 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1956).

5. Residence.

The word “reside” involves the idea of a domicile, and the word “residence” as used in divorce statutes should be construed as equivalent to “domicile.” Brown v. Brown, 150 Tenn. 89, 261 S.W. 959, 1923 Tenn. LEXIS 66 (1924); Tyborowski v. Tyborowski, 28 Tenn. App. 583, 192 S.W.2d 231, 1945 Tenn. App. LEXIS 97 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1945).

Where the defendant husband had a summer residence in Giles county, where he was living at the time of the separation, but his domicile, when his wife filed her bill for divorce, and for 30 years prior thereto had been in Davidson county, a decree dismissing her bill, filed in Giles county, for lack of jurisdiction was proper on the theory that complainant should have filed her bill in Davidson county. Brown v. Brown, 150 Tenn. 89, 261 S.W. 959, 1923 Tenn. LEXIS 66 (1924).

Member of armed forces, stationed in Shelby County, could obtain domicile there by repeated declarations by defendant of intention to make such his future home, inquiries looking to a future position there as a fireman, his marriage there and the establishment of his matrimonial domicile there. Bernardi v. Bernardi, 42 Tenn. App. 282, 302 S.W.2d 63, 1956 Tenn. App. LEXIS 128 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1956).

6. —Domicile of Wife.

Common law rule that a wife's domicile follows that of her husband no longer obtains and it is the law that a wife may acquire a domicile separate from that of her husband. Bernardi v. Bernardi, 42 Tenn. App. 282, 302 S.W.2d 63, 1956 Tenn. App. LEXIS 128 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1956).

7. Place of Suit.

Where husband and wife lived apart in different counties, the husband could not sue in the county of his residence. Person v. Person, 25 Tenn. 148, 1845 Tenn. LEXIS 47 (1845).

The circuit or chancery court of the county where the wife resides has no jurisdiction of her suit for divorce, if the parties resided in another county of this state at the time of their separation, and the husband, not being a convict, resided in another county when the suit was instituted, and was there found and served with process. Walton v. Walton, 96 Tenn. 25, 33 S.W. 561, 1895 Tenn. LEXIS 4 (1896).

Under the provisions of this section after the 1963 amendment, divorce suit was improperly brought in county in which the parties worked and husband was served where both of the parties lived in another county. Ivey v. Ivey, 212 Tenn. 650, 371 S.W.2d 448, 1963 Tenn. LEXIS 455 (1963); Williams v. Williams, 193 Tenn. 133, 244 S.W.2d 995, 1951 Tenn. LEXIS 336 (1951) (held to be no longer applicable).

8. Waiver of Venue.

The limitation on venue is to be availed of as a personal privilege, and does not affect the court's jurisdiction over the subject-matter, and accordingly may be waived. Brown v. Brown, 155 Tenn. 530, 296 S.W. 356, 1926 Tenn. LEXIS 77 (1927); McFerrin v. McFerrin, 28 Tenn. App. 552, 191 S.W.2d 946, 1945 Tenn. App. LEXIS 93 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1945); Kelley v. Kelley, 195 Tenn. 649, 263 S.W.2d 505, 1953 Tenn. LEXIS 391 (1953).

Where plaintiff did not object to venue in the original divorce suit, her objection was waived. Kane v. Kane, 547 S.W.2d 559, 1977 Tenn. LEXIS 561 (Tenn. 1977).

9. Minors.

Minors may prosecute and defend divorce actions without the necessity of a next friend or a guardian ad litem, as this section makes no distinction between adults and minors. Holman v. Holman, 35 Tenn. App. 273, 244 S.W.2d 618, 1951 Tenn. App. LEXIS 71 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1951); Talley v. Talley, 51 Tenn. App. 622, 371 S.W.2d 152, 1962 Tenn. App. LEXIS 126 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1962).

10. Costs.

If the court has jurisdiction of the subject-matter, it has power to adjudge the costs, though the cause is remanded by the appellate court and suit is ordered dismissed upon defendant's plea raising question of venue for action of divorce. Brown v. Brown, 155 Tenn. 530, 296 S.W. 356, 1926 Tenn. LEXIS 77 (1927).

36-4-106. Complaint for divorce or legal separation — Temporary injunctions.

    1. The complaint for divorce shall set forth the grounds for the divorce in substantially the language of § 36-4-101 or § 36-4-102, and pray only for a divorce from the defendant, or for a divorce and such other and further relief to which the complainant may think to be entitled. In cases wherein an answer is filed, the court shall, on motion of the defendant, require the complainant to file a bill of particulars, setting forth the facts relied on as grounds for the divorce, with reasonable certainty as to time and place.
    2. The complaint for legal separation shall set forth the grounds for legal separation in substantially the language of § 36-4-101, and pray for such further relief to which the complainant is entitled. In all cases where an answer is filed, the court shall, on motion of the defendant, require the complainant to file a bill of particulars, stating the facts relied on as a ground for legal separation, with reasonable certainty as to time and place.
    1. The complainant shall also allege the full name of the husband, the full maiden name of the wife, their mailing addresses, dates and places of their birth, race or color of each spouse, number of previous marriages of each spouse, date and place of the marriage of the parties, the number of their children who are minors at the time of the filing of the complaint, and any other litigation concerning the custody of those children in this or any other state in which either party has participated, as specified in § 36-6-224. Further, at the time a complaint or pleading is filed under this part, the filing party shall, simultaneously with the initial complaint or pleading filed by that party, file with the clerk a separate document that contains the full names and social security numbers, current mailing addresses and dates of birth of the husband, the wife, and those of all children born of the marriage. The filing party shall provide to the clerk one (1) eight and one-half inch by eleven inch (8½" x 11") envelope labeled with the names of the parties, which shall be marked with the docket number. The clerk shall file stamp the document and the envelope, store the document in the envelope, which shall be sealed, and place the sealed envelope in the case file. The social security numbers and other information filed with the clerk shall be available to the clerk of court for processing of documents and legal actions such as, but not limited to, divorce certificates, garnishments, and income assignments. On request, the sealed information shall be made available to the department of human services and any other agency required by law to have access to the information, and to other persons or agencies as ordered by the court. It shall be mandatory that every complaint filed under this chapter shall contain the foregoing information or that such information is provided by the parties and is contained in the court's records as described above prior to the entry of the final decree of divorce, unless it can be shown to the satisfaction of the court that such information could not be obtained by the complainant or petitioner by exercising due diligence or after the court has granted a reasonable time to amend the complaint. In lieu of a mailing address, either party may designate an agent for the service of process throughout the proceedings and, except as provided in subdivision (b)(2), the name and address of such agent shall be the only address used for the designating party in all petitions, pleadings, motions and orders relating to such divorce action.
    2. If the complainant or the defendant shows to the satisfaction of the court in which the petition is filed that the residential address of the other party is relevant and necessary in order to prove the allegations contained in the complaint or to ascertain information necessary to determine value and/or ownership of property, or to ascertain other data necessary to evaluate and agree upon a property division or custody or defend against such allegations, the court may order either party to reveal such residential address to the other party.
    3. If the complainant elects to designate an agent for service of process in lieu of the mailing address as authorized by this subsection (b) but does not designate a specific person, the complainant's attorney shall be deemed the complainant's agent for service of process.
  1. Notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, the plaintiff or other party shall not be required in those counties having a divorce proctor to file an affidavit swearing that the defendant is not in the military service where:
    1. The complaint states facts that would make the defendant ineligible for military service; or
    2. The residence address of the defendant is set forth in the complaint, and:
      1. The defendant has been personally served with service of process, or has been mailed a copy of the complaint by a divorce proctor;
      2. The defendant has actual notice of the commencement of the suit;
      3. Proof of mailing to the defendant of notice of the suit is exhibited to the court; or
      4. The defendant is represented by an attorney.
  2. Upon the filing of a petition for divorce or legal separation, and upon personal service of the complaint and summons on the respondent or upon waiver and acceptance of service by the respondent, the following temporary injunctions shall be in effect against both parties until the final decree of divorce or order of legal separation is entered, the petition is dismissed, the parties reach agreement, or until the court modifies or dissolves the injunction, written notice of which shall be served with the complaint:
      1. An injunction restraining and enjoining both parties from transferring, assigning, borrowing against, concealing or in any way dissipating or disposing, without the consent of the other party or an order of the court, of any marital property. Nothing herein is intended to preclude either of the parties from seeking broader injunctive relief from the court.
      2. Expenditures from current income to maintain the marital standard of living and the usual and ordinary costs of operating a business are not restricted by this injunction. Each party shall maintain records of all expenditures, copies of which shall be available to the other party upon request.
    1. An injunction restraining and enjoining both parties from voluntarily canceling, modifying, terminating, assigning, or allowing to lapse for nonpayment of premiums, any insurance policy, including, but not limited to, life, health, disability, homeowners, renters, and automobile, where such insurance policy provides coverage to either of the parties or the children, or that names either of the parties or the children as beneficiaries without the consent of the other party or an order of the court. “Modifying” includes any change in beneficiary status.
    2. An injunction restraining both parties from harassing, threatening, assaulting or abusing the other and from making disparaging remarks about the other to or in the presence of any children of the parties or to either party's employer.
    3. An injunction restraining and enjoining both parties from hiding, destroying or spoiling, in whole or in part, any evidence electronically stored or on computer hard drives or other memory storage devices.
    4. An injunction restraining both parties from relocating any children of the parties outside the state, or more than fifty (50) miles from the marital home, without the permission of the other party or an order of the court, except in the case of a removal based upon a well-founded fear of physical abuse against either the fleeing parent or the child. In such cases, upon request of the nonrelocating parent, the court will conduct an expedited hearing, by telephone conference if appropriate, to determine the reasonableness of the relocation and to make such other orders as appropriate.
    5. The provisions of these injunctions shall be attached to the summons and the complaint and shall be served with the complaint. The injunctions shall become an order of the court upon fulfillment of the requirements of this subsection (d). However, nothing in this subsection (d) shall preclude either party from applying to the court for further temporary orders, an expanded temporary injunction, or modification or revocation of this temporary injunction.
    6. The temporary injunctions provided in this section shall only apply to the spousal parties named in the petition and shall not apply to any third party named in the petition; provided, however, that nothing in this subsection (d) shall preclude any party from applying to the court for an order of injunctive or extraordinary relief against any other party named in any petition as provided by law or rule.

Code 1858, § 2452 (deriv. Acts 1835-1836, ch. 26, §§ 3, 18); Shan., § 4205; mod. Code 1932, § 8430; Acts 1957, ch. 46, § 1; 1957, ch. 74, § 1; 1971, ch. 50, § 1; 1971, ch. 437, § 1; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 36-805; Acts 1987, ch. 36, § 1; 1994, ch. 975, §§ 1-3; 1997, ch. 544, § 1; 1997, ch. 551, § 31; 1998, ch. 1059, §§ 8-10; 2001, ch. 280, § 1; 2002, ch. 565, § 1; 2007, ch. 187, §§ 1-3; 2009, ch. 280, § 1; 2014, ch. 617, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2009, ch. 280, § 2 provided that the act, which amended subdivision (b)(1), shall apply to petitions for divorce or legal separation filed on or after July 1, 2009.

For the Preamble to the act concerning domestic relations, please refer to Acts 2014, ch. 617.

Cross-References. As to allegations under specific grounds for divorce, see notes to §§ 36-4-101, 36-4-102.

Irreconcilable differences, procedure, § 36-4-103.

Textbooks. Gibson's Suits in Chancery (7th ed., Inman), § 518.

Tennessee Forms (Robinson, Ramsey and Harwell), No. 1-8-16.

Law Reviews.

A Survey of Civil Procedure in Tennessee — 1977, IV. Pretrial Procedure (John L. Sobieski, Jr.), 46 Tenn. L. Rev. 308 (1979).

Mutual Temporary Injunctions in Divorce Cases (Amy J. Amundsen), 37 No. 11 Tenn. B.J. 17 (2001).

Attorney General Opinions. Injunctions issued at the commencement of a divorce under T.C.A. § 36-4-106(d) are not unconstitutional on the basis that they do not follow the requirements of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 65.04(2), because Tenn. R. Civ. P. 65.07 allows the existence of contrary statutory provisions governing injunctions, OAG 03-117, 2003 Tenn. AG LEXIS 135 (9/15/03).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Construction.

The provision of this section that the causes of the complaint shall be set out with reasonable certainty cannot be construed as requiring husband bringing suit under § 36-4-101(a)(8), to allege that he did not move from the state where his wife resided for the purpose of obtaining a divorce since the requirements to this effect in § 36-4-106 are as to proof and not as to pleading and notice as to what will be proven is carried to the defendant by the clear provisions of the Code. Baeyertz v. Baeyertz, 171 Tenn. 190, 101 S.W.2d 689, 1936 Tenn. LEXIS 79 (1937).

There is nothing in T.C.A. § 36-4-107 indicating that it is applicable to petitions for annulment; moreover, statutes must be considered “in pari materia, not in a vacuum,” and when § 36-4-107 is read in conjunction with T.C.A. § 36-4-106, it is clear that the “petition” referred to in the former statute relates only to a petition for divorce; thus, the wife's argument that the chancery court erred in denying her motion to dismiss the annulment action by the conservator on that basis the conservator did not comply with § 36-4-107(a) was rejected. Nave v. Nave, 173 S.W.3d 766, 2005 Tenn. App. LEXIS 179 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 904 (Tenn. Oct. 17, 2005).

Divorce action abates upon the death of a party, but a trial court should have the authority to consider the equities of the parties and remedy the violation of a statutory injunction; a trial court should have the authority to “right a wrong” and remedy an injustice based on equitable considerations when a party violates a statutory injunction and later dies while the divorce action is pending. Coleman v. Olson, 551 S.W.3d 686, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 315 (Tenn. June 15, 2018).

2. Construction With Other Law.

Order did give the conservator the authority to “do any other act of legal significance which the trial court, at any time in the future, might have deemed necessary or advisable”; that “catch-all” provision included the filing and maintaining of an annulment action, as such an action was clearly an “act of legal significance.” Nave v. Nave, 173 S.W.3d 766, 2005 Tenn. App. LEXIS 179 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 904 (Tenn. Oct. 17, 2005).

3. Legislative Intent.

The legislative intent in requiring pleadings to set forth the grounds for the divorce in substantially the language of the statute was to avoid the insertion of scurrilous matter in divorce bills. Farrar v. Farrar, 553 S.W.2d 741, 1977 Tenn. LEXIS 589 (Tenn. 1977).

4. Effect of Statute.

Each petition must be tested by the statute and meet its requirements. Page v. Turcott, 179 Tenn. 491, 167 S.W.2d 350, 1942 Tenn. LEXIS 46 (1943).

5. Allegation of Causes.

Divorces should never be granted, unless the case is clearly established within the provisions of the statutes. The cause must be well averred, as well as proved. Shell v. Shell, 34 Tenn. 716, 1855 Tenn. LEXIS 124 (1855); Rutledge v. Rutledge, 37 Tenn. 554, 1858 Tenn. LEXIS 61 (1858); Horne v. Horne, 1 Cooper's Tenn. Ch. 259 (1853); Majors v. Majors, 1 Cooper's Tenn. Ch. 264 (1873); Beard v. Beard, 3 Tenn. App. 392, — S.W. —, 1926 Tenn. App. LEXIS 114 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1926).

It is bad pleading to charge the grounds of divorce as upon the petitioner's information and belief, for the charges ought to be positive, although the petitioner may not have any personal knowledge of them. Dismukes v. Dismukes, 1 Cooper's Tenn. Ch. 266 (1873).

Court is without jurisdiction to grant divorce in absence of appropriate pleadings containing averments of facts that would in law constitute cause or causes for divorce. Stargel v. Stargel, 21 Tenn. App. 193, 107 S.W.2d 520, 1937 Tenn. App. LEXIS 20 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1937).

6. —Degree of Certainty.

The petition for divorce must set forth particularly and specially the causes for divorce, with circumstances of time and place, and with reasonable certainty. Horne v. Horne, 1 Cooper's Tenn. Ch. 259 (1853); Ward v. Ward, 1 Cooper's Tenn. Ch. 262 (1873); Dismukes v. Dismukes, 1 Cooper's Tenn. Ch. 266 (1873); Lishey v. Lishey, 2 Cooper's Tenn. Ch. 1 (1873), aff'd, 74 Tenn. 418, 1880 Tenn. LEXIS 269 (1880); De Armond v. De Armond, 92 Tenn. 40, 20 S.W. 422, 1892 Tenn. LEXIS 49 (1892); Copeland v. Green, 4 Tenn. App. 463, — S.W. —, 1927 Tenn. App. LEXIS 200 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1927).

The requirements do not demand mathematical exactness. All the law requires is “reasonable certainty.” Dismukes v. Dismukes, 1 Cooper's Tenn. Ch. 266 (1873); Brown v. Brown, 159 Tenn. 551, 20 S.W.2d 1037, 1929 Tenn. LEXIS 8 (1929).

Bills held to set forth the cause of complaint with sufficient particularity and the circumstances of time and place with reasonable certainty to meet the requirements of the statute. Clardy v. Clardy, 23 Tenn. App. 608, 136 S.W.2d 526, 1939 Tenn. App. LEXIS 66 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1939); Meeks v. Meeks, 27 Tenn. App. 279, 179 S.W.2d 189, 1943 Tenn. App. LEXIS 141 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1943).

When the cause relied on the petition for divorce is willful or malicious desertion under former § 36-4-101(4), or cruel and inhuman treatment under former § 36-4-102(a)(1), not only must the allegation be made “in words fully equal and definite in their meaning” but the requirements of particularity and specifications with circumstances as to time and place as required by this section must be observed with particular care, but even in these cases only “reasonable certainty” and not “mathematical certainty” is required. Page v. Turcott, 179 Tenn. 491, 167 S.W.2d 350, 1942 Tenn. LEXIS 46 (1943).

The requirement that the bill must set forth the cause for complaint with reasonable certainty does not mean mathematical certainty but rather that it must convey such notice of defendant that he may defend intelligently. Akins v. Akins, 61 Tenn. App. 506, 456 S.W.2d 354, 1969 Tenn. App. LEXIS 296 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1969).

7. —Number of Grounds.

The petitioner for a divorce is not compelled to rely upon any one of the grounds for divorce, but may charge any number of them, identifying each of them by such particularities of time, place, and person as will enable the defendant to prepare to meet the charge. Dismukes v. Dismukes, 1 Cooper's Tenn. Ch. 266 (1873).

8. —Present Tense.

Allegations in the present tense will be deemed to refer to time when the action was commenced. Brown v. Brown, 159 Tenn. 551, 20 S.W.2d 1037, 1929 Tenn. LEXIS 8 (1929).

9. —Amendment.

The prayer may be amended after the trial commences, so as to pray for an absolute divorce instead of a divorce from bed and board. Hackney v. Hackney, 28 Tenn. 450, 1848 Tenn. LEXIS 101 (1848).

Where bill entitled “Petition for Separate Maintenance and Support” alleged cruel and inhuman treatment in the language of a former version of § 36-4-102, specified circumstances in support of same with reasonable certainty and bill was verified in accordance with § 36-4-107, trial court upon proper proof was justified in granting decree for absolute divorce especially where bill had been amended to pray for absolute divorce. Murrell v. Murrell, 45 Tenn. App. 309, 323 S.W.2d 15, 1958 Tenn. App. LEXIS 129 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1958).

10. Proof of Grounds.

The proof of the grounds of divorce should be satisfactory. Dismukes v. Dismukes, 1 Cooper's Tenn. Ch. 266 (1873).

Where it did not appear that chancellor considered certain evidence in granting divorce, and where other evidence was sufficient to make out a case, it would be presumed that court's action was based thereon. Rush v. Rush, 33 Tenn. App. 496, 232 S.W.2d 333, 1949 Tenn. App. LEXIS 132 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1949), superseded by statute as stated in, Jones v. Jones, — S.W.2d —, 1990 Tenn. App. LEXIS 664 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 21, 1990).

11. —Proof Not Supported by Pleadings.

Specific application of elementary rule that proof without pleadings will not support a decree is rule that a divorce will not be granted upon evidence of an instance of cruel treatment not mentioned in the pleadings. Clardy v. Clardy, 23 Tenn. App. 608, 136 S.W.2d 526, 1939 Tenn. App. LEXIS 66 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1939).

12. Form of Proceedings.

Divorce cases tried in a law court without a jury are tried according to chancery procedure and forms of the chancery court. Clardy v. Clardy, 23 Tenn. App. 608, 136 S.W.2d 526, 1939 Tenn. App. LEXIS 66 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1939).

Divorce cases, even though tried in the circuit court, are treated as chancery suits. Murrell v. Murrell, 45 Tenn. App. 309, 323 S.W.2d 15, 1958 Tenn. App. LEXIS 129 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1958).

13. Temporary Injunction.

It was no error to proceed to trial in the absence of an allegedly incompetent husband or the husband's counsel because, inter alia, the wife raised supported concerns that the husband was dissipating marital property, in violation of T.C.A. § 36-4-106(d) and three restraining orders. McClure v. McClure, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 160 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 30, 2015).

Equity supported the father's request that the grandmother be ordered to return the life insurance proceeds to him because the mother changed the beneficiary on her policy one week after filing for divorce, in violation of T.C.A. § 36-4-106(d)(2), and such a remedy would return to the status quo that § 36-4-106 was intended to preserve. Coleman v. Olson, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 782 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 20, 2016).

Deceased wife violated the statutory injunction because she removed her husband as her life insurance beneficiary a week after she filed a divorce complaint. Coleman v. Olson, 551 S.W.3d 686, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 315 (Tenn. June 15, 2018).

Divorce action abated because the wife died, and the statutory injunction was no longer effective. Coleman v. Olson, 551 S.W.3d 686, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 315 (Tenn. June 15, 2018).

Wife's changing the policy beneficiary to her mother two days after being diagnosed with a serious condition that took her life one week later did not require an all-or-nothing determination; the equities justified awarding part of the proceeds to the husband for unexpected future medical and educational expenses with the balance to the wife's mother. The wife was justified to change the beneficiary because she believed the husband engaged in inappropriate conduct and he had no vested interest in the death benefit when she modified the beneficiary. Coleman v. Olson, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 19 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 21, 2020).

14. Annulment.

Evidence in the record overwhelmingly supported the trial court's findings with respect to the husband's mental incapacity to enter into a marriage contract; the wife introduced no expert proof to rebut the testimony of the husband's physician and while the husband's adopted son attempted to convince the trial court that the husband's mental and physical condition was good at the time of the marriage, the trial court specifically found that the wife's credibility was not good and the adopted son's credibility was poor. Nave v. Nave, 173 S.W.3d 766, 2005 Tenn. App. LEXIS 179 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 904 (Tenn. Oct. 17, 2005).

15. Contempt.

Wife had violated the court's standing orders because the wife had received the insurance proceeds from the fire that burned the marital home and the proceeds from the sale of the land on which the marital house had stood, but failed to give the husband his share of the proceeds, and the wife was ordered to pay court costs. Davis v. Davis, 223 S.W.3d 233, 2006 Tenn. App. LEXIS 739 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 419 (Tenn. Apr. 16, 2007).

Trial court properly found a husband guilty of criminal contempt because the record supported its conclusion that the husband violated statutory injunctions by purchasing, buying, or selling real estate after being served with the divorce complaint and notice of injunction. Trezevant v. Trezevant, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 213 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 25, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 622 (Tenn. Sept. 18, 2018).

Husband was properly found guilty of criminal contempt because the trial court made the specific findings of fact that supported the allegation that the husband's failure to disclose the full value of properties constituted deliberate attempts on more than one occasion to conceal the information from the wife and the trial court; the trial court found that he violated the mandatory injunction by purchasing real estate after being served with the divorce complaint and notice of injunctions. Trezevant v. Trezevant, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 213 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 25, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 622 (Tenn. Sept. 18, 2018).

Trial court held the wife in direct civil contempt and ordered her incarcerated until she agreed to remove her social media post; she was in custody for approximately four hours before she agreed to remove the post and was released. Thus, the wife purged herself of contempt, and absent a showing of specific prejudicial collateral consequences resulting from the trial court's finding of contempt, the court declined to apply the collateral consequences exception to the mootness doctrine. Stark v. Stark, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 36 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2020).

16. Application of Unclean Hands Doctrine.

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to punish a wife for civil contempt in a divorce proceeding because, although the wife withdrew money from the parties'  joint account without the husband's knowledge in violation of the set of mandatory mutual injunctions imposed on parties, the husband also violated the injunction by cancelling the wife's credit card after the divorce was filed. Mabie v. Mabie, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2017).

36-4-107. Verification of petition — Effect of noncompliance.

  1. The bill or petition, except those seeking a divorce from the bonds of matrimony on the grounds of irreconcilable differences, shall be verified by an affidavit, upon oath or affirmation, before a general sessions court judge, notary public or the judge or clerk of the court, or as provided in §§ 58-1-605 — 58-1-607, that the facts stated in the bill are true to the best of the complainant's knowledge and belief for the causes mentioned in the bill. The authority conferred in §§ 58-1-605 — 58-1-607 may be exercised beyond the continental limits of the United States.
  2. If the issue of whether the affidavit contains the complainant's verification that the complaint is not made out of levity or in collusion with the defendant is not raised at trial, each party waives the right to contest such issue on appeal.
  3. A divorce decree or order issued prior to March 22, 1996, in which the bill or petition for such divorce did not include the affidavit of verification required by this section shall remain valid and the parties shall remain divorced. Likewise, all other issues resolved in the divorce decree, order or agreement, such as distribution of marital property, alimony, child support and custody, shall remain valid and in full force and effect.

Code 1858, § 2453 (deriv. Acts 1835-1836, ch. 26, § 4); Shan., § 4206; mod. Code 1932, § 8431; Acts 1953, ch. 174, § 1; modified; impl. am. Acts 1957, ch. 320, § 2; 1977, ch. 107, § 3; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 36-806; Acts 1996, ch. 655, § 1; 1996, ch. 872, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 1996, ch. 655, § 3 provided that the provisions of that act, which added (b) and (c), are to be liberally construed to effectuate its purposes.

Textbooks. Gibson's Suits in Chancery (7th ed., Inman), §§ 237, 518.

Law Reviews.

Divorces in Tennessee (Harold C. Warner), 14 Tenn. L. Rev. 588 (1936).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Intent of Statute.

The marriage relation is the most sacred of domestic relations, and the legislature intended to protect this relation from any collusive attack by the husband and wife. De Armond v. De Armond, 92 Tenn. 40, 20 S.W. 422, 1892 Tenn. LEXIS 49 (1892).

Where the facts stated in the bill as grounds for divorce, while technically true, are susceptible of such explanation as would defeat the right to divorce, as where the complainant knows other facts that would in law defeat such right, such as complainant's condonation of defendant's adultery charged in the bill, the complainant cannot truly swear that the complaint was not made out of levity. It was intended, by the statute, to make such evasion impossible, and to compel the applicant for divorce to use the utmost good faith toward the court. De Armond v. De Armond, 92 Tenn. 40, 20 S.W. 422, 1892 Tenn. LEXIS 49 (1892).

There is nothing in T.C.A. § 36-4-107 indicating that it is applicable to petitions for annulment; moreover, statutes must be considered “in pari materia, not in a vacuum,” and when § 36-4-107 is read in conjunction with T.C.A. § 36-4-106, it is clear that the “petition” referred to in the former statute relates only to a petition for divorce; thus, the wife's argument that the chancery court erred in denying her motion to dismiss the annulment action by the conservator on that basis the conservator did not comply with § 36-4-107(a) was rejected. Nave v. Nave, 173 S.W.3d 766, 2005 Tenn. App. LEXIS 179 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 904 (Tenn. Oct. 17, 2005).

2. Jurisdiction.

The court acquires no jurisdiction of a divorce suit, in any material respect, if the affidavit to the bill fails to comply with the requirements of this section. The affidavit required by this section is essential to the jurisdiction of the court. De Armond v. De Armond, 92 Tenn. 40, 20 S.W. 422, 1892 Tenn. LEXIS 49 (1892); Fitzpatrick v. Fitzpatrick, 131 Tenn. 54, 173 S.W. 444, 1914 Tenn. LEXIS 84 (1915).

An affidavit meeting the requirements of this section is a jurisdictional prerequisite. Wagner v. Wagner, 8 Tenn. Civ. App. 254 (1918); Carter v. Carter, 28 Tenn. App. 478, 191 S.W.2d 451, 1944 Tenn. App. LEXIS 80 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1944); McFerrin v. McFerrin, 28 Tenn. App. 552, 191 S.W.2d 946, 1945 Tenn. App. LEXIS 93 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1945).

No person has a right to a divorce except as granted by statute and therefore a person using that privilege must accept the restrictions and limitations and must strictly comply with the statute including the taking of oath. Turner v. Bell, 198 Tenn. 232, 279 S.W.2d 71, 1955 Tenn. LEXIS 365 (1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 842, 76 S. Ct. 83, 100 L. Ed. 751, 1955 U.S. LEXIS 511 (1955).

3. Time of Affidavit.

There was no reversible error in allowing the affidavit to be made after argument. Hackney v. Hackney, 28 Tenn. 450, 1848 Tenn. LEXIS 101 (1848).

Where the defendant was not prejudiced by the delay, an amendment offered to cure a verbally defective affidavit offered during the time of the trial of issue raised by plea in abatement was not too late. Fitzpatrick v. Fitzpatrick, 131 Tenn. 54, 173 S.W. 444, 1914 Tenn. LEXIS 84 (1915).

4. Oath.

Where it was insisted that amendment to bill of divorce could not be considered because the appended affidavit was not in the language required by the statute in that it failed to reaffirm petitioner's good faith in making the complaint and failed to negative levity and collusion, it was held that the policy of the statute was served when the proper affidavit was attached to the original petition and that it was unnecessary to again take the required oath. Garvey v. Garvey, 29 Tenn. App. 291, 203 S.W.2d 912, 1946 Tenn. App. LEXIS 107 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1946).

5. —Verification by Nonresident Official.

This section does not authorize nonresident officials to administer the required oath. Carter v. Carter, 28 Tenn. App. 478, 191 S.W.2d 451, 1944 Tenn. App. LEXIS 80 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1944).

6. — —Official of Another Country.

Verification of petition for divorce by chief presidency magistrate of Calcutta was fatally defective because not authorized under this section or § 21-1-102 and also because not attested by clerk of court in which the official presided or by any other person. McFerrin v. McFerrin, 28 Tenn. App. 552, 191 S.W.2d 946, 1945 Tenn. App. LEXIS 93 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1945).

7. Sufficiency of Affidavit.

The affidavit must state “that the complaint is not made out of levity, or by collusion with the defendant.” The omission of the word “levity” is not cured by the use of the word “sincerity” in the affidavit. Words negativing levity other than those used in the statute may be employed in the affidavit, but the levity must be clearly negatived. The omission of the words “with the defendant” after the word “collusion” is fatal to the affidavit. No room should be left for evasion. De Armond v. De Armond, 92 Tenn. 40, 20 S.W. 422, 1892 Tenn. LEXIS 49 (1892).

The substitution of the word “purposes” for the word “causes” renders the affidavit fatally defective. The “purposes” expressed in the bill are to secure the divorce. The “causes” mentioned in the bill are the grounds for the divorce. De Armond v. De Armond, 92 Tenn. 40, 20 S.W. 422, 1892 Tenn. LEXIS 49 (1892).

The affidavit to a divorce bill that the facts stated in the bill are true to the best of affiant's “knowledge, information, and belief” is in substantial compliance with the requirements of this section, for the legislature did not intend to require personal, direct, or actual knowledge. E. W. M. v. J. C. M., 2 Tenn. Ch. App. 463 (1897).

8. —Amendment.

In DeArmond (1892), 92 Tenn. 40, 20 S.W. 422, 1892 Tenn. LEXIS 49, no amendment was offered to correct the defects in the affidavit, but if such amendment had been offered it should have been allowed. Fitzpatrick v. Fitzpatrick, 131 Tenn. 54, 173 S.W. 444, 1914 Tenn. LEXIS 84 (1915).

Where the bill was otherwise sufficient, but the verification was defective in omitting the word “levity,” and in substituting the word “purposes” in place of the required “causes,” the defects were not so fatal but that the chancellor should have allowed the amendment offered to correct. Fitzpatrick v. Fitzpatrick, 131 Tenn. 54, 173 S.W. 444, 1914 Tenn. LEXIS 84 (1915).

The service of a subpoena to answer, served with a copy of the bill in a divorce suit, upon a nonresident defendant temporarily in the state, was good, and gave jurisdiction of the person, though the affidavit verifying the complaint was verbally defective, at least so as to permit an amendment correcting the defective verification. Fitzpatrick v. Fitzpatrick, 131 Tenn. 54, 173 S.W. 444, 1914 Tenn. LEXIS 84 (1915).

9. —Cross Complaint.

Cross complaint in divorce action was fatally defective for failure of accompanying affidavit to include statement as to collusion or levity, as required, which was jurisdictional. Rayl v. Rayl, 64 S.W. 309, 1900 Tenn. Ch. App. LEXIS 183 (1900).

An answer and cross bill that does not seek a divorce need not be verified in accordance with this section but the oath may be in words similar to oaths generally made to answers and cross bills in other chancery and equitable proceedings. Canning v. Canning, 59 Tenn. App. 678, 443 S.W.2d 502, 1968 Tenn. App. LEXIS 363 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1968), overruled on other grounds, Fox v. Fox, 676 S.W.2d 956, 1984 Tenn. LEXIS 849 (Tenn. 1984).

10. Dismissal for Want of Sufficient Affidavit.

The appellate court will dismiss the bill for want of sufficient affidavit though no objection was made in the court below. De Armond v. De Armond, 92 Tenn. 40, 20 S.W. 422, 1892 Tenn. LEXIS 49 (1892); Fitzpatrick v. Fitzpatrick, 131 Tenn. 54, 173 S.W. 444, 1914 Tenn. LEXIS 84 (1915).

If the court discovers the omission of the affidavit, the bill will be dismissed. If complainant elects to dismiss, the court is without power to direct payment of counsel's fee. Wagner v. Wagner, 8 Tenn. Civ. App. 254 (1918).

36-4-108. Security for costs — Service of process.

  1. The complainant, upon giving security for costs, or otherwise complying with the law, shall have the usual process to compel the defendant to appear and answer the bill, or it may be taken for confessed, as in other chancery cases.
  2. In actions for annulment of marriage, service on the defendant may be by subpoena or by publication as in divorce cases.

Code 1858, § 2454 (deriv. Acts 1831, ch. 20, § 1; 1835-1836, ch. 26, §§ 3, 18; 1841-1842, ch. 133, § 3); Shan., § 4207; mod. Code 1932, § 8432; Acts 1957, ch. 100, § 1; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), §§ 36-807, 36-834.

Cross-References. Irreconcilable differences, procedure, § 36-4-103.

Proceeding in forma pauperis, § 20-12-127.

Law Reviews.

Divorce Decree Taken on Pro Confesso — When It May Be Set Aside for Fraud, 19 Tenn. L. Rev. 843 (1947).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Pauper's Oath.

A defendant, not asking for affirmative relief, may appeal on the pauper's oath. Prince v. Prince, 9 Tenn. App. 359, — S.W. —, 1926 Tenn. App. LEXIS 212 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1926); Tarver v. Tarver, 10 Tenn. App. 677, 1929 Tenn. App. LEXIS 66 (1929).

2. Service of Process.

It is axiomatic that a decree of divorce, obtained without actual or constructive service of process, is void. Gallagher v. Knoxville Iron Co., 5 Tenn. Civ. App. (5 Higgins) 718 (1914).

3. —Constructive Service.

There can be no constructive service of process in divorce cases except in those cases where some substituted service prescribed by statute is strictly observed. Gallagher v. Knoxville Iron Co., 5 Tenn. Civ. App. (5 Higgins) 718 (1914).

Trial court did not obtain personal jurisdiction over the father through the attempted service by publication because the record contained no statement made under oath or by affidavit that service of process had been attempted on the father at his usual place of abode or last known residence and that delineated facts supporting the allegation that he was no longer in the State; therefore, any portion of the trial court's judgment related to child support was void ab initio. State ex rel. Catalano v. Woodcock, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 469 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 5, 2016).

4. —Service on Defendant in Foreign Penitentiary.

If the defendant spouse in a divorce case is a nonresident by occupying the penitentiary of another state, publication may be made as in other cases of nonresidence of the defendants in divorce suits. Klutts v. Klutts, 37 Tenn. 423, 1858 Tenn. LEXIS 28 (1858).

36-4-109. Time for hearing.

If the subpoena to answer has been served upon the defendant, or if publication has been completed as required by law, the cause may be set for hearing and tried at the first term of court thereafter.

Code 1858, § 2455 (deriv. Acts 1841-1842, ch. 133, § 3); Shan., § 4208; Code 1932, § 8433; Acts 1933, ch. 156, § 1; C. Supp. 1950, § 8433; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 36-808.

Cross-References. Irreconcilable differences, procedure, § 36-4-103.

Law Reviews.

Domestic Relations — Inherent Annulment Jurisdiction of Equity Court, 22 Tenn. L. Rev. 1063 (1953).

36-4-110. Appearance and answer.

The defendant may appear according to the rules of the court and answer the bill upon oath or affirmation.

Code 1858, § 2457 (deriv. Acts 1835-1836, ch. 26, § 5); Shan., § 4210; Code 1932, § 8435; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 36-810.

Compiler's Notes. For abolition of demurrers, pleas, etc., see Tenn. R. Civ. P. 7.03.

Cross-References. Defenses to grounds specified in §§ 36-4-102, 36-4-120.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Verification.

An answer and cross bill that does not seek a divorce need not be verified as provided in T.C.A. § 36-4-107, but the oath may be in words similar to oaths generally made to answers and cross bills in other chancery and equitable proceedings. Canning v. Canning, 59 Tenn. App. 678, 443 S.W.2d 502, 1968 Tenn. App. LEXIS 363 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1968), overruled on other grounds, Fox v. Fox, 676 S.W.2d 956, 1984 Tenn. LEXIS 849 (Tenn. 1984).

36-4-111. Failure to separate not a defense.

It is no impediment to a divorce that the offended spouse did not leave the marital domicile or separate from the offending spouse on account of the conduct of the offending spouse.

Acts 1977, ch. 107, § 2; T.C.A., § 36-809.

Law Reviews.

A Critical Survey of Developments in Tennessee Family Law in 1976-77, IV. Divorce (Neil P. Cohen), 45 Tenn. L. Rev. 433 (1978).

36-4-112. Defense when ground is adultery.

If the cause assigned for the divorce is adultery, it is a good defense and perpetual bar to the same if the defendant alleges and proves that:

  1. The complainant has been guilty of like act or crime;
  2. The complainant has admitted the defendant into conjugal society and embraces after knowledge of the criminal act;
  3. The complainant, if the husband, allowed the wife's prostitutions and received hire for them; or
  4. The husband exposed the wife to lewd company, whereby the wife became ensnared to the act or crime of adultery.

Code 1858, § 2460 (deriv. Acts 1835-1836, ch. 26, § 9); Shan., § 4213; mod. Code 1932, § 8438; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 36-811.

Law Reviews.

Domestic Relations — Defenses to Divorce Confined to Those Prescribed by Statute, 9 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 346 (1979).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. In General.

All of the statutory defenses to a divorce action listed in this section and § 36-4-120 are affirmative defenses under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 8.03. Thomasson v. Thomasson, 755 S.W.2d 779, 1988 Tenn. LEXIS 153 (Tenn. 1988).

2. Burden of Proof.

Where a divorce is sought upon the charge of adultery that is clearly established by the proof, the complainant must establish by affirmative proof a character for virtue and chastity, or otherwise prove that he or she has not been guilty of adultery or of the other acts in the foregoing section that defeat the divorce sought upon the ground of the defendant's adultery; and this is required after an order pro confesso, and is required though not set up as a defense in the pleadings. The evidence, and not the pleadings and presumptions of law that might arise as to good character or conduct in other cases, constitutes the ground of divorce. It seems that it is not necessary for complainant to allege in the bill a character for virtue and chastity, but may show it in the proof simply. Cameron v. Cameron, 42 Tenn. 375, 1865 Tenn. LEXIS 78 (1865); Dismukes v. Dismukes, 1 Cooper's Tenn. Ch. 266 (1873); McClanahan v. McClanahan, 104 Tenn. 217, 56 S.W. 858, 1899 Tenn. LEXIS 30 (1900).

This section would seem to place the burden of proof upon the party setting up the defenses enumerated, and no decision to the contrary is found. Stepp v. Black, 14 Tenn. App. 153, — S.W.2d —, 1931 Tenn. App. LEXIS 24 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1931), superseded by statute as stated in, Hanover v. Ruch, 809 S.W.2d 893, 1991 Tenn. LEXIS 156 (Tenn. 1991).

The rule as to burden of proof under this section is not controlling, by analogy, in a common law action where special pleas set up new matter in avoidance to defeat the action. Stepp v. Black, 14 Tenn. App. 153, — S.W.2d —, 1931 Tenn. App. LEXIS 24 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1931), superseded by statute as stated in, Hanover v. Ruch, 809 S.W.2d 893, 1991 Tenn. LEXIS 156 (Tenn. 1991).

3. Like Act or Crime.

A husband cannot obtain a divorce on the grounds of his wife's adultery, where the record convicts him of the violation of his own marriage vows. Moore v. Moore, 102 Tenn. 148, 52 S.W. 778, 1898 Tenn. LEXIS 15 (1899).

Canning v. Canning, 59 Tenn. App. 678, 443 S.W.2d 502 (1968) is overruled to the extent that it held that adultery by a party was a complete bar to the right of that party to a divorce on the grounds of cruel and inhuman treatment. Fox v. Fox, 676 S.W.2d 956, 1984 Tenn. LEXIS 849 (Tenn. 1984).

A court can grant a divorce on the ground of cruel and inhuman treatment notwithstanding the fact that both parties committed adultery. Fox v. Fox, 676 S.W.2d 956, 1984 Tenn. LEXIS 849 (Tenn. 1984).

A party cannot use adultery to support a divorce on the grounds of cruel and inhuman treatment; there must be substantial proof of cruel and inhuman treatment without regard to the charge of adultery. Fox v. Fox, 676 S.W.2d 956, 1984 Tenn. LEXIS 849 (Tenn. 1984).

4. Condonation.

Condonation of adultery in divorce cases will be available, though not relied on in the pleadings, if it appears in the proof that the injured party, with full knowledge of the facts, has forgiven the offense or has procured or connived at its commission. McClanahan v. McClanahan, 104 Tenn. 217, 56 S.W. 858, 1899 Tenn. LEXIS 30 (1900).

The court will not, without pleadings raising the question, and upon mere motion, raise and make effective the defense of condonation, even where it might, if pleaded, be legally available, in order to defeat the wife's suit for divorce against a recusant and ruffianly husband, who confessed his adultery, and is shown to have assaulted his wife with brutal violence, to have falsely assailed her virtue by the grossest charges of lechery and immorality, to have slandered her vilely, and to have treated her with gross indignity, and great cruelty. McClanahan v. McClanahan, 104 Tenn. 217, 56 S.W. 858, 1899 Tenn. LEXIS 30 (1900).

There could be no condonation until the plaintiff had knowledge of the improper acts and mere suspicion or rumor was not enough. Doe v. Doe, 59 Tenn. App. 108, 438 S.W.2d 353, 1968 Tenn. App. LEXIS 334 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1968).

5. Adultery of Husband as a Defense.

Where wife offered defense of husband's adultery in suit by husband for divorce on alleged grounds of cruel and inhuman treatment, she was not obligated to affirmatively establish her character for virtue and chastity unless the same was put in issue. Canning v. Canning, 59 Tenn. App. 678, 443 S.W.2d 502, 1968 Tenn. App. LEXIS 363 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1968), overruled in Fox v. Fox, 676 S.W.2d 956, 1984 Tenn. LEXIS 849 (Tenn. 1984).

Husband was entitled to a divorce on the ground of inappropriate marital conduct, even though wife had an absolute defense to the husband's claim for an entitlement for divorce based on adultery since he had admitted to having committed a like act. Wilder v. Wilder, 863 S.W.2d 707, 1992 Tenn. App. LEXIS 617 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992).

6. Adultery by Both Spouses.

A court can grant a divorce on the ground of cruel and inhuman treatment notwithstanding the fact that both parties committed adultery. Stanfill v. Stanfill, 742 S.W.2d 267, 1987 Tenn. App. LEXIS 2937 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987).

7. Clean Hands.

Unclean hands is not listed as statutory defense to an action for divorce and, except for fraud and deceit upon the court, which are always available as defenses in any court, the clean hands principle does not apply in divorce litigation. Chastain v. Chastain, 559 S.W.2d 933, 1977 Tenn. LEXIS 655 (Tenn. 1977); Bush v. Bush, 684 S.W.2d 89, 1984 Tenn. App. LEXIS 3203 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984).

36-4-113. Issues — Trial by jury — New trial.

Issues may be made up at the request of either party upon matters of fact charged in the bill or petition and denied in the answer, and be tried by a jury in presence of the court, and a new trial may be granted of the issues, should the court deem it necessary.

Code 1858, § 2458 (deriv. Acts 1835-1836, ch. 26, § 5); Shan., § 4211; Code 1932, § 8436; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 36-812.

Textbooks. Gibson's Suits in Chancery (7th ed., Inman), § 523.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Applicability of Rules of Civil Procedure.

T.C.A. § 36-4-113 does not contain language suggesting that any determination requiring a new trial was exempted from the normal rules contained in the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, any motion for a new trial had to meet the requirements of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 59.02 or 59.05, which contained 30 day limits. Wright v. Quillen, 75 S.W.3d 413, 2001 Tenn. App. LEXIS 484 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001).

2. Right of Parties.

Either party may have any material fact, put in issue by the petition and answer, tried by a jury. Pillow v. Pillow, 13 Tenn. 420, 1826 Tenn. LEXIS 22 (1826).

3. Manner of Submission to Jury.

In the trial of a divorce suit before a jury, the petition and answer need not be read to the jury as forming the issues to be tried, but the matters submitted may be drawn up in a separate paper. Richmond v. Richmond, 18 Tenn. 343, 1837 Tenn. LEXIS 32 (1837).

4. Answer in Jury Cases.

Where an issue in a divorce case is submitted to a jury, the answer is not evidence as in other chancery cases, requiring two witnesses, or one witness with corroborating circumstances, to overthrow it, but it has merely the effect of a plea in making up the issue. Richmond v. Richmond, 18 Tenn. 343, 1837 Tenn. LEXIS 32 (1837).

5. Force and Effect of Jury Verdict.

Where the issues in a divorce case are submitted to a jury, the chancery court cannot disregard the verdict, for it must have the same force as a verdict at law, and be governed by the principles applicable to the verdict in trials at law. Richmond v. Richmond, 18 Tenn. 343, 1837 Tenn. LEXIS 32 (1837); James v. Brooks, 53 Tenn. 150, 1871 Tenn. LEXIS 334 (Tenn. Sep. 27, 1871); Morris v. Swaney, 54 Tenn. 591, 1872 Tenn. LEXIS 91 (1872); Ragsdale v. Gossett, 70 Tenn. 729, 1879 Tenn. LEXIS 233 (1879); First Nat'l Bank v. Oldham, 74 Tenn. 718, 1881 Tenn. LEXIS 203 (1881); Toomey v. Atyoe, 95 Tenn. 373, 32 S.W. 254, 1895 Tenn. LEXIS 102 (1895).

The supreme court will, in a divorce case, where there has been an issue of fact tried by a jury, examine the testimony as in other jury cases. Richmond v. Richmond, 18 Tenn. 343, 1837 Tenn. LEXIS 32 (1837).

6. Bill of Exceptions.

The parol testimony in a divorce suit, though in chancery, must be preserved by a bill of exceptions, and it is incumbent upon the appellant to have this done. Phillips v. Phillips, 73 Tenn. 451, 1880 Tenn. LEXIS 161 (1880); Goodman v. Goodman, 127 Tenn. 501, 155 S.W. 388, 1912 Tenn. LEXIS 44 (1912).

In the absence of a bill of exceptions showing the evidence submitted to the trial court, the appellate court will presume, on appeal in a divorce suit, as in other actions, that the chancellor's decree was based on proper and sufficient evidence. Phillips v. Phillips, 73 Tenn. 451, 1880 Tenn. LEXIS 161 (1880); Goodman v. Goodman, 127 Tenn. 501, 155 S.W. 388, 1912 Tenn. LEXIS 44 (1912).

7. Issues Submitted to Jury.

The right to a jury in an equitable matter exists only to the extent provided by statute. The jury does not try the whole case or render a verdict for one party or the other and these rules apply in a divorce action where a jury has been demanded under this section. Wright v. Quillen, 909 S.W.2d 804, 1995 Tenn. App. LEXIS 195 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995).

A trial judge has the authority to determine what issues should be submitted to the jury but may not deprive a litigant of the right to have the substantial disputes as to matters of fact passed upon by the jury. Wright v. Quillen, 909 S.W.2d 804, 1995 Tenn. App. LEXIS 195 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995).

This section does not require all mixed questions of law and fact to be submitted to the jury. The trial judge has a choice and, either must inform the jury hypothetically whether or not the facts that the evidence tends to prove will, if established in the opinion of the jury, satisfy the allegations, or the jury must find the facts specially, and then the court will apply the law. Wright v. Quillen, 909 S.W.2d 804, 1995 Tenn. App. LEXIS 195 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995).

8. Issues Not Submitted to Jury.

There is no right to a jury trial prior to the issuance of an order of protection issued under the Domestic Abuse Act, compiled in § 36-3-601 et seq.Clark v. Crow, 37 S.W.3d 919, 2000 Tenn. App. LEXIS 492 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000).

36-4-114. Proof required.

If the defendant admits the facts charged in the bill or petition and relied upon as the ground for a divorce, or the bill is taken for confessed, the court shall, nevertheless, before decreeing a divorce, except a divorce on the ground of irreconcilable differences, hear proof of the facts alleged as aforementioned, and either dismiss the bill or petition or grant a divorce, as the justice of the case may require.

Code 1858, § 2459 (deriv. Acts 1835-1836, ch. 26, § 6); Shan., § 4212; mod. Code 1932, § 8437; Acts 1977, ch. 107, § 4; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 36-813.

Cross-References. Irreconcilable differences, procedure, § 36-4-103.

Textbooks. Gibson's Suits in Chancery (7th ed., Inman), § 523.

Law Reviews.

Divorce Decree Taken on Pro Confesso — When It May Be Set Aside for Fraud, 19 Tenn. L. Rev. 843 (1947).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Sufficiency of Proof.

In divorce proceedings based on grounds of a previous marriage still subsisting, testimony of petitioner that defendant stated that she had never been divorced from previous husband and statement of defendant's attorney that there was no denial of a prior subsisting marriage was sufficient under this section to support divorce decree. Pewitt v. Pewitt, 192 Tenn. 227, 240 S.W.2d 521, 1951 Tenn. LEXIS 397 (1951).

This section precludes the obtaining of a divorce by stipulation and introduction of proof of grounds is a prerequisite to a valid divorce. Warren v. Warren, 731 S.W.2d 908, 1985 Tenn. App. LEXIS 3308 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985), superseded by statute as stated in, Kent v. Kent, — S.W.2d —, 1993 Tenn. App. LEXIS 678 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 27, 1993).

2. Corroboration of Plaintiff's Testimony.

Under petition alleging that the defendant husband had abandoned plaintiff and refused or neglected to provide for her, uncorroborated testimony of wife was not sufficient proof. Fulford v. Fulford, 156 Tenn. 640, 4 S.W.2d 350, 1927 Tenn. LEXIS 160 (1928).

A divorce should not be granted without corroborating testimony where it is practicable to obtain such corroborating testimony. Greene v. Greene, 43 Tenn. App. 411, 309 S.W.2d 403, 1957 Tenn. App. LEXIS 124 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1957); Crews v. Crews, 743 S.W.2d 182, 1987 Tenn. App. LEXIS 2924 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987).

3. —Evidence Required.

The statute appears to require some evidence in every divorce case rather than requiring evidence corroborating the testimony of the successful party in a contested divorce case. Dukes v. Dukes, 528 S.W.2d 43, 1975 Tenn. App. LEXIS 199 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1975).

Trial court erred in granting a husband's motion to enter a decree of divorce for the wife where, even though the husband admitted to allegations of adultery in the divorce petition, that was not an agreed upon stipulation and the court should have held an evidentiary hearing to hear proof of the facts prior to having granted the divorce. Hyneman v. Hyneman, 152 S.W.3d 549, 2003 Tenn. App. LEXIS 680 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 407 (Tenn. May 10, 2004).

4. Endorsement of Divorce Proctor.

Where endorsement of the divorce proctor, required under Acts 1915, ch. 121 was omitted by petitioner but was subsequently made before trial, proceeding was not to be treated as void. Taylor v. Taylor, 144 Tenn. 311, 232 S.W. 445, 1921 Tenn. LEXIS 41 (1921), overruled in part, Morrissey v. Morrissey, 214 Tenn. 112, 377 S.W.2d 944, 1964 Tenn. LEXIS 455 (1964).

5. Stipulation.

T.C.A. § 36-4-114 addresses the situation in which a defendant admits the facts charged in the bill or petition and relied upon as the ground for a divorce, and mandates that the trial court shall, nevertheless, before decreeing a divorce, hear proof of the facts alleged; the statutes must be interpreted in pari materia, and thus the meaning of “stipulation” in T.C.A. § 36-4-129 must be construed in light of the express terms of T.C.A. § 36-4-114. Hyneman v. Hyneman, 152 S.W.3d 549, 2003 Tenn. App. LEXIS 680 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 407 (Tenn. May 10, 2004).

Trial court did not err in granting a wife a divorce on the ground of inappropriate marital conduct because it gave the wife's counsel the opportunity to present proof, and counsel declined, recognizing the stipulation to inappropriate marital conduct. Richards v. Richards, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 712 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 26, 2016).

Probate and family court erred in denying a husband's motion to set aside a judgment that granted the wife a default judgment on the ground of inappropriate marital conduct because the court was statutorily required to hear proof of the facts alleged before granting a divorce, on any ground other than irreconcilable differences, in the absence of a valid stipulation between the parties and the court failed to do so inasmuch as there was no transcript of the hearing or evidence in the record to evaluate, and the wife did not deny or contradict the husband's assertions that the trial court heard no proof at the hearing. Slagle v. Slagle, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 252 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 24, 2019).

36-4-115. Form of proof.

Either party may take proof by depositions according to the rules or orders of the court, or have the witnesses examined in open court at pleasure.

Code 1858, § 2462 (deriv. Acts 1835-1836, ch. 26, § 22); Shan., § 4215; mod. Code 1932, § 8440; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 36-814.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Depositions Without Order of Court.

The parties in a divorce suit have a right to take depositions as in chancery suits, without an order of court for that purpose. Richmond v. Richmond, 18 Tenn. 343, 1837 Tenn. LEXIS 32 (1837).

36-4-116. Affidavits of proof not required — Sworn statements concerning financial matters required — Sworn statements as evidence.

  1. No judge or chancellor shall require the filing of affidavits of proof from witnesses, plaintiffs, defendants, or petitioners and respondents in support of any complaint for divorce, legal separation, separate maintenance or annulment.
  2. Any such judge or chancellor may, however, require a sworn statement from such persons relative or pertaining to the income of the parties, their expenses, any real or personal property in which the parties have an interest and the extent of such parties' interest therein, and such sworn statement shall be admissible as evidence of the truth of the contents.

Acts 1982, ch. 640, § 1; T.C.A., § 36-839; Acts 1991, ch. 273, § 39; 1998, ch. 1059, § 3.

36-4-117. Proof when ground is spouse's refusal to remove to this state.

If the divorce is sought by the complainant spouse on the ground of the defendant spouse's refusal to remove with the complainant spouse to this state, and of the defendant spouse's willful absence for two (2) years without reasonable cause, the complainant spouse shall prove endeavors to induce the defendant spouse to live with the complainant spouse after the separation, and that the complainant spouse did not remove from the state where the complainant spouse resided for the purpose of obtaining a divorce.

Code 1858, § 2463 (deriv. Acts 1835-1836, ch. 26, § 2); Shan., § 4216; Code 1932, § 8441; Acts 1982, ch. 853, § 3; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 36-815.

Textbooks. Gibson's Suits in Chancery (7th ed., Inman), § 523.

Law Reviews.

Tennessee Law and the Equal Rights Amendment: Domestic Relations, 3 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 312 (1972).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Construction.

The requirements of this section relate to proof and not to pleading, and it is not necessary for petitioner seeking a divorce under § 36-4-101(a)(8), to allege that he did not move from the state where the wife resided for the purpose of obtaining a divorce. Baeyertz v. Baeyertz, 171 Tenn. 190, 101 S.W.2d 689, 1936 Tenn. LEXIS 79 (1937).

2. Application.

The requirement of this statute that the husband “shall prove endeavors to induce” the wife “to live with him after the separation” does not apply to § 36-4-101(a)(4) making “willful or malicious desertion or absence of either party, without a reasonable cause, for two whole years” (now “one whole year”), a ground for absolute divorce. Lanier v. Lanier, 52 Tenn. 462, 1871 Tenn. LEXIS 280 (1871).

3. Failure of Proof.

Where husband did not comply with this section in that he did not prove that he did not remove to Tennessee for the purpose of obtaining a divorce, chancellor properly refused to grant divorce on ground of refusal of wife to remove to this state and willful absence for two years without reasonable cause. Greene v. Greene, 43 Tenn. App. 411, 309 S.W.2d 403, 1957 Tenn. App. LEXIS 124 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1957).

36-4-118. Proof when ground is conviction of crime.

The proof that the defendant is a convict, or is sentenced to the penitentiary, if that is the cause relied upon for the divorce, shall be by the record of the conviction and sentence.

Code 1858, § 2464 (deriv. Acts 1841-1842, ch. 133, § 3); Shan., § 4217; Code 1932, § 8442; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 36-816.

Law Reviews.

Tennessee Civil Disabilities: A Systematic Approach (Neil P. Cohen), 41 Tenn. L. Rev. 253 (1974).

36-4-119. Decree of court generally.

If, upon hearing the cause, the court is satisfied that the complainant is entitled to relief, it may be granted either by pronouncing the marriage void from the beginning, or by dissolving it forever and freeing each party from the obligations thereof, or by a separation for a limited time.

Code 1858, § 2465 (deriv. Acts 1835-1836, ch. 26, §§ 7, 19); Shan., § 4218; Code 1932, § 8443; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 36-817.

Cross-References. Entry of judgments, Tenn. R. Civ. P. 58.

Irreconcilable differences, procedure, § 36-4-103.

Law Reviews.

Domestic Relations (William J. Harbison), 6 Vand. L. Rev. 974 (1953).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Jurisdiction.

Chancery court had jurisdiction of suit to annul marriage based on prior marriage of defendant from which there had been no divorce notwithstanding fact that plaintiff had not been a resident of the state for two years prior to institution of suit. Estes v. Estes, 194 Tenn. 96, 250 S.W.2d 32, 1952 Tenn. LEXIS 355, 32 A.L.R.2d 730 (1952).

2. Discretion of Court.

Relief involves an exercise of discretion, affected in some measure by considerations of public policy. Parks v. Parks, 158 Tenn. 91, 11 S.W.2d 680, 1928 Tenn. LEXIS 127 (1928).

The discretion of annulling the marriage rather than granting a divorce is given by this section. Southern R. Co. v. Baskette, 175 Tenn. 253, 133 S.W.2d 498, 1939 Tenn. LEXIS 37 (1939); Estes v. Estes, 194 Tenn. 96, 250 S.W.2d 32, 1952 Tenn. LEXIS 355, 32 A.L.R.2d 730 (1952).

3. Nature of Decree.

In divorce proceeding, which is in the nature of a suit in equity, the court is deemed to have decided all material issues, and especially the question of (1) divorce, (2) the care and custody of minor children and (3) the property rights of the parties. Gracey v. Gracey, 201 Tenn. 414, 300 S.W.2d 606, 1957 Tenn. LEXIS 317 (1957).

4. Effect of Annulment.

The legal effect of a decree annulling a voidable marriage was to render the marriage a nullity and to judicially declare that there had never been a legal and lawful marriage. Southern R. Co. v. Baskette, 175 Tenn. 253, 133 S.W.2d 498, 1939 Tenn. LEXIS 37 (1939).

5. Decree Awarding Divorce to Both Parties.

A decree awarding husband a divorce on his original bill on grounds of cruel and inhuman treatment and awarding wife a divorce on cross bill on grounds of desertion was self emasculating and could not stand. Brewies v. Brewies, 27 Tenn. App. 68, 178 S.W.2d 84, 1943 Tenn. App. LEXIS 131 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1943).

6. Decree Denying Divorce.

In a suit for divorce by husband on grounds of desertion, evidence to the effect that withdrawal of wife was forced by the cruel and inhuman treatment of the husband was properly excluded where the question had been previously decided against the wife in divorce suit against the husband on grounds of cruel and inhuman treatment. Douglas v. Douglas, 156 Tenn. 655, 4 S.W.2d 358, 1927 Tenn. LEXIS 163 (1928).

A decree denying divorce does not bar a later action on similar grounds subsequently occurring. Banks v. Banks, 18 Tenn. App. 347, 77 S.W.2d 74, 1934 Tenn. App. LEXIS 37 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1934).

7. Decree After Death.

A nunc pro tunc decree of divorce cannot be entered in a divorce suit, after the death of one of the parties, because it requires proceedings and evidence to authorize the entry of such decree involving the principles of a revivor of a divorce suit to the extent of showing a proper cause for the entry of such decree. Owens v. Sims, 43 Tenn. 544, 1866 Tenn. LEXIS 85 (1866).

A cause of action for divorce is purely personal, and it has been held that such a cause of action terminates on the death of either spouse; if an action for a divorce is commenced, and one of the parties dies thereafter, but before the entry of the final decree, the action abates. The judicial power is ended when a party dies before the entry of a decree; if the court thereafter grants a divorce in ignorance of the death of a party, the decree is void; and the decree does not estop the survivor from asserting in another proceeding that the decedent was dead when the decree was entered. If, on the other hand, the court has entered a decree, or if the judicial function has terminated without formal entry of a decree, the death of the spouse does not affect the matter. Steele v. Steele, 757 S.W.2d 340, 1988 Tenn. App. LEXIS 373 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988).

Where spouse in divorce action died subsequent to announcement of judicial decision by letter, but prior to entry of the judgment with the clerk, and evidence showed that the judge knew his decision needed to be formalized by entry of judgment on the minutes of the court, there was no judgment entered prior to the death of the spouse as required by (former) Tenn. R. Civ. P. 58.02, and the action abated with his death. Steele v. Steele, 757 S.W.2d 340, 1988 Tenn. App. LEXIS 373 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988).

8. Foreign Decree.

Validity and effect of foreign divorce decrees discussed. Kenner v. Kenner, 139 Tenn. 211, 201 S.W. 779, 1917 Tenn. LEXIS 99, L.R.A. (n.s.) 1918E587 (1918), rehearing denied, 139 Tenn. 700, 202 S.W. 723, 1917 Tenn. LEXIS 139 (1918).

Trial court erred in declaring a marriage by estoppel because the husband had rebutted the presumption that the parties'  marriage was valid by presenting evidence sufficient to establish that their marriage was bigamous. Guzman v. Alvares, 205 S.W.3d 375, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 605 (Tenn. July 11, 2006).

9. Setting Aside Decree.

A decree of annulment could not be collaterally attacked on grounds that an amendment to the bill was not sworn to and that the allegations of fraud in the bill were insufficient to support the judgment where the court had jurisdiction of the subject matter and parties. Southern R. Co. v. Baskette, 175 Tenn. 253, 133 S.W.2d 498, 1939 Tenn. LEXIS 37 (1939).

Wife who had been previously adjudged insane could acquire a valid divorce barring claim for husband's property, even though she had not been restored, where she was adequately represented in the divorce action by competent attorneys and where defendant failed to object to action in her name, since the court, representing the public in divorce actions, can supply the necessary volition in parties' interests and the necessary capacity to take oath and be a witness. Turner v. Bell, 198 Tenn. 232, 279 S.W.2d 71, 1955 Tenn. LEXIS 365 (1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 842, 76 S. Ct. 83, 100 L. Ed. 751, 1955 U.S. LEXIS 511 (1955).

Where husband obtained divorce after notice by publication in 1945 while wife was temporarily out of the state but wife made no attempt to question validity of decree until after husband's death in 1962 even though she testified that she left attorney to watch after her interests while she was out of the state and was informed while she was out of the state that husband was a free man, wife's suit to set aside divorce was barred by laches. Coleman v. Coleman, 212 Tenn. 258, 369 S.W.2d 557, 1963 Tenn. LEXIS 420 (1963).

36-4-120. Ill conduct defense.

  1. If the cause assigned for a divorce is that specified in § 36-4-101(a)(11), the defendant may make defense by alleging and proving the ill conduct of the complainant as a justifiable cause for the conduct complained of, and on making out the defense to the satisfaction of the court, the bill may be dismissed with or without costs, in the discretion of the court.
  2. But, if the court is of the opinion that the complainant is entitled to relief, it may be granted, according to the prayer of the bill, by annulling the marriage, or by ordering a separation, perpetual or temporary, or such other decree as the nature and circumstances of the case require.

Code 1858, §§ 2466, 2467 (deriv. Acts 1835-1836, ch. 26, §§ 19, 20); Shan., §§ 4219, 4220; Code 1932, §§ 8444, 8445; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), §§ 36-818, 36-819; Acts 1998, ch. 1059, § 11.

Cross-References. Stipulated grounds for divorce, § 36-4-129.

Law Reviews.

Dual Fault Divorce in Tennessee: The Thomasson Case and the New Statute, 19 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 353 (1989).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. In General.

All of the statutory defenses to a divorce action listed in T.C.A. § 36-4-112 and this section are affirmative defenses under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 8.03. Thomasson v. Thomasson, 755 S.W.2d 779, 1988 Tenn. LEXIS 153 (Tenn. 1988).

2. Constitutionality.

This section does not violate U.S. Const., amend. 14, as abridging privileges and immunities since divorce is not privilege or immunity of citizenship. Turner v. Bell, 198 Tenn. 232, 279 S.W.2d 71, 1955 Tenn. LEXIS 365 (1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 842, 76 S. Ct. 83, 100 L. Ed. 751, 1955 U.S. LEXIS 511 (1955).

3. Applicability.

This section is only available when it is alleged and proved that plaintiff was guilty of misconduct that was a justifiable cause and preceded in time the defendant's misconduct. Thomasson v. Thomasson, 755 S.W.2d 779, 1988 Tenn. LEXIS 153 (Tenn. 1988).

The statutory defense of justifiable cause is not available where the ground for divorce is adultery. Thomasson v. Thomasson, 755 S.W.2d 779, 1988 Tenn. LEXIS 153 (Tenn. 1988).

4. Authority of Court.

Whatever decree the chancery court is authorized to enter under this section is a decree that ipso facto the circuit court is authorized to enter by reason of T.C.A. § 36-4-105 from which each court derives its authority with reference to this section. Browder v. Browder, 188 Tenn. 488, 221 S.W.2d 526, 1949 Tenn. LEXIS 364 (1949).

Circuit court has jurisdiction of suit by wife seeking support for herself and child although she did not pray for either limited or absolute divorce. Browder v. Browder, 188 Tenn. 488, 221 S.W.2d 526, 1949 Tenn. LEXIS 364 (1949).

Where husband has proven a cause of action for divorce to which wife is without a valid defense and wife has proven a cause of action for divorce to which husband is without a valid defense, the court cannot award a divorce to either party and their respective suits must be dismissed. Thomasson v. Thomasson, 755 S.W.2d 779, 1988 Tenn. LEXIS 153 (Tenn. 1988).

5. Recrimination.

This statute authorizes the defense of recrimination by a husband, but giving full measure to the husband's insistence that the outbreaks on his part were largely the result of the angry impatience of the wife at his management of the property that she brought to him, yet her such conduct was no excuse for the brutality and obscenity that habitually marked his conduct toward her on such occasions. McClanahan v. McClanahan, 104 Tenn. 217, 56 S.W. 858, 1899 Tenn. LEXIS 30 (1900).

Where trial court's decree in granting divorce to husband recited that husband gave wife no cause or just excuse for her misconduct, such statement clearly indicated that court considered and rejected the defense of recrimination. Ellis v. Ellis, 63 Tenn. App. 361, 472 S.W.2d 741, 1971 Tenn. App. LEXIS 225 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1971).

As defined in this section, the defense to an action brought pursuant to T.C.A. § 36-4-102 is not one of recrimination per se, since the ill conduct of the complainant may constitute a defense to the complaint only if such ill conduct is shown to be a justifiable cause for the conduct complained of in the action. Chastain v. Chastain, 559 S.W.2d 933, 1977 Tenn. LEXIS 655 (Tenn. 1977); Bush v. Bush, 684 S.W.2d 89, 1984 Tenn. App. LEXIS 3203 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984).

Where conduct of husband was remote in time and not so egregious as to justify wife's response, and wife's conduct was disproportionate to husband's conduct, wife failed to establish ill-conduct defense. Thompson v. Thompson, 797 S.W.2d 599, 1990 Tenn. App. LEXIS 273 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990).

6. Adultery.

Where plaintiff's adultery was committed after the defendant husband had abandoned her and turned her out of doors and refused or neglected to provide for her, her ill conduct could not have been a justifiable cause for the alleged abandonment on the part of the defendant, and therefore plaintiff's adultery was not a defense to the divorce action. Chastain v. Chastain, 559 S.W.2d 933, 1977 Tenn. LEXIS 655 (Tenn. 1977); Bush v. Bush, 684 S.W.2d 89, 1984 Tenn. App. LEXIS 3203 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984).

A court can grant a divorce on the ground of cruel and inhuman treatment notwithstanding the fact that both parties committed adultery. Stanfill v. Stanfill, 742 S.W.2d 267, 1987 Tenn. App. LEXIS 2937 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987).

7. Equitable Principles.

The court has power to apply equitable principles. Sloan v. Sloan, 155 Tenn. 422, 295 S.W. 62, 1926 Tenn. LEXIS 62 (1927).

8. Clean Hands.

Unclean hands is not listed as statutory defense to an action for divorce and, except for fraud and deceit upon the court, which are always available as defenses in any court, the clean hands principle does not apply in divorce litigation. Chastain v. Chastain, 559 S.W.2d 933, 1977 Tenn. LEXIS 655 (Tenn. 1977); Bush v. Bush, 684 S.W.2d 89, 1984 Tenn. App. LEXIS 3203 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984).

9. Relief Other Than That Prayed For.

Though the only specific relief prayed for in a bill for divorce is a divorce from bed and board, the court may grant an absolute divorce if the circumstances of the case require it. Lingner v. Lingner, 165 Tenn. 525, 56 S.W.2d 749, 1932 Tenn. LEXIS 80 (1933).

In action for separate maintenance where none of the statutory grounds for divorce are pleaded, an absolute divorce may not be decreed merely because it appears that there is no hope of reconciliation between the parties. Stephenson v. Stephenson, 201 Tenn. 253, 298 S.W.2d 717, 1957 Tenn. LEXIS 419 (1957).

Right of wife to separate maintenance and support is founded on obligation of the husband to support and is not dependent on the divorce statutes, and chancery court has inherent power, independent of statute, to grant such relief in proper cases, where a divorce is not sought or in which the complainant is not entitled to a divorce. Stephenson v. Stephenson, 201 Tenn. 253, 298 S.W.2d 717, 1957 Tenn. LEXIS 419 (1957).

10. Annulment.

Where marriage of persons under 18 years of age contracted in another state was contrary to the public policy of this state and the state where contracted, it could be annulled here. DeFur v. DeFur, 156 Tenn. 634, 4 S.W.2d 341, 1927 Tenn. LEXIS 158 (1928).

11. Decree Awarding Divorce to Both Parties.

Decree awarding husband a divorce on his original bill on grounds of cruel and inhuman treatment and awarding wife a divorce on cross bill on grounds of desertion was self emasculating and could not stand. Brewies v. Brewies, 27 Tenn. App. 68, 178 S.W.2d 84, 1943 Tenn. App. LEXIS 131 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1943).

12. Alimony or Support After Foreign Divorce Decree.

Public policy of Tennessee limits right of a wife to recover alimony from a husband who has obtained a divorce on constructive service in another state to those cases where Tennessee is or was the matrimonial domicile. Burton v. Burton, 52 Tenn. App. 484, 376 S.W.2d 504, 1963 Tenn. App. LEXIS 108 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1963).

36-4-121. Distribution of marital property.

    1. In all actions for divorce or legal separation, the court having jurisdiction thereof may, upon request of either party, and prior to any determination as to whether it is appropriate to order the support and maintenance of one (1) party by the other, equitably divide, distribute or assign the marital property between the parties without regard to marital fault in proportions as the court deems just.
    2. In all actions for legal separation, the court, in its discretion, may equitably divide, distribute, or assign the marital property in whole or in part, or reserve the division or assignment of marital property until a later time. If the court makes a final distribution of marital property at the time of the decree of legal separation, any after-acquired property is separate property.
      1. Any auction sale of property ordered pursuant to this section shall be conducted in accordance with title 35, chapter 5.
      2. To this end, the court shall be empowered to effectuate its decree by divesting and reinvesting title to such property and, where deemed necessary, to order a sale of such property and to order the proceeds divided between the parties.
      3. The court may order title 35, chapter 5 to apply to any sale ordered by the court pursuant to this section.
      4. The court, in its discretion, may impose any additional conditions or procedures upon the sale of property in divorce cases as are reasonably designed to ensure that such property is sold for its fair market value.
  1. For purposes of this chapter:
      1. “Marital property” means all real and personal property, both tangible and intangible, acquired by either or both spouses during the course of the marriage up to the date of the final divorce hearing and owned by either or both spouses as of the date of filing of a complaint for divorce, except in the case of fraudulent conveyance in anticipation of filing, and including any property to which a right was acquired up to the date of the final divorce hearing, and valued as of a date as near as reasonably possible to the final divorce hearing date. In the case of a complaint for legal separation, the court may make a final disposition of the marital property either at the time of entering an order of legal separation or at the time of entering a final divorce decree, if any. If the marital property is divided as part of the order of legal separation, any property acquired by a spouse thereafter is deemed separate property of that spouse. All marital property shall be valued as of a date as near as possible to the date of entry of the order finally dividing the marital property;
        1. “Marital property” includes income from, and any increase in the value during the marriage of, property determined to be separate property in accordance with subdivision (b)(2) if each party substantially contributed to its preservation and appreciation;
        2. “Marital property” includes the value of vested and unvested pension benefits, vested and unvested stock option rights, retirement, and other fringe benefit rights accrued as a result of employment during the marriage;
        3. The account balance, accrued benefit, or other value of vested and unvested pension benefits, vested and unvested stock option rights, retirement, and other fringe benefits accrued as a result of employment prior to the marriage, together with the appreciation of the value, shall be “separate property.” In determining appreciation for purposes of this subdivision (b)(1)(B)(iii), the court shall utilize any reasonable method of accounting to attribute postmarital appreciation to the value of the premarital benefits, even though contributions have been made to the account or accounts during the marriage, and even though the contributions have appreciated in value during the marriage; provided, however, the contributions made during the marriage, if made as a result of employment during the marriage and the appreciation attributable to these contributions, would be “marital property.” When determining appreciation pursuant to this subdivision (b)(1)(B)(iii), the concepts of commingling and transmutation shall not apply;
        4. Any withdrawals from assets described in subdivision (b)(1)(B)(iii) used to acquire separate assets of the employee spouse shall be deemed to have come from the separate portion of the account, up to the total of the separate portion. Any withdrawals from assets described in subdivision (b)(1)(B)(iii) used to acquire marital assets shall be deemed to have come from the marital portion of the account, up to the total of the marital portion;
      2. “Marital property” includes recovery in personal injury, workers' compensation, social security disability actions, and other similar actions for the following: wages lost during the marriage, reimbursement for medical bills incurred and paid with marital property, and property damage to marital property;
      3. As used in this subsection (b), “substantial contribution” may include, but not be limited to, the direct or indirect contribution of a spouse as homemaker, wage earner, parent or family financial manager, together with such other factors as the court having jurisdiction thereof may determine;
      4. Property shall be considered marital property as defined by this subsection (b) for the sole purpose of dividing assets upon divorce or legal separation and for no other purpose; and assets distributed as marital property will not be considered as income for child support or alimony purposes, except to the extent the asset will create additional income after the division;
    1. “Separate property” means:
      1. All real and personal property owned by a spouse before marriage, including, but not limited to, assets held in individual retirement accounts (IRAs) as that term is defined in the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (26 U.S.C.), as amended;
      2. Property acquired in exchange for property acquired before the marriage;
      3. Income from and appreciation of property owned by a spouse before marriage except when characterized as marital property under subdivision (b)(1);
      4. Property acquired by a spouse at any time by gift, bequest, devise or descent;
      5. Pain and suffering awards, victim of crime compensation awards, future medical expenses, and future lost wages; and
      6. Property acquired by a spouse after an order of legal separation where the court has made a final disposition of property.
  2. In making equitable division of marital property, the court shall consider all relevant factors including:
    1. The duration of the marriage;
    2. The age, physical and mental health, vocational skills, employability, earning capacity, estate, financial liabilities and financial needs of each of the parties;
    3. The tangible or intangible contribution by one (1) party to the education, training or increased earning power of the other party;
    4. The relative ability of each party for future acquisitions of capital assets and income;
      1. The contribution of each party to the acquisition, preservation, appreciation, depreciation or dissipation of the marital or separate property, including the contribution of a party to the marriage as homemaker, wage earner or parent, with the contribution of a party as homemaker or wage earner to be given the same weight if each party has fulfilled its role;
      2. For purposes of this subdivision (c)(5), dissipation of assets means wasteful expenditures which reduce the marital property available for equitable distributions and which are made for a purpose contrary to the marriage either before or after a complaint for divorce or legal separation has been filed.
    5. The value of the separate property of each party;
    6. The estate of each party at the time of the marriage;
    7. The economic circumstances of each party at the time the division of property is to become effective;
    8. The tax consequences to each party, costs associated with the reasonably foreseeable sale of the asset, and other reasonably foreseeable expenses associated with the asset;
    9. In determining the value of an interest in a closely held business or similar asset, all relevant evidence, including valuation methods typically used with regard to such assets without regard to whether the sale of the asset is reasonably foreseeable. Depending on the characteristics of the asset, such considerations could include, but would not be limited to, a lack of marketability discount, a discount for lack of control, and a control premium, if any should be relevant and supported by the evidence;
    10. The amount of social security benefits available to each spouse; and
    11. Such other factors as are necessary to consider the equities between the parties.
  3. The court may award the family home and household effects, or the right to live therein and use the household effects for a reasonable period, to either party, but shall give special consideration to a spouse having physical custody of a child or children of the marriage.
    1. The court may impose a lien upon the marital real property assigned to a party, or upon such party's separate real property, or both, as security for the payment of child support.
    2. The court may impose a lien upon the marital real property assigned to a party as security for the payment of spouse support or payment pursuant to property division.
    1. If, in making equitable distribution of marital property, the court determines that the distribution of an interest in a business, corporation or profession would be contrary to law, the court may make a distributive award of money or other property in order to achieve equity between the parties. The court, in its discretion, may also make a distributive award of money or other property to supplement, facilitate or effectuate a distribution of marital property.
    2. The court may provide that any distributive award payable over a period of time be secured by a lien on specific property.
    1. Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent the affirmation, ratification and incorporation in a decree of an agreement between the parties regarding the division of property.
    2. Nothing in this section shall affect validity of an antenuptial agreement that is enforceable under § 36-3-501.
  4. If an order of protection issued in or recognized by this state has been in effect or there is a court finding of domestic abuse or any criminal conviction involving domestic abuse within the marriage that is the subject of the proceeding for divorce, the court shall attribute any debt owed for any batterers' intervention or rehabilitation programs to the abuser only.

Acts 1953, ch. 90, § 1 (Williams, § 8446); 1959, ch. 192, § 1; 1983, ch. 414, § 4; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 36-825; Acts 1984, ch. 590, § 1; 1986, ch. 722, § 2; 1987, ch. 122, § 1; 1987, ch. 390, § 6; 1988, ch. 682, § 1; 1988, ch. 735, § 1; 1988, ch. 841, §§ 1, 2; 1991, ch. 449, § 1; 2000, ch. 713, §§ 1-9; 2001, ch. 274, § 1; 2002, ch. 651, § 8; 2011, ch. 119, § 1; 2014, ch. 786, § 1; 2015, ch. 202, § 1; 2017, ch. 309, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 1987, ch. 122, § 2 provided that the 1987 amendment by that act, shall apply to all actions for divorce or separate maintenance that are pending on April 9, 1987, or that are filed after April 9, 1987.

Acts 1987, ch. 390, § 7 provided that the 1987 amendment to this section by that act applies to all actions for divorce or separate support and maintenance that are pending on May 17, 1987, or that are filed on or after that date.

Acts 2014, ch. 786, § 2 provided that the act, which added subsection (h), shall apply to divorce actions commenced on or after July 1, 2014.

Acts 2015, ch. 202, § 2 provided that the act, which amended subdivision (b)(1)(B), shall apply to actions for divorce or legal separation filed on or after July 1, 2015.

Acts 2017, ch. 309, § 2 provided that the act, which amended this section, shall apply to actions filed on or after July 1, 2017.

Amendments. The 2017 amendment  added present (c)(10) and redesignated former (c)(10) and (11) as present (c)(11) and (12).

Effective Dates. Acts 2017, ch. 309, § 2. July 1, 2017.

Cross-References. Privilege tax on recordation of divorce decree adjusting property rights, § 67-4-409.

Textbooks. Gibson's Suits in Chancery (7th ed., Inman), § 525.

Pritchard on Wills and Administration of Estates (5th ed., Phillips and Robinson), § 669.

Tennessee Forms (Robinson, Ramsey and Harwell), No. 4-401.

Law Reviews.

Bankruptcy Issues Arising in Divorce Practice (Ellen B. Vergos), 24 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 697 (1994).

Covenant Marriage: Should Tennessee Join the Noble Experiment?, 29 U. Mem. L. Rev. 397 (1999).

Family Law — Gragg v. Gragg: Tennessee Adopts the Analytical Standard that Classifies Private Disability Policies According to Parties' Intent (Philip M. Mize), 32 U. Mem. L. Rev. 749 (2002).

Protection Against Spousal Disinheritance: A Critical Analysis of Tennessee's New Forced Share System, 28 U. Mem. L. Rev. 561 (1998).

The Revocation-Upon-Divorce Doctrine: Tennessee's Need to Adopt the Broader Uniform Probate Code Approach (Hailey H. David), 39 U. Mem. L. Rev. 383 (2009).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

This section would not be construed to authorize divestiture of estate that vested prior to its enactment since such a construction would sanction taking a vested property right without due process of law. Kittrell v. Kittrell, 56 Tenn. App. 584, 409 S.W.2d 179, 1966 Tenn. App. LEXIS 237 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1966).

1.5. Alimony In Futuro.

Award of alimony in futuro in the amount of $ 400 per month to the wife was affirmed; the trial court based its award on the fact that the wife would be eligible for Social Security in less than two years and was capable of maintaining employment, thereby necessitating modification of the award in the near future, and the record supported this assessment. Rufsholm v. Rufsholm, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 517 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 30, 2018).

2. Construction.

There was nothing in the 1959 amendment to this section that either directly or by implication repealed the provisions of §§ 36-5-101, 36-5-102. Witherspoon v. Witherspoon, 55 Tenn. App. 484, 402 S.W.2d 492, 1965 Tenn. App. LEXIS 293 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1965).

This section is not mandatory but leaves it within the discretion of the trial judge as to the vesting and divesting of title. Witherspoon v. Witherspoon, 55 Tenn. App. 484, 402 S.W.2d 492, 1965 Tenn. App. LEXIS 293 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1965).

A division of jointly held property under this section is not an award of alimony. Langford v. Langford, 220 Tenn. 600, 421 S.W.2d 632, 1967 Tenn. LEXIS 443 (1967), superseded by statute as stated in, Perkinson v. Perkinson, — S.W.2d —, 1990 Tenn. App. LEXIS 39 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 1990). See also Trimble v. Trimble, 224 Tenn. 571, 458 S.W.2d 794, 1970 Tenn. LEXIS 357 (1970).

The proper procedure to be followed where this section applies is for the court to first determine the interest of each party in jointly owned property and award the wife alimony on the basis of such interests and after this allot her homestead. Trimble v. Trimble, 224 Tenn. 571, 458 S.W.2d 794, 1970 Tenn. LEXIS 357 (1970).

The statute should be broadly construed and liberally applied to accomplish its objective. Pennington v. Pennington, 592 S.W.2d 576, 1979 Tenn. App. LEXIS 364 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1979).

This provision is neutral on its face and susceptible of a constitutionally sound interpretation. Mitchell v. Mitchell, 594 S.W.2d 699, 1980 Tenn. LEXIS 421 (Tenn. 1980).

The 1983 amendment to this section was remedial in nature and, as such, was applied to a case where a division of property that occurred prior to the effective date (September 1, 1983) was vacated on appeal after the effective date, and the case remanded for further consideration and findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to this section as amended. Kelly v. Kelly, 679 S.W.2d 458, 1984 Tenn. App. LEXIS 3109 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984).

Manner in which the trial court divided the marital estate was equitable under T.C.A. § 36-4-121; the evidence regarding the husband's financial contributions to the marriage provided a sufficient basis for awarding the husband a larger share of the marital estate. Altman v. Altman, 181 S.W.3d 676, 2005 Tenn. App. LEXIS 207 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 1016 (Tenn. Oct. 31, 2005).

Subsection (c) concerns the equitable division of marital property, and the ownership of separate property may be considered in the division of marital property, however, separate property is not deemed marital in order to equitably divide the estate; instead, the distribution of marital property may be adjusted in accordance with the facts and circumstances of the case. Draper v. Draper, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 905 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 15, 2015).

3. —“Jointly Owned” Defined.

The words in this section, “jointly owned,” are not the equivalent of “jointly held” and, so, do not limit the inquiry to interests represented by instruments of conveyance at law but include every legal or equitable interest recognized at law or by equity in any kind of property held in the name of either party, or both parties, that either party is able to establish by competent evidence. Jones v. Jones, 597 S.W.2d 886, 1979 Tenn. LEXIS 536 (Tenn. 1979).

4. Construction with Other Sections.

Where chancery court enforced parts of the Kansas court's divorce decree by reducing the husband's share of the parties' Tennessee marital property by the amounts of the child support arrearage and discovery-related sanction assessed by the Kansas court, that enforcement violated the registration and notice provisions of the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act's (UIFSA), specifically T.C.A. §§  36-5-260136-5-2607, because the Kansas court's decree was never registered in Tennessee and the husband was never provided notice of the registration or an opportunity to contest the validity and enforcement of the decree. Jolly v. Jolly, 130 S.W.3d 783, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 251 (Tenn. 2004), rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 332 (Tenn. 2004), review or rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 591 (Tenn. 2005).

5. Purpose.

The 1959 amendment broadened the purpose of the statute to include adjustments in favor of the wife as well as the husband that the court in its discretion may think right and proper as well as the original power to vest and divest title. Kittrell v. Kittrell, 56 Tenn. App. 584, 409 S.W.2d 179, 1966 Tenn. App. LEXIS 237 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1966); Elias v. Elias, 61 Tenn. App. 692, 457 S.W.2d 612, 1969 Tenn. App. LEXIS 302 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1969).

One of the primary purposes of the 1953 amendment was to prevent the unjust enrichment of the wife in divorce cases where the title to real estate paid for by the husband had been taken in the joint names of the husband and wife, and by the 1959 amendment the act broadened the powers of the courts to achieve justice and equitably adjust the rights of parties in jointly owned property in divorce cases. Elias v. Elias, 61 Tenn. App. 692, 457 S.W.2d 612, 1969 Tenn. App. LEXIS 302 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1969).

This section gives the court wide discretion to adjust and adjudicate the respective rights and interests of the parties in all jointly owned property, and the statute should be broadly construed and liberally applied to accomplish its objective. Evans v. Evans, 558 S.W.2d 851, 1977 Tenn. App. LEXIS 316 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1977).

The equitable division of joint property is designed to preserve the property rights (the net worth) of the wronged spouse. Duncan v. Duncan, 686 S.W.2d 568, 1984 Tenn. App. LEXIS 3264 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984).

Given the remedial nature of the statute authorizing division of property, T.C.A. § 29-27-107, it was intended by the legislature that a court in divorce proceedings, after determining the various rights of the parties, be clothed with the authority under this section to enforce its determination by appropriate orders as to the title of property irrespective of where located in Tennessee. Knobler v. Knobler, 697 S.W.2d 583, 1985 Tenn. App. LEXIS 2715 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985).

Concept of marital property had no place in this matter involving a father who obtained a judgment against his married daughter because this was not a divorce case. Ammons v. Longworth, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 559 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 14, 2019).

7. Division Not Award of Alimony.

A division of property under this section is not an award of alimony. Salisbury v. Salisbury, 657 S.W.2d 761, 1983 Tenn. App. LEXIS 698 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983).

7. Discretion of Court.

Fact that court granted divorce in accordance with husband's bill did not preclude court from divesting husband's share of jointly owned property from husband and vesting it in wife. Langford v. Langford, 220 Tenn. 600, 421 S.W.2d 632, 1967 Tenn. LEXIS 443 (1967), superseded by statute as stated in, Perkinson v. Perkinson, — S.W.2d —, 1990 Tenn. App. LEXIS 39 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 1990).

The court in division of property in a divorce action has jurisdiction to do what may be just and reasonable under the circumstances of the case regardless of which party obtains the divorce, absolute or otherwise. Langford v. Langford, 220 Tenn. 600, 421 S.W.2d 632, 1967 Tenn. LEXIS 443 (1967), superseded by statute as stated in, Perkinson v. Perkinson, — S.W.2d —, 1990 Tenn. App. LEXIS 39 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 1990).

Where plaintiff and defendant had been married for 28 years and had accumulated an estate through their joint efforts, it was within the court's discretion to award each party approximately one-half the value of the estate. Evans v. Evans, 558 S.W.2d 851, 1977 Tenn. App. LEXIS 316 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1977).

This section gives the court wide discretion to adjust and adjudicate the respective rights and interests of the parties in all jointly owned property. Pennington v. Pennington, 592 S.W.2d 576, 1979 Tenn. App. LEXIS 364 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1979).

This section provides no direction concerning when the value of marital property should be determined. Trial courts have wide discretion concerning the manner in which they divide marital property. Wallace v. Wallace, 733 S.W.2d 102, 1987 Tenn. App. LEXIS 2630 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987).

When, after the equitable division of marital assets, there remain obligations of the parties, the court has the discretion to order the payment of the obligations in such a manner that is just and equitable, considering the respective earning capacities of the spouses and the other relevant factors enumerated in this section. Hanover v. Hanover, 775 S.W.2d 612, 1989 Tenn. App. LEXIS 174 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989).

Trial courts are afforded wide discretion in dividing the interest of parties in jointly-owned property. Its distribution will be given great weight on appeal, and will be presumed to be correct unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Barnhill v. Barnhill, 826 S.W.2d 443, 1991 Tenn. App. LEXIS 561 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991).

The trial court has wide discretion in dividing the marital estate upon divorce. Loyd v. Loyd, 860 S.W.2d 409, 1993 Tenn. App. LEXIS 215 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993).

Trial judges have wide latitude in fashioning an equitable division of marital property, and appellate courts accord great weight to a trial judge's decision unless it is inconsistent with the factors in T.C.A. § 36-4-121(c) or is not supported by a preponderance of the evidence. Manis v. Manis, 49 S.W.3d 295, 2001 Tenn. App. LEXIS 48 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001), review or rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 534 (Tenn. 2001).

In divorce cases, a trial court has the authority, upon the request of either party, to equitably divide the marital estate between the parties, under T.C.A. § 36-4-121(a)(1). Flannary v. Flannary, 121 S.W.3d 647, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 1199 (Tenn. 2003).

Trial courts have broad discretion in fashioning an equitable division of a marital estate, under T.C.A. § 36-4-121(c), and because of the court's broad discretion, its division of assets is not a mechanical process. Flannary v. Flannary, 121 S.W.3d 647, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 1199 (Tenn. 2003).

Trial court has broad discretion in dividing the net marital estate, and the court was disinclined to second-guess the trial court in this case. Culver v. Culver, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 510 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 26, 2015).

8. Presumptions.

In making an equitable division of property under this statute, there is a presumption that the ownership of the property is equal. Salisbury v. Salisbury, 657 S.W.2d 761, 1983 Tenn. App. LEXIS 698 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983).

Trial court erred in classifying 1.2 million dollars of the house's equity as one spouse's separate property as the spouse failed to rebut the presumption that the spouse made a gift to the marital estate when the couple assumed joint title to the property. Eldridge v. Eldridge, 137 S.W.3d 1, 2002 Tenn. App. LEXIS 583 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 247 (Tenn. Mar. 10, 2003).

There being no way to determine if $180,000 used to purchase the marital home came from a husband's premarital funds and its appreciation or from the postmarital contributions and their appreciation, the husband did not show that the $180,000 withdrawn from his account was solely from the marital portion of his 401(k) account, and he did not rebut the presumption that transmutation occurred; thus, husband's 401(k) account became marital property subject to equitable division under the rationale of commingling and transmutation. Snodgrass v. Snodgrass, — S.W.3d —, 2008 Tenn. App. LEXIS 196 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2008), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 295 S.W.3d 240, 2009 Tenn. LEXIS 677 (Tenn. Oct. 9, 2009).

9. Factors for Consideration.

Need can be considered in adjusting the interests of the parties in jointly owned property. Fisher v. Fisher, 648 S.W.2d 244, 1983 Tenn. LEXIS 632 (Tenn. 1983).

The court will adjust and adjudicate the interests of the parties regardless of fault. Fisher v. Fisher, 648 S.W.2d 244, 1983 Tenn. LEXIS 632 (Tenn. 1983).

When apportioning marital debts the court considers the following factors: (1) Which party incurred the debt and the reason for the debt; (2) Which party benefitted from the loan; and (3) Which party is better able to assume the debt. Mahaffey v. Mahaffey, 775 S.W.2d 618, 1989 Tenn. App. LEXIS 353 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989).

Trial court did not err in distributing marital property notwithstanding the tax consequences of the marital property distribution. Fulbright v. Fulbright, 64 S.W.3d 359, 2001 Tenn. App. LEXIS 532 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001), review or rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 843 (Tenn. Dec. 10, 2001).

Husband had greater earning potential than the wife, had greater ability to acquire assets in the future, had a significant educational background that was obtained during the marriage that the wife lacked, and was five years younger than the wife; thus, while the division of the marital assets was not equal, the trial court's division of the marital property was just and equitable pursuant to T.C.A. § 36-4-121(c). Dube v. Dube, 104 S.W.3d 863, 2002 Tenn. App. LEXIS 856 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002), review or rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 394 (Tenn. May 5, 2003).

When a husband withdrew funds from a savings account held jointly with his wife and placed the funds in a bedroom drawer, after which the funds were missing, while the funds were not marital property, the husband's careless handling of them could be considered the dissipation of a marital asset, under T.C.A. § 36-4-121(c)(5), which would be relevant to the division of property that was part of the parties' marital estate, and, as his careless handling of the funds affected the equities between the parties, it could be regarded as a necessary factor in considering those equities, under T.C.A. § 36-4-121(c)(11). Flannary v. Flannary, 121 S.W.3d 647, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 1199 (Tenn. 2003).

T.C.A. § 36-4-121(c)(5) requires a court dividing marital property to consider the contribution of each party to the acquisition, preservation, appreciation, depreciation or dissipation of the marital or separate property. Flannary v. Flannary, 121 S.W.3d 647, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 1199 (Tenn. 2003).

Under T.C.A. § 36-4-121(c)(11), a court dividing a marital estate must consider such other factors as are necessary to consider the equities between the parties, and this provision, together with T.C.A. § 36-4-121(c)(5), regarding considering each party's contribution to the preservation, appreciation, depreciation or dissipation of marital or separate property, require the trial court to consider the actions of the parties throughout the course of the marriage. Flannary v. Flannary, 121 S.W.3d 647, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 1199 (Tenn. 2003).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion when it divided the parties'  net marital assets favoring the wife by approximately $43,000 because the parties were married for 30 years, the wife was capable of earning at least $1,200 a month as a nurse assistant, the husband received a total of $4,258 a month, the wife contributed approximately $48,636 in separate funds to the marriage, and the husband inherited the real property on which he and his mother resided and which was valued at $102,000. Oakes v. Oakes, 235 S.W.3d 152, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 160 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 26, 2007), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 708 (Tenn. Aug. 13, 2007).

Classification and division of the husband's and wife's property was appropriate under T.C.A. § 36-4-121(c) because there was no economic and earning disparity, and the trial court did acknowledge the brevity of the marriage in making its determinations of the classification and division of property. Woodward v. Woodward, 240 S.W.3d 825, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 302 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 11, 2007), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 851 (Tenn. Sept. 17, 2007).

Wife's motion for rehearing was denied because the court of appeals had not inequitably divided the marital estate by awarding her 49.2% of the net marital estate where the division was made after carefully balancing the factors in T.C.A. § 36-4-121(c); the husband was charged with repayment of substantially all of the marital debt, and the wife was made responsible only for a mortgage and credit card debt that she incurred after her separation from the husband. Owens v. Owens, 241 S.W.3d 478, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 306 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 19, 2007).

Trial court failed to make appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law as required by Tenn. R. Civ. P. 52.01 and therefore the case was remanded for it to do so because it did not make determinations concerning the equitable division of property, the dissipation of marital assets, and the benefit the husband allegedly derived from his exclusive use of the marital home for several months, and nothing in its judgment indicated that it considered this section as required. Turman v. Turman, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 221 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 14, 2015).

Trial court considered monies that the wife had obtained through withdrawing her premarital separate funds or liquidating her premarital separate property as contributions to the marital estate, and at no time did the trial court engage in a dollar-for-dollar credit to the wife of separate property for the funds she had contributed, and the husband was not entitled to relief. Howard v. Howard, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 877 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 29, 2015).

Husband paid to refinance the mortgage on property originated with the sale of a relative's home and was derived from the wife's separate, premarital property; the trial court did not err by declining to consider any nominal income earned from certain property as a contribution somehow made through the husband's separate property. Howard v. Howard, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 877 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 29, 2015).

Rental property was not occupied by tenants at all times during the marriage, and the proof concerning a variable amount of rent, taken together with the parties'  payment of insurance and taxes on the property, did not preponderate in favor of a finding that rental income from the property was any more than a nominal contribution to the marital estate at best. Howard v. Howard, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 877 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 29, 2015).

Although some portion of the insurance and other expenses the husband paid might have constituted marital debt, he presented no proof to this effect, and the trial court did not err by declining to consider the down payment received by the husband for sale of property as a contribution to the parties'  marital estate. Howard v. Howard, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 877 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 29, 2015).

Husband had demonstrated ancestral ties to the marital residence while the wife had indicated that extended members of her family had become dependent on their ability to reside at the marital residence during their elder years; the trial court did not err by awarding to the wife the marital residence as part of an equitable distribution of the marital estate. Howard v. Howard, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 877 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 29, 2015).

Evidence preponderated in favor of a determination that the trial court's distribution of the marital estate should be modified to award the Mustang to the husband; this modification to the judgment was necessary to equitably distribute the marital estate of this relatively short-term marriage. Howard v. Howard, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 877 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 29, 2015).

Trial court failed to consider any of the relevant factors in distributing the marital estate and whether the farm had increased in value due to the husband's alleged substantial contribution to its preservation and appreciation; the case was remanded. Draper v. Draper, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 905 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 15, 2015).

Trial court erred in dividing the marital property because it failed to consider the relevant factors in distributing the marital estate. Draper v. Draper, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 905 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 15, 2015).

Wife did not finish school but she did not know any reason she could not return and complete court reporter training, plus she had not looked in to any possibilities of vocational training during the three years the divorce had been pending, and thus the record did not support the finding that the wife was unable to secure employment beyond the three days of waitressing per week or that she was unable to rehabilitate herself. Franks v. Franks, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 152 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 29, 2016).

Record did not support the trial court's finding of the husband's income to be $ 16,000 per month; he testified that he earned $ 7,200 per month, it appeared that the trial court adopted arguments of the wife's attorney suggesting the husband's income, but statements by counsel were not evidence, plus the trial court increased the husband's monthly income based on an undefined tax benefit. Franks v. Franks, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 152 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 29, 2016).

Trial court properly distributed the marital estate because it reviewed and applied the statutory factors to the financial situations of the husband and the wife and explained its decision in a well-reasoned manner. Moon v. Moon, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 270 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 21, 2016).

Parties themselves divided much of the household furnishings and tools, and thus the parties effectively stipulated to the division of this property, and the trial court did not err by accepting the division of personal property that the parties themselves agreed to make. Watt v. Watt, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 295 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 27, 2016).

Overall division of the marital property was not inequitable because several factors supported awarding the wife somewhat more marital property, including the long duration of the marriage, the husband's substantially higher income, earning capacity, and level of training and education, and the wife's lack of separate property. Naylor v. Naylor, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 494 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 15, 2016).

Based on the disparity between the parties'  respective physical and mental health, earning capacity, financial needs, and the value of their separate property, the trial court misapplied the statutory requirements for division of the marital estate, and an equal division of the marital estate was not equitable to the wife. Gant v. Gant, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 63 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2017).

When calculating the total amount of marital property awarded to each party, the award of alimony in solido was not to be considered. Gant v. Gant, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 63 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2017).

Division of marital estate in a divorce case was consistent with the statutory factors and was supported by the preponderance of the evidence because the trial court properly considered the husband's dissipation of marital assets during an affair as one factor in the context of weighing the totality of the circumstances and equities of the divorce. The court also considered it important for the children to be able to remain in the same residence and school district and recognized the wife's role as the children's primary caregiver. Slocum v. Slocum, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 705 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 17, 2017).

Trial court properly awarded a patent application to a wife because it considered the relevant statutory factors, and its findings were supported the wife's testimony; the trial court found that the invention contained in the patent application was the wife's idea, the invention contained in the patent application was a product sold through the wife's separate business, the marriage was short-term, and the wife contributed funds towards pursuing the patent during the litigation. Gentry v. Gentry, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 838 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2017).

Appellate court could not determine whether the overall distribution of marital property was equitable because the trial court did not provide any explanation for its determination that the husband had a separate interest in the marital home valued at $64,500 and did not provide any justification for its division of the marital estate or make any findings that aligned with T.C.A. § 36-4-121(c). Dalili v. Dalili, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 59 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 10, 2020).

10. —Contribution to Other Spouse's Separate Property.

Wife, by working in the husband's law office and working directly on the litigation in question, made a direct contribution to the preservation of the asset, i.e., the husband's fee for successfully litigating the case, which warranted consideration in the division of marital assets. Wilder v. Wilder, 863 S.W.2d 707, 1992 Tenn. App. LEXIS 617 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992).

Wife who worked part-time in husband's law office for no pay was awarded five percent of the husband's interest in litigation fees, after subtracting the litigation expenses paid by the husband from the fee, the income tax paid by the husband on the fee, and the ten percent of the fee paid by the husband to his previous wife under the divorce decree dissolving that marriage. Wilder v. Wilder, 863 S.W.2d 707, 1992 Tenn. App. LEXIS 617 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992).

In order to prove an increase in the value of separate property, a nonowner spouse must present evidence that proves the value of the separate asset prior to the marriage. Cutsinger v. Cutsinger, 917 S.W.2d 238, 1995 Tenn. App. LEXIS 648 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995).

Where wife failed to prove an appreciation in husband's chiropractic practice and where she had been contemporaneously compensated for her contributions during the marriage, she was not entitled to any more than her equitable share of the value of equipment purchased for the practice during the marriage. Cutsinger v. Cutsinger, 917 S.W.2d 238, 1995 Tenn. App. LEXIS 648 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995).

An increased equity in the husband's separate real property, which accrued during the marriage and as a result of the wife's substantial contribution, was marital property subject to division. Cohen v. Cohen, 937 S.W.2d 823, 1996 Tenn. LEXIS 567 (Tenn. 1996).

Wife did not carry her burden of proving an increase in the value of husband's separate property where no evidence was presented regarding the value of the property at the time the parties married. Garfinkel v. Garfinkel, 945 S.W.2d 744, 1996 Tenn. App. LEXIS 766 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996).

A spouse's contributions must be real and significant in order to be substantial; however, they need not be monetarily commensurate to the appreciation in the separate property's value, nor must they relate directly to the separate property at issue. Wright-Miller v. Miller, 984 S.W.2d 936, 1998 Tenn. App. LEXIS 537 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998).

Husband's substantial efforts in maintaining and improving overall real property he had previously executed to wife in a quitclaim deed, resulted in an increase in value that was all marital property under this section. Denton v. Denton, 33 S.W.3d 229, 2000 Tenn. App. LEXIS 343 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000).

Large division of the marital estate in favor of a wife was extreme and inequitable, resulting in an injustice to the husband, because, although the wife's parent gifted business entities to the wife, the husband contributed to the management of the entities after the gift and marital funds were used to pay taxes for the entities. Telfer v. Telfer, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 120 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 5, 2018).

11. —Marital Fault.

The court could not consider the fact that the wife's adulterous relationship with husband's law partner precipitated the breakup of the marriage in dividing husband's litigation fee, a marital asset. Wilder v. Wilder, 863 S.W.2d 707, 1992 Tenn. App. LEXIS 617 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992).

Although marital fault is not to be considered in property division, any negative effect wife's adultery may have had on husband's ability to negotiate successfully a settlement of case in question should be taken into account, under the property division, in determining her appropriate share of husband's fee for litigating such case. Wilder v. Wilder, 863 S.W.2d 707, 1992 Tenn. App. LEXIS 617 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992).

12. —Debts.

Trial courts have the authority to apportion marital debts in the same way they divide marital assets; thus, the court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that husband should be liable for any deficiency arising from forfeiture of a pleasure boat that was marital property. Cutsinger v. Cutsinger, 917 S.W.2d 238, 1995 Tenn. App. LEXIS 648 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995).

Marital debts should, where possible, follow their associated assets, and should be apportioned by considering the reason for the debt, the party who benefited from the debt, and the party better able to assume the debt. King v. King, 986 S.W.2d 216, 1998 Tenn. App. LEXIS 425 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998).

Marital debts need not be divided in precisely the same manner as the marital assets, although they frequently follow their related assets. Kinard v. Kinard, 986 S.W.2d 220, 1998 Tenn. App. LEXIS 543 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998), modified, 986 S.W.2d 220, 1998 Tenn. App. LEXIS 598 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998).

Trial court did not err in making its equitable distribution of the parties' marital debt because the one spouse did not limit or object to the other spouse's use of the credit cards, the other spouse used the credit cards to benefit both parties, as well as the other spouse's two children, the one spouse knew that the other spouse used the credit cards to support the other spouse's children and did not object to that practice, and the one spouse was more capable of paying the debt. Smith v. Smith, 93 S.W.3d 871, 2002 Tenn. App. LEXIS 622 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002).

In dissolution proceedings, although a trial court erred in assigning to a wife her attorney fees as marital debt and a utility bill as marital debt, the property division was not inequitable, pursuant to T.C.A. § 36-4-121, because after considering the amount of assets and liabilities properly awarded to each party in the divorce, the husband received a net gain of $ 2,616.33 while the wife's net gain was only $ 618.36. Rountree v. Rountree, 369 S.W.3d 122, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 69 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 1, 2012), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 355 (Tenn. May 16, 2012).

In a dissolution matter, a trial court erred in determining a loan in which both parties'  were borrowers was marital debt, T.C.A. § 36-4-121(b)(1)(A), because the loan was applied for and the proceeds distributed to the husband shortly before the parties were married, the proceeds were used to pay off an obligation that was solely the debt of the husband, and the balance of the proceeds went into the husband's personal bank account; the husband benefitted most from the loan and was responsible for the balance. Yattoni-Prestwood v. Prestwood, 397 S.W.3d 583, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 602 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 29, 2012), appeal denied, Yattoni-Prestwood v. Prestwood, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 70 (Tenn. Jan. 9, 2013).

In a dissolution matter, a trial court erred in determining certain debts a wife acquired during the marriage were the wife's separate obligations, T.C.A. § 36-4-121, because the expenditures were gifts of the wife's separate property for the benefit of the marriage and, as such, considered marital obligations subject to equitable distribution; the husband was responsible for one-half of the marital debt in the form of alimony in solido, T.C.A. § 36-5-121. Yattoni-Prestwood v. Prestwood, 397 S.W.3d 583, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 602 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 29, 2012), appeal denied, Yattoni-Prestwood v. Prestwood, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 70 (Tenn. Jan. 9, 2013).

Although a wife's separate property was used by the parties to secure a line of credit, the debt was marital property because both parties incurred the debt, both parties benefitted from its use, and the purpose of the debt was marital; the wife was responsible for one-third and the husband was responsible for two-thirds of the remaining debt on the line of credit. Luplow v. Luplow, 450 S.W.3d 105, 2014 Tenn. App. LEXIS 355 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 19, 2014).

Trial court erred in equally dividing as marital debt a judgment incurred by a husband because the husband incurred the judgment debt as a result of his malfeasance and, considering the nature and amount of the parties' other debt, was best able to repay the debt. Luplow v. Luplow, 450 S.W.3d 105, 2014 Tenn. App. LEXIS 355 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 19, 2014).

Trial court did not err in dividing the marital debt incurred as a result of the parties' child's private school tuition because there was no requirement the wife consent to the child's enrollment in private school and the husband incurred the tuition debt by borrowing the money from his mother and signing several notes to repay the debt; the husband was allocated two-thirds of the debt and the wife was allocated the remaining one-third. Luplow v. Luplow, 450 S.W.3d 105, 2014 Tenn. App. LEXIS 355 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 19, 2014).

Trial court did not err in dividing debt from three credit cards that accrued during the marriage, wherein the cards were in the wife's name jointly with her father's business, because the wife used all three cards for “personal and business” use, and the wife's use of the cards for business purposes was sufficient to support allocation of the marital debt on two of the cards to the wife. Luplow v. Luplow, 450 S.W.3d 105, 2014 Tenn. App. LEXIS 355 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 19, 2014).

Status of the property as separate or marital property was disputed by the parties at the outset of trial, but each party had listed the property as the husband's separate property in his or her table on appeal; any debt still associated with that property was the husband's sole responsibility prior to the distribution of marital assets and liabilities. Howard v. Howard, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 877 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 29, 2015).

Trial court did not err in equitably dividing a wife's credit card debt between the parties. The trial court's distribution of the wife's credit card debt was not based solely upon the representation of the wife's counsel, as the husband claimed, but rather was based upon the testimony of the parties. Culpepper v. Culpepper, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 892 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 4, 2015).

Insufficient evidence supported the classification that the obligation owed to the parties'  son, as evidenced by checks, was a separate debt; the checks were written on a marital account during the marriage and there was no evidence that this was a separate debt of the husband. Jones v. Jones, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 589 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 12, 2016).

Husband was responsible to repay the $ 2,000 to the parties'  son; while the specific purpose of the $ 2,000 was not clear, the husband, who controlled the account and wrote the checks, failed to deliver them to the son, thus incurring the debt, nothing showed that the wife benefitted from the $ 2,000, and the husband, who received a larger share of the marital assets, was best able to repay the debt. Jones v. Jones, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 589 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 12, 2016).

Trial court's allocation of the marital debt to the husband was proper under T.C.A. § 36-4-121(c); the parties had been married for 17 years, the husband had a college degree and earned about three times as much as the wife, who had no college degree, and she could not cover her expenses while the husband had a surplus. Cardle v. Cardle, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 330 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 17, 2017).

Trial court did not err in assessing the total amount of marital credit card debt to a mother because it clearly intended to protect the spouse who did not incur the debt from bearing responsibility for debts that were the result of personal excesses of the other spouse; the combined debt was undisputedly incurred by the mother because the father testified that he had never utilized any of the credit cards in question. Buchanan v. Buchanan, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 565 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 26, 2018).

Trial court did not err in finding that the wife would be unable to refinance the mortgage on the marital residence in order to place the debt solely in her name due to her lack of employment history, and the judgment was modified to add a provision that the wife would indemnify the husband from his mortgage obligation. Brown v. Brown, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 622 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 25, 2018).

Marital debt was considered before the marital estate was divided given that the wife was assigned about $250,000 in debt, the husband was assigned $37,000 in debt, and the husband's transitional alimony obligation was not an allocation of debt. Diffie v. Diffie, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 191 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 23, 2019).

In allocating the parties'  marital debt, although the parties maintained separate accounts with several credit card companies, the trial court failed to recognize that there were separate accounts with those companies and ruled as if each party had submitted its own approximate value. Further, the failure to assign those debts was not harmless as the court's erroneous property division affected other aspects of the divorce proceeding. Blakemore v. Blakemore, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 290 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 25, 2020).

13. Marital Property.

An interest in a profession may be a marital asset. Smith v. Smith, 709 S.W.2d 588, 1985 Tenn. App. LEXIS 3148 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985).

A law practice may be a marital asset but the value placed on it does not include the professional goodwill of the firm. Smith v. Smith, 709 S.W.2d 588, 1985 Tenn. App. LEXIS 3148 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985).

A professional license is not itself an item of marital property subject to division; however, one spouse's contribution to the other's professional education is one factor to be considered by the court in equitably dividing a marital estate. Beeler v. Beeler, 715 S.W.2d 625, 1986 Tenn. App. LEXIS 3008 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986).

Alimony of in solido is not awarded from the expectation of the future earnings of a professional practice, since the amount of such future earnings is entirely speculative. Beeler v. Beeler, 715 S.W.2d 625, 1986 Tenn. App. LEXIS 3008 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986).

T.C.A. § 36-4-121(b)(1) clearly states that “any increase in value during the marriage” of certain property shall be included as marital property subject to division. The word “any” is all inclusive and does not allow an exception based on inflation. Ellis v. Ellis, 748 S.W.2d 424, 1988 Tenn. LEXIS 48 (Tenn. 1988).

Husband's right to share the full appreciation of the property during the marriage was not limited to the amount that he alone had contributed to its maintenance and repair, and the husband was entitled to share fully in the whole appreciation and value of the property during the marriage. Ellis v. Ellis, 748 S.W.2d 424, 1988 Tenn. LEXIS 48 (Tenn. 1988).

This section does not require an “equal” division of the marital property but an “equitable” division of that property considering the factors set out in T.C.A. § 36-4-121(c), and, in some cases, the most equitable division would be an approximate equal division. Ellis v. Ellis, 748 S.W.2d 424, 1988 Tenn. LEXIS 48 (Tenn. 1988).

Gifts by one spouse to another of property that would otherwise be classified as marital property are the separate property of the recipient spouse. Batson v. Batson, 769 S.W.2d 849, 1988 Tenn. App. LEXIS 593 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988).

Pension benefits earned by a spouse during the marriage are marital property even though the other spouse did not contribute directly to their preservation or appreciation. Batson v. Batson, 769 S.W.2d 849, 1988 Tenn. App. LEXIS 593 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988).

The portion of a spouse's pension or other retirement benefit attributable to creditable service prior to the marriage is separate property. Batson v. Batson, 769 S.W.2d 849, 1988 Tenn. App. LEXIS 593 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988).

Professional good will is not a marital asset that would be accounted for in making an equitable distribution of the marital estate. Hazard v. Hazard, 833 S.W.2d 911, 1991 Tenn. App. LEXIS 928 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991).

Trial judge correctly characterized the property of residence as marital where husband testified that one of the reasons he bought the house was so they could have a family situation with son coming over, and, when asked whether he intended to have that house for the family, he responded “for a family, yes,” and wife testified that upon purchasing the home she planned to live the rest of her life there and make a family and a home. McClellan v. McClellan, 873 S.W.2d 350, 1993 Tenn. App. LEXIS 654 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993).

Where husband inherited and brought into the marriage approximately $120,000 and virtually the entire amount was spent during the marriage, there was no error by the trial court in awarding the marital home, having little or no equity, to husband as a division of the marital estate. McClellan v. McClellan, 873 S.W.2d 350, 1993 Tenn. App. LEXIS 654 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993).

Trial court did not err in its division of marital property by awarding wife only 45 percent of the parties' marital assets and 55 percent to husband where the court found that the wife had not been a full partner at all times in the marriage business, and left the husband during different periods of time during the marriage. Koch v. Koch, 874 S.W.2d 571, 1993 Tenn. App. LEXIS 662 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993).

The classification of property as “marital property” within the meaning of this section serves no purpose until after parties have filed a state court action for divorce and the state court exercises its jurisdiction to classify the property of the parties in connection with the granting of a divorce. Blair v. Hohenberg (In re Hohenberg), 174 B.R. 487, 1994 Bankr. LEXIS 1748 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1994).

“Marital property,” within the meaning of this section is not a preexisting property interest, and the concept has no real meaning outside of the realm of marital dissolution. Blair v. Hohenberg (In re Hohenberg), 174 B.R. 487, 1994 Bankr. LEXIS 1748 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1994).

Property acquired by spouses during marriage does not automatically become marital property simply because it was acquired during marriage; the parties must first request the court to divide the property as part of formal divorce proceedings. Moreover, it is clear that marital property and jointly-owned property are not equivalent terms. Spence v. Allstate Ins. Co., 883 S.W.2d 586, 1994 Tenn. LEXIS 251 (Tenn. 1994).

Where insureds, husband and wife, had not requested the court to divide their property as part of divorce proceedings, the concept of “marital property” did not apply and the husband, an innocent co-insured, had a separate interest in property destroyed in a fire. A marital dissolution agreement provided that the parties had property in his or her possession at the time of the execution of the agreement and, while the agreement did not become effective until after the date of the fire, it manifested the intentions of the parties with regard to ownership of the property. Spence v. Allstate Ins. Co., 883 S.W.2d 586, 1994 Tenn. LEXIS 251 (Tenn. 1994).

Appreciation of stocks owned by husband prior to marriage was properly classified as marital property where wife substantially contributed to the stocks' preservation and appreciation not only by her indirect contributions as homemaker, wage earner, parent, and family financial manager, but by her direct contributions as monitor of the stocks during the period of her employment with a brokerage firm. Wade v. Wade, 897 S.W.2d 702, 1994 Tenn. App. LEXIS 388 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994), rehearing denied, 897 S.W.2d 702, 1994 Tenn. App. LEXIS 703 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994), appeal denied, — S.W.2d —, 1995 Tenn. LEXIS 155 (Tenn. 1995).

Husband's interest in a business given to him by his father was marital property where the wife made substantial indirect contributions to such interest in her role as homemaker and wage earner. Brown v. Brown, 913 S.W.2d 163, 1994 Tenn. App. LEXIS 711 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994).

A tract of land was not marital property where it was acquired by the husband as a vested remainder subject to life estates in the husband's parents and was owned by him before marriage and where the wife did not contribute to the preservation and appreciation of the property because the sole cause of an increase in the value was the construction of a highway across the land. Harrison v. Harrison, 912 S.W.2d 124, 1995 Tenn. LEXIS 765 (Tenn. 1995), rehearing denied, — S.W.2d —, 1996 Tenn. LEXIS 54 (Tenn. Jan. 22, 1996).

Tracts of land acquired by husband during the course of the marriage and conveyed by him before any claim for alimony was pending or decree for alimony was entered for adequate consideration without intent to defraud did not constitute marital property. Denton v. Denton, 902 S.W.2d 930, 1995 Tenn. App. LEXIS 64 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995).

Trial court did not err in making an equal division of the marital home where the husband failed to rebut the presumption that when the property was acquired as joint tenants, the purchasing spouse made a gift to the marital estate. Kincaid v. Kincaid, 912 S.W.2d 140, 1995 Tenn. App. LEXIS 309 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995).

Husband's contractual rights as an insurance agent were properly considered as part of the marital estate at their present value. Ray v. Ray, 916 S.W.2d 469, 1995 Tenn. App. LEXIS 611 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995).

It is well established that the trial court's division of the marital estate need not be equal to be equitable. Generally, the fairness of the property division is judged upon its final results. Watters v. Watters, 959 S.W.2d 585, 1997 Tenn. App. LEXIS 441 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997).

The property interests identified in T.C.A. § 36-4-121(b)(1)(B) are simply illustrative of the types of intangible property interests that may be classified as “marital property.” Gragg v. Gragg, 12 S.W.3d 412, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 55 (Tenn. 2000).

Other types of property interests that are similar to those enumerated in this section should also be considered marital property. Gragg v. Gragg, 12 S.W.3d 412, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 55 (Tenn. 2000).

Under T.C.A. § 36-4-121(b)(1)(B), once the threshold condition of a substantial contribution to the preservation and appreciation of property is satisfied, the entirety of the increase in value is marital property. Husband's marital property interest was not limited to the amount of appreciation of real property that could be traced to his efforts. Denton v. Denton, 33 S.W.3d 229, 2000 Tenn. App. LEXIS 343 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000).

Parties were married on December 28, 1990, and the divorce hearing was held on November 16, 1999; thus, pursuant to T.C.A. § 36-4-121(a)(1), those dates were appropriate for the determination of marital property and its equitable division. Lee v. Lee, 66 S.W.3d 837, 2001 Tenn. App. LEXIS 465 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001).

Because marital property is to be valued as of a date as near as reasonably possible to the final divorce hearing date pursuant to T.C.A. § 36-4-121(b)(1)(A), payments that husband made to wife before the court ordered alimony pendente lite were voluntary and not part of a division of marital property. Manis v. Manis, 49 S.W.3d 295, 2001 Tenn. App. LEXIS 48 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001), review or rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 534 (Tenn. 2001).

Trial court erred in classifying portions of one spouse's pre-marital investment accounts as separate property as they became inextricably commingled with marital property. Eldridge v. Eldridge, 137 S.W.3d 1, 2002 Tenn. App. LEXIS 583 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 247 (Tenn. Mar. 10, 2003).

Only marital property is equitably divided as part of the marital estate, under T.C.A. § 36-4-121(a)(1). Flannary v. Flannary, 121 S.W.3d 647, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 1199 (Tenn. 2003).

When a husband withdrew funds from a savings account jointly owned with his wife and placed those funds in a bedroom drawer, after which they were missing when the husband went to redeposit them, the funds were not marital property, under T.C.A. § 36-4-121(b)(1)(A), because they were not owned by either of the parties as of the date the complaint for divorce was filed. Flannary v. Flannary, 121 S.W.3d 647, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 1199 (Tenn. 2003).

In a dissolution of marriage case, a court did not err in its division of marital assets with respect to contributions to the husband's retirement plan and dental equipment where, for the entire period of time preceding the divorce, the wife cared for the parties' children, and she was subsequently awarded primary responsibility for the care of one child and responsibility for the care of the other on weekends. In addition, although the dental equipment was acquired during the marriage from the husband's father, and he denied that he was paid any money by the husband when he transferred the equipment, his testimony was evasive and self-contradictory. Stinson v. Stinson, 161 S.W.3d 438, 2004 Tenn. App. LEXIS 692 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 292 (Tenn. Mar. 21, 2005).

In a dissolution of marriage case, a court erred in its valuation of personal property where the wife's evidence did not support a valuation for a boat. In addition, based upon the wife's testimony, it was appropriate to reduce the value assigned to the marital furniture which were awarded to the husband. Stinson v. Stinson, 161 S.W.3d 438, 2004 Tenn. App. LEXIS 692 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 292 (Tenn. Mar. 21, 2005).

Both a marital dissolution agreement and a quitclaim deed were transparent attempts by a husband to keep the marital home out of the marital estate, but the documents failed to accomplish their desired effect because no matter where the current legal title to the property was, the property remained marital property because it was the parties' home; thus, the trial court properly classified the real property where the house once stood and the insurance proceeds from the destruction of the house as marital property. Altman v. Altman, 181 S.W.3d 676, 2005 Tenn. App. LEXIS 207 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 1016 (Tenn. Oct. 31, 2005).

Court disagreed with a husband's valuation of the marital residence because under T.C.A. § 36-4-121(b), the value of the residence was determined at the time of the divorce and the future costs associated with rebuilding the home were not part of the equation. Altman v. Altman, 181 S.W.3d 676, 2005 Tenn. App. LEXIS 207 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 1016 (Tenn. Oct. 31, 2005).

Court did not err in its marital property division where the evidence showed that it was a 36 year marriage and that the wife contributed to the marriage by being a homemaker, raising the parties'  two children, and helping out on the family farm, among other things. In addition, the real property at issue was acquired during the marriage and much of that property was purchased either through cash and loan transactions using marital funds, or by exchanging marital property for the new property and, thus, constituted marital property, whether the wife's name appeared on the deeds or not. Morton v. Morton, 182 S.W.3d 821, 2005 Tenn. App. LEXIS 491 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 1167 (Tenn. 2006).

Trial court did not err in classifying a husband's pre-divorce lump sum workers'  compensation award of $141,642 as marital property because the appellate court was unable to determine from the record whether the $141,642, or any portion thereof, replaced the husband's post-divorce wages as he had claimed. Bilyeu v. Bilyeu, 196 S.W.3d 131, 2005 Tenn. App. LEXIS 741 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 540 (Tenn. 2006).

By executing a quit claim deed to the marital home just before the wife filed for divorce, the husband did not intend to make a gift of his interest in the property to her and the trial court did not err in finding that the insurance proceeds after the house and contents burned were marital property to which the husband was entitled to his share; the trial court concluded that the husband executed the quit claim deed not as a gift, but as part of the wife's scheme to deprive him of his marital interest in the home and the contents. Davis v. Davis, 223 S.W.3d 233, 2006 Tenn. App. LEXIS 739 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 419 (Tenn. Apr. 16, 2007).

In an action in which the husband appealed the circuit court for Rutherford County's division of marital property, the amount of the award of rehabilitative alimony to the wife, and the grant of divorce to the wife based on the husband's adultery, the trial court did not err in its apportionment of marital property where: (1) The instant court did not agree with the husband's conclusion that the trial court failed to consider tax consequences and debts associated with assets awarded in this divorce; and (2) While acknowledging that almost all of the marital assets were acquired through the efforts of the husband, the trial court also recognized that the wife aided the husband in achieving his professional goals and current earning capacity. Jekot v. Jekot, 232 S.W.3d 744, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 3, 2007), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 475 (Tenn. May 14, 2007).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion when it classified a pickup truck as marital property because there was a paucity of evidence on the issue of the classification of the pickup truck, how it was titled, and the only evidence in the record was a document introduced into evidence by the wife listing assets and other matters that reflected the truck as a “marital” asset. Oakes v. Oakes, 235 S.W.3d 152, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 160 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 26, 2007), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 708 (Tenn. Aug. 13, 2007).

In a divorce case, the evidence did not support the ex-husband's contention that his interest in the Boca Raton house was separate property because it was a gift from his parents, as it was essentially undisputed that the husband was an owner of record of the property, and that for 20 years he used marital funds to pay the mortgage on the property; that evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's decision to classify the husband's interest in the house as marital property. Owens v. Owens, 241 S.W.3d 478, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 178 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 29, 2007), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 817 (Tenn. Sept. 17, 2007).

Holding that each debtor could claim a personal property exemption in vehicles pursuant to T.C.A. § 26-2-103 which were owned as tenants by the entireties, even though the certificates of title reflected only that wife was the registered owner, comported with the definition of “marital property” set forth in T.C.A. § 36-4-121 concerning the distribution of assets in a divorce. In re Hensley, 393 B.R. 186, 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 2493 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. Aug. 12, 2008).

Although marital residence purchased by the husband prior to the marriage was considered separate property under T.C.A. § 36-4-121(b)(2)(A)-(C), its increase in value during the parties'  marriage was deemed marital property because of the wife's substantial contributions under T.C.A. § 36-4-121(b)(1)(B) to the preservation and appreciation of the marital residence. Summer v. Summer, 296 S.W.3d 57, 2008 Tenn. App. LEXIS 222 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 10, 2008).

Classification of the husband's and wife's assets as marital property was appropriate under T.C.A. § 36-4-121(b)(1)(A), (B) because any guitars purchased with the husband's separate assets had been inextricably mingled with marital property; although some guitars had been bought with separate funds, it was not clear if any of those guitars remained in the collection. Summer v. Summer, 296 S.W.3d 57, 2008 Tenn. App. LEXIS 222 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 10, 2008).

Appellate court was unable to conclude that evidence preponderated against the implicit conclusion that wife made substantial contributions to the preservation and appreciation of farm land at issue under T.C.A. § 36-4-121(b)(1)(B); husband not only advanced crop production expenses to the tenant farmer, but he and the wife apparently bore the risk as well, agreeing to split the proceeds rather than collect a fixed rent. Fickle v. Fickle, 287 S.W.3d 723, 2008 Tenn. App. LEXIS 479 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 19, 2008).

Court correctly classified attorney fee as marital property because although the husband did not own the attorney fee as of the filing of the complaint for divorce by the wife, the asset was acquired by the husband during the course of the marriage, he possessed it as of the date of the final divorce hearing, and the trial court had not previously made a final disposition of marital property pursuant to an order of legal separation. Larsen-Ball v. Ball, — S.W.3d —, 2008 Tenn. App. LEXIS 654 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 13, 2008), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2009 Tenn. LEXIS 266 (Tenn. Apr. 27, 2009), aff'd, Larsen-Ball v. Ball, 301 S.W.3d 228, 2010 Tenn. LEXIS 7 (Tenn. Jan. 14, 2010).

In a divorce case, division of property was proper because trial court correctly classified a house as marital property because husband purchased the property prior to the final hearing held in the case; additionally, wife's ability to seek employment outside the home was limited due to her education, experience, and health issues, and husband enjoyed a successful career. Lofton v. Lofton, 345 S.W.3d 913, 2008 Tenn. App. LEXIS 784 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 30, 2008).

Trial court erred in refusing to divide the wife's post-separation income earned in 2008 and 2009 under T.C.A. § 36-4-121(c) because that income was marital property subject to division. Any income earned until the filing of the final decree of divorce was subject to division and should have been considered in the court's initial order dividing the marital property. Mayfield v. Mayfield, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 40 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 17, 2012), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 395 S.W.3d 108, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 876 (Tenn. Dec. 3, 2012).

While the retroactive VA benefits were awarded for the husband's service prior to the marriage, he used the funds to purchase a joint certificate of deposit with the wife, thereby creating a rebuttable presumption that the certificate of deposit was marital property. Phipps v. Phipps, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 36 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 27, 2015), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 421 (Tenn. May 15, 2015), cert. denied, 193 L. Ed. 2d 290, 136 S. Ct. 360, 2015 U.S. LEXIS 6710 (U.S. 2015).

Husband submitted no evidence to establish that he ever intended to keep his retroactive VA benefits as his separate property during the marriage, and instead, his intent to keep the benefits as his separate property surfaced only after the demise of the marriage, and thus the evidence supported the determination that the certificate of deposit purchased with the benefits was marital property. Phipps v. Phipps, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 36 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 27, 2015), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 421 (Tenn. May 15, 2015), cert. denied, 193 L. Ed. 2d 290, 136 S. Ct. 360, 2015 U.S. LEXIS 6710 (U.S. 2015).

Although a trial court allocated a majority of a marital home's equity value to one spouse, the trial court appropriately valued and divided the home equity value and ordered the sale of the marital home at auction because the court considered the short duration of the marriage, each party's separate contributions to marital property, and the parties'  age, health, earning capacity, vocational skills, and economic circumstances. Brady v. Brady, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 664 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 18, 2015).

Trial court correctly found that one-half of the equity in a marital residence was marital property, when one spouse's parent purchased the residence during the parties'  marriage with title in the name of the parent and the spouse as tenants in common, and awarded the other spouse one-fourth of the equity value of the residence. Moreover, the trial court placed a value on the marital residence that was distinctly within the range of evidence submitted. McNabb v. McNabb, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 667 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 20, 2015).

Trial court properly determined that a vacant lot and a boat, which one spouse claimed belonged to that spouse's parent, were marital property, when that spouse purchased the vacant lot during the marriage and made the monthly payments on the lot, while both parties were listed as the insured parties on the boat that was purchased during the parties'  marriage. The evidence did not preponderate against the trial court's valuation of the vacant lot as it was within the range of evidence submitted. McNabb v. McNabb, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 667 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 20, 2015).

Because there was evidence the wife's jewelry was purchased with marital funds and not clearly given as a gift, the evidence did not preponderate against the finding by the trial court that the jewelry was marital property. Kabiri v. Kabiri, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 845 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 16, 2015).

Equity in the marital residence was marital property with consideration given to the husband for the separate funds he originally contributed to provide the down payment. Howard v. Howard, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 877 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 29, 2015).

Nonprofit organization was not a marital asset where the evidence showed that the husband was compensated as allowed by the Tennessee Nonprofit Corporation Act, and thus, the wife failed to show that he functioned as the corporation's alter ego. Lubell v. Lubell, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 904 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 12, 2015).

Evidence did not preponderate against the finding that the marital residence was marital property, given that the husband obtained a construction loan with the intent to build a home that would be the parties'  marital residence, they resided in the home, the mortgage was paid for from income earned during the marriage, and the wife made contributions by maintaining the household, preparing their meals, doing his laundry, and other household responsibilities, and there was no abuse of discretion in the award of 30 percent equity in the home to the wife. Hollar v. Hollar, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 944 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2015).

Interest in a company was acquired during the course of the marriage, and the husband was a signatory on the business account and often assisted the wife with the deposit of income generated from the company; thus, the interest in the company was marital property. Hardin v. Hensley-Hardin, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 975 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 18, 2015).

Certain items were properly considered marital property; the prints and the jet skis were enjoyed by the parties throughout the marriage, and while the husband's mother-in-law might have gifted some of the prints, he never confirmed that the gifts were intended solely for the wife's benefit, and the same held true for the father-in-law's gift of the jet skis. Hardin v. Hensley-Hardin, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 975 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 18, 2015).

Evidence did not preponderate against the trial court's findings that the husband's boat was marital property because the husband testified the he used marital funds to make payments on his credit cards, that he used his credit cards to get cash advances from which he repaid his brother for the loan to buy the boat, and that marital funds were used to improve the boat. Moon v. Moon, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 270 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 21, 2016).

Parties' cherry cabinet was marital property; the undisputed testimony was that the cabinet was acquired during the marriage, and accordingly it was presumed to be marital property subject to division. Watt v. Watt, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 295 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 27, 2016).

Wife testified at trial that many tools were purchased during the marriage, and thus they were presumed to be marital property; although the husband testified that some tools were acquired before the marriage, he failed to adequately identify them. Watt v. Watt, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 295 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 27, 2016).

Record supported the trial court's finding that the marital residence would have been lost but for the wife's exceptional efforts to keep it out of foreclosure while the husband remained in jail, and thus the award of the proceeds to the wife from the sale of the residence was not error. Watt v. Watt, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 295 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 27, 2016).

Trial court erred in determining that the appreciation in a business's value became separate property after the husband moved out of the marital residence because the appreciation in the business's value during the parties'  separation was part of the marital estate. Kadivar v. Fathiamirkhiz, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 333 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 13, 2016).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in dividing the marital estate because in its order, the trial court clearly considered the statutory factors in dividing the marital estate and divided the estate in a manner it considered equitable. Kadivar v. Fathiamirkhiz, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 333 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 13, 2016).

Trial court did not err in determining that all of the corporate debentures at issue were marital property because the court elected to credit the testimony of the wife's financial expert as credible. Although the expert considered some of the debentures to be the property of the husband's parents, not the husband's separate property, in the early years, the expert's ultimate conclusion was that, as of the date at issue, all of the debentures were marital property. St. John-Parker v. Parker, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 335 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 17, 2016).

Stock purchased prior to the marriage and the stock options held by the husband were separate property, but upon the marriage, income from the stock became marital property pursuant to the statute and the finding that the wife substantially contributed to the preservation and appreciation of the account. Jones v. Jones, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 589 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 12, 2016).

Due to the wife's substantial contributions to the preservation and appreciation of the stock, dividends that were received during the marriage were marital property. Jones v. Jones, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 589 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 12, 2016).

Evidence showed a pattern of the husband's transfers of funds between the marital accounts and a Scottrade regular account, he did not distinguish the portion of the account he claimed remained his separate property, and the evidence supported the finding of commingling; the Scottrade account was thus properly classified as marital property. Jones v. Jones, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 589 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 12, 2016).

Marital funds were used to grow one account and supported the determination that this was a marital account; the wife contributed to the preservation and appreciation of this account by working in the business and caring for the parties'  children and home, which was to be recognized in the determination of a party's contribution. Jones v. Jones, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 589 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 12, 2016).

As the husband's trail income could be sold or assigned and a recognized methodology within the industry for valuing such trail income as sellable property existed, the trial court properly determined that the husband's trail income to be a divisible marital asset; in contrast to professional goodwill, the trail income could be sold separately or assigned by the husband upon his disability or death. Fuller v. Fuller, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 974 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 21, 2016).

Husband's trail income distributed as marital property was not be considered as income for child support purposes. Fuller v. Fuller, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 974 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 21, 2016).

As the trial court considered the asset of trail income, which had been divided as marital property, as income to the husband for the purpose of setting alimony, such determination was erroneous. Fuller v. Fuller, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 974 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 21, 2016).

Trial court properly classified a husband's interest in an out-of-state LLC as marital property where he testified that he would not have acquired the interest in the dental practice from his father had he been unwilling to work there, and the LLC's operating agreement stated that the husband agreed to make an initial capital contribution of $170,000.00 for his two-thirds interest. Bewick v. Bewick, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 97 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 13, 2017).

Trial court properly determined that real properties were marital property because the evidence did not preponderate against its findings that the husband had no credibility and that since, by the husband's own admission, the properties were worthless when he acquired them, the entire values of the properties were marital property by virtue of his use of marital funds to contribute to the preservation and appreciation of the property's interest. Trezevant v. Trezevant, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 213 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 25, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 622 (Tenn. Sept. 18, 2018).

Court of appeal declined to disturb or modify the equitable division of marital property because the trial court fashioned a nearly equal distribution of marital assets, and the proof supported such a distribution when considering the applicable statutory factors; the trial court equally divided the parties'  equity in the marital residence and the parties'  401(k) accounts, and each party received an equal amount of marital assets as valued by the trial court. Buchanan v. Buchanan, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 565 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 26, 2018).

Property distribution was equitable, including the award of the marital residence to the wife, as the trial court properly considered the factors contained in the statute. Brown v. Brown, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 622 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 25, 2018).

Husband failed to present sufficient evidence to overcome the presumption that his interest in a railroad company property was marital property, rather than a gift, where the evidence did not preponderate against a finding that the husband received his interest in a company property not as a mere gift but as an incentive to return to work for his father given the circumstances, history, and timing of the property's acquisition and development and his return to work. Tarver v. Tarver, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 128 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 13, 2019).

Because the parties elected to reinvest the dividends from Class A shares to purchase more shares, the shares of Class A stock purchased during the marriage were marital property, but on the other hand, the dividends from the Class B shares were used as received to support the family's lifestyle, and thus there was no need for the trial court to divide them. Spergl v. Spergl, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 235 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 16, 2019).

14. —Findings.

Trial court did not fulfill its duty to first classify the parties'  property as either marital or separate, and in the absence of appropriate findings and conclusions regarding the classification and valuation of all property at issue, it could not be determined whether the wife was awarded an equitable portion of the marital estate, and the matter was remanded. Babcock v. Babcock, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 105 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 9, 2015).

With respect to furniture and tools, the trial court found that the wife had not taken any of husband's tools or anything other than what she was entitled to, and the remainder of the trial court's findings did not provide a clear understanding of the basis for this decision, and thus the mandate of the rule was not met; however, the evidence supported the division of property in this case. Watt v. Watt, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 295 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 27, 2016).

Marital estate division was proper because the division considered statutory factors, including a husband's considerable marital income and a wife's intangible contributions and employment income, and the parties'  disparate finances at the time of divorce. Davis v. Davis, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 994 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 29, 2016).

Trial court's classification of a fifth wheel camper as marital property because its finding that a husband and a wife owned the camper when the divorce action was initiated was supported by the wife's testimony, her aunt's testimony, photographs, and documentary evidence; the husband pointed to nothing in the record other than his own testimony that contradicted the trial court's finding. Parker v. Parker, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 173 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 9, 2019).

Trial court's division of marital property was vacated, and a remand was appropriate because the trial court did not make a finding regarding the value of any of the assets, including those assigned to the wife as her separate property, and those upon which the parties disagreed as to their value; the trial court's order did not refer to subsection, or make a finding regarding any of the factors prescribed therein. Long v. Long, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 409 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 23, 2019).

Ruling that a wife's interest in a partnership was marital was vacated because the trial court did not make a finding regarding whether the wife met her burden to prove it was a gift, and it made no finding regarding whether the husband made a substantial contribution to the preservation and appreciation of the partnership interest; the trial court did not make any findings regarding whether the wife's partnership interest was converted to marital property by commingling or transmutation. Long v. Long, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 409 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 23, 2019).

Trial court did not err in considering the value of the property, which it awarded to the husband, when dividing the parties'  marital property because the parties did not dispute that they acquired a one-half interest in the property during the course of their marriage and the husband failed to prove that the property was separate property despite the fact that the wife signed a quit claim deed transferring her interest in the property to the husband. Climer v. Climer, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 33 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 29, 2020).

15. Dissipation of Marital Assets.

Court did not err in its distribution of marital property, because the wife presented no evidence that the husband's extra income was “stashed” for his personal use, with deliberate intent to deprive the wife of access to it after the divorce, and the total distribution to the husband and to the wife was equitable. Burden v. Burden, 250 S.W.3d 899, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 611 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 26, 2007), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2008 Tenn. LEXIS 133 (Tenn. Feb. 25, 2008).

Husband did not engage in dissipation because, although he admitted that he spent $ 25,000 on his girlfriend, the husband had spent money on similar travel and meals prior to the separation, and the wife indirectly benefitted because the husband was able to provide the wife temporary support while the parties were separated. Watson v. Watson, 309 S.W.3d 483, 2009 Tenn. App. LEXIS 355 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 27, 2009), rehearing denied, 309 S.W.3d 483, 2009 Tenn. App. LEXIS 906 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 6, 2009), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2010 Tenn. LEXIS 206 (Tenn. Feb. 22, 2010).

Trial court did not err in finding a father dissipated the marital estate, T.C.A. § 36-4-121(c)(5), regarding an $ 81,000 payment to the father's former attorney because the funds were used to develop a civil suit against the mother for parental alienation syndrome and such an atypical and wasteful expenditure of marital funds, made with the intent of filing a civil suit against a spouse, in no way benefitted the marriage and clearly amounted to dissipation. Beyer v. Beyer, 428 S.W.3d 59, 2013 Tenn. App. LEXIS 229 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 5, 2013), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 827 (Tenn. Oct. 16, 2013).

Trial court erred in finding a father dissipated the marital estate, T.C.A. § 36-4-121(c)(5), by depleting the parties'  savings account valued at $ 45,000 because beyond the mother's mere allegations, the only portion of the record cited by the mother to support her position was father's own testimony that “a good chunk of that money has gone to paying for, you know, this divorce in one form or fashion or another”; the mother failed to present any evidence to show that the father dissipated the funds. Beyer v. Beyer, 428 S.W.3d 59, 2013 Tenn. App. LEXIS 229 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 5, 2013), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 827 (Tenn. Oct. 16, 2013).

Trial court did not err in finding a father dissipated the marital estate, T.C.A. § 36-4-121(c)(5), regarding an unreasonable amount of attorney's fees paid because the father's actions caused him to incur an unnecessary and excessive amount of attorney's fees that he paid with marital funds. Beyer v. Beyer, 428 S.W.3d 59, 2013 Tenn. App. LEXIS 229 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 5, 2013), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 827 (Tenn. Oct. 16, 2013).

Trial court erred in finding a father dissipated the marital estate, T.C.A. § 36-4-121(c)(5), by repaying $ 50,300 in loans to his parents because absent the trial court's statements that the payments were in violation of its orders, the record contained no findings or evidence that supported the trial court's conclusion; the trial court's criminal contempt finding based on the father's repayment of the loans was overturned. Beyer v. Beyer, 428 S.W.3d 59, 2013 Tenn. App. LEXIS 229 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 5, 2013), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 827 (Tenn. Oct. 16, 2013).

Trial court's determination of dissipation did not appear to be analyzed under the appropriate standard, and the trial court's reasoning rested on whether the parties were placed in “financial strain,” which is not an element courts consider when making a determination of dissipation; the case was remanded for specific findings of fact and conclusions of law. Babcock v. Babcock, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 105 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 9, 2015).

Neither party was innocent in terms of dissipating marital assets, the parties were roughly equal in terms of the statutory factors, and the facts all tended to support the division of the marital estate as being equitable; the division was affirmed. Culver v. Culver, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 510 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 26, 2015).

Lack of recall or failure to account for spending was not sufficient to support a finding of dissipation, as it did not establish that the husband engaged in wasteful expenditures of marital funds for a purpose contrary to the marriage; the husband spent significant amounts of marital funds to support the parties'  unprofitable printing business, to pay off some marital debts, and to repair the marital home, and the entire evidence did not establish that his expenditures were wasteful and for purposes contrary to the marriage. Jones v. Jones, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 589 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 12, 2016).

Trial court's finding that the husband dissipated marital assets did not provide a basis for a different distribution of marital assets where regardless of the valuation of the dental practice, the distribution balance did not change significantly. Bewick v. Bewick, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 97 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 13, 2017).

Division of marital estate in a divorce case was consistent with the statutory factors and was supported by the preponderance of the evidence because the trial court properly considered the husband's dissipation of marital assets during an affair as one factor in the context of weighing the totality of the circumstances and equities of the divorce. The court also considered it important for the children to be able to remain in the same residence and school district and recognized the wife's role as the children's primary caregiver. Slocum v. Slocum, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 705 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 17, 2017).

Trial court's division of marital property was not inequitable or otherwise in error because the husband testified that the electronic transfers to his fiancée were loans and that she reimbursed him; the record did not preponderate against the trial court's determination that there was no dissipation of marital assets; and the extent to which a party might have dissipated marital assets was only one of multiple factors that the court took into account when dividing marital property. Williams v. Williams, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 563 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 17, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 883 (Tenn. Dec. 8, 2017).

Evidence does not preponderate against the trial court's determination that a husband dissipated the more than $ 2 million dollars that he transferred to his attorney during the divorce proceedings because the record showed that the husband transferred the money during the course of the divorce to an associate in the Cayman Islands without any evidence that the friend was entitled to that sum of money; the husband was unable to identify what the friend's expenses were when asked about them at trial. Trezevant v. Trezevant, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 213 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 25, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 622 (Tenn. Sept. 18, 2018).

Chancery court properly divided the parties'  marital assets because the trial court discussed each of the statutory factors in dividing the marital property, including the issue of dissipation where the wife submitted evidence that the husband withdrew approximately $200,000 from a joint account and never adequately accounted for the funds, and the husband's use of marital funds to live separate from the wife in order to be with his paramour for 13 years. Yuhasz v. Yuhasz, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 294 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 24, 2018).

Trial court did not offset half of a husband's investment losses as a dissipation of marital assets because it merely took his day-trading losses into consideration along with other relevant statutory factors; irrespective of whether the trial court mischaracterized the husband's stock trading as a “dissipation” of marital assets or a failure to preserve the marital property, that fact alone did not undermine the validity of the manner in which it divided the parties'  marital estate. Pack v. Pack, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 206 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2019).

Trial court's division of the marital estate was affirmed where the final decree made clear that the court considered the nature and quality of the wife's contributions as a wife or homemaker to the preservation or appreciation of the parties'  marital assets, including a business, prior to and after the parties separated in 2011; it then proceeded to weigh all factors, resulting in a division of the marital estate in which the husband received the greater portion. Middendorf v. Middendorf, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 323 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 27, 2019).

Evidence did not preponderate against the finding that the husband dissipated over $ 215,000 in marital assets; the wife met her burden of proof showing dissipation by the husband, which shifted the burden to him to demonstrate that his expenditures were appropriate, yet he offered nothing to contradict the wife's evidence. Wise v. Bercu, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 479 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2019).

16. Dissolution of Marital Property.

When a husband withdrew funds from a savings account held jointly with his wife and placed the funds in a bedroom drawer, after which the funds were missing, while the funds were not marital property, the husband's careless handling of them could be considered the dissipation of a marital asset, under T.C.A. § 36-4-121(c)(5), which would be relevant to the division of property that was part of the parties' marital estate. Flannary v. Flannary, 121 S.W.3d 647, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 1199 (Tenn. 2003).

Three adjustments had to be made to the trial court's division of the marital estate: (1) The value of the ex-husband's interest in the Boca Raton house at the time of the divorce was increased from $20,000 to $97,000; (2) The parties'  interest in the first partnership was awarded to the ex-wife; and (3) The parties'  interest in the second partnership was awarded to the husband; the modified division of the marital estate properly balanced the factors in T.C.A. § 36-4-121(c), particularly the wife's age, her longtime status and contributions as a homemaker, and the difference between her and the husband's anticipated social security benefits. Owens v. Owens, 241 S.W.3d 478, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 178 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 29, 2007), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 817 (Tenn. Sept. 17, 2007).

Appellate court was unable to find that trial court abused discretion or that overall property distribution was not equitable because trial court correctly valued the husband's 401k as of a date as near as reasonably possible to the final divorce hearing when the wife and the husband were not legally separated prior to trial, and the house was not subject to classification and distribution in the divorce, when the agreement constituted a rent-to-own contract on the house and neither party had any ownership interest in the house. Bunch v. Bunch, 281 S.W.3d 406, 2008 Tenn. App. LEXIS 374 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 30, 2008), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2009 Tenn. LEXIS 171 (Tenn. Jan. 20, 2009).

Evidence did not preponderate against the trial court's finding that the husband's expenditures consisting of 41 checks he wrote to his girlfriend totaling $15,633 constituted dissipation where the trial court found that the husband's testimony that the checks were for living expenses was not credible and he did not sift through the checks to discern which notations indicated an expenditure for living expenses. However the trial court erred by ordering the husband to reimburse the wife for the full amount of the checks where it divided the parties'  marital assets equally. Holdsworth v. Holdsworth, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 424 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 3, 2015), modified, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 73 (Tenn. Jan. 25, 2016).

17. —Bankruptcy of Spouse.

The term “marital property” and its concepts do not grant the bankruptcy court any authority to divest “marital property” out of one spouse and place it in the bankruptcy estate; bankruptcy estate property is not created as a result of post-bankruptcy classification of property as “marital property,” except for the limited purposes of the section of Bankruptcy Code providing that, in the case of a property settlement or divorce, property included in the bankruptcy estate is that acquired by the debtor within 180 days of commencement of the bankruptcy case. Blair v. Hohenberg (In re Hohenberg), 174 B.R. 487, 1994 Bankr. LEXIS 1748 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1994).

A bankruptcy estate acquired no property interest in a nondebtor spouse's separately owned and titled business assets merely because the property was subject to possible classification as “marital property” under this section; the trustee would be required to assert either an avoidance or other bankruptcy or nonbankruptcy cause of action against the spouse. Blair v. Hohenberg (In re Hohenberg), 174 B.R. 487, 1994 Bankr. LEXIS 1748 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1994).

18. —Pensions.

Pension interests that accrue during a marriage are considered as marital property regardless of whether the interest is vested or nonvested, mature or unmature, or contributory or noncontributory; the only requirement is that the employee spouse acquired the interest during the marriage. Kendrick v. Kendrick, 902 S.W.2d 918, 1994 Tenn. App. LEXIS 658 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994).

Vested and nonvested military pension rights should be valued and distributed using the same principles and procedures used to value and distribute other public and private pension rights. Kendrick v. Kendrick, 902 S.W.2d 918, 1994 Tenn. App. LEXIS 658 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994).

Any procedure used to value and distribute pension rights must be consistent with this section. There are four principles to assist in the process: (1) Pension rights accrued during marriage will be classified as marital property even though the nonemployee spouse did not make direct contributions to the increase in the pension's value; (2) Only pension rights accruing during the marriage will be considered marital property; (3) Difficulty in valuing pension rights has no bearing on the classification of the pension as marital property; (4) Pension rights must be valued as of a date as near as possible to the final divorce hearing date. Kendrick v. Kendrick, 902 S.W.2d 918, 1994 Tenn. App. LEXIS 658 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994).

Anticipated social security benefits are not part of the marital estate because they are not vested. Reymann v. Reymann, 919 S.W.2d 615, 1995 Tenn. App. LEXIS 793 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995).

An interest in a retirement benefit, vested or unvested, accruing during a marriage, is marital property subject to division. Cohen v. Cohen, 937 S.W.2d 823, 1996 Tenn. LEXIS 567 (Tenn. 1996).

Husband's contributions from his salary to separate property retirement accounts were marital property subject to divisions. Wilson v. Moore, 929 S.W.2d 367, 1996 Tenn. App. LEXIS 264 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996).

Retirement benefits that “accrued” during the marriage included amounts that accrued on husband's premarital contribution to his retirement plan, although the premarital contribution itself remained husband's separate property. Umstot v. Umstot, 968 S.W.2d 819, 1997 Tenn. App. LEXIS 606 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997).

Retirement benefits, as marital property, are subject to the same considerations as other property during the equitable division, and such division need not be mathematically precise but must reflect essential fairness in light of the facts. Kinard v. Kinard, 986 S.W.2d 220, 1998 Tenn. App. LEXIS 543 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998), modified, 986 S.W.2d 220, 1998 Tenn. App. LEXIS 598 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998).

Trial court did not err in its equal division between parties of monthly benefits from the parties'  two pensions where it was undisputed that the parties'  pensions were both vested and mature, as both parties had actually retired and were collecting monthly pension benefits; thus, the values of the retirement benefits were easily determined as near as possible to the date of the divorce as required by T.C.A. § 36-4-121(b)(1)(A) and applicable case law, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in valuing the pensions based on the monthly benefits that the husband had received since 1994 and the wife since 1998. Snodgrass v. Snodgrass, — S.W.3d —, 2008 Tenn. App. LEXIS 196 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2008), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 295 S.W.3d 240, 2009 Tenn. LEXIS 677 (Tenn. Oct. 9, 2009).

There was no merit to the husband's assertion that the trial court was required to round down the years of marriage when calculating a percentage of the pension to assign as marital property; the evidence did not preponderate against the finding that one-third of the pension was marital property, and the award to the wife was proper. Hollar v. Hollar, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 944 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2015).

Trial court's amendment insofar as it reflected the wife's receipt of 1/2 of the 7/30 marital portion of the husband's pension was appropriate; however, the award should be maintained as a percentage to ensure the wife's receipt of the full value of the award without need to return to the court for continued amendments. Blakemore v. Blakemore, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 290 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 25, 2020).

19. Dissolution Agreements.

A dissolution agreement that stated that spousal support and alimony were specifically in consideration of the wife waiving any right to the husband's military retirement retained its contractual nature because it constituted the division of marital property and did not constitute alimony in futuro, and thus the agreement was not subject to modification by the court. Towner v. Towner, 858 S.W.2d 888, 1993 Tenn. LEXIS 251 (Tenn. 1993).

In their 2000 divorce, the wife and the husband executed a marital dissolution agreement (MDA), and in 2003, the wife filed a “complaint for damages for fraud, deceit, and coercion,” alleging the lawyer husband coerced her into signing the MDA while she was under the influence of alcohol; as to extrinsic fraud, the reviewing court, in examining the allegations in the complaint in conjunction with the wording of the MDA, found the wife failed to allege sufficient facts to have supported either an independent action to set aside the final divorce decree under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 or separate common law causes of action for fraud or coercion. Black v. Black, 166 S.W.3d 699, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 611 (Tenn. 2005).

Parties'  marital dissolution agreement provided for the division of the husband's military retirement benefits as marital property pursuant to T.C.A. § 36-4-121, but the total amount of the wife's award was not calculable when the parties divorced as the husband's right to receive benefits had not vested at that time; the wife's award was to be based on the husband's rank, not pay, at the time of the divorce, and the trial court correctly calculated the amount to be a percentage of the husband's pay based on his rank at the time of the divorce. Foster v. Foster, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 477 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 14, 2017).

20. Antenuptial Agreement.

A $25,000 award to plaintiff wife based on the appreciation of assets that resulted through the joint efforts of the parties during the period of the marriage, where plaintiff had contributed to the appreciation of the parties' assets by furnishing them with a residence during the marriage, offering her services in the family business, and perhaps contributing some personal moneys for the accumulation of joint assets, constituted a division of jointly-held property acquired after marriage and did not violate antenuptial agreement regarding division of the parties' property. Duncan v. Duncan, 652 S.W.2d 913, 1983 Tenn. App. LEXIS 545 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983), overruled, Cary v. Cary, 937 S.W.2d 777, 1996 Tenn. LEXIS 362 (Tenn. 1996).

Antenuptial agreements regarding marital property do not violate public policy. Perkinson v. Perkinson, 802 S.W.2d 600, 1990 Tenn. LEXIS 487 (Tenn. 1990), rehearing denied, — S.W.2d —, 1991 Tenn. LEXIS 57 (Tenn. Feb. 4, 1991).

Valid antenuptial agreements relating to marital property, or separate property an interest in which may become marital property, will be enforced without regard to marital fault. Perkinson v. Perkinson, 802 S.W.2d 600, 1990 Tenn. LEXIS 487 (Tenn. 1990), rehearing denied, — S.W.2d —, 1991 Tenn. LEXIS 57 (Tenn. Feb. 4, 1991).

Evidence did not preponderate against the equity in the division decreed by the trial court because it reviewed the terms of the parties'  marital dissolution agreement and found them to be equitable; the husband agreed to pay alimony, the wife received disability payments, both parties were relatively well educated, and the wife was able to take care of her house and pay her bills. Richards v. Richards, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 712 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 26, 2016).

21. Separate Property.

As the spouse's premarital Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) did not represent deferred marital compensation, but were funded with premarital earnings, the spouse's premarital IRAs were not retirement benefits under T.C.A. § 36-4-121(b)(1)(B). Langschmidt v. Langschmidt, 81 S.W.3d 741, 2002 Tenn. LEXIS 308 (Tenn. 2002).

Appreciation in value of an Individual Retirement Account (IRA) during the marriage may be classified as marital property, if both parties substantially contributed to the IRAs' preservation and appreciation. Langschmidt v. Langschmidt, 81 S.W.3d 741, 2002 Tenn. LEXIS 308 (Tenn. 2002).

Spouse testified to adding the other spouse's name to the bond portfolio account so other spouse could have accessible funds when the one spouse died, the other spouse did not use the account during the couple's marriage, though other spouse used the couple's other jointly named accounts, and no marital funds went into the account; thus, the trial court properly classified the account as the one spouse's separate property because the presumption was rebutted that adding the other spouse's name to the account made it marital property. Smith v. Smith, 93 S.W.3d 871, 2002 Tenn. App. LEXIS 622 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002).

Pursuant to T.C.A. § 36-4-121(b)(2)(A), the four Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) that one spouse funded prior to marriage were properly classified as separate property; because the other spouse did not substantially contribute to the preservation and appreciation of those IRAs, they were properly classified as the one spouse's separate property. Smith v. Smith, 93 S.W.3d 871, 2002 Tenn. App. LEXIS 622 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002).

Because an accountant was able to determine the value of the Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) that was attributable to premarital deposits and performed a similar analysis with regards to the contributions that consisted of marital property, the accountant could segregate the one spouse's separate property and its associated gains from the parties' marital property and its corresponding gains; thus, the separate property in those accounts was not inextricably commingled with the marital property in the accounts, the trial court erred when it classified the appreciation from of the one spouse's premarital deposits in the two IRAs as marital property, and only the remaining value that was not attributable to the one spouse's premarital deposits was properly classified as marital property that was subject to equitable distribution. Smith v. Smith, 93 S.W.3d 871, 2002 Tenn. App. LEXIS 622 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002).

Trial court erred when, in its division of a marital estate, it included the parties' separate properties in the division of the marital property, and awarded the marital home to the husband; the marital property was to be sold and the proceeds were to be divided equally between the parties resulting in an equitable division of the property comporting with the parties intent. Tate v. Tate, 138 S.W.3d 872, 2003 Tenn. App. LEXIS 593 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 79 (Tenn. Jan. 26, 2004).

Evidence did not preponderate against a trial court's finding that the appreciation in a mother's partnership interests were her separate property, T.C.A. § 36-4-121(b)(2)(A), because the mother's interests in the partnerships themselves were separate property, beyond her ownership interest in the partnerships, the mother had no significant involvement in the partnerships whatsoever, and the father in no way contributed to the appreciation in the mother's partnership interests. Beyer v. Beyer, 428 S.W.3d 59, 2013 Tenn. App. LEXIS 229 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 5, 2013), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 827 (Tenn. Oct. 16, 2013).

Trial court properly determined that a home the wife inherited had not transmuted into marital property and remained her separate property because the home was titled in the wife's name only, one year's payment of property taxes from marital funds was de minimus, and the use of the property to secure a line of credit which was taken out during the marriage was not evidence of the wife's intention that the property become marital property. Luplow v. Luplow, 450 S.W.3d 105, 2014 Tenn. App. LEXIS 355 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 19, 2014).

After transferring ownership of the farm, the husband told the wife that he had done for her that her parents would not do, give her sole ownership of the farm, and the husband intended to transfer ownership of the farm as a gift and he relinquished control and dominion over the property by executing the quitclaim deed; although he transferred the farm in an attempt to achieve reconciliation, he did not initiate the transfer as a result of the wife's domination, and thus the classification of the farm as the wife's separate property was affirmed. Draper v. Draper, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 905 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 15, 2015).

Ownership of separate property may be considered in the division of marital property, however, separate property is not deemed marital in order to equitably divide the estate; instead, the distribution of marital property may be adjusted in accordance with the facts and circumstances of the case. Draper v. Draper, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 905 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 15, 2015).

Trial court did not err in classifying a farm as a wife's separate property because the husband intended to transfer ownership of the farm as a gift, and he relinquished control and dominion over the property by executing a quitclaim deed; while the husband transferred the farm to achieve reconciliation, he did not initiate the transfer as a result of the wife's domination and control. Draper v. Draper, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 905 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 15, 2015).

Trial court correctly held that a husband had no interest in real property because the one-half interest in the residence was properly classified as the wife's separate property; the wife's father paid for the residence at a time when the husband and wife were separated, and he intended to make a gift of the one-half interest in the property to the wife. Merkel v. Merkel, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 228 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2016).

Concerning the pump organ, both parties testified that it was their separate property prior to the marriage, the trial court credited the wife's testimony over the husband's in this regard, and no error in that determination was found. Watt v. Watt, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 295 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 27, 2016).

Trial court did not err in classifying an account, containing an inheritance from the wife's father, as the wife's separate property, as the wife testified that her intent in titling the account in both parties'  names was for estate planning purposes and to avoid estate taxes, the husband had no involvement with the account, and the wife's use of the money to occasionally help the family did not demonstrate an intent that the account be a gift to the marital estate. Douglas v. Douglas, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 571 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 8, 2016).

Trial court did not err in finding that the 100 shares given to the husband by his father were his separate property because the shares were a gift. Gant v. Gant, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 63 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2017).

Trial court did not err in finding that 283 shares were not purchased by the husband with marital assets, but were inherited from his mother in 2010, and thus amounted to separate property. Gant v. Gant, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 63 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2017).

Trial court did not err in finding that all of the appreciation of the value of the husband's company shares was his separate property; although the wife occasionally ran errands, answered the phone, and relayed messages to the husband concerning the company, these tasks resembled those of a low-level employee, plus both parties contributed to the household in roughly equal part, and the wife did not substantially contribute to the appreciation of the company. Gant v. Gant, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 63 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2017).

Property owned by the husband prior to the marriage was properly classified as the husband's separate property, as there was no evidence that the property increased in value during the marriage. Treadwell v. Lamb, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 167 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 10, 2017).

Property used as the sole marital residence was properly awarded to the husband as his separate property, as he owned it prior to the marriage, free from encumbrances, and there was no evidence concerning the wife's efforts to preserve it or increase the value of the property. Treadwell v. Lamb, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 167 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 10, 2017).

Wife received a $ 10,000.00 accident settlement in 2009, which constituted her separate property under T.C.A. § 36-4-121. Cardle v. Cardle, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 330 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 17, 2017).

Trial court properly classified the wife's Roth IRA as her separate property where resolution depended on the parties'  credibility, the trial court had credited the wife's testimony regarding the origin of the funds on the IRA, and the parties had stipulated as to the value. Harrison v. Harrison, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 336 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 22, 2017).

Trial court did not err by failing to apply the doctrine of commingling because the husband did not show that a wife's business increased in value as a result of the substantial contribution he made, and the husband was compensated as an employee for his services to the company. Gentry v. Gentry, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 838 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2017).

Trial court did not err by failing to apply the doctrine of commingling because it correctly classified a patent application for a fondant mat as marital property but did not classify the mats as marital property; the husband did not show that the wife's business increased in value as a result of the substantial contribution he made, and he was compensated as an employee for his services to the company. Gentry v. Gentry, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 838 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2017).

Trial court properly determined that a business was a wife's separate property because the wife did not gift an interest in the business to the husband; the wife never delivered the stock certificate to the husband, and thus, the gift was never completed. Gentry v. Gentry, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 838 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2017).

Trial court did not err in finding transfers of funds a husband made to a wife were gifts and her separate property because the husband had the requisite intent to make a gift; for each of the transfers, the husband did not put any restrictions on how the wife was to spend the money, he never told the wife should would have to return the money in the future, he told the wife she could do as she pleased with the funds, and his name had never been on any account in which the monies were deposited. Trezevant v. Trezevant, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 213 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 25, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 622 (Tenn. Sept. 18, 2018).

Because the parties did marry, the engagement ring was a completed gift and the wife's separate property. Disterdick v. Disterdick, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 325 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 18, 2018).

Evidence did not preponderate against the trial court's classification of the wife's jewelry as her separate property based on her testimony that these assets were gifted to her by the husband. Disterdick v. Disterdick, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 325 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 18, 2018).

Investment was the wife's separate property because it represented property acquired in exchange for property acquired before the marriage; the wife testified that premarital funds were used for the repurchase of the investment that was then titled solely in her name, and although testimony suggested that marital income might have been subsequently commingled with the funds in this account, no other proof was presented regarding the source of funds. Disterdick v. Disterdick, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 325 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 18, 2018).

Trial court did not err in classifying the parties'  residence as the husband's separate property; he established a separate account for his military retirement funds and paid all mortgage payments through that account, the wife remitted $100 or $200 on a weekly basis for general household expenses, when she was able, and she was not responsible for missed payments and had no knowledge of the particulars of the mortgage indebtedness. Rufsholm v. Rufsholm, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 517 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 30, 2018).

Trial court properly classified three tracts of land as a wife's separate property because the wife properly rebutted the presumption of a gift to the marital estate; the wife alleged that the husband unduly influenced her to execute the quit claim deeds on the disputed tracts and that he berated and badgered her daily regarding transferring ownership of the tracts, and the testimony regarding the husband's emotional abuse of the wife was unrefuted. Harper v. Harper, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 620 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 13, 2018).

Evidence did not preponderate against the trial court's classification of certain jewelry as the wife's separate property. Although the husband claimed that he purchased the jewelry as an investment, during cross-examination he admitted that the wife wore the jewelry during the marriage. Williams v. Williams, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 148 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 26, 2019).

In the absence of competent proof that the wife's activities contributed to the appreciation in value, the evidence did not preponderate against the trial court's determination that the appreciation in value of stock was the husband's separate property. Spergl v. Spergl, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 235 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 16, 2019).

Court of appeals declined to disturb the trial court's holding that real property was the wife's separate property because the husband's testimony confirmed the wife's assertion that she always considered the property separate and had no intention that it become marital; the husband did not show that the parties agreed that the property would be owned jointly, nor did the wife concede that she ever intended that the property would be converted to marital property. Long v. Long, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 409 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 23, 2019).

Trial court erred by classifying residential property as the wife's separate asset rather than a marital asset because the funds the wife used to pay the mortgage and expenses were marital assets since they were earned during the marriage, the parties used the property as their marital residence during their 10-year marriage, and the husband provided some, albeit modest, assistance in maintaining the property. Lewis v. Lewis, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 360 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 11, 2020).

22. Transmutation.

Husband's separate property, a business, was not transmuted to marital property because (1) no intent to treat the property as marital property was shown, (2) the husband did not concede the property was jointly owned or to treat the property as a marital asset, so the property was not given to the marital estate, (3) the wife only helped with bookkeeping and admitted the husband handled daily operation, (4) the wife's name was not put on the property, and (5) using the wife's credit to buy the realty the business was on concerned a distinct asset. Griffith v. Griffith, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 218 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 14, 2015).

Evidence did not preponderate against the trial court's finding that the vehicle was not marital property and did not become marital property as a result of transmutation because the vehicle was titled in the name of both the father and the company owned by him and his father and that the company made the overwhelming majority of payments on the vehicle; the father never had any intention for the vehicle to become marital property; and the mother's contributions toward the vehicle were nominal. Keown v. Keown, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 407 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 29, 2015).

Classification of appreciation in value of real property which a husband owned before the parties'  marriage as marital property was appropriate because the trial court found that the wife substantially contributed to the preservation and appreciation of the marital residence on the property during the marriage. Ogle v. Duff, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 344 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 24, 2017).

Trial court erred in classifying a property acquired by the husband pre-marriage as separate property where marital funds were used to pay off the mortgage and to remodel the property, and as a result, the property had transmuted into marital property. Givens v. Givens, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 661 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 29, 2017).

Real property was properly characterized as marital property where marital funds were used to purchase an additional half-interest in it and to make improvements thereon, and the fact that it was titled in the wife's name alone was not determinative. Cox v. Cox, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 822 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 20, 2017).

Trial court did not err in finding that a business was marital property because sufficient evidence supported its conclusion of transmutation of any of the business that could have ever been a husband's separate property; marital funds were used to purchase the later-acquired properties that comprised the business, all of the various properties the parties owned were under the umbrella of a corporation that was a marital asset, and the business, was held out as the parties'  joint property. Trezevant v. Trezevant, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 213 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 25, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 622 (Tenn. Sept. 18, 2018).

Testimony was sufficient to rebut the presumption of marital property created by joint titling, as there were allegations that the parties agreed the husband would take title to the home to get a home equity line of credit to do renovations, and the property had been converted from separate property to marital property due to transmutation; because there was evidence of an intention that the property become marital property, it should have been considered part of the parties'  marital estate. Carter v. Browne, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 63 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 4, 2019).

Simply depositing income from a separately-owned asset into a joint account does not, in and of itself, transmute the corpus of the asset into marital property. Long v. Long, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 409 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 23, 2019).

Trial court did not err in classifying the parties'  home as marital property because, even though the title to the home remained in the husband's name, the husband's actions in concert with the wife established that more likely than not, the property became marital. Although the husband may have considered the wife's contributions to be minor, the evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's finding of transmutation of the house. Hunt-Carden v. Carden, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 91 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 3, 2020).

Because both parties testified that a substantial amount of marital funds were used to maintain a property owned by the husband in Texas, including the mortgage payments thereon, the trial court's characterization of the property as mixed marital and separate property was incorrect, and remand for an equitable division of the equity and debt thereon as marital property was appropriate as the property was transmuted, through joint maintenance and management, into marital property. Wright v. Wright, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 99 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 6, 2020).

23. Proceeds from Separate Assets.

Accounts opened by husband with funds from the proceeds of his separate assets were not marital property. Wilson v. Moore, 929 S.W.2d 367, 1996 Tenn. App. LEXIS 264 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996).

T.C.A. § 36-4-121(b)(1)(B) does not permit the conclusion that any increase in value of separate property during marriage constitutes marital property; the increase in value constitutes marital property only when the spouse has substantially contributed to its preservation and appreciation. Langschmidt v. Langschmidt, 81 S.W.3d 741, 2002 Tenn. LEXIS 308 (Tenn. 2002).

Wife was granted partial summary judgment, pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04, in a divorce action wherein it was determined that her husband had no interest in the marital residence and had not contributed to its acquisition, preservation, or enhancement, where the marriage was of very short duration and the wife had used her separate property for the down payment and had made all payments as to mortgage and utilities except for one; pursuant to T.C.A. § 36-4-121(c)(1), the issue was not one of classification of property as marital or separate, but rather, the equitable distribution thereof, and the court properly considered each spouse's contributions to the accumulation of the residence. Cronin-Wright v. Wright, 121 S.W.3d 673, 2003 Tenn. App. LEXIS 404 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003), review or rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 1145  (Tenn. 2003).

As for funds in a wife's 401(k) account, a trial court erred in finding that only the balance in her account at the time of the marriage was separate property, and the matter was remanded for the trial court to determine what portion of the wife's 401(k) account was attributable to the appreciation of the premarital portion of her account and then designate that amount as the wife's separate property and award it to her. Snodgrass v. Snodgrass, — S.W.3d —, 2008 Tenn. App. LEXIS 196 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2008), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 295 S.W.3d 240, 2009 Tenn. LEXIS 677 (Tenn. Oct. 9, 2009).

Due to commingling of funds in a husband's 401(k) account, the premarital balance and its growth became marital property, and thus testimony on the segregation of those funds from the post-marital contributions and their appreciation was not needed; however, appreciation of the wife's premarital balance remained separate property and the expert witnesses'  testimony on the segregation of the earnings on her premarital property would have been helpful. Snodgrass v. Snodgrass, — S.W.3d —, 2008 Tenn. App. LEXIS 196 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2008), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 295 S.W.3d 240, 2009 Tenn. LEXIS 677 (Tenn. Oct. 9, 2009).

24. Award of Business.

Where credit card debts were incurred by the wife while the parties were living apart, and the wife offered no proof that husband benefited from such debt, although the husband unquestionably earned more than wife, the trial court's division of property and award of alimony in solido provided wife with more than ample resources to pay her own debts, and therefore, order requiring husband to pay the wife's credit card debts was reversed and such debts were allocated to the wife. Dellinger v. Dellinger, 958 S.W.2d 778, 1997 Tenn. App. LEXIS 368 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997).

Businesses acquired during the parties' marriage were clearly marital property, and the increase in value of a business owned by the husband before the marriage was marital property as the trial court found that the wife took active involvement in the businesses; the trial court properly relied on the wife's expert and on other evidence, such as financial statements prepared by husband, in finding the value of the husband's businesses. Powell v. Powell, 124 S.W.3d 100, 2003 Tenn. App. LEXIS 281 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 1075 (Tenn. 2003).

Even if a wife's challenge to a trial court's distributive award of a partnership interest, pursuant to T.C.A. § 36-4-121(f), in lieu of a property interest in the partnership had not been waived, the challenge lacked merit because the wife was not a partner and a property interest in the partnership could not be transferred to a non-partner, pursuant to T.C.A. § 61-1-501. Forbess v. Forbess, 370 S.W.3d 347, 2011 Tenn. App. LEXIS 654 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 9, 2011), rehearing denied, 370 S.W.3d 347, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 927 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 10, 2012), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 245 (Tenn. Apr. 12, 2012).

While there was some question as to a trial court awarding a computer business to a wife as “separate property” but including the value of the business as “marital property” in the allocation of assets to the wife, the classification of one asset did not render the overall distribution inequitable because the wife had no other assets, no separate income, was years from receiving social security, and had relied upon the computer business operated at the marital home as her sole source of income. Baggett v. Baggett, 422 S.W.3d 537, 2013 Tenn. App. LEXIS 550 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 26, 2013), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 1095 (Tenn. Dec. 23, 2013).

In a dissolution matter, a trial court erred in determining a husband and a wife did not have a partnership in a computer business because the wife expressly admitted to its existence in her answer to the husband's lawsuit and a partnership could be implied from the circumstances; nevertheless, the trial court properly included the business among the parties'  assets, to be valued and distributed under domestic relations law rather than partnership law. Baggett v. Baggett, 422 S.W.3d 537, 2013 Tenn. App. LEXIS 550 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 26, 2013), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 1095 (Tenn. Dec. 23, 2013).

25. —Improper.

The evidence preponderated against the court's finding as to the value of business awarded to wife where wife lacked the technical experience to successfully operate the business, and where there was evidence in the record that husband operated a business in direct competition with such business, resulting in a marked decline in its value. Loyd v. Loyd, 860 S.W.2d 409, 1993 Tenn. App. LEXIS 215 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993).

Because the husband failed to present any evidence that the wife started or operated her business for the sole purpose of depleting the marital estate, the trial court erred by characterizing the wife's management of the business as dissipation for the purpose of T.C.A. § 36-4-121. Altman v. Altman, 181 S.W.3d 676, 2005 Tenn. App. LEXIS 207 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 1016 (Tenn. Oct. 31, 2005).

26. —Business Debts.

Where business debts are marital debts subject to allocation between the parties they should follow the businesses for which they were incurred. Mondelli v. Howard, 780 S.W.2d 769, 1989 Tenn. App. LEXIS 644 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989), overruled in part, Alford v. Alford, 120 S.W.3d 810, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 1046 (Tenn. 2003), overruled in part, Clement v. Clement, — S.W.3d —, 2004 Tenn. App. LEXIS 891 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 30, 2004), overruled in part, Radebaugh v. Radebaugh, — S.W.3d —, 2006 Tenn. App. LEXIS 690 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 26, 2006), overruled in part, Walker v. Walker, — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 148 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 22, 2007), overruled in part, Garman v. Garman, — S.W.3d —, 2011 Tenn. App. LEXIS 252 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 16, 2011), overruled in part, Rooney v. Pollan, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 452 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 3, 2012).

Trial court did not err in assigning the husband all of the business debts to the assets it awarded him where there was no indication in the record that the wife was responsible for incurring any of the business debts, the husband was in a better financial position to repay the debts, and he had transferred marital interests to a trust for purposes of defrauding the wife. Street v. Street, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 213 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 29, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 439 (Tenn. July 20, 2017).

Circuit court, inter alia, properly divided and valued the marital property and refused to award spousal support to a husband because the parties'  printing business was well-positioned for profitability at the time of trial, the husband controlled the business, including its associated debts, the trial court made specific findings of fact relative to each of the pertinent statutory factors where he had no need of assistance to adjust to the economic consequences of a divorce, he had sufficient assets to be self-sufficient, the wife did not have the ability to pay the husband support, and he did not have the need. Morelock v. Morelock, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 569 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 18, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 864 (Tenn. Dec. 7, 2017).

27. Deferred Compensation Plans.

Upon the parties' divorce, the wife was not entitled to one-half of her husband's retirement from the state of Tennessee, because there was no evidence in the record to indicate the worth, increase, and amount earned during the marriage. Davis v. Davis, 138 S.W.3d 886, 2003 Tenn. App. LEXIS 754 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 274 (Tenn. Mar. 22, 2004).

28. Disability Benefits.

Disability benefits replace lost income and are not marital property subject to distribution upon divorce. Gragg v. Gragg, 12 S.W.3d 412, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 55 (Tenn. 2000).

Disability benefits may be considered by a trial court when determining alimony and child support obligations. Gragg v. Gragg, 12 S.W.3d 412, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 55 (Tenn. 2000).

Trial court erred when it characterized the husband's VA disability benefits as marital property and when it awarded the wife one-half of those military disability benefits because state courts could not treat military disability pay as marital property subject to division upon divorce. Oakes v. Oakes, 235 S.W.3d 152, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 160 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 26, 2007), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 708 (Tenn. Aug. 13, 2007).

29. Retirement Benefits.

Portions of divorce parties'  401(k) accounts at issue did not represent deferred compensation during the marriage as they were funded with premarital earnings which were not retirement benefits under T.C.A. § 36-4-121(b)(1)(B), and should have been classified as separate property; monies used to fund the 401(k) accounts were not deferred income, but rather compensation provided by the employer at the time earned, which was before the marriage. Snodgrass v. Snodgrass, — S.W.3d —, 2008 Tenn. App. LEXIS 196 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2008), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 295 S.W.3d 240, 2009 Tenn. LEXIS 677 (Tenn. Oct. 9, 2009).

Given that the husband opened the IRA on the same day he filed for divorce, he depleted the account's funds following the parties'  separation, and he presented no credible documentation regarding the value of the account at the time of trial, the trial court was well within its discretion in addressing the value of the IRA around the time of the of the divorce filing and factoring in the use of those funds as a part of its reasoning in determining an equitable division, and the valuation was within the range of the values presented. Hollar v. Hollar, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 944 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2015).

Trial court properly valued the marital estate, which did not include the husband's pensions, because the parties agreed not to place a value on those assets; the husband's own proposed property division did not include a value for the subject pensions, the husband chose to enter into a stipulation regarding the values to be assigned to the marital property, and that stipulation did not contain any value for the pensions. Naylor v. Naylor, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 494 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 15, 2016).

Overall division of the marital property valued by the parties'  agreement was not inequitable because the husband declined to assign a value to his pensions when he was seeking to retain them; therefore, the trial court did not err in failing to consider the present value of those assets in making an equitable division of the parties'  marital property. Naylor v. Naylor, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 494 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 15, 2016).

Classification of the appreciation in value of a husband's individual retirement account as marital property was inappropriate because the wife did not contribute to the account during the marriage and the husband did not commingle separate and marital funds with regard to the account. Ogle v. Duff, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 344 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 24, 2017).

Because the parties failed to assign a present value to the wife's pension, the trial court did not err in failing to consider the present value of her pension in making an equitable division of the marital property; the total value of the marital estate did not include the present cash value of the wife's pension plan; because the parties failed to assign a present value to the wife's pension, the trial court did not err in failing to consider the present value of her pension in making an equitable division of the marital property. Pack v. Pack, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 206 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2019).

30. Equitable Interests.

The court of appeals could not limit the application of this section to a division of property thereunder on the basis of the interests of the parties therein at law, excluding consideration of equitable interests such as might arise given a state of facts that would establish such interests. Jones v. Jones, 597 S.W.2d 886, 1979 Tenn. LEXIS 536 (Tenn. 1979).

In holding that the trial court erred in classifying one spouse's Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs), the appellate court significantly reduced the size of the marital estate and increased the value of the one spouse's separate property; on remand, the trial court had to determine the value of the one spouse's separate property to determine whether an equitable distribution of the parties' marital property existed pursuant to T.C.A. § 36-4-121(c)(6) (2001). Smith v. Smith, 93 S.W.3d 871, 2002 Tenn. App. LEXIS 622 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002).

Chancery court properly equitably divided the marital estate because an essentially equal division of the parties'  long-term marriage was appropriate, the husband was awarded the parties'  business based on the wife's inequitable conduct, he was in the best position to repay a debt for the children's higher education. Norman v. Norman, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 579 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 28, 2017).

31. Adjustment of Property Rights.

The 1959 amendment to this section empowers the court to settle property rights upon equitable principles upon dissolution of marriage but does not envision an unconstitutional taking of vested property rights. Kittrell v. Kittrell, 56 Tenn. App. 584, 409 S.W.2d 179, 1966 Tenn. App. LEXIS 237 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1966).

The determination of jointly owned property within the meaning of this section is a question of fact and the court in making such determination is not held to record title. Langford v. Langford, 220 Tenn. 600, 421 S.W.2d 632, 1967 Tenn. LEXIS 443 (1967), superseded by statute as stated in, Perkinson v. Perkinson, — S.W.2d —, 1990 Tenn. App. LEXIS 39 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 1990).

Jurisdiction under this section is not limited to legal or “paper” title but extends to equitable estates and interests dependent upon proof. Trimble v. Trimble, 224 Tenn. 571, 458 S.W.2d 794, 1970 Tenn. LEXIS 357 (1970).

Where husband was granted divorce on grounds of desertion, the trial court did not err in not taking into consideration the husband's annual income and retirement benefits and awarding part of same to the wife, since to do so would have been to award alimony under this section, which that court could not do. Daves v. Daves, 576 S.W.2d 4, 1978 Tenn. App. LEXIS 323 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1978).

An equitable division is not necessarily an equal one. Barnhill v. Barnhill, 826 S.W.2d 443, 1991 Tenn. App. LEXIS 561 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991).

Even though a division of property did not appear to be equal, the test was whether the division was equitable, not whether it was equal. Word v. Word, 937 S.W.2d 931, 1996 Tenn. App. LEXIS 490 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996), appeal denied, — S.W.2d —, 1997 Tenn. LEXIS 88 (Tenn. Jan. 6, 1997).

The division of the estate is not rendered inequitable simply because it is not mathematically equal, or because each party did not receive a share of every item of marital property. King v. King, 986 S.W.2d 216, 1998 Tenn. App. LEXIS 425 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998).

32. Extinguishment of Property Rights.

The voluntary remarriage of a party wherein the legal relationship is merely voidable at the option of that party operates to extinguish the right to alimony, support or other benefits conferred as a result of a prior marriage that were decreed to terminate upon the remarriage of such party. Brewer v. Miller, 673 S.W.2d 530, 1984 Tenn. App. LEXIS 2690 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984).

Where a spouse had the right to reside in the residential premises until her remarriage, as provided in the property settlement incorporated into the final decree of divorce, that right was not revived by the annulment of the second marriage for failure of consummation, which made the marriage voidable and not void ab initio. Brewer v. Miller, 673 S.W.2d 530, 1984 Tenn. App. LEXIS 2690 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984).

33. Facts Justifying Transfer.

While 1959 amendment did not authorize divestiture of previously vested legal title to property, it did authorize equitable adjustment of interests, and where facts were to effect that wife squandered her earnings while husband improved jointly owned property by construction of modern house for family and further facts were to effect that wife caused husband to become heavily indebted by her extravagance and finally left the family, court would enjoin wife from disposing of her interest in jointly held property until daughter of the marriage reached majority or became self-supporting, at which time the court would adjust the equities, considering among other things the wife's fair share for support of daughter who was in custody of husband. Kittrell v. Kittrell, 56 Tenn. App. 584, 409 S.W.2d 179, 1966 Tenn. App. LEXIS 237 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1966).

34. Divestiture of Title to Realty.

In a divorce action filed by the husband, trial court had the power to divest title to realty owned by the entirety out of the nonresident defendant wife, who was before the court by publication only, where the realty was within the court's jurisdiction. Wilson v. Andrew, 213 Tenn. 173, 375 S.W.2d 650, 1964 Tenn. LEXIS 407 (1964).

35. Wills.

This section does not afford the trial judge the authority to make a will for a party. Allison v. Allison, 638 S.W.2d 394, 1982 Tenn. App. LEXIS 380 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982).

36. Valuation.

In a divorce case, the trial court agreed that the ex-husband's expert undervalued his interest in a business, and it eventually valued his interest at four times more than the value placed on the interest by the husband's expert; however, the trial court was not obligated to accept the opinion of the ex-wife's expert either because the value the trial court placed on the husband's interest in the business was within the range of values presented by competent evidence, the trial court's decision would not be second-guessed. Owens v. Owens, 241 S.W.3d 478, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 178 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 29, 2007), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 817 (Tenn. Sept. 17, 2007).

In a divorce case, there was no basis to completely discount the ex-husband's appraiser regarding the value of the parties'  marital home, as the trial court also received testimony from the husband, a relator on behalf of the husband, and the ex-wife's appraiser; based on that testimony, the value of the parties'  marital home at the time of the divorce was somewhere between $305,000 and $425,000, and thus the trial court did not err when it valued the house at $345,000. Owens v. Owens, 241 S.W.3d 478, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 178 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 29, 2007), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 817 (Tenn. Sept. 17, 2007).

Ex-husband and his brother were co-owners of record of a house in Boca Raton where their mother lived, and the market value of the house was $200,000, but there was a mortgage of between $6,000 and $9,000 on the house; without taking the value of the life estate into consideration, the value of the husband's interest in the house at the time of the divorce was $100,000, which was his one-half interest in the house, but with his one-half share of the mortgage, the trial court should have valued his share of the house at $97,000. Owens v. Owens, 241 S.W.3d 478, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 178 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 29, 2007), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 817 (Tenn. Sept. 17, 2007).

When valuing a husband's separate property, a business, it was error to treat an earnest money deposit for an unrealized sale of the business an asset because finding testimony that the money had to be repaid “shady” was no proper basis to add the money to the business's value, when the money had been spent. Griffith v. Griffith, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 218 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 14, 2015).

Valuation of realty on which a husband's separate property, a business, was located had to be vacated because a dispute as to the property included in an appraisal of the realty could not be resolved on appeal. Griffith v. Griffith, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 218 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 14, 2015).

While the wife's argument about the specific difficulties the parties faced in selling the marital residence had a certain logic, it was an insufficient basis to overturn the trial court's valuation that fell within the range of evidence presented, and the trial court did not commit reversible error. Culver v. Culver, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 510 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 26, 2015).

Statute does not provide that any increase in value must occur following the transfer of the property. Draper v. Draper, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 905 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 15, 2015).

Trial court determined that the value of the equity in the home was $ 60,000, which was within the range of the values presented, and thus the valuation was affirmed. Hollar v. Hollar, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 944 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2015).

In a divorce case, the trial court did not err in finding that the net fair market value of the husband's business was $110,000 because the wife's expert did not have to personally inspect the assets of the husband's business to testify as to their value; and the trial court's value was within the range of the value set by the wife's expert and the husband. Neas v. Neas, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 968 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 15, 2015).

In a divorce case, the trial court did not err in finding that the husband held certain unspecified personal property with the value of $15,000 as the wife testified to various items that the husband allegedly removed from the home; the wife submitted an estimate of $30,000 for the personal property removed; the husband denied any such unspecified personal property in his possession, and submitted a value of $0; and the trial court heard the testimony, had a defined range within which to select a figure, and arrived at $15,000. Neas v. Neas, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 968 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 15, 2015).

It could not be determined how the trial court valued the limited liability company, and it was questioned whether the company could be properly be valued without the aid of qualified expert witnesses; thus, the trial court's findings with regard to the value of the company were not supported by the evidence. Franks v. Franks, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 152 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 29, 2016).

Amount of cash on hand might figure into the trial court's valuation of the company, but the trial court did not use any valuation method supported by Tennessee law, and thus the findings on the cash in hand were not supported. Franks v. Franks, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 152 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 29, 2016).

Record did not support the finding that the parties' motor home was worth $ 291,000, when both parties agreed the value was significantly lower. Franks v. Franks, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 152 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 29, 2016).

Because the husband's ability to earn income was a relevant factor for the trial court to consider in making its award of alimony, the trial court had to reconsider its finding with respect to the husband's future employment in a manner consistent with a proper valuation of the company. Franks v. Franks, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 152 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 29, 2016).

Given the failure of either party to secure the sale of the marital residence, which was a luxury estate, in the almost ten years from the entry of the final judgment of divorce and the unique nature of the property, the trial court's setting of the reserve price was indicative of the fair market value. Granoff v. Granoff, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 214 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 16, 2016).

Although the wife's expert used the 2013 figures provided by the husband and the husband's K-1s in order to determine a 2014 value for the stock, and although the market value method was generally not preferred in valuing a closely held corporation, because the trial court was provided with no additional evidence to assist its valuation, and it was free to place a value on a marital asset that was within the range of evidence presented, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its valuation of the husband's stock. Bettis v. Bettis, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 783 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 24, 2016).

Trial court properly valued the husband's trail income at two times its annual amount in accordance with the evidence presented regarding value. Fuller v. Fuller, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 974 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 21, 2016).

Parties failed to provide evidence of the value of certain property; therefore, there was no fault with the trial court not placing a value on the property. Gant v. Gant, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 63 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2017).

Trial court properly valued a dental practice where there was conflicting evidence, the husband did not dispute that the parameters of proof at trial supported the stated valuation of the accounts receivable, and even accepting the husband's figures, the overall distribution did not change significantly. Bewick v. Bewick, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 97 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 13, 2017).

Trial court's valuation of the marital home was proper because, throughout the course of litigation, the marital home was valued by the parties at different amounts ranging from $295,000 to $342,000; the trial court determined that the home was worth $300,000 and the debt owed on the home was $300,000; and the assessment of $300,000 was squarely within the range of values for the home supported by evidence that was presented to the trial court. Williams v. Williams, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 563 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 17, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 883 (Tenn. Dec. 8, 2017).

Value of the husband's interest in the lake property was zero because the loan officer who handled the mortgage for the property testified that the husband's fiancée made the down payment on the property in the amount of $155,000 and that the husband did not contribute any funds; the husband and the fiancée were not married when the property was purchased; and the wife has cited no authority for the position that the husband was entitled to any portion of the equity in the property. Williams v. Williams, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 563 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 17, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 883 (Tenn. Dec. 8, 2017).

Wife's retirement account was properly valued where the value assigned to the account was within pennies of the lump sum value as testified to by the husband's expert. Givens v. Givens, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 661 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 29, 2017).

Although the trial court erred in finding a husband incompetent to testify as to the value of his own personal property, the error was harmless because the trial court court properly determined that the husband failed to prove the wife kept any silver to which he was entitled. Trezevant v. Trezevant, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 213 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 25, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 622 (Tenn. Sept. 18, 2018).

Trial court's valuation of marital property was vacated because it appeared that the trial violated the statutory directive found subsection (b)(1)(A), and the wife did not object to certified appraisals or to the appraisers'  testimony at trial; the court of appeals could not determine whether the trial court applied an incorrect legal standard or relied on reasoning that caused an injustice because it did not know what legal standard the trial court applied or what reasoning it employed. Trezevant v. Trezevant, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 213 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 25, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 622 (Tenn. Sept. 18, 2018).

Increase in value of husband's shares of stock in a corporation was marital property, subject to equitable division, because the husband's role at the corporation included the authority to delegate power and to engage in negotiations that led to the profitable sale of the business and the husband's efforts substantially contributed to the appreciation in the value of the corporation's stock. Additionally, the parties stipulated that the wife's efforts as a homemaker substantially contributed to the appreciation of marital assets. Lucchesi v. Lucchesi, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 27 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 23, 2019).

Property was properly valued as no legal authority was cited to support the theory that it was a joint venture between the husband and father, and since partition sale principles did not apply, no deduction was necessary for any debt allegedly owed to the father in connection with the construction costs or any adjustment for what the father might have claimed if either filed a partition suit. Tarver v. Tarver, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 128 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 13, 2019).

Trial court properly valued a fifth wheel camper because the value it assigned was within the range of the values a husband and wife presented. Parker v. Parker, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 173 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 9, 2019).

Evidence did not preponderate against the trial court's valuation of the marital property; the husband had failed to disclose the court-ordered financial accounting of his income and spending and had not fully complied with discovery in this matter, and the wife's evidence was uncontested. Wise v. Bercu, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 479 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2019).

Trial court did not undervalue the husband's premarital interest in a closely held corporation where the evidence did not preponderate against its findings, and the stock agreement had not assigned the husband a stock option. Bates v. Bates, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 312 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 9, 2020).

Wife's alternate method of valuing the husband's 20 percent interest in a closely held corporation was appropriate where it combined the asset, income, and market value methods, considered the value of the company's good will, and provided persuasive reasons for discounting the valuation. Bates v. Bates, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 312 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 9, 2020).

Although a husband's 20 percent interest in a closely held corporation as his separate property was properly classified, the interest was undervalued due to reliance on a stock agreement's termination provision that had not been signed by the wife and did not govern the value of the husband's interest. Bates v. Bates, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 312 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 9, 2020).

37. Bankruptcy.

Where property of the bankruptcy estate is involved in a divorce proceeding, the bankruptcy court has exclusive jurisdiction over this property unless the automatic stay is lifted pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(d). Hohenberg v. Hohenberg, 143 B.R. 480, 1992 Bankr. LEXIS 1202 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1992).

Where the divorce was filed after the bankruptcy petition of one spouse, the nondebtor spouse's rights were subject to the distributions and priorities of creditors under the Bankruptcy Code. Hohenberg v. Hohenberg, 143 B.R. 480, 1992 Bankr. LEXIS 1202 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1992).

The bankruptcy court's lifting of the automatic stay to allow adjudication in state court of spouses' property interest in divorce proceedings does not include authority to enter any form of consensual property settlement agreement between the parties that affects property of the bankruptcy estate without prior approval of the bankruptcy court. Hohenberg v. Hohenberg, 143 B.R. 480, 1992 Bankr. LEXIS 1202 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1992).

To the extent a state court awards rights in property of a bankruptcy estate to the nondebtor spouse, she may have an unsecured claim for its monetary value to be determined and allowed by the bankruptcy court. Hohenberg v. Hohenberg, 143 B.R. 480, 1992 Bankr. LEXIS 1202 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1992).

The debtor in bankruptcy possesses an interest in having all of his property revest in him, except as otherwise provided for in a confirmed plan. This equitable interest may be “marital property” for purposes of a pending divorce proceeding. The state court does not need to limit its valuation and classification of the debtor's property to property that is not part of the bankruptcy estate, since the inchoate right to revestment may be included in the marital estate. Hohenberg v. Hohenberg, 143 B.R. 480, 1992 Bankr. LEXIS 1202 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1992).

38. —Contribution to Other Spouse's Separate Property.

In order to prove an increase in the value of separate property, a nonowner spouse must present evidence that proves the value of the separate asset prior to the marriage. Cutsinger v. Cutsinger, 917 S.W.2d 238, 1995 Tenn. App. LEXIS 648 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995).

Where wife failed to prove an appreciation in husband's chiropractic practice and where she had been contemporaneously compensated for her contributions during the marriage, she was not entitled to any more than her equitable share of the value of equipment purchased for the practice during the marriage. Cutsinger v. Cutsinger, 917 S.W.2d 238, 1995 Tenn. App. LEXIS 648 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995).

Although antenuptial agreement provided that property owned “partially or wholly” by either party would not be subject to division, that phrase in an antenuptial agreement cannot overcome the statutory definition of marital property, which includes the increase in value of separate property during the marriage if each party substantially contributed to its preservation and appreciation. Wilson v. Wilson, 987 S.W.2d 555, 1998 Tenn. App. LEXIS 612 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998), rehearing denied, 987 S.W.2d 555, 1998 Tenn. App. LEXIS 630 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998), rev'd, 984 S.W.2d 898, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 744 (Tenn. 1998).

In an appropriate bankruptcy case, a non-income producing non-filing spouse, who is a homemaker that makes substantial contributions to the family, may be entitled to have a property interest in a joint tax refund check, notwithstanding that all taxable income was generated by the debtor-spouse. Loevy v. Aldrich (In re Aldrich), 250 B.R. 907, 2000 Bankr. LEXIS 820 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 2000).

To be considered substantial, a spouse's contribution to the preservation and appreciation of the property must be real and significant; whether a spouse made substantial contributions to the preservation and appreciation of separate property is a question of fact. Mitts v. Mitts, 39 S.W.3d 142, 2000 Tenn. App. LEXIS 537 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000), review or rehearing denied, 39 S.W.3d 142, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 201 (Tenn. 2001).

Despite the fact that wife's efforts in her role as parent and homemaker certainly contributed to the success of husband's golf course and country club, because the increase in value of the corporation's stock resulted not from the golf course and country club but rather from the attractiveness of the raw land as developable residential property, the trial court correctly classified the increase in value as husband's separate property. Mitts v. Mitts, 39 S.W.3d 142, 2000 Tenn. App. LEXIS 537 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000), review or rehearing denied, 39 S.W.3d 142, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 201 (Tenn. 2001).

Where the evidence showed that a former husband was really nothing more than just an average employee with his parents'  company, a trial court erred by treating the appreciation from his separate stock as marital property under T.C.A. § 36-4-121(a)(1) because he did not substantially contribute to its appreciation. Keyt v. Keyt, 244 S.W.3d 321, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 1082 (Tenn. Dec. 19, 2007).

Evidence did not support a wife's contention that the parties substantially contributed to the appreciation of the premarital portions of each of the parties'  investment accounts; thus, evidence did not support a finding that the appreciation of the premarital portions of the accounts was considered marital property under T.C.A. § 36-4-121(b)(1)(B). Snodgrass v. Snodgrass, — S.W.3d —, 2008 Tenn. App. LEXIS 196 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2008), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 295 S.W.3d 240, 2009 Tenn. LEXIS 677 (Tenn. Oct. 9, 2009).

39. Modification of Award.

Although temporary decree awarded yacht to husband, court had jurisdiction to change the order to that of joint ownership where evidence showed wife had sufficient investment in yacht and title was in both names. Salisbury v. Salisbury, 657 S.W.2d 761, 1983 Tenn. App. LEXIS 698 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983).

Wife was entitled to an award of alimony in futuro upon termination of the transitional alimony because whatever work the wife was able to secure, she would never approach a level of earnings remotely comparable to the husband. Although the husband's debt was large, the court found that he chose to incur it, and the court specifically found that the wife needed support and that the husband was able to pay. Watson v. Watson, 309 S.W.3d 483, 2009 Tenn. App. LEXIS 355 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 27, 2009), rehearing denied, 309 S.W.3d 483, 2009 Tenn. App. LEXIS 906 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 6, 2009), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2010 Tenn. LEXIS 206 (Tenn. Feb. 22, 2010).

Court erred in finding that the husband's corporation was zero because, although the husband's receivable from the corporation might have been worthless, the corporation itself was not, and should have been considered an asset, awarded to the husband in the property division, with a value of approximately $ 300,000. Watson v. Watson, 309 S.W.3d 483, 2009 Tenn. App. LEXIS 355 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 27, 2009), rehearing denied, 309 S.W.3d 483, 2009 Tenn. App. LEXIS 906 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 6, 2009), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2010 Tenn. LEXIS 206 (Tenn. Feb. 22, 2010).

Because the trial court intended to make a substantially equal division of the marital estate but the calculation corrections resulted in an unequal division, the trial court's order was modified by awarding the ex-husband $56,477.23 from the sale proceeds of the lot adjoining the marital residence, which was valued at $476,482.92, and awarding the remainder to the ex-wife, which resulted in the husband receiving 49% in marital assets and the wife receiving 51%. Griffin v. Griffin, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 371 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 19, 2020).

40. Facts Justifying Modification of Award.

Trial judge failed to equitably divide the marital estate where the duration of the marriage, the spouse's age, earning capacity, limited ability to acquire income in the future and contribution to the marriage as homemaker and parent were all in favor of a more equal division of the estate. Harrington v. Harrington, 798 S.W.2d 244, 1990 Tenn. App. LEXIS 419 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990).

41. Attorney Fees.

Court did not err in denying the wife attorney's fees because the wife received a generous share of the marital property. Her net allocation prior to any division of the value of a corporation totaled over $ 300,000, and upon termination of the wife's transitional alimony, she was to receive alimony in futuro in the amount of $ 1,500 per month. Watson v. Watson, 309 S.W.3d 483, 2009 Tenn. App. LEXIS 355 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 27, 2009), rehearing denied, 309 S.W.3d 483, 2009 Tenn. App. LEXIS 906 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 6, 2009), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2010 Tenn. LEXIS 206 (Tenn. Feb. 22, 2010).

In a divorce case, the trial court did not employ the correct standard or criteria in arriving at an award of attorney's fees for the wife, and merely noting that the husband was less than forthcoming in discovery would not suffice. Neas v. Neas, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 968 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 15, 2015).

Trial court properly structured the alimony award to include the wife's legal fees as the first payment because the wife had sufficient funds to pay her own legal expenses. Kadivar v. Fathiamirkhiz, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 333 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 13, 2016).

Trial court erred in awarding the wife attorney's fees as alimony in solido in the amount of $35,710 and modified that amount to $29,060 because the parties stipulated that the wife had paid the majority of the $23,300 total payment from her income, which were made during the marriage and were therefore made from marital funds, but it was appropriate to charge the husband with half of the $23,300 amount, or $11,650; thus, the amount of attorney's fees awarded to the wife was modified to $29,060, which was the $40,710 in attorney's fees sought minus $11,650 in attorney's fees previously paid. Talley v. Talley, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 272 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 1, 2017).

Because the trial court implicitly acknowledged its award of attorney's fees to the wife as alimony in solido, its award of attorney's fees to the wife was vacated by virtue of the need to re-evaluate the marital estate. Trezevant v. Trezevant, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 213 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 25, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 622 (Tenn. Sept. 18, 2018).

Amount of alimony in solido awarded to a wife, based on husband's superior earnings, attempt to conceal the parties'  assets, and repeated refusal to comply with wife's discovery requests, was insufficient because the amount awarded was contrary to the proof as to the wife's counsel fees. An increase in the award of alimony in solido by the appellate court was appropriate because, based upon the division of property, it appeared that the wife, to pay attorney's fees, would have to deplete a significant amount of the wife's resources. Lucchesi v. Lucchesi, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 27 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 23, 2019).

42. Appeal.

Valuation decisions will be set aside on appeal, even if within the range of proof, if they are contrary to a preponderance of the evidence. Loyd v. Loyd, 860 S.W.2d 409, 1993 Tenn. App. LEXIS 215 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993).

Husband filed a motion to alter or amend, in which he sought disbursement of the marital accounts but noted that his request should not be considered a waiver of any objection to the designation and division of the parties'  assets, and then he filed an appeal, raising the distribution of the marital property as an issue, and thus the issue was not waived. Draper v. Draper, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 905 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 15, 2015).

Although the trial court failed to make detailed factual findings regarding the statutory factors for equitable distribution, its decision was “readily ascertainable.” Buchanan v. Buchanan, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 565 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 26, 2018).

Husband waived issues related to the classification, valuation, and division of the marital property and debt because his brief did not contain any table; because there was no right to reply to the husband's reply brief, the wife was unable to argue over perceived deficiencies or inaccuracies in the husband's table. Kanski v. Kanski, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 630 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 29, 2018).

43. Remand.

Because the trial court's determinations regarding the division of marital property were subject to change on remand, any change that the trial court makes could have a significant effect on the issue of alimony, and thus the issue was pretermitted. Babcock v. Babcock, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 105 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 9, 2015).

Trial court awarded lots to the wife, and another building and property to the husband, but the building was located on the lots awarded to the wife, which required remand. Franks v. Franks, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 152 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 29, 2016).

Trial court erred in failing to consider the required statutory factors and in placing improper reliance upon the parties'  tax treatment of the interest from corporate debentures in dividing the debentures between the parties. On remand, the court was to make a proper equitable determination concerning the division of the debentures, all of which were determined to be marital property, upon consideration of the factors. St. John-Parker v. Parker, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 335 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 17, 2016).

Trial court's property distribution had to be vacated and the matter remanded to the court for the entry of appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law because, in the absence of sufficient findings and conclusions as to the valuation of all property at issue and the statutory factors, the appellate court could not determine whether each party was awarded an equitable portion of the marital estate. Kirby v. Kirby, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 531 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 25, 2016).

Because an appellate court vacated and remanded a trial court's distribution of marital property, the appellate court also had to vacate and remand the issue of alimony for reconsideration by the trial court once an equitable distribution of marital property was fashioned by the trial court. Kirby v. Kirby, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 531 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 25, 2016).

In a divorce action involving the classification of the parties'  separate and marital property and equitable division of the marital assets, because the appellate court was unable to discern whether the trial court classified the wife's retirement accounts as marital or separate property prior to its division of the marital estate, and because the trial court failed to make sufficient findings of fact regarding several items of property prior to the distribution, the appellate court vacated the trial court's distribution of marital property and remanded the matter to the trial court for the entry of appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law supporting its classification, valuation, and ultimate distribution of marital property. Swafford v. Swafford, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 845 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 17, 2017).

Because the trial court failed to make sufficient findings of fact regarding the property valuations, it was difficult for the court to discern the rationale behind the property division and whether it was equitable, and on remand the trial court was directed to make specific fact findings pursuant to the factors listed in this section. Mangum v. Mangum, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 192 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 24, 2019).

44. Illustrative Cases.

When the parties divorced after nearly thirty years of marriage, the husband owned a real estate business, was living in a home worth over $358,000 with no mortgage, and owned a second home in Arkansas; whereas, the wife stayed at home with the children and had various health problems. The trial court awarded the husband the residence in Arkansas, all the rental real estate, one-half of his retirement account, and various vehicles and items of personal property; the trial court did not err by ordering the husband to pay the wife in cash for her share of the marital estate. Martin v. Martin, — S.W.3d —, 2009 Tenn. App. LEXIS 81 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 24, 2009).

Upon the parties'  divorce, the husband and his brother owned an excavating business; they tied their individual assets to the business debts such that none of the marital assets could be used to provide the wife with her share of the marital estate, which included real and personal property. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by awarding the wife a lump sum cash award of $98,000 from the husband's line of credit for her share of the marital estate. Boyatt v. Boyatt, — S.W.3d —, 2009 Tenn. App. LEXIS 222 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 18, 2009).

In this divorce action, the classification and award of property to the wife was affirmed where: (1) the marital estate divided by the trial court included, in addition to the real property, the parties'  mobile home, firearms, livestock and horses, vehicles, bank accounts and the husband's retirement account; and (2) the trial court ordered each party to assume responsibility for debt acquired individually since the parties separated, and ordered that the parties would be responsible for their own medical expenses. Melvin v. Melvin, 415 S.W.3d 847, 2011 Tenn. App. LEXIS 407 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 26, 2011), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2011 Tenn. LEXIS 1082 (Tenn. Nov. 16, 2011).

Trial court properly characterized a tractor as marital property rather than the wife's separate property where the husband testified that it was purchased for the farm by the parties' cattle business, and he denied that the wife asked him to purchase the Gator and denied that it was a gift to her. Ogles v. Ogles, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 7, 2015).

Trial court properly characterized two jewelry pieces as marital property rather than the wife's separate property where the parties adamantly disputed whether they were gifts to the wife, and the wife had purchased both pieces. Ogles v. Ogles, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 7, 2015).

Trial court properly characterized a pickup truck as marital property rather than the wife's separate property where the vehicle was purchased by the husband's LLC, the LLC paid the insurance and tags, and it was included in the business valuations of the LLC performed by both parties' experts. Ogles v. Ogles, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 7, 2015).

Trial court properly characterized a vehicle as marital property rather than the wife's separate property where the vehicle was purchased with a check drawn on the husband's LLC account, the LLC paid the insurance and tags for the vehicle, the vehicle was carried on the LLC's books and depreciated as a company asset, and the vehicle was included in the business valuations of the LLC performed by both parties' experts. Ogles v. Ogles, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 7, 2015).

Trial court properly found that the checks the husband wrote to a paramour constituted dissipation was proper, but the trial court erred in ordering the husband to reimburse the wife for the full amount of the checks because he was entitled to one-half of the assets he dissipated. Holdsworth v. Holdsworth, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 974 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 10, 2015), substituted opinion, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 424 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 3, 2015).

Trial court's division of marital property in a lengthy marriage was equitable because, while one spouse demonstrated a significantly greater earning capacity than the other spouse and the difference in their ages likely afforded the one spouse a longer period of time within which to earn income and accumulate assets than the other spouse, the other spouse demonstrated an exemplary ability to save money, resulting in a larger contribution by that spouse to the marital estate. Waters v. Waters, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 668 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 20, 2015).

Husband failed to show the net worth of the parties at the time they married or how the division he demanded would restore each party to his or her financial condition as it was at that time, and thus there was no error with the trial court's decision not to restore the parties to their premarital status. Hollar v. Hollar, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 944 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2015).

In a divorce case, the evidence did not preponderate against the trial court's finding that the husband's monthly income was $5,500, which was more than what was shown on his W-2, because, although the husband argued that he and his bookkeeper were careful to keep the husband's personal and business expenses separate, the trial court, to some extent, implicitly did not credit that explanation, which was within the trial court's prerogative as the determiner of credibility. Neas v. Neas, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 968 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 15, 2015).

In a divorce case, the trial court did not err in failing to divide the marital assets equitably, although not equally, because the husband received the welding business and the wife received the marital residence; the wife, with her nursing background and degree and bookkeeper experience, was well-equipped to be financially secure going forward; and the husband continued to own and operate his business. Neas v. Neas, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 968 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 15, 2015).

In a divorce case, the trial court erred in imposing upon the husband some 99% of the marital liabilities as the trial court's allocation of marital debt was hugely favorable to the wife, and served to change a 55/45 division of the marital estate to something more akin to 60/40 in the wife's favor; the parties had a comparable income; and the wife had presented no satisfactory argument such that could justify the disparity. Neas v. Neas, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 968 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 15, 2015).

Evidence did not preponderate against the division of the marital estate; great weight was given to the wife's substantial contribution to the acquisition, preservation and appreciation of the company in the form of her loan forgiveness and labor, the husband's contribution was not commensurate with the wife's and did not continue after the parties separated, and the unique circumstances of the case necessitated an award of the majority of the liquid assets to the husband, and the adjustment the wife suggested would have resulted in an inequitable distribution of the marital property given the unique circumstances of this case. Hardin v. Hensley-Hardin, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 975 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 18, 2015).

Marital assets and debts were properly divided because (1) a wife was properly found to be economically disadvantaged, (2) cash assets, other than restricted accounts, and personal property were substantially equally divided, (3) a husband disclaimed an interest in airline passes awarded to the wife, and (4) it was not inequitable to allocate debts to the husband, given the wife's separate debt and the husband's greater ability to pay. Jeronimus v. Jeronimus, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 259 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 15, 2016).

Evidence did not preponderate against a trial court's division of the marital property because the court considered the long term of the parties'  marriage; the husband's skills and means to continue to be successful in business, while the wife was a homemaker and mother to the parties'  child; and the husband's dissipation of marital assets during an affair. Moreover, once the court awarded the business interests to the husband, the trial court had no other option than to award a substantial portion of the remaining liquid assets to the wife. Grant v. Grant, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 327 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 12, 2016).

Trial court did not violate the requirements of the statute, as the trial court's order required the parties to undertake commercially reasonable efforts to market and sell the property and appointed an experienced real estate professional as the special master, and he was not to act unless the parties could not agree; at no time did the husband object to the special master, and thus he waived this issue and there was no error with the appointment of the special master. Kuhlo v. Kuhlo, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 425 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 23, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 804 (Tenn. Oct. 19, 2016).

Trial court made appropriate findings, considered the age and health of the parties as well as the value of a retirement account at the time of the marriage, and made a division of property in accordance with the statutory factors; the division was equitable. Jones v. Jones, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 589 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 12, 2016).

Property owned by the husband prior to the marriage but paid for, in part, during the marriage was considered a marital assets and included in the division of the martial estate. Treadwell v. Lamb, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 167 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 10, 2017).

Trial court err in awarding a wife an equalization payment to render the marital property distribution equal because (1) the court did not make a valuation error from the expert testimony regarding the husband's business; (2) the husband was due no credit for temporary alimony payments; (3) the court properly considered income tax liability; and (4) the court did not err in awarding the wife an equal membership interest, with governing rights, in a business. Stratienko v. Stratienko, 529 S.W.3d 389, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 222 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 499 (Tenn. Aug. 16, 2017).

Record did not preponderate against the trial court's division of marital debt, as there was a large disparity of income between the parties, it was clear that the wife was unable to maintain the mortgage payments, pending sale of the marital home, and the wife's credit card debt incurred during the pendency of the case was due to the husband's revocation of support and the wife's need to maintain the house and pay other living expenses. Henson v. Henson, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 257 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 24, 2017).

Trial court properly made findings with regard to certain statutory factors, militating in favor of a greater share of the marital estate being awarded to the wife; thus, by eliminating the reduction of $53,425 from the wife's share of the marital estate, which resulted in an allocation of assets to the wife in the amount of $542,763, which was 52.8% of the total marital estate, and an allocation of 47.2% of the total marital estate to the husband, the relatively small difference between the allocations did not demonstrate an inequitable distribution of the marital estate. Talley v. Talley, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 272 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 1, 2017).

Wife's income tax liability was properly considered a marital liability as the testimony showed that it was incurred to prevent the parties from being assessed penalties for failure to file certain income tax returns. Harrison v. Harrison, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 336 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 22, 2017).

Wife's pension was properly apportioned where the T.C.A. § 36-4-121 (Supp. 2016) factors were considered, and the husband provided no documentation supporting his claimed monetary contributions to the marriage. Harrison v. Harrison, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 336 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 22, 2017).

In light of the wife's substantial financial contributions during the marriage, the trial court did not err in dividing all marital property in equal shares to both parties even though the parties'  marriage of five and one-half years was of short duration. Ogle v. Duff, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 344 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 24, 2017).

In a divorce case, the trial court did not err in awarding the marital residence to the ex-wife as the trial court's distribution of the marital property, including the parties'  debt, was not an abuse of discretion because the parties agreed at mediation that they would retain their respective vehicles; the marital residence awarded to the wife was encumbered with a mortgage; the parties equally split a credit card balance with debt associated with the parties'  business; the ex-husband was ordered to pay any additional debts associated with the business; and the ex-wife was ordered to pay her student loans, which she estimated to be around $100,000. Sibley v. Sibley, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 355 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 25, 2017).

On remand, a trial court was to enforce the terms of the parties'  stipulation agreement as written and allow a business valuation expert a reasonable time to ascertain the values of small businesses as of a date as near as reasonably possible to the final divorce hearing date. The trial court was to make findings classifying the parties'  property as marital or separate and concerning the value of the property to be divided before then dividing only that property classified as marital in an equitable manner. Watts v. Watts, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 461 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 11, 2017).

Trial court did not err in making a distribution of one property and a partnership account where it properly classified them each as marital property, and since the parties had not entered into any stipulations or agreements with regard to marital assets, the trial court did not err in making a distribution of the two assets that was different than that proposed by the parties. Givens v. Givens, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 661 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 29, 2017).

Classification of the wife's bank accounts as marital property was proper where marital funds were deposited into the accounts and marital bills were paid from the accounts throughout the marriage. Givens v. Givens, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 661 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 29, 2017).

Because the trial court could award spousal support only after it equitably divided the parties'  marital property, the awards of alimony to the wife were vacated and remanded for reconsideration in light of a proper valuation and distribution of the marital estate; Trezevant v. Trezevant, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 213 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 25, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 622 (Tenn. Sept. 18, 2018).

Although the distribution of marital property was not mathematically equal, it was equitable; each party had significant income to draw from following the marriage, it appeared that the parties enjoyed relatively equal positions with regard to their ability to acquire assets and income in the future, each party had contributed to the marital estate, and although the wife maintained a slightly larger separate estate following the divorce, she had contributed a substantial amount of income from her separate assets. Disterdick v. Disterdick, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 325 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 18, 2018).

Any error by the trial court in valuing a husband's bank account was harmless because assuming that the husband's assigned value to the bank account was correct, that would result in a division of $ 10,616 to him and $ 11,364 to the wife, which was roughly equal division of marital property and was equitable. Harper v. Harper, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 620 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 13, 2018).

Because the trial court's final judgment was unclear regarding the classification of the real property on which the marital home was located, review of whether the trial court erred by awarding the value of the property to the wife in its judgment was precluded. Bolt v. Bolt, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 635 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 30, 2018).

Record supported further inquiry on remand as to whether an award of rehabilitative and/or transitional alimony was appropriate because, despite the court's finding that the wife had an earning ability well below the wife's monthly need, and that the wife had transferable skills and training, the court did not consider whether an award of short term alimony was appropriate. Lucchesi v. Lucchesi, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 27 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 23, 2019).

Division of the marital estate was consistent with the T.C.A. § 36-4-121(c) factors where although the 17-year length of the marriage favored a more even split, the parties'  earning potentials and the other enumerated factors favored the court's 60-40 split in the wife's favor. Diffie v. Diffie, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 191 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 23, 2019).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in its division of the marital estate because the trial court considered the relevant factors in subsection (c), and the testimony and other evidence in the record supported its factual findings; the wife was the primary wage earner and the primary caretaker of the home and the children while the husband engaged in years of often secretive day-trading that resulted in the wasteful expenditure of marital assets. Pack v. Pack, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 206 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2019).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in dividing the marital property because it made findings of fact and conclusions of law sufficient to explain its classification of assets and debts and their division between the parties, the husband received a total of $435,583 in marital assets and the wife received a net benefit of $412,430 in marital assets. Shackelford v. Shackelford, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 236 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 16, 2019).

Because the marital residence became part of the land when it was constructed during the parties'  marriage on a tract of land which the husband owned before the marriage, and conversely at least some of the land became part of the marital estate, the trial court erred in determining that the entire tract of land remained the husband's separate property. On remand, the court was to identify that portion of the land the parties treated and used as part of their marital residence, classify that land as marital property, and determine its value. Anderson v. Anderson, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 397 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 16, 2019).

Although a wife claimed that the increase in value of the husband's separate farm tracts of land were marital property because the wife's financial contributions as a wage earner enabled the husband to retain the properties, the wife was not entitled to any share of the increased value of these properties because the wife failed to show that the wife substantially contributed to the preservation and appreciation of the properties. Anderson v. Anderson, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 397 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 16, 2019).

Trial court did not err in awarding a wife 25 percent of the equity in the marital home because the court considered the husband's contribution of a greater percentage of funds from the husband's retirement account to the purchase of the property and the period of time the parties lived in the home during the marriage in determining the weight afforded to the parties'  respective non-economic contributions. The court erred in its calculation of the wife's net award by twice crediting against the wife the marital debt associated with the home. Ackerman v. Ackerman, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 470 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 24, 2019).

Division of the marital assets and liabilities in this case was proper; the wife was 57 years old at the time of trial and was unable to maintain employment due to her medical condition, the husband was an emergency room physician earning an average of $ 38,123 per month, and the trial court also took into account the marital funds that the husband had dissipated when making its equitable distribution of property. Wise v. Bercu, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 479 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2019).

Trial court did not err in making the husband responsible for repayment of the business debt because it was incurred as a result of his performance of contracting work without the required license or repayment of five of the wife's seven credit cards because they were used for family expenses and the husband had the greater ability to repay the debts. Poole v. Kinslow, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 539 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 5, 2019).

Husband was awarded as the husband's separate property the amount of the husband's down payment on the marital home. Upon the sale of the house, the wife was to be awarded one half of the remaining equity in the marital home after that payment, in addition to the award of one half of the marital interest in the husband's retirement (as found by the trial court). Hunt-Carden v. Carden, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 91 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 3, 2020).

Husband was entitled to a portion of an individual retirement account (IRA), as the husband's separate property, that consisted of the husband's 401(k) account that was opened by the husband prior to the marriage and rolled into the IRA before the marriage. The remaining balance of the IRA, including any accrual or loss during the pendency of the appeal, was marital property, which the trial court was instructed to divided equitably on remand. Wright v. Wright, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 99 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 6, 2020).

Because the ex-husband asked the trial court to award the ex-wife 50% of the marital royalty income in order to provide the wife a monthly income of $4,377, and, of his own volition, he then told the court that he felt so strongly about that asset that he was willing to guarantee that the wife received $4,377 per month for up to eight years, the trial court's division of the marital estate with the guarantee regarding the marital royalty income to the wife did not constitute reversible error. Griffin v. Griffin, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 371 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 19, 2020).

45. Lien.

Trial court's judgment was modified to provide for a lien to be imposed upon a portion of a husband's assets in an amount sufficient to secure the alimony in solido award to the wife, with the trial court to determine on remand which asset(s) were to be encumbered. Furthermore, placing a lien on the husband's assets reduced the amount of life insurance necessary to secure the husband's alimony obligations, but also provided the wife with a means of enforcing the alimony in solido award. Stratienko v. Stratienko, 529 S.W.3d 389, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 222 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 499 (Tenn. Aug. 16, 2017).

46. Jurisdiction.

Trust assets were owned by the trust rather than the parties, and because the trust was not a party to these divorce proceedings, the trial court correctly ruled that it had no authority over the trust or its assets. Disterdick v. Disterdick, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 325 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 18, 2018).

36-4-122. Costs.

The court may decree costs against either party, and may award execution for the same, or, in case any estate is sequestered, or in the power of the court, or in the hands of a receiver, it may order the costs to be paid out of such property.

Code 1858, § 2477 (deriv. Acts 1831, ch. 20, § 1; 1835-1836, ch. 26, §§ 17, 20, 21); Shan., § 4230; mod. Code 1932, § 8455; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 36-829.

Cross-References. Proceeding in forma pauperis, § 20-12-127.

Security for costs, § 36-4-108.

Law Reviews.

Divorces in Tennessee (Harold C. Warner), 14 Tenn. L. Rev. 588 (1936).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Married Women.

A married woman may be adjudged to pay the costs of her unsuccessful suit for divorce and also the costs of the husband's successful cross suit for divorce. Payne v. Payne, 96 Tenn. 59, 33 S.W. 613, 1895 Tenn. LEXIS 8 (1896); Brasfield v. Brasfield, 96 Tenn. 580, 36 S.W. 384, 1896 Tenn. LEXIS 11 (1896); Williams v. Williams, 1 Tenn. Civ. App. (1 Higgins) 538 (1911).

2. Solicitors of Wife.

Where the solicitors, representing the complainant wife in her divorce suit, procured a void decree of sale of the defendant's land, under their agreement with the complainant, which was void as to the defendant because he was not a party to it, and the decree was reversed upon the defendant's appeal, the costs incident to such decree and the appeal to reverse it will be adjudged against the solicitors at whose instance it was rendered. Stillman v. Stillman, 72 Tenn. 271, 1880 Tenn. LEXIS 10 (1880).

3. Dismissal of Suit.

Where wife files bill for divorce and alimony, attaches the property of the husband, and, before the return day of the writ, voluntarily orders the dismissal of her suit, and it is dismissed, the husband is not liable for the costs and his property thus wrongfully attached cannot be sold by the order of the court to pay the costs. Hall v. Hall, 42 S.W. 273, 1897 Tenn. Ch. App. LEXIS 53 (1897).

4. Attorneys' Fees.

Allowance of counsel fees must be made in the name and right of the wife, upon a showing of reasonable foundation for her suit, and that she has no sufficient separate property. Carden v. Carden, 37 S.W. 1022, 1896 Tenn. Ch. App. LEXIS 49 (1896).

Court of original jurisdiction and not appellate court should determine fee for services performed in court of appeals and supreme court. Folk v. Folk, 210 Tenn. 367, 357 S.W.2d 828, 1962 Tenn. LEXIS 430 (1962).

In determining compensation for attorneys, the amount and character of service rendered, labor, time and trouble involved, character and importance of litigation, amount of money or value of the property involved, professional skill and experience called for, and character and standing of the attorneys are questions that should be determined by the court having original jurisdiction. Folk v. Folk, 210 Tenn. 367, 357 S.W.2d 828, 1962 Tenn. LEXIS 430 (1962).

Award of $750 in attorney fees was improper where plaintiff wife was financially able to pay her own attorney. Duncan v. Duncan, 652 S.W.2d 913, 1983 Tenn. App. LEXIS 545 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983), overruled, Cary v. Cary, 937 S.W.2d 777, 1996 Tenn. LEXIS 362 (Tenn. 1996).

Court held not in error in not requiring husband to pay all of wife's attorneys' fees, but only a part thereof, where with the award of proceeds from sale of house to wife, she was able to pay the balance of the attorneys' fees as required by the court. Walker v. Walker, 656 S.W.2d 11, 1983 Tenn. App. LEXIS 597 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983), overruled, Seessel v. Seessel, 748 S.W.2d 422, 1988 Tenn. LEXIS 55 (Tenn. 1988), overruled, Webster v. Webster, — S.W.3d —, 2006 Tenn. App. LEXIS 685 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 24, 2006).

5. —Discretion of Court.

A discretion in fixing fees is to be exercised by the trial court, not to be interfered with in the appellate courts unless injustice has been done. Riley v. Riley, 9 Tenn. App. 643, — S.W.2d —, 1929 Tenn. App. LEXIS 124 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1929).

The trial court has wide discretion in determining whether to require one spouse to pay for the other's legal expenses incident to divorce litigation. Loyd v. Loyd, 860 S.W.2d 409, 1993 Tenn. App. LEXIS 215 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993).

6. —Effect of Amount of Alimony Awarded.

The amount allowed counsel of the wife is governed to some extent by the amount of alimony allowed. Lingner v. Lingner, 165 Tenn. 525, 56 S.W.2d 749, 1932 Tenn. LEXIS 80 (1933).

7. —Fees as Lien.

Reasonable counsel fees should be a lien upon the defendant's impounded property. Stillman v. Stillman, 66 Tenn. 169, 1874 Tenn. LEXIS 102 (1874).

Where a lien for the fees of certain counsel of the complainant wife was, by decree of the supreme court, declared on certain impounded property of the defendant husband, an agreement between the complainant and those of her counsel in whose favor such lien had been declared, and whose fees were allowed, and those of her counsel in whose favor no lien had been declared, and whose claim for fees had been disallowed, will not bind the defendant who was not a party thereto, and a subsequent decree thereon for a sale of the property for the satisfaction of the claims of the counsel in whose favor no lien had been declared and whose claim for fees had been disallowed was erroneous as against the defendant. The agreement was void as to the defendant, and the decree thereon, so far as it affected his rights, was coram non judice and void. The defendant has a right to stand upon the original decree, to be executed as an entirety. Stillman v. Stillman, 72 Tenn. 271, 1880 Tenn. LEXIS 10 (1880).

8. —Fees on Appeal.

Where the appellate court granted the wife a divorce from bed and board, allowed her alimony, and remanded the cause for the execution of its decree, without expressly authorizing the trial court to make any decree in regard to fees of counsel, such court may nevertheless make all necessary orders to carry out such decree and, as an incident, adjudge such costs and expenses as have been incurred, or may be necessarily incurred, in the progress of the cause; and counsel fees are a part of the expenses incident to a divorce suit. Shy v. Shy, 54 Tenn. 125, 1872 Tenn. LEXIS 28 (1872). See Lingner v. Lingner, 165 Tenn. 525, 56 S.W.2d 749, 1932 Tenn. LEXIS 80 (1933).

Where the trial court allowed counsel fees, but an appeal was taken by the husband, either the fees for services of counsel on appeal may be fixed by the appellate court, or the case may be remanded for the purpose of having the fee determined. Taylor v. Taylor, 144 Tenn. 311, 232 S.W. 445, 1921 Tenn. LEXIS 41 (1921), overruled in part, Morrissey v. Morrissey, 214 Tenn. 112, 377 S.W.2d 944, 1964 Tenn. LEXIS 455 (1964); Lingner v. Lingner, 165 Tenn. 525, 56 S.W.2d 749, 1932 Tenn. LEXIS 80 (1933).

36-4-123. Appeals.

Appeals in divorce cases shall be governed by the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. Pending appeal, orders and decrees of the trial court shall have the effect prescribed by the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure.

Code 1958, § 3158; Shan., § 4890; Code 1932, § 9039; Acts 1970, ch. 595, § 1; 1981, ch. 449, § 2(23); T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 36-830.

Law Reviews.

Procedure — Writ of Error Coram Nobis in Divorce Cases, 36 Tenn. L. Rev. 411 (1969).

36-4-124. Right to remarry.

When a marriage is absolutely annulled, or dissolved, the parties shall severally be at liberty to marry again.

Code 1858, § 2475 (deriv. Acts 1835-1836, ch. 26, § 7); Shan., § 4228; mod. Code, 1932, § 8452; Acts 1970, ch. 347, § 1; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 36-831.

Textbooks. Pritchard on Wills and Administration of Estates (5th ed., Phillips and Robinson), § 462.

Law Reviews.

Use of Presumptions in Proving the Existence of Marriage Relationships in Tennessee (Richard T. Doughtie), 5 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 409 (1975).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Annulment.

Where the marriage is absolutely annulled, the liberty to marry again is not limited to any time within which it may occur, nor are there any rights reserved, in any case, after the unconditional dissolution of the bonds of matrimony, to either party to open the decree or set it aside. Owens v. Sims, 43 Tenn. 544, 1866 Tenn. LEXIS 85 (1866).

2. Foreign Law Inhibiting Remarriage.

The law of another state, providing that the offending party shall not marry again, after the other party has obtained an absolute divorce, is of no force and effect in this state, where such marriages are not prohibited. There is no principle of comity requiring this state to give force and effect to the penal laws of another state. Dickson v. Dickson's Heirs, 9 Tenn. 110, 1826 Tenn. LEXIS 16 (1826); Pennegar v. State, 87 Tenn. 244, 10 S.W. 305, 1888 Tenn. LEXIS 58, 10 Am. St. Rep. 648, 2 L.R.A. 703 (1889).

3. Injunction Against Marriage in Decree.

The court may not in its decree include a prohibition against remarriage of the guilty party, and the violation of such an injunction does not render party liable for contempt of court. Bennett v. Anderson, 20 Tenn. App. 523, 101 S.W.2d 148, 1936 Tenn. App. LEXIS 42 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1936).

36-4-125. Legitimacy of children unaffected by divorce or annulment.

The annulment or dissolution of the marriage shall not in any way affect the legitimacy of the children of the same.

Code 1858, § 2476 (deriv. Acts 1835-1836, ch. 26, § 7); Shan., § 4229; mod. Code 1932, § 8453; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 36-832.

Textbooks. Pritchard on Wills and Administration of Estates (5th ed., Phillips and Robinson), § 849.

Law Reviews.

Workmen's Compensation — Dependency — Posthumous Illegitimate Child, 29 Tenn. L. Rev. 600 (1961).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Construction.

This statute being remedial in nature is to be liberally construed. Taliaferro v. Rogers, 35 Tenn. App. 521, 248 S.W.2d 835, 1951 Tenn. App. LEXIS 89 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1951).

2. Effect of Amendment.

By the amendment of this section adding the words “annulment or”, the same status of legitimacy is extended to children of a marriage annulled as to those of a dissolved marriage. Deihl v. Jones, 170 Tenn. 217, 94 S.W.2d 47, 1935 Tenn. LEXIS 130 (1936); Taliaferro v. Rogers, 35 Tenn. App. 521, 248 S.W.2d 835, 1951 Tenn. App. LEXIS 89 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1951).

The addition of the words “annulment or” to this section had the effect of broadening the statute, since the words “annulment” and “dissolution” are not synonymous. Deihl v. Jones, 170 Tenn. 217, 94 S.W.2d 47, 1935 Tenn. LEXIS 130 (1936).

3. Marriage Void Ab Initio.

The issue of a marriage void ab initio is legitimate and capable of inheriting from the parents. Deihl v. Jones, 170 Tenn. 217, 94 S.W.2d 47, 1935 Tenn. LEXIS 130 (1936); Duggan v. Ogle, 25 Tenn. App. 467, 159 S.W.2d 834, 1941 Tenn. App. LEXIS 133 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1941); Taliaferro v. Rogers, 35 Tenn. App. 521, 248 S.W.2d 835, 1951 Tenn. App. LEXIS 89 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1951).

Where one of the parties of a marriage was an adjudged lunatic at the date of the marriage and the marriage was void ab initio, the effect of this section was to legitimize the issue of such marriage in the same manner as in the case of divorce or annulment of a marriage. Deihl v. Jones, 170 Tenn. 217, 94 S.W.2d 47, 1935 Tenn. LEXIS 130 (1936).

Even though a bigamous marriage is void ab initio, the children of such a marriage are legitimate. Taliaferro v. Rogers, 35 Tenn. App. 521, 248 S.W.2d 835, 1951 Tenn. App. LEXIS 89 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1951).

Although the parties marriage was void because it was bigamous, that did not affect the legitimacy of the parties' four children; however, the trial court did not specify in its order whether the ten thousand one hundred seventy-six constituted net income or gross income and did not explain how it computed the father's income and his child support obligation. Guzman v. Alvares, 205 S.W.3d 375, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 605 (Tenn. July 11, 2006).

4. —Effect of Statute Where No Relief Sought by Parents.

The statute is not limited in its application to cases where there is an annulment by decree of court, but protects equally the children of marriages void ab initio even though no such relief is sought by the parents. Deihl v. Jones, 170 Tenn. 217, 94 S.W.2d 47, 1935 Tenn. LEXIS 130 (1936); Duggan v. Ogle, 25 Tenn. App. 467, 159 S.W.2d 834, 1941 Tenn. App. LEXIS 133 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1941); Taliaferro v. Rogers, 35 Tenn. App. 521, 248 S.W.2d 835, 1951 Tenn. App. LEXIS 89 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1951).

5. Natural Children.

Under this section and former § 36-2-207 [see now § 36-2-304], children born out of wedlock are legitimated by the marriage of their parents, even though the marriage is void. Southern R. Co. v. Sanders, 193 Tenn. 409, 246 S.W.2d 65, 1952 Tenn. LEXIS 306 (1952).

6. Workers' Compensation.

Posthumous child of void second marriage of employee was entitled to benefits under workers' compensation law. Winfield v. Cargill, Inc., 196 Tenn. 133, 264 S.W.2d 584, 1954 Tenn. LEXIS 352 (1954).

Posthumous illegitimate child of deceased worker becomes dependent of such worker under the workers' compensation law. Shelley v. Central Woodwork, Inc., 207 Tenn. 411, 340 S.W.2d 896, 1960 Tenn. LEXIS 473 (1960).

7. Effect of Former Decisions.

In Jennings v. Jennings, 165 Tenn. 295, 54 S.W.2d 961, 1932 Tenn. LEXIS 50, the court did not consider the amendment to this section added by the Code of 1932 and such section was not mentioned in the opinion and is not a controlling authority on the construction of this section. Taliaferro v. Rogers, 35 Tenn. App. 521, 248 S.W.2d 835, 1951 Tenn. App. LEXIS 89 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1951).

In Bennett v. Anderson, 20 Tenn. App. 523, 101 S.W.2d 148, 1936 Tenn. App. LEXIS 42, there was no construction of this section and the true basis of the court's refusal to hold that the children of a marriage between person divorced on grounds of adultery and the coadulterer were legitimated by the statute was that there was “no proof or presumption of marriage”, and if there is any conflict between that case and the view adopted in Deihl v. Jones, 170 Tenn. 217, 94 S.W.2d 47, 1935 Tenn. LEXIS 130 (1936), that this section protects equally the children of marriage void ab initio it cannot stand as a precedent. Taliaferro v. Rogers, 35 Tenn. App. 521, 248 S.W.2d 835, 1951 Tenn. App. LEXIS 89 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1951).

36-4-126. Suspension of proceedings to attempt reconciliation — Revocation.

  1. During the pendency of any suit for absolute divorce, limited divorce or separate maintenance, the court having jurisdiction of the matter may, upon the written stipulation of both the husband and wife that they desire to attempt a reconciliation, enter an order suspending any and all orders and proceedings for such time as the court, in its discretion, may determine advisable under the circumstances, so as to permit the parties to attempt such reconciliation without prejudice to their respective rights. During the period of such suspension, the parties may resume living together as husband and wife and their acts and conduct in so doing shall not be determined a condonation of any prior misconduct.
  2. Such suspension may be revoked upon motion of either party by order of the court.

Acts 1965, ch. 329, § 1; T.C.A., § 36-836.

Law Reviews.

The New Office of Divorce Referee in Shelby County (William K. West, Jr.), 4 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 33 (1973).

36-4-127. Expunction of divorce records upon reconciliation of parties.

Parties to any divorce proceeding, who have reconciled and dismissed their cause of action, may thereafter file an agreed sworn petition signed by both parties and notarized, requesting expunction of their divorce records. Upon the filing of such petition, the judge shall issue an order directing the clerk to expunge all records pertaining to such divorce proceedings, once all court costs have been paid. The clerk shall receive a fee of fifty dollars ($50.00) for performing such clerk's duties under this section.

Acts 1981, ch. 435, § 1; T.C.A., § 36-838.

Attorney General Opinions. When presented with an order to expunge divorce records, the clerk of the court must destroy or obliterate the records, OAG 06-15, 2006 Tenn. AG LEXIS 15 (1/19/06).

36-4-128. Remarriage after spouse's two-year absence — Effect of spouse's return.

  1. If, upon a false rumor, apparently well founded, of the death of one (1) of the parties, who has been absent two (2) whole years, the other party marries again, the party remaining single may, upon returning, insist upon a restoration of conjugal rights or upon a dissolution of the marriage, and the court shall decree accordingly, to wit: that the first marriage shall stand and the second be dissolved, or vice versa.
  2. Such bill or petition shall be filed within one (1) year after the return.

Code 1858, § 2461 (deriv. Acts 1835-1836, ch. 26, § 8); Shan., § 4214; Code 1932, § 8439; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 36-833.

Cross-References. Bigamy, § 39-15-301.

Remarriage after absence of five years, § 36-3-102.

Textbooks. Gibson's Suits in Chancery (7th ed., Inman), § 516.

Law Reviews.

Use of Presumptions in Proving the Existence of Marriage Relationships in Tennessee (Richard T. Doughtie), 5 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 409 (1975).

36-4-129. Stipulated grounds and/or defenses — Grant of divorce.

  1. In all actions for divorce from the bonds of matrimony or legal separation the parties may stipulate as to grounds and/or defenses.
  2. The court may, upon stipulation to or proof of any ground of divorce pursuant to § 36-4-101, grant a divorce to the party who was less at fault or, if either or both parties are entitled to a divorce or if a divorce is to be granted on the grounds of irreconcilable differences, declare the parties to be divorced, rather than awarding a divorce to either party alone.

Acts 1989, ch. 543, § 1; 1998, ch. 1059, § 5; 2008, ch. 868, § 2.

Law Reviews.

Dual Fault Divorce in Tennessee: The Thomasson Case and the New Statute, 19 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 353 (1989).

Family law — Cary v. Cary: Antenuptial Agreements Waiving or Limiting Alimony in Tennessee, 27 U. Mem. L. Rev. 1041 (1997).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Findings of Court.

The trial court was not required to make a written finding that both parties were at fault or which party was less at fault in its order awarding a divorce to the husband “alone.” Varley v. Varley, 934 S.W.2d 659, 1996 Tenn. App. LEXIS 459 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996).

The court should have found that both parties engaged in an inappropriate course of conduct over many months that rendered continued cohabitation as husband and wife unacceptable pursuant to T.C.A. § 36-4-129(b) rather than “cruel and inhuman treatment” pursuant to T.C.A. § 36-4-101(a)(11), where the parties relationship had disintegrated and their love and affection had been extinguished. Earls v. Earls, 42 S.W.3d 877, 2000 Tenn. App. LEXIS 356 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000), rehearing denied, 42 S.W.3d 877, 2000 Tenn. App. LEXIS 398 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000).

Trial court was not required to state with specificity in its order finding that both parties were entitled to a divorce exactly what one spouse's inappropriate marital conduct was given that spouse's admitted adultery and the fact both parties admitted in the divorce proceeding to conduct that would entitle the other to a divorce. Fulbright v. Fulbright, 64 S.W.3d 359, 2001 Tenn. App. LEXIS 532 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001), review or rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 843 (Tenn. Dec. 10, 2001).

Trial court erred in granting a husband's motion to enter a decree of divorce for the wife where, even though the husband admitted to allegations of adultery in the divorce petition, that was not an agreed upon stipulation and the court should have held an evidentiary hearing to hear proof of the facts prior to having granted the divorce. Hyneman v. Hyneman, 152 S.W.3d 549, 2003 Tenn. App. LEXIS 680 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 407 (Tenn. May 10, 2004).

2. Discretion of Court.

In an action in which the husband appealed the circuit court for Rutherford County's division of marital property, the amount of the award of rehabilitative alimony to the wife, and the grant of divorce to the wife based on the husband's adultery, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting the wife a divorce based upon the husband's adultery where, inter alia, the husband testified that he had been dating another woman for two years prior to the divorce and that he and this woman had engaged in sexual relations since the fall of 2003. Jekot v. Jekot, 232 S.W.3d 744, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 3, 2007), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 475 (Tenn. May 14, 2007).

Chancery court erred in denying a husband's motion to set aside the divorce judgment without hearing because the record was insufficient to establish whether the husband complied with the request requirements of the judicial branch's ADA Policy prior to the hearing or whether he was a “qualified individual with a disability” such that modification was necessary—those issues were questions of fact that the trial court should have considered when making its decision—and the issue of whether the trial court erred by entering its judgment after the husband had withdrawn his consent was in part dependent on whether the trial court and the husband had complied with the ADA Policy. Harris v. Harris, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 267 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 29, 2019).

3. Stipulations.

T.C.A. § 36-4-114 addresses the situation in which a defendant admits the facts charged in the bill or petition and relied upon as the ground for a divorce, and mandates that the trial court shall, nevertheless, before decreeing a divorce, hear proof of the facts alleged; the statutes must be interpreted in pari materia, and thus the meaning of “stipulation” in T.C.A. § 36-4-129 must be construed in light of the express terms of T.C.A. § 36-4-114. Hyneman v. Hyneman, 152 S.W.3d 549, 2003 Tenn. App. LEXIS 680 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 407 (Tenn. May 10, 2004).

Trial court did not err in granting a wife a divorce on the ground of inappropriate marital conduct because it gave the wife's counsel the opportunity to present proof, and counsel declined, recognizing the stipulation to inappropriate marital conduct. Richards v. Richards, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 712 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 26, 2016).

4. Illustrative Cases.

Decision to grant divorce to the wife based on the husband's inappropriate marital conduct under T.C.A. § 36-4-101(a)(11) was supported by ample evidence in the record, which showed that the husband and his mother, with whom the couple lived, combined first to indoctrinate the wife in their religious beliefs and then to methodically humiliate, ostracize, and subjugate her. The mother was encouraged not to see her family, was punished for failing to comply with the rules set by the husband and his mother, and was eventually isolated in another house on the property and was not permitted to see her daughter. Chaffin v. Ellis, 211 S.W.3d 264, 2006 Tenn. App. LEXIS 200 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 867 (Tenn. 2006).

Neither party was awarded divorce because the trial court simply declared the parties divorced in accordance with T.C.A. § 36-4-129(b), and also neither party clearly prevailed on the issues of the valuation of the marital property and the division of the marital estate and the type, amount, and duration of the spousal support requested by the ex-wife; thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it refused the wife's request for discretionary costs as the appellate court was unable to determine which party prevailed on appeal. Owens v. Owens, 241 S.W.3d 478, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 178 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 29, 2007), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 817 (Tenn. Sept. 17, 2007).

Trial court did not find the husband's unsupported testimony sufficient to establish that he was less at fault than the wife; the husband's testimony that he did not file for divorce because he took an oath on the Bible stood in stark contrast to his convictions for rape and sexual assault and was so outrageous and incredible as to have rendered all of his testimony untrustworthy, and the record supported the trial court decision to grant the divorce to the wife. Watt v. Watt, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 295 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 27, 2016).

It was not error to declare parties divorced instead of awarding a wife a divorce because, once either party demonstrated grounds for divorce, a trial court had discretion to declare the parties divorced. Henegar v. Henegar, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 450 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 29, 2016).

Trial court abused its discretion in awarding the divorce to the wife, rather than granting a divorce without regard to fault, when it later considered her relative fault in making its alimony determination and each party played a role in the demise of the marriage. Jackson v. Jackson, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 835 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 4, 2016).

36-4-130. Mediation — Confidentiality of information and documents.

  1. When the parties to a divorce action mediate the dispute, the mediator shall not divulge information disclosed to the mediator by the parties or by others in the course of mediation. All records, reports, and other documents developed for the mediation are confidential and privileged.
  2. Communications made during a mediation may be disclosed only:
    1. When all parties to the mediation agree, in writing, to waive the confidentiality of the written information;
    2. In a subsequent action between the mediator and a party to the mediation for damages arising out of the mediation;
    3. When statements, memoranda, materials and other tangible evidence are otherwise subject to discovery and were not prepared specifically for use in and actually used in the mediation;
    4. When the parties to the mediation are engaged in litigation with a third party and the court determines that fairness to the third party requires that the fact or substance of an agreement resulting from mediation be disclosed; or
    5. When the disclosure reveals abuse or neglect of a child by one (1) of the parties.
  3. The mediator shall not be compelled to testify in any proceeding, unless all parties to the mediation and the mediator agree in writing.

Acts 1993, ch. 245, § 1; 2007, ch. 519, § 2.

Cross-References. Confidentiality of public records, § 10-7-504.

Law Reviews.

Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Personal Injury Forum (William P. Zdancewicz), 26 U. Mem. L. Rev. 1169 (1996).

36-4-131. Mediation — Waiver or extension — Domestic abuse.

  1. Except as provided in subsections (b), (c) and (d), in any proceeding for divorce or separate maintenance, the court shall order the parties to participate in mediation.
  2. The court may waive or extend mediation pursuant to subsection (a) for reasons including, but not limited to:
    1. Any factor codified in § 36-6-409(4);
    2. Either party is unable to afford the cost of the mediation, unless the cost is waived or subsidized by the state or if the cost of mediation would be an unreasonable burden on either or both of the parties;
    3. The parties have entered into a written marital dissolution agreement or an agreed order resolving all of the pending issues in the divorce, except as provided in subsection (c);
    4. The parties have participated in a settlement conference presided over by the court or a special master;
    5. The court finds a substantial likelihood that mediation will result in an impasse; or
    6. For other cause found sufficient by the court.
  3. If the ground for the divorce is irreconcilable differences and the parties have filed with the court a properly executed marital dissolution agreement, and if there are minor children of the marriage, a properly executed parenting plan, the court shall not require the parties to attend mediation.
    1. In any proceeding for divorce or separate support and maintenance, if an order of protection issued in or recognized by this state is in effect or there is a court finding of domestic abuse or any criminal conviction involving domestic abuse within the marriage that is the subject of the proceeding for divorce or separate support and maintenance, the court may order mediation or refer either party to mediation, only if:
      1. Mediation is agreed to by the victim of the alleged domestic or family violence;
      2. Mediation is provided by a certified mediator who is trained in domestic and family violence in a specialized manner that protects the safety of the victim; and
      3. The victim is permitted to have in attendance at mediation a supporting person of the victim's choice, including, but not limited to, an attorney or advocate. No victim may provide monetary compensation to a nonattorney advocate for attendance at mediation.
    2. Mediation conducted pursuant to subdivision (b)(1) shall be concluded and a report provided to the court no later than one hundred eighty (180) days from the date the complaint for divorce was filed.

Acts 1997, ch. 350, § 1; 2007, ch. 519, § 3; 2008, ch. 994, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2008, ch. 994, § 2 provided that the act shall apply to any proceeding for divorce or separate maintenance where mediation has not been ordered by a court pursuant to § 36-4-131 prior to July 1, 2008.

Law Reviews.

Family Mediation in Tennessee (Judge Marietta Shipley), 26 U. Mem. L. Rev. 1085 (1996).

Meet Me in the Middle: The Time is Ripe for Tennessee to Adopt the Uniform Collaborative Law Act (Diana M. Comes), 41 U. Mem. L. Rev. 551 (2011).

36-4-132. Appointment of guardian ad litem.

  1. In an action for dissolution of marriage involving minor children, upon its own motion or upon the motion of either party, the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for any minor child of the marriage.
  2. The reasonable fees or costs of the guardian ad litem shall be borne by the parties and may be assessed by the court as it deems equitable. Such fees or costs may be waived upon motion for an indigent person.
  3. Any guardian ad litem appointed by the court pursuant to this section shall be presumed to be acting in good faith and in so doing shall be immune from any liability that might otherwise be incurred while acting within the scope of such appointment. Such immunity shall apply in all proceedings in which such guardian ad litem may act.

Acts 1998, ch. 1059, § 6; 2000, ch. 736, § 1.

Law Reviews.

Student Essay: No Champion For Children: Tennessee's Rule 40a And The Appointment Of Guardians Ad Litem In Custody Proceedings, 7 Tenn. J. L. & Pol'y 438 (2011).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. In General.

Tennessee statutes governing divorce do not specifically address the appointment of an attorney ad litem, but in this case, where the motion filed by the guardian ad litem sought to appoint an attorney ad litem to assist the guardian ad litem during the course of the appeal, it was within the discretion of the trial court to appoint an attorney ad litem and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering the appointment. Toms v. Toms, 209 S.W.3d 76, 2005 Tenn. App. LEXIS 635 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005), appeal denied, Toms v. Williams , — S.W.3d —, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 596 (Tenn. 2006).

2. Assessment of Guardian Ad Litem Fees And Costs.

It was not an abuse of discretion to assess a husband with a guardian ad litem's fees and costs because the wife did not attempt to alienate the children from the husband. Lunn v. Lunn, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 515 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 29, 2015).

3. Immunity.

Guardian ad litem did not have quasi-judicial immunity from a child's claims as T.C.A. § 36-4-132(c) did not provide absolute immunity, and under Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 40A, § 6(b), the guardian was not performing quasi-judicial responsibilities. Runyon v. Zacharias, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 26 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 23, 2018).

36-4-133. Compliance with notice of insurance termination provisions required.

On and after January 1, 2007, before entering an order or decree for a divorce or a legal separation under this title, the court shall determine that the appropriate spouse has complied with § 56-7-2366, if applicable. If the court determines that the notification process has not been followed, then the court shall consider requiring the insured or covered individual to provide a health care insurance policy for the former spouse.

Acts 2006, ch. 764, § 2.

36-4-134. Notice that the decree does not necessarily affect the ability of a creditor to proceed against a party or a party's property.

  1. Every final decree of divorce granted on any fault ground of divorce and every marital dissolution agreement shall contain a notice that the decree does not necessarily affect the ability of a creditor to proceed against a party or a party's property, even though the party is not responsible under the terms of the decree for an account, any debt associated with an account or any debt. The notice shall also state that it may be in a party's best interest to cancel, close or freeze any jointly held accounts.
  2. Failure to include the notice required by subsection (a) shall not affect the validity of the decree of divorce, legal separation or annulment.

Acts 2009, ch. 157, § 1.

Code Commission Notes.

Acts 2010, ch. 894, § 1 purported to add a new section concerning false allegations of sexual abuse in furtherance of litigation as § 36-4-134. Since Acts 2009, ch. 157, § 1 added § 36-4-134 concerning notice that a decree does not necessarily affect the ability of a creditor to proceed against a party or a party's property, ch. 894 was added as § 36-4-135.

36-4-135. False allegations of sexual abuse in furtherance of litigation.

Whenever a trial court finds that any person knowingly made a false allegation of sexual abuse in furtherance of litigation, in addition to any other penalties provided for by law or rule, the court may hold the accuser in contempt of court and may order the accuser to pay all litigation expenses, including, but not limited to, the reasonable attorney's fees, discretionary costs and other costs incurred by the wrongly accused party in defending against the false allegation.

Acts 2010, ch. 894, § 1.

Code Commission Notes.

Acts 2010, ch. 894, § 1 purported to add a new section concerning false allegations of sexual abuse in furtherance of litigation as § 36-4-134. Since Acts 2009, ch. 157, § 1 added § 36-4-134 concerning notice that a decree does not necessarily affect the ability of a creditor to proceed against a party or a party's property, ch. 894 was added as § 36-4-135.

Chapter 5
Alimony and Child Support

Part 1
General Provisions

36-5-101. Child support order — Jurisdiction — Amount of support — Enforcement — Modification — Insurance — Scientific parentage tests.

    1. Upon dissolution of a marriage, whether dissolved absolutely or by a perpetual or temporary decree of separation, the court may make an order and decree for the suitable support and maintenance of the children by either spouse or out of such spouse's property, according to the nature of the case and the circumstances of the parties, the order or decree to remain in the court's control.
    2. Courts having jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties are hereby expressly authorized to provide for the future support of the children, in proper cases, by fixing some definite amount or amounts to be paid in monthly, semimonthly, or weekly installments, or otherwise, as circumstances may warrant, and such awards, if not paid, may be enforced by any appropriate process of the court having jurisdiction, including levy of execution.
    3. In interstate cases, jurisdiction to modify, alter or enforce orders or decrees for the support of children shall be determined in accordance with parts 20-29 of this chapter. In intrastate cases, jurisdiction to modify, alter or enforce orders or decrees for the support of children shall be determined in accordance with parts 30 and 31 of this chapter.
    4. As used in this chapter, “order,” where the context requires, includes an order concerning child or medical support issued pursuant to an administrative proceeding in any other state.
    5. In establishing or enforcing any duty of support under this chapter, the court shall give full faith and credit to all paternity determinations of any other state or territory, made pursuant to a voluntary acknowledgment or pursuant to any administrative or judicial process.
    6. A voluntary acknowledgment of paternity that is completed under § 68-3-203(g), § 68-3-302, or § 68-3-305(b), or under similar provisions of another state or government, when certified by the state registrar or other governmental or institutional entity maintaining the record of the acknowledgment, shall be a basis for establishing a support order without requiring any further proceedings to establish paternity.
    7. The state of Tennessee, its officers, employees, agents or contractors, any counties, county officials, the clerks of any court, or any Title IV-D child support enforcement agency shall not be liable, in any case, to compensate any person for repayment of child support paid or for any other costs, as a result of the rescission pursuant to § 24-7-113 of any voluntary acknowledgment, or the rescission of any orders of legitimation, paternity, or support.
    8. When a court having jurisdiction determines child support pursuant to the Tennessee child support guidelines, based on either the actual income or the court's findings of an obligor's ability to earn income, the final child support order shall create an inference in any subsequent proceeding that the obligor has the ability to pay the ordered amount until such time as the obligor files an application with the court to modify the ordered amount.
    9. Where the lump sum amount of retirement or pension benefits or of balances in an individual retirement account, §§ 401(k), 403(b), 457 (26 U.S.C. §§ 401(k), 403(b) and 457), respectively, or any other tax qualified account has been considered by the trial court, and determined to be marital property to be divided, the distributions of such lump sum amounts necessary to complete the division of property, whether distributed in a single payment or by periodic payments, shall not be considered income for the purpose of determining a spouse or ex-spouse's right to receive alimony or child support, but the income generated by the investment of such lump sum awards shall be considered income for such purpose.
    1. Notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, neither the department of human services, nor any Title IV-D child support contractor of the department, nor any recipient of public assistance in this or any other state or territory, nor any applicant for either public assistance in this or any other state or territory or for Title IV-D child support services from the department or any other Title IV-D agency in this or any other state or territory, shall be required to demonstrate to a court or administrative tribunal that the caretaker of the child for whom child support is sought is vested with any more than physical custody of the subject child or children, in order to have standing to petition for child support from the legal parent of the child or children for whom support is sought, or to seek enforcement or modification of any existing orders involving such child or children.
    2. Legal custody of a child to whom a child support obligation is owed shall not be a prerequisite to the initiation of any support action or to the enforcement or modification of any support obligation in such cases, whether or not the obligation has been assigned to this state or any other state or territory by operation of law.
    1. The court shall set a specific amount that is due each month, to be paid in one (1) or more payments as the court directs. In making any decree or order pursuant to this section, the court shall consider § 34-1-102(b). Unless the court finds otherwise, each order made under this section shall contain the current address of the parties.
      1. The order or decree of the court may provide that the payments for the support of such child or children shall be paid either to the clerk of the court or directly to the spouse, or other person awarded the custody of the child or children; provided, however, that:
        1. The court shall order that all child support payments based upon an income assignment issued by the clerk be paid to the clerk of the court, except as set forth in subdivision (c)(2)(A)(ii), for child support cases that are subject to the provisions for central collection and disbursement pursuant to § 36-5-116; and
        2. In all Title IV-D child support cases in which payment of child support is to be made by income assignment, or otherwise, and in all cases where payments made by income assignment based upon support orders entered on or after January 1, 1994, that are not Title IV-D support cases, but must be made to the central collection and disbursement unit as provided by § 36-5-116, and, except as may otherwise be allowed by § 36-5-501(a)(2)(B), the court shall only order that the support payments be made to the central collection and disbursement unit pursuant to § 36-5-116. No agreement by the parties in a parenting plan, either temporary or permanent, entered pursuant to chapter 6, part 4 of this title, or any other agreement of the parties or order of the court, except as may otherwise be allowed by § 36-5-501(a)(2)(B), shall alter the requirements for payment to the central collection and disbursement unit as required by § 36-5-116, and any provision of any parenting plan, agreement or court order providing for any other payment procedure contrary to the requirements of § 36-5-116, except as may otherwise be allowed by § 36-5-501(a)(2)(B), whether or not approved by the court, shall be void and of no effect. No credit shall be given by the court, the court clerk or the department of human services, for child support payments required by the support order that are made in contravention of such requirements; provided, however, that the department may make any necessary adjustments to the balances owed to account for changes in the Title IV-D or central collection and disbursement status of the support case.
        1. (a)  When the court enters an order in which the paternity of a child is determined or support is ordered, enforced or modified for a child, each individual who is a party to any action pursuant to this part shall be immediately required to file with the court and, if the case is a Title IV-D child support case, shall immediately file with the local Title IV-D child support office, for entry into the state registry of support cases, and shall update, as appropriate, the parties' and, for subdivisions (c)(2)(B)(i)(a )(1 )-(3 ), the child's or children's:

        Full name and any change in name;

    2. Residential and mailing addresses;
    3. Home telephone numbers;
    4. Driver license number;
    5. The name, address, and telephone number of the person's employer;
    6. The availability and cost of health insurance for the child; and
    7. Gross annual income.
    1. All support payments that have been paid to the clerk of the court shall be distributed by the clerk, as provided in the order of the court, within ten (10) days; provided, that the payments made to the clerk of the court in Title IV-D child support cases shall be distributed and deposited pursuant to the operating agreements under subdivisions (d)(3) and (6), after implementation of the statewide Title IV-D child support computer system in the clerk's county, and after the appropriate notice to the clerk by the department under subdivisions (d)(3) and (6).
    2. In every child support case being processed through the state's central collection and disbursement unit, if unable to provide the information concerning an order through a computer information transfer, the clerk shall send a copy of any new order or modification of such order, prior to or along with the first payment received pursuant to such order, to the department, or its designee, within ten (10) working days.
    3. Clerks participating in the operation of the statewide Title IV-D child support computer system shall be bound by the terms of the agreement and the laws, regulations, and policies and procedures of the Title IV-D child support program for the term of the agreement, unless the agreement is canceled by the department after notice to the clerk and an opportunity to correct any deficiencies caused by failure of the clerk to comply with federal or state regulations or procedures for operation of the system within thirty (30) days of such notice. While participating in the system, the clerks shall be entitled to receive the statutory fee for the collection and handling of child support obligations under the Title IV-D program. Any child support payment subject to distribution through the state's central collection and disbursement unit that has been received by a clerk shall be sent immediately by the clerk to the department or its designee, without the necessity of a court order.
    4. The clerks of all courts involved in the collection of any child support shall cooperate with and provide any reasonable and necessary assistance to the department or its contractors in the transfer of data concerning child support to the statewide Title IV-D child support computer system.
    5. Whenever the clerk has ceased handling Title IV-D child support payments under subdivision (d)(3), and only where the context requires, all provisions in this chapter relating to the duties or actions involving the clerk shall be interpreted to substitute the department or its contractor.
    6. In all cases in which child support payments are subject to processing through the state's central collection and disbursement unit, the clerks shall, upon notice by the department, deposit all receipts of such child support payments on a daily basis to a bank account from which the state shall electronically debit those payments for the purpose of obtaining funds to distribute the child support obligations to the obligee.
    7. In all Title IV-D child support cases, child support payments shall be made by the obligor to the department. No credit shall be given to an obligor for any payments made by the obligor or by another person on behalf of the obligor, directly to an obligee or the obligor's child or children, unless the obligee remits the payment to the department. In the event that a Title IV-D case is instituted subsequent to the establishment of an order of child support, the department shall notify the obligor and obligee and the appropriate clerk of this fact, and all payments of child support in Title IV-D cases shall be made by the obligor to the department, without further order of the court.
    8. When an order provides for the support of two (2) or more children in a case that is subject to enforcement under Title IV-D, and at least one (1) child is a public charge, based upon receipt of temporary assistance pursuant to title 71, chapter 3, part 1, TennCare-medicaid, or foster care or other custodial services from the state, the child support order shall be prorated by the department for purposes of distribution of the child support to the appropriate person or agency providing care or support for the child, without the need for modification of the child support order by the court.
      1. In making the court's determination concerning the amount of support of any minor child or children of the parties, the court shall apply, as a rebuttable presumption, the child support guidelines, as provided in this subsection (e). If the court finds that evidence is sufficient to rebut this presumption, the court shall make a written finding that the application of the child support guidelines would be unjust or inappropriate in that particular case, in order to provide for the best interest of the child or children, or the equity between the parties. Findings that the application of the guidelines would be unjust or inappropriate shall state the amount of support that would have been ordered under the child support guidelines and a justification for the variance from the guidelines.
      2. Notwithstanding this section or any other law or rule to the contrary, if the net income of the obligor exceeds ten thousand dollars ($10,000) per month, then the custodial parent must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that child support in excess of the amount provided for in the child support guidelines is reasonably necessary to provide for the needs of the minor child or children of the parties. In making the court's determination, the court shall consider all available income of the obligor, as required by this chapter, and shall make a written finding that child support in excess of the amount so calculated is or is not reasonably necessary to provide for the needs of the minor child or children of the parties. In determining each party's income for the purpose of applying the child support guidelines, the court shall deduct each party's capital losses from that party's capital gains in each year.
      3. When making retroactive support awards, pursuant to the child support guidelines established pursuant to this subsection (e), in cases where the parents of the minor child are separated or divorced, but where the court has not entered an order of child support, the court shall consider the following factors as a basis for deviation from the presumption in the child support guidelines that child and medical support for the benefit of the child shall be awarded retroactively to the date of the parents' separation or divorce:
        1. Whether the remaining spouse knew or could have known of the location of the child or children who had been removed from the marital home by the abandoning spouse; or
        2. Whether the abandoning spouse, or other caretaker of the child, intentionally, and without good cause, failed or refused to notify the remaining spouse of the location of the child following removal of the child from the marital home by the abandoning spouse; and
        3. The attempts, if any, by the abandoning spouse, or other caretaker of the child, to notify the remaining spouse of the location of the child following removal of the child from the marital home by the abandoning spouse.
      4. In cases in which the presumption of the application of the guidelines is rebutted by clear and convincing evidence, the court shall deviate from the child support guidelines to reduce, in whole or in part, any retroactive support. The court must make a written finding that application of the guidelines would be unjust or inappropriate, in order to provide for the best interests of the child or children or the equity between the parties.
      5. Deviations shall not be granted in circumstances where, based upon clear and convincing evidence:
        1. The remaining spouse has a demonstrated history of violence or domestic violence toward the abandoning spouse, the child's caretaker or the child;
        2. The child is the product of rape or incest of the mother by the father of the child;
        3. The abandoning spouse has a reasonable apprehension of harm from the remaining spouse, or those acting on the remaining spouse's behalf, toward the abandoning spouse or the child; or
        4. The remaining spouse, or those acting on the remaining spouse's behalf, has abused or neglected the child.
      6. In making any deviations from awarding child and medical support retroactively to the date of separation or divorce of the parties, the court shall make written findings of fact and conclusions of law to support the basis for the deviation, and shall include in the order the total amount of retroactive child and medical support that would have been paid retroactively to the date of separation or divorce of the parties, had a deviation not been made by the court.
      7. Nothing in this subdivision (e)(1) shall limit the right of the state of Tennessee to recover from the father or the remaining spouse expenditures made by the state for the benefit of the child, or the right, or obligation, of the Title IV-D child support agency to pursue retroactive support for the custodial parent or caretaker of the child, where appropriate.
      8. Any amounts of retroactive support ordered that have been assigned to the state of Tennessee, pursuant to § 71-3-124, shall be subject to the child support distribution requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 657. In such cases, the court order shall contain any language necessary to allow the state to recover the assigned support amounts.
        1. In any action for retroactive child support filed on or after July 1, 2017, retroactive child support shall not be awarded for a period of more than five (5) years from the date the action for support is filed unless the court determines, for good cause shown, that a different award of retroactive child support is in the interest of justice. The burden to show that a longer time period of retroactive support is in the interest of justice is on the custodial parent. Good cause includes, but is not limited to, the following:
          1. The noncustodial parent deliberately avoided service or knowingly impeded or delayed the imposition of a support obligation;
          2. The noncustodial parent used threats, intimidation, or force to prevent or delay the imposition of a support obligation; or
          3. The custodial parent reasonably feared that the establishment of parentage would result in domestic abuse, as defined in § 36-3-601.
        2. The court may award retroactive child support for less than the five-year-period required by subdivision (e)(1)(I)(i) if the court determines, for good cause shown, that a different award of retroactive child support is in the interest of justice. The burden to show that a shorter time period of retroactive support is in the interest of justice is on the noncustodial parent.
        3. Upon a finding of good cause in accordance with this subdivision (e)(1)(I), the court may order retroactive support from the date the court determines to be equitable and just.
        4. The presumption that child support for the benefit of the child be awarded retroactively to the date of the child's birth contained in the child support guidelines shall not apply to any action in which this subdivision (e)(1)(I) is applicable.
        5. Nothing in this subdivision (e)(1)(I) limits any claim for retroactive child support owed to the department of human services.
    1. Beginning October 13, 1989, the child support guidelines promulgated by the department, pursuant to the rulemaking provisions of the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, compiled in title 4, chapter 5, shall be the guidelines that courts shall apply as a rebuttable presumption in child support cases.
    2. Child support guidelines shall be reviewed by the department of human services every three (3) years from the date of promulgation. The department shall make recommendations to the supreme court of any revisions needed in order to maintain compliance with the Family Support Act of 1988, and to ensure that application of the guidelines results in determinations of appropriate child support awards. A copy of the recommendations shall also be sent to the judiciary committee of the house of representatives and the health and welfare committee of the senate.
      1. In addition to any other subtractions, calculations of net income under the guidelines shall take into consideration the support of any other children the obligor is legally responsible to provide. The court shall consider children of the obligor who are not included in a decree of child support, but for whom the obligor is legally responsible to provide support and is supporting, for the purposes of reducing the obligor's net income, in calculating the guideline amount, or as a reason for deviation from the guidelines.
      2. In calculating amounts of support for children under the guidelines, the court shall allocate an obligor's financial child support responsibility from the obligor's income among all children of the obligor for whom the obligor is legally responsible to provide support and is supporting, in a manner that gives equitable consideration as defined by the department's child support guidelines, to the children for whom support is being set in the case before the court and to any other children for whom the obligor is legally responsible and is supporting. The court shall require that payments, made out of that allocation for all children of the obligor for whom the obligor is legally responsible and is supporting, be made upon such consideration. Guidelines promulgated by the department shall be consistent with this subdivision (e)(4)(B).
      1. Any order for child support shall be a judgment entitled to be enforced as any other judgment of a court of this state, and shall be entitled to full faith and credit in this state and in any other state. Except as provided in subdivision (f)(6), such judgment shall not be subject to modification as to any time period or any amounts due prior to the date that an action for modification is filed and notice of the action has been mailed to the last known address of the opposing parties. If the full amount of child support is not paid by the date when the ordered support is due, the unpaid amount that is in arrears, shall become a judgment for the unpaid amounts, and shall accrue interest pursuant to subdivision (f)(1)(B). All interest that accumulates on arrearages shall be considered child support. Computation of interest shall not be the responsibility of the clerk.
        1. Interest on unpaid child support that is in arrears shall accrue from the date of the arrearage at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per year; provided, that interest shall no longer accrue on or after April 17, 2017, unless the court makes a written finding that interest shall continue to accrue. In making such finding, the court shall set the rate at which interest shall accrue after consideration of any factors the court deems relevant; provided, that the interest rate shall be no more than four percent (4%) per year.
        2. On or after July 1, 2018, interest on arrearages in non-Title IV-D cases shall accrue at the rate of six percent (6%) per year; provided, however, that the court, in its discretion, may reduce the rate of interest to a lower interest rate, including no interest, as deemed appropriate under the circumstances. In making its determination, the court may consider any factors the court deems relevant.
        3. On or after July 1, 2018, interest shall not accrue on arrearages in Title IV-D cases unless the court makes a written finding that interest shall continue to accrue. In making such finding, the court shall set the rate at which interest shall accrue after consideration of any factors the court deems relevant; provided, that the interest rate shall be no more than six percent (6%) per year.
    1. In addition to the remedies provided in part 5 of this chapter, but not as an alternative to those provisions, if a parent is more than thirty (30) days in arrears, the clerk of the court may, upon written application of the obligee parent, a guardian or custodian of the children, or the department of human services or its contractors in Title IV-D support cases, issue a summons or, in the discretion of the court, an attachment for such parent, setting a bond of not less than two hundred fifty dollars ($250) or, in the discretion of the court, up to the amount of the arrears, for such other proceedings as may be held in the matter. In addition, the court may, at any time, require an obligor parent to give security by bond, with sufficient sureties approved by the court, or, alternatively, in the absence of the judge from the court, approved by the clerk of the court, for payment of past, present, and future support due under the order of support. If the obligor parent thereafter fails to appear or fails without good cause to comply with the order of support, such bonds may be forfeited and the proceeds from the bonds paid to the court clerk and applied to the order of support.
    2. Absent a court order to the contrary, if an arrearage for child support or fees due as court costs exists at the time an order for child support would otherwise terminate, the order of support, or any then existing income withholding arrangement, and all amounts ordered for payment of current support or arrears, including any arrears due for court costs, shall continue in effect in an amount equal to the then existing support order or income withholding arrangement, until the arrearage and costs due are satisfied, and the court may enforce all orders for such arrearages by contempt.
    3. The order of any court or administrative tribunal directing that an obligor pay a sum certain to reduce any support arrearage shall not preclude the use, by the department of human services or its contractors in the Title IV-D child support program, of any other administrative means of collecting the remaining balance of the outstanding arrearage, including, but not limited to, income tax refund intercepts, financial institution collections, enforcement of liens, or any other method authorized by law. The use of any additional administrative means of collection by the department or its contractors in the Title IV-D child support program is expressly authorized to reduce any portion, or all, of the outstanding balance of support as shown by the department's records, and any order of the court or administrative tribunal to the contrary is without any effect whatsoever, except for such appeal as may lie from the implementation of the administrative procedure that is used to reduce the arrearage.
      1. In enforcing any provision of child support, if an obligee, or the department or its contractor in Title IV-D cases, specifically prays for revocation of a license because an obligor is alleged to be in noncompliance with an order of support, or if the court determines on its own motion, or on motion of a party, that any individual party has failed to comply with a subpoena or a warrant in connection with the establishment or enforcement of an order of support, the court may find, specifically, in its order that the obligor is not in compliance with an order of support as defined by part 7 of this chapter, or it may find that an individual party has failed to comply with a subpoena or warrant in connection with the establishment or enforcement of an order of support, and may direct that any or all of the obligor's or individual party's licenses be subject to revocation, denial or suspension by the appropriate licensing authority, pursuant to part 7 of this chapter. The court shall direct the clerk to send a copy of that order to the department of human services to be sent by the department to each licensing authority specified in the order for processing and suspension, denial or revocation pursuant to § 36-5-706 and any other applicable provisions of part 7 of this chapter. Costs related to such order shall be taxed to the obligor or individual party.
      2. If the obligor whose license has been subject to subdivision (f)(5)(A) complies with the order of support, or if the individual party complies with the subpoena or warrant, the court shall enter an order making such a finding, and the clerk shall send an order immediately to the department of human services to be transmitted to each licensing authority specified in the order, which shall then immediately issue, renew or reinstate the obligor's or individual party's license, in accordance with § 36-5-707. Costs related to such order shall be taxed to the obligor or individual party, as the case may be, and shall be paid by the obligor or the individual party prior to sending the order to the department for transmission to the licensing authority.
      3. The department shall provide available information to the obligee, party or the court in actions under this subdivision (f)(5), concerning the name and address of the licensing authority or authorities of the obligor or individual party, in order to enable the enforcement of  this subdivision (f)(5). The obligee or individual party, as the case may be, seeking such information shall pay a fee, as established by the department for the provision of such service. These fees may be taxed as costs to the obligor whose license has been revoked pursuant to this subdivision (f)(5), or to the individual party who has failed to comply with the warrant or subpoena.
      4. If the licensing authority fails to take appropriate action pursuant to the orders of the court under this subdivision (f)(5), the party may seek a further order from the court to direct the licensing authority to take such action, and the party may seek any appropriate court sanctions against the licensing authority.
      5. For purposes of this subdivision (f)(5), “individual party” means a party to the support action who is a person, but does not include a governmental agency, or the contractor or agent of such governmental agency, that is enforcing an order of support. “Party” may include, where the context requires, an individual person, or it may include a governmental agency or contractor or agent of such governmental agency.
      1. With the approval of the court, the obligor and obligee shall have the right to compromise and settle a child support arrearage balance owed directly to the obligee. The authority is given to forgive accrued principal and interest on delinquent child support with the approval of the obligee and shall not include any monies owed to this or any other state. In all Title IV-D cases, the department of human services or its contractors must be a party to the action. Both the obligee and obligor must consent to the compromise and settlement in writing in accordance with the procedures established by the child support agency or court.
      2. Prior to giving consent, the obligee shall be provided with a written explanation of the compromise and settlement and of the obligee's rights with respect to child support arrears owed to the obligee. In no event may an offer of compromise and settlement of any child support arrears owed directly to the obligee be accepted unless the obligee consents to the offer of compromise and settlement in writing.
      3. To be eligible for a compromise and settlement of the child support arrearage balance, the obligor must pay the child support obligation in full as ordered for a minimum of twelve (12) consecutive months immediately preceding the compromise and settlement between the obligor and obligee in order to compromise and settle the remaining balance. If additional child support arrears accrue after a compromise and settlement, such subsequent arrears shall be paid in full and not subject to further compromise and settlement.
      4. A compromise and settlement of a lesser amount than the total principal and interest that is owed shall not be considered against public policy if the compromise and settlement is in the best interest of the child or children.
      5. The program shall operate uniformly across this state and shall take into consideration the needs of the child or children subject to the child support order and the obligor's ability to pay.
    1. Upon application of either party, the court shall decree an increase or decrease of support when there is found to be a significant variance, as defined in the child support guidelines established by subsection (e), between the guidelines and the amount of support currently ordered, unless the variance has resulted from a previously court-ordered deviation from the guidelines and the circumstances that caused the deviation have not changed. Any support order subject to enforcement under Title IV-D may be modified in accordance with § 36-5-103(f).
    2. The necessity to provide for the child's health care needs shall also be a basis for modification of the amount of the order, regardless of whether a modification in the amount of child support is necessary.
    3. The court shall not refuse to consider a modification of a prior order and decree as it relates to future payments of child support because the party is in arrears under that order and decree, unless the arrearage is a result of intentional action by the party.
      1. Notwithstanding subdivision (g)(4)(B) and § 36-5-103(f), for the purposes of this chapter, the birth or adoption of another child for whom an obligor is legally responsible to support and is supporting shall constitute a substantial and material change of circumstances for seeking a review of the existing order to determine if the addition of such child, and any credits applicable for the addition of such child under the department's child support guidelines, would result in a significant variance under such guidelines. If the significant variance is demonstrated by the review, the amount of an existing child support order may be modified by the court.
      2. For purposes of this chapter, the significant variance established by the department of human services pursuant to the child support guidelines shall provide a lower threshold for modification of child support orders for persons whose adjusted gross incomes are within low income categories established by the department's child support guidelines. The significant variance involving low income persons shall be established by rule of the department at no more than seven and one-half percent (7 ½ %) of the difference between the current child support order and the amount of the proposed child support order.
      1. In Title IV-D child support cases that the department of human services is enforcing, the department shall provide a child support obligor notice ninety (90) days prior to the eighteenth birthday of a child or children for whom the obligor is paying child support, as such birthday is indicated by the department's records.
      2. If the following conditions are met, then the obligor may seek termination of the order of support and may also request that the department, as required by federal law, assist in seeking termination of the order:
        1. The department's records demonstrate that the child for whom an order of support in a Title IV-D child support case has been entered has reached eighteen (18) years of age and has graduated from high school, or that the class of which the child is a member when the child reached eighteen (18) years of age has graduated from high school, the obligor has otherwise provided the department with written documentation of such facts, or the obligor has provided the department with written documentation that a child for whom the obligor is required to pay support has died or has married;
        2. No other special circumstances exist, including, but not limited to, the circumstances provided for in subsection (k) regarding disabled children, that require the obligation to continue;
        3. The obligor does not owe arrearages to the obligee parent, any guardian or custodian of the child, the department of human services, any other agency of the state, or any other Title IV-D agency of any state;
        4. The costs of court have been paid; and
        5. There are no other children for whom the obligor is required to pay child support.
        1. If the conditions of subdivisions (g)(5)(B)(i)-(v) exist in the Title IV-D case, as shown by the department's records, or such conditions exist based upon the written documentation provided by the obligor and verified by the department, then the department shall immediately temporarily suspend the order of support for the child who has reached majority. If the existing court order was the result of a deviation from the child support guidelines, the department shall immediately seek from the court termination of the support order for such child, and shall provide the obligee with notice of the filing of the petition to terminate such order.
        2. If the existing order was not the result of a deviation from the child support guidelines, the department shall give notice to the obligee, and to the other obligor, of the temporary suspension of the order, based upon verification of the status of the case pursuant to subdivision (g)(5)(B), of its intent to permanently terminate the support order by an administrative order, which the department may issue for such purpose, and of the opportunity for a hearing upon the issue of permanent termination of the order.
        3. If the obligee contests the temporary suspension of the order of support under the circumstances of subdivisions (g)(5)(B)(i)-(v) and prevails following entry of the court or administrative order, the obligor shall pay the support amounts and any other arrearages or court costs not paid as a result of the temporary suspension of the order. The administrative order shall be filed with the clerk of the court having jurisdiction of the case.
        1. If the conditions of subdivisions (g)(5)(B)(i)-(iv) are met in the Title IV-D case, but there are other children for whom the obligor is still obligated to support, the department shall immediately conduct a review of the support order and shall seek the support order's adjustment, if appropriate under the child support guidelines for such children. The obligor shall continue to make child support payments, in accordance with the existing order, until the court or department modifies the order pursuant to this subdivision (g)(5)(D).
        2. If the existing court order was the result of a deviation from the child support guidelines, the department shall seek modification of the support order from the court, and shall provide the obligee and the obligor with notice of the filing of the petition to modify such order.
        3. If the existing order was not the result of a deviation from the child support guidelines, and the department reviews the order and determines that the order should be modified pursuant to such guidelines, then the department shall notify the parties of the department's intent to modify the support order by an administrative order, which the department may issue for such purpose, and shall notify the parties of the opportunity for a hearing on the issue of modification of the order.
        4. The support order shall be modified as established by order of the court or the department, as required pursuant to the child support guidelines. If the modified payment amount is lower than the payment amount required prior to the modification, then the obligor shall be given credit for such amount against future payments of support for the remaining children under the order. If the modified payment amount is higher than the payment amount required prior to the modification, then the obligor shall pay the higher ordered amount from the date of entry of the order. The administrative order shall be filed with the clerk of the court having jurisdiction of the case.
      3. The department's review and adjustment process, and the administrative hearing process outlined in this subdivision (g)(5), shall comply with any other due process requirements for notice to the obligor and obligee as may otherwise be required by this chapter.
    1. The court may direct the acquisition or maintenance of health insurance covering each child of the marriage and may order either party to pay all, or each party to pay a pro rata share of, the healthcare costs not paid by insurance proceeds if reasonable and affordable health insurance is available.
    2. In any case in which the court enters an order of support enforced under Title IV-D of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. §  651 et seq.), the court shall enter an order providing for health care coverage to be provided for the child or children.
    3. Section 36-5-501(a)(3) shall apply with respect to enrollment of a child in the noncustodial parent's employer-based health care plan.
  1. The court may direct either or both parties to designate the children as beneficiaries under any existing policies insuring the life of either party, and maintenance of existing policies insuring the life of either party, or the purchase and maintenance of life insurance and designation of beneficiaries.
  2. Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent the affirmation, ratification and incorporation in a decree of an agreement between the parties as to child support. In any such agreement, the parties must affirmatively acknowledge that no action by the parties shall be effective to reduce child support after the due date of each payment, and that they understand that court approval must be obtained before child support may be reduced, unless such payments are automatically reduced or terminated under the terms of the agreement.
    1. Except as provided in subdivision (k)(2), the court may continue child support beyond a child's minority for the benefit of a child who is handicapped or disabled, as defined by the Americans with Disabilities Act (42 U.S.C. §  12101 et seq.), until such child reaches twenty-one (21) years of age.
    2. Provided, that such age limitation shall not apply if such child is severely disabled and living under the care and supervision of a parent, and the court determines that it is in the child's best interest to remain under such care and supervision and that the obligor is financially able to continue to pay child support. In such cases, the court may require the obligor to continue to pay child support for such period as it deems in the best interest of the child; provided, however, that, if the severely disabled child living with a parent was disabled prior to this child attaining eighteen (18) years of age and if the child remains severely disabled at the time of entry of a final decree of divorce or legal separation, then the court may order child support regardless of the age of the child at the time of entry of the decree.
    3. In so doing, the court may use the child support guidelines.
    1. The court may, in its discretion, at any time pending the suit, upon motion and after notice and hearing, make any order that may be proper to compel a spouse to pay any sums necessary to enable the other spouse to prosecute or defend the suit and to provide for the custody and support of the minor children of the parties during the pendency of the suit, and to make other orders as it deems appropriate. In making any order under this subsection (l ), the court shall consider the financial needs of each spouse and the children, and the financial ability of each spouse to meet those needs and to prosecute or defend the suit.
    2. In any Title IV-D case, if the court grants relief, whether in whole or in part, to the department of human services or the department's Title IV-D contractor, or to any applicant for Title IV-D child support services, the court shall not tax any court costs against the department, the Title IV-D contractor or any applicant for child support services. The court shall not award attorney fees against the department, the Title IV-D contractor or any applicant for child support services, unless there is a clearly established violation of Rule 11 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure or for other contemptuous or other sanctionable conduct. This subdivision (l )(2) is not intended to limit the discretion of the courts to tax costs to the individual parties on non-Title IV-D issues, such as custody or visitation.
  3. No provision, finding of fact or conclusion of law in a final decree of divorce or annulment or other declaration of invalidity of a marriage that provides that the husband is not the father of a child born to the wife during the marriage or within three hundred (300) days of the entry of the final decree, or that names another person as the father of such child, shall be given preclusive effect, unless scientific tests to determine parentage are first performed and the results of the test that exclude the husband from parentage of the child or children, or that establish paternity in another person, are admitted into evidence. The results of such parentage testing shall only be admitted into evidence in accordance with the procedures established in § 24-7-112.

Date and place of birth. This information shall be filed with the court as a separate document containing the parties' and the child's or children's names, dates of birth and social security numbers. The document shall be placed in an eight and one-half inch by eleven inch (8½" x 11") envelope containing the style of the case and docket number of the case and the document and envelope shall be file stamped by the clerk, and filed under seal in the case file. The document shall also be provided by the parties to the Title IV-D child support office together with the other information required in subdivisions (c)(2)(B)(i)(a )(1 )-(8 ). The social security numbers and other information filed with the clerk shall be available to the clerk of court for processing of documents and legal actions such as, but not limited to, divorce certificates, garnishments, and income assignments. On request, the sealed information shall be made available to the department of human services and any other agency required by law to have access to the information and to other persons or agencies as ordered by the court.

The requirements of subdivision (c)(2)(B)(i)(a ) may be included in the court's order.

Each individual who is a party must update changes in circumstances of the individual for the information required by subdivision (c)(2)(B)(i)(a ) within ten (10) days of the date of such change. At the time of the entry of the first order pertaining to child support after July 1, 1997, clear written notice shall be given to each party of the requirements of this subsection (c), procedures for complying with this subsection (c), and a description of the effect or failure to comply. Such requirement may be noted in the order of the court.

In any subsequent child support enforcement action, the delivery of written notice as required by Rule 5 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, to the most recent residential or employer address shown in the court's records or the Title IV-D agency's records, as required in subdivision (c)(2)(B)(i)(a ) shall be deemed to satisfy the due process requirements for notice and service of process with respect to that party, if there is a sufficient showing and the court is satisfied that a diligent effort has been made to ascertain the location and whereabouts of the party.

Upon motion of either party, upon a showing of domestic violence or the threat of such violence, the court may enter an order to withhold from public access the address, telephone number, and location of the alleged victim or victims or threatened victims of such circumstances. The clerk of the court shall withhold such information based upon the court's specific order, but may not be held liable for release of such information.

In any subsequent proceeding to modify or enforce support, there shall be a rebuttable presumption that the information provided by the parties, as required by this part, has not changed, unless a party has complied with this section by updating the information with the court and, if the case is a Title IV-D child support case, with the local Title IV-D child support office.

Code 1858, § 2468 (deriv. Acts 1835-1836, ch. 26, §§ 10, 19); Shan., § 4221; mod. Code 1932, § 8446; Acts 1949, ch. 53, § 1; mod. C. Supp. 1950, § 8446; Acts 1970, ch. 425, § 1; 1979, ch. 187, § 1; 1979, ch. 339, § 1; 1980, ch. 691, § 1; 1983, ch. 352, § 1; 1983, ch. 414, § 1; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 36-820; Acts 1984, ch. 818, §§ 1-3; 1985, ch. 477, §§ 5-7, 17; 1986, ch. 890, § 17; 1987, ch. 39, § 1; 1988, ch. 671, § 1; 1989, ch. 206, § 1; 1989, ch. 489, § 4; 1991, ch. 447, § 1; 1992, ch. 824, § 1; 1993, ch. 243, §§ 1, 2; 1993, ch. 286, § 1; 1994, ch. 926, § 1; 1994, ch. 987, §§ 1-5; 1994, ch. 988, §§ 8, 9; 1995, ch. 504, § 2; 1996, ch. 892, § 16; 1997, ch. 551, §§ 7, 19, 22, 25, 41, 51-53, 66; 1998, ch. 1098, §§ 13-15, 72; 1999, ch. 303, § 1; 2000, ch. 922, §§ 5-9; 2001, ch. 447, §§ 3, 14, 20; 2002, ch. 651, §§ 1-3; 2003, ch. 305, § 1; 2003, ch. 361, § 2; 2003, ch. 373, § 1; 2004, ch. 549, §§ 1, 2; 2004, ch. 714, § 1; 2004, ch. 906, § 1; 2005, ch. 287, § 1; 2007, ch. 91, § 1; 2007, ch. 187, §§ 4-6; 2007, ch. 502, §§ 1, 3; 2008, ch. 868, § 3; 2011, ch. 119, § 2; 2013, ch. 236, § 22; 2015, ch. 200, §§ 1, 2; 2017, ch. 145, § 1; 2017, ch. 419, § 2; 2018, ch. 742, § 1; 2018, ch. 1049, §§ 1, 2; 2019, ch. 345, § 31.

Compiler's Notes. Provisions relating to alimony may now be found in §  36-5-121, pursuant to amendments by Acts 2005, ch. 287.

The Family Support Act of 1988, referred to in this section, is codified throughout U.S.C. Title 42.

Acts 2003, ch. 361, § 4 provided the act shall apply to any pending case in which the judgment of the trial court has not become final by June 17, 2003.

Acts 2003, ch. 305, § 1 was corrected due to a codification error, where provisions originally added to the end of subdivision (d)(1)(D) were moved to the end of the second sentence. The act was resigned by the governor; although the act was originally effective June 1, 2003, the resigned act become effective August 8, 2003.

Amendments. The 2017 amendment by ch. 145, in (f)(1), added the proviso in the second sentence, and added the present third sentence.

The 2017 amendment by ch. 419 added (e)(1)(I).

The 2018 amendment by ch. 742 rewrote (h)(1) which read: “The court may direct the acquisition or maintenance of health insurance covering each child of the marriage and may order either party to pay all, or each party to pay a pro rata share of, the health care costs not paid by insurance proceeds. In no event shall eligibility for or receipt of medicaid or TennCare-Medicaid by the custodial parent be considered to meet the need to provide for the child's health care needs in the order, if reasonable and affordable health insurance is available.”

The 2018 amendment by ch. 1049 added (f)(1)(B); and, in present (f)(1)(A), rewrote the third sentence which read: “If the full amount of child support is not paid by the date when the ordered support is due, the unpaid amount is in arrears, shall become a judgment for the unpaid amounts, and shall accrue interest from the date of the arrearage at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per year; provided, that interest shall no longer accrue on or after April 17, 2017, unless the court makes a written finding that interest shall continue to accrue.”,  and deleted the former fourth sentence which read: “In making such finding, the court shall set the rate at which interest shall accrue after consideration of any factors the court deems relevant; provided, that the interest rate shall be no more than four percent (4%) per year.”

The 2019 amendment substituted “judiciary” for “civil justice” in (e)(3).

Effective Dates. Acts 2017, ch. 145, § 2. April 17, 2017.

Acts 2017, ch. 419, § 3. July 1, 2017.

Acts 2018, ch. 742 § 2. July 1, 2018.

Acts 2018, ch. 1049, § 9. July 1, 2018.

Acts 2019, ch. 345, § 148. May 10, 2019.

Cross-References. Assignment of wages by a court for child support, § 50-2-105.

Clerk's commission, § 8-21-403.

Criminal sanctions, § 36-5-104.

Decree for custody and support of child, § 36-6-101.

Juvenile courts and proceedings, parents' liability for support, § 37-1-151.

Support of child over 18 in high school, § 34-1-102.

Termination of Acts 1985, ch. 477, which amended this section, § 36-5-110.

Textbooks. Gibson's Suits in Chancery (7th ed., Inman), § 525.

Tennessee Law of Evidence (2nd ed., Cohen, Paine and Sheppeard), § 300.12.

Law Reviews.

A Comparison of Classification and Treatment of Family Support Obligations and Student Loans: A Case Analysis (William Houston Brown and Katherine L. Evans), 24 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 623 (1994).

Alternative Dispute Resolution- Tuetken v. Tuetken: Reinforcing the Duty of the Court to Protect the Best Interests of the Child (Joshua Baker), 42 U. Mem. L. Rev. 831 (2012).

Bankruptcy Issues Arising in Divorce Practice (Ellen B. Vergos), 24 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 697 (1994).

Criminal Contempt, Jury Trial, Private Prosecutors & Child Support, (Clarke Lee Shaw), 34 No. 4 Tenn. B.J. 22 (1998).

Covenant Marriage: Should Tennessee Join the Noble Experiment?, 29 U. Mem. L. Rev. 397 (1999).

Family Law — Alexander v. Inman: The Tennessee Court of Appeals Establishes Guidelines for Contingent Attorneys' Fees in Domestic Relation Cases, 26 U. Mem. L. Rev. 1575 (1996).

Family Law — Berryhill v. Rhodes: Attempts to Circumvent Child Support Obligations Through Private Child Support Agreements Violate Public Policy (Kenneth G. Southerlin, Jr.), 32 U. Mem. L. Rev. 767 (2002).

Family law — Cary v. Cary: Antenuptial Agreements Waiving or Limiting Alimony in Tennessee, 27 U. Mem. L. Rev. 1041 (1997).

Family Support and Supporting Families, 68 Vand. L. Rev. En Banc 153   (2015).

Protection Against Spousal Disinheritance: A Critical Analysis of Tennessee's New Forced Share System, 28 U. Mem. L. Rev. 561 (1998).

Tennessee's Prohibition of the Retroactive Modification of Child Support Orders, 59 Tenn. L. Rev. 425 (1992).

The Cradle Will Rock: Intentional Misrepresentation of Paternity, 49 Tenn. B.J. 12 (2013).

Attorney General Opinions. Approval of sufficient sureties for child support security bonds, OAG 99-184, 1999 Tenn. AG LEXIS 214 (9/17/99).

Centralized collection and distribution unit for child support payments, OAG 99-222, 1999 Tenn. AG LEXIS 234 (11/9/99).

Statistical information in domestic relations and worker's compensation cases, OAG 99-230, 1999 Tenn. AG LEXIS 226 (12/15/99).

It would be inappropriate to attach guardian ad litem fees to a person's child support obligation because such fees are not child support, OAG 07-154, 2007 Tenn. AG LEXIS 154 (1/21/07).

Authority to award child support in the absence of a divorce or separation decree. OAG 12-42, 2012 Tenn. AG LEXIS 42 (3/21/12).

Cash bonds for child support attachments under T.C.A. § 36-5-101(f)(2).  OAG 13-62, 2013 Tenn. AG LEXIS 63 (8/8/13).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

The whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the states and not to the laws of the United States. Before a state law governing domestic relations will be overridden, it must do major damage to clear and substantial federal interests. Rose v. Rose, 481 U.S. 619, 107 S. Ct. 2029, 95 L. Ed. 2d 599, 1987 U.S. LEXIS 2060 (1987), aff'd, — S.W.2d —, 1985 Tenn. App. LEXIS 3415 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 14, 1985).

In state action to collect child support arrearage, husband could not assert equitable defense based on wife's 1985 private agreement to accept reduced support since the 1987 amendments to this section prohibit such a defense, husband had no enforceable contractual rights entitled to constitutional protection, and husband did not seek to modify his court-ordered obligation until 1995, and thus had no constitutionally protected vested right in the remedies provided under prior law. State ex rel. McAllister v. Goode, 968 S.W.2d 834, 1997 Tenn. App. LEXIS 634 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997).

2. Constitutionality of Former Law.

Plaintiff, complaining that the alimony statutes were unconstitutional on grounds that they discriminate against husbands as a class was not entitled to seek a declaratory judgment since there was no allegation in the complaint that he requested alimony be awarded to him in the divorce action or that he was denied alimony under circumstances that would have entitled him to alimony if he were a female. Burkett v. Ashley, 535 S.W.2d 332, 1976 Tenn. LEXIS 580 (Tenn. 1976).

This section, which, as written prior to the 1979 amendment, provided for alimony and support awards only to wives, created a gender-based classification with no rational relation to legitimate government interests and was violative of the equal protection guarantees of both state and federal constitutions. Mitchell v. Mitchell, 594 S.W.2d 699, 1980 Tenn. LEXIS 421 (Tenn. 1980).

This section, as it existed prior to the 1979 amendment, was in contravention of Tenn. Const., art. I and art. XI, § 8, as well as the equal protection clause of the United States constitution.Kolker v. Gelb, 600 S.W.2d 728, 1980 Tenn. App. LEXIS 379 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980).

The doctrine of res judicata bars the retroactive application to this section of Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 99 S. Ct. 1102, 59 L. Ed. 2d 306, 1979 U.S. LEXIS 65 (1979), declaring unconstitutional statutes requiring men but not women to pay alimony. Kolker v. Gelb, 600 S.W.2d 728, 1980 Tenn. App. LEXIS 379 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980).

3. Construction.

This section and § 36-6-101 and Private Acts 1963, ch. 124, creating a probate court for Davidson County and giving the same certain jurisdiction including concurrent jurisdiction with chancery and circuit courts in domestic relations matters, were in pari materia and were to be construed together. Mayhew v. Mayhew, 52 Tenn. App. 459, 376 S.W.2d 324, 1963 Tenn. App. LEXIS 106 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1963).

Because a trial court's child support order was a final order and the father failed to file a notice of appeal therefrom, the father could not challenge that order on appeal. Therefore, to the extent that the father sought an adjudication concerning the amount of the father's child support obligation following the initial setting, the father had to seek a modification based upon a material change in circumstance. Dawson v. Dawson, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 120 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 24, 2020).

4. Purpose.

This section and § 36-6-101 were evidently included in the Code of 1932 to meet the holdings of the supreme court in the cases of Going v. Going, 144 Tenn. 303, 232 S.W. 443, 1921 Tenn. LEXIS 40 (1921), and Taylor v. Taylor, 144 Tenn. 311, 232 S.W. 445, 1921 Tenn. LEXIS 41 (1921). Crane v. Crane, 26 Tenn. App. 227, 170 S.W.2d 663, 1942 Tenn. App. LEXIS 44 (1942).

It was the purpose of this section to give the trial court such elasticity of action as was necessary to meet the equities of the case as well as to take care of the interest of the state, which is a third party in interest in divorce cases. Daugherty v. Dixon, 41 Tenn. App. 623, 297 S.W.2d 944, 1956 Tenn. App. LEXIS 104 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1956).

Alimony is not and never has been intended by the legislature to be punitive; nor was it intended simply as an award for virtue. It is not designed to serve as an annuity for the wife, nor to care for the wife's needs after divorce or provide her with a life-time profit-sharing plan. Lindsey v. Lindsey, 976 S.W.2d 175, 1997 Tenn. App. LEXIS 581 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997).

The purpose of spousal support is to aid the disadvantaged spouse to become and remain self-sufficient and, when economic rehabilitation is not feasible, to mitigate the harsh economic realities of divorce. Kinard v. Kinard, 986 S.W.2d 220, 1998 Tenn. App. LEXIS 543 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998), modified, 986 S.W.2d 220, 1998 Tenn. App. LEXIS 598 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998).

The legislative purpose of rehabilitation is to encourage divorced spouses to become self-sufficient. Burlew v. Burlew, 40 S.W.3d 465, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 111 (Tenn. 2001).

5. Retroactivity.

There was nothing in the 1959 amendment to § 36-4-121 enlarging the scope of that section, that had the effect of repealing this section whether directly or by implication. Witherspoon v. Witherspoon, 55 Tenn. App. 484, 402 S.W.2d 492, 1965 Tenn. App. LEXIS 293 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1965).

The determining factor in distinguishing whether alimony is in futuro or in solido is the definiteness or indefiniteness of the amount ordered to be paid. McKee v. McKee, 655 S.W.2d 164, 1983 Tenn. App. LEXIS 592 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983).

This section is primarily procedural in nature; however, because it allows for enforcement of orders by contempt, and thus has a decidedly penal component, it should not be applied retroactively. Kuykendall v. Wheeler, 890 S.W.2d 785, 1994 Tenn. LEXIS 353 (Tenn. 1994).

Court of appeals erred when it affirmed a trial court's decision and construed T.C.A. § 37-1-151(b), to limit liability for retroactive child support to 45 days prior to filing; the supreme court of Tennessee, agreeing with the court of appeal's dissent, held that T.C.A. § 37-1-151 unambiguously required a trial court to set child support retroactive to the date a child was placed in state custody, the amount of support was first to be calculated according to the guidelines. State v. Wilson, 132 S.W.3d 340, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 329 (Tenn. 2004).

Common-law action for intentional misrepresentation encompassed a former husband's claim that his former wife intentionally misrepresented her child's paternity, and awarding him damages based on his post-divorce payments of child support, medical expenses, and insurance premiums was not a retroactive modification of child support of the sort prohibited by T.C.A. § 36-5-101(f)(1); as he owed no support at the time the award was entered, the award did not have the effect of reducing or extinguishing any child support arrearage. Hodge v. Craig, 382 S.W.3d 325, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 720 (Tenn. Oct. 1, 2012).

If a former husband owing back child support prevails on his claim that his former wife intentionally misrepresented her child's paternity, the trial court, rather than forgiving the past due child support, must offset the judgment by the amount of the past due child support owed at the time suit was filed. Hodge v. Craig, 382 S.W.3d 325, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 720 (Tenn. Oct. 1, 2012).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in making a child support modification retroactive to the date that one parent filed a counterclaim asking the court to recalculate child support under the guidelines. McCosh v. McCosh, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 695 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2015).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to make a child support modification retroactive. The trial court chose not to make the new support amount effective, as of an earlier date, when the obligor parent paid the full child support obligation in a timely manner each month from the entry of the final decree of divorce and continued to pay the full amount of child support after one child attained the age of majority. Halim v. El-Alayli, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 270 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 28, 2017).

Trial court's order and reasoning for declining to order retroactive child support to the mother did not include the required written findings, which were mandatory in the event that the court deviated from ordering retroactive child support; thus, the case was remanded for calculation of retroactive child support pursuant to the Tennessee Child Support Guidelines. Williams v. Williams, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 563 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 17, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 883 (Tenn. Dec. 8, 2017).

6. “Alimony” Defined.

Alimony is an allowance out of the estate of the husband, made pending a divorce suit, for the maintenance of the wife, or for her sustenance after the legal separation or a divorce. White v. Bates, 89 Tenn. 570, 15 S.W. 651, 1890 Tenn. LEXIS 80 (1891).

Alimony is the allowance that a husband by order of court pays to his wife living separate and apart from him for her maintenance. Livingston v. Livingston, 58 Tenn. App. 271, 429 S.W.2d 452, 1967 Tenn. App. LEXIS 267 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1968).

The term “alimony” does not include child support even though this section has been entitled “Alimony for Support of Wife and Children” since the time of Shannon's Code. Livingston v. Livingston, 58 Tenn. App. 271, 429 S.W.2d 452, 1967 Tenn. App. LEXIS 267 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1968).

Alimony and support payments, by their very nature, flow from one spouse to the other; they are not mutual obligations. Light v. Adkins, 151 B.R. 458, 1992 Bankr. LEXIS 2276 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1992).

7. Relation of Divorce and Alimony.

A divorce may be granted without alimony, and alimony may be granted without decreeing a divorce, for there is, under this statute, no necessary or absolute connection between divorce and alimony. McBee v. McBee, 48 Tenn. 558, 1870 Tenn. LEXIS 111 (1870); Toncray v. Toncray, 123 Tenn. 476, 131 S.W. 977, 1910 Tenn. LEXIS 18, 34 L.R.A. (n.s.) 1106, 1912C Ann. Cas. 284 (1910); Williams v. Williams, 146 Tenn. 38, 236 S.W. 938, 1921 Tenn. LEXIS 2 (1922); Thones v. Thones, 185 Tenn. 124, 203 S.W.2d 597, 1947 Tenn. LEXIS 311 (1947).

A divorce may be granted without alimony, and alimony may be granted without decreeing a divorce, there being no necessary or absolute connection between divorce and alimony under the statute, and therefore a prayer for general relief is not sufficient to support an award of alimony in a case in which judgment is taken by default. Qualls v. Qualls, 589 S.W.2d 906, 1979 Tenn. LEXIS 513 (Tenn. 1979).

8. Jurisdiction.

In a divorce suit where no property is impounded and defendant is before the court on constructive service only, court is without jurisdiction to award alimony. Darby v. Darby, 152 Tenn. 287, 277 S.W. 894, 1925 Tenn. LEXIS 72, 42 A.L.R. 1379 (1925).

Later petition for alimony on defendant's return to jurisdiction after constructive service in divorce proceeding may not be treated as original bill. Darby v. Darby, 152 Tenn. 287, 277 S.W. 894, 1925 Tenn. LEXIS 72, 42 A.L.R. 1379 (1925).

A change of domicile and absence from the forum does not affect the court's jurisdiction, which is regarded as continuing once it has been acquired in the original action, and personal notice served outside the state was sufficient. Darty v. Darty, 33 Tenn. App. 321, 232 S.W.2d 59, 1949 Tenn. App. LEXIS 127 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1949).

The various divisions of the circuit court of Hamilton County are treated as a single court for the purposes of this section. Talley v. Talley, 51 Tenn. App. 622, 371 S.W.2d 152, 1962 Tenn. App. LEXIS 126 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1962).

Circuit court that granted divorce and entered order as to custody of children, alimony and support, had exclusive jurisdiction of the matter and probate court could not punish for contempt, even though by statute it had concurrent jurisdiction on domestic relations matters. Mayhew v. Mayhew, 52 Tenn. App. 459, 376 S.W.2d 324, 1963 Tenn. App. LEXIS 106 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1963).

Probate court of Davidson County lacked jurisdiction to punish for contempt for violation of decree of circuit court of Davidson County in divorce proceeding, even though statute provided that such probate court had concurrent jurisdiction with circuit and chancery court in domestic relations matters. Mayhew v. Mayhew, 52 Tenn. App. 459, 376 S.W.2d 324, 1963 Tenn. App. LEXIS 106 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1963).

The rule that a judgment in personam against a defendant who is not before the court either by service of process or the entry of appearance is void is applicable to judgments and decrees that award alimony. Overby v. Overby, 224 Tenn. 523, 457 S.W.2d 851, 1970 Tenn. LEXIS 351 (1970).

Where husband and wife were divorced in Georgia and husband moved to Tennessee, and wife sued in Tennessee for increase in support, courts of Tennessee acquired jurisdiction of the subject matter of complaint and jurisdiction of defendant by personal service of process, and increase ordered by chancery court was valid except as to order of annual increase due to rise in cost of living, such increase not being accurately predictable and since court could increase or decrease allowance on cause being shown. Parker v. Parker, 497 S.W.2d 572, 1973 Tenn. LEXIS 466 (Tenn. 1973).

Pending an appeal the trial court has continuing power, jurisdiction and authority to make all such orders as may be necessary touching on the custody, support and welfare of children in divorce cases subject only to the extraordinary remedy of certiorari and supersedeas in proper cases. Smith v. Haase, 521 S.W.2d 49, 1975 Tenn. LEXIS 680 (Tenn. 1975).

Pending appellate review trial court was without jurisdiction to entertain petition that challenged procedural aspects of child support decree and asserted that expense of rearing child was beyond petitioner's financial ability. Smith v. Haase, 521 S.W.2d 49, 1975 Tenn. LEXIS 680 (Tenn. 1975).

Trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to set the father's child support obligation for his adult disabled child because no prior child support order existed; any order within the divorce judgment regarding child support was void ab initio for lack of personal jurisdiction over the father. State ex rel. Catalano v. Woodcock, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 469 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 5, 2016).

Legislature merely provided the court with the additional authority to order support at the time of the divorce for a child who became severely disabled prior to the age of majority even though he or she may have reached the age of majority by the time of the divorce; however, the statute does not specifically provide the trial court with the additional authority to set support for such an individual when the original divorce judgment contains no valid support order. Woodard v. Woodard, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 393 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 9, 2018).

Trial court did not err in finding that it was without jurisdiction to enter an order of permanent child support because no valid child support order was entered at the time of the filing of the divorce decree. Woodard v. Woodard, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 393 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 9, 2018).

9. —Nature.

Insofar as a divorce decree seeks a personal judgment against a husband as alimony, it is an action in personam, which requires personal service of process upon the husband, but insofar as a divorce decree seeks an award of alimony out of the real estate within the territorial jurisdiction of the court and belonging to a nonresident husband such proceeding is at least quasi in rem. Terrell v. Terrell, 192 Tenn. 317, 241 S.W.2d 411, 1951 Tenn. LEXIS 407 (1951).

10. Alimony Pendente Lite.

Whether a divorce suit is brought by or against the wife, an allowance as alimony will be made to her for her support pending the suit, and to defray the expenses of the suit on her part, including her counsel fees, where she has no adequate means of her own for such purposes. This rule is to enable the wife, when destitute of means of her own, to obtain justice and to prevent its denial. This rule, however, is subject to the qualification that the wife is prosecuting or defending the suit in good faith, for where it appears of record that her suit is without any just or reasonable foundation, and cannot be sustained, no allowance will be made. Thompson v. Thompson, 40 Tenn. 527, 1859 Tenn. LEXIS 152 (1859); Lishey v. Lishey, 2 Cooper's Tenn. Ch. 1 (1873), aff'd, 74 Tenn. 418, 1880 Tenn. LEXIS 269 (1880); Burrow v. Burrow, 74 Tenn. 499, 1880 Tenn. LEXIS 281 (1880); Winslow v. Winslow, 133 Tenn. 663, 182 S.W. 241, 1915 Tenn. LEXIS 126 (1916), superseded by statute as stated in, Aleshire v. Aleshire, 642 S.W.2d 729, 1981 Tenn. App. LEXIS 460 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981).

The allowance to the wife, pending the divorce suit, should be put at a low figure and proportioned to the husband's property and income. Reasonable support and enough to cover the expenses of the suit is all that she can justly claim. Lishey v. Lishey, 2 Cooper's Tenn. Ch. 1 (1873), aff'd, 74 Tenn. 418, 1880 Tenn. LEXIS 269 (1880).

An appeal from order overruling motion to require complainant to pay into court the amount of alimony pendente lite, for judgment against surety and for arrest of complainant for failure to pay, is not allowable. Campbell v. Campbell, 46 S.W. 308, 1898 Tenn. Ch. App. LEXIS 3 (1898).

In the case of debt incurred between separation and divorce, one spouse should not be held responsible for the debts the other spouse incurs unless the debts were for a marital purpose or for the joint benefit of the parties. Goodman v. Goodman, 8 S.W.3d 289, 1999 Tenn. App. LEXIS 546 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999), superseded by statute as stated in, Tippens-Florea v. Florea, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 361 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 31, 2012).

11. —Refund of Allowance Made Pending Suit.

The wife will not be compelled to refund alimony, expenses, or counsel fees allowed her pending the divorce suit, though she fail in her suit, where it appears that her suit was prosecuted in good faith, or where malice or bad faith does not appear. Lishey v. Lishey, 74 Tenn. 418, 1880 Tenn. LEXIS 269 (1880).

12. —Effect of Dismissal.

Where an interlocutory order was made for the payment of a certain sum of money as alimony for her support, pending the suit, and, before the wife had received the same, her bill was dismissed by the court, she could not afterwards collect it, although she continued to live apart from her husband. Persons v. Persons, 26 Tenn. 183, 1846 Tenn. LEXIS 97 (1846).

13. Alimony In Solido.

The awarding of alimony in solido in installments is an acceptable practice. Isbell v. Isbell, 816 S.W.2d 735, 1991 Tenn. LEXIS 366 (Tenn. 1991), superseded by statute as stated in, Gregory v. Gregory, — S.W.2d —, 1995 Tenn. App. LEXIS 511 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 31, 1995), superseded by statute as stated in, Sommerville v. Sommerville, — S.W.2d —, 1995 Tenn. App. LEXIS 551 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 23, 1995), superseded by statute as stated in, Wiseman v. Wiseman, — S.W.2d —, 1997 Tenn. App. LEXIS 528 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 28, 1997).

Husband's interest in trust constituted an “estate” from which to award alimony in solido. Houghland v. Houghland, 844 S.W.2d 619, 1992 Tenn. App. LEXIS 441 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992).

Husband was properly ordered to pay the amount of money received from payment of promissory note, given as partial payment for previous sale of marital home, as alimony in solido. Houghland v. Houghland, 844 S.W.2d 619, 1992 Tenn. App. LEXIS 441 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992).

Where the court awards the wife alimony in solido adequate for her needs and attorney's fees, it may be improper for the trial court to make an additional award of alimony in solido for payment of the wife's attorney's fees. Houghland v. Houghland, 844 S.W.2d 619, 1992 Tenn. App. LEXIS 441 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992).

Rehabilitative alimony award payable monthly for 48 months or until the remarriage or death of the wife, whichever should occur first, was alimony in solido, not subject to subsequent modification. Self v. Self, 861 S.W.2d 360, 1993 Tenn. LEXIS 317 (Tenn. 1993).

The trial court did not err in awarding the wife alimony in solido where without alimony in solido, husband was awarded more of the marital assets, and considering that the husband's infidelity precipitated the divorce, he should not be placed in a better position than the wife following division of the marital assets. Lindsey v. Lindsey, 976 S.W.2d 175, 1997 Tenn. App. LEXIS 581 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997).

Alimony in solido should be awarded generally only out of a spouse's estate; alimony in solido should not be awarded out of an expectation of future earnings. Goodman v. Goodman, 8 S.W.3d 289, 1999 Tenn. App. LEXIS 546 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999), superseded by statute as stated in, Tippens-Florea v. Florea, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 361 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 31, 2012).

Former T.C.A. § 36-5-101(a)(2)(B) does not apply to alimony in solido; therefore, husband's obligation to pay wife alimony in solido, spread out over the course of ten years, did not automatically terminate as a result of the wife's remarriage. Grissom v. Grissom, 15 S.W.3d 474, 1999 Tenn. App. LEXIS 693 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999), review or rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 237 (Tenn. Apr. 17, 2000).

Attorney's fees constitute alimony in solido, and need is the critical factor to be considered in making an award of alimony; the trial court's award of attorney's fees to the wife in a divorce action was reversed where the wife did not lack the resources to prosecute her suit and the final decree provided funds out of which her attorney's and witness fees may have been paid. Powell v. Powell, 124 S.W.3d 100, 2003 Tenn. App. LEXIS 281 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 1075 (Tenn. 2003).

Trial court did not err in awarding the wife attorney's fees as alimony in solido after considering the relevant statutory factors and noting that the parties were married for 26 years, the wife had a disability, the husband's fault in the divorce, and the parties'  sources of income. Ingram v. Ingram, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 315 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 7, 2018).

14. Alimony In Futuro.

The occurrence of a contingency terminating support did not convert the award of alimony in futuro to an award of alimony in solido. Waddey v. Waddey, 6 S.W.3d 230, 1999 Tenn. LEXIS 422 (Tenn. 1999).

A trial court's ability to modify an award of alimony in futuro terminates upon the occurrence of a contingency when the award ceases to exist. Waddey v. Waddey, 6 S.W.3d 230, 1999 Tenn. LEXIS 422 (Tenn. 1999).

Husband properly ordered to pay wife alimony in futuro rather than rehabilitative alimony, where wife's psychologist testified that wife was not capable of employment, of rehabilitating herself, or of being a full-time student. Goodman v. Goodman, 8 S.W.3d 289, 1999 Tenn. App. LEXIS 546 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999), superseded by statute as stated in, Tippens-Florea v. Florea, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 361 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 31, 2012).

Where a husband and a wife divorced after 24 years of marriage, and the husband was ordered to pay monthly child support and alimony in futuro, the trial court considered the factors outlined in T.C.A. § 36-5-101(d)(1) and properly found that the evidence supported an award of alimony in futuro, as opposed to an award of rehabilitative alimony. Bowie v. Bowie, 101 S.W.3d 420, 2002 Tenn. App. LEXIS 773 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 304 (Tenn. Mar. 17, 2003).

While the legislature had expressed a preference for rehabilitative alimony in T.C.A. § 36-5-101(d)(1), the record on appeal showed that the wife's possibilities to rehabilitate herself were extremely limited and after applying all relevant statutory factors to the facts and circumstances shown by the record, the trial court properly awarded the wife permanent alimony, as opposed to rehabilitative alimony. Dube v. Dube, 104 S.W.3d 863, 2002 Tenn. App. LEXIS 856 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002), review or rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 394 (Tenn. May 5, 2003).

After an eight and one-half year marriage, where the spouse of highly paid physician had experience as a legal secretary and a masters degree, the spouse was not a candidate for rehabilitation and was entitled to alimony until death or remarriage, although the amount was reduced on appeal because the spouse could expect a substantial and increasing income when the spouse returned to the workforce. Nelson v. Nelson, 106 S.W.3d 20, 2002 Tenn. App. LEXIS 525 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002), review or rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2002 Tenn. LEXIS 767 (Tenn. Dec. 23, 2002).

Trial court's award of alimony in futuro was not an abuse of discretion because of, inter alia: (1) The disparity in the parties' incomes; (2) The relative education and training of the parties; (3) The long duration of the marriage, (4) The relative fault of the parties; and (5) The wife's educational background in music and having a very limited work history. Bowie v. Bowie, 101 S.W.3d 420, 2002 Tenn. App. LEXIS 773 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 304 (Tenn. Mar. 17, 2003).

Upon the parties' divorce, the disabled wife was entitled to an award of alimony in futuro in the amount of $850.00 a month. Davis v. Davis, 138 S.W.3d 886, 2003 Tenn. App. LEXIS 754 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 274 (Tenn. Mar. 22, 2004).

Husband's alimony payment should have been modified in accordance with T.C.A. § 36-5-121(f)(2)(A) because the record showed a substantial and material change in circumstance since the husband's income dropped dramatically from the time of the divorce to the time of the hearing on his petition for modification; the decrease in income impaired the husband's ability to pay the amount of alimony and was a consequence of his health problems, and the husband's health problems and resulting decrease in income were not within the contemplation of the parties at the time of the divorce. Bordes v. Bordes, 358 S.W.3d 623, 2011 Tenn. App. LEXIS 536 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2011).

15. Separate Maintenance.

A decree for the separate maintenance of the wife, requiring the husband to pay monthly sums therefor, should provide for the continuance of such payments within the discretion of the chancellor only until a reconciliation may be effected between the husband and wife, and until the husband may return to the discharge of his marital duties. Rutledge v. Rutledge, 37 Tenn. 554, 1858 Tenn. LEXIS 61 (1858); Cureton v. Cureton, 117 Tenn. 103, 96 S.W. 608, 1906 Tenn. LEXIS 35 (1906).

Under this section, where a decree for divorce or separation is sought, but is refused, the court may, nevertheless, proceed to decree a separate maintenance or alimony to the wife. Nicely v. Nicely, 40 Tenn. 184, 1859 Tenn. LEXIS 50 (1859); Swan v. Harrison, 42 Tenn. 534, 1865 Tenn. LEXIS 100 (1865); McBee v. McBee, 48 Tenn. 558, 1870 Tenn. LEXIS 111 (1870); Toncray v. Toncray, 123 Tenn. 476, 131 S.W. 977, 1910 Tenn. LEXIS 18, 34 L.R.A. (n.s.) 1106, 1912C Ann. Cas. 284 (1910); Chapman v. Chapman, 3 Tenn. Civ. App. (3 Higgins) 3 (1912).

Under the broad and comprehensive provisions, the chancery court has power to decree alimony or a separate maintenance for the wife, in a separate, substantive proceeding against the husband, in which no divorce or separation is prayed for or decreed. Nicely v. Nicely, 40 Tenn. 184, 1859 Tenn. LEXIS 50 (1859); Corley v. Corley, 67 Tenn. 7, 1874 Tenn. LEXIS 315 (1874); Cureton v. Cureton, 117 Tenn. 103, 96 S.W. 608, 1906 Tenn. LEXIS 35 (1906); Chapman v. Chapman, 3 Tenn. Civ. App. (3 Higgins) 3 (1912); Brown v. Brown, 156 Tenn. 619, 4 S.W.2d 345, 1927 Tenn. LEXIS 157 (1928); Bevil v. Bevil, 8 Tenn. App. 490, — S.W.2d —, 1928 Tenn. App. LEXIS 167 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1928).

To entitle wife to allowance for separate maintenance, it is not necessary to establish sufficient grounds to justify dissolution of bonds of matrimony or absolute divorce. Bevil v. Bevil, 8 Tenn. App. 490, — S.W.2d —, 1928 Tenn. App. LEXIS 167 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1928).

Where husband had income of $50.00 per week and money from sale of property and wife was ill and destitute, award of weekly amount of $12.00 for separate maintenance of wife would be sustained. Crabtree v. Crabtree, 28 Tenn. App. 373, 190 S.W.2d 319, 1945 Tenn. App. LEXIS 78 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1945).

Circuit court has jurisdiction of suit by wife seeking support for herself and child although she did not pray for either limited or absolute divorce. Browder v. Browder, 188 Tenn. 488, 221 S.W.2d 526, 1949 Tenn. LEXIS 364 (1949).

A decree of separate maintenance continues in force and the husband must continue to make the required payments to the wife until the court orders their discontinuance after first being satisfied that there has been a reconciliation or that he proposes in good faith to take her back and resume his marital duties. Folk v. Folk, 167 Tenn. 367, 210 Tenn. 367, 355 S.W.2d 634, 1962 Tenn. LEXIS 402 (1962).

A decree of separate maintenance is not a mere temporary order but is a final decree in the sense that it is appealable as of right and is binding as res judicata upon the facts and issues adjudged. Folk v. Folk, 167 Tenn. 367, 210 Tenn. 367, 355 S.W.2d 634, 1962 Tenn. LEXIS 402 (1962).

The wife's right to separate maintenance rests upon the husband's duty to support her and his fault in causing their separation, and a court of equity has inherent jurisdiction independent of the divorce statutes to decree her separate maintenance even though his fault is not a statutory ground for divorce. Folk v. Folk, 167 Tenn. 367, 210 Tenn. 367, 355 S.W.2d 634, 1962 Tenn. LEXIS 402 (1962).

16. Awarding and Fixing Alimony.

If the separation is decreed to be perpetual, alimony may be decreed to the wife, as a whole and absolutely, or if the separation decreed be otherwise than perpetual, it should be decreed to be paid to her at stated periods, for a limited time or for life. Swan v. Harrison, 42 Tenn. 534, 1865 Tenn. LEXIS 100 (1865).

The court may give the wife as alimony all, part, or any fixed portion of her husband's estate in specie or a fixed proportion of his estate, without regard to its location, or may adjudge specific property to her, or a certain sum of money to be paid, based upon an estimate of the value of his estate, at the time. Boggers v. Boggers, 65 Tenn. 299, 1873 Tenn. LEXIS 349 (1873); White v. Bates, 89 Tenn. 570, 15 S.W. 651, 1890 Tenn. LEXIS 80 (1891).

Decree for alimony payable in installments, though in excess of the estate owned by the husband at the time, was enforceable out of future estate coming into his possession. Watson v. Campodonico, 3 Tenn. Civ. App. (3 Higgins) 698 (1913).

Prior to the 1949 amendment it was held that where the wife obtains an absolute divorce, the court can only give her a decree for part or all that the husband then owns, according to the circumstances, but where he has no property, the court can give a decree binding his future services, earnings or acquisitions. Watson v. Campodonico, 3 Tenn. Civ. App. (3 Higgins) 698 (1913); Winslow v. Winslow, 133 Tenn. 663, 182 S.W. 241, 1915 Tenn. LEXIS 126 (1916), superseded by statute as stated in, Aleshire v. Aleshire, 642 S.W.2d 729, 1981 Tenn. App. LEXIS 460 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981) (declining to follow Chenault v. Chenault, 37 Tenn. 248, 1857 Tenn. LEXIS 116 (1856); Boggers v. Boggers, 65 Tenn. 299, 1873 Tenn. LEXIS 349 (1873), insofar as those cases held that the future earnings of the husband could not, under any circumstances, be bound upon the granting of a divorce from the bonds of matrimony).

The usual practice is to grant alimony in solido in case an absolute divorce is decreed. Winslow v. Winslow, 133 Tenn. 663, 182 S.W. 241, 1915 Tenn. LEXIS 126 (1916), superseded by statute as stated in, Aleshire v. Aleshire, 642 S.W.2d 729, 1981 Tenn. App. LEXIS 460 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981).

Where a husband had cruelly and inhumanly treated his wife and deserted her after she reached middle life, the parties having lived together for more than 20 years, the wife was entitled to one third of the husband's income as alimony. Taylor v. Taylor, 144 Tenn. 311, 232 S.W. 445, 1921 Tenn. LEXIS 41 (1921), overruled in part, Morrissey v. Morrissey, 214 Tenn. 112, 377 S.W.2d 944, 1964 Tenn. LEXIS 455 (1964).

It appearing that the husband did not own sufficient property to warrant a decree for alimony in solido, the wife was entitled to alimony at the rate of $125 per month. Taylor v. Taylor, 144 Tenn. 311, 232 S.W. 445, 1921 Tenn. LEXIS 41 (1921), overruled in part, Morrissey v. Morrissey, 214 Tenn. 112, 377 S.W.2d 944, 1964 Tenn. LEXIS 455 (1964).

Upon granting the wife an absolute divorce, in the absence of any reasons for making an award for her support in the form of monthly or yearly allowances or by setting aside a particular part of the husband's estate in specie to the wife, the proper practice is to award alimony in solido. Williams v. Williams, 146 Tenn. 38, 236 S.W. 938, 1921 Tenn. LEXIS 2 (1922).

Where husband has no estate, but an earning capacity, the wife's support may be provided for by monthly allowance. Brown v. Brown, 156 Tenn. 619, 4 S.W.2d 345, 1927 Tenn. LEXIS 157 (1928).

Alimony in futuro should not be awarded in addition to alimony in solido if the amount awarded in solido is considered sufficient. Raskind v. Raskind, 45 Tenn. App. 583, 325 S.W.2d 617, 1959 Tenn. App. LEXIS 80 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1959).

Court may award alimony both in solido and in futuro. Mount v. Mount, 46 Tenn. App. 30, 326 S.W.2d 493, 1959 Tenn. App. LEXIS 86 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1959).

Where husband and wife were 44 and 42 years of age respectively and no alimony in futuro was awarded, action of trial court in awarding interests in property in the amount of $18,750 as alimony in solido while permitting husband to retain property in the amount of $7,800 was not improper. Smith v. Smith, 47 Tenn. App. 548, 339 S.W.2d 326, 1960 Tenn. App. LEXIS 89 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1960).

Contributions made by wife from her earnings or separate estate are but one factor to be considered in awarding alimony and except under unusual circumstances there is a well-nigh conclusive presumption that contributions of each party to the family needs and welfare were made out of love and a sense of duty with no expectation of reimbursement. Stone v. Stone, 56 Tenn. App. 607, 409 S.W.2d 388, 1966 Tenn. App. LEXIS 240 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1966).

Factors to be considered in fixing the amount of alimony are the earning capacity of each of the parties, their separate property holdings, their condition of health, age and station in life, the way and manner in which the estate has been created including the contributions made by the wife from her earnings and the merit or lack of merit of the respective parties. Stone v. Stone, 56 Tenn. App. 607, 409 S.W.2d 388, 1966 Tenn. App. LEXIS 240 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1966).

Where both parties are before the court in personam and the real property within the territorial jurisdiction of the court and reasonably identified in the pleadings, there is no question of the authority of the courts to decree proper distribution of the property pursuant to the statute. Rains v. Rains, 58 Tenn. App. 214, 428 S.W.2d 650, 1968 Tenn. App. LEXIS 295 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1968).

In the intervening years since 1910 the economy of our society has changed to an emphasis upon earning power rather than upon estate. Rains v. Rains, 58 Tenn. App. 214, 428 S.W.2d 650, 1968 Tenn. App. LEXIS 295 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1968).

In awarding alimony trial court should consider extent, if any, wife contributed to husband's estate. Newberry v. Newberry, 493 S.W.2d 99, 1973 Tenn. App. LEXIS 310 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1972).

Provisions in a divorce decree that the husband would give to the wife life insurance policies that he carried and would continue to pay premiums on the policies were in the nature of a property settlement, requiring the husband to maintain the policies for the benefit of the wife despite her remarriage and were not intended merely to be temporary security for the payment of interim alimony. Prince v. Prince, 572 S.W.2d 908, 1978 Tenn. LEXIS 661 (Tenn. 1978).

The policy in Tennessee has always been that alimony in gross was preferred to periodic alimony in cases of divorce. Spalding v. Spalding, 597 S.W.2d 739, 1980 Tenn. App. LEXIS 326 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980).

The language “the nature of the case and the circumstances of the parties” as used in this section allows the court, in fixing alimony, to consider the conduct of the parties with reference to the cause of divorce and the relative or comparative responsibility of each spouse therefor. Massey v. Massey, 621 S.W.2d 728, 1981 Tenn. LEXIS 486 (Tenn. 1981).

Where the defendant does not have an estate out of which to award alimony solido, the court should award periodic or alimony in futuro pursuant to this section. Aleshire v. Aleshire, 642 S.W.2d 729, 1981 Tenn. App. LEXIS 460 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981), superseded by statute as stated in, Andrews v. Susie Heasook Cho Andrews, 344 S.W.3d 321, 2010 Tenn. App. LEXIS 553 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2010), superseded by statute as stated in, Tippens-Florea v. Florea, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 361 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 31, 2012).

There is no question that fault and need are to be considered in determining alimony in futuro. Fisher v. Fisher, 648 S.W.2d 244, 1983 Tenn. LEXIS 632 (Tenn. 1983).

Plaintiff wife, on dissolution of second marriage, which lasted less than three years, who was receiving $25,000 out of the parties' joint assets and already owned substantial personal assets as well, was not entitled to any additional award in the form of alimony. Duncan v. Duncan, 652 S.W.2d 913, 1983 Tenn. App. LEXIS 545 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983), overruled, Cary v. Cary, 937 S.W.2d 777, 1996 Tenn. LEXIS 362 (Tenn. 1996).

Real need is the single most critical factor in the award of alimony. Lancaster v. Lancaster, 671 S.W.2d 501, 1984 Tenn. App. LEXIS 3408 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984).

To the extent the concept of “fault” might creep into the subconscious mind of a trial judge in the division of jointly held property, no matter how much care is taken to avoid that temptation, a subsequent careful review of the very steady barometer of need when considering alimony will temper excessive awards based primarily on “fault” and an ability to pay. Lancaster v. Lancaster, 671 S.W.2d 501, 1984 Tenn. App. LEXIS 3408 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984).

Where wife received $500,000 in divorce settlement, insufficient need was shown for an additional award of alimony of $250,000 where the assets of the husband were $1,000,000. Lancaster v. Lancaster, 671 S.W.2d 501, 1984 Tenn. App. LEXIS 3408 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984).

The evidence was sufficient to warrant the payment of alimony in futuro. Barker v. Barker, 671 S.W.2d 843, 1984 Tenn. App. LEXIS 2754 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984).

A divorce court has the power and jurisdiction to require a party to pay a fixed percentage of his cash receipts into court as alimony and child support for an indefinite time without any limitation on the total amount, subject to periodic review by the court as to satisfaction of past due liability and reasonable anticipated liability. Lescher v. Lescher, 679 S.W.2d 463, 1984 Tenn. App. LEXIS 3104 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984).

The court had authority to award as alimony or child support all or any part of an ownership interest in real estate; implicit in authority to award the entire such ownership interest was also the authority to award a security interest in such property. In re Shumate, 39 B.R. 808, 1984 Bankr. LEXIS 5780 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1984).

Although income and net worth are inter-connected and, to some degree, inter-dependent, they deserve separate consideration in a divorce case. Duncan v. Duncan, 686 S.W.2d 568, 1984 Tenn. App. LEXIS 3264 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984).

Periodic alimony remains subject to both retrospective and prospective modification. In re Deatherage, 55 B.R. 268, 1985 Bankr. LEXIS 4905 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1985).

Where there are insufficient funds in the estate to make an award of alimony in solido, an award of alimony in futuro is proper. Campanali v. Campanali, 695 S.W.2d 193, 1985 Tenn. App. LEXIS 2861 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985).

In making determinations with regard to alimony, the need of the spouse is the single most important factor followed by the ability of the obligor spouse to pay. Campanali v. Campanali, 695 S.W.2d 193, 1985 Tenn. App. LEXIS 2861 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985).

A trial judge may award long-term support and maintenance if in his or her opinion rehabilitation is not feasible. Ingram v. Ingram, 721 S.W.2d 262, 1986 Tenn. App. LEXIS 3292 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986).

An exception to the rule that alimony may be awarded subsequent to a decree is that alimony may be awarded after a decree of absolute divorce is final where the right is afforded by the statute or reserved in the divorce decree. Robinette v. Robinette, 726 S.W.2d 524, 1986 Tenn. App. LEXIS 3177 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986).

The most common factors considered by the courts in fixing alimony are: (1) The need of the innocent spouse; (2) The fault of the obligor spouse; and (3) The obligor spouse's ability to provide support and maintenance. Bull v. Bull, 729 S.W.2d 673, 1987 Tenn. App. LEXIS 2532 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987).

The advent of rehabilitative support did not totally displace permanent alimony and the courts may still award long-term support and maintenance until the death or remarriage of the recipient spouse where rehabilitation is not feasible in consideration of all relevant factors. Cranford v. Cranford, 772 S.W.2d 48, 1989 Tenn. App. LEXIS 127 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989).

Even though a spouse has no property, such spouse may be required to support the other spouse to the extent of the needs of the needy spouse and the capacity or ability of the supporting spouse. Hall v. Hall, 772 S.W.2d 432, 1989 Tenn. App. LEXIS 11 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989).

The needs of the spouse to whom spousal support is awarded and the ability of the other spouse to pay are the dominant factors to consider in making an award of spousal support. Hazard v. Hazard, 833 S.W.2d 911, 1991 Tenn. App. LEXIS 928 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991).

Where possible, awards of alimony in solido are preferred to awards in futuro. Houghland v. Houghland, 844 S.W.2d 619, 1992 Tenn. App. LEXIS 441 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992).

Alimony in solido should not be awarded out of an expectation of future earnings. Houghland v. Houghland, 844 S.W.2d 619, 1992 Tenn. App. LEXIS 441 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992).

The child support guidelines apply in all cases awarding financial support to a custodial parent for the maintenance of a child, whether or not the child is a welfare recipient, and whether or note the child's parents are married. Nash v. Mulle, 846 S.W.2d 803, 1993 Tenn. LEXIS 16 (Tenn. 1993), superseded by statute as stated in, Smith v. Smith, 984 S.W.2d 606, 1997 Tenn. App. LEXIS 218 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997).

Trial judge was not limited to the child support guidelines' ordinary schedule in calculating the amount of support to be paid by a wealthy noncustodial parent. Nash v. Mulle, 846 S.W.2d 803, 1993 Tenn. LEXIS 16 (Tenn. 1993), superseded by statute as stated in, Smith v. Smith, 984 S.W.2d 606, 1997 Tenn. App. LEXIS 218 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997).

Under this section, long-term support and maintenance is appropriate only where there is relative economic disadvantage and rehabilitation of the disadvantaged party is not feasible. Self v. Self, 861 S.W.2d 360, 1993 Tenn. LEXIS 317 (Tenn. 1993).

It was an abuse of discretion to classify alimony to be paid to the wife as rehabilitative, rather than in futuro, in view of evidence of the wife's low employability and earning capacity and the husband's inappropriate marital conduct. Long v. Long, 957 S.W.2d 825, 1997 Tenn. App. LEXIS 78 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997).

While the legislature has expressed a preference for rehabilitative alimony, a court may grant alimony in futuro where rehabilitation is not feasible. Long v. Long, 968 S.W.2d 292, 1997 Tenn. App. LEXIS 478 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997).

Child support decisions should precede decisions about spousal support because a spouse's ability to pay spousal support may be directly and significantly influenced by the amount of child support he or she has been ordered to pay. Anderton v. Anderton, 988 S.W.2d 675, 1998 Tenn. App. LEXIS 366 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998), modified, 988 S.W.2d 675, 1998 Tenn. App. LEXIS 431 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998).

A concurrent award of both rehabilitative alimony and alimony in futuro is inconsistent because at the time of the decree, a trial court must necessarily find that the recipient of alimony either can be or cannot be rehabilitated, even though that determination is subject to later modification. Crabtree v. Crabtree, 16 S.W.3d 356, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 201 (Tenn. 2000), superseded by statute as stated in, Goodman v. Goodman, — S.W.3d —, 2006 Tenn. App. LEXIS 20 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2006), superseded by statute as stated in, Anderson v. Anderson, — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 175 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 29, 2007), superseded by statute as stated in, Gorman v. Gorman, — S.W.3d —, 2011 Tenn. App. LEXIS 624 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 16, 2011).

A concurrent award of both rehabilitative alimony and alimony in futuro is inconsistent; this holding emphasizes both the legislative preference for rehabilitation as well as the established rule that this preference does not entirely displace other forms of spousal support when the facts warrant long term or more open-ended support. Alimony in solido is not inconsistent with a concurrent award of rehabilitative alimony. Burlew v. Burlew, 40 S.W.3d 465, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 111 (Tenn. 2001).

In light of the appellate court's remand to the trial court to reconsider its distribution of the parties' marital property, the trial court had to reconsider its award of rehabilitative alimony as well; pursuant to former T.C.A. § 36-5-101(d)(1)(G), (H), the trial court had to consider the separate assets of each party in addition to the distribution of the parties' marital property when awarding alimony. Smith v. Smith, 93 S.W.3d 871, 2002 Tenn. App. LEXIS 622 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002).

In light of the length of the marriage, the work histories of parties, their educational backgrounds, age and health status, an appellate court believed an award of alimony in futuro to have been appropriate, but the amount of alimony awarded was excessive based on earnings. Sullivan v. Sullivan, 107 S.W.3d 507, 2002 Tenn. App. LEXIS 641 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002), review or rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 87 (Tenn. Feb. 3, 2003).

When a court awards rehabilitative alimony under T.C.A. § 36-5-101(d)(1), it must consider the listed factors to determine the amount of time it will take to rehabilitate the economically disadvantaged spouse, and a temporary award may run afoul of § 36-5-101(d)(1) if the duration of the award bears little relationship to the factors set forth in the statute. Perry v. Perry, 114 S.W.3d 465, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 725 (Tenn. 2003).

While the husband was required to pay temporary alimony and the wife requested an alimony award at trial, she never requested an award of health insurance; as a result, there was no proof offered as to whether she could be insured and, if so, the cost of the premiums and whether the husband had the ability to pay those premiums. Fairness dictated that the cause be remanded to the trial court for the parties to present evidence on the limited issue of the wife's health insurance. Martin v. Martin, 155 S.W.3d 126, 2004 Tenn. App. LEXIS 450 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 1053 (Tenn. Nov. 29, 2004).

17. —Factors.

Of the factors listed in subsection (d), need and the ability to pay are the most critical. Loyd v. Loyd, 860 S.W.2d 409, 1993 Tenn. App. LEXIS 215 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993); Watters v. Watters, 959 S.W.2d 585, 1997 Tenn. App. LEXIS 441 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997).

A court must examine all the factors of T.C.A. § 36-5-101(d)(1)in determining the proper alimony award; while the real need of the spouse seeking the support is the single most important factor, courts should also consider the ability of the obligor spouse to provide support. Goodman v. Goodman, 8 S.W.3d 289, 1999 Tenn. App. LEXIS 546 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999), superseded by statute as stated in, Tippens-Florea v. Florea, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 361 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 31, 2012).

Trial courts had to consider all relevant factors in the statute to determine whether an economically disadvantaged spouse could be rehabilitated. Robertson v. Robertson, 76 S.W.3d 337, 2002 Tenn. LEXIS 172 (Tenn. 2002).

In making an award of alimony under T.C.A. § 36-5-101(d)(1), a court must consider all relevant factors, including those set out in the statute; the two most important factors are the need of the disadvantaged spouse and the obligor spouse's ability to pay. Perry v. Perry, 114 S.W.3d 465, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 725 (Tenn. 2003).

Court erred in its amount of spousal support where the wife had a degree in nursing, she was a nurse with 15 years of experience, she was not in need of further education or training, and there was no evidence that she could not obtain full time employment. Stinson v. Stinson, 161 S.W.3d 438, 2004 Tenn. App. LEXIS 692 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 292 (Tenn. Mar. 21, 2005).

Court properly ordered a husband to pay the wife's health insurance for the remainder of her life, as a form of alimony, where the parties were married for 36 years, the wife was a mother and homemaker for many of those years, the wife was 58 years old, and she had a high school education. Morton v. Morton, 182 S.W.3d 821, 2005 Tenn. App. LEXIS 491 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 1167 (Tenn. 2006).

Court properly awarded alimony in futuro to wife because she suffered from a myriad of medical issues, was unable to work outside the home, had no means of future income, had a need for health insurance to cover her considerable medical bills, and husband had the ability to pay. Lofton v. Lofton, 345 S.W.3d 913, 2008 Tenn. App. LEXIS 784 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 30, 2008).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in the calculation of a father's gross income under the child support guidelines because the court determined that a downward deviation in child support based upon the father's travel expenses from Colorado to Tennessee was not appropriate at the time based upon the relevant financial situation, employment obligation, and ease of travel or lack thereof for both parties. Furthermore, trial court did not abuse its discretion in the calculation of the father's gross income. In re Conner F., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 505 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 26, 2017).

18. —Need.

Wife's “need” was established, where evidence showed wife was unemployed, had numerous health problems, and had expenses of over $2,000 per month. Loyd v. Loyd, 860 S.W.2d 409, 1993 Tenn. App. LEXIS 215 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993).

Division of marital property whereby wife received 58% of the marital estate was deemed excessive in light of wife's greater monthly net income and sufficient separate assets. Umstot v. Umstot, 968 S.W.2d 819, 1997 Tenn. App. LEXIS 606 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997).

Although the husband's residence was owned by his mother and was not a part of his separate estate, the fact that he may continue to live there rent free and might be able to experience the benefits of appreciation, while the wife was forced to rent a two-bedroom apartment for her and the parties' daughter, goes directly to the needs of the parties and the husband's ability to pay. Lindsey v. Lindsey, 976 S.W.2d 175, 1997 Tenn. App. LEXIS 581 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997).

19. —Ability to Pay.

Husband's ability to pay was established, where he averaged over $50,000 in income for the four years preceding the divorce; where need was also established, an alimony award of $1,000 per month, continuing until the wife's death or remarriage, was proper. Loyd v. Loyd, 860 S.W.2d 409, 1993 Tenn. App. LEXIS 215 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993).

In establishing the amount of child support, the trial court erred in not making a determination of the husband's monthly income potential. Herrera v. Herrera, 944 S.W.2d 379, 1996 Tenn. App. LEXIS 656 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996).

In virtually every case, the two most important factors in determining spousal support are the demonstrated need of the disadvantaged spouse and the obligor spouse's ability to pay. Manis v. Manis, 49 S.W.3d 295, 2001 Tenn. App. LEXIS 48 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001), review or rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 534 (Tenn. 2001).

Although one spouse earned more on paper than the other spouse, the other spouse was obligated to pay the alimony as the other spouse had the greater earning capacity between the two; the statute is not based on actual earnings but on earning capacity. Yount v. Yount, 91 S.W.3d 777, 2002 Tenn. App. LEXIS 355 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002).

20. —Unemployment.

Merely because an obligor parent is fired for misconduct, the parent is not automatically willfully unemployed. Wilson v. Wilson, 43 S.W.3d 495, 2000 Tenn. App. LEXIS 533 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000).

21. —Underemployment.

Where husband was unable to pay sum of $2,200 in in futuro alimony, trial court exceeded its discretion in setting amount without a finding that husband was underemployed. Goodman v. Goodman, 8 S.W.3d 289, 1999 Tenn. App. LEXIS 546 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999), superseded by statute as stated in, Tippens-Florea v. Florea, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 361 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 31, 2012).

Where, despite husband's recent health problems, he still received the same amount from his former employment and had started to work in the real estate field, the evidence failed to show husband was willfully unemployed or underemployed. Mitts v. Mitts, 39 S.W.3d 142, 2000 Tenn. App. LEXIS 537 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000), review or rehearing denied, 39 S.W.3d 142, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 201 (Tenn. 2001).

Despite that husband's criminal actions at work that resulted in significantly lowering the husband's monthly income were willful and voluntary, the court did not find that husband was willfully and voluntarily underemployed. Wilson v. Wilson, 43 S.W.3d 495, 2000 Tenn. App. LEXIS 533 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000).

22. —Rehabilitative Potential.

Finding that wife was economically disadvantaged relative to husband, but was capable of rehabilitation, under this section, constituted the basis for rehabilitative, temporary support and maintenance, rather than support and maintenance on a long-term basis. Self v. Self, 861 S.W.2d 360, 1993 Tenn. LEXIS 317 (Tenn. 1993); Kincaid v. Kincaid, 912 S.W.2d 140, 1995 Tenn. App. LEXIS 309 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995).

Wife was properly denied rehabilitative alimony where the marriage was of short duration, the value of items received by the wife during the marriage offset the value of her contributions, and, even though she was 65 years old, her age and physical condition did not disqualify her from seeking employment. Crain v. Crain, 925 S.W.2d 232, 1996 Tenn. App. LEXIS 91 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996).

An award of rehabilitative alimony of $2,500 per month for five years to be paid by the husband was not error, considering the relative earning capacity and education and training of the parties. Herrera v. Herrera, 944 S.W.2d 379, 1996 Tenn. App. LEXIS 656 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996).

An award of rehabilitative alimony pursuant to this section must be predicated upon a finding that the recipient can be economically rehabilitated. Crabtree v. Crabtree, 16 S.W.3d 356, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 201 (Tenn. 2000), superseded by statute as stated in, Goodman v. Goodman, — S.W.3d —, 2006 Tenn. App. LEXIS 20 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2006), superseded by statute as stated in, Anderson v. Anderson, — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 175 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 29, 2007), superseded by statute as stated in, Gorman v. Gorman, — S.W.3d —, 2011 Tenn. App. LEXIS 624 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 16, 2011).

If an award of rehabilitative alimony is justified by the parties' circumstances, a trial court initially should award rehabilitative alimony only. Burlew v. Burlew, 40 S.W.3d 465, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 111 (Tenn. 2001).

Trial court did not err in awarding monthly rehabilitative alimony for eight years to wife who was a former nurse and a stay-at-home mother during her marriage, because that would permit the mother to stay at home with her children until they entered middle school and then become recertified as a nurse; however, trial court should have permitted the alimony to be terminated or modifed upon a substantial and material change in circumstances. Fulbright v. Fulbright, 64 S.W.3d 359, 2001 Tenn. App. LEXIS 532 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001), review or rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 843 (Tenn. Dec. 10, 2001).

Trial court erred in awarding rehabilitative alimony and attorney's fees as alimony in solido to the ex-wife because the trial court did not explain how or why it reached its decision on the issues of alimony or attorney's fees; and the final decree lacked any discussion of the wife's need or the ex-husband's ability to pay either the rehabilitative alimony or the attorney's fees, and there was no determination that the wife had the need to be or was capable of being rehabilitated. Sibley v. Sibley, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 355 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 25, 2017).

23. —Attorney's Fees.

Where wife has adequate sums for her needs and payment of her attorney's fees, there is no occasion for the court to fix a fee. Franklin v. Franklin, 746 S.W.2d 715, 1987 Tenn. App. LEXIS 3101 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987).

The trial court is vested with wide discretion in the allowance of attorney fees and expenses, and where the husband brought litigation to reduce alimony, forcing the wife to seek counsel, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by awarding attorney fees and expenses to the wife. Elliot v. Elliot, 825 S.W.2d 87, 1991 Tenn. App. LEXIS 481 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991).

As with any alimony award, in deciding whether to award attorney's fees as alimony in solido, the trial court should consider the relevant factors enumerated in subsection (d). Storey v. Storey, 835 S.W.2d 593, 1992 Tenn. App. LEXIS 47 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992).

Where the wife has demonstrated that she is financially unable to procure counsel, and where the husband has the ability to pay, the court may properly order the husband to pay the wife's attorney's fees. Houghland v. Houghland, 844 S.W.2d 619, 1992 Tenn. App. LEXIS 441 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992).

Where award of alimony in solido to wife was a sufficient award from which to pay her attorney's fees, additional award for wife's attorney's fees was not appropriate. Houghland v. Houghland, 844 S.W.2d 619, 1992 Tenn. App. LEXIS 441 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992).

Attorney's fees incurred on appeal not awarded. Houghland v. Houghland, 844 S.W.2d 619, 1992 Tenn. App. LEXIS 441 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992).

If the final decree awards wife sufficient funds out of which her needs and counsel fees can be reasonably met, then an award of attorney's fees is inappropriate. Wade v. Wade, 897 S.W.2d 702, 1994 Tenn. App. LEXIS 388 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994), rehearing denied, 897 S.W.2d 702, 1994 Tenn. App. LEXIS 703 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994), appeal denied, — S.W.2d —, 1995 Tenn. LEXIS 155 (Tenn. 1995); Kincaid v. Kincaid, 912 S.W.2d 140, 1995 Tenn. App. LEXIS 309 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995).

Where the wife was able-bodied and employable and had been awarded significant assets, and where the husband had been ordered to assume large debts and had significant support obligations, an order that he pay one half the wife's attorney's fees was appropriate. Herrera v. Herrera, 944 S.W.2d 379, 1996 Tenn. App. LEXIS 656 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996).

Trial court erred in awarding wife additional alimony in solido for her attorney's fees where wife had sufficient separate assets to afford counsel. Umstot v. Umstot, 968 S.W.2d 819, 1997 Tenn. App. LEXIS 606 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997).

In determining whether to award attorney's fees, the trial court should consider the relevant statutory factors, including the relative fault of the parties. Lindsey v. Lindsey, 976 S.W.2d 175, 1997 Tenn. App. LEXIS 581 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997).

The husband was required to pay the wife's attorney's fees where the wife did not have adequate property and income to pay her attorney's fees, and the husband's actions started the divorce proceedings. However, considering the division of the marital property and the respective income of the parties, it was appropriate for the parties to pay their own attorney fees incurred on appeal. Lindsey v. Lindsey, 976 S.W.2d 175, 1997 Tenn. App. LEXIS 581 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997).

A party is entitled to attorney fees when he or she lacks sufficient funds to pay his or her legal expenses or would be required to deplete other assets to do so. Kinard v. Kinard, 986 S.W.2d 220, 1998 Tenn. App. LEXIS 543 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998), modified, 986 S.W.2d 220, 1998 Tenn. App. LEXIS 598 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998).

An award of attorney's fees is in the nature of alimony. Wife was entitled to an award of attorney's fees where she demonstrated requisite need and her husband had the ability to pay. Mitts v. Mitts, 39 S.W.3d 142, 2000 Tenn. App. LEXIS 537 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000), review or rehearing denied, 39 S.W.3d 142, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 201 (Tenn. 2001).

An award of attorney's fees is appropriate only when the spouse seeking them lacks sufficient funds to pay his or her own legal expenses, or would be required to deplete his or her resources in order to pay these expenses. Koja v. Koja, 42 S.W.3d 94, 2000 Tenn. App. LEXIS 506 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000).

The two critical factors in setting an award for attorney's fees were met where husband had the means to provide a portion of wife's attorney's fees, and wife continued to have some need of assistance in paying her attorney's fees to avoid a depletion of the assets that the trial court awarded for her future support. Koja v. Koja, 42 S.W.3d 94, 2000 Tenn. App. LEXIS 506 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the wife attorney's fees, because the husband knowingly failed to pay alimony, and the husband was not entitled to attorney's fees as the non-prevailing party. Freeman v. Freeman, 147 S.W.3d 234, 2003 Tenn. App. LEXIS 660 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 261 (Tenn. Mar. 22, 2004).

Attorney's fees may be properly allowed as part of the alimony awarded. Raskind v. Raskind, 45 Tenn. App. 583, 325 S.W.2d 617, 1959 Tenn. App. LEXIS 80 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1959).

Even though taxing attorney's fees as part of costs is contrary to public policy, action of chancellor in taxing attorney's fees against husband in divorce proceeding was harmless error since such fees could have been properly allowed as part of alimony. Raskind v. Raskind, 45 Tenn. App. 583, 325 S.W.2d 617, 1959 Tenn. App. LEXIS 80 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1959).

Action of trial court in permitting attorney's fee to be paid before final disposition of suit by appellate court was matter within court's discretion. Crouch v. Crouch, 53 Tenn. App. 594, 385 S.W.2d 288, 1964 Tenn. App. LEXIS 125 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1964), overruled, Cary v. Cary, 937 S.W.2d 777, 1996 Tenn. LEXIS 362 (Tenn. 1996).

The allowance of attorney's fees is largely in the discretion of the trial court and the appellate court will not interfere except upon a clear showing of abuse of that discretion. Crouch v. Crouch, 53 Tenn. App. 594, 385 S.W.2d 288, 1964 Tenn. App. LEXIS 125 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1964), overruled, Cary v. Cary, 937 S.W.2d 777, 1996 Tenn. LEXIS 362 (Tenn. 1996); Houghland v. Houghland, 844 S.W.2d 619, 1992 Tenn. App. LEXIS 441 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992).

Where the final decree does not provide funds out of which counsel may reasonably be paid, it is in order for the court to award to the wife as additional alimony such amount as will reasonably enable her to pay reasonable compensation to her counsel. Harwell v. Harwell, 612 S.W.2d 182, 1980 Tenn. App. LEXIS 371 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980).

24. —Interest.

Alimony decree ordering transfer of stock to wife in value of $75,000 was tantamount to a money decree, and wife was entitled to recover interest from date of decree until paid. Ballard v. Ballard, 224 Tenn. 390, 455 S.W.2d 592, 1970 Tenn. LEXIS 337 (1970).

25. —Discretion of Court.

The amount of alimony to be allowed is a matter for the discretion of the court, in view of the particular circumstances of each case. Swan v. Harrison, 42 Tenn. 534, 1865 Tenn. LEXIS 100 (1865); Stillman v. Stillman, 66 Tenn. 169, 1874 Tenn. LEXIS 102 (1874); Toncray v. Toncray, 123 Tenn. 476, 131 S.W. 977, 1910 Tenn. LEXIS 18, 34 L.R.A. (n.s.) 1106, 1912C Ann. Cas. 284 (1910); Houghland v. Houghland, 844 S.W.2d 619, 1992 Tenn. App. LEXIS 441 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992).

The court may decree such support and maintenance to a wife obtaining relief as the nature of the case and the circumstances of the parties may require. Swan v. Harrison, 42 Tenn. 534, 1865 Tenn. LEXIS 100 (1865); Owens v. Sims, 43 Tenn. 544, 1866 Tenn. LEXIS 85 (1866). See Nicely v. Nicely, 40 Tenn. 184, 1859 Tenn. LEXIS 50 (1859).

The alimony or maintenance may consist of a part of the husband's real or personal assets, or it may be charged upon his real estate, as the court may, in its sound discretion, think proper. Swan v. Harrison, 42 Tenn. 534, 1865 Tenn. LEXIS 100 (1865).

Trial court in awarding alimony does so according to the nature and circumstances of the case and may consider property settlement between the parties but is not required to do so. Brown v. Brown, 198 Tenn. 600, 281 S.W.2d 492, 1955 Tenn. LEXIS 412 (1955), rehearing denied, 198 Tenn. 600, 281 S.W.2d 492, 1955 Tenn. LEXIS 413 (1955), superseded by statute as stated in, Perkinson v. Perkinson, — S.W.2d —, 1990 Tenn. App. LEXIS 39 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 1990).

The amount of alimony to be awarded is largely in the discretion of the trial judge or chancellor and the appellate courts are disinclined to review such discretion except in cases where it has manifestly been abused. Raskind v. Raskind, 45 Tenn. App. 583, 325 S.W.2d 617, 1959 Tenn. App. LEXIS 80 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1959); Smith v. Smith, 47 Tenn. App. 548, 339 S.W.2d 326, 1960 Tenn. App. LEXIS 89 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1960); Crouch v. Crouch, 53 Tenn. App. 594, 385 S.W.2d 288, 1964 Tenn. App. LEXIS 125 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1964), overruled, Cary v. Cary, 937 S.W.2d 777, 1996 Tenn. LEXIS 362 (Tenn. 1996).

The amount of alimony to be awarded lies within the discretion of the court and depends upon the circumstances of each particular case. Rains v. Rains, 58 Tenn. App. 214, 428 S.W.2d 650, 1968 Tenn. App. LEXIS 295 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1968).

Trial court must weigh all relevant facts including the obligations of both parties in awarding alimony and adjusting property interests. Newberry v. Newberry, 493 S.W.2d 99, 1973 Tenn. App. LEXIS 310 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1972).

If, in the final decree, the wife is awarded alimony in solido adequate for her needs and attorney's fees, there is again no occasion for the court to fix a fee, which should be set by agreement of counsel and client. This principle does not, of course, deprive the trial judge of the discretion to fix attorney's fees in proper cases. Harwell v. Harwell, 612 S.W.2d 182, 1980 Tenn. App. LEXIS 371 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980).

Trial court abused its discretion in awarding wife a percentage of husband's bonus, as the amount of the bonus was uncertain and could vary from year to year. Franklin v. Franklin, 746 S.W.2d 715, 1987 Tenn. App. LEXIS 3101 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987).

The trial court has broad discretion in determining whether to award alimony. Loyd v. Loyd, 860 S.W.2d 409, 1993 Tenn. App. LEXIS 215 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993).

A trial court's broad discretion permitted it to award back child support in an amount other than the amount calculated in strict compliance with the Child Support Guidelines. Department of Human Services v. Springs, 976 S.W.2d 654, 1997 Tenn. App. LEXIS 593 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997), appeal denied, State v. Springs, — S.W.2d —, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 503 (Tenn. 1998).

Whether there has been a sufficient showing of a substantial and material change of circumstances is in the sound discretion of the trial court. Watters v. Watters, 22 S.W.3d 817, 1999 Tenn. App. LEXIS 727 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999).

A trial court has wide discretion in determining whether an award of alimony should be rehabilitative or in futuro. Crabtree v. Crabtree, 16 S.W.3d 356, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 201 (Tenn. 2000), superseded by statute as stated in, Goodman v. Goodman, — S.W.3d —, 2006 Tenn. App. LEXIS 20 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2006), superseded by statute as stated in, Anderson v. Anderson, — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 175 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 29, 2007), superseded by statute as stated in, Gorman v. Gorman, — S.W.3d —, 2011 Tenn. App. LEXIS 624 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 16, 2011).

Provided that the trial court considers the purposes of alimony and the specific factors listed in T.C.A. § 36-5-101(d), it has wide discretion in determining the appropriate award. Burlew v. Burlew, 40 S.W.3d 465, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 111 (Tenn. 2001).

26. —Appellate Court.

Where trial court abused its discretion in refusing to award wife substantial alimony, it became duty of court of appeals on appeal to award wife the measure of alimony that in its opinion should have been awarded by the trial court in its sound discretion. Mount v. Mount, 46 Tenn. App. 30, 326 S.W.2d 493, 1959 Tenn. App. LEXIS 86 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1959).

27. —Order of Reference.

Where an absolute divorce is granted to the wife, and the court is of the opinion that she is entitled to alimony, an order of reference may be made to ascertain the proper amount of alimony to which she is entitled. Chenault v. Chenault, 37 Tenn. 248, 1857 Tenn. LEXIS 116 (1856).

28. —Agreements between Parties.

Where the husband orally relinquished to his wife all of his certain property, real and personal, as a settlement upon her in lieu of alimony, when she should obtain a divorce, and she accepted and took possession thereof, under an agreement with him to file a bill for divorce at the end of two years, upon the ground of his abandonment and desertion of her without any just cause whatever, she is not thereby precluded from supplementing her charge of abandonment with that of adultery, where that ground was unknown at the time of the agreement, and was subsequently discovered, and she will be allowed all such property as alimony under the agreement. Taylor v. Taylor, 6 Tenn. Civ. App. (6 Higgins) 268 (1915).

Courts do not take the agreements of the parties as conclusive but merely use them as a basis on which an alimony decree is fixed so that when the circumstances of the parties change the court's decree may be changed. Osborne v. Osborne, 29 Tenn. App. 463, 197 S.W.2d 234, 1946 Tenn. App. LEXIS 81 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1946).

The fact that a husband and wife prior to a divorce entered into an agreement providing for the suitable support and maintenance of the wife and a child, which agreement was approved by the court on granting the divorce, does not deprive the court of the power to alter or change the allowance granted, although this might not be true if the agreement had been purely for alimony. Doty v. Doty, 37 Tenn. App. 120, 260 S.W.2d 411, 1952 Tenn. App. LEXIS 146 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1952).

Property settlement agreements are generally subject to future modification. Thomas v. Thomas, 46 Tenn. App. 572, 330 S.W.2d 583, 1959 Tenn. App. LEXIS 116 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1959).

It is beyond the power of the court to deprive itself of the authority conferred by this section. Thomas v. Thomas, 46 Tenn. App. 572, 330 S.W.2d 583, 1959 Tenn. App. LEXIS 116 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1959).

Where property settlement agreement has been approved by the court it should not be lightly overturned or disregarded. Thomas v. Thomas, 46 Tenn. App. 572, 330 S.W.2d 583, 1959 Tenn. App. LEXIS 116 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1959).

An antenuptial contract limiting the liability of the husband for alimony in case of divorce is void. Crouch v. Crouch, 53 Tenn. App. 594, 385 S.W.2d 288, 1964 Tenn. App. LEXIS 125 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1964), overruled, Cary v. Cary, 937 S.W.2d 777, 1996 Tenn. LEXIS 362 (Tenn. 1996).

Verbal property settlement adopted by husband and wife prior to divorce allegedly for benefit of minor children was properly enforceable by court that granted divorce and had continuing duty to look to interest of children and not by another court of concurrent jurisdiction. Youree v. Youree, 217 Tenn. 53, 394 S.W.2d 869, 1965 Tenn. LEXIS 518 (1965).

When a divorce court adopts a property settlement between the parties the court is not necessarily bound by the settlement but merely uses it for its evidentiary value in arriving at a conclusion as to whether settlement is just and fair. Youree v. Youree, 217 Tenn. 53, 394 S.W.2d 869, 1965 Tenn. LEXIS 518 (1965).

Oral testimony was inadmissible to show that term “alimony” in divorce decree was intended to encompass child support but was admissible to establish express or implied agreement by wife that if court decreed her a specified sum as alimony she would support the children whose custody was awarded to her. Livingston v. Livingston, 58 Tenn. App. 271, 429 S.W.2d 452, 1967 Tenn. App. LEXIS 267 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1968).

A divorce action is really a triangular proceeding where, in addition to the parties, the state through the court is a quasi party. For this reason the courts afford the fullest possible hearing and must guard against collusion, fraud and any unfair practice or undue advantage that one party might take of the other. Adhering to these principles the courts do not take the agreements of the parties as conclusive but merely use them as a basis on which an alimony decree is fixed. When the circumstances of the parties change the court's decree may be changed. Anderson v. Anderson, 810 S.W.2d 153, 1991 Tenn. App. LEXIS 81 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991), appeal denied, 1991 Tenn. LEXIS 190 (Tenn. May 6, 1991).

A dissolution agreement that stated that spousal support and alimony were specifically in consideration of the wife waiving any right to the husband's military retirement retained its contractual nature because it constituted the division of marital property and did not constitute alimony in futuro, and thus the agreement was not subject to modification by the court. Towner v. Towner, 858 S.W.2d 888, 1993 Tenn. LEXIS 251 (Tenn. 1993).

A voluntary and knowing waiver or limitation of alimony in an antenuptial agreement is not per se void and unenforceable as contrary to public policy, and such provisions will be fully enforced, unless enforcement will render one spouse a public charge. Cary v. Cary, 937 S.W.2d 777, 1996 Tenn. LEXIS 362 (Tenn. 1996).

29. —Prior Agreement Incorporated into Decree.

Prior property settlement incorporated into divorce decree merges into the decree and loses its contractual nature so that it may not be separately enforced. Morrissey v. Morrissey, 214 Tenn. 112, 377 S.W.2d 944, 1964 Tenn. LEXIS 455 (1964).

Where a conflict arose between the terms of an agreement submitted to a court for its approval and the alimony decree of the court based upon that submission, the decree prevailed absent a showing of fraud or mistake. Bringhurst v. Tual, 598 S.W.2d 620, 1980 Tenn. App. LEXIS 355 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980).

30. —Divorce from Bed and Board.

Upon a divorce from bed and board merely, the marriage relation is left intact, and continues to subsist as before the decree. It deprives the wife of none of the rights belonging to that relation, in the event of a reconciliation, or in the event of her surviving her husband. The husband's marital obligation suitably to maintain the wife, according to his condition and ability, continues to exist, after such separation as before. Therefore, in such case, a specific portion of the husband's estate, or an aggregate sum of money, computed to be sufficient to support her during the period of her probable life, should not be given to the wife, but periodical payments should be required for that purpose. Chenault v. Chenault, 37 Tenn. 248, 1857 Tenn. LEXIS 116 (1856); Boggers v. Boggers, 65 Tenn. 299, 1873 Tenn. LEXIS 349 (1873); Jarnigan v. Jarnigan, 80 Tenn. 292, 1883 Tenn. LEXIS 170 (1883); Howell v. Thompson, 95 Tenn. 396, 32 S.W. 309, 1895 Tenn. LEXIS 107 (1895).

Where wife obtained divorce from bed and board only, decree vesting in her the fee of part of husband's real estate as alimony was modified on appeal so as to vest in her an estate for life. Edwards v. Edwards, 8 Tenn. Civ. App. 482 (1918).

31. —Grant of Homestead on Appeal.

Where in decree of divorce complainant was allowed a sum of money as alimony, but on appeal claimed and was granted homestead, the money allowance will be abated. Belcher v. Belcher, 57 S.W. 382, 1900 Tenn. Ch. App. LEXIS 33 (1900).

32. —Jurisdiction of Lower Court After Appeal.

After appeal, denied as to order granting alimony, the lower court may entertain a petition by the losing party to set off a claimed excess paid. Johnson v. Johnson, 49 S.W. 305, 1898 Tenn. Ch. App. LEXIS 122 (1898).

33. —Excessive Alimony.

Where payments were made under decretal order that is subsequently modified, the excess could not, after such modification, be credited on the wife's current demands for accruing alimony. Johnson v. Johnson, 49 S.W. 305, 1898 Tenn. Ch. App. LEXIS 122 (1898).

Petition of husband in reference to allowance for excess paid on alimony is not a suit between the husband and wife, but a defensive action of the husband, arising in wife's divorce suit against her demand for alimony. Johnson v. Johnson, 49 S.W. 305, 1898 Tenn. Ch. App. LEXIS 122 (1898).

Although none of the reasons, taken by themselves, would be sufficient to terminate alimony, a combination of the husband's decreased income, the wife's relationship with another man, and her ability to secure some gainful employment required a decrease in alimony paid to the wife. Richardson v. Richardson, 598 S.W.2d 791, 1980 Tenn. App. LEXIS 324 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980).

34. —Alimony Denied.

In light of the wife's earning capacity, education, and the property division, an award of alimony was inappropriate. Barnhill v. Barnhill, 826 S.W.2d 443, 1991 Tenn. App. LEXIS 561 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991).

Where wife received portion of husband's fees in property division, and where court found her adultery to have been the precipitating factor in the divorce, and that no other statutory factors entitled her to alimony, the trial court's judgment denying the wife alimony was proper. Wilder v. Wilder, 863 S.W.2d 707, 1992 Tenn. App. LEXIS 617 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992).

35. —Punishment of Guilty Spouse.

A court may approve the reduction of alimony for misconduct of the wronged spouse, but not the addition of unneeded alimony to punish the guilty spouse. Duncan v. Duncan, 686 S.W.2d 568, 1984 Tenn. App. LEXIS 3264 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984).

Even though fault is a relative consideration when setting spousal support, it is not intended to be punitive. Earls v. Earls, 42 S.W.3d 877, 2000 Tenn. App. LEXIS 356 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000), rehearing denied, 42 S.W.3d 877, 2000 Tenn. App. LEXIS 398 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000).

36. —Worse Financial Situation.

A spouse should not place the other spouse in a financial situation worse than it was before his misconduct brought about a legal separation. The reference to worse financial situation does not refer to a worse situation of net worth or of income where, as in the present case, the income and net worth are more than needed to provide for the spouse according to the standards of living established and maintained during the marriage. The intended meaning of “worse financial situation” is a financial situation that would not provide a continuation of the scale of living, or the comforts of life that the wronged spouse had enjoyed during the marriage and that were reasonably to be anticipated if the wrongful conduct of the guilty spouse had not terminated the marriage by misconduct. Duncan v. Duncan, 686 S.W.2d 568, 1984 Tenn. App. LEXIS 3264 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984).

37. —Changed Circumstances.

The fact that wife has refused to seek gainful employment has not changed circumstances under T.C.A. § 36-5-101(a)(1) where the wife had not been employed for three (3) years prior to the divorce and where the final decree did not require the wife to seek employment. Seal v. Seal, 726 S.W.2d 934, 1986 Tenn. App. LEXIS 3468 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986).

The voluntary assumption of financial obligations does not constitute a change of circumstances. Jones v. Jones, 784 S.W.2d 349, 1989 Tenn. App. LEXIS 664 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989), superseded by statute as stated in, Wilson v. Wilson, — S.W.2d —, 1991 Tenn. App. LEXIS 375 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 22, 1991).

Evidence insufficient to establish a change of circumstances under T.C.A. § 36-5-101(d) sufficient to justify a reduction in alimony. Jones v. Jones, 784 S.W.2d 349, 1989 Tenn. App. LEXIS 664 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989), superseded by statute as stated in, Wilson v. Wilson, — S.W.2d —, 1991 Tenn. App. LEXIS 375 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 22, 1991).

The fact that wife was unemployed at the time of alimony award but was making $15,780 per year at the time of hearing for modification of alimony did not alone warrant a reduction in alimony. Seal v. Seal, 802 S.W.2d 617, 1990 Tenn. App. LEXIS 610 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990).

Any income produced from the proceeds of the sale of the parties' marital home awarded to a spouse in the division of marital property should not be a factor in determining whether or not a change of circumstances existed that warranted a modification of periodic alimony payments. Seal v. Seal, 802 S.W.2d 617, 1990 Tenn. App. LEXIS 610 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990).

Absent the husband's establishing that such income was unanticipated or unforeseen, any dividend or interest income earned by an alimony recipient from stocks or bonds received under a property settlement agreement should not be considered as a factor constituting a substantial and material change in circumstances to support a reduction in alimony payments. Seal v. Seal, 802 S.W.2d 617, 1990 Tenn. App. LEXIS 610 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990).

Changes in the tax laws are not a material change in circumstances. Elliot v. Elliot, 825 S.W.2d 87, 1991 Tenn. App. LEXIS 481 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991).

The voluntary assumption of an obligation, which is not a change in circumstances, may include buying a house after the divorce or a subsequent marriage or moving to another state. Elliot v. Elliot, 825 S.W.2d 87, 1991 Tenn. App. LEXIS 481 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991).

The fact that a spouse has obtained gainful employment after the divorce is not in itself a material change in circumstances warranting a reduction in alimony. Elliot v. Elliot, 825 S.W.2d 87, 1991 Tenn. App. LEXIS 481 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991).

The party seeking relief on the grounds of changed circumstances has the burden of proving the changed circumstances, which must be shown to have occurred after the entry of the divorce decree, and must not have been foreseeable when the decree was entered into or in the contemplation of the parties when they entered into the support and alimony agreement. Elliot v. Elliot, 825 S.W.2d 87, 1991 Tenn. App. LEXIS 481 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991).

This section provides that the court may, upon the application of either party, decree an increase or a decrease of alimony upon the showing of a substantial and material change of circumstances. It is not sufficient to simply show a change of circumstances. The change must be “substantial and material.” The change must affect the obligor spouse's ability to pay or the obligee spouse's need for the alimony awarded. Bowman v. Bowman, 836 S.W.2d 563, 1991 Tenn. App. LEXIS 839 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991).

The party seeking modification in alimony or child support has the burden of showing a substantial and material change in circumstances. McCarty v. McCarty, 863 S.W.2d 716, 1992 Tenn. App. LEXIS 816 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992).

The relevant change of circumstances for modification purposes is the payor's increase in salary from the time of the divorce to the time of his petition for modification, not his decrease in salary in the year prior to his petition. McCarty v. McCarty, 863 S.W.2d 716, 1992 Tenn. App. LEXIS 816 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992).

To be material a change of circumstances must be shown to have been unforeseeable at the time the decree was entered. McCarty v. McCarty, 863 S.W.2d 716, 1992 Tenn. App. LEXIS 816 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992).

Changes in the tax laws did not substantially affect appellee's ability to pay alimony, because his income increased substantially since his divorce. McCarty v. McCarty, 863 S.W.2d 716, 1992 Tenn. App. LEXIS 816 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992).

The increased cost of a higher education is not a substantial and material change in circumstances because of its foreseeability and because the appellee's income has increased substantially since the divorce. Therefore, the increased cost in education has not substantially affected his ability to pay his alimony obligation. McCarty v. McCarty, 863 S.W.2d 716, 1992 Tenn. App. LEXIS 816 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992).

Although the need of the spouse is one of the primary factors in determining the proper amount of alimony, modification of alimony based solely on a wife's increased earnings is not proper unless the husband introduces evidence indicating that the amount of alimony initially awarded was based upon a presumption that the wife would not continue to increase her income through the pursuit of her career. McCarty v. McCarty, 863 S.W.2d 716, 1992 Tenn. App. LEXIS 816 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992).

Facts showed a substantial and material change of circumstances. Ragan v. Ragan, 858 S.W.2d 332, 1993 Tenn. App. LEXIS 217 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993).

The factors listed in this section, applicable to the initial award of alimony, where relevant, must be taken into consideration when determining whether there has been a change in circumstances warranting a modification of the award. Brewer v. Brewer, 869 S.W.2d 928, 1993 Tenn. App. LEXIS 525 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993).

Where an alimony award was rehabilitative and temporary, it was subject to modification, and the wife's remarriage was a substantial change of circumstances warranting termination of the award. Struck v. Struck, 958 S.W.2d 352, 1997 Tenn. App. LEXIS 467 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997), review or rehearing denied, — S.W.2d —, 1997 Tenn. App. LEXIS 499 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 18, 1997).

Where a court contemplates that a spouse receiving alimony will obtain employment, a declaration by the court that alimony is being awarded based on this assumption does not foreclose the possibility of a future modification based on a change of circumstances if the spouse is later able to earn more than the current proof showed he or she was capable of earning. Long v. Long, 968 S.W.2d 292, 1997 Tenn. App. LEXIS 478 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997).

Husband is not entitled to reduction of alimony payments due to changed circumstances because his retirement and wife's employment were not the result of significant, unanticipated changes where wife, as a single parent of four children, had little choice but to enter the workforce, having received no portion of husband's retirement benefits in the divorce proceedings. Sannella v. Sannella, 993 S.W.2d 73, 1999 Tenn. App. LEXIS 49 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999).

Whether there has been a sufficient showing of a substantial and material change of circumstances is in the sound discretion of the trial court. Watters v. Watters, 22 S.W.3d 817, 1999 Tenn. App. LEXIS 727 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999).

The factors set forth in T.C.A. § 36-5-101(d), applicable to the initial grant of spousal support and maintenance, where relevant, must be taken into consideration in determining whether there has been a change in circumstances to warrant a modification of the alimony obligation, with the most important factor being the need of the spouse receiving the support. Watters v. Watters, 22 S.W.3d 817, 1999 Tenn. App. LEXIS 727 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999).

While technically there was a change in circumstances, where the change was brought about solely by the husband's voluntary actions, he should not be able to escape his obligations under such circumstances. Watters v. Watters, 22 S.W.3d 817, 1999 Tenn. App. LEXIS 727 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999).

While an objectively reasonable retirement, taken in good faith and without intent to defeat a spousal support obligation, could constitute a substantial and material change in circumstances, justifying a consideration of modification of a support obligation, the spouse's retirement did not create such a change. Miller v. Miller, 81 S.W.3d 771, 2001 Tenn. App. LEXIS 967 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001).

In reversing an appellate court's ruling that a temporary award of rehabilitative child support could be extended without proof of a substantial and material change in circumstances since the alimony award was not final but temporary and open-ended, the Tennessee supreme court held that the standard for modifying an award of rehabilitative alimony set out in T.C.A. § 36-5-101(d)(2), applied to the trial court's alimony award in the case. Perry v. Perry, 114 S.W.3d 465, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 725 (Tenn. 2003).

Defendant's petition to terminate or modify alimony was properly dismissed, because the record indicated that the husband failed to present sufficient evidence to prove that his retirement constituted a substantial and material change in circumstances such as to justify termination or modification of his support obligation, as the husband failed to provide a factual basis from which the appellate court could compare his circumstances as they existed at the time of the final divorce decree to his present day circumstances. Freeman v. Freeman, 147 S.W.3d 234, 2003 Tenn. App. LEXIS 660 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 261 (Tenn. Mar. 22, 2004).

Finding that a decrease in the husband's income constituted a substantial and material change of circumstance under T.C.A. § 36-5-101(a)(1) that warranted the reduction in alimony was improper because the trial court erred by limiting its examination of his ability to pay alimony to his Schedule E income instead of considering his total income from all sources to determine whether there had been a substantial and material reduction in the husband's ability to pay alimony. Jekot v. Jekot, 362 S.W.3d 76, 2011 Tenn. App. LEXIS 581 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 25, 2011), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 192 (Tenn. Mar. 7, 2012).

Trial court did not err in refusing to modify the father's child support obligation when he failed to present current evidence of the parties'  circumstances to establish a significant variance; the mother testified that she was currently unemployed and without any form of income. Langlo v. Langlo, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 232 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 20, 2015).

Trial court erred in decreasing a husband's alimony obligation because its factual findings did not support its decision, and the only significant change since the divorce was that the husband's income had increased, but the wife's income had remained the same; the fact that the wife owned a home while the husband had to sell his house and rent a home failed, on its own, to support a finding that the husband no longer had the ability to pay alimony. Covarrubias v. Baker, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 791 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 11, 2017).

38. Proceedings for Support of Child.

Failure of trial court to include support of children with divorce decree does not deprive court of authority to make such an award in the future, since every such cause is retained in court without express language because the statute becomes a part of such decree just as if copied therein. Darty v. Darty, 33 Tenn. App. 321, 232 S.W.2d 59, 1949 Tenn. App. LEXIS 127 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1949).

In contempt proceedings to enforce child support payments provided for in divorce decree, court could commit defendant until arrears were paid or adjustment satisfactory to parties and court was made. Black v. Black, 50 Tenn. App. 455, 362 S.W.2d 472, 1962 Tenn. App. LEXIS 157 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1962). See also Mowery v. Mowery, 50 Tenn. App. 648, 363 S.W.2d 405, 1962 Tenn. App. LEXIS 86 (1962).

The trial court is vested with wide discretion in awarding support for minor children, and the Court of Appeals will not interfere except upon a clear showing that the trial court erred in exercising its discretion. Harwell v. Harwell, 612 S.W.2d 182, 1980 Tenn. App. LEXIS 371 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980).

T.C.A. § 36-5-101(a)(5) prevents both retroactive modification of child support orders and the interposition of traditional equitable defenses to the enforcement of such orders. Rutledge v. Barrett, 802 S.W.2d 604, 1991 Tenn. LEXIS 27 (Tenn. 1991).

Appellate court had continuing jurisdiction over subsequent issues in domestic matters, such as child support; the fact that an agreement by the parties was incorporated in the decree did not divest the court of its statutory power to make subsequent orders where circumstances warranted. State ex rel. Wrzesniewski v. Miller, 77 S.W.3d 195, 2001 Tenn. App. LEXIS 892 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001).

Obligation imposed under the child support guidelines, properly considering the father's imputed gross income met the definition of a significant change thereby warranting an increased award of child support to the mother. Wade v. Wade, 115 S.W.3d 917, 2002 Tenn. App. LEXIS 933 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002).

Trial court concluded that the marriage dissolution agreement was silent as to how the medical and dental expenses were to be treated during the father's military career; accordingly, the trial court properly exercised its discretion in employing its “continuing statutory power” to modify the apportionment of those expenses between the mother and the father. Wade v. Wade, 115 S.W.3d 917, 2002 Tenn. App. LEXIS 933 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002).

On appeal, the father asserted that the special master failed to file a transcript with his report and that the special master's conclusions as to the respective amounts of child support owed by the parties were not supported by material evidence due to his failure to file a transcript. However, the father could not represent to the trial court his agreement to abide by the special master's determination, solemnized in the trial court's prior order, and then take a contrary position on appeal; thus, summary judgment upon the mother's proposed consent order was proper. Johnston v. Houston, 170 S.W.3d 573, 2004 Tenn. App. LEXIS 887 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004).

Trial court improperly imputed retained earnings of an S corporation of which the father was the sole shareholder to the father because there was no showing that the earnings were excessive or that the father manipulated income to avoid child support. Further, in computing the father's income, the trial court erred in failing to consider the economic value of his company car that he had full use of during business and nonbusiness hours. Taylor v. Fezell, 158 S.W.3d 352, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 6 (Tenn. 2005).

For the retained earnings of a corporation to be imputed to the sole or majority shareholder of a corporation for the purposes of calculating child support obligations, there must be a showing that those retained earnings are excessive or that the income is actually being manipulated. Taylor v. Fezell, 158 S.W.3d 352, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 6 (Tenn. 2005).

Father was permitted credit against his child support obligation pursuant to T.C.A. § 36-5-101(c)(2)(A) under specific circumstances where the mother received checks made payable to the child, without affecting her right and obligation to control how support monies were spent; the trial court acted properly in giving the father credit for child support checks. Smith v. Smith, 255 S.W.3d 77, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 629 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 3, 2007), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2008 Tenn. LEXIS 165 (Tenn. Mar. 3, 2008).

Trial court erred in determining the husband's base salary, as the wife admitted his salary was reduced and merely sought that the salary used be imputed to the husband based on that fact that his misconduct led to the reduction in salary. Holdsworth v. Holdsworth, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 974 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 10, 2015), substituted opinion, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 424 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 3, 2015).

Remand of a matter for a redetermination of a parent's child support obligation was appropriate because a trial court's findings were vacated as the court apparently relied on an erroneous assessment of the evidence by transposing the parents'  monthly gross incomes on the child support worksheet. Kennedy v. Childs, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 177 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 30, 2015), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 801 (Tenn. Sept. 16, 2015).

Trial court erred in restraining a mother and the child support office from issuing a wage assignment against the father's wages because there was no finding as to why the wage assignment was not in the best interest of the children and there was no indication the trial court considered the father's alleged bankruptcy in relieving him of wage assignment. Martin v. Martin, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 354 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 20, 2015).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that a mother had the ability to earn $ 5,000 per month because the mother's prior salary was $ 6,666 per month and by reducing the mother's annual gross income from $ 80,000 to $60,000, the trial court implicitly found that it should take the mother three months to find comparable employment; the mother had been unemployed for four weeks. Solima v. Solima, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 628 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 30, 2015).

In a Title IV-D child support case, child support was modified due to a significant variance, and there was no error in setting a father's monthly income based on employment records and the credibility findings concerning the father. The trial court made a specific finding that the father was not a credible witness and that he used two different social security numbers and names. In re Chase R., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 814 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 6, 2015).

Trial court erred by not charging a parent with child support during the time when the parent was incarcerated because the Tennessee Child Support Guidelines mandated that incarceration did not absolve the parent from the parent's obligation to pay child support. On remand, the trial court was to determine the appropriate amount of the parent's child support arrearage, including the amount due during the period of time the parent was incarcerated. State ex rel. Brown v. Shipe, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 879 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 29, 2015), appeal denied, State ex rel. Brown v. Shipe, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 123 (Tenn. Feb. 18, 2016).

In a divorce case, a trial court did not err in setting a former husband's income when determining that the former wife was not required to pay him any amount of child support; it was not error for the trial court to fail to consider the former husband's income in 2010 when the real estate market was down. Moreover, it was proper to treat his portion of company profits as income, and the trial court did not deduct the former husband's business expenses under the child support guidelines. Yates v. Yates, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 144 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 24, 2016).

It was no error to award a mother child support for a period when the child spent more time with a step-grandfather because (1) the mother was the primary residential parent, and (2) the step-grandfather sought no support and was not a party, so the trial court had no jurisdiction to award the step-grandfather support. State ex rel. Williams v. Woods, 530 S.W.3d 129, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 190 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 21, 2017), appeal denied, State ex rel. Williams v. Woods, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 552 (Tenn. Aug. 21, 2017).

Trial court's order did not comply with the requirements in order for a trial court to deviate from the presumptive child support obligation contemplated under the Child Support Guidelines because it should have calculated the wife's retroactive child support obligation using the Guidelines in effect at the time of its ruling; pursuant to the Guidelines, the trial court was required to first determine the presumptive amount of support due and then make specific findings regarding any deviation. Maher v. Woodruff, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 237 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 13, 2017).

Trial court did not err by denying a father's petition to decrease child support because the father did not provide the court with evidence of the father's most recent actual income, and did not present credible testimony concerning the father's and the mother's past or future income. Scobey v. Scobey, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 612 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 13, 2017).

Trial court erred in awarding the mother child support which purportedly exceeded the amounted mandated by the child support guidelines without adequately justifying its decision to deviate from the guidelines or indicate why application of the guidelines would have been unjust or unfair. Wright v. Wright, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 440 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 6, 2019).

There was no error in the trial court's conclusion that the father failed to carry his burden of proving that he was entitled to a decrease in his support obligation; he did not testify as to his total gross monthly income. State Ex Rel. Sensing v. Sensing, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 535 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 31, 2019).

39. Age of Child.

40. —Allegations.

If neither original bill nor any subsequent pleading contains allegations or prayer as to child support, there would be no predicate for evidence on the point and a decree awarding it would be coram non judice and void under the rule that decree is circumscribed by evidence, which is circumscribed by pleadings. Darty v. Darty, 33 Tenn. App. 321, 232 S.W.2d 59, 1949 Tenn. App. LEXIS 127 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1949).

The duty now by statute rests upon both parents to contribute according to their relative means, and an allegation in petition that husband was able to contribute was a sufficient predicate for proof without alleging that mother was in need of support for children. Darty v. Darty, 33 Tenn. App. 321, 232 S.W.2d 59, 1949 Tenn. App. LEXIS 127 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1949).

Averment in bill for divorce to effect that wife and children moved with wife's parents because she had no money nor any place to live was equivalent to an averment of husband's duty of support if and when it could otherwise be properly made and was sufficient to support a subsequent support award. Darty v. Darty, 33 Tenn. App. 321, 232 S.W.2d 59, 1949 Tenn. App. LEXIS 127 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1949).

A husband may not allege facts as constituting a change in circumstances if he was aware of those facts prior to the entry of the divorce decree. Dillow v. Dillow, 575 S.W.2d 289, 1978 Tenn. App. LEXIS 320 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1978), superseded by statute as stated in, Wilson v. Wilson, — S.W.2d —, 1991 Tenn. App. LEXIS 375 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 22, 1991).

41. —Service.

Since court that heard divorce case retained jurisdiction with respect to support of children, it was not necessary that husband, who had moved from the state, receive personal service in support proceeding. Darty v. Darty, 33 Tenn. App. 321, 232 S.W.2d 59, 1949 Tenn. App. LEXIS 127 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1949).

Under this section a court has power to enforce its decree awarding child support by contempt proceedings and a nonresident husband who received notice of the proceedings by use of the secretary of state's office pursuant to § 20-2-214 was properly served and before the court. Sowell v. Sowell, 493 S.W.2d 86, 1973 Tenn. LEXIS 499 (Tenn. 1973).

42. —Liability of Parent.

A father is liable for the support of his minor child, after a divorce has been obtained at the suit of the wife and the custody of the child awarded to her, when no provision was made in the divorce decree for the maintenance of the child. Evans v. Evans, 125 Tenn. 112, 140 S.W. 745, 1911 Tenn. LEXIS 10 (1911).

The father is liable for the support of his infant child after divorce and award of the custody of such child to the mother. Baker v. Baker, 169 Tenn. 589, 89 S.W.2d 763, 1935 Tenn. LEXIS 86 (1935).

The legal liability of the father for the support of his minor children continues after divorce and an award of custody to the mother and independent of any specific decree to this effect in any given case. Davenport v. Davenport, 178 Tenn. 517, 160 S.W.2d 406, 1941 Tenn. LEXIS 84 (1942).

Where actual custody of minor child was in the mother at the time of divorce there was no necessity of any decree awarding the child to her and the right of the child to support by the father and the right of the mother to look to him to help support the child was not affected by the omission of the court to enter a formal decree awarding custody to the mother. Roble v. Roble, 41 Tenn. App. 412, 295 S.W.2d 817, 1956 Tenn. App. LEXIS 96 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1956).

Husband's obligation to support minor child continued after divorce notwithstanding the fact that the mother had actual custody of the child and the fact that no provision was made in the divorce decree for its custody and support. Roble v. Roble, 41 Tenn. App. 412, 295 S.W.2d 817, 1956 Tenn. App. LEXIS 96 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1956).

Where exclusive custody of two boys was granted to wife in divorce proceedings and husband agreed to pay $250 monthly for their support, husband was not relieved of his duty as to support to the extent of the earnings of the boys. Churchill v. Churchill, 203 Tenn. 406, 313 S.W.2d 436, 1958 Tenn. LEXIS 318 (1958).

The civil liability of the father for the support of his child continues even though custody is committed to the mother. Damron v. Damron, 212 Tenn. 14, 367 S.W.2d 476, 1963 Tenn. LEXIS 394 (1963).

Where divorce decree provided for child support by father “until each child reaches twenty-one (21) years of age or is otherwise emancipated,” passage of § 1-3-113 relieved father of obligation to make support payments for 18-year-old child. Garey v. Garey, 482 S.W.2d 133, 1972 Tenn. LEXIS 353 (Tenn. 1972).

The authority of the court to order appellee to make payments for support of his children was for that period when appellee was required by law to support his children, which was during their minority. Whitt v. Whitt, 490 S.W.2d 159, 1973 Tenn. LEXIS 514 (Tenn. 1973).

Where divorce decree provided for child support by father until children completed education or reached age 22 and would be reduced if child permanently left custody of mother, father was liable for support of 18-year-old daughter who had not left custody of mother regardless of § 1-3-113. Jones v. Jones, 503 S.W.2d 924, 1973 Tenn. App. LEXIS 278 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1973).

Separation agreement between husband and wife providing that husband pay support for the children until they reached the age of 21 was within the husband's legal obligations and therefore lost its contractual nature when approved by the court and could be enforced only so long as he had a legal duty to support his children and the statute lowering the age of majority to eighteen cut short his support obligations under the agreement. Blackburn v. Blackburn, 526 S.W.2d 463, 1975 Tenn. LEXIS 601 (Tenn. 1975).

Agreements, incorporated in court decrees or otherwise, thatrelieve a natural or adoptive parent of his or her obligation to provide child support are void as against public policy. Witt v. Witt, 929 S.W.2d 360, 1996 Tenn. App. LEXIS 187 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996), appeal denied, 1996 Tenn. LEXIS 559 (Tenn. Sept. 3, 1996).

The child support guidelines apply not only in divorce cases but also in proceedings in which one unmarried parent is seeking child support from the other. State v. Kaatrude, 21 S.W.3d 244, 2000 Tenn. App. LEXIS 64 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000).

In a case involving a father's obligation, pursuant to a divorce decree, to pay for his child's college education, the contractual obligation to pay for his daughter's college education at a school of her choice was subject to a determination of whether that choice was reasonable in the circumstances. Pylant v. Spivey, 174 S.W.3d 143, 2003 Tenn. App. LEXIS 951 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 503 (Tenn. June 1, 2004).

Father, pursuant to a divorce agreement, was obligated to pay the reasonable cost of a college education for his child, and while the child could choose to go to a school whose cost exceeded a reasonable cost, the father was obligated to contribute only a reasonable cost. Pylant v. Spivey, 174 S.W.3d 143, 2003 Tenn. App. LEXIS 951 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 503 (Tenn. June 1, 2004).

Court did not err in reducing a father's child support obligation, where the mother was willfully unemployed, and it considered the standard of living of the children, the father's standard of living, and the standard of living of the father's other children. Smith v. Smith, 165 S.W.3d 279, 2004 Tenn. App. LEXIS 686 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004).

DNA proof that a father was not, in fact, a child's biological father was ineffective to warrant relief under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 because the father had known undisputedly that he was not the child's biological father at the time he petitioned the court for, and was granted, legitimation and the trial court erred when it granted his rule 60.02 motion and reversed the prior legitimation decree. He could not disavow the obligation he knowingly undertook merely because he failed to recognize it would extend beyond the duration of his marriage to the child's mother. Welch v. Welch, 195 S.W.3d 72, 2005 Tenn. App. LEXIS 570 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 166 (Tenn. 2006).

Trial court did not err in holding that the parties agreed in their marital dissolution agreement (MDA) that the husband would pay eight hundred eighteen dollars in child support, and the payment of that amount would continue until the youngest child reached the age of eighteen or graduated from high school, whichever occurred last, and to the extent that any of the eight hundred eighteen dollars exceeded the amount of base child support called for in the guidelines, the excess amount was a contractual obligation agreed to by the husband. Allison v. Hagan, 211 S.W.3d 255, 2006 Tenn. App. LEXIS 415 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 1070 (Tenn. 2006).

Trial court did not err by imputing income of $ 16.50 per hour to a father for purposes of child support, representing an annual income of $ 34,230, because the father had been earning $ 70,000 per year prior to being laid off due to lack of work; the trial court erred by including the father's unemployment benefit because the father had exhausted that benefit and could not receive unemployment benefits if he was gainfully employed. Velez v. Velez, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 522 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 30, 2015).

43. —Severe Disability.

Chancery court properly continued a father's child support obligation because the father's twenty-one year old and mentally retarded and epileptic daughter was severely disabled and living under a guardianship in the care and supervision of the mother and was not capable of living independently. Moreover, the mother paid for the daughter to stay four days per week in a group home with other individuals who had similar disabilities to allow the daughter to experience a sense of independence and visited the daughter in the group home daily. Gregory v. Gregory, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 464 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 30, 2016).

44. —Medical and Funeral Expenditures.

The divorced father's obligation to support the child included medical and funeral expenditures. In re Shumate, 39 B.R. 808, 1984 Bankr. LEXIS 5780 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1984).

Trial court concluded that the marriage dissolution agreement was silent as to how the medical and dental expenses were to be treated during the father's military career; accordingly, the trial court properly exercised its discretion in employing its “continuing statutory power” to modify the apportionment of those expenses between the mother and the father. Wade v. Wade, 115 S.W.3d 917, 2002 Tenn. App. LEXIS 933 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002).

Trial court did not err in requiring a father to pay all of the children's out-of-network medical expenses T.C.A. § 36-5-101(h)(1), because the father allowed his health insurance coverage for the children to lapse and the father's new insurance plan failed to cover many of the children's health care providers in their home county. Beyer v. Beyer, 428 S.W.3d 59, 2013 Tenn. App. LEXIS 229 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 5, 2013), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 827 (Tenn. Oct. 16, 2013).

Trial court did not err by requiring a obligor parent to provide health insurance for the parties'  child until the child reached twenty-one years of age because the evidence supported a finding of disability such that the child was in need of continuing health insurance coverage past the age of majority, as the genetic and incurable problems of the immune system which were considered a disability. Stewart v. Rowland, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 385 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 2, 2016).

45. —Veterans' Benefits.

There is no indication that congress intended the veterans' administration to make child support determinations contrary to the determinations of state courts. The interest in uniform administration of veterans' benefits focuses, instead, on the technical interpretations of the statutes granting entitlements, particularly on the definitions and degrees of recognized disabilities and the application of the graduated benefits schedules. Rose v. Rose, 481 U.S. 619, 107 S. Ct. 2029, 95 L. Ed. 2d 599, 1987 U.S. LEXIS 2060 (1987), aff'd, — S.W.2d —, 1985 Tenn. App. LEXIS 3415 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 14, 1985).

An exception to the federal prohibition against attachment, levy, or seizure of veterans' benefits would not undermine the federal purpose in providing these benefits. Therefore, the prohibition does not extend to protect a veteran's disability benefits from seizure where the veteran invokes that provision to avoid an otherwise valid order of child support. Rose v. Rose, 481 U.S. 619, 107 S. Ct. 2029, 95 L. Ed. 2d 599, 1987 U.S. LEXIS 2060 (1987), aff'd, — S.W.2d —, 1985 Tenn. App. LEXIS 3415 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 14, 1985).

46. —Amount of Award.

The father is only required to maintain and support a minor child, whose custody has been awarded to the mother, in a manner commensurate with his means and station in life. Evans v. Evans, 125 Tenn. 112, 140 S.W. 745, 1911 Tenn. LEXIS 10 (1911).

Award of $200 per month for support of a 15-year-old daughter by father whose only income was $383 per month take-home pay was too high and action of trial judge in reducing the amount to $165 was affirmed. Plumb v. Plumb, 52 Tenn. App. 267, 372 S.W.2d 771, 1962 Tenn. App. LEXIS 135 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1962).

Obligation imposed under the child support guidelines, properly considering the father's imputed gross income met the definition of a significant change thereby warranting an increased award of child support to the mother. Wade v. Wade, 115 S.W.3d 917, 2002 Tenn. App. LEXIS 933 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002).

Trial court properly found that a mother failed to carry her burden in showing that the father was willfully and voluntarily underemployed where the trial court accredited the father's testimony that he had used his best efforts to obtain his position as an emergency room physician; the father testified without contradiction that the lower hourly rate he was earning under his new contract was due to the large pool of physicians seeking similar work and that he had asked his employer to assign him more shifts. Richardson v. Spanos, 189 S.W.3d 720, 2005 Tenn. App. LEXIS 638 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 5, 2005), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 228 (Tenn. 2006).

In calculating the husband's child support, the trial court erred in finding that he had a monthly income of $25,102 because the wife was awarded 50% of the marital royalty income. Griffin v. Griffin, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 371 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 19, 2020).

47. — —Factors in Determining.

Evidence of the wealth of the father is competent in such case, for the purpose of determining the character of support that could or should be properly furnished to the son. Roths v. Roths, 3 Tenn. Civ. App. (3 Higgins) 557 (1912).

Where record showed divorced husband to have been “able-bodied” young man and made no suggestion that he lacked intelligence or the capacity or opportunity to earn sufficient sum for payment of child's support, his duty to furnish such support was not affected by fact that record showed his property to be mortgaged to secure sum twice its value. Dawson v. Dawson, 23 Tenn. App. 556, 135 S.W.2d 458, 1939 Tenn. App. LEXIS 62 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1939).

Where the trial court did not find the amount of support based upon the child support guidelines nor did it make written findings that the application of the guidelines would be unjust or inappropriate, the case was remanded to the trial court for a determination of the amount of child support based upon the child support guidelines or if not appropriate, written findings by the trial court. Malone v. Malone, 842 S.W.2d 621, 1992 Tenn. App. LEXIS 605 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992).

The establishment of an educational trust fund by noncustodial parent for his daughter did not unlawfully require him to support her past her minority. Nash v. Mulle, 846 S.W.2d 803, 1993 Tenn. LEXIS 16 (Tenn. 1993), superseded by statute as stated in, Smith v. Smith, 984 S.W.2d 606, 1997 Tenn. App. LEXIS 218 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997).

Establishing a program of savings for a college education is a proper element of child support when the resources of the noncustodial parent can provide the necessary funds without hardship to that parent. Nash v. Mulle, 846 S.W.2d 803, 1993 Tenn. LEXIS 16 (Tenn. 1993), superseded by statute as stated in, Smith v. Smith, 984 S.W.2d 606, 1997 Tenn. App. LEXIS 218 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997).

It was appropriate to consider the income of the custodial parent in considering whether a downward deviation from the total child support (percentage plus extraordinary educational expense) would achieve equity. Barnett v. Barnett, 27 S.W.3d 904, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 466 (Tenn. 2000).

Where a business is solely owned, the business' accumulation of retained earnings can be considered in determining an obligor's income for the purpose of child support; however, a court is not required to consider a corporation's retained earnings in calculating an obligor's income where the obligor is a minority shareholder and thus lacks control over the distribution of the corporation's income. Mitts v. Mitts, 39 S.W.3d 142, 2000 Tenn. App. LEXIS 537 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000), review or rehearing denied, 39 S.W.3d 142, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 201 (Tenn. 2001).

It would not be appropriate for the trial court, or the appellate court, to set future support payments based on a potentially reduced work schedule for the husband when that reduced schedule might never happen or might not occur for several years; thus, pursuant to T.C.A. § 36-5-101(a)(1), the trial court's determination with regard to child support payments as well as its refusal to make some holding concerning the number of hours the husband had to work was appropriate and the issue could be addressed in the future if circumstances warranted a change under the child support guidelines. Dube v. Dube, 104 S.W.3d 863, 2002 Tenn. App. LEXIS 856 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002), review or rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 394 (Tenn. May 5, 2003).

With respect to a trial court's modification of a father's child support obligations pursuant to T.C.A. § 36-5-101(g)(1), even if a mother had preserved her claim for appellate review on the issue, it would have lacked merit, as the father's unilateral reduction of child support was not intentional; rather, it was the result of his loss of income. Bradford v. Pitts, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 59 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2012), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 314 (Tenn. May 21, 2012).

Recalculation of the parties'  child support obligations and calculation of the wife's support arrearage was required because the trial court did not impute income to the wife commensurate with her education and employment history; the consideration of pension income in determining the wife's support obligation was error; and the support arrearage should be calculated from August 31, 2015, the date of the separation and the date on which the husband received exclusive physical custody of the child. Blakemore v. Blakemore, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 290 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 25, 2020).

48. — —Child Support Guidelines.

Child support guidelines were applicable in case of custodial father's petition seeking increase in child support from mother, even though original judgment was entered prior to effective date of guidelines. Jones v. Jones, 870 S.W.2d 281, 1994 Tenn. LEXIS 7 (Tenn. 1994).

Where joint custody was awarded and the children would be spending substantial amounts of time with both parents, it was appropriate to deviate from the child support guidelines. Gray v. Gray, 885 S.W.2d 353, 1994 Tenn. App. LEXIS 145 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994), rehearing denied, — S.W.2d —, 1994 Tenn. App. LEXIS 203 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 13, 1994).

Child support arrearage under a divorce judgment did not itself have to be reduced to judgment before it could serve as the basis for interception of a tax refund under the federal intercept program. Redmond v. Grunow, 898 S.W.2d 229, 1995 Tenn. App. LEXIS 23 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995), appeal denied, 1995 Tenn. LEXIS 217 (Tenn. May 1, 1995).

Even though the obligee was not perfectly forthright concerning his finances and child care expenses, and he made questionable expenditures, downward deviation from child support guidelines was not authorized where the obligor was not under economic hardship, her income had nearly doubled since the divorce was granted, and she had no other dependents. Jones v. Jones, 930 S.W.2d 541, 1996 Tenn. LEXIS 584 (Tenn. 1996).

School tuition is not to be considered as a portion of child support under the guideline percentages. Dwight v. Dwight, 936 S.W.2d 945, 1996 Tenn. App. LEXIS 405 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996).

Where the trial court did not comply with this section and departed from the mandatory guidelines, remand was required for proceedings leading to an award of child support in conformity with the guidelines or an adequate explanation for not doing so. Rubin v. Kirshner, 948 S.W.2d 742, 1997 Tenn. App. LEXIS 64 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997).

These guidelines shall be applicable in any action brought to establish or modify child support, whether temporary or permanent. Department of Human Services v. Springs, 976 S.W.2d 654, 1997 Tenn. App. LEXIS 593 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997), appeal denied, State v. Springs, — S.W.2d —, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 503 (Tenn. 1998).

The guidelines have the force of law, and the purposes, premises, guidelines for compliance, and criteria for deviation from the guidelines carry what amounts to a legislative mandate. Department of Human Services v. Springs, 976 S.W.2d 654, 1997 Tenn. App. LEXIS 593 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997), appeal denied, State v. Springs, — S.W.2d —, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 503 (Tenn. 1998).

A trial court's broad discretion permits it to award back child support in an amount other than the amount calculated in strict compliance with the Guidelines. Department of Human Services v. Springs, 976 S.W.2d 654, 1997 Tenn. App. LEXIS 593 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997), appeal denied, State v. Springs, — S.W.2d —, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 503 (Tenn. 1998).

Since child support decisions in divorce cases must be made in accordance with the child support guidelines, decisions involving prospective child support in paternity cases must also be consistent with the guidelines. However, unlike awards for prospective child support, awards for expenses arising between the child's birth and the filing of a paternity petition are discretionary decisions based on the facts of the particular case. Department of Human Services v. Springs, 976 S.W.2d 654, 1997 Tenn. App. LEXIS 593 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997), appeal denied, State v. Springs, — S.W.2d —, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 503 (Tenn. 1998).

The present child support guidelines do not give the trial court discretion to award less than the percentage of all net income, unless very specific reasons are given by that court. Smith v. Smith, 984 S.W.2d 606, 1997 Tenn. App. LEXIS 218 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997).

A mistake of law is not a basis for relief from judgment. Therefore, mother's motion for relief based upon an alleged illegal deviation from the child support guidelines was without merit where at the time of the divorce, mother was aware of the facts of the case but ignorant of the law. Spruce v. Spruce, 2 S.W.3d 192, 1998 Tenn. App. LEXIS 791 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998), rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 1999 Tenn. App. LEXIS 21 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 14, 1999), review or rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 1999 Tenn. LEXIS 359 (Tenn. July 6, 1999).

Private agreements used to circumvent the obligations set forth in the child support guidelines violate public policy. Berryhill v. Rhodes, 21 S.W.3d 188, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 286 (Tenn. 2000).

The goal of the statutes and regulations governing child support is to assure that children receive support reasonably consistent with their parent or parents' financial resources. State v. Kaatrude, 21 S.W.3d 244, 2000 Tenn. App. LEXIS 64 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000).

Trial court did not err in declining father's petition to reduce his child support payments where father's income increased, he had no other dependents, and father failed to prove either “extreme hardship” or that he met any of the criteria to justify a downward departure from the guidelines. Miltier v. Miltier, 31 S.W.3d 583, 2000 Tenn. App. LEXIS 351 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000), review or rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 619 (Tenn. Nov. 6, 2000).

Capital gain resulting from a sale of an asset to fund a division of property in a divorce should not be considered in calculating child support. Alexander v. Alexander, 34 S.W.3d 456, 2000 Tenn. App. LEXIS 103 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000), review or rehearing denied, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 730 (Tenn. Dec. 18, 2000).

It was appropriate to average father's income for three years in order to determine if there had been a significant variance for purposes of calculating child support under the guidelines. Alexander v. Alexander, 34 S.W.3d 456, 2000 Tenn. App. LEXIS 103 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000), review or rehearing denied, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 730 (Tenn. Dec. 18, 2000).

Although the guidelines provide that depreciation should not be considered a reasonable expense when a court is attempting to ascertain income from self-employment, this does not mean that the real cost of a capital asset cannot be considered in determining income from self-employment. Alexander v. Alexander, 34 S.W.3d 456, 2000 Tenn. App. LEXIS 103 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000), review or rehearing denied, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 730 (Tenn. Dec. 18, 2000).

A significant variance existed between the Tennessee Child Support Guidelines and a father's child support obligation under a prior agreement with the mother where the support obligation was $1,440 per month under the agreement and $6,600 under the Guidelines; thus, the prior agreement did not control. Huntley v. Huntley, 61 S.W.3d 329, 2001 Tenn. App. LEXIS 432 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001).

Child support guidelines have the force of law; if the guidelines are not followed, the court has to make specific written findings that their application would be unjust or inappropriate. State ex rel. Wrzesniewski v. Miller, 77 S.W.3d 195, 2001 Tenn. App. LEXIS 892 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001).

Obligation imposed under the child support guidelines, properly considering the father's imputed gross income met the definition of a significant change thereby warranting an increased award of child support to the mother. Wade v. Wade, 115 S.W.3d 917, 2002 Tenn. App. LEXIS 933 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002).

Nontaxable nature of certain military pay and allowances are a “fringe benefit” falling squarely within the purview of the Tennessee Child Support Guidelines; thus, where a military member receives pay or allowances that are not subject to taxation, an amount must be imputed on top of the amount actually received in calculating the service member's gross income for purposes of calculating the service member's child support obligation under the Guidelines, but the trial court need not make a written or specific finding on the record that the application of the guidelines would be unjust or inappropriate. Wade v. Wade, 115 S.W.3d 917, 2002 Tenn. App. LEXIS 933 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002).

Although the parties' marriage was void because it was bigamous, that did not affect the legitimacy of the parties four children; however, the trial court did not specify in its order whether the ten thousand one hundred seventy-six dollars constituted net income or gross income and did not explain how it computed the father's income and his child support obligation. Guzman v. Alvares, 205 S.W.3d 375, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 605 (Tenn. July 11, 2006).

Parties may agree in a marital dissolution agreement (MDA) to a child support obligation that exceeds the amount payable directly to an obligee parent under the child support guidelines and to a method of calculating child support that differs from the mechanism contemplated by the guidelines as long as the resulting child support meets or exceeds the amount mandated under the guidelines. Kesser v. Kesser, 201 S.W.3d 636, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 693 (Tenn. 2006), superseded by statute as stated in, Moore v. Moore, 254 S.W.3d 357, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 778 (Tenn. Sept. 5, 2007).

Child support provision of a marital dissolution agreement (MDA), in which the father agreed to pay the mother two thousand dollars per month (the fixed amount provision) and twenty-one percent of all bonuses or other income as defined by the child support guidelines (the twenty-one percent provision), was enforceable because the resulting child support met or exceeded the amount mandated under the guidelines. Kesser v. Kesser, 201 S.W.3d 636, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 693 (Tenn. 2006), superseded by statute as stated in, Moore v. Moore, 254 S.W.3d 357, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 778 (Tenn. Sept. 5, 2007).

Child support provision of a marital dissolution agreement (MDA), in which the father agreed to pay, inter alia, twenty-one percent of all bonuses or other income as defined by the child support guidelines, was subject to modification because, when the trial court approved the agreement and incorporated the MDA into the final decree of divorce, the twenty-one percent provision merged into the divorce decree, lost its contractual nature, and thus became subject to modification by the trial court. Kesser v. Kesser, 201 S.W.3d 636, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 693 (Tenn. 2006), superseded by statute as stated in, Moore v. Moore, 254 S.W.3d 357, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 778 (Tenn. Sept. 5, 2007).

Neither a father's loss of employment, his visitation with the child, nor a change in the law were proper bases for modification of the twenty-one percent child support provision of a marital dissolution agreement (MDA) in which he had agreed to pay, inter alia, twenty-one percent of all bonuses or other income as defined by the child support guidelines, however, the three additional children he had adopted should have been considered in awarding support based upon the twenty-one percent provision. Kesser v. Kesser, 201 S.W.3d 636, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 693 (Tenn. 2006), superseded by statute as stated in, Moore v. Moore, 254 S.W.3d 357, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 778 (Tenn. Sept. 5, 2007).

Father was not entitled to a downward deviation of the twenty-one percent child support provision of a marital dissolution agreement (MDA) provision because of his loss of employment and his unemployment, because, he was obligated to pay child support under the twenty-one percent provision only when he received bonuses or other income as defined by the child support guidelines; if he did not receive such income, he was not obligated to pay child support under that provision. Kesser v. Kesser, 201 S.W.3d 636, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 693 (Tenn. 2006), superseded by statute as stated in, Moore v. Moore, 254 S.W.3d 357, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 778 (Tenn. Sept. 5, 2007).

According to a twenty-one percent child support provision of a marital dissolution agreement (MDA) the father had to pay twenty-one percent on any capital gains that he received and he was not entitled to deduct any capital losses in calculating the child support because, the plain language of the child support guidelines referred only to capital gains and did not refer to capital losses or a net amount of capital gains. Kesser v. Kesser, 201 S.W.3d 636, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 693 (Tenn. 2006), superseded by statute as stated in, Moore v. Moore, 254 S.W.3d 357, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 778 (Tenn. Sept. 5, 2007).

One-time capital gains had to be included in calculating a parent's gross income for purposes of modifying child support, because such a requirement was consistent with the plain language and purpose of the child support guidelines. Moore v. Moore, 254 S.W.3d 357, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 778 (Tenn. Sept. 5, 2007).

Judgment denying the wife's request for an upward deviation from the Child Support Guideline amount of child support was affirmed; the instant court's modification of the alimony award should increase the overall financial resources available to the wife, and ease somewhat the contrast in the standard of living the children experience as they move between their parents'  households. Wiser v. Wiser, 339 S.W.3d 1, 2010 Tenn. App. LEXIS 402 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 25, 2010), rehearing denied, 339 S.W.3d 1, 2010 Tenn. App. LEXIS 521 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 11, 2010), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2011 Tenn. LEXIS 153 (Tenn. Feb. 16, 2011).

Pursuant to T.C.A. § 36-5-101(e)(1)(A) and Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 1240-2-4-.07(2)(d)(2)(i), the parties'  daughter's cheerleading expenses were clearly a “special expense” that justified a deviation from the child support guildelines; further, the trial court made the requisite findings thereon and the amount of the deviation was modest. Reeder v. Reeder, 375 S.W.3d 268, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 126 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 24, 2012), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 440 (Tenn. June 20, 2012).

Trial court erred in requiring a father to pay $ 1,500 in “additional child support” along with the statutory threshold amount of $ 4,100 per month, T.C.A. § 36-5-101(e)(1)(B), because the trial court failed to make any findings and provided no justification as to why an amount of child support in excess of the statutory threshold amount was reasonably necessary to provide for the needs of the children; the father's net income was $ 32,646 per month. Beyer v. Beyer, 428 S.W.3d 59, 2013 Tenn. App. LEXIS 229 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 5, 2013), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 827 (Tenn. Oct. 16, 2013).

Trial court erred in requiring a father to pay all of the children's private school expenses, representing an upward deviation from the Child Support Guidelines, T.C.A. § 36-5-101, because the trial court provided no written findings or any justification for ordering the father to pay for the children's extraordinary educational expenses, made no findings as to the amount of the expenses, and failed to enter an amount representing the monthly average of the expenses in the deviation section of the child support worksheets. Beyer v. Beyer, 428 S.W.3d 59, 2013 Tenn. App. LEXIS 229 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 5, 2013), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 827 (Tenn. Oct. 16, 2013).

Trial court did not err in denying the husband's request for child support where the child support worksheet yielded an obligation of $5 per month, and thus, a downward deviation from the presumptive child support order was appropriate. McCloud v. McCloud, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 959 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 9, 2015).

Trial court did not err in failing to allocate the federal income tax exemption to him as the primary residential parent where the parents received substantially equal parenting time and had comparable incomes, and thus, alternating the yearly tax exemption was appropriate. McCloud v. McCloud, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 959 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 9, 2015).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in adjusting a mother's child support obligations based on tax deductions and the necessaries doctrine because the court explained its reasons for deviating from the presumptive guideline amount, the mother bore in-kind expenses throughout, especially as she was directed to do so by the guardian, the deviation served the purposes of equity between the parties, the guardian had not borne any child support expenses, and the guardian had sufficient opportunity to appeal the magistrate's finding as to visitation, but failed to do so. Kernan v. Kernan Nabors, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 58 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 1, 2016), appeal denied, Kernan v. Nabors, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 462 (Tenn. June 23, 2016).

Trial court did not err in finding that a strict application of the Child Support Guidelines would be unjust because it properly determined the amount of support that would be awarded to a wife under the Guidelines in order to evaluate the adequacy of the support provision in the postnuptial agreement; based on the children's special needs and the extraordinary expenses associated with their care, the trial court determined an upward deviation was warranted and in the children's best interest. Pandey v. Pandey, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 692 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 16, 2017).

49. —Arrearages.

No showing is ordinarily required to show that arrearages will be used for the benefit of the children, because enforcement of arrearages constitutes a form of reimbursement for the obligee's assumption of the entire duty of support during the period covered by arrearages. Hoyle v. Wilson, 746 S.W.2d 665, 1988 Tenn. LEXIS 6 (Tenn. 1988), superseded by statute as stated in, Goins v. Shelton, — S.W.2d —, 1989 Tenn. App. LEXIS 604 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 13, 1989), superseded by statute as stated in, O'Brien v. Bainbridge, — S.W.2d —, 1992 Tenn. App. LEXIS 565 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 8, 1992).

It would be inequitable to require the biological father to pay retroactive child support to his child's mother during the time that she and her husband actively prevented the biological father from establishing his paternity and taking responsibility for supporting the child; the mother and her husband obtained a restraining order against the biological father and he was rebuffed in his attempt to send the child a birthday present. In re T.K.Y., 205 S.W.3d 343, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 757 (Tenn. 2006), rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 891 (Tenn. Sept. 19, 2006).

Although a trial court acted within its discretion in granting a father a $ 250 monthly credit against child support arrears for providing necessaries to the parties'  child that lived primarily with him, the trial court erred in granting the monthly credit for 76 months because any credit for necessaries sounded in contract, the mother's petition to modify support was filed in April 2013, and, as such, the father was time-barred from receiving any credit for necessaries prior to April 2007. Martin v. Martin, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 354 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 20, 2015).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying a father credit on the father's child support arrearage for the payments which the father made on a debit card provided to the father's children, or for the time when one of the father's children lived with the father in Texas. Contreras v. Hinson, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 431 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 25, 2018).

50. — —Interest on Arrearages.

Trial court erred when it denied prejudgment interest on a father's child support arrearages owed to the mother, as pursuant to T.C.A. § 36-5-101(f)(1), such interest was mandated from the date the ordered support was due. Reeder v. Reeder, 375 S.W.3d 268, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 126 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 24, 2012), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 440 (Tenn. June 20, 2012).

Mother was not entitled to an award of interest on a father's child support arrearage because (1) the mother significantly delayed seeking enforcement of child support or a contractual provision allegedly requiring recalculation of the father's support obligation, and (2) the father timely paid existing support obligations. Schwager v. Messer, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 477 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 27, 2019).

51. —Showing Inability to Pay.

Burden was on divorced husband to show his inability to make monthly payments for support of minor child. Dawson v. Dawson, 23 Tenn. App. 556, 135 S.W.2d 458, 1939 Tenn. App. LEXIS 62 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1939).

Trial court erred by denying the father's petition to modify child support because the mother failed to carry her burden of proof to establish that he was willfully or voluntarily underemployed; the mere fact he lost one job for alleged improper conduct was not sufficient to constitute the type of “intentional choice or act” contemplated in the 2005 revision to Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 1240-2-4-.04(3)(a)(2)(ii)(I). Wine  v. Wine, 245 S.W.3d 389, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 324 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 18, 2007), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 953 (Tenn. Oct. 22, 2007).

52. —Alteration of Allowance.

Application may be made in the future for diminution or increase of the allowances, according to the financial condition of the father or the necessities of the child. Mason v. Mason, 163 Tenn. 520, 43 S.W.2d 1067, 1931 Tenn. LEXIS 143 (1931) (citing Sessum v. Sessum, 163 Tenn. 6, 40 S.W.2d 794, 1931 Tenn. LEXIS 86 (1931)); Dews v. Dews, 6 Tenn. Civ. App. (6 Higgins) 154 (1915).

Where petitioner for custody of child alleged that he had recently been discharged from government hospital as an arrested tuberculosis patient and that in addition to disability pension he was earning $100 a month and had paid support money until former wife and husband left state the petition was not subject to dismissal on the ground that petitioner was in contempt of court for failure to keep up support payments but was entitled to a hearing since welfare of the child was the important issue. Williams v. Williams, 196 Tenn. 9, 263 S.W.2d 531, 1953 Tenn. LEXIS 398 (1953).

Where property settlement agreement incorporated into divorce decree provided that husband was to pay $250 monthly for support of two boys who were in exclusive custody of the mother under the decree, husband was entitled to have payments reduced to $125 monthly when one of the boys reached majority. Churchill v. Churchill, 203 Tenn. 406, 313 S.W.2d 436, 1958 Tenn. LEXIS 318 (1958).

The trial court is without jurisdiction during the pendency of appellate review, to entertain a petition to modify a child support decree where the petition merely challenges the procedural aspects of the decree or does not allege a change in circumstances. Smith v. Haase, 521 S.W.2d 49, 1975 Tenn. LEXIS 680 (Tenn. 1975).

Obligations voluntarily assumed are not proper to be considered as changed circumstance to reduce support payments otherwise owed. Dillow v. Dillow, 575 S.W.2d 289, 1978 Tenn. App. LEXIS 320 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1978), superseded by statute as stated in, Wilson v. Wilson, — S.W.2d —, 1991 Tenn. App. LEXIS 375 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 22, 1991).

The factors set forth in this section which are applicable in the initial grant of support and maintenance, where relevant, must be taken into consideration in arriving at whether there has been a change of circumstances that requires a modification of support and maintenance. Threadgill v. Threadgill, 740 S.W.2d 419, 1987 Tenn. App. LEXIS 2804 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987).

Financial obligations, voluntarily assumed subsequent to a divorce, do not establish a basis to reduce child support. Tronco v. Crosley, 827 S.W.2d 802, 1991 Tenn. App. LEXIS 795 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991), rehearing denied, — S.W.2d —, 1991 Tenn. App. LEXIS 863 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 4, 1991), appeal denied, 1992 Tenn. LEXIS 300 (Tenn. Mar. 30, 1992).

The enactment of the statute establishing the use of child support guidelines is not to be considered a substantial and material change in circumstances that authorizes a court to modify an existing child support order. Tronco v. Crosley, 827 S.W.2d 802, 1991 Tenn. App. LEXIS 795 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991), rehearing denied, — S.W.2d —, 1991 Tenn. App. LEXIS 863 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 4, 1991), appeal denied, 1992 Tenn. LEXIS 300 (Tenn. Mar. 30, 1992).

The proper standard in determining whether to modify an existing child support order is to determine whether a significant variance exists between the amount of the current support obligation and the amount of support that would be required based on the obligor's present income. Turner v. Turner, 919 S.W.2d 340, 1995 Tenn. App. LEXIS 815 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995).

The statutory provision and rule pertaining to alteration of a support obligation did not apply in a proceeding for an initial order of support. State ex rel. Smith v. Early, 934 S.W.2d 655, 1996 Tenn. App. LEXIS 409 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996).

53. —Conveyance of Property to Child.

Chancellor in divorce proceeding wherein mother was given custody of 15-year-old child properly required father to deed property to child for her support and maintenance though she was not a party to proceeding, since mother as guardian of the child was before the court. Cline v. Cline, 186 Tenn. 509, 212 S.W.2d 361, 1948 Tenn. LEXIS 571 (1948).

54. —Reimbursement of Mother.

The obligation of a father to support his minor child continues after grant of divorce and award of child's custody to the mother, who may recover reimbursement for expenditures for the necessary support of the child, on terms stated respecting the mutual obligation. Brooks v. Brooks, 166 Tenn. 255, 61 S.W.2d 654, 1933 Tenn. LEXIS 88 (1933).

Where a divorce is granted at the suit of the wife she may maintain an action against the divorced husband to recover for reasonable expenses incurred by her in the support and maintenance of their minor children in her custody. Dawson v. Dawson, 23 Tenn. App. 556, 135 S.W.2d 458, 1939 Tenn. App. LEXIS 62 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1939).

Where circuit court entered a divorce decree but decree failed to provide for custody of child the mother could file a proceeding in chancery court against father to recover amount expended by her in supporting child, since it was a suit to recover for money already spent and not a suit to obtain a decree for support. Coleman v. Coleman, 190 Tenn. 286, 229 S.W.2d 341, 1950 Tenn. LEXIS 480 (1950).

55. — —Necessities Furnished Child in Custody of Father.

Divorced wife may recover from divorced husband for attention and necessaries furnished their minor child in the custody of the father, where he went from school to the home of his mother, because of his sickness and the need of the mother's attention, and not in disobedience to his father, and she furnished him attention and necessaries of life during the period of his illness and convalescence, a period for which the father had made no provision for his support. Roths v. Roths, 3 Tenn. Civ. App. (3 Higgins) 557 (1912).

56. — —Status of Mother's Claim.

The liability of a father to his divorced wife for sums paid by her after the divorce and without a judgment of court, for the support of a minor child of the parties, stands substantially upon the same footing as the liability of the father to a third person for necessaries furnished to the child. Dawson v. Dawson, 23 Tenn. App. 556, 135 S.W.2d 458, 1939 Tenn. App. LEXIS 62 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1939).

57. —Independent Suit for Support.

Where child had been awarded to mother in a prior divorce suit, the decree in which contained no provision for the support of the child by the father, mother could not on behalf of the child maintain a later separate action to compel divorced husband to pay for the support of the child. Fuller v. Fuller, 169 Tenn. 586, 89 S.W.2d 762, 1932 Tenn. LEXIS 21 (1932); Baker v. Baker, 169 Tenn. 589, 89 S.W.2d 763, 1935 Tenn. LEXIS 86 (1935).

Mother was not entitled to maintain a bill in an independent suit in her own name and right to recover future support of their child. Brooks v. Brooks, 166 Tenn. 255, 61 S.W.2d 654, 1933 Tenn. LEXIS 88 (1933).

58. —Suit by Furnisher of Necessities.

Furnisher of necessities to child in custody of mother may sue divorced father. Baker v. Baker, 169 Tenn. 589, 89 S.W.2d 763, 1935 Tenn. LEXIS 86 (1935).

If the trial court's intent in refusing to modify the father's child support as of the date of the petition's filing was to award the father a credit against any arrearage for monies he had expended on the children above his child support obligation, such an offset was inappropriate, as he failed to establish the requirements regarding a claim of offset for necessaries. Blackwell v. Blackwell, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 449 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 29, 2016).

59. —Rights of Child.

A child under the age of 16 years has no right to sue its father and obtain a decree that the father pay into court a certain sum monthly for its future support. Baker v. Baker, 169 Tenn. 589, 89 S.W.2d 763, 1935 Tenn. LEXIS 86 (1935).

Where a divorce decree awarding custody of the child to the mother provides that the father shall contribute to its maintenance, such decree relates merely to the relative rights and duties of the parents toward each other and the child's rights against the father are not affected. Rose Funeral Home, Inc. v. Julian, 176 Tenn. 534, 144 S.W.2d 755, 1940 Tenn. LEXIS 98, 131 A.L.R. 858 (1940).

60. Private School Tuition.

Wholesale imposition of private school tuition on a noncustodial parent may, in some instances, constitute an unjust or inappropriate application of the child support guidelines that would warrant downward deviation. Where the non-custodial parent has substantially less income than the custodial parent, downward deviation would spread the cost of private school tuition equitably among the parties. Barnett v. Barnett, 27 S.W.3d 904, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 466 (Tenn. 2000).

It was not unjust or inappropriate to require the entire amount of private school tuition to be paid by the noncustodial parent, where the non-custodial parent's income was $209,000 per year and the custodial parent earned $28,000 per year and was dependent upon child support and alimony to meet the remainder of the custodial parent's needs and those of the children. Barnett v. Barnett, 27 S.W.3d 904, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 466 (Tenn. 2000).

Trial court erred by failing to require a father to pay a portion of his son's private school tuition, as because the mother was raising the parties'  child by herself, it fell to her to make educational decisions on behalf of her son; the parties'  son had special educational needs, and it was thus not surprising that the mother desired to enroll him in a school best suited to help him maximize his potential. Richardson v. Spanos, 189 S.W.3d 720, 2005 Tenn. App. LEXIS 638 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 5, 2005), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 228 (Tenn. 2006).

Pursuant to T.C.A. § 36-5-101(g), the significant variance provision of the statute pertained only to modification of the minimum base child support as stated in the Child Support Guidelines, Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 1240-2-4-.02; a material change in circumstances occurred as the mother remained in Tennessee and the children remained in private school and the father's support obligation had to be modified to help pay extraordinary educational expenses. Kaplan v. Bugalla, 188 S.W.3d 632, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 302 (Tenn. 2006).

Evidence preponderated against a trial court's finding a father responsible for 50 percent of private school tuition because the trial court did not consider the cost of tuition in light of the significant increase in the father's monthly child support obligation and the monthly arrearage payment as well as the deductions each month for the father's federal income taxes and FICA payments; after all the deductions, the father was left with less than $ 1,800 to pay all of his expenses. Martin v. Martin, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 354 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 20, 2015).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion regarding the apportionment of the children's private school tuition because the expense was prorated based on each parent's percentage share of income, with the mother's being 22 percent and the father's being 78 percent. Velez v. Velez, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 522 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 30, 2015).

Trial court did not err in granting an upward deviation for extraordinary educational expenses as the current cost of attending the private school for children with learning challenges was commensurate with the parents'  financial abilities. Thayer v. Thayer, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 535 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 26, 2016).

It was no error to decline to order a father to pay children's entire private school tuition retroactively because the mother was able to share in this expense. Schwager v. Messer, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 477 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 27, 2019).

61. —Payment of Allowance to Clerk.

The allowance for the support of the child may be paid to the clerk of the court and by him paid to the child's guardian, but, in the absence of a guardian, the clerk may be clothed with power to expend the fund, under the suggestions of the mother, for the support and maintenance of the child. Dews v. Dews, 6 Tenn. Civ. App. (6 Higgins) 154 (1915); Graham v. Graham, 140 Tenn. 328, 204 S.W. 987, 1918 Tenn. LEXIS 46 (1918).

Asserted unwillingness of mother to give up right to cite father for contempt if he became delinquent in support and alimony payments was not sufficient to justify denial joint petition of parties to have payments made directly to wife. Acree v. Acree, 225 Tenn. 7, 462 S.W.2d 870, 1971 Tenn. LEXIS 268 (1971).

There is no requirement that payments must be made to clerk of court, and chancery rule to that effect was unreasonable and would not be enforced. Acree v. Acree, 225 Tenn. 7, 462 S.W.2d 870, 1971 Tenn. LEXIS 268 (1971).

There were valid reasons for the exercise of the court's discretion in ordering child support payments made through the clerk's office. Weinstein v. Heimberg, 490 S.W.2d 692, 1972 Tenn. App. LEXIS 315 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1972).

62. —Attorney's Fees.

The children are entitled to have their father pay reasonable counsel fees incurred in their behalf, on petition by the mother to require the father to contribute to their support and maintenance. Graham v. Graham, 140 Tenn. 328, 204 S.W. 987, 1918 Tenn. LEXIS 46 (1918).

63. Void Marriage.

Where the wife obtained a decree for divorce from bed and board and alimony, the decree for alimony will be perpetually enjoined in a subsequent suit by the husband, giving him an absolute divorce, upon the ground that she had another living husband at the time of her marriage to him. Scurlock v. Scurlock, 92 Tenn. 629, 22 S.W. 858, 1893 Tenn. LEXIS 19 (1893).

64. Power of Arbitrators.

Arbitrators have no power to grant divorces or alimony, without the concurrence of the court, and the cause must be heard by the court, even after an award has been made by the arbitrators. Swan v. Harrison, 42 Tenn. 534, 1865 Tenn. LEXIS 100 (1865).

65. Third Parties.

Where divorce decree provided for an increase in the amount of mortgage loan on husband's real estate to the bank, the bank could be made a party to suit by wife to enforce alimony and support order contained in decree by circuit court in divorce proceeding. Kizer v. Bellar, 192 Tenn. 540, 241 S.W.2d 561, 1951 Tenn. LEXIS 301 (1951).

66. Dismissal of Suit.

Where the wife voluntarily and understandingly dismisses her suit, the husband cannot, thereafter, be charged with expenses of suit or counsel fees previously incurred, though her suit was dismissed by her written order out of term time, as provided. Thompson v. Thompson, 40 Tenn. 527, 1859 Tenn. LEXIS 152 (1859). See Payne v. Payne, 106 Tenn. 467, 61 S.W. 767, 1900 Tenn. LEXIS 183 (1901).

Where wife dismisses her bill before issue joined, court is without jurisdiction to decree against the husband an allowance to her attorneys. Attorney acquired no lien upon property that she had attached. Carden v. Carden, 37 S.W. 1022, 1896 Tenn. Ch. App. LEXIS 49 (1896).

Action by wife's attorneys would lie to recover attorney's fees from husband for services in divorce proceeding after reconciliation of parties and dismissal of suit where wife's attorneys alleged in their declaration that such legal services were “necessaries” and that wife had been without counsel and needed such services for protection and relief of herself and minor children, provided trial court made determination that under all the circumstances wife was justified in pledging husband's credit when she employed attorneys. Law v. Wilhite, 225 Tenn. 415, 470 S.W.2d 8, 1971 Tenn. LEXIS 310 (1971).

67. Retention of Cause.

Where decree of circuit court approved divorce and settlement in bar of alimony, but retained cause for further order in the event complainant should “become a mother,” it was proper under statute for court subsequently to entertain petition of divorced wife wherein she sought decree requiring divorced husband to support child born after divorce. Dawson v. Dawson, 23 Tenn. App. 556, 135 S.W.2d 458, 1939 Tenn. App. LEXIS 62 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1939).

The intention of the provisions of this section and § 36-6-101 for the retention of control of decrees or orders made under such sections was to incorporate into every divorce decree without express recitation therein, a retention of control over the decree by the court as to all questions involving the custody or support of the minor children of the parent parties with the power to make “all such changes or modification” in the decree “as the exigencies of the case may require.” Davenport v. Davenport, 178 Tenn. 517, 160 S.W.2d 406, 1941 Tenn. LEXIS 84 (1942).

Failure of trial court to include support of children with divorce decree does not deprive court of authority to make such an award in the future, since under the statute every such cause is retained in court without express language. Darty v. Darty, 33 Tenn. App. 321, 232 S.W.2d 59, 1949 Tenn. App. LEXIS 127 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1949); Doty v. Doty, 37 Tenn. App. 120, 260 S.W.2d 411, 1952 Tenn. App. LEXIS 146 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1952).

If court makes an order in divorce proceeding for support and maintenance of wife and children the court retains exclusive jurisdiction though decree of divorce is silent on control by court. Kizer v. Bellar, 192 Tenn. 540, 241 S.W.2d 561, 1951 Tenn. LEXIS 301 (1951).

Fact that divorce decree made no provision for custody and support of minor child who was in custody of the mother at the time of the decree was immaterial in proceeding by the mother for order for support of child since the effect of this section and § 36-6-101 is to retain the case in the court and to preserve its jurisdiction to make such an order at any time on application of either of the divorced parents. Roble v. Roble, 41 Tenn. App. 412, 295 S.W.2d 817, 1956 Tenn. App. LEXIS 96 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1956).

Circuit court that awarded wife divorce and custody of minor child retained jurisdiction for the purpose of changing custody of the child even though wife had become a nonresident. Talley v. Talley, 51 Tenn. App. 622, 371 S.W.2d 152, 1962 Tenn. App. LEXIS 126 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1962).

Modification or enforcement of decree providing for alimony and support may only be had in court issuing the decree. Morrissey v. Morrissey, 214 Tenn. 112, 377 S.W.2d 944, 1964 Tenn. LEXIS 455 (1964).

The trial court exercises continuing control over the custody of a minor child after the divorce decree otherwise becomes final. Smith v. Haase, 521 S.W.2d 49, 1975 Tenn. LEXIS 680 (Tenn. 1975).

An appeal in a divorce case does not abrogate the decree of the trial court awarding custody of children. Smith v. Haase, 521 S.W.2d 49, 1975 Tenn. LEXIS 680 (Tenn. 1975).

68. —Cases Prior to 1932 Code.

When monthly payments are decreed in a separation suit, it should be provided that same continue in the discretion of the court until a reconciliation is effected. Cureton v. Cureton, 117 Tenn. 103, 96 S.W. 608, 1906 Tenn. LEXIS 35 (1906).

A decree allowing alimony in conjunction with a divorce a mensa et thoro could be changed after the expiration of the term at which the decree was rendered, without statutory authority or reservation of power to modify, inasmuch as power to amend such award existed at common law. Going v. Going, 144 Tenn. 303, 232 S.W. 443, 1921 Tenn. LEXIS 40 (1921), overruled in part, Morrissey v. Morrissey, 214 Tenn. 112, 377 S.W.2d 944, 1964 Tenn. LEXIS 455 (1964).

Where periodic alimony is awarded, the case should be retained on the docket in order that future decrees may be entered to meet the exigencies of the case arising. Taylor v. Taylor, 144 Tenn. 311, 232 S.W. 445, 1921 Tenn. LEXIS 41 (1921), overruled in part, Morrissey v. Morrissey, 214 Tenn. 112, 377 S.W.2d 944, 1964 Tenn. LEXIS 455 (1964).

69. —Retroactive Modification.

Husband's petition to reduce alimony was supported by uncontroverted medical proof provided in the deposition of his doctor that his earning capacity was diminished due to a deterioration of his medical condition; pursuant to T.C.A. § 36-5-101(d)(1)(E)(i) (now T.C.A. §  36-5-101(i)(1)), the evidence did not preponderate against the trial court's finding that the husband was voluntarily unemployed but his alimony obligation could be modified based on his ability to pay and the wife's need. Byrd v. Byrd, 184 S.W.3d 686, 2005 Tenn. App. LEXIS 406 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005), appeal denied, ,— S.W.3d —, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 153 (Tenn. 2006).

Pursuant to T.C.A. § 36-5-101, a trial court did not err in limiting the retroactive application of a father's reduced child support obligation, arising from the older child's emancipation, as circumstances justified the amount of support for the remaining minor child. Reeder v. Reeder, 375 S.W.3d 268, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 126 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 24, 2012), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 440 (Tenn. June 20, 2012).

70. Power to Modify Decree.

The court awarding the divorce decree had authority in a subsequent proceeding to modify the decree and provide for support by the father of children awarded by the court to the mother notwithstanding the fact that no provision was made in the original decree for such support. Davenport v. Davenport, 178 Tenn. 517, 160 S.W.2d 406, 1941 Tenn. LEXIS 84 (1942).

A decree of the chancery court for the support of a minor child may be modified even as to past due or unpaid installments, at any subsequent term so as to increase or decrease the allowance made. Crane v. Crane, 26 Tenn. App. 227, 170 S.W.2d 663, 1942 Tenn. App. LEXIS 44 (1942).

Decree for alimony is subject to modification by the court. Perry v. Perry, 183 Tenn. 362, 192 S.W.2d 830, 1946 Tenn. LEXIS 215 (1946).

This section and § 36-6-101 are remedial and should be liberally construed to include the power of the court to cancel or modify delinquent installments of child support. Gossett v. Gossett, 34 Tenn. App. 654, 241 S.W.2d 934, 1951 Tenn. App. LEXIS 108 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1951).

It was not error for court to increase monthly alimony payments notwithstanding property settlement agreement that had been approved by court. Thomas v. Thomas, 46 Tenn. App. 572, 330 S.W.2d 583, 1959 Tenn. App. LEXIS 116 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1959).

Where by property settlement agreement approved by court alimony payments were to terminate on a specified date, still in the future, action of court in amending award to continue payments beyond such date would be reversed and the court's power to so extend payments reserved until such future time. Thomas v. Thomas, 46 Tenn. App. 572, 330 S.W.2d 583, 1959 Tenn. App. LEXIS 116 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1959).

In action for modification of award it was proper for court to tax one half of former wife's counsel fees against the former husband. Thomas v. Thomas, 46 Tenn. App. 572, 330 S.W.2d 583, 1959 Tenn. App. LEXIS 116 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1959).

The language of this section relating to increases and decreases in allowances for alimony and child support refers only to allowances of money and does not contemplate the further award of the husband's property in solido after a decree of absolute divorce. Johnson v. Johnson, 51 Tenn. App. 205, 366 S.W.2d 141, 1962 Tenn. App. LEXIS 104 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1962).

The court that in a divorce, annulment or separate maintenance action awards custody and support of a child retains all decrees for custody and support in its control to make such future changes or modifications as the exigencies of the case may require. Sutton v. Sutton, 220 Tenn. 410, 417 S.W.2d 786, 1967 Tenn. LEXIS 422 (1967).

The exclusive jurisdiction of the question as to whom the custody of a child should be awarded is in the court wherein the divorce was granted and custody of the child first awarded. Sutton v. Sutton, 220 Tenn. 410, 417 S.W.2d 786, 1967 Tenn. LEXIS 422 (1967).

Since the circuit court had granted the divorce decree and made the initial award of alimony, it retained jurisdiction over the action and the power to modify the award or to order its cessation, and the plaintiff could not avoid the alimony award by filing an independent suit for a declaratory judgment that the alimony statutes were unconstitutional. Burkett v. Ashley, 535 S.W.2d 332, 1976 Tenn. LEXIS 580 (Tenn. 1976).

Court order forgiving child support arrearages was not an abuse of discretion in view of the husband's considerable obligations, part of which were incurred by his former wife since their separation. Dillow v. Dillow, 575 S.W.2d 289, 1978 Tenn. App. LEXIS 320 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1978), superseded by statute as stated in, Wilson v. Wilson, — S.W.2d —, 1991 Tenn. App. LEXIS 375 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 22, 1991).

Where the final divorce decree ordered petitioner to pay respondent as alimony, the sum of $2,000 per month for a period of 108 months or nine years, and specified that “the payment shall continue in that amount until the entire amount mentioned above has been paid,” the decree was susceptible of only one construction: respondent was awarded alimony in solido payable on an installment basis of $2,000 per month for 108 months or nine years until the entire amount was paid; and therefore, the trial judge, after the expiration of 30 days, no longer had jurisdiction to make any modification in the award. Spalding v. Spalding, 597 S.W.2d 739, 1980 Tenn. App. LEXIS 326 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980).

A court may decree an increase or a decrease of a monthly alimony award on cause being shown, and such change in circumstances must be shown to have occurred since the original award as would justify a decree or increase in the amount of the award. Jones v. Jones, 659 S.W.2d 23, 1983 Tenn. App. LEXIS 579 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983).

In determining whether ex-spouse lives with a third person for reduction of alimony purposes, the word lives is synonymous with resides, and does not require any type of liaison, sexual or otherwise. Azbill v. Azbill, 661 S.W.2d 682, 1983 Tenn. App. LEXIS 629 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983).

Where relevant, the factors set forth in this section applicable to the initial grant of support and maintenance must be taken into consideration when arriving at a determination of whether there has been a change in circumstances sufficient to require a modification of support and maintenance. Norvell v. Norvell, 805 S.W.2d 772, 1990 Tenn. App. LEXIS 842 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990).

Trial court retained the power to modify divorce decree as to the issue of spousal support when the husband's retirement, which was objectively reasonable, resulted in a bona fide change of circumstances; trial court properly considered the relevant factors. Bogan v. Bogan, 60 S.W.3d 721, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 782 (Tenn. 2001).

Since T.C.A. § 36-5-101(d)(2) places limitations on a court's ability to extend, or otherwise modify, its initial rehabilitative alimony award, it requires the court to make a finding that a substantial and material change in circumstances exists before the court may modify the award; in determining whether a substantial and material change in circumstances exists, a trial court must take into consideration the same factors that it considered in arriving at its initial alimony award, including the factors enumerated in T.C.A. § 36-5-101(d)(1). Perry v. Perry, 114 S.W.3d 465, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 725 (Tenn. 2003).

When a father's petition for modification of parenting time did not mention modification of child support, the issue was, nonetheless, properly considered because (1) the father's petition and required income disclosures provided a mother with notice that the issue was before the court, and (2) an increase in the mother's income met the significant variance criterion of the child support guidelines. Leonardo v. Leonardo, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 486 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 18, 2015), modified, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 943 (Tenn. Nov. 24, 2015).

Based upon: (1) the requirement that a proposed parenting plan form must be filed with a petition for modification of a permanent parenting plan; (2) the fact that the proposed form requires disclosure of the parties'  incomes; (3) the plan requires disclosure of a proposed child support amount; and (4) the fact that a trial court is required to include a child support worksheet with its parenting plan, the filing of a petition to modify child visitation and/or the child's residential parenting schedule triggers a review of the parents'  respective child support obligations. Leonardo v. Leonardo, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 486 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 18, 2015), modified, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 943 (Tenn. Nov. 24, 2015).

Because the parties'  child was in need of health insurance, the obligee parent was legally obligated to provide insurance, and the obligee parent failed to provide this necessary, the obligor parent was entitled to a credit for the time period when the obligor parent paid for a portion of the child's insurance coverage but the obligee parent failed to provide health insurance other than TennCare. The trial court did not err in ordering the obligor parent to pay one-half of the costs of uncovered medical expenses. Stewart v. Rowland, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 385 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 2, 2016).

Husband agreed to pay for private elementary and secondary education, and upon adoption of the parties'  parenting plan into the trial court's final order of divorce, this support obligation merged into the divorce decree and lost its contractual nature; therefore, the trial court erred in holding that it was without power to modify the husband's private school tuition obligation. Ghorashi-Bajestani v. Bajestani, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 149 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 1, 2017).

Husband argued that he should have been relieved from a portion of the child support arrearage award due to his unemployment, but the court simply lacked authority to grant this, given that any award of less than the full amount of the child support arrearage would have amounted to a retroactive modification of a valid child support order. Lee v. Lee, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 215 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2017).

Father was not entitled to unilaterally modify his child support obligation upon the emancipation of his eldest child because he never sought any relief from the trial court; therefore, no notice was given to the mother as required under the Child Support Guidlines, and because no petition was filed, the father failed to establish that a significant variance existed to warrant modification. State ex rel. Nichols v. Songstad, 563 S.W.3d 868, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 265 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 17, 2018).

71. —Retroactive Modification.

T.C.A. § 36-5-101(a)(5) prevents both retroactive modification of child support orders and the interposition of traditional equitable defenses to the enforcement of such orders. Rutledge v. Barrett, 802 S.W.2d 604, 1991 Tenn. LEXIS 27 (Tenn. 1991).

It was no error to decline to recalculate a father's child support obligation pursuant to the parties'  contractual agreement because (1) the agreement lost its contractual nature when merged into a divorce decree, and (2) a modification of the obligation prior to the filing of a modification petition was statutorily barred. Schwager v. Messer, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 477 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 27, 2019).

72. Power to Modify Foreign Decree.

While it is true that a decree of a court of another state granting a divorce to a husband or wife with custody of the children is binding on the courts of this state, this rule is qualified by the proposition that if the children are domiciled in Tennessee and there is such a change in circumstances surrounding them as would call for action on the part of the local courts to protect them jurisdiction is assumed by the courts of this state. Dearing v. Dearing, 50 Tenn. App. 394, 362 S.W.2d 45, 1962 Tenn. App. LEXIS 154 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1962).

Where husband and wife were divorced in Georgia and husband moved to Tennessee, and wife sued in Tennessee for increase in support, courts of Tennessee acquired jurisdiction of the subject matter of complaint and jurisdiction of defendant by personal service of process, and increase ordered by chancery court was valid except as to order of annual increase due to rise in cost of living, such increase not being accurately predictable and since court could increase or decrease allowance on cause being shown. Parker v. Parker, 497 S.W.2d 572, 1973 Tenn. LEXIS 466 (Tenn. 1973).

73. Finality of Decree.

Decrees under this section are final for the purpose of execution or appeal and are final as res judicata upon the facts then existing. Hicks v. Hicks, 26 Tenn. App. 641, 176 S.W.2d 371, 1943 Tenn. App. LEXIS 117 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1943).

In cases of divorce where the custody and support of children are decreed such decrees become final in the sense that they are subject to execution, appealable and res judicata upon the facts then existing and are not merely interlocutory, but they are not final in the sense that they preclude a later decree in the same cause upon new or changed conditions requiring a change in the existing decree as to custody. Darty v. Darty, 33 Tenn. App. 321, 232 S.W.2d 59, 1949 Tenn. App. LEXIS 127 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1949).

Mere fact that divorce decree providing for custody and support is retained in court for the purpose of future orders does not deprive such decree of its quality of finality. Damron v. Damron, 212 Tenn. 14, 367 S.W.2d 476, 1963 Tenn. LEXIS 394 (1963).

Ex-husband paying alimony under decree rendered before statute was declared unconstitutional was not making payments under any statute, constitutional or otherwise, but rather by virtue of a court decree from which no appeal was taken; and in accordance with the doctrine of res judicata, it made no difference whether that decree was based upon good law or upon bad law, for if no appeal was taken therefrom, it could not subsequently be attacked because of some defect in the proceedings. Kolker v. Gelb, 600 S.W.2d 728, 1980 Tenn. App. LEXIS 379 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980).

Termination or modification of an alimony award after the divorce decree has become final depends on whether the original award is in solido or a lump sum contrasted with in futuro or periodic. Phillips v. Webster, 611 S.W.2d 591, 1980 Tenn. App. LEXIS 405 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980).

Alimony in solido is not subject to change after the decree becomes final. Phillips v. Webster, 611 S.W.2d 591, 1980 Tenn. App. LEXIS 405 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980).

74. Jurisdiction to Enforce Decree.

Where the chancery court in its decree of divorce made provisions for child support no other court had jurisdiction to enforce the provisions. Crane v. Crane, 26 Tenn. App. 227, 170 S.W.2d 663, 1942 Tenn. App. LEXIS 44 (1942).

Although a court may increase or decrease child support “on application of either party,” the power of the court to enforce an order of support is statutory and exists only during minority. Hawkins v. Hawkins, 797 S.W.2d 897, 1990 Tenn. App. LEXIS 501 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990), appeal denied, — S.W.2d —, 1990 Tenn. LEXIS 384 (Tenn. Oct. 22, 1990).

75. —Review of Action of Trial Court.

There was no appeal from action of trial court in dismissing contempt proceeding against husband for alleged failure to comply with provisions of divorce decree as to child support. Plumb v. Plumb, 52 Tenn. App. 267, 372 S.W.2d 771, 1962 Tenn. App. LEXIS 135 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1962).

76. Death of Party.

On the death of the husband or wife pending a suit for divorce or a suit for divorce and alimony, or pending the appeal, the suit abates and cannot be revived. The death pending appeal abates the suit and not merely the appeal. Maskall v. Maskall, 35 Tenn. 208, 1855 Tenn. LEXIS 41 (1855); Swan v. Harrison, 42 Tenn. 534, 1865 Tenn. LEXIS 100 (1865); Owens v. Sims, 43 Tenn. 544, 1866 Tenn. LEXIS 85 (1866).

Where the husband filed a bill of review attacking a decree for alimony, and seeking to review and vacate it, and obtained a decree in his favor, from which the divorced wife appealed, and pending the appeal, the husband died, such reviewing suit may be revived in the appellate court in the name of his personal representative. McCollum v. McCollum, 48 Tenn. 565 (1871).

Where in divorce proceedings custody of child was awarded to father and father was subsequently killed, death of father did not defeat jurisdiction of court in which divorce proceeding was brought to make suitable provision for custody of the child. Sutton v. Sutton, 220 Tenn. 410, 417 S.W.2d 786, 1967 Tenn. LEXIS 422 (1967).

This section fixes no limitation upon the duration of the obligation that the court is authorized to impose upon the father or his property; therefore, a court, by its decree rendered in a divorce, may bind the husband's estate after his death. Bringhurst v. Tual, 598 S.W.2d 620, 1980 Tenn. App. LEXIS 355 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980).

77. —Effect on Alimony and Support.

The right to alimony could not be enforced after the death of the husband. Swan v. Harrison, 42 Tenn. 534, 1865 Tenn. LEXIS 100 (1865).

A suit for alimony does not survive, and the wife cannot, therefore, after the death of her husband, bring her bill against his personal representative, where she neglected to enforce her remedy in his lifetime. Even when a proceeding has been commenced during his life, it abates at his death and cannot be carried on against his personal representative. Swan v. Harrison, 42 Tenn. 534, 1865 Tenn. LEXIS 100 (1865); Owens v. Sims, 43 Tenn. 544, 1866 Tenn. LEXIS 85 (1866).

Divorce decree providing merely for monthly payments toward support of children did not charge former husband's estate with liability to make such payments. In re Moore's Estate, 34 Tenn. App. 131, 234 S.W.2d 847, 1949 Tenn. App. LEXIS 142 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1949).

Under this section, equity court has power to provide for support of minor children in manner binding upon father's estate. In re Moore's Estate, 34 Tenn. App. 131, 234 S.W.2d 847, 1949 Tenn. App. LEXIS 142 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1949).

Where wife or child support payments are represented by contract and the divorce decree recognized the existence of the agreement and pronounces judgment so to speak thereon, such payment provisions survive the death of the husband. In re Estate of Kerby, 49 Tenn. App. 329, 354 S.W.2d 814, 1961 Tenn. App. LEXIS 115 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1961); Smith v. Phelps, 218 Tenn. 369, 403 S.W.2d 747, 1966 Tenn. LEXIS 573 (1966).

The general rule is that a decree providing for monthly payments of alimony is abated or terminated upon death of husband in absence of some stipulation in the order that would require payments after death. Smith v. Phelps, 218 Tenn. 369, 403 S.W.2d 747, 1966 Tenn. LEXIS 573 (1966).

Where, in divorce action, agreement approved by court provided for the payment of a monthly sum as alimony for a period of ten years, the estate of the husband was liable for such payments upon death of husband prior to such 10 year period. Smith v. Phelps, 218 Tenn. 369, 403 S.W.2d 747, 1966 Tenn. LEXIS 573 (1966).

The general rule in this state is that monthly payments of alimony provided for in a decree are abated or terminated upon the death of the husband in the absence of some stipulation in the order that would require payments after death. Bringhurst v. Tual, 598 S.W.2d 620, 1980 Tenn. App. LEXIS 355 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980).

Alimony of ex-wife is continued, until she remarries or dies, from estate of ex-husband, reversing award of a lump sum. Edwards v. Edwards, 713 S.W.2d 642, 1986 Tenn. LEXIS 834 (Tenn. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1024, 107 S. Ct. 863, 93 L. Ed. 2d 819, 1987 U.S. LEXIS 3 (1987).

78. Remarriage of Party.

Although remarriage of divorced wife did not ipso facto terminate former husband's obligation to pay alimony installments decreed, court had authority to grant relief from past due installments accruing after such remarriage. Daugherty v. Dixon, 41 Tenn. App. 623, 297 S.W.2d 944, 1956 Tenn. App. LEXIS 104 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1956).

Plaintiff's entitlement to alimony terminated when she began cohabiting with her present husband. In re Wilburn, 125 B.R. 759, 1991 Bankr. LEXIS 443 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1991).

The statutory presumption created by T.C.A. § 36-5-101(a)(3), that further spousal support is not needed when the recipient is living with “a third person,” is expressly made rebuttable by the terms of T.C.A. § 36-5-101(a)(3), and thus will not serve to cut off automatically the right to receive periodic alimony payments. Isbell v. Isbell, 816 S.W.2d 735, 1991 Tenn. LEXIS 366 (Tenn. 1991), superseded by statute as stated in, Gregory v. Gregory, — S.W.2d —, 1995 Tenn. App. LEXIS 511 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 31, 1995), superseded by statute as stated in, Sommerville v. Sommerville, — S.W.2d —, 1995 Tenn. App. LEXIS 551 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 23, 1995), superseded by statute as stated in, Wiseman v. Wiseman, — S.W.2d —, 1997 Tenn. App. LEXIS 528 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 28, 1997).

The presumption that the state of marriage in and of itself meets the economic needs of the female, or indeed of either spouse, is an antiquated presumption that may not be indulged in modern society. It is an anachronism. The reality of today's married society is that both husband and wife usually are employed. Moreover, the remarriage may be to a spouse who earns less, is diseased, disabled, unemployed, retired, or just plain lazy. As a result, the remarriage may be a source of financial drain, not support. Isbell v. Isbell, 816 S.W.2d 735, 1991 Tenn. LEXIS 366 (Tenn. 1991), superseded by statute as stated in, Gregory v. Gregory, — S.W.2d —, 1995 Tenn. App. LEXIS 511 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 31, 1995), superseded by statute as stated in, Sommerville v. Sommerville, — S.W.2d —, 1995 Tenn. App. LEXIS 551 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 23, 1995), superseded by statute as stated in, Wiseman v. Wiseman, — S.W.2d —, 1997 Tenn. App. LEXIS 528 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 28, 1997).

79. Limitations on Enforcement of Award.

Divorced wife's claim for past due installments of alimony from 1935 to date of her remarriage in 1938 would not be considered since such claim was stale and barred by the 10-year limitation of § 28-3-110 where claim was not brought until 1956. Daugherty v. Dixon, 41 Tenn. App. 623, 297 S.W.2d 944, 1956 Tenn. App. LEXIS 104 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1956).

80. Power to Modify Judgment for Delinquent Payment.

Final judgments for delinquent alimony and/or support are not subject to forgiveness or modification in amount, whereas judgments less than final may be forgiven or modified under the general powers of a divorce court. Zeitlin v. Zeitlin, 544 S.W.2d 103, 1976 Tenn. App. LEXIS 231 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1976), superseded by statute as stated in, Aubin v. Aubin, — S.W.2d —, 1989 Tenn. App. LEXIS 101 (1989), superseded by statute as stated in, State ex rel. Woody v. Morris, — S.W.2d —, 1990 Tenn. App. LEXIS 22 (1990).

81. Minor Wife or Husband.

Minors may prosecute or defend divorce actions without the necessity of a guardian ad litem or next friend. Talley v. Talley, 51 Tenn. App. 622, 371 S.W.2d 152, 1962 Tenn. App. LEXIS 126 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1962).

Where minor was complainant or petitioner in a divorce proceeding that was filed by her without intervention of guardian or next friend she was required to be treated as if she were an adult in subsequent proceedings in or growing out of that cause. Talley v. Talley, 51 Tenn. App. 622, 371 S.W.2d 152, 1962 Tenn. App. LEXIS 126 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1962).

82. Relief from Judgment.

Fact that husband paid part of periodic alimony payments after being threatened with contempt and waited 11 months after entry of divorce decree did not estop him from seeking relief from judgment where decree was entered by default and complaint did not contain prayer requesting alimony. Qualls v. Qualls, 589 S.W.2d 906, 1979 Tenn. LEXIS 513 (Tenn. 1979).

83. Previous Marriages of Same Parties.

Occurrences during two previous marriages between the same parties were not pertinent in divorce suit relating to their marriage between the parties, as the previous decrees settled all issues then existing between the parties and they could not be resurrected in subsequent proceeding. Flanagan v. Flanagan, 656 S.W.2d 1, 1983 Tenn. App. LEXIS 594 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983).

84. Military Retirement Benefits.

When a marital dissolution agreement (MDA) divides military retirement benefits, the non-military spouse has a vested interest in his or her portion of those benefits as of the date of the court's decree that cannot thereafter be unilaterally diminished by an act of the military spouse. Johnson v. Johnson, 37 S.W.3d 892, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 115 (Tenn. 2001).

Trial court's order allowing the cost of living allowance to be divided equally between the husband and wife was a proper clarification of its previous order, and not a modification of the original order; the ordinary meaning of “retirement” included cost of living allowances since there was no proof that such allowances were not amounts to which the retiree would ordinarily be entitled as a result of retirement from the military. Bridges v. Bridges, 168 S.W.3d 158, 2004 Tenn. App. LEXIS 785 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 398 (Tenn. May 2, 2005).

Trial court did not err in setting aside its order of contempt against a husband because the order had no basis in law or fact; the husband had never been under an obligation to pay the wife alimony so he could not have been liable for an alimony arrearage or held in contempt of court for nonpayment and because the wife had not been awarded alimony in the original decree, the court had no authority to subsequently modify the decree to award alimony. Sellers v. Sellers, 221 S.W.3d 43, 2006 Tenn. App. LEXIS 595 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 86 (Tenn. 2006).

85. Bankruptcy.

A bankruptcy court may consider debtor's current ability to pay insofar as it relates to continuing obligation where the debtor's circumstances have changed since assuming liability for joint marital debts. In re White, 55 B.R. 878, 1985 Bankr. LEXIS 4790 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1985).

A discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 727 does not discharge in bankruptcy an individual debtor from any debt to a former spouse that is “actually in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support,” 11 U.S.C. § 523. The sixth circuit court of appeals in In re Calhoun, 715 F.2d 1103, 1983 U.S. App. LEXIS 24391 (6th Cir. 1983), established a four-part test for determining dischargeability of such a debt, in which a more extensive inquiry is required than merely the application of state law factors. Frisbee v. Frisbee, 144 B.R. 839, 1992 Bankr. LEXIS 1284 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1992).

Marital dissolution agreement clause stating that, with respect to each party's responsibility for payment of certain debts and liabilities and their obligation to hold the other harmless for the payment thereof, the parties understand and agree that their obligation is a nondischargeable debt under the Bankruptcy Code, had no effect on bankruptcy court's determination of nondischargeability under 11 U.S.C. § 523. Light v. Adkins, 151 B.R. 458, 1992 Bankr. LEXIS 2276 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1992).

Bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction to suspend child support order pending state court appeal of transfer of custody where, because the Full Faith and Credit Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738 directed the court to refer to the preclusive law of Tennessee in this matter, the court relied on T.C.A. § 36-5-101(f) to conclude that it had no power to alter the order without the debtor's filing of an action for modification; in addition, state court remedy existed for temporary suspension under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 62.03. In re Hurt, 389 B.R. 551, 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 1775 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. June 17, 2008).

Debtor who declared Chapter 7 bankruptcy was allowed to exempt $56,000 in child support arrearages her ex-husband owed from creditors'  claims because the arrearages where excluded from her bankruptcy estate under 11 U.S.C.S. § 541; although courts were split over question of whether child support arrearages should be included as part of a custodial parent's bankruptcy estate, under Tennessee law child support payments were paid to a custodial parent or other custodian of a child for the benefit of the child, and did not belong to the custodial parent or other custodian. In re Rush, — B.R. —, 2018 Bankr. LEXIS 571 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. Mar. 1, 2018).

86. Rehabilitation.

The duty of rehabilitation, added by a 1984 amendment to this section, is not imposed on alimony recipients claiming alimony pursuant to pre-1984 decrees. Hays v. Hays, 709 S.W.2d 625, 1986 Tenn. App. LEXIS 2812 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986); Dodd v. Dodd, 737 S.W.2d 286, 1987 Tenn. App. LEXIS 2733 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987).

While in most cases only temporary support and maintenance should be awarded to an economically disadvantaged spouse until such time as he or she can be rehabilitated, where there is such relative economic disadvantage and rehabilitation is not feasible in consideration of all relevant factors, then the court may grant an order for support and maintenance on a long-term basis. Franklin v. Franklin, 746 S.W.2d 715, 1987 Tenn. App. LEXIS 3101 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987).

The provisions relative to rehabilitative alimony are in no way applicable to pre-1983 decrees. Norvell v. Norvell, 805 S.W.2d 772, 1990 Tenn. App. LEXIS 842 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990).

By the terms of T.C.A. § 36-5-101(d) the provisions in T.C.A. § 36-5-101(a)(3) are applicable only to long-term, permanent alimony, and not to temporary, rehabilitative support. Isbell v. Isbell, 816 S.W.2d 735, 1991 Tenn. LEXIS 366 (Tenn. 1991), superseded by statute as stated in, Gregory v. Gregory, — S.W.2d —, 1995 Tenn. App. LEXIS 511 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 31, 1995), superseded by statute as stated in, Sommerville v. Sommerville, — S.W.2d —, 1995 Tenn. App. LEXIS 551 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 23, 1995), superseded by statute as stated in, Wiseman v. Wiseman, — S.W.2d —, 1997 Tenn. App. LEXIS 528 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 28, 1997).

Where rehabilitative support is awarded, it may be made subject to conditions imposed by the court or agreed to by the parties. But where the rehabilitative award has been made for a fixed amount, the award must be considered nonmodifiable, even if it is to be paid in installments and not in a lump sum. Isbell v. Isbell, 816 S.W.2d 735, 1991 Tenn. LEXIS 366 (Tenn. 1991), superseded by statute as stated in, Gregory v. Gregory, — S.W.2d —, 1995 Tenn. App. LEXIS 511 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 31, 1995), superseded by statute as stated in, Sommerville v. Sommerville, — S.W.2d —, 1995 Tenn. App. LEXIS 551 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 23, 1995), superseded by statute as stated in, Wiseman v. Wiseman, — S.W.2d —, 1997 Tenn. App. LEXIS 528 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 28, 1997).

A trial court cannot reopen an award of rehabilitative alimony unless the court has expressly retained the right to modify the award. Campbell v. Campbell, 832 S.W.2d 31, 1991 Tenn. App. LEXIS 955 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991), appeal denied, 1992 Tenn. LEXIS 289 (Tenn. Mar. 23, 1992).

The granting of alimony in futuro requires a threshold determination by the trial judge that, considering all relevant factors, rehabilitation of the economically disadvantaged spouse is not feasible. Storey v. Storey, 835 S.W.2d 593, 1992 Tenn. App. LEXIS 47 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992).

T.C.A. § 36-5-101(d) of this section, as amended in 1989, does not apply retroactively to alimony awards made prior to 1984, to the extent that it allows courts to terminate alimony payments because an alimony recipient has been rehabilitated or has had time for rehabilitation. McCarty v. McCarty, 863 S.W.2d 716, 1992 Tenn. App. LEXIS 816 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992).

T.C.A. § 36-5-101 clearly reflects a bias in favor of rehabilitative alimony; however, it is also clear that rehabilitative alimony is favored only where rehabilitation is feasible. Mitts v. Mitts, 39 S.W.3d 142, 2000 Tenn. App. LEXIS 537 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000), review or rehearing denied, 39 S.W.3d 142, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 201 (Tenn. 2001).

Where only a relatively small amount of marital property was awarded to wife and she had been absent from the workforce for 23 years, lacked liquid assets or an income stream, and her plans for successfully reentering the workforce were indefinite, four years of rehabilitative alimony, as opposed to 14 months, was appropriate despite the fact that wife was 46 years old and in good health. Mitts v. Mitts, 39 S.W.3d 142, 2000 Tenn. App. LEXIS 537 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000), review or rehearing denied, 39 S.W.3d 142, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 201 (Tenn. 2001).

87. Contempt.

Pursuant to T.C.A. § 36-5-101(f)(3), although a trial court erred in finding that a father's failure to make child support payments was contempt where the nonpayment was due to loss of a job and not anything that was willful, he was still obligated to pay the arrears that were owed. Reeder v. Reeder, 375 S.W.3d 268, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 126 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 24, 2012), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 440 (Tenn. June 20, 2012).

Although an obligee parent could not satisfy a trial court's order that the parent provide insurance coverage for the parties'  child by the parent enrolling the child in TennCare when the parent was laid off at work, a finding of civil contempt was inappropriate because the obligor parent could not show that the obligee parent was in willful violation of the order. Stewart v. Rowland, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 385 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 2, 2016).

It was not error to hold a mother in contempt for not paying child support because the mother's support obligation was not modifiable before a modification action was filed. Howe v. Howe, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 233 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 10, 2017).

88. Costs and Fees.

Father was correct that the mother cited no other authority to support the designation of the special master's fee as child support. However, per case precedent, fees such as the fee of a guardian ad litem were properly assessed as costs, and in modifying the trial court's judgment, the appellate court held the special master's fee could be properly designated as costs. Johnston v. Houston, 170 S.W.3d 573, 2004 Tenn. App. LEXIS 887 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004).

Upon the parties' divorce, the trial court did not err by awarding the wife attorney fees, and considering the appropriate factors under T.C.A. § 36-5-101(d), the court noted that the husband made $70,000 a year and the wife had no salary; based upon the division of property, requiring the wife to pay all of her own attorney fees would have depleted her resources, and on appeal the parties were each ordered to pay one-half of the costs. Riggs v. Riggs, 250 S.W.3d 453, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 709 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 16, 2007).

Mother was entitled to attorney's fees in defending a father's appeal regarding his child support obligation because the trial court misinterpreted the law of the case on remand by limiting its review only to the father's actual income for a specific period of time and not considering other child support variables and the father was in a better position to bear the burden of the costs; there was no doubt the father owed a child support arrearage. In re Jaiden C.W., 420 S.W.3d 13, 2013 Tenn. App. LEXIS 270 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 11, 2013).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding a former spouse attorney's fees and discretionary costs in the amounts set forth in the court's final order because, although the court provided some relief to the obligor spouse by reducing the obligor spouse's alimony payments for a number of months, the former spouse was the prevailing party as the court did not reduce the obligor spouse's alimony permanently or allow the obligor spouse to reduce the obligor spouse's child support obligation. Wiser v. Wiser, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 293 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2015).

In a Title IV-D child support case, there was no abuse of discretion in awarding attorney fees to a guardian ad litem in light of the parties'  respective incomes and the court's findings concerning the father's lack of candor in both his testimony and in the disclosure of his income. In re Chase R., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 814 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 6, 2015).

In recognition of the trial court's discretion in such matters and the availability of funds from the division of the marital property, the trial court's denial of an additional award of alimony in solido for the husband's attorney fees, litigation expenses, and costs was affirmed. Hardin v. Hensley-Hardin, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 975 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 18, 2015).

Since the trial court did not consider the factors provided in the statute, the award of attorney's fees was vacated, and the case was remanded to the trial court to consider the factors provided by this statute. State ex rel. Rogers v. Lewis, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 781 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 21, 2016).

89. Retroactive Child Support.

Trial court determined that the father owed a child support obligation retroactive to the child's birth, and thus the trial court implicitly found that the mother and father had not lived together since that date, and the father had not been providing support for the child since that date, and the evidence did not preponderate against either of those findings; the father did not rebut any of mother's claims, and he also failed to offer proof of any support he provided for a certain time period. In re Jake S., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 277 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 29, 2015).

Mother was not entitled to retroactive modification of child support at any time prior to March 22, 2013, because the mother did not request a modification of child support until that date; the trial court allocated the mother $ 67 per month in work-related child care expenses when determining child support from April 2013 through May 2013 because the mother established that she paid that amount in child care expenses from April 2013 through May 2013. Velez v. Velez, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 522 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 30, 2015).

Since an order setting child support entered before the State filed its petition, the State erroneously asserted in the trial court that its petition was a petition to set child support instead of a petition to modify child support and, therefore, retroactive support could only be ordered as far back as when the petition to modify was filed. State ex rel. Holt v. Holt, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 802 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2015).

Trial court erred by failing to modify the father's child support obligation retroactive to the date of the mother's filing the petition to modify, as the parties' son had been residing with her for months before she filed the petition, the father exercised minimal co-parenting time, and the trial court provided no adequate basis for allowing the father to avoid the payment of his child support obligation for 11 months. Blackwell v. Blackwell, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 449 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 29, 2016).

Prior order was final and not void on its face, and the trial court's setting of retroactive child support was an impermissible modification of that order because the order did not entirely relieve the father of his obligation to remit support when he retained the responsibility to maintain the cost of medical insurance or to remit payment for future medical expenses. State ex rel. Rogers v. Lewis, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 781 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 21, 2016).

Trial court did not err in determining that a father owed retroactive child support dating back to the child's birth where he made no argument that he had proven the rebuttal provisions of T.C.A. §§ 36-2-311(a)(11) or 36-5-101(e), and there was not evidence to support their applicability. In re Jalen O-H, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 212 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 29, 2017).

Juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by denying a father's request to deviate from the presumption that he was responsible for child support back to the date of the child's birth because it applied the correct legal standard; the juvenile court cited T.C.A. § 36-2-311(a)(11)(B), which discussed deviation from a presumptive award of full retroactive support in paternity cases, and it found the father failed to establish the equity between the parties justified a deviation. Parrish v. Griggs, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 350 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 25, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 644 (Tenn. Oct. 5, 2017).

90. Appeal.

In determining a father's child support obligation, a trial court misinterpreted the law of the case on remand by limiting its review only to the father's actual income for a specific period of time and not considering other child support variables because the gravamen of the appellate court's opinion was that the parties'  actual circumstances should dictate the calculation of the support obligation. In re Jaiden C.W., 420 S.W.3d 13, 2013 Tenn. App. LEXIS 270 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 11, 2013).

91. Significant Variance Found.

Modification of one parent's child support obligation was appropriate because the documents filed by the parent established a significant variance of more than fifteen percent between the child support order and the presumptive support order using the parent's updated income figures. McCosh v. McCosh, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 695 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2015).

92. Voluntary Underemployment.

Trial court erred by imputing additional income to a father based on a finding of willful underemployment because the issue was not raised in the pleadings, and notice that child support could be modified based on a change in the primary residential parent did not, without more, put the father on notice that he was alleged to be underemployed. Solima v. Solima, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 628 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 30, 2015).

In modifying a father's child support obligation, the trial court erred in imputing income to both the father and the mother because it made no finding that either parent was willfully and/or voluntarily underemployed or unemployed; even if the trial court determined that both the father and the mother were willfully and/or voluntarily underemployed or unemployed, the evidence did not support the amounts imputed. Cook v. Iverson, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 946 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2015).

Trial court did not err by not determining that a mother was willfully and/or voluntarily unemployed where it endorsed the mother's plan of pursuing a degree; the reasonableness of the mother's decision to pursue additional training or education was a factor under the child support guidelines. Tidwell v. Tidwell, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 73 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 2, 2016).

Finding that the mother was not voluntarily underemployed for purposes of determining her child support obligation was supported by evidence that the mother quit her job because she was losing time with the parties'  minor child due to the long commute, the mother did obtain new full-time employment, though at a lesser salary, and the mother was attending school full-time to obtain a degree as a radiology technician. State ex rel. Brown v. Brown, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 86 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 8, 2016).

Circuit court properly granted a mother's petition to downwardly modify her child support obligation based on a decrease in her income because the evidence did not preponderates against the finding that the mother was not voluntarily underemployed; while the mother technically quit her job prior to being fired, she did not leave her job “voluntarily,” and her choice was reasonable. Smith v. Smith, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 370 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 24, 2016).

Trial court erred in ruling that a father was intentionally underemployed because although there was substantial and credible evidence that the father was inflating his expenses and assigning a substantial portion of his income-producing business to his brother, that did not constitute intentional underemployment. Reid v. Reid, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 471 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 15, 2018).

93. Effective Modification Date.

Selection of an effective modification date is a discretionary decision by the trial court; in this case, the trial court should have selected a less arbitrary date, namely that of the June 14, 2011 aging out of the child, which was the only date consistent with case law and the explicit expectations of the parties in their agreed parenting plan, and the trial court erred in designating the date of the final hearing, March 31, 2014, as the effective modification date. Mitchell v. Hall, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 146 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 26, 2016).

94. Disability Payments.

There is no provision in the Child Support Guidelines allowing credit for Social Security disability payments retroactive to the filing of a petition for modification, and such an allowance would be contrary to the operation of the statute. Sewell v. Sewell, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 374 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 27, 2016).

If prior to the modification of custody, the father had filed a petition to modify the amount of child support, the Social Security disability benefits paid to the mother on behalf of the child could have been considered in calculating child support from the date of the petition forward; however, the father did not file a petition to modify support prior to his petition requesting designation of the primary residential parent, and thus the trial court did not err in denying the father's request for an offset as an impermissible retroactive modification of child support. Sewell v. Sewell, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 374 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 27, 2016).

95. Voluntary Payment.

Trial court properly determined that payments taken from the father's pay were involuntary, and thus the voluntary payment doctrine did not bar his recovery for the amount deducted from his income that exceeded a default judgment amount, plus interest; the default judgment awarded interest at a statutory rate without specifying it, yet two different rates applied, the order of income assignment required the surrender of payments even though the judgment had been satisfied, and the award of post-judgment interest was required by statute. Love v. Clark, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 274 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 17, 2018).

96. Significant Variance Not Found.

Trial court properly denied a father's motion to modify his child support obligation because he failed to meet his burden of showing a significant variance; the trial court did not have credible evidence from which to determine the father's true income for purposes of the significant variance calculation because there was no testimony or other evidence that explained the increase in his expenses as a percentage of gross receipts over the pertinent years. Reid v. Reid, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 471 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 15, 2018).

97. Bond.

Because the trial court did not properly ensure that a father possessed the key to his prison cell, the trial court violated the father's right to due process; the trial court had no competent evidence of what the father actually owed in child support or any evidence of the father's ability to pay the arrearage. State ex rel. Haynes v. Daugherty, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 449 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 10, 2019).

Because a trial court had no rational basis for making it more difficult for a father, a defendant in a civil child support enforcement action, to obtain pretrial release than a criminal defendant, requiring a cash-only bond violated the father's right to equal protection of the law under both the state and federal constitutions; a trial court's discretion to require a cash-only appearance bond is constrained by the equal protection guarantees of the United States and Tennessee Constitutions. State ex rel. Haynes v. Daugherty, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 449 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 10, 2019).

Defendants in child support enforcement actions, by virtue of their alleged wrong, pose no risk of danger to the public, and a civil defendant not facing the possibility of a prison sentence upon conviction has less incentive to flee than a criminal defendant; considering the civil contemnor's risk to the community and incentive to flee, it is illogical to make it more difficult for a defendant in a child support enforcement action to secure pretrial release than it for a criminal defendant. State ex rel. Haynes v. Daugherty, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 449 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 10, 2019).

Trial court's discretion to require a cash-only bond is constrained by the due process guarantees of the United States and Tennessee Constitutions. State ex rel. Haynes v. Daugherty, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 449 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 10, 2019).

Trial court exceeded its discretion when it required the immediate forfeiture of a cash-only appearance bond because its decision to require a cash-only bond at the maximum amount allowed, which was to be forfeited immediately upon payment, was not based on a proper application of the statute, nor was it supported by an evidentiary foundation. State ex rel. Haynes v. Daugherty, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 449 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 10, 2019).

In order to comport with the Equal Protection guarantees of both the United States and Tennessee Constitutions in a child support enforcement action, the court must follow the applicable bail statutes set forth in the Release from Custody and Bail Reform Act of 1978 unless the bail statute or statutes conflict with T.C.A. § 36-5-101(f)(2), in which case § 36-5-101(f)(2) controls; this mandate includes T.C.A. §§ 40-11-122 and 40-11-118. State ex rel. Haynes v. Daugherty, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 449 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 10, 2019).

When the “Order of Attachment” was issued there was no basis for the trial court to order the forfeiture of the bond because the father had not failed to appear, and the trial court did not have competent evidence before it to determine whether the father had failed without good cause to comply with the order of support. State ex rel. Haynes v. Daugherty, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 449 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 10, 2019).

Trial court violated a father's constitutional rights because it imposed a cash-only appearance bond after the father arrested and incarcerated pursuant to an order of attachment; the trial court erred by not considering the constitutional constraints in requiring a cash-only bond. State ex rel. Haynes v. Daugherty, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 449 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 10, 2019).

Statute clearly establishes two conditions precedent to forfeiture of a bond, and because the statute states that the bonds may be forfeited, a forfeiture of a bond is not mandated. State ex rel. Haynes v. Daugherty, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 449 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 10, 2019).

Trial court erred in requiring a cash-only appearance bond because it misconstrued and misapplied subsection (f)(2); the cash-only “appearance bond” was used as a means to collect the father's child support arrearage, to coerce his compliance, instead of assuring his appearance at future court hearings, and the trial court set the “appearance bond” at the amount of the alleged arrears and ordered that the cash bond be forfeited immediately upon payment and applied to the child support order. State ex rel. Haynes v. Daugherty, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 449 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 10, 2019).

36-5-102. Portion of spouse's estate decreed to spouse entitled to alimony or support — Maintenance of minor custodial parent.

  1. In cases where the court orders alimony or child support in accordance with § 36-5-101 and § 36-5-121, the court may decree to the spouse who is entitled to such alimony or child support such part of the other spouse's real and personal estate as it may think proper. In doing so, the court may have reference and look to the property that either spouse received by the other at the time of the marriage, or afterwards, as well as to the separate property secured to either by marriage contract or otherwise.
  2. In addition to child support, a judge may require the noncustodial adult parent, who is not the legal spouse of the custodial parent, to pay an amount for the maintenance and support of the custodial parent if the custodial parent of the child is a minor. Such amount shall be determined by the court based on the noncustodial parent's ability to pay and shall be in addition to any court-ordered child support. Any order requiring the noncustodial parent to pay an additional amount for the maintenance and support of the custodial parent shall continue to be effective after the custodial parent reaches eighteen (18) years of age if the custodial parent is in high school. Such order shall continue until the custodial parent marries or graduates from high school or until the class of which the custodial parent is a member when the custodial parent attains eighteen (18) years of age graduates, whichever occurs first. As used in this subsection (b), “maintenance and support of the custodial parent” may also include counseling and other special medical services needed by the custodial parent.

Code 1858, § 2469 (deriv. Acts 1841-1842, ch. 133, § 2); Shan., § 4222; Code 1932, § 8447; Acts 1979, ch. 339, § 2; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 36-821; Acts 1997, ch. 134, § 1; 1998, ch. 1018, § 1; 2005, ch. 287, § 3.

Cross-References. Privilege tax on recordation of divorce decree adjusting property rights, § 67-4-409.

Law Reviews.

Tennessee Law and the Equal Rights Amendment: Domestic Relations, 3 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 312 (1972).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality of Former Law.

This section, which, as written prior to the 1979 amendment, provided for alimony and support awards only to wives, created a gender-based classification with no rational relation to legitimate government interests and was violative of the equal protection guarantees of both state and federal constitutions. Mitchell v. Mitchell, 594 S.W.2d 699, 1980 Tenn. LEXIS 421 (Tenn. 1980).

This section as it existed prior to the 1979 amendment was in contravention of Tenn. Const., art. I and art. XI, § 8 as well as the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution.Kolker v. Gelb, 600 S.W.2d 728, 1980 Tenn. App. LEXIS 379 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980).

2. Construction.

The word “may” cannot be interpreted to mean “shall,” but the court may not exercise arbitrary discretion and, where the facts bring the case within the purpose of the allowance of alimony, it is the duty of the court to allow it. Williams v. Williams, 146 Tenn. 38, 236 S.W. 938, 1921 Tenn. LEXIS 2 (1922).

There was nothing in the 1959 amendment to § 36-4-121 enlarging the scope of that section that had the effect of repealing this section whether directly or by implication. Witherspoon v. Witherspoon, 55 Tenn. App. 484, 402 S.W.2d 492, 1965 Tenn. App. LEXIS 293 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1965).

3. Application.

The provisions in this section obviously were intended to apply only to divorces from the bonds of matrimony. Chenault v. Chenault, 37 Tenn. 248, 1857 Tenn. LEXIS 116 (1856); Boggers v. Boggers, 65 Tenn. 299, 1873 Tenn. LEXIS 349 (1873); Howell v. Thompson, 95 Tenn. 396, 32 S.W. 309, 1895 Tenn. LEXIS 107 (1895).

This section did not apply to petition by wife's counsel to recover attorney fee against husband after parties became reconciled. Haynes v. Haynes, 192 Tenn. 486, 241 S.W.2d 540, 1951 Tenn. LEXIS 291 (1951).

Court did not have authority to award any part of former husband's alleged interest to wife in lieu of monthly alimony payments after decree for absolute divorce had become final. Johnson v. Johnson, 51 Tenn. App. 205, 366 S.W.2d 141, 1962 Tenn. App. LEXIS 104 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1962).

The party obtaining the divorce should not be left in a worse financial situation than he or she had before the opposite party's misconduct brought about the divorce. Shackleford v. Shackleford, 611 S.W.2d 598, 1980 Tenn. App. LEXIS 408 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980), superseded by statute as stated in, Jones v. Jones, — S.W.2d —, 1990 Tenn. App. LEXIS 664 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 21, 1990).

Alimony in solido should not be awarded out of an expectation of future earnings. Aleshire v. Aleshire, 642 S.W.2d 729, 1981 Tenn. App. LEXIS 460 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981), superseded by statute as stated in, Andrews v. Susie Heasook Cho Andrews, 344 S.W.3d 321, 2010 Tenn. App. LEXIS 553 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2010), superseded by statute as stated in, Tippens-Florea v. Florea, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 361 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 31, 2012).

There is no question that fault and need are to be considered in determining alimony in solido. Fisher v. Fisher, 648 S.W.2d 244, 1983 Tenn. LEXIS 632 (Tenn. 1983).

4. Contents of Petition.

Although the levy of an attachment against real estate within the jurisdiction of the court of a nonresident husband who is served only constructively is not a prerequisite to a valid decree for alimony, the petition must disclose that the wife intends to take the realty as alimony. Terrell v. Terrell, 192 Tenn. 317, 241 S.W.2d 411, 1951 Tenn. LEXIS 407 (1951).

In divorce proceeding by wife where there was no personal service on husband or attachment of real estate a decree vesting in wife the husband's interest in real estate “as alimony” was void where petition merely stated that wife intended to take husband's equity in real estate on account of payments made by her on mortgage. Terrell v. Terrell, 192 Tenn. 317, 241 S.W.2d 411, 1951 Tenn. LEXIS 407 (1951).

5. Award.

In case of a divorce a vinculo procured at the suit of the wife the court may vest in the wife absolutely a specific portion of the real or personal estate of the husband. Hamby v. Northcut, 25 Tenn. App. 11, 149 S.W.2d 484, 1940 Tenn. App. LEXIS 87 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1940); Witherspoon v. Witherspoon, 55 Tenn. App. 484, 402 S.W.2d 492, 1965 Tenn. App. LEXIS 293 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1965).

This section empowers the court in a divorce proceeding to award the wife part or all of the husband's real estate as alimony. Terrell v. Terrell, 192 Tenn. 317, 241 S.W.2d 411, 1951 Tenn. LEXIS 407 (1951); Rains v. Rains, 58 Tenn. App. 214, 428 S.W.2d 650, 1968 Tenn. App. LEXIS 295 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1968).

Where both parties are before the court in personam and the real property within the territorial jurisdiction of the court and reasonably identified in the pleadings, there is no question of the authority of the court to decree proper distribution of the property pursuant to the statute. Rains v. Rains, 58 Tenn. App. 214, 428 S.W.2d 650, 1968 Tenn. App. LEXIS 295 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1968).

6. —Amount and Extent.

In general, it is not usual to allow the wife more than one half of the husband's estate as alimony, after making proper deduction for his indebtedness existing before the divorce; but each case must be governed by its own circumstances. Stillman v. Stillman, 66 Tenn. 169, 1874 Tenn. LEXIS 102 (1874). See Chunn v. Chunn, 19 Tenn. 131, 1838 Tenn. LEXIS 34 (1838); Toncray v. Toncray, 123 Tenn. 476, 131 S.W. 977, 1910 Tenn. LEXIS 18, 34 L.R.A. (n.s.) 1106, 1912C Ann. Cas. 284 (1910).

This section and § 36-5-101 do not make any distinction between the two classes of divorce, but it is better practice where a divorce from bed and board is granted to decree the wife a life estate in the husband's land rather than the fee. Edwards v. Edwards, 8 Tenn. Civ. App. 482 (1918).

Upon absolute divorce obtained by the wife, she is entitled to a fair portion of the husband's estate for her suitable support, the amount to be determined according to the circumstances of the parties and the facts of the particular case. Williams v. Williams, 146 Tenn. 38, 236 S.W. 938, 1921 Tenn. LEXIS 2 (1922).

Circumstances of acquisition, maintenance or improvement of property may create equities between the parties that the court is authorized to adjust as an incident to the divorce decree. Rains v. Rains, 58 Tenn. App. 214, 428 S.W.2d 650, 1968 Tenn. App. LEXIS 295 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1968).

Where all of real property awarded to wife in divorce proceeding was received by the parties from wife's father by gift or purchase, wife assisted in or completely performed all improvements on the property and during six years of desertion wife completely supported minor child without any real assistance from husband who was gainfully employed and where husband's claim of present disability was not sustained, trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding entire amount of the real property to wife. Rains v. Rains, 58 Tenn. App. 214, 428 S.W.2d 650, 1968 Tenn. App. LEXIS 295 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1968).

Only under unusual circumstances do the courts allow over one half of a husband's property to the wife as alimony. Elias v. Elias, 61 Tenn. App. 692, 457 S.W.2d 612, 1969 Tenn. App. LEXIS 302 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1969).

Trial court must weigh all relevant facts including the obligations of both parties in awarding alimony and adjusting property interests. Newberry v. Newberry, 493 S.W.2d 99, 1973 Tenn. App. LEXIS 310 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1972).

The court had authority to award as alimony or child support all or any part of an ownership interest in real estate; implicit in authority to award the entire such ownership interest was also the authority to award a security interest in such property. In re Shumate, 39 B.R. 808, 1984 Bankr. LEXIS 5780 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1984).

Inherent in the authority to divest an entire ownership interest is also the power to divest and award the beneficial interest therein. In re Elrod, 42 B.R. 468, 1984 B.R. LEXIS 5206 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1984).

Even though a spouse has no property, such spouse may be required to support the other spouse to the extent of the needs of the needy spouse and the capacity or ability of the supporting spouse. Hall v. Hall, 772 S.W.2d 432, 1989 Tenn. App. LEXIS 11 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989).

7. Wife's Property — Consideration.

In fixing the amount of the alimony or separate maintenance allowed the wife, the court should have reference to the property that the husband received from his wife at the time of their marriage, or afterwards, as well as to the separate property secured to her by marriage contract or otherwise. Swan v. Harrison, 42 Tenn. 534, 1865 Tenn. LEXIS 100 (1865).

While a husband cannot be entirely freed from contributing to his wife's support upon the granting of a divorce because of her ownership of property, yet, under express provisions of this section, the extent of her separate estate shall be taken into consideration, and the amount to be set apart to her may be reduced below what it would otherwise be, because of her ownership of an estate of her own. Williams v. Williams, 146 Tenn. 38, 236 S.W. 938, 1921 Tenn. LEXIS 2 (1922).

In awarding alimony trial court should consider extent, if any, wife contributed to husband's estate. Newberry v. Newberry, 493 S.W.2d 99, 1973 Tenn. App. LEXIS 310 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1972).

8. Estate Not Owned by Husband — Effect of Decree on.

A decree in a divorce case purporting to transfer to the wife a vested remainder interest of the husband in certain land does not convey anything where his sole interest is a contingent remainder, and this defect is not cured by a further description including any other property or estate of the defendant husband. Scruggs v. Mayberry, 135 Tenn. 586, 188 S.W. 207, 1915 Tenn. LEXIS 197 (1915).

9. Fraudulent Conveyance.

Where dismissal of wife's suit for divorce was procured by fraud on the part of the husband, a conveyance by the husband after such dismissal, made to defeat the wife's right of alimony, was void. Brooks v. Caughran, 40 Tenn. 464, 1859 Tenn. LEXIS 131 (1859).

The husband's fraudulent conveyance or assignment made to defeat alimony in which fraudulent design the grantee participated is void as to the wife, and will not even stand good for the purchase money advanced on the same, or responsibilities assumed on account of it, though it may be valid as against the husband's creditors, and such conveyance may be set aside at the instance of the wife, and the property subjected to the payment of her alimony. Brooks v. Caughran, 40 Tenn. 464, 1859 Tenn. LEXIS 131 (1859); Boils v. Boils, 41 Tenn. 284, 1860 Tenn. LEXIS 64 (1860); Nix v. Nix, 57 Tenn. 546, 1873 Tenn. LEXIS 257 (1873); Wilhoit v. Castell, 62 Tenn. 419, 1874 Tenn. LEXIS 72 (1874); Cunningham v. Campbell, 3 Cooper's Tenn. Ch. 708 (1878); Taylor v. Taylor, 6 Tenn. Civ. App. (6 Higgins) 268 (1915).

10. Collateral Proceedings.

In collateral proceedings all presumptions are favorable to the validity of a divorce decree by which the property of the husband is decreed to the wife as part of alimony and the parties thereto are bound thereby and will not be heard to question its efficacy to divest and vest title according to its terms. Hamby v. Northcut, 25 Tenn. App. 11, 149 S.W.2d 484, 1940 Tenn. App. LEXIS 87 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1940).

11. Discretion of Court.

There are no hard and fast rules that will guarantee the parties to a divorce will get a fair share of their property on dissolution of the marriage. In fact, the courts have laid down only general rules and, in general, have left it to the discretion of the trial judge. Shackleford v. Shackleford, 611 S.W.2d 598, 1980 Tenn. App. LEXIS 408 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980), superseded by statute as stated in, Jones v. Jones, — S.W.2d —, 1990 Tenn. App. LEXIS 664 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 21, 1990).

36-5-103. Enforcement of decree for alimony and support.

    1. In addition to the remedies in part 5 of this chapter, the court shall enforce its orders and decrees by requiring the obligor to post a bond or give sufficient personal surety under § 36-5-101(f)(2) to secure past, present, and future support, unless the court finds that the payment record of the obligor parent, the availability of other remedies and other relevant factors make the bond or surety unnecessary.
    2. The court may enforce its orders and decrees by sequestering the rents and profits of the real estate of the obligor against whom such order or decree was issued, if such obligor has any, and such obligor's personal estate and choses in action, and by appointing a receiver thereof, and from time to time causing the same to be applied to the use of the obligee and the children, or by such other lawful means the court deems necessary to assure compliance with its orders, including, but not limited to, the imposition of a lien against the real and personal property of the obligor.
  1. In intrastate cases, jurisdiction to modify, alter or enforce orders or decrees for the support of children shall be determined in accordance with parts 30 and 31 of this chapter.
  2. A prevailing party may recover reasonable attorney's fees, which may be fixed and allowed in the court's discretion, from the non-prevailing party in any criminal or civil contempt action or other proceeding to enforce, alter, change, or modify any decree of alimony, child support, or provision of a permanent parenting plan order, or in any suit or action concerning the adjudication of the custody or change of custody of any children, both upon the original divorce hearing and at any subsequent hearing.
  3. No state court order shall preclude the department of human services from implementing federal requirements for the interception of federal income tax refunds of an obligor for the payment of arrearages of child support.
    1. The commissioner of human services is expressly authorized to issue an administrative order of income assignment to the commissioner of labor and workforce development against any wages or wage benefits to which an obligor is entitled. Such administrative order shall be based upon and issued pursuant to an order from a court of competent jurisdiction or pursuant to state or local law, shall be deemed to be legal process in the nature of a garnishment pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 659(i)(5), and shall direct the payment of child or spousal support by an obligor parent.
    2. Administrative orders of income assignment issued pursuant to the authority of this part may, in the discretion of the commissioner of human services, be delivered to a representative of the commissioner for the purpose of execution, and such representative shall have the power and authority to levy and execute such administrative order.
    3. The administrative order of income assignment authorized by this section may be directed to, and effectively served upon, the commissioner of labor and workforce development by electronically transmitted data to compel the assignment of unemployment benefits in order to satisfy the legal obligation of obligor parents to provide child support payments. The transmission of any such order by the commissioner of human services shall be certification by the commissioner of the existence of the underlying court order and that the procedural requirements for notice to the obligor parent as required by part 5 of this chapter have been satisfied. The administrative order shall show the amount to be deducted from the obligor's unemployment compensation benefits by the department of labor and workforce development so as to comply with the underlying court order, and with any applicable statutes, rules, regulations, or inter-departmental agreements and, when necessary, the order shall contain the last known address of the obligor parent.
    4. The state child support enforcement computer system records shall be the official records of child support orders and child support-related spousal support orders and payment records for purposes of this subsection (e).
    5. If it is determined that the department of labor and workforce development has erroneously or wrongfully withheld benefits from an individual and delivered such benefits to the department of human services pursuant to a commissioner's order of income assignment, the department of human services will pay the correct amount to the individual to correct the erroneous payment.
      1. Every three (3) years, upon request of the custodial or noncustodial parent, or any other caretaker of the child, or, if there is an assignment of support pursuant to title 71, chapter 3, part 1, upon the request of the department or upon the request of the custodial or noncustodial parent, or of any other caretaker of the child, then, in any support order subject to enforcement under Title IV-D of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. § 651 et seq.), the department shall review, and, if appropriate, seek an adjustment of the order in accordance with child support guidelines established pursuant to § 36-5-101(e) without a requirement for proof or showing of any other change in circumstances. If, at the time of the review, there is a “significant variance,” as defined by the department's child support guidelines, between the current support order and the amount that would be ordered under the department's child support guidelines, the department shall seek an adjustment of the order.
      2. In the case of a request for review that is made between three-year cycles, the department shall review, and, if the requesting party demonstrates to the department that there has been a substantial change in circumstances, the department shall seek an adjustment to the support order in accordance with the guidelines established pursuant to § 36-5-101(e). For purposes of this subsection (f), a “substantial change in circumstances” shall be a “significant variance,” as defined by the department's child support guidelines, between the amount of the current order and the amount that would be ordered under the department's child support guidelines.
      3. The review and adjustment in subdivisions (f)(1)(A) and (B) may be conducted by the court, or by the department by issuance of an administrative order by the department or its contractors.
    1. As an alternative to the method described in subdivision (f)(1) for review and adjustment, the child support order may be reviewed, and the order may be adjusted by an administrative order issued by the department or its contractors by:
      1. Applying a cost-of-living adjustment to the order in accordance with a formula developed by the department; or
      2. Using automated methods, including automated comparisons with wage data to identify orders eligible for review, conduct the review, identify orders eligible for adjustment, and apply the appropriate adjustment to the orders eligible for adjustment based upon a threshold developed by the department.
    2. The methods for adjustment of orders of support by issuance of an administrative order pursuant to this section shall be promulgated in the department's rules.
    3. The department shall give written notice to the obligor and obligee that a review of the order of support has been initiated.
    4. The department shall give written notice to the obligor and obligee of the review findings. If the department elects to seek the adjustment of the support order by issuance of an administrative order instead of by judicial order, notice of the proposed administrative adjustment to the order of support shall be sent to the last known addresses of the obligor and obligee thirty (30) calendar days prior to the issuance of the administrative order adjusting the order of support pursuant to the same procedures for service of administrative orders described in § 36-5-807.
      1. The obligor and obligee shall have the right to contest the proposed administrative adjustment to the order of support within thirty (30) days of the mailing date of the notice of the proposed administrative adjustment to the order of support by filing a motion for a hearing on the proposed adjustment with the court having jurisdiction to modify the order of support and by providing notice of the hearing to the department by copy of such motion.
      2. The review by the court shall be completed within timeframes established by federal law.
      3. If the obligor or obligee contests the proposed administrative adjustment pursuant to the procedure in this subsection (f), no further administrative appeal to the department shall be available, and further appeal of the modified support order entered by the court shall be made pursuant to the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure.
    5. If the obligor or obligee does not contest the proposed administrative adjustment to the order of support within thirty (30) calendar days of the mailing date of the notice of the proposed adjustment pursuant to subdivision (f)(6), the department shall issue the administrative order adjusting the order of support.
    6. A copy of an administrative order of adjustment of the child support order shall be sent to the clerk of the court that has jurisdiction of the child support order that has been administratively adjusted and it shall be filed in the court record. A copy of the order shall be sent to the obligor and the obligee by the department by general mail at the last known addresses shown in the department's records.
    7. If an order of support is adjusted by administrative order of the department pursuant to subdivision (f)(7), the obligor and obligee shall have the right to administratively appeal the adjustment by requesting the appeal to the department as provided in part 10 of this chapter. The obligor or obligee may request a stay of the administrative order pursuant to the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, compiled in title 4, chapter 5. The appeal from any decision resulting from the administrative appeal shall be to the court having jurisdiction of the support order and shall be subject to the scope of review as provided pursuant to § 36-5-1003.
    8. Notice of the right to request a review, and, if appropriate, adjust the child support order shall be sent to the obligor and the obligee by the department at least every three (3) years for a child subject to an order being enforced pursuant to Title IV-D of the Social Security Act. The notice may be included in the order.
    9. The requirement for review and adjustment may be delayed if the best interests of the child require. Such interests would include the threat of physical or emotional harm to the child if the review and adjustment were to occur or the threat of severe physical or emotional harm to the child's custodial parent or caretaker.
  4. Judgments for child support payments for each child subject to the order for child support pursuant to this part shall be enforceable without limitation as to time.

Code 1858, § 2470 (deriv. Acts 1835-1836, ch. 26, § 10); Shan., § 4223; Code 1932, § 8448; mod. C. Supp. 1950, § 8448; Acts 1957, ch. 21, § 1; 1965, ch. 229, §§ 1, 2; 1979, ch. 187, § 2; 1979, ch. 339, § 3; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 36-822; Acts 1985, ch. 477, § 8; 1987, ch. 421, §§ 1, 2; 1994, ch. 987, § 6; 1995, ch. 504, § 3; 1997, ch. 551, §§ 8, 28, 45; 1998, ch. 1098, § 16; 1999, ch. 520, § 36; 2001, ch. 447, § 4; 2004, ch. 728, § 1; 2018, ch. 905, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 1998, ch. 1098, § 16 added a second sentence to (f)(4) which read:

“No fee shall be charged for the filing of the order; provided, however, if Senate Bill 3303/House Bill 3305 is enacted and the cost reimbursement provisions are implemented as provided therein, the provisions of this sentence shall be void.” The bill was enacted as Acts 1998, ch. 1048, so the second sentence was not codified.

Acts 2018, ch. 905, § 2 provided that the act, which amended this section, shall apply to actions commenced on or after July 1, 2018.

Amendments. The 2018 amendment rewrote (c) which read: “The plaintiff spouse may recover from the defendant spouse, and the spouse or other person to whom the custody of the child, or children, is awarded may recover from the other spouse reasonable attorney fees incurred in enforcing any decree for alimony and/or child support, or in regard to any suit or action concerning the adjudication of the custody or the change of custody of any child, or children, of the parties, both upon the original divorce hearing and at any subsequent hearing, which fees may be fixed and allowed by the court, before whom such action or proceeding is pending, in the discretion of such court.”

Effective Dates. Acts 2018, ch. 905, § 2. July 1, 2018.

Cross-References. Assignment of income by a court for child support, § 50-2-105.

Criminal sanctions, § 36-5-104.

Personal earnings not exempt from order for alimony or child support, § 26-2-108.

Termination of Acts 1985, ch. 477, which amended this section, § 36-5-110.

Textbooks. Gibson's Suits in Chancery (7th ed., Inman), § 357.

Law Reviews.

A Comparison of Classification and Treatment of Family Support Obligations and Student Loans: A Case Analysis (William Houston Brown and Katherine L. Evans), 24 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 623 (1994).

Family Law — Alexander v. Inman: The Tennessee Court of Appeals Establishes Guidelines for Contingent Attorneys' Fees in Domestic Relation Cases, 26 U. Mem. L. Rev. 1575 (1996).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality of Former Law.

This section, which, as written prior to the 1979 amendment, provided for alimony and support awards only to wives, created a gender-based classification with no rational relation to legitimate government interests and was violative of the equal protection guarantees of both state and federal constitutions. Mitchell v. Mitchell, 594 S.W.2d 699, 1980 Tenn. LEXIS 421 (Tenn. 1980).

This section as it existed prior to the 1979 amendment was in contravention of Tenn. Const., art. I and art. XI, § 8 as well as the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution.Kolker v. Gelb, 600 S.W.2d 728, 1980 Tenn. App. LEXIS 379 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980).

2. Jurisdiction.

Where the chancery court in its decree of divorce made provisions for child support no other court had jurisdiction to enforce the provisions. Crane v. Crane, 26 Tenn. App. 227, 170 S.W.2d 663, 1942 Tenn. App. LEXIS 44 (1942).

Insofar as a divorce case is concerned the authority given by this section to the circuit court to enforce its divorce decree by such means “as are usual and according to the course and practice of the court” necessarily means the authority to do anything that a chancery court can do for the enforcement of such decree since such divorce suit is for all intents and purposes a chancery suit. Kizer v. Bellar, 192 Tenn. 540, 241 S.W.2d 561, 1951 Tenn. LEXIS 301 (1951).

Exclusive jurisdiction of chancery court in enforcing judgments against property subject to execution did not deprive circuit court of exclusive jurisdiction of proceeding by wife to enforce award of alimony and child support provisions of decree entered by circuit court in divorce proceeding. Kizer v. Bellar, 192 Tenn. 540, 241 S.W.2d 561, 1951 Tenn. LEXIS 301 (1951).

If award of alimony in a circuit court case was void, chancery court had jurisdiction to enjoin contempt proceeding by wife to enforce alimony decree. Brown v. Brown, 198 Tenn. 600, 281 S.W.2d 492, 1955 Tenn. LEXIS 412 (1955), rehearing denied, 198 Tenn. 600, 281 S.W.2d 492, 1955 Tenn. LEXIS 413 (1955), superseded by statute as stated in, Perkinson v. Perkinson, — S.W.2d —, 1990 Tenn. App. LEXIS 39 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 1990).

3. Contempt Proceedings.

An award of permanent alimony should not be enforced by attachment for contempt where the former wife has obtained some property of her own, the husband is without an estate, and to imprison him would take away his earning power. Going v. Going, 148 Tenn. 522, 256 S.W. 890, 1923 Tenn. LEXIS 42, 31 A.L.R. 633 (1923).

The declared public policy of this state is to punish for contempt husbands who through willful disobedience or obstinancy refuse to comply with a court order to pay alimony. Thones v. Thones, 185 Tenn. 124, 203 S.W.2d 597, 1947 Tenn. LEXIS 311 (1947).

Where defendant had been held in contempt for failure to pay child support, which contempt had been purged, it was within power of chancellor to relieve defendant from prior judgment of appellate court in same cause. Gossett v. Gossett, 34 Tenn. App. 654, 241 S.W.2d 934, 1951 Tenn. App. LEXIS 108 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1951).

Decree of contempt based on petition for failure to pay alimony was not void because it contained no finding that defendant was able to comply with the decree and willfully refused to pay the amount in arrears. Leonard v. Leonard, 207 Tenn. 609, 341 S.W.2d 740, 1960 Tenn. LEXIS 501 (1960).

Court has jurisdiction to enforce provision in divorce decree for periodic child support payments by contempt proceedings. Sowell v. Sowell, 493 S.W.2d 86, 1973 Tenn. LEXIS 499 (Tenn. 1973).

Trial court erred in awarding the mother attorney's fees and costs because former statute did not authorize the award of attorney's fees related to petitions for contempt or modification of the permanent parenting plan, and, although the father raised matters resolved in a prior order, no substantive evidence was presented, and an award of attorney's fees on appeal was not appropriate. Akins v. Akins, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 337 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 3, 2019).

4. —Constitutionality.

Enforcement of order to pay alimony by contempt proceedings does not violate federal constitutional provision against involuntary servitude (U.S. Const., amend. 13). Clark v. Clark, 152 Tenn. 431, 278 S.W. 65, 1925 Tenn. LEXIS 87 (1925).

Alimony is not a debt within the meaning of the constitutional provision. Contempt proceedings lie in a proper case. Brown v. Brown, 156 Tenn. 619, 4 S.W.2d 345, 1927 Tenn. LEXIS 157 (1928).

5. —Court's Continued Control.

Where divorce decree expressly retained suit for future orders as to payment of alimony, court may thereafter attach for contempt for failure to pay. Clark v. Clark, 152 Tenn. 431, 278 S.W. 65, 1925 Tenn. LEXIS 87 (1925).

6. —Burden of Proof to Show Inability to Pay.

Burden is on defendant to show his inability to comply with decree's provision for alimony. Clark v. Clark, 152 Tenn. 431, 278 S.W. 65, 1925 Tenn. LEXIS 87 (1925).

In contempt proceedings for failure to pay alimony, the burden of proof is on the divorced husband to show his inability to pay. Leonard v. Leonard, 207 Tenn. 609, 341 S.W.2d 740, 1960 Tenn. LEXIS 501 (1960).

7. Decree for Alimony in Excess of Husband's Estate.

Bill to enforce decree for alimony in excess of husband's estate, and to be paid in installments so long as the divorced wife shall remain single, will be sustained, where the divorced husband subsequently inherits an estate of sufficient value to justify the enforcement of such decree for alimony. Watson v. Campodonico, 3 Tenn. Civ. App. (3 Higgins) 698 (1913).

8. Foreign Decree.

A foreign judgment for alimony can be enforced by remedy of sequestration or attachment for contempt providing the foreign judgment is enforceable by same equitable remedies in state where judgment was originally entered. Thones v. Thones, 185 Tenn. 124, 203 S.W.2d 597, 1947 Tenn. LEXIS 311 (1947).

9. Review.

In contempt proceedings for failure to pay alimony, the order cannot be attacked by the bringing of a habeas corpus proceeding based on the inability to comply with the order since the remedy where there is a holding of contempt is by appeal. Leonard v. Leonard, 207 Tenn. 609, 341 S.W.2d 740, 1960 Tenn. LEXIS 501 (1960).

Because the juvenile court did not state its reasoning for denying a mother attorney's fees, the court of appeals conducted a de novo review of the record to determine whether an award of attorney's fees was appropriate. In re Jasmine G., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 194 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 16, 2016).

Father waived his argument that the mother's attorney's fees were unreasonable because the mother submitted the affidavit of her attorney setting forth her fees incurred in the case prior to the hearing, and the father chose not to contest the amount of the mother's attorney's fees in the trial court. Davis v. Hood, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 459 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 30, 2016).

10. Attorney Fees.

In a divorce action, where divorce was granted the husband on cross-complaint of the wife's misconduct, and the wife at all times possessed sufficient financial resources to assert and defend her legal rights, the court held that this section did not require, and the husband should not be burdened with, the payment of the wife's attorney's fees. Baggett v. Baggett, 512 S.W.2d 292, 1973 Tenn. App. LEXIS 260 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1973).

Award of statutory attorney's fees is in the nature of spousal or child support under this section and not dischargeable in bankruptcy. In re Paulson, 27 B.R. 330, 1983 Bankr. LEXIS 6962 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1983).

Counsel fees are not special damages within the purview of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 9.07 in cases covered by this section. Deas v. Deas, 774 S.W.2d 167, 1989 Tenn. LEXIS 376 (Tenn. 1989).

Fee awards under T.C.A. § 36-5-103(c) are not primarily for the benefit of the custodial parent but rather to facilitate a child's access to the courts. Sherrod v. Wix, 849 S.W.2d 780, 1992 Tenn. App. LEXIS 848 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992).

Ability to pay should not be the controlling consideration with regard to awards for legal expenses in custody or support proceedings; it is certainly a factor to be considered, but trial courts may award attorney's fees without proof that the requesting party is unable to pay them as long as the award is just and equitable under the facts of the case. Sherrod v. Wix, 849 S.W.2d 780, 1992 Tenn. App. LEXIS 848 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992).

Trial courts may act upon requests for legal expenses without a fully developed record as long as the party opposing the request has been afforded a fair opportunity to cross-examine the requesting parties' witnesses and to present proof of its own on the issue. Sherrod v. Wix, 849 S.W.2d 780, 1992 Tenn. App. LEXIS 848 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992).

The trial court properly determined that former husband should pay the legal expenses his former wife incurred in responding to his request for a change in child custody where he precipitated the proceedings, where the obsessive way he pursued his former wife prolonged the proceedings and added significantly to their expense, and where many of his allegations were eventually found to be unwarranted. Sherrod v. Wix, 849 S.W.2d 780, 1992 Tenn. App. LEXIS 848 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992).

Services performed by attorney with regard to letters to appellee's first husband and with regard to representing her current husband in a criminal proceeding were not directly related to custody dispute and fees for such services should not have been charged to appellant under T.C.A. § 36-5-103(c). Sherrod v. Wix, 849 S.W.2d 780, 1992 Tenn. App. LEXIS 848 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992).

A showing that prevailing party is financially unable to pay his attorney fees is not a prerequisite for awarding fees under this section. Gaddy v. Gaddy, 861 S.W.2d 236, 1992 Tenn. App. LEXIS 303 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992), rehearing denied, — S.W.2d —, 1992 Tenn. App. LEXIS 412 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 8, 1992), appeal denied, 1992 Tenn. LEXIS 579 (Tenn. Oct. 26, 1992).

T.C.A. § 36-5-103(c) does not authorize the federal bankruptcy court to award attorney fees incurred in a nondischargeability action. Martin v. Morello (In re Morello), 185 B.R. 753, 1995 Bankr. LEXIS 1218 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1995).

The Bankruptcy Court did not have the authority to award attorney's fees under this section following the bankruptcy court's determination that divorce obligations to former wife were nondischargeable. Colbert v. Colbert (In re Colbert), 185 B.R. 247, 1995 Bankr. LEXIS 1121 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1995).

Award of statutory attorney's fees to the wife by the state court was an ancillary obligation of the child support obligation and thus it was actually in the nature of support; therefore, the attorney fee obligation was non-dischargeable in bankruptcy. Silverstein v. Glazer (In re Silverstein), 186 B.R. 85, 1995 Bankr. LEXIS 1288 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1995).

Where wife successfully pursued a suit for change in visitation necessitated by husband's behavior, she was entitled to an award of fees and expenses. D v. K, 917 S.W.2d 682, 1995 Tenn. App. LEXIS 630 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995), appeal denied, D. v. K., — S.W.2d —, 1996 Tenn. LEXIS 91 (Tenn. Feb. 5, 1996).

Award of attorney fees incurred on appeal was inappropriate where both parties were partially successful on appeal. Smith v. Smith, 984 S.W.2d 606, 1997 Tenn. App. LEXIS 218 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997).

Award of attorney fees to ex-wife was reversed where the decision to award custody to the ex-wife was also reversed. Placencia v. Placencia, 3 S.W.3d 497, 1999 Tenn. App. LEXIS 232 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999).

Pursuant to T.C.A. § 36-5-103(c), mother was entitled to recover fees and expenses against father for her counsel's trial and appellate work in child support modification proceedings. Alexander v. Alexander, 34 S.W.3d 456, 2000 Tenn. App. LEXIS 103 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000), review or rehearing denied, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 730 (Tenn. Dec. 18, 2000).

Request for attorney's fees was proper where one party had to resort to the courts in order to enforce the other party's child support obligations. Harris v. Harris, 83 S.W.3d 137, 2001 Tenn. App. LEXIS 902 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001).

Mother was entitled to recover her attorney's fees from the grandparents who intervened in the divorce proceeding to obtain custody of the minor children, as the grandparents would have been entitled to request the fees themselves if they had been the prevailing party. Toms v. Toms, 98 S.W.3d 140, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 1 (Tenn. 2003).

In a child custody case, where the trial court committed several serious procedural errors, and the mother's arguments did not lack factual or legal support, the appellate court denied the father's request that the mother be ordered to pay his appellate legal expenses. Shofner v. Shofner, 181 S.W.3d 703, 2004 Tenn. App. LEXIS 865 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004), rehearing denied, 181 S.W.3d 703, 2005 Tenn. App. LEXIS 854 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005), appeal denied, Shofner v. Kalisz, — S.W.3d —, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 943 (Tenn. Oct. 24, 2005).

Trial court erred in not granting the mother's attorney's fees for the initial litigation because the father sought to have his parenting time altered and his child support obligation decreased, and both T.C.A. § 36-5-103(c) and the contractual agreement between the parties provided a basis to award attorney's fees to the successful litigant. Taylor v. Fezell, 158 S.W.3d 352, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 6 (Tenn. 2005).

In an appeal by the mother and her husband of the trial court's denial of their petition to terminate the biological father's parental rights, the court rejected the biological father's request for attorney fees under T.C.A. § 36-5-103(c) because he was not enforcing any prior custody decree, but the father was entitled to damages under T.C.A. § 27-1-122 for the frivolous appeal. In re M.L.D., 182 S.W.3d 890, 2005 Tenn. App. LEXIS 339 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005), appeal denied, In re Adoption of M.L.D., — S.W.3d —, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 779 (Tenn. Sept. 12, 2005).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying both parties'  requests for attorney's fees under T.C.A. § 36-5-103(c) because neither party was a clear winner in a child support modification action; the mother prevailed with regard to her request that the father be required to pay a portion of private school tuition, but the father prevailed on his claim that he was entitled to a decrease in his base child support because of the decrease in his income. Richardson v. Spanos, 189 S.W.3d 720, 2005 Tenn. App. LEXIS 638 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 5, 2005), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 228 (Tenn. 2006).

Trial court had not erred in awarding attorney fees under T.C.A. § 36-5-103(c) to the wife in her action to enforce the parties'  marital dissolution agreement (MDA), and T.C.A. § 28-3-110 did not bar the wife's claim for the forty-seven thousand dollars she was due upon the sale of the marital residence because the limitations period began to run from the time of the sale which the husband alone had unreasonably delayed. Allison v. Hagan, 211 S.W.3d 255, 2006 Tenn. App. LEXIS 415 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 1070 (Tenn. 2006).

In a divorce proceeding, a wife was not entitled to attorney fees under T.C.A. § 36-6-236, because this was a purely intrastate custody dispute; however, the issue of whether fees should have been awarded under T.C.A. § 36-5-103(c) was not decided since the case was being remanded for reconsideration of alimony and the marital property award to the wife. Keyt v. Keyt, 244 S.W.3d 321, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 1082 (Tenn. Dec. 19, 2007).

By successfully enforcing the earlier custody decree, the father was entitled to recover reasonable attorney fees pursuant to T.C.A. § 36-5-103(c); the fact that the mother chose a different forum in which to challenge a valid custody decree did not impair the father's right pursuant to § 36-5-103(c) to recover his attorney fees. Shofner v. Shofner, 232 S.W.3d 36, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 63 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 30, 2007), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 558 (Tenn. June 18, 2007).

Award of attorney fees on appeal to the mother was appropriate under T.C.A. § 36-5-103(c) because she prevailed on the issue concerning the adjudication of the change of custody of the children. Marlow v. Parkinson, 236 S.W.3d 744, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 243 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 23, 2007), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 867 (Tenn. Sept. 17, 2007).

In addition to a trial court's award of attorney fees to a mother in parties'  post-divorce litigation involving custody and child support matters, which was based on the additional delay caused by the father's conduct, the mother, as the primary residential parent, was also entitled to attorney fees on appeal under T.C.A. § 36-5-103(c). Reeder v. Reeder, 375 S.W.3d 268, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 126 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 24, 2012), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 440 (Tenn. June 20, 2012).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to award a parent in a post-divorce proceeding the total amount of the parent's request for reimbursement in legal expenses and in ordering the other parent to pay the parent for at least some of the parent's incurred legal expenses. The amount of attorney's fees awarded was a reasonable amount considering that the results obtained were not different from a proposed settlement and the expenses incurred for legal counsel and private investigators. Coleman v. Coleman, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 59 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 4, 2015).

Considering the record as whole, a trial court did not abuse its discretion in requiring both parties to pay their respective attorney's fees when an obligor spouse sought to terminated alimony in solido payments. Young v. Young, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 89 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 26, 2015).

Appellate court exercised its discretion to decline an obligee spouse's request for attorney's fees on appeal because the record contained little evidence of the obligee spouse's ability to pay the fees. In addition, while the obligee spouse ultimately prevailed in retaining alimony payments, the spouse did not prevail on an argument that the obligor spouse's petition was barred by the doctrine of res judicata, which issue constituted a good faith basis for the obligor spouse to appeal the ruling. Young v. Young, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 89 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 26, 2015).

Appellate court considered the following factors in its decision to award fees: (1) the requesting party's ability to pay the accrued fees; (2) the requesting party's success in the appeal; (3) whether the requesting party sought the appeal in good faith; and (4) any other relevant equitable factors. Solima v. Solima, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 116 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 11, 2015).

Mother and a father were responsible for their own attorney's fees on appeal because although the father was successful on appeal, the mother's claims were not without merit. In re Jayden C., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 142 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 23, 2015).

Former wife was entitled to an award of attorney's fees and expenses on appeal with respect to the husband's alimony modification petition, based on the nature of the issues, the parties'  respective financial positions, and her success on appeal. Malkin v. Malkin, 475 S.W.3d 252, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 151 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 26, 2015), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 617 (Tenn. July 21, 2015).

Mother awarded her attorney fees incurred on appeal, given that she prevailed on appeal, and the child benefitted from the award of support. In re Jake S., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 277 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 29, 2015).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding a former spouse attorney's fees and discretionary costs in the amounts set forth in the court's final order because, although the court provided some relief to the obligor spouse by reducing the obligor spouse's alimony payments for a number of months, the former spouse was the prevailing party as the court did not reduce the obligor spouse's alimony permanently or allow the obligor spouse to reduce the obligor spouse's child support obligation. Wiser v. Wiser, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 293 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2015).

Appellate court exercised its discretion to award a former spouse the reasonable attorney's fees and costs the spouse incurred in defending the obligor spouse's appeal of the trial court's order denying the obligor spouse's petition to modify alimony and child support. Remand of the case to the trial court for a determination of the appropriate amount of fees and costs that were be awarded to the former spouse was necessary. Wiser v. Wiser, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 293 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2015).

Although the trial court had the authority to award attorney fees, the court did not abuse its discretion in declining to do so when the court found that each party in the parenting time and child support dispute was to bear the expense of his or her own attorney fees. As to the matter of attorney fees on appeal, the appellate court declined to award fees to either party because each was successful on some issues on appeal. In re Grace N., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 331 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 14, 2015).

Wife was not entitled to her attorney fees on appeal because the husband's appeal of an alimony award in futuro was not frivolous. Inman v. Inman, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 368 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 26, 2015).

Where the daughter's primary residential parents initiated the case by filing a petition for termination of the biological parents'  rights, this section did not provide a statutory basis for the award of attorney's fees. In re Makenzie L., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 480 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 17, 2015), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 860 (Tenn. Oct. 15, 2015).

Because both of the parents prevailed on different issues in an appeal, neither party, therefore, was entitled to an award of fees in the case involving a child's custody and enforcement of a child support order. In re Gabriel V., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 506 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 24, 2015), appeal denied, In re Gabriel, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 961 (Tenn. Nov. 24, 2015).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion by awarding the payee parent attorney's fees for having to respond to an inappropriately prepared permanent parenting plan as well as multiple motions to alter or amend judgment dealing with issues that the court had previously decided. McCosh v. McCosh, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 695 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2015).

In a Title IV-D child support case, there was no abuse of discretion in awarding attorney fees to a guardian ad litem in light of the parties'  respective incomes and the court's findings concerning the father's lack of candor in both his testimony and in the disclosure of his income. In re Chase R., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 814 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 6, 2015).

Trial court acted within its discretion by not awarding attorney fees to the mother, even though the father was not successful in his petition to modify custody, because the trial court noted that the primary responsibility for creating an environment for the child to believe that the other parent was not as important rested on the mother's shoulders. Watson v. Myers, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 826 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 7, 2015), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 149 (Tenn. Feb. 18, 2016).

Mother was entitled to reasonable attorney's fees incurred in her appeal, as the father knew he did not always act in good faith throughout the proceedings, in which he challenged the trial court's finding that the mother did not receive notice of his intent to relocate and that the relocation did not have a reasonable purpose and was not in the child's best interest. Mackey v. Mayfield, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 822 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 8, 2015).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding a parent attorney's fees and costs because the proceedings concerning the parent's relocation did not need to be contentious or as difficult as they were. The trial court further found that the fees which the parent requested were very reasonable in light of the extensive litigation that was conducted in the case from when the parent gave notice that the parent was relocating. Eberbach v. Eberbach, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 872 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 23, 2015), rev'd, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 281 (Tenn. May 23, 2017).

This matter was not one in which the father incurred attorney fees on behalf of the minor, and the matter was not to enforce any decree for child support, nor did it seek to adjudicate the custody of a child, and thus the action did not fit the language or purpose of the statute, no exception to the American Rule existed in this case, and the trial court erred in awarding attorney fees to the father's attorney, plus the father was not awarded fees on appeal. Carter v. Carter, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 919 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 18, 2015), substituted opinion, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 130 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 19, 2016).

Because a case had to be remanded for further proceedings on child support, and based on the particular factual circumstances, the court of appeals declined to award either a father or a mother attorney?s fees. Cook v. Iverson, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 946 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2015).

Court of appeals exercised its discretion and awarded a wife a reasonable amount of fees she incurred to defend the appeal because as the prevailing party, the wife could recover the fees from the husband. Chumley v. Chumley, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 990 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 23, 2015).

While petitioner obtained relief as to the elder children and received a reduction in child support, respondent also prevailed on the issue of the amount of petitioner's income and alleged underemployment, and both sides prevailed, such that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding respondent her attorney fees. Mitchell v. Hall, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 146 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 26, 2016).

Mother was entitled to recover the attorney's fees she incurred to enforce the father's child support obligation and to defend his petition to change custody because if the mother was required to pay the entirety of her attorney's fees it would, in effect, reduce the amount of support received; there was a large disparity between the income of the mother and the father. In re Jasmine G., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 194 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 16, 2016).

Mother was not entitled to an award of attorney's fees under the parental relocation statute because she abandoned her planned relocation; the statute allowing attorney fees did not permit the recovery of attorney's fees in litigation relating to the relocation of a minor child. In re Jasmine G., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 194 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 16, 2016).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding a mother a portion of her attorney's fees because the mother was successful in enforcing the trial court's prior order regarding alimony and defending against the father's efforts to change the primary residential parent. Galaway v. Galaway, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 232 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2016).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion with respect to the award of attorney fees to the wife because the award was required because of the husband's obstructionist behavior in the case. However, the wife was not entitled to fees for time spent responding to the husband's motion for a stay of execution on the judgment, which motion for a stay was granted, as this motion was related to the parties'  access to corporate debentures, not to alimony or child support. St. John-Parker v. Parker, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 335 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 17, 2016).

In a child support case, a trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a request for statutory attorney's fees; moreover, because a mother's appeal in this case was not frivolous, the appellate court declined to award the father attorney's fees on that basis. Benedict v. Benedict, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 358 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 25, 2016).

Trial court abused its discretion in ordering an obligor parent to pay any of the obligee parent's attorney's fees because there was fault on the part of both parties in the case. Considering the equities between the parties and the ultimate disposition of the appeal, the appellate court declined to award either party's attorney's fees on appeal. Stewart v. Rowland, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 385 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 2, 2016).

Because criminal contempt petitions do not operate to enforce child support orders or adjudicate custody, T.C.A. § 36-5-103(c) does not authorize a court to award attorney's fees related to criminal contempt. Watts v. Watts, 519 S.W.3d 572, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 402 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 8, 2016).

Balancing the father's lack of funds and the alimony in solido awarded to the mother, there was no abuse of discretion in the trial court's decision to award the mother some reasonable attorney fees; the matter was remanded for a calculation of the mother's fees that were only attributable to issues involving custody and child support. Hopwood v. Hopwood, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 427 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 23, 2016).

Trial court was not authorized to award any fees to the mother in expectation of the appeal, and that award was reversed. Hopwood v. Hopwood, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 427 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 23, 2016).

Because of the factors militating against an award of fees and the fact that the father prevailed on some of the issues in the case, attorney fees on appeal were not awarded to the mother. Hopwood v. Hopwood, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 427 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 23, 2016).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding a mother half of her attorney's fees because both the mother and the father were partially successful. Davis v. Hood, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 459 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 30, 2016).

Chancery court did not abuse its discretion in awarding a mother partial attorney's fees because, as the parties'  mentally retarded and epileptic daughter was not yet twenty-two at the time when the father filed a petition to terminate child support, at least a portion of the mother's attorney's fees were incurred enforcing a decree for child support. Gregory v. Gregory, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 464 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 30, 2016).

Because the mother's efforts to modify child support benefited the special needs child as an upward deviation was awarded for extraordinary educational expenses, the award of the mother's attorney's fees was appropriate under this statute. Thayer v. Thayer, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 535 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 26, 2016).

Because the trial court erred in requiring each party to pay his or her own attorney's fees, the matter was remanded for the trial court was to reconsider the appropriateness of an award of reasonable attorney's fees, both at trial and on appeal, under the applicable statute and the dissolution agreement. Hauf v. Hauf, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 635 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 26, 2016).

Mother was not entitled to an award of attorney's fees, as the parties filed competing petitions to modify the parenting plan and the mother did not prevail at the trial court level. Lanier v. Lanier, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 943 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 9, 2016).

There was no abuse of discretion in the trial court's determination that an award of attorney fees of $ 10,000 was reasonable under the circumstances; although the court might may have chosen to deny the husband's request to recover his attorney fees incurred in the trial, it was not the court's prerogative to second guess the trial court in such matters. Cain-Swope v. Swope, 523 S.W.3d 79, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 986 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 23, 2016), appeal denied, Cain-Swope v. Swope, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 227 (Tenn. Apr. 12, 2017).

Trial court properly declined to award the mother additional attorney's fees because she did not prevail at trial inasmuch as she lost on her primary issue raised below and on appeal. In re Maddox P., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 26 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 17, 2017).

Because there were genuine issues in a child custody case that needed to be resolved, there was no abuse of discretion in ordering the parties to pay their own attorney's fees. Grigsby v. Alvis-Crawford, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 58 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2017).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion by awarding the mother attorney's fees after denying the father's motions to change primary custody and to hold the mother in contempt. Colley v. McBee, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 68 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 2, 2017).

Mother was properly awarded the costs she incurred in enforcing a previous judgment because requiring her to bear the fees she incurred to enforce the previous decree of child support would cause her an injustice; the mother was also awrded the portion of the attorney's fees she incurred that were attributable to securing the judgment for the child support arrearage. In re Braylin D., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 81 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 7, 2017).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to award a mother attorney's fees for the time spent relative to litigating the competing petitions to modify the parenting plan because both the mother and the father engaged in a history of defending and prosecuting suits against the other as respects their parental rights and duties. In re Braylin D., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 81 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 7, 2017).

Award of attorney's fees to the father had to be reversed given the mother's success on appeal in challenging the restriction of her parenting time. Allen v. Allen, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 157 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 7, 2017).

Considering all the factors, the wife was awarded attorney fees on appeal. Lee v. Lee, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 215 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2017).

If the court determines a martial dissolution agreement (MDA) is inapplicable, it should so state on the record and then turn to the parties'  statutory claims under which any award of fees is within the sound discretion of the trial or appellate courts unless otherwise specified in the statute; even if the court determines an award of attorney's fees is mandated by the terms of the MDA, the court still should also review the claims for fees or expenses under any applicable statutory authority. Eberbach v. Eberbach, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 281 (Tenn. May 23, 2017).

In cases where parties seek attorney's fees under statutory authority alone, the statute governs the award, is the exception to the American Rule, and is the basis for the court's authority to grant fees on appeal; thus, when appellate attorney's fees are requested pursuant to statutes that expressly permit the court to exercise its discretion, the court of appeals should analyze a request by exercising its discretion to determine whether an award to the prevailing party is appropriate. Eberbach v. Eberbach, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 281 (Tenn. May 23, 2017).

Because fee provisions in marital dissolution agreements are binding on the parties, when confronted with a request for fees under both contractual and statutory authority, the courts should look to the parties'  contract first before moving on to any discretionary analysis under statutes. Eberbach v. Eberbach, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 281 (Tenn. May 23, 2017).

It is important for the courts to ensure they conduct an analysis under both the parties'  contract and any applicable statutes or other equitable grounds, and in the event the award is reversed on one ground, it may be upheld on another; analyzing all applicable grounds for attorney's fee awards ensures judicial economy is maximized. Eberbach v. Eberbach, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 281 (Tenn. May 23, 2017).

Mother's request for attorney's fees was denied as both parties filed competing petitions to modify the permanent parenting plan and were in agreement that the residential schedule needed to be revised, and while the mother prevailed on the child support issue, the father prevailed on the issue of decision-making authority. In re Emmett D., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 458 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 7, 2017).

Trial court did not err in refusing to exercise its discretion to award the wife reasonable attorney's fees at trial because, although the wife stated that she was not able to pay for her attorney, that the husband had substantial income, and that the husband was found at fault in the divorce, the wife did not include any citations to the record or otherwise expound upon her claim that she was in need of money to pay her attorney. Williams v. Williams, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 563 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 17, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 883 (Tenn. Dec. 8, 2017).

Because a former wife prevailed on the issue of child support, when the former husband petitioned to reduce the husband's child support obligation, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the wife the attorney's fees which the wife incurred in defending the original child support order. Scobey v. Scobey, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 612 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 13, 2017).

Mother's request for attorney's fees on appeal was denied where the father was successful in appealing the finding of criminal contempt and the amount of attorney's fees and costs with which he was assessed by the trial court. McClain v. McClain, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 634 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 21, 2017).

Wife's request for attorney's fees was denied because even to the extent the statute was applicable, the court of appeals declined to exercise its discretion to award attorney's fees to the wife under the statute. Vlach v. Vlach, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 717 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 27, 2017).

Denial of parent's request for attorney's fees incurred on appeal in a child custody issue was appropriate because both parents were partially successful on appeal. Roberts v. Roberts, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 758 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 22, 2017).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney's fees to the mother because she filed her petition for modification of the parenting plan and child support in April 2015, but the matter was not finally heard until September 2016 after numerous delays by the father, including his refusal to provide proof of income so that child support could be properly calculated; and the mother prevailed on her petition after the trial court heard lengthy testimony from both parents. Steakin v. Steakin, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2018).

Although T.C.A. § 36-5-103(c) provided a basis for an award of attorney's fees in actions to enforce alimony, the trial court improperly awarded attorney's fees on based T.C.A. § 20-12-119(c)(1). Karsonovich v. Kempe, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 104 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2018).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding a mother attorney fees for the entire proceeding, from the beginning when the father's parenting time was suspended, based upon the father's physical altercation with the father's then wife during parenting time with the parties'  children, to the end when the father's parenting time was reinstated, after the father addressed anger management issues, as the mother was the prevailing party in that the mother's petition was filed to protect the interests of the parties'  children. Stancil v. Stancil, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 188 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 10, 2018).

Because an appeal concerned a trial court's denial of one spouse's motion for recusal rather than alimony, child support, or custody, the statute providing for attorney's fees was not applicable to the case and the moving spouse wss unable to recover the spouse's fees pursuant to the statute. Rich v. Rich, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 229 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 27, 2018).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding a mother a portion of her attorney's fees because the father sought equal parenting time and major-decision making authority over decisions related to the child's non-emergency healthcare, extracurricular activities, and education, but his parenting time was reduced by nineteen days, and he was not awarded major decision-making authority. Bowen v. Wiseman, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 375 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 29, 2018).

Trial court, which found that a father's children were no longer dependent and neglected, did not abuse its discretion in failing to award attorney fees to the father pursuant to this section. In re Maya M., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 395 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 9, 2018).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding a parent a portion of the attorney fees which the parent incurred in the enforcement of a decree for child support. Contreras v. Hinson, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 431 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 25, 2018).

Because the court of appeals remanded the case for further proceedings relative to the modification of support, it vacate the order denying a mother's application for fees and remanded that issue for reconsideration after completion of proceedings on remand. Reid v. Reid, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 471 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 15, 2018).

When a mother unsuccessfully sought modification of a primary residential parent and a residential parenting schedule, the father was not entitled to appellate attorney's fees because the factors relevant to such fees did not warrant an award. Null v. Cummins, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 480 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 17, 2018).

Case involved not only the custody of the parties'  minor child but the collection of child support that the husband owed dating back to 2012; the husband had not shown that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding the wife the attorney's fees she incurred in this case. Jackson v. Jackson, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 596 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 9, 2018).

Trial court, which denied an ex-husband's petition for modification of alimony and two motions to alter or amend, did not abuse its discretion in awarding the ex-wife attorney fees incurred in defending the original petition and the subsequent motions to alter or amend the judgment. Friesen v. Friesen, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 651 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 5, 2018).

Because the mother prevailed in her issues on appeal concerning the payment of private school tuition and the father's child support obligation, this was an appropriate case for an award to the mother attorney fees incurred on appeal. Pierce v. Pierce, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 671 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 19, 2018).

Father enjoyed a significant increase in income for approximately two and one-half years before the mother became aware of the change and sought a modification of the father's child support obligation; as the mother demonstrated that a significant variance existed warranting an increase in the father's obligation, the trial court erred in failing to award the mother the full measure of her attorney fees. Pierce v. Pierce, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 671 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 19, 2018).

Although the trial court did not make a finding concerning the father's ability to pay in the current order, the court previously found him in civil contempt for having the ability to pay and willfully failing to do so; furthermore, having found an award of attorney's fees appropriate, the trial court's additional consideration of the father's ability to pay those fees was at that point discretionary. State ex rel. Groesse v. Sumner, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 23 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 18, 2019).

Mother successfully enforced the existing child support order, and inasmuch as she was the prevailing party in the de novo hearing, the fact that she was also the prevailing party in the hearing before the magistrate did not affect the award of attorney fees for the de novo proceeding; the trial court found the amount of fees awarded to be properly calculated for services rendered from the month following the hearing before the magistrate. State ex rel. Groesse v. Sumner, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 23 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 18, 2019).

Attorney's fee award to the mother was affirmed where the father failed to provide a transcript or statement of the evidence, and thus, the appellate court had no means to review the trial court's decision. In re Jaxon W., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 87 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 15, 2019).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding a mother attorney's fees because, while no party in the case may have been completely without fault, the mother succeeded in the litigation to modify the permanent parenting plan and child support applicable to the parties'  minor child and the trial court had the discretion to award the attorney's fees as it did. Iveson v. Iveson, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 130 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 18, 2019).

Court of appeals exercised its discretion to award a wife the reasonable fees she incurred in defending a husband's appeal because the wife the prevailing party on appeal and could not be required to use her limited resources to pay for the defense of the trial court's award to her of either the one-half interest in a fifth wheel camper or long-term spousal support. Parker v. Parker, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 173 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 9, 2019).

Mother was not the plaintiff spouse, she was not seeking to enforce a decree for alimony or child support, and the father's petition did not seek to change the custody of the minor child; therefore, the statute did not authorize the chancery court's award of attorney's fees. New v. Dumitrache, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 174 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 12, 2019).

Remand court did not abuse its discretion in divorce proceedings with respect to attorney's fees attributable to child support and child custody, when other issues were involved, because the court explained its calculation of the amount of the fees. Hopwood v. Hopwood, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 232 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 14, 2019).

Mother was entitled to attorney fees on appeal because she had prevailed on each issue raised in the father's appeal concerning visitation and the record shows that the mother earned approximately $37,779 per year as a school teacher, while the father earned approximately $69,780. Burchfield v. Burchfield, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 248 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 21, 2019).

Trial court properly held that a father's petition for attorney's fees was not barred by res judicata where despite the mother's decision to voluntarily dismiss her petition without prejudice, father was still permitted to recover the attorney's fees he incurred in defending against her petition, the father's petition to modify the summer parenting schedule did not arise out of the same transaction as the mother's petition, and nothing in the consent order resolving the father's petition could be interpreted as having resolved his claim for attorney's fees in the separate matter or that could be deemed to otherwise preclude his ability to file a petition to recover those attorney's fees. Hayes v. Scoggin, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 360 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 25, 2019).

No party was entitled to appellate attorney's fees on appeal from a child support modification proceeding because (1) each party had the ability to pay the fees, and (2) neither party procured a reversal. Schwager v. Messer, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 477 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 27, 2019).

Mother was properly awarded part of the mother's attorney's fees and expert witness fees incurred in a child support modification proceeding because (1) the mother partially prevailed, and (2) the reasonable award protected the children's interest in child support. Schwager v. Messer, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 477 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 27, 2019).

Appellate court found that a mother was not to be required to bear the financial burden of the father's actions in alleging that a material change in circumstance had occurred and award the mother reasonable attorney's fees because all of the relevant factors weighed in favor of an award of attorney's fees. The mother had meager wage earnings, did not have much ability to pay the mother's own attorney's fees, was likely to succeed on the appeal, and had been acting in good faith throughout the proceedings. In re Caroline U., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 489 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 4, 2019).

Wife was entitled to an award of trial and appellate attorney's fees when her former husband filed a fourth petition to modify his alimony obligation because (1) her alimony award demonstrated her financial need and the husband's ability to pay, and (2) she was successful on appeal. Malkin v. Malkin, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 494 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 7, 2019), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. LEXIS 200 (Tenn. Apr. 1, 2020).

There was no error in a trial court's decision to award attorney fees separately to the father regarding the mother's proposed relocation to another state and to the mother regarding modification of the parties'  parenting plan because courts regularly distinguished between issues in post-divorce actions when awarding attorney fees. Dale v. Dale, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 619 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 20, 2019).

Because a mother did not contest that the father prevailed on the father's petition in opposition to the mother's relocation request, the trial court's determination that the father was a prevailing party for the purposes of awarding attorney fees was appropriate. The court found that the mother had no reasonable purpose for the move—as the mother's job prospects in another state were too speculative and the mother sought to get away from the conflict between the parties—and the move would not have been in the children's best interests. Dale v. Dale, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 619 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 20, 2019).

Trial court's denial of attorney fees was affirmed in deference to the court's discretion in such matters, and attorney fees on appeal were also denied. Kibbe v. Kibbe, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 38 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 30, 2020).

Because the trial court's ruling on the ex-wife's child support obligation was vacated and remanded for reconsideration under the state's child support guidelines, and remained an issue to be decided by the trial court, the appellate court vacated the denial of attorney's fees at trial and remanded the decision to the trial court to determine with the wife's child support obligation. Cain-Swope v. Swope, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 76 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 21, 2020).

Upon consideration of the appropriate factors and in the court's discretion, the court denied the wife's request for attorney's fees. Henry v. Henry, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 84 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 26, 2020).

In light of the issues involved in the litigation, the respective financial positions of the parties, and the resolution of the parties'  respective appellate issues, the appellate court exercised its discretion to deny a wife's request for an award of the wife's reasonable appellate attorney's fees and expenses on appeal. Wright v. Wright, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 99 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 6, 2020).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in requiring each party to be responsible for his or her own attorney fees and expenses, and the court declined to award either party attorney fees on appeal. Tutor v. Tutor, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 108 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 10, 2020).

Mother was entitled to an award of fees, as the father's motion for relief was an attempt to avoid the child support modification and arrearage judgment that had been entered and it was his own actions that led to the default judgment against him; moreover, the judgment set the father's income far above the mother's and he admitted that he willfully deprived the mother of child support for a considerable period of time. Napier v. Napier, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 332 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 27, 2020).

Court exercised its discretion in this case to award the wife the reasonable fees she has incurred in defending the husband's appeal. Story v. Nussbaumer-Story, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 372 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 19, 2020).

11. Applicability.

Award of attorney's fees subsection not applicable to parental rights termination cases. In re Mattie L., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 152 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 14, 2020).

36-5-104. Failure to comply with child support order — Criminal sanctions — Inference of obligor's ability to pay.

  1. Any person, ordered to provide support and maintenance for a minor child or children, who fails to comply with the order or decree, may, in the discretion of the court, be punished by imprisonment in the county workhouse or county jail for a period not to exceed six (6) months.
  2. No arrest warrant shall issue for the violation of any court order of support if such violation occurred during a period of time in which the obligor was incarcerated in any penal institution and was otherwise unable to comply with the order.
  3. In addition to the sanction provided in subsection (a), the court shall have the discretion to require an individual who fails to comply with the order or decree of support and maintenance to remove litter from the state highway system, public playgrounds, public parks, or other appropriate locations for any prescribed period or to work in a recycling center or other appropriate location for any prescribed period of time in lieu of or in addition to any of the penalties otherwise provided; provided, however, that any person sentenced to remove litter from the state highway system, public playgrounds, public parks, or other appropriate locations or to work in a recycling center shall be allowed to do so at a time other than such person's regular hours of employment.
  4. In any proceeding to enforce child support, the court may apply an inference that the obligor had the ability to pay the ordered child support as set forth in § 36-5-101(a)(8).

Acts 1961, ch. 201, § 1; 1978, ch. 882, § 1; T.C.A., § 36-835; Acts 2003, ch. 189, § 1; 2007, ch. 502, § 2.

Cross-References. Assignment of income by a court for child support, § 50-2-105.

Nonsupport and flagrant nonsupport, § 39-15-101.

Support of child over 18 in high school, § 34-1-102.

Textbooks. Gibson's Suits in Chancery (7th ed., Inman), § 377.

Law Reviews.

Criminal Contempt, Jury Trial, Private Prosecutors & Child Support, (Clarke Lee Shaw), 34 No. 4 Tenn. B.J. 22 (1998).

Criminal Procedure — Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A.: The Right to a Disinterested Prosecutor in a Federal Criminal Contempt Proceeding Arising from the Underlying Civil Litigation, 18 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 143 (1987).

Attorney General Opinions. Transfer upon demand for jury trial in criminal contempt proceeding, OAG 98-048, 1998 Tenn. AG LEXIS 48 (2/23/98).

Public defenders' representation of indigents in child support and contempt proceedings, OAG 98-092, 1998 Tenn. AG LEXIS 92 (4/15/98).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Visitation and Custody Orders.

Court improperly sentenced defendant to six months imprisonment for contempt for removing child in violation of court orders under this section because the only contempt power conferred upon the trial court for infractions of visitation and custody orders is found in T.C.A. § 29-9-102. State v. Sammons, 656 S.W.2d 862, 1982 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 491 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1982).

Prosecutions for contempt for the violation of this section, where imprisonment may not exceed six months upon conviction, is a “small offense” within the meaning of Tenn. R. Crim. P. 23. Robinson v. Gaines, 725 S.W.2d 692, 1986 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 2865 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1986).

2. Effect of Procedural Errors upon Judgment.

Where a father was held in contempt for failure to pay delinquent alimony, an error in the mittimus directing the sheriff to incarcerate the person for an indefinite period of time or until he paid a certain sum did not vitiate the judgment, i.e., the order of confinement. Richmond v. Barksdale, 688 S.W.2d 86, 1984 Tenn. App. LEXIS 3340 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984).

3. Willful Conduct Required for Contempt.

A finding of willful misconduct must precede a judgment for contempt; thus, a holding that a father was in contempt of prior court orders for the payment of child support was unjustified where the court found the father's “contempt” was not willful. Haynes v. Haynes, 904 S.W.2d 118, 1995 Tenn. App. LEXIS 130 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995).

4. Jury Trial Required.

T.C.A. § 36-5-104(a) defines a criminal offense, for which persons charged with a violation thereof are entitled to jury trials. Brown v. Latham, 914 S.W.2d 887, 1996 Tenn. LEXIS 29 (Tenn. 1996).

5. Sentence.

Sentence of husband for failure to pay child support to six months' incarceration to be served 24 hours at a time one day each month was not authorized; the maximum penalty for failure to pay support is six months incarceration and any punishment imposed must be completed within a six month period. Herrera v. Herrera, 944 S.W.2d 379, 1996 Tenn. App. LEXIS 656 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996).

Trial court erred in denying a mother's motion to alter or amend an order finding her guilty of criminal contempt for non-payment of child support because nothing in the order indicated that it considered whether the mother's sentence would be served consecutively or concurrently, and it completely omitted any discussion of the sentencing factors; the order failed to even indicate the statutory provision relies upon in finding the mother in contempt and imposing the sentence of incarceration. Burris v. Burris, 512 S.W.3d 239, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 698 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 20, 2016).

6. Punishment.

This section addresses the failure to pay child support; the punishment for violation is the equivalent of punishment for committing a misdemeanor offense. Ahern v. Ahern, 15 S.W.3d 73, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 137 (Tenn. 2000).

T.C.A. § 36-5-104 is not a contempt statute, and as such, the trial court's power to punish under T.C.A. § 29-9-103 is unaffected by § 36-5-104; section 36-5-104 is instead a criminal offense, and the trial court is, therefore, not required to limit its sentence to merely six months in compliance with § 36-5-104, if it instead relies upon § 29-9-103. Burris v. Burris, 512 S.W.3d 239, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 698 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 20, 2016).

Nothing in the statute specifically limits a court's contempt power under Title 29; the General Assembly does not expressly characterize the statute as a contempt statute. Burris v. Burris, 512 S.W.3d 239, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 698 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 20, 2016).

7. Contempt Properly Found.

Trial court did not err in denying a mother's motion to alter or amend an order finding her in contempt for failure to pay child support because the facts the mother alleged were not a proper basis for the alteration of the trial court's judgment; even assuming some of the facts the mother alleged in her motion were in existence at the time of the contempt hearing, nothing in the mother's motion alleged that those facts could not have been known to her through exercise of reasonable diligence. Burris v. Burris, 512 S.W.3d 239, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 698 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 20, 2016).

Mother failed to comply with the clear mandates of the rule because she filed no transcript or statement of the evidence from the trial court proceedings; because the trial court's findings of fact were presumed to be correct in the absence of a transcript or statement of the evidence, the denial of the mother's motion to alter or amend was affirmed, and the underlying judgment finding the mother guilty of criminal contempt for failure to pay child support was therefore affirmed. Burris v. Burris, 512 S.W.3d 239, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 698 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 20, 2016).

8. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

Trial court erred in denying a mother's motion to alter or amend an order finding her guilty of criminal contempt for non-payment of child support because its failure to make specific findings of fact and conclusions of law in its order, together with its apparent failure to even consider the excessiveness of the sentence imposed, created an injustice or error of law sufficient to justify reconsideration. Burris v. Burris, 512 S.W.3d 239, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 698 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 20, 2016).

36-5-105. Intestacy of plaintiff spouse — Effect on alimony.

    1. If the bonds of matrimony have been dissolved at the suit of the plaintiff spouse, the defendant spouse shall not be entitled to any part of the real or personal estate of the plaintiff spouse in case of such plaintiff's intestacy.
    2. Any entitlement a spouse may have to alimony shall be decided on the basis of factors set forth in § 36-5-121.
  1. However, when the cause of divorce is irreconcilable differences under § 36-4-103, subsection (a) shall not apply if the parties have entered into a written marital dissolution agreement wherein the plaintiff consents to the payment to the defendant of alimony, either in lump sum form or periodic payments; provided, that such marital dissolution agreement is approved by the court granting the decree of divorce.

Acts 1983, ch. 414, § 6; T.C.A., § 36-840; Acts 1987, ch. 390, § 5; 2005, ch. 287, § 4.

Cross-References. Effect of divorce, annulment, or decree of separation on entitlement to decedent's estate, § 31-1-102.

Law Reviews.

Marital Property in Tennessee: An Evolution, Not a Revolution (Sheryl S. Scheible), 15 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 475 (1985).

36-5-106. Reports pursuant to Fair Credit Reporting Act.

  1. The department of human services or any of its Title IV-D child support contractors shall report periodically to consumer reporting agencies, as defined in the Fair Credit Reporting Act (15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f)), the name of any noncustodial parent, of which the department or its Title IV-D contractors has a record, who is either current in payments of support or who is delinquent in the payment of support and the amount of the current obligation or arrears owed by such parent. Such information shall only be furnished to an entity that furnishes evidence to the department of human services that it meets the requirements to be defined as a consumer reporting agency pursuant to the Fair Credit Reporting Act.
  2. For purposes of this section, “delinquent” means any occasion on which the full amount of ordered support ordered for or on behalf of a minor child, or for a spouse or former spouse of the obligor with whom the child is living to the extent the spousal support would be included for the purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 654(4), is not paid by the due date for arrears as defined in § 36-5-101(f)(1) unless an income assignment is in effect and the payor of income is paying pursuant to § 36-5-501(g).
  3. Reports of delinquent support and the amount of the arrears shall be made only after the noncustodial parent has been notified of the intended action at the last record address required by §§ 36-5-101(c)(2)(B)(i), 36-5-805, 36-2-311, and 37-1-151(b)(4)(C)-(F) or such other address as may be known to the department, and the noncustodial parent is afforded an opportunity for an administrative hearing before the department to contest the accuracy of such information. The noncustodial parent shall file a written request for appeal of the intended actions as provided by part 10 of this chapter.

Acts 1985, ch. 477, § 18; 1994, ch. 987, § 7; 1997, ch. 551, § 21; 2001, ch. 447, § 5.

Compiler's Notes. The Fair Credit Reporting Act, referred to in this section, is compiled at 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq.

Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, referred to in this section, is compiled in 42 U.S.C. § 651 et seq.

Cross-References. Termination of Acts 1985, ch. 477, which enacted this section, § 36-5-110.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Attorney Fees.

Because the trial court ultimately denied the father's petitions to modify the parenting plan and to relocate with the child, granted the mother's petition to modify the parenting plan, and adopted the mother's proposed new parenting plan with slight modifications, the trial court did not err in awarding the mother attorney's fees for defending the father's petitions. Sansom v. Sansom, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 298 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 10, 2017).

36-5-107. Disposition of incentive payments — Prohibition against agency use of payments for social and recreational purposes.

  1. In the event that, pursuant to federal requirements, the department of human services adopts a plan requiring political subdivisions to pass incentive payments through to agencies actually participating in the IV-D program of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 651-665), any incentive payment made to a political subdivision that the department designates to be passed through to such an agency shall be appropriated by the political subdivision to the use and benefit of the designated agency.
    1. Except in districts where existing non-child support obligations for rent and payroll already exceed this figure, at least seventy percent (70%) of the federal incentive payments distributed by the department and disbursed by the executive director of the district attorneys general conference as provided in § 8-7-602 shall be utilized to encourage and improve the cost-effectiveness of child support enforcement efforts.
    2. In those districts where existing non-child support rent and payroll obligations already exceed thirty percent (30%) of the incentive payment expenditures for that district, one hundred percent (100%) of the federal incentive funds shall be utilized to encourage and improve the cost-effectiveness of child support enforcement efforts.
    3. Notwithstanding the requirements in subdivisions (b)(1) and (2), such funds may be appropriated by the general assembly for other purposes consistent with applicable federal requirements, to the extent that such appropriation is specifically set forth in the general appropriations act. Further, such funds shall be disbursed only for goods and services for which state funds may properly be disbursed and within limitations imposed on state disbursements including, but not limited to, state travel regulations.
    4. This subsection (b) shall not be construed or implemented in any manner that jeopardizes the receipt of federal funding pursuant to the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 651-665).
  2. An agency that participates in the IV-D program, and that receives federal incentive payments from the department as a result of such participation, shall not utilize any portion of the incentive payments for the social or recreational benefit of the agency's officers, employees, agents, or the family members of the officers, employees or agents.

Acts 1985, ch. 477, § 19; 1990, ch. 974, §§ 2, 3, 5.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 1985, ch. 477, § 1 provided that Acts 1985, ch. 477 may be cited as the “Child Support Enforcement Act of 1985.”

Cross-References. Termination of Acts 1985, ch. 477, which enacted this section, § 36-5-110.

36-5-108. [Repealed.]

Acts 1985, ch. 477, § 20; repealed by Acts 2012, ch. 673, § 3, effective July 1, 2012.

Compiler's Notes. Former § 36-5-108 concerned the reallocation of staff and funding of aid to families with dependent children (AFDC).

36-5-109. Construction.

Chapter 477 of the Public Acts of 1985 is declared to be remedial in nature and all provisions of that act shall be liberally construed to effectuate its purpose.

Acts 1985, ch. 477, § 22.

Compiler's Notes. For codification of Acts 1985, ch. 477, see Disposition of Acts Table in Volume 13.

Cross-References. Termination of Acts 1985, ch. 477, which enacted this section, § 36-5-110.

36-5-110. Termination of Acts 1985, ch. 477.

  1. If any provision of the federal law that mandates any provision of chapter 477 of the Public Acts of 1985 is declared to be unconstitutional by the supreme court of the United States, any such provision of such act shall cease to be effective one (1) year from the date of such supreme court decision.
  2. Enactment of chapter 477 of the Public Acts of 1985 is dependent on the availability of federal funding for its implementation, and if, at any time, such federal funding becomes unavailable, such act is thereby rendered repealed, null and void, and of no effect.

Acts 1985, ch. 477, §§ 23, 24.

Compiler's Notes. For codification of Acts 1985, ch. 477, see Disposition of Acts Table in Volume 13.

36-5-111. Liability for clerk's fee.

In all cases where payments for child support are made through or administered by the court clerk, the decree or order setting the child support must state that the party responsible for paying such support shall be responsible for the clerk's fee, as stated in § 8-21-403, and the amount thereof.

Acts 1985, ch. 379, § 1.

36-5-112. Responsible teen parent pilot project.

  1. Notwithstanding title 71, chapter 3, part 1, or any other law to the contrary, the department shall establish and implement the responsible teen parent pilot project. The pilot project shall be established in at least one (1) county within each of the three (3) grand divisions. Acting in consultation with the department of education and department of labor and workforce development, the council of juvenile and family court judges, the district attorneys general conference, the department of human services shall develop policies and procedures whereby child support obligations of project participants may be adjusted or deferred; provided, that the participants engage in one (1) or more of the following activities:
    1. Attending school and making satisfactory progress toward high school graduation;
    2. Attending preparatory classes and making satisfactory progress toward receipt of a general equivalency diploma;
    3. Participating in approved job training programs and making satisfactory progress toward job placement; or
    4. Participating in approved parenting skills training courses and making satisfactory progress toward mastery of the subject matter of such courses.
  2. Participation in the responsible teen parent pilot program shall be restricted to persons who:
    1. Are under twenty-one (21) years of age;
    2. Are noncustodial parents of children who are receiving, or who have recently received, aid to families with dependent children benefits;
    3. Are unable to provide adequate support for such children due to unemployment or underemployment;
    4. Pay a minimum, specified amount of child support; and
    5. Visit their children at least once each week unless such visitation is restricted by court order.
  3. In accordance with the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, compiled in title 4, chapter 5, the department of human services, acting in consultation with the department of education, department of labor and workforce development, the council of juvenile and family court judges, and the district attorneys general conference, shall promulgate such rules as may be necessary to implement the responsible teen parent pilot project in an efficient and effective manner. Such rules shall include, but shall not be limited to, policies and procedures for:
    1. Identifying teen parents who would be eligible to participate in these programs in the pilot counties;
    2. Pursuing the establishment of paternity in all cases involving teen parenthood within the pilot counties;
    3. Pursuing the establishment and enforcement of support orders in such cases;
    4. Selecting project participants;
    5. Monitoring project participants;
    6. Determining adjustments or deferral of child support obligations for project participants;
    7. Selecting approved job training programs; and
    8. Determining the minimum amount of child support that must be paid by project participants throughout their enrollment in the pilot project.
  4. The department of human services shall gather and compile data to evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness of the pilot project in promoting responsible parenting and in encouraging near- and long-term fulfillment of child support obligations. On or before December 31 each year, the department of human services, acting in consultation with the department of education, department of labor and workforce development, the council of juvenile and family court judges, and the district attorneys general conference, shall report to the judiciary committee of the senate and the committee of the house of representatives having oversight over children and families concerning implementation of the pilot project and shall include any recommendations pertaining thereto.
  5. Within each of the pilot counties, the department of human services and the juvenile court or the district attorney general shall jointly undertake a public awareness campaign to periodically inform and remind teens that:
    1. Teen parents have a legal obligation to financially support their children, and that such obligation continues for eighteen (18) years following the birth of a child;
    2. The legal obligation of support exists regardless of a teen parent's gender or marital status; and
    3. The legal obligation of support will be enforced and the means with which the department may enforce the obligation.
  6. This section shall not be construed or applied in any manner that jeopardizes or reduces the availability of federal funding resources for state administered public assistance programs.

Acts 1989, ch. 568, §§ 1, 2; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 71-3-128; Acts 1996, ch. 950, § 20; 1999, ch. 520, § 36; 2011, ch. 410, § 3(c); 2012, ch. 861, § 1; 2013, ch. 236, § 21; 2019, ch. 345, § 32.

Compiler's Notes. For the Preamble to the act concerning the prohibition against establishment of a special committee if there is a standing committee on the same subject, please refer to Acts 2011, ch. 410.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment substituted “the committee of the house of representatives having oversight over children and families” for “the civil justice committee of the house of representatives” in (d).

Effective Dates. Acts 2019, ch. 345, § 148. May 10, 2019.

Cross-References. Grand divisions, title 4, ch.1, part 2.

36-5-113. Plans for payment of child support; work requirements.

    1. In any case in which a child is receiving assistance under a state program funded under Title IV-A of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. § 601 et seq.), including, but not limited to, temporary assistance as provided under title 71, and the payment of support for such child is overdue, then the department of human services may issue an administrative order to direct an individual who owes overdue support to such a child to pay the overdue support in accordance with a plan for payment of all overdue support.
    2. The plan shall require the obligor to pay the overdue amount in full, or by monthly installments that are calculated to reduce the overdue amount by a reasonable payment over a reasonable period of time. The order may be enforced by either the court with jurisdiction of the support order or by the department pursuant to § 36-5-811 or § 36-5-812, or by any other remedies available for the collection or enforcement of current support.
  1. The department may also order the individual who is not incapacitated and who is subject to a plan requiring payment of the overdue support for a child receiving assistance under a state program funded under Title IV-A of the Social Security Act, including, but not limited to, temporary assistance as provided under title 71, to engage in work activities as required under § 71-3-104.
  2. A copy of the order issued pursuant to this section shall be filed with the court.
  3. An order issued by the department pursuant to this part may be appealed as provided in part 10 of this chapter.
  4. For purposes of this section, “overdue” support is defined as any occasion on which the full amount of support ordered for or on behalf of a minor child, or for a spouse or former spouse of the obligor with whom the child is living to the extent the spousal support would be included for the purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 654(4), is not paid by the due date for arrears as defined in § 36-5-101(f)(1), unless an income assignment is in effect and the payer of income is paying pursuant to § 36-5-501(g).

Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 48; 1998, ch. 1098, § 17.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 1998, ch. 1098, § 17 contained a second sentence in (c) which read:

“No fee shall be charged for the filing of the order; provided, however, if Senate Bill 3303/House Bill 3305 is enacted and the cost reimbursement provisions are implemented as provided therein, the provisions of this sentence shall be void.” The bill was enacted as Acts 1998, ch. 1048, so the second sentence was not codified.

36-5-114. Federally required state collection and disbursement unit for child and spousal support.

    1. This section is intended to outline a flexible waiver application procedure for the federally required centralized collection and disbursement of child and spousal support established pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 654b. Wherever the terminology “collection and disbursement” is used in this section, or in other sections of law using that terminology, it is the legislative intent that the use of such term in the conjunctive shall not be construed to prevent the department of human services from seeking waivers and the state from implementing any procedures, permitted by federal law, regulations, or interpretations of such law or regulations or such waivers, that may allow for alternate methods or processes for either collection or disbursement of child and spousal support by the clerks of the courts of this state.
      1. If the federal law, or regulations or the interpretation of such law or regulations, are repealed or modified so that centralized collection and disbursement are no longer mandated by federal law, and such repeal or modification occurs before the implementation of the centralized collection system, either directly by department itself or before the execution of a contract by the department with a contractor for the operation of such system, the provisions of state law addressing such a centralized system for the collection and disbursement of child and spousal support shall be null and void.
      2. Should the federal requirement of a centralized system be repealed or modified after implementation by the department of the federally required centralized collection and disbursement system, either directly by the department or by the department through a contractor, the provisions of law relative to the federally required centralized collection and disbursement system shall remain in effect, but the commissioner of human services shall, at the request of and in conjunction with the clerks of the court, develop a plan for transition of the collection and disbursement functions to the clerks of the court, which shall include proposed legislation that may be necessary to return the collection and disbursement process to the clerks of court. The plan shall be submitted to chairs of the judiciary committee of the house of representatives and the judiciary committee of the senate prior to the beginning of the next session of the general assembly after the repeal or modification of the federal requirements, but in no event later than ninety (90) days after the repeal or modification of the federal requirements.
    2. Nothing herein shall impair the validity of a contract that has been executed by the state of Tennessee or the department with any person or entity for the operation of the federally required centralized collection and disbursement system before the repeal or modification of the federal centralized collection and disbursement requirement.
    1. If a waiver is available under federal law or regulations that would enable the clerks of the court to continue to collect or disburse child and spousal support, the commissioner shall, at the request of the state court clerks conference, consult with the clerks of the court to determine the feasibility of implementing the provisions of such a waiver, and shall make application to the United States department of health and human services for such a waiver; provided, that if the department has contracted for the operation of the central collection and disbursement system at the time federal law and regulations, or the interpretation of such, have changed, then this subdivision (b)(1) shall be subject to the contract terms.
    2. In the event the waiver is granted that permits the clerks of court to perform services in the central collection and disbursement system, the clerks of court may enter into a contract, as permitted by state and federal law, with a third party to perform any of the functions required by federal law or required under such a waiver. If such a contract is appropriate, the president of the state court clerks conference, upon authorization of the board of directors of the state court clerks conference, shall have authority to bind the members of the conference to the terms of the contract. The contract may provide for any contractor to retain or distribute all or part of the clerks' fees authorized by § 8-21-403, if permitted by federal regulations. Under any plan, the collection and disbursement of child and spousal support shall be conducted in such a manner as will not adversely affect either compliance with federal regulations or federal funding for the Title IV-A block grant program and the Title IV-D child support program.

Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 69; 1998, ch. 1048, § 1; 2013, ch. 236, § 21; 2019, ch. 345, § 33.

Compiler's Notes. Title IV-A of the Social Security Act, referred to in this section, is compiled in 42 U.S.C. §  601 et seq.

Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, referred to in this section, is compiled in 42 U.S.C. § 651 et seq.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment substituted “judiciary” for “civil justice” following “chairs of the” in (a)(2)(B).

Effective Dates. Acts 2019, ch. 345, § 148. May 10, 2019.

36-5-115. State registry of support cases.

  1. For the purposes of this section, “support order” means an order in which there is a judgment, decree, or order, whether temporary, final, or subject to modification, that is issued by a court of competent jurisdiction or an administrative agency of competent jurisdiction, for the support and maintenance of a child, including a child who has attained the age of majority under the law of the state that issued the order and which order, judgment, or decree provides for monetary support, health care, arrearages, or reimbursement, and which may include related costs and fees, interest, penalties, income withholding, attorneys fees, and other relief.
  2. All cases of support for which services are being provided pursuant to Title IV-D of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. § 651 et seq.), and all support orders that are established or modified on or after October 1, 1998, regardless of whether such orders result from cases being enforced pursuant to Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, shall be contained in an automated state registry of support cases and support orders to be operated by the department of human services under such conditions, and containing such data elements, as are required by the secretary of the United States department of health and human services pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 654a.
      1. The clerk of a court who had opted out of the statewide child support computer system prior to March 1, 1998, and who maintains the records of support orders described in subsection (b) in non-Title IV-D cases, shall send a facsimile copy of the order, any necessary data elements required by the secretary of the United States department of health and human services, and any additional updated information regarding such data elements on the support case at such time as it is supplied to the clerk by the parties to the case, to the department or its contractor on a daily basis on a line and facsimile machine provided for such purpose by the department of human services. The machine shall be provided if the clerk's office does not have a facsimile machine as determined by the department through an equipment assessment. Line charges shall be the responsibility of the department either through use of a toll-free line or pursuant to the cost reimbursement requirements of § 36-5-117.
      2. As an alternative to provision by the clerk of the order and information as required by subdivision (c)(1)(A) by use of a facsimile machine, for those clerks who opted out of the statewide child support enforcement system pursuant to the former provisions of § 36-5-101(a), upon the request of the clerk, the department shall conduct a computer needs assessment of the clerk's office. Based upon the assessment, the department shall provide either adequate computer equipment and Tennessee Child Support Enforcement System (TCSES) software to permit the transfer of information required by the federal case registry provisions, or if the clerk has an existing computer system that is the same system as a clerk that is currently interfacing with the department of human services' TCSES system, that clerk shall be given the same opportunity to interface with the TCSES system, with the costs of any modifications required to transmit the required data elements or to otherwise meet the requirements of federal law needed for the interfacing system to be the responsibility of the department of human services.
    1. For clerks who operate under TCSES or under the TCSES interfacing system, including the model interfacing systems, the department will absorb the costs of modifications of the computer system necessary to receive and transmit information required by the federal law for the operation of the central case registry. For cases that are not subject to enforcement by the department pursuant to Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, these clerks shall transmit to the department or its contractor on a daily basis on TCSES, or the TCSES interfacing system, including the model interfacing system, the necessary data elements for the support case registry required by the secretary of the United States department of health and human services and any additional updated information regarding such data elements at such time as it is supplied to the clerk.
  3. The clerks' costs for services of this section shall be paid according to the reimbursement process established pursuant to § 36-5-117.

Acts 1998, ch. 1048, § 2.

Attorney General Opinions. Statistical information in domestic relations and worker's compensation cases, OAG 99-230, 1999 Tenn. AG LEXIS 226 (12/15/99).

36-5-116. Establishment of central collection and disbursement unit.

    1. Effective October 1, 1999, the department of human services shall become the central collection and disbursement unit for the state as required by 42 U.S.C. § 654b. All orders in Title IV-D support cases, and all orders for income assignments that have directed support to be paid to the clerk of any court, and that are subject to 42 U.S.C. § 654b, shall be deemed to require that the support be sent to the central collection and disbursement unit, any order of the court notwithstanding.
    2. When the department or its contractor acts as the central collection and disbursement unit, then, notwithstanding any law to the contrary, the fee paid by the obligor for the collection and disbursement of child support pursuant to § 8-21-403 shall be paid to the department with respect to payments collected or disbursed by the central system. The processing of such fees shall be conducted in such a manner as will not adversely affect compliance with federal law or regulations and will not adversely affect federal funding for the Title IV-A block grant program and the Title IV-D child support program; provided, the department may by rules promulgated pursuant to the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, compiled in title 4, chapter 5, reduce the fee provided in § 8-21-403 with respect to cases under the centralized collection and disbursement unit.
    1. Each clerk shall submit to the department, in the manner described in subsection (c), on a daily basis on the day the order is entered, the information required to permit the department to process all payments for child and spousal support that are required by federal law to be collected and disbursed by the federally mandated state collection and disbursement unit, and such other information necessary to update the processing of information for collection and disbursement, if contained in the court records.
    2. The clerks' services for providing such information shall be paid by the department according to the reimbursement process established by § 36-5-117.
  1. The clerks of court who have opted out and those clerks who operate a Tennessee child support enforcement system (TCSES) or TCSES interface computer system, including the model interface system, shall have the same options as contained in § 36-5-115(c) for transmitting data required for the processing of information relative to the collection and disbursement of child and spousal support as required by this section. The clerk must, however, choose the same method of transmission of data for both the central case registry and the central collection data transmission.
    1. Following implementation of the federally required central collection and disbursement unit, each clerk shall remain responsible for receipt of all support payments not subject to the requirements of the centralized collection and disbursement system.
    2. Payments received by the clerk for support cases that are not Title IV-D cases or that are not otherwise subject to the requirements of a central collection or disbursement system shall not be included in the cost reimbursement and shall be subject to the fees permitted by § 8-21-403 or such other fees permitted by law. Payments that are received by the clerk in cases subject to the central collection and disbursement system shall be distributed to the centralized collection and disbursement system; provided, that the clerks shall be reimbursed the costs of such services pursuant to § 36-5-117.
    1. By August 31, 2002, and to the extent required by federal law, the department of human services shall provide a monthly notice to the custodial parent or other caretaker of the child who receives child support payments from the central collection and disbursement unit established by this section, when a child support payment is received or distributed by the department during the reporting month.
    2. The recipients of monthly notices shall include:
      1. Current Families First recipients;
      2. Former Families First recipients, to include former Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) recipients;
      3. Any other persons who are recipients of Title IV-D child support services from the department; and
      4. Any other persons who receive payments from the central collection and disbursement unit.
    3. The notice to each custodial parent or other caretaker shall include, in an easily understood format, the following information relative to the child support payments:
      1. Custodial parent's or other caretaker's name;
      2. Noncustodial parent's name;
      3. TCSES case number;
      4. Court docket number;
      5. The amount of the current child support payment or payments issued to the custodial parent or other caretaker of the child;
      6. The date on which the child support payment or payments were issued to the custodial parent or other caretaker of the child;
      7. The total of all child support payments issued to date during the current year;
      8. Information regarding the right to administrative review and appeal;
      9. Understandable, case-specific information regarding negative numbers and adjustments related to the collection, distribution and disbursement of child support that are shown on the notice of collection in the cases subject to this subsection (e);
      10. The date the child support payment or payments were received;
      11. The toll-free number for accessing child support customer service; and
      12. Where available, the following additional information shall be provided:
        1. The custodial parent's or other caretaker's member identification number;
        2. The court location of the court in which the order is established;
        3. The court-ordered child support amount for both current child support and for amounts of child support that are in arrears; and
        4. The date of the court order in effect.
    4. In addition, for current or former recipients of Families First, the following information shall be provided to the custodial parent or caretaker of the child:
      1. Any information required by federal law or regulation;
      2. The federal rules for distribution of child support as they may be related to the specific category of either current Families First or former Families First recipients;
      3. The unmet need amount for current Families First recipients;
      4. The category, specifically either current Families First or former Families First, and a reason for any disparity between the amount received and the amount disbursed to the custodial parent or caretaker that is related to the category;
      5. The toll-free telephone number to call with questions about the unmet need amount for current Families First recipients;
      6. The amount of child support received that was treated as current child support;
      7. The amount of child support received that was treated as past due child support;
      8. A message keyed to the appearance of a collection of child support arrears from a federal income tax refund offset involving the noncustodial parent;
      9. The toll-free telephone numbers for both the IV-D child support and the IV-A Families First programs to facilitate inquiry for any questions or concerns; and
      10. General explanatory information.
    5. By April 1, 2002, child support payments sent to the custodial parent or other caretaker of the child by the central collection and disbursement unit shall include with each payment warrant, where available, the following information regarding the payment or payments:
      1. The custodial parent's or other caretaker's name and TCSES member identification number;
      2. The noncustodial parent's name;
      3. The payment warrant number;
      4. TCSES case identification number associated with each support payment included in the payment warrant;
      5. Court name and docket number from which each support payment on the payment warrant originated;
      6. The date on which the payment warrant was issued; and
      7. The total of all payments issued to date during the current year.
    6. The department may include any additional information on the notices or with the payments under this subsection (e) as it may determine necessary or helpful to the custodial parent or other caretaker of the child.
  2. If, due to the fault of the department of human services fiscal services unit, a properly identified current payment of child support that has an order properly entered into TCSES is not disbursed within two (2) weeks of receipt of the payment by the department, the custodial parent may request, and the department shall promptly pay, an additional payment as provided for in this subsection (f). Such additional payment from the department shall be in an amount not to exceed ten percent (10%) of the amount actually paid toward current support that was delayed by the action of the fiscal services unit, or fifty dollars ($50.00), whichever is less. Such ten percent (10%) payment shall be derived from the department's budget without additional appropriation. Any cost incurred by the department to implement this subsection (f) shall be paid from the statutory fees paid to the department.

Acts 1998, ch. 1048, § 3; 2000, ch. 909, § 2; 2000, ch. 922, § 41; 2002, ch. 674, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2000, ch. 909, § 3 provided that the act shall apply to any pending child support order owed under a court or administrative order that is subject to centralized collection and disbursement.

Acts 2002, ch. 674, § 4 provided that funding for that act shall be by existing resources of the department of human services.

Title IV-A of the Social Security Act, referred to in this section, is compiled in 42 U.S.C. §  601 et seq.

Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, referred to in this section, is compiled in 42 U.S.C. § 651 et seq.

Attorney General Opinions. Centralized collection and distribution unit for child support payments, OAG 99-222, 1999 Tenn. AG LEXIS 234 (11/9/99).

Constitutionality of § 36-5-116, OAG 00-012, 2000 Tenn. AG LEXIS 12 (1/24/00).

36-5-117. Reimbursement of clerks of court for activities involving child support, central state case registry and the central collection and disbursement system.

    1. Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, and in lieu of any other fees or costs set forth by law that would otherwise be applicable to cases enforced by the department of human services or its contractors pursuant to Title IV-D of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. § 651 et seq.), and for activity related to the collection and disbursement of support in cases subject to 42 U.S.C. § 654b, and for their activities required pursuant to § 36-5-115, the clerks of court shall be reimbursed by the department to the maximum extent permitted under federal law and regulations for the actual costs of providing services for which federal financial participation is available for child and spousal support cases being enforced pursuant to, or otherwise subject to, the requirements of the Title IV-D child support program.
    2. Nothing in this section shall alter the method for payment of court costs in Title IV-D support cases or in non-Title IV-D support cases by private parties, if otherwise permitted by federal law or regulations.
  1. The actual costs and the clerks of court reimbursement rates shall be set according to the Study of Actual Costs of Activities by Clerks of Court for Child and Spousal Support Cases and Determination of Actual Costs for Reimbursement by the department of human services-revised report of study dated November 18, 1998.
  2. [Deleted by 2020 amendment.]
  3. [Deleted by 2020 amendment.]
  4. The cost reimbursement process section shall be implemented upon the implementation of the centralized collection and disbursement system, but in no circumstance later than October 1, 1999. Reimbursement to the clerks of court under the cost reimbursement process shall be made on a monthly basis by electronic fund transfer. Reimbursement of such costs shall be made pursuant to a contract, if required by federal law or regulations, by the department with each clerk who performs such child or spousal support services as may be required by Title IV-D of the Social Security Act. Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, the clerk of the court shall have authority to contract with the department as may be required pursuant to this subsection (e).
  5. Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, upon implementation of the reimbursement process described in this section, any provision of law that would otherwise exempt the department or its contractors from the payment of costs for cases subject to Title IV-D requirements involving child or spousal support services or as otherwise required pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 654b, shall be superseded by the cost reimbursement provisions of this section, and all costs associated with services provided by the clerks of court to the department or its contractors will be paid according to the cost reimbursement provisions of this section; provided, that the provisions of this subsection (f) negating such exemptions shall not apply to any exemptions from costs or fees required by federal law or regulations or any uniform act.

Acts 1998, ch. 1048, § 4; 2020, ch. 535, §§ 1-3.

Amendments. The 2020 amendment rewrote (b) which read: “The actual costs shall be set according to the determination by the comptroller of the treasury pursuant to federal regulations relative to allowable and reimbursable costs under the Title IV-D child support enforcement program and for which federal financial participation is available.”; and deleted (c) and (d) which read: “(c)(1)  The comptroller of the treasury shall conduct a study of the actual costs of the activities described for reimbursement pursuant to this section, and shall make a determination of the amount of funds generated by the collection of the fee on the collection of child support pursuant to § 8-21-403.“(2) When determining actual costs for services that shall be reimbursed, the comptroller of the treasury shall consider that such services shall include, but are not limited to, filing costs, issuance of process or subpoenas, entry of orders, provision of copies, transmission of data, mailing costs, customer service activities, billing, auditing, electronic fund transfer costs, accounting activities, space, storage and personnel costs, equipment and materials costs, and any other reasonably related expenses that are not otherwise provided by the state or the federal government, or by a litigant, and that are allowable costs for federal financial participation.”;“(d) The comptroller of the treasury shall review the costs for the clerks to provide such services on a biennial basis and shall report this to the departments of human services and finance and administration in order for the departments to adjust the costs as permitted by federal law and regulations and for which federal financial participation is available.”

Effective Dates. Acts 2020, ch. 535, § 4. March 19, 2020.

Attorney General Opinions. Centralized collection and distribution unit for child support payments, OAG 99-222, 1999 Tenn. AG LEXIS 234 (11/9/99).

36-5-118. Customer service unit—Statewide toll-free telephone line.

Notwithstanding this part or any other law to the contrary, if the department of human services serves as the central collection and disbursement unit for the state, then the department must establish, advertise and maintain a customer service unit and a statewide toll-free telephone line for the express purpose of receiving and responding to citizen inquiries and complaints concerning child support collections and disbursements. Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, if a contractor of the department serves as the central collection and disbursement unit for the state, then the contractor must establish, advertise and maintain a customer service unit and a statewide toll-free telephone line for the express purpose of receiving and responding to citizen inquiries and complaints concerning child support collections and disbursements.

Acts 1998, ch. 1048, § 5.

36-5-119. Satellite offices.

Notwithstanding this part or any other law to the contrary, the department of human services shall vigorously investigate and determine the feasibility of securing the necessary waivers required to permit establishment of satellite offices for the state's central collection and disbursement unit. Such satellite offices would be established only in those counties that account for a substantial percentage of total child support collections within the state. Such satellite offices would locally collect and/or disburse child support and/or would provide a locally based customer service unit for residents of such county.

Acts 1998, ch. 1048, § 6.

36-5-120. Payments and identifying information required for support payments made to the centralized collection and disbursement unit.

  1. All payments to the centralized collection and disbursement unit by either the obligor parent or a payer on behalf of the obligor parent shall include the following information:
    1. The name and social security number of the obligor parent; and
    2. The code identifier for the court for which the payment is being made and the docket number of the case in which the support order was entered.
  2. As an alternative to compliance with subsection (a), an employer or other payer of support on behalf of an obligor parent may submit a payment document provided by the department of human services on which the employer or other payer shall include the amount of income withholding on each affected employee or other payee, and, if appropriate, shall provide the name and address of any new employer of an affected employee or payee if known to the employer or other payer.
  3. As an alternative to subsection (a), a self-employed obligor parent, or an obligor parent whose employer or other payer of income is unknown to the department, may submit a payment coupon provided by the department to the parent with the payment due.
  4. Any payment made to the centralized collection and disbursement unit that does not comply with the requirements of subsections (a)-(c) shall be subject to a penalty.
    1. If, after prior warning notification by the department of failure to provide the information with the payments as required by this section, any employer or other payer of income fails or refuses to comply with the requirements of this section, the violator shall be subject to a civil penalty of one hundred dollars ($100) per individual for whom the required information is not provided upon the first failure to comply, two hundred dollars ($200) per individual for the second failure to comply and five hundred dollars ($500) per individual for each occurrence thereafter. The warning notification shall specifically state the information required to be submitted and the information omitted by the employer or other payer of income, shall provide a telephone number for questions, and shall set forth the penalties for failure to comply, referencing statutory authority.
    2. If, after prior warning notification by the department of failure to provide the information with the payments as required by this section, any obligor fails or refuses to comply with the requirements of this section, the violator shall be subject to a civil penalty of one hundred dollars ($100) or the amount equaling twenty-five percent (25%) of the obligor's monthly support obligation, whichever is less, for the first failure to provide the required information; two hundred dollars ($200) or the amount equaling fifty percent (50%) of the obligor's monthly obligation, whichever is less, for the second failure to comply; and five hundred dollars ($500) or the obligor's monthly support obligation, whichever is less, for each occurrence thereafter. The warning notification shall specifically state the information required to be submitted and the information omitted by the obligor, shall provide a telephone number for questions, and shall set forth the penalties for failure to comply, referencing statutory authority.
    3. Any employer, payer of income or obligor who conspires not to provide the information required by this section or who conspires to provide false or incomplete information shall each be subject to a civil penalty of five hundred dollars ($500).
    4. These penalties shall be assessed by the commissioner of human services after written notice to the violator. The notice shall provide fifteen (15) days from the mailing date of such notice to file a written request to the department for appeal of the civil penalty.
    5. If an appeal is timely filed with the department by the employer, payer of income or obligor, the department shall set an administrative hearing on the issue of the assessment pursuant to the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, compiled in title 4, chapter 5, relative to contested case hearings.
    6. Failure to timely appeal the assessment of the civil penalty shall be final and conclusive of the correctness of the assessment.
    7. Any amount found owing shall be due and payable not later than fifteen (15) days after the mailing date of the determination.
      1. Failure to pay an assessment shall result in a lien against the real or personal property of the employer, payer of income or the obligor in favor of the department. If the violator fails to pay an assessment when it becomes final, the department may collect the amount of the civil penalty by any available administrative enforcement procedures or by court action.
      2. The nonprevailing party shall be liable for all court costs and litigation taxes of the proceedings and shall be liable to the department for the cost of any private, contract or government attorney representing the state and for the time of any of its Title IV-D or contractor staff utilized in litigating the assessment.
    8. Any appeal of the action of the commissioner pursuant to this section shall be made in conformity with § 36-5-1003.

Acts 2000, ch. 909, § 1; 2002, ch. 674, § 2.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2000, ch. 909, § 3 provided that the act shall apply to any pending child support order owed under a court or administrative order that is subject to centralized collection and disbursement.

Acts 2002, ch. 674, § 4 provided that funding for that act shall be by existing resources of the department of human services.

Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, referred to in this section, is compiled in 42 U.S.C. § 651 et seq.

36-5-121. Decree for support of spouse.

  1. In any action for divorce, legal separation or separate maintenance, the court may award alimony to be paid by one spouse to or for the benefit of the other, or out of either spouse's property, according to the nature of the case and the circumstances of the parties. The court may fix some definite amount or amounts to be paid in monthly, semimonthly or weekly installments, or otherwise, as the circumstances may warrant. Such award, if not paid, may be enforced by any appropriate process of the court having jurisdiction including levy of execution. Further, the order or decree shall remain in the court's jurisdiction and control, and, upon application of either party, the court may award an increase or decrease or other modification of the award based upon a showing of a substantial and material change of circumstances; provided, that the award is subject to modification by the court based on the type of alimony awarded, the terms of the court's decree or the terms of the parties' agreement.
  2. The court may, in its discretion, at any time pending the final hearing, upon motion and after notice and hearing, make any order that may be proper to compel a spouse to pay any sums necessary for the support and maintenance of the other spouse, to enable such spouse to prosecute or defend the suit of the parties and to make other orders as it deems appropriate. Further, the court may award such sum as may be necessary to enable a spouse to pay the expenses of job training and education. In making any order under this subsection (b), the court shall consider the financial needs of each spouse and the financial ability of each spouse to meet those needs and to prosecute or defend the suit.
    1. Spouses have traditionally strengthened the family unit through private arrangements whereby one (1) spouse focuses on nurturing the personal side of the marriage, including the care and nurturing of the children, while the other spouse focuses primarily on building the economic strength of the family unit. This arrangement often results in economic detriment to the spouse who subordinated such spouse's own personal career for the benefit of the marriage. It is the public policy of this state to encourage and support marriage, and to encourage family arrangements that provide for the rearing of healthy and productive children who will become healthy and productive citizens of our state.
    2. The general assembly finds that the contributions to the marriage as homemaker or parent are of equal dignity and importance as economic contributions to the marriage. Further, where one (1) spouse suffers economic detriment for the benefit of the marriage, the general assembly finds that the economically disadvantaged spouse's standard of living after the divorce should be reasonably comparable to the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage or to the post-divorce standard of living expected to be available to the other spouse, considering the relevant statutory factors and the equities between the parties.
    1. The court may award rehabilitative alimony, alimony in futuro, also known as periodic alimony, transitional alimony, or alimony in solido, also known as lump sum alimony or a combination of these, as provided in this subsection (d).
    2. It is the intent of the general assembly that a spouse, who is economically disadvantaged relative to the other spouse, be rehabilitated, whenever possible, by the granting of an order for payment of rehabilitative alimony. To be rehabilitated means to achieve, with reasonable effort, an earning capacity that will permit the economically disadvantaged spouse's standard of living after the divorce to be reasonably comparable to the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage, or to the post-divorce standard of living expected to be available to the other spouse, considering the relevant statutory factors and the equities between the parties.
    3. Where there is relative economic disadvantage and rehabilitation is not feasible, in consideration of all relevant factors, including those set out in subsection (i), the court may grant an order for payment of support and maintenance on a long-term basis or until death or remarriage of the recipient, except as otherwise provided in subdivision (f)(2)(B).
    4. An award of alimony in futuro may be made, either in addition to an award of rehabilitative alimony, where a spouse may be only partially rehabilitated, or instead of an award of rehabilitative alimony, where rehabilitation is not feasible. Transitional alimony is awarded when the court finds that rehabilitation is not necessary, but the economically disadvantaged spouse needs assistance to adjust to the economic consequences of a divorce, legal separation or other proceeding where spousal support may be awarded, such as a petition for an order of protection.
    5. Alimony in solido may be awarded in lieu of or in addition to any other alimony award, in order to provide support, including attorney fees, where appropriate.
    1. Rehabilitative alimony is a separate class of spousal support, as distinguished from alimony in solido, alimony in futuro, and transitional alimony. To be rehabilitated means to achieve, with reasonable effort, an earning capacity that will permit the economically disadvantaged spouse's standard of living after the divorce to be reasonably comparable to the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage, or to the post-divorce standard of living expected to be available to the other spouse, considering the relevant statutory factors and the equities between the parties.
    2. An award of rehabilitative alimony shall remain in the court's control for the duration of such award, and may be increased, decreased, terminated, extended, or otherwise modified, upon a showing of a substantial and material change in circumstances. For rehabilitative alimony to be extended beyond the term initially established by the court, or to be increased in amount, or both, the recipient of the rehabilitative alimony shall have the burden of proving that all reasonable efforts at rehabilitation have been made and have been unsuccessful.
    3. Rehabilitative alimony shall terminate upon the death of the recipient. Rehabilitative alimony shall also terminate upon the death of the payor, unless otherwise specifically stated.
    1. Alimony in futuro, also known as periodic alimony, is a payment of support and maintenance on a long term basis or until death or remarriage of the recipient. Such alimony may be awarded when the court finds that there is relative economic disadvantage and that rehabilitation is not feasible, meaning that the disadvantaged spouse is unable to achieve, with reasonable effort, an earning capacity that will permit the spouse's standard of living after the divorce to be reasonably comparable to the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage, or to the post-divorce standard of living expected to be available to the other spouse, considering the relevant statutory factors and the equities between the parties.
      1. An award of alimony in futuro shall remain in the court's control for the duration of such award, and may be increased, decreased, terminated, extended, or otherwise modified, upon a showing of substantial and material change in circumstances.
      2. In all cases where a person is receiving alimony in futuro and the alimony recipient lives with a third person, a rebuttable presumption is raised that:
        1. The third person is contributing to the support of the alimony recipient and the alimony recipient does not need the amount of support previously awarded, and the court should suspend all or part of the alimony obligation of the former spouse; or
        2. The third person is receiving support from the alimony recipient and the alimony recipient does not need the amount of alimony previously awarded and the court should suspend all or part of the alimony obligation of the former spouse.
    2. An award for alimony in futuro shall terminate automatically and unconditionally upon the death or remarriage of the recipient. The recipient shall notify the obligor immediately upon the recipient's remarriage. Failure of the recipient to timely give notice of the remarriage shall allow the obligor to recover all amounts paid as alimony in futuro to the recipient after the recipient's marriage. Alimony in futuro shall also terminate upon the death of the payor, unless otherwise specifically stated.
    1. Transitional alimony means a sum of money payable by one (1) party to, or on behalf of, the other party for a determinate period of time. Transitional alimony is awarded when the court finds that rehabilitation is not necessary, but the economically disadvantaged spouse needs assistance to adjust to the economic consequences of a divorce, legal separation or other proceeding where spousal support may be awarded, such as a petition for an order of protection.
    2. Transitional alimony shall be nonmodifiable unless:
      1. The parties otherwise agree in an agreement incorporated into the initial decree of divorce or legal separation, or order of protection;
      2. The court otherwise orders in the initial decree of divorce, legal separation or order of protection; or
      3. The alimony recipient lives with a third person, in which case a rebuttable presumption is raised that:
        1. The third person is contributing to the support of the alimony recipient and the alimony recipient does not need the amount of support previously awarded, and the court should suspend all or part of the alimony obligation of the former spouse; or
        2. The third person is receiving support from the alimony recipient and the alimony recipient does not need the amount of alimony previously awarded and the court should suspend all or part of the alimony obligation of the former spouse.
    3. Transitional alimony shall terminate upon the death of the recipient. Transitional alimony shall also terminate upon the death of the payor, unless otherwise specifically stated in the decree.
    4. The court may provide, at the time of entry of the order to pay transitional alimony, that the transitional alimony shall terminate upon the occurrence of other conditions, including, but not limited to, the remarriage of the party receiving transitional alimony.
    1. Alimony in solido, also known as lump sum alimony, is a form of long term support, the total amount of which is calculable on the date the decree is entered, but which is not designated as transitional alimony. Alimony in solido may be paid in installments; provided, that the payments are ordered over a definite period of time and the sum of the alimony to be paid is ascertainable when awarded. The purpose of this form of alimony is to provide financial support to a spouse. In addition, alimony in solido may include attorney fees, where appropriate.
    2. A final award of alimony in solido is not modifiable, except by agreement of the parties only.
    3. Alimony in solido is not terminable upon the death or remarriage of the recipient or the payor.
  3. In determining whether the granting of an order for payment of support and maintenance to a party is appropriate, and in determining the nature, amount, length of term, and manner of payment, the court shall consider all relevant factors, including:
    1. The relative earning capacity, obligations, needs, and financial resources of each party, including income from pension, profit sharing or retirement plans and all other sources;
    2. The relative education and training of each party, the ability and opportunity of each party to secure such education and training, and the necessity of a party to secure further education and training to improve such party's earnings capacity to a reasonable level;
    3. The duration of the marriage;
    4. The age and mental condition of each party;
    5. The physical condition of each party, including, but not limited to, physical disability or incapacity due to a chronic debilitating disease;
    6. The extent to which it would be undesirable for a party to seek employment outside the home, because such party will be custodian of a minor child of the marriage;
    7. The separate assets of each party, both real and personal, tangible and intangible;
    8. The provisions made with regard to the marital property, as defined in § 36-4-121;
    9. The standard of living of the parties established during the marriage;
    10. The extent to which each party has made such tangible and intangible contributions to the marriage as monetary and homemaker contributions, and tangible and intangible contributions by a party to the education, training or increased earning power of the other party;
    11. The relative fault of the parties, in cases where the court, in its discretion, deems it appropriate to do so; and
    12. Such other factors, including the tax consequences to each party, as are necessary to consider the equities between the parties.
  4. Where the lump sum amount of retirement or pension benefits or of balances in an individual retirement account, §§ 401(k), 403(b), 457 (26 U.S.C. §§ 401(k), 403(b) and 457), respectively, or any other tax qualified account has been considered by the trial court, and determined to be marital property to be divided, the distributions of such lump sum amounts necessary to complete the division of property, whether distributed in a single payment or by periodic payments, shall not be considered income for the purpose of determining a spouse or ex-spouse's right to receive alimony or child support, but the income generated by the investment of such lump sum awards shall be considered income for such purpose.
  5. The court may direct a party to pay the premiums for insurance insuring the health care costs of the other party, in whole or in part, for such duration as the court deems appropriate.
  6. To secure the obligation of one party to pay alimony to or for the benefit of the other party, the court may direct a party to designate the other party as the beneficiary of, and to pay the premiums required to maintain, any existing policies insuring the life of a party, or to purchase and pay the premiums required to maintain such new or additional life insurance designating the other party the beneficiary of the insurance, or a combination of these, as the court deems appropriate.
  7. The order or decree of the court may provide that the payments for the support of such spouse shall be paid either to the clerk of the court or directly to the spouse, or, in Title IV-D cases, the order or decree of the court shall provide that payments shall be paid to the central collections and disbursement unit, pursuant to § 36-5-116.
  8. Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent the affirmation, ratification and incorporation in a decree of an agreement between the parties as to support and maintenance of a party.
  9. Any order of alimony that has been reduced to judgment shall be entitled to be enforced as any other judgment of a court of this state and shall be entitled to full faith and credit in this state and in any other state.

Acts 2005, ch. 287, § 2; 2011, ch. 119, § 3.

Compiler's Notes. Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, referred to in this section, is compiled in 42 U.S.C. § 651 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Alimony In Futuro.

Appellate court found it appropriate to change the wife's $400 per month rehabilitative alimony award for 36 months to an award of alimony in futuro of $1,200 per month because the wife could not be rehabilitated; the parties were married for 30 years, the wife was capable of earning at least $1,200 per month as a nurse assistant, and the husband received a total of $4,258 per month, and unlike the husband, the wife had no separate property. Oakes v. Oakes, 235 S.W.3d 152, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 160 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 26, 2007), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 708 (Tenn. Aug. 13, 2007).

Appellate court found it appropriate to change the wife's $400 per month rehabilitative alimony award for 36 months to an award of alimony in futuro of $1,200 per month because the wife could not be rehabilitated as that term was defined, and the trial court erred in treating the husband's military disability pay as marital property, awarding the wife a portion of that pay in its division of the marital estate, and taking that into consideration. Oakes v. Oakes, 235 S.W.3d 152, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 160 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 26, 2007), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 708 (Tenn. Aug. 13, 2007).

Record fully supported trial court's characterization of the wife's circumstances that at the time of trial, she was disabled, was receiving less than $500 per month in disability and retirement benefits, was forced to live with family because she could not afford to live on her own, was forced to rely on family for basic transportation because she could not afford a car, and had been forced to declare bankruptcy by her ongoing medical expenses and the husband's failure to pay the court-ordered pendente lite support; husband had far more income that he would admit and engaged in behaviors that were directly relevant to the issue of his ability to pay alimony, and the record supported the finding that the husband had the ability to pay $1,000 per month in alimony in futuro to the wife. Williams v. Williams, 286 S.W.3d 290, 2008 Tenn. App. LEXIS 416 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 28, 2008).

Award of rehabilitative and in futuro alimony to the wife in the parties'  divorce action was proper pursuant to T.C.A. § 36-5-121(d)(2), (d)(4), and (i) because the trial court's finding was derived in part from its assessment of the husband's credibility and because, with the husband earning $ 850,000 per year, despite the size of the overall debt, the amount of support awarded was not more than the husband was able to pay. Andrews v. Susie Heasook Cho Andrews, 344 S.W.3d 321, 2010 Tenn. App. LEXIS 553 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2010), appeal denied, Andrews v. Andrews, — S.W.3d —, 2011 Tenn. LEXIS 240 (Tenn. Mar. 9, 2011).

Former spouse was not entitled to an award of alimony in futuro, under T.C.A. § 36-5-121(f)(1), because the spouse had a college degree, good health, a stable work history in a relatively high paying job, and a lack of demonstrated need for such long-term alimony. Gonsewski v. Gonsewski, 350 S.W.3d 99, 2011 Tenn. LEXIS 872 (Tenn. Sept. 16, 2011).

Trial court did not err in refusing to award rehabilitative alimony or alimony in futuro under T.C.A. § 36-5-121(e)(1) or (f)(1) because the husband was fully capable of finding suitable employment utilizing his skills in farming or in the tool and die industry and because he was fully capable of achieving an earning capacity that will allow him to maintain an appropriate standard of living. However, he was entitled to transitional alimony under § 36-5-121(g)(1) because he suffered an economic detriment for the benefit of the marriage; that award should allow him adequate time in which to adjust to the economic consequences of the divorce. Mayfield v. Mayfield, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 40 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 17, 2012), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 395 S.W.3d 108, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 876 (Tenn. Dec. 3, 2012).

Trial court properly awarded a wife alimony in futuro because it addressed and applied the following statutory factors: the wife's demonstrated need, the husband's ability to pay, the 29-year duration of the marriage, the wife's age, poor health, relatively small earning capacity, intangible contributions to the marriage, including her efforts as mother to the parties'  children and as a homemaker, and the fact that she was not voluntarily underemployed. Inman v. Inman, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 368 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 26, 2015).

Trial court erred by awarding the wife alimony in futuro of $4,000 per month until her death or remarriage where the preponderance of the evidence supported a determination that the wife was capable of rehabilitation, as she was 43 years old, she did not have any medical conditions that impaired her ability to work, she had a masters degree in science and social work, although she had been out of the workforce for seven years she had experience in the field of social work, and while she was in the process of establishing her private practice the evidence indicated that she would be able to utilize her education and experience to earn a good income. Holdsworth v. Holdsworth, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 424 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 3, 2015), modified, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 73 (Tenn. Jan. 25, 2016).

An award of alimony in futuro rather than transitional alimony should have been awarded, because the wife had not worked in years, the wife contributed a significant inheritance to the marriage, which both parties spent to maintain their standard of living, the husband had a greater income, and even if the wife obtained full-time employment, she would still be at an economic disadvantage. Norris v. Norris, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 673 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 24, 2015).

Factors under the statute militated in favor of an award of alimony in futuro to the wife, who was an economically disadvantaged spouse; she was unable to maintain employment due to her health condition, her listed expenses were reasonable, the husband's decision to amass credit card debt and vehicle payments should not deprive the wife of having her reasonable needs met, and the husband, who was making contributions to his IRA on a monthly basis and also paying health club dues and other discretionary expenses, had the ability to pay support. Fabrizio v. Fabrizio, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 880 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 29, 2015).

Award of transitional alimony to the wife was modified to an award of alimony in futuro given the parties'  widely disparate respective incomes and future earning capabilities. Lubell v. Lubell, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 904 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 12, 2015).

In awarding alimony in futuro the trial court emphasized the parties'  disparate income and relative earning capacity and the extent to which it was undesirable for the wife to seek employment outside the home due to her role as a caregiver to the children, especially the one child with special medical needs and the husband's employment overseas and resultant unavailability as a custodial parent. Yocum v. Yocum, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 969 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 15, 2015).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding a wife alimony in futuro because it applied the correct legal standards, took the relevant facts into account, and reached a conclusion that was not clearly unreasonable; the wife showed a need for the financial support on an ongoing basis, and the husband had the ability to pay. Chumley v. Chumley, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 990 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 23, 2015).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding a wife alimony in futuro because the wife was entitled by statute to an equitable share of the marital assets; the husband provided no support for his argument that the amount and nature of alimony the wife was entitled to receive depended on the amount of debt he could incur to compensate the wife for her fair share when the husband could sell some of the marital assets and avoid incurring additional debt. Chumley v. Chumley, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 990 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 23, 2015).

Although the trial court did not classify the award as alimony in futuro, both parties conceded it was alimony in futuro; this was affirmed because the award was a long-term award that terminates automatically upon the wife's death or remarriage, plus the order clearly indicated that, like an award of alimony in futuro, this award was intended to be modifiable and to remain in the court's control for its duration. Longstreth v. Longstreth, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 271 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 20, 2016).

Ruling that the wife was entitled to receive alimony in futuro under was proper; the parties were married for 27 years, the wife was 19 when they married and only had a high school education, and two doctors testified that she was unable to maintain full-time employment due to her bipolar diagnosis. Longstreth v. Longstreth, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 271 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 20, 2016).

Both spouses had very modest incomes, and the wife, who was 69 years of age and in poor health at the time of trial, has a much greater need for support than the husband, and his fault was much greater than the wife's; the award of alimony in futuro to the wife was affirmed. Watt v. Watt, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 295 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 27, 2016).

Possibility that the husband might be financially responsible for some of the costs associated with his incarceration at some point did not require reversal of the alimony in futuro award because the reimbursement issue was not raised at trial or on appeal, plus if the State sought reimbursement, the husband would have the opportunity to present evidence of his alimony obligation. Watt v. Watt, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 295 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 27, 2016).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding a wife a monthly payment as alimony in futuro because, during the parties'  lengthy marriage, the wife fulfilled the roles of homemaker and mother while the husband was the wage earner, both parties made significant contributions to the marriage, the parties'  enjoyed a high standard of living, the husband admitted to being at fault in the demise of the marriage, there was a disparity in the relative earning capacity between the parties, and the wife otherwise would have dissipated her assets. Grant v. Grant, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 327 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 12, 2016).

Trial court erred in awarding a wife award of alimony in futuro because entirely absent from its order was any finding regarding economic rehabilitation or analysis of whether the wife was a candidate for rehabilitative or transitional alimony or temporary alimony in solido. Wills v. Wills, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 338 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 16, 2016).

Husband's alimony in futuro obligation was modified because the trial court abused its discretion in requiring the husband to pay more alimony than he could currently afford; the evidence was largely undisputed that both reimbursements from the husband's employment for mileage and per diem for expenses would be eliminated from his income. Naylor v. Naylor, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 494 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 15, 2016).

Trial court properly awarded the wife alimony in futuro because the wife was unlikely to obtain employment; the wife had no training, education, or experience that would make her employable. Naylor v. Naylor, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 494 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 15, 2016).

Chancery court properly award of alimony in futuro to a wife because the wife had a need for alimony where she was 60 years old, English was not her first language, she had not worked full-time in over 20 years, and disability payments were her only source of income and the husband had the ability to pay where, while he testified that he had never made more than $20,000 a year, he also testified that his 2013 tax return showed gross receipts from his drywall business of $62,000 and that he spent the cash which he received. Kucinski v. Ortega, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 608 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 24, 2016).

In a case where neither party testified explicitly to the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage, but the trial court awarded the wife over $800,000 in retirement accounts, ordered the husband to pay the wife $300,000 cash in annual installments of $50,000, and ordered alimony to bridge the gap between the divorce and the wife turning 65, at which point she would be eligible for full social security retirement benefits, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in not awarding the wife alimony in futuro. Bettis v. Bettis, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 783 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 24, 2016).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that rehabilitation was not appropriate and awarding the husband alimony in futuro; he was the disadvantaged spouse and demonstrated a need for support, he suffered some economic detriment for the benefit of the marriage by agreeing to be a stay-at-home parent for several years, and he would not be able to achieve an earning capacity permitting a standard of living that was reasonably comparable to the post-divorce standard of living expected to be available to the wife, a doctor. Cain-Swope v. Swope, 523 S.W.3d 79, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 986 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 23, 2016), appeal denied, Cain-Swope v. Swope, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 227 (Tenn. Apr. 12, 2017).

Simply stating the trial court's decision on alimony, without more, did not fulfill the requirements of the rule, and the record failed to disclose how the trial court reached the conclusion that the amount of $ 2,400 per month was appropriate; given the wife's expenses, it appeared that ordering her to pay the husband $ 2,400 each month in alimony would create a substantial deficit for the wife, and the matter was remanded for reconsideration. Cain-Swope v. Swope, 523 S.W.3d 79, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 986 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 23, 2016), appeal denied, Cain-Swope v. Swope, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 227 (Tenn. Apr. 12, 2017).

Amount of a wife's alimony in futuro award erred because (1) a finding of the amount of the wife's deficit was unsupported, and (2) the husband's ability to pay was unexplained. Davis v. Davis, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 994 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 29, 2016).

Wife's need for an award of alimony in futuro award was properly found because (1) the evidence supported findings that the wife could not be rehabilitated and of the parties'  marital living standard, and (2) the husband's future income from the husband's separate property was shown. Davis v. Davis, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 994 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 29, 2016).

Trial court's award of alimony in futuro to a wife was appropriate and was not an abuse of discretion because (1) a significant income disparity existed between the parties; (2) although the wife was educated and skilled, the wife's work experience during the previous 25 years had been limited to the parties'  businesses; (3) the wife's income was derived solely from the assets awarded in the divorce; and (4) the husband had a significantly higher earning capacity than the wife and enjoyed a much greater ability to accumulate assets. Stratienko v. Stratienko, 529 S.W.3d 389, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 222 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 499 (Tenn. Aug. 16, 2017).

Even assuming, arguendo, that this statute would apply to an initial alimony in futuro award, the wife rebutted the presumption that the parties'  daughter, who was attending college, financially contributed to or received significant support from the wife's household because the wife testified that the parties'  daughter paid no rent and did not otherwise substantially contribute to the household. Talley v. Talley, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 272 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 1, 2017).

Trial court properly awarded the wife alimony in futuro in the amount of $1,800 per month because several of the statutory factors, including the husband's significantly greater earning capacity, better physical health, and higher level of education, militate in favor of an award of spousal support to the wife; the wife's social security and non-marital pension income only amounted to approximately $1,682 per month while the wife claimed expenses of $3,488 per month; and the husband demonstrated an ability to pay alimony. Talley v. Talley, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 272 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 1, 2017).

Trial court did not err by requiring the husband to maintain a life insurance policy in the amount of $500,000 in order to secure his alimony in futuro obligation to the wife as the trial court had discretion regarding whether to order such security for an alimony obligation. Talley v. Talley, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 272 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 1, 2017).

Considering the profound discrepancy in the parties'  respective earning capacities, the wife was the disadvantaged spouse and entitled to alimony, plus given her age and the length of time she remained out of the workforce while serving as homemaker and primary child caregiver, rehabilitation was not appropriate; there was no error with the trial court's decision to award the wife $ 8,000 per month as alimony in futuro under T.C.A. § 36-5-121. Seifert v. Seifert, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 325 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 17, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 689 (Tenn. Oct. 3, 2017).

Award of alimony in futuro to a wife was vacated because (1) the trial court did not make adequate findings as to the feasibility of rehabilitation and the propriety of rehabilitative and/or transitional alimony, and (2) the wife's disinterest in rehabilitation did not alone entitle the wife to long term alimony. Hallums v. Hallums, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 419 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 21, 2017).

Trial court abused its discretion in awarding alimony in futuro to the wife, as the record did not support findings that there was no proof that the wife was underemployed and no proof that she could be rehabilitated; the wife's managerial experience and ability to increase her current work hours demonstrated that she could improve her earning capacity to a reasonable level without additional training, and thus her ability to be self-sufficient was not only feasible, but likely. Finstad v. Finstad, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 612 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 19, 2018).

Chancery court properly awarded alimony in futuro to a wife because while the husband had the ability to pay both the alimony amount requested by the wife and the alimony actually awarded by the trial court and even with partial rehabilitation and the investment income from the marital assets awarded to her, the wife would be unable to achieve the standard of living after the divorce comparable to that which she enjoyed during the marriage without alimony in futuro. Brecker v. Brecker, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 625 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 26, 2018).

Wife's alimony in futuro award erred because (1) the sum awarded exceeded the need found, (2) the court did not consider findings the wife could re-enter the employment market, and (3) the court did not find the wife's economic rehabilitation was not feasible. Ellis v. Ellis, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 61 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2019).

Trial court did not err in its determination that alimony in futuro was inappropriate in this case; the trial court properly considered all of the relevant factors under the statute, and just because the wife ascribed greater weight to the factor regarding her physical health did not necessarily mean that the trial court was required to undertake the same analysis, especially in light of the conflicting evidence on Wife's ability to work. Carter v. Browne, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 63 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 4, 2019).

Husband filed to show that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding a wife alimony in futuro because he did not point to any evidence showing that the wife would be able to achieve a standard of living comparable to the parties'  standard of living during the marriage or to the post-divorce standard of living expected to be available to him in the absence of long-term support; no evidence was introduced suggesting that the wife was able either to return to school or obtain employment. Parker v. Parker, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 173 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 9, 2019).

Trial court did not err by awarding the wife alimony in futuro because the record showed that without ongoing lifetime assistance she would never be able to support herself at any level near that enjoyed during the marriage. Prior to obtaining a part-time job, and the wife had not been employed for over 30 years, she did not graduate from college. Pearson v. Pearson, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 288 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 6, 2019).

Award of alimony in futuro in futuro in the amount of $ 1,600 per month was appropriate because it would appropriately address the wife's monthly shortfall concerning her income and expenses, and the husband clearly had the ability to pay such an award based upon his income. Pierce v. Pierce, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 306 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 21, 2019).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding alimony in futuro to a wife because the wife had contributed to the husband's career and resulting high earning capacity at the expense of wife's own career. The husband, who was a student from another country when the parties married, became an American citizen earning a substantial income as a medical doctor, and, although the wife was making an appropriate effort to further the wife's education, the wife had no prospect of achieving the same standard of living enjoyed during the marriage. Patel v. Patel, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 560 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 17, 2019).

Alimony award in the parties'  marital dissolution agreement was properly characterized as alimony in futuro due to its indefinite character. Jones v. Jones, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 536 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 4, 2019).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion by awarding the wife alimony in futuro of $1,500 per month because it determined that the husband's earning capacity was at least $60,000 per year based on his reported income and rental income and that even if the trial court erred by failing to impute potential income to the wife, in light of the income disparity between the parties, any such error worked no injustice. Climer v. Climer, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 33 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 29, 2020).

Award of alimony in futuro to the wife was not an abuse of discretion; given the wife's age of 58 and lack of any work experience or job skills, the trial court found that rehabilitation was not feasible and the award allowed her to adjust to the immediate economic consequences of the divorce, and as the award was subject to modification, the husband had the ability to receive a reduction in the amount upon petition and proper showing to the court. Henry v. Henry, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 84 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 26, 2020).

Ex-wife was properly awarded alimony in futuro because the ex-husband's earning capacity far exceeded that of the wife; the wife had minimal work experience due to her roles during the marriage as a caregiver and homemaker; it would be nearly impossible, even with a degree or retail employment, for the wife to increase her earning capacity to a reasonable level in light of the high standard of living the parties enjoyed during the marriage or the husband's substantial monthly income; and the husband had separate property the trial court found was worth $1 million or more; however, the alimony award was vacated as sufficient findings were not made regarding the husband's ability to pay the amount of alimony awarded to the wife. Griffin v. Griffin, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 371 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 19, 2020).

On appeal, neither party disputed the type of alimony awarded, and the evidence supported the trial court's finding that the wife would not be able to support herself at any level near that enjoyed during the marriage; thus, an award of alimony in futuro was appropriate in this case. Ellis v. Ellis, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 387 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 27, 2020).

Contrary to the court's mandate, the trial court's adjustment of alimony did not account for the wife's relative earning capacity, but in view of the circumstances, including the wife's age, work experience, the number of years she had not worked outside the home, and the training she would need to re-enter the workforce, the court adopted the wife's expert's opinion that she was capable of earning $ 2,326.00 per month, and the order was modified to reflect an award of $ 5,674.00 per month in alimony in futuro. Ellis v. Ellis, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 387 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 27, 2020).

2. Alimony In Solido.

In a dissolution matter, a trial court erred in determining a loan in which both parties'  were borrowers was marital debt, T.C.A. § 36-4-121(b)(1)(A), because the loan was applied for and the proceeds distributed to the husband shortly before the parties were married, the proceeds were used to pay off an obligation that was solely the debt of the husband, and the balance of the proceeds went into the husband's personal bank account; the husband benefitted most from the loan and was obligated to pay the balance of the loan in the form of alimony in solido to the wife, T.C.A. § 36-5-121(h)(1). Yattoni-Prestwood v. Prestwood, 397 S.W.3d 583, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 602 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 29, 2012), appeal denied, Yattoni-Prestwood v. Prestwood, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 70 (Tenn. Jan. 9, 2013).

In a dissolution matter, a trial court erred in determining certain debts a wife acquired during the marriage were the wife's separate obligations, T.C.A. § 36-4-121, because the expenditures were gifts of the wife's separate property for the benefit of the marriage and, as such, considered marital obligations subject to equitable distribution; the husband was responsible for one-half of the marital debt in the form of alimony in solido, T.C.A. § 36-5-121. Yattoni-Prestwood v. Prestwood, 397 S.W.3d 583, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 602 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 29, 2012), appeal denied, Yattoni-Prestwood v. Prestwood, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 70 (Tenn. Jan. 9, 2013).

Trial court did not err in interpreting the final decree of divorce as requiring the obligor spouse to remit to the obligee spouse one-half of the total value of the obligor spouse's municipal pension plan, as of the date of the entry of the final decree of divorce. The obligor spouse was, therefore, not entitled to terminate payments once the obligee spouse received one-half of the obligor spouse's total contributions to the plan, and the obligor spouse was not entitled to reimbursement of any overpayment. Young v. Young, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 89 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 26, 2015).

trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding alimony in futuro to the wife until her death or remarriage because unlike the husband, the wife lacked funds from sources other than her division of the marital property to sustain her; the wife's position as their daughter's caretaker impeded her ability to find suitable employment, the wife made substantial contributions to the marriage, the husband was a fault for the divorce, and the wife was economically disadvantaged. Kibbe v. Kibbe, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 262 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 28, 2015).

Denying the wife alimony in solido was error where the husband's past and future income was far greater. Lubell v. Lubell, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 904 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 12, 2015).

Trial court did not err in awarding alimony in solido to cover the wife's attorney's fees, as the wife demonstrated her nominal income and the constraint placed upon her potential for employment by a child's special needs. Yocum v. Yocum, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 969 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 15, 2015).

Award of alimony in solido to the husband was appropriate to adjust the division of the marital property; the wife was awarded a significant portion of the marital estate and enjoyed a much higher earning potential as a result of the division, but the husband was entitled to an award of alimony in solido to equalize the division and account for his lesser earning potential. Hardin v. Hensley-Hardin, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 975 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 18, 2015).

In recognition of the trial court's discretion in such matters and the availability of funds from the division of the marital property, the trial court's denial of an additional award of alimony in solido for the husband's attorney fees, litigation expenses, and costs was affirmed. Hardin v. Hensley-Hardin, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 975 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 18, 2015).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding a wife alimony in solido because the husband had the ability to pay, and the wife had the need for the funds; the trial court awarded the wife just over half of the fees her attorney has billed for her services, which meant she already had to use some of the cash she had been awarded from the property division to pay her lawyer's fees. Chumley v. Chumley, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 990 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 23, 2015).

Because the trial court had to reconsider its award of alimony, the award of attorney fees as alimony in solido could not be considered. Franks v. Franks, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 152 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 29, 2016).

Wife had a substantial need for the husband to pay her attorney fees and he had the ability to pay some if not all of the fees requested; having revised the total amount of the wife's litigation expenses, and given that the wife's current income, including her alimony in futuro, was approximately one-fourth of the husband's current income, and neither party received substantial liquid or income-producing assets, the wife was significantly disadvantaged economically, and she needed substantial assistance to pay her fees and litigation expenses, which award was modified on appeal. Longstreth v. Longstreth, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 271 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 20, 2016).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering a husband to pay a sum of money as alimony in solido to the wife for the wife's attorneys'  fees because the court found that the husband's actions during the pendency of the divorce increased the amount of the wife's legal expenses and that the husband used marital funds to pay the husband's own expenses. Moreover, the wife's portion of the marital estate was the wife's main source of future income, and the wife was not required to use that source of future income to pay legal expenses. Grant v. Grant, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 327 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 12, 2016).

Trial court did not err in awarding the mother attorney's fees as alimony in solido where the father had the ability to pay, the amount did not exceed his income minus expenses, and he failed to offer any proof that the amount of the fees was unreasonable. Ghorley v. Ghorley, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 861 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 10, 2016).

Wife was properly awarded alimony in solido because the wife was not to be required to deplete the wife's assets to pay the wife's attorney's fees. Davis v. Davis, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 994 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 29, 2016).

Trial court's alimony in solido award was vacated as the its findings appeared to be devoid of consideration of the wife's need. Bewick v. Bewick, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 97 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 13, 2017).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion by awarding a wife alimony in solido for a period of years to prevent the husband from voluntarily reducing the husband's income to thwart the wife's ability to collect spousal support. During the course of the litigation, the husband not only significantly removed the wife's access to marital funds, but repeatedly deducted amounts from the wife's temporary alimony payments, which behavior the court deemed contemptuous. Stratienko v. Stratienko, 529 S.W.3d 389, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 222 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 499 (Tenn. Aug. 16, 2017).

Wife's request of $500,000 for alimony in solido was reasonable considering her debts were somewhere between $ 200,000 and $ 250,000 and she had no home; the trial court's decision to award the wife alimony in solido under T.C.A. § 36-5-121 was consistent with public policy and was supported by the evidence. Seifert v. Seifert, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 325 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 17, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 689 (Tenn. Oct. 3, 2017).

Wife's income was insufficient to cover her expenses and the husband's income exceeded his expenses; the husband failed to show that the trial court abused its discretion by awarding the wife alimony in solido under T.C.A. § 36-5-121. Cardle v. Cardle, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 330 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 17, 2017).

In light of the explicit allowance under T.C.A. § 36-5-121 that the payments be made in installments, the wife's argument, that the trial court erred by allowing the husband to make payments in 72 equal installments over the course of six years, was rejected. Cardle v. Cardle, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 330 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 17, 2017).

Interest rate applicable to judgments entered between January 1 and June 30, 2016, was 5.50 percent per annum, and the case was remanded with instructions to modify the order awarding the wife alimony in solido under T.C.A. § 36-5-121 to lower the interest rate on the judgment from 10 percent per annum to 5.50 percent per annum so that it complied with the version of T.C.A. § 47-14-121 applicable at the time of trial. Cardle v. Cardle, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 330 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 17, 2017).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in a divorce proceeding by awarding the wife alimony in solido because the court considered all of the relevant statutory factors, including need and ability to pay, and the evidence did not preponderate against the trial court's findings. The court considered the amount of assets with which each party was leaving the marriage and the ongoing financial needs of the parties. Bounds v. Bounds, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 524 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 6, 2018).

Denial of the wife's attorney's fees as alimony in solido was upheld, as the trial court applied the correct legal standard and found that, in the division of property, she received a net distribution amount of approximately $ 884,000, which included real property and bank account funds. Nisenbaum v. Nisenbaum, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 258 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 23, 2019).

Award of attorney's fees to a husband as alimony in solido was unwarranted because the trial court made no finding relative to the husband's need; the husband was gainfully employed as executive director of two medical organizations, he had additional income from his retirement and a real estate partnership, and he was also awarded a disproportionate share of the marital estate. Odom v. Odom, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 378 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 5, 2019).

Trial court's award of alimony in solido to a wife was appropriate because the court considered the relevant statutory factors and made sufficient findings on each—in particular the court considered the wife's need for alimony due to various physical ailments and an inability to work full-time, as well as the husband's ability to pay. Furthermore, the court's award of alimony in solido was not punitive or, alternatively, an impermissible back-door division of the husband's separate property from an inheritance. Howell v. Howell, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 554 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 13, 2019).

Husband was ordered to pay $ 90,000 to cover his unsecured debt, and contrary to his claim, this obligation was not alimony paid to the wife, as it was more accurately characterized as a division of marital debt; although some of the debt may have been incurred to pay for marital expenses, the husband requested that these debts be assigned to him and presented no evidence concerning the purposes for which the debt was incurred. Story v. Nussbaumer-Story, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 372 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 19, 2020).

Award of alimony in solido in the amount of $ 1,100 per month to the wife for eight years was proper; the court placed emphasis on the parties'  difference in earning capacity, the wife's physical condition, and the parties'  decision during the marriage for her to stay home and homeschool their child. The husband had the ability to pay and the wife had a need for alimony, plus it did not appear that she would be enjoying a standard of living comparable to that enjoyed during the marriage or equivalent to the husband's post-divorce standard of living. Story v. Nussbaumer-Story, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 372 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 19, 2020).

To charge the husband with the full amount of attorney fees would be inequitable in view of the fact that the pendente lite support he paid to the wife was used to pay a portion of her fees; the amount of the alimony in solido was modified accordingly. Ellis v. Ellis, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 387 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 27, 2020).

Wife's primary share of the marital estate was the marital residence and the liquid assets she received were insufficient to cover her legal expenses without selling the marital home; the husband had the ability to pay all of the attorney fees accrued in this case, the wife did not, and thus she was entitled to some amount of alimony in solido for fees. Ellis v. Ellis, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 387 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 27, 2020).

3. Sum Certainty.

In an action in which the husband appealed the circuit court for Rutherford County's division of marital property, the amount of the award of rehabilitative alimony to the wife, and the grant of divorce to the wife based on the husband's adultery, the instant court disagreed with the trial court's decision that alimony payments to the wife should begin at the rate of fifteen thousand dollars a month and that the wife should receive rehabilitative alimony rather than alimony in futuro. Jekot v. Jekot, 232 S.W.3d 744, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 3, 2007), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 475 (Tenn. May 14, 2007).

4. Attorney Fees.

Trial court erred in sua sponte awarding a wife attorney fees of four thousand dollars because the wife clearly did not lack sufficient funds to pay her attorney, nor would the four thousand dollar payment require her to deplete her considerable financial resources. Mimms v. Mimms, 234 S.W.3d 634, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 65 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 30, 2007), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 601 (Tenn. June 25, 2007).

Trial court erred in awarding the wife attorney fees of $1,500 because the wife had the financial resources to pay the fees; the wife withdrew $39,700 upon the parties'  separation, at the time of trial, she still had approximately $26,000, and the wife received other substantial assets as a result of the trial court's division of the net marital estate. Oakes v. Oakes, 235 S.W.3d 152, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 160 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 26, 2007), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 708 (Tenn. Aug. 13, 2007).

In a divorce case, the ex-wife could not pay her attorney fees without being forced to deplete the assets that she would eventually use to support herself in retirement, as she was already forced to rely upon her credit cards to pay for a portion of her legal expenses; while the rehabilitative alimony award would help her defray her living expenses, it would not enable her to pay the remaining amount she owed her lawyer for services rendered in the trial court, and therefore the trial court erred by failing to award her alimony in solido in the amount of the her legal expenses in the trial court. Owens v. Owens, 241 S.W.3d 478, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 178 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 29, 2007), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 817 (Tenn. Sept. 17, 2007).

Former spouse was not entitled to an award of attorney's fees and expenses as alimony in solido, under T.C.A. § 36-5-121(h)(1), because the record contained nothing to suggest that the spouse was unable to secure counsel, either at trial or on appeal, but for an award of attorney's fees. Furthermore, the procedural history of the case militated against an award of attorney's fees and expenses as both of the parties engaged in conduct in litigating the case which led to numerous, unnecessary filings that resulted in numerous, unnecessary court hearings. Gonsewski v. Gonsewski, 350 S.W.3d 99, 2011 Tenn. LEXIS 872 (Tenn. Sept. 16, 2011).

Awarding a wife the attorney fees she incurred in defending a husband's petition for modification of alimony was inappropriate because the trial court awarded attorney fees based on the ruling that the wife prevailed on the petition for modification, but the court of civil appeals reversed the trial court's denial of the petition, Bordes v. Bordes, 358 S.W.3d 623, 2011 Tenn. App. LEXIS 536 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2011).

Denial of the wife's request for attorney fees was proper under T.C.A. § 36-5-121(h)(1), (i) because, at all times material to the husband's petition for modification of alimony, the wife, although not working, possessed significant assets that she received in the divorce, as well as an income-producing asset in the medical office building. Moreover, the wife did not establish that she was unable to secure counsel, either at trial or on appeal, but for an award of attorney's fees. Jekot v. Jekot, 362 S.W.3d 76, 2011 Tenn. App. LEXIS 581 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 25, 2011), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 192 (Tenn. Mar. 7, 2012).

In a dissolution matter, a trial court abused its discretion in denying attorney's fees to the wife, T.C.A. § 36-5-121(i), because the trial court initially awarded the wife her reasonable attorney's fees, which were submitted without objection or response, and then denied the fees without comment. Yattoni-Prestwood v. Prestwood, 397 S.W.3d 583, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 602 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 29, 2012), appeal denied, Yattoni-Prestwood v. Prestwood, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 70 (Tenn. Jan. 9, 2013).

Trial court's award of attorney's fees to the wife was proper since the wife's financial status was such that she could not readily pay her attorney's fees while the husband had the ability to pay the wife's fees. Kelly v. Kelly, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. App. LEXIS 514 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 6, 2013), modified, 445 S.W.3d 685, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 664 (Tenn. Sept. 10, 2014).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to award a wife her attorney fees because the husband and the wife had accrued a great deal of debt during the marriage, at the time of the final decree there were few liquid assets to divide between the parties, both parties were gainfully employed, and the wife had successfully reentered the work force. Luplow v. Luplow, 450 S.W.3d 105, 2014 Tenn. App. LEXIS 355 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 19, 2014).

Considering the trial court's express findings regarding the parties' ability to pay their own attorney's fees and their contribution to the demise of the marriage, there was no abuse of discretion in the court's decision to require both parties to pay their own attorney's fees. Ogles v. Ogles, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 7, 2015).

Award of attorney's fees to the wife was erroneous, as the trial court did not analyze the wife's share of the marital estate or her income, the wife had to bear some responsibility for her choice of counsel and litigation strategy, and it was not logical to allow the wife to preserve her share of the marital estate while depleting the husband's share based on the wife's choice of counsel and litigation strategy. Holdsworth v. Holdsworth, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 974 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 10, 2015), substituted opinion, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 424 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 3, 2015).

Trial court erred in awarding the wife $471,114 in attorney's fees and expenses as alimony in solido where the wife did not demonstrate that she was financially unable to procure counsel, the wife had resources upon which to draw to participate in the litigation and she was not destitute as she was awarded over $400,000 in marital assets, the trial court did not make an express finding that the husband had the ability to pay the attorney's fees in light of the other financial obligations he had to bear, and considering those obligations he did not have the ability to pay the wife's attorney's fees. Holdsworth v. Holdsworth, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 424 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 3, 2015), modified, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 73 (Tenn. Jan. 25, 2016).

Wife's award of attorney's fees as alimony in solido was not improper because, inter alia, a reversal of the valuation of the husband's dental practice meant the wife would likely receive a smaller award of marital assets, so requiring the wife to pay the fees would result in a depletion of the wife's marital assets. Lunn v. Lunn, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 515 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 29, 2015).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding a mother $ 2,600 in attorney's fees, or roughly 25 percent of the $ 10,350 in attorney's fees she incurred in the first appeal, even though the mother was successful on the majority of her claims on appeal, because the father was unemployed at the time of the hearings on remand, and the mother had completed her education and obtained employment in her licensed field. Velez v. Velez, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 522 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 30, 2015).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to award a mother her attorney's fees on remand following the first appeal because the father did not have the ability to pay; the father became unemployed in May 2013 and continued to be unemployed throughout the remand hearings, with no present prospects for employment. Velez v. Velez, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 522 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 30, 2015).

Trial court erred in awarding one spouse attorney's fees because the trial court's order revealed a singular focus upon the other spouse's fault without specific consideration of the other statutory factors. Furthermore, the one spouse was awarded a large share of liquid assets from which that spouse could have paid attorney'  fees. Waters v. Waters, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 668 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 20, 2015).

Wife was entitled to attorney fees, as she displayed financial hardship and lacked the ability to pay, while the husband had the ability to pay. Norris v. Norris, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 673 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 24, 2015).

It was not error to award a wife attorney's fees incurred in defending against a husband's invalid marriage claim because (1) there was a deep disparity in the parties'  earning power, and (2) the wife was made not only to contest the divorce but also to defend the marriage's validity, on which the wife prevailed, incurring additional attorney's fees. Echols v. Echols, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 798 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 29, 2015).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering the husband to pay his wife's attorney fees; unless he did so, the wife would likely have to deplete her resources in order to pay them, and the husband was awarded approximately 59 percent of the marital assets in the divorce and was also responsible for dissipating approximately $ 700,000 worth of marital assets. Kuhlo v. Kuhlo, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 425 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 23, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 804 (Tenn. Oct. 19, 2016).

Reversal of an award of attorney's fees to a mother was appropriate because there was no showing or finding that the mother lacked sufficient funds to pay the mother's own legal expenses, or would have been required to deplete the mother's resources to pay them; no finding regarding the father's ability to pay; no alimony award; and the father was entirely successful on the appeal in challenging the parenting plan provisions at issue. Mashburn v. Mashburn, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 445 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 30, 2016).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney's fees to the wife as the debt on a credit card that was assigned to the husband was used to pay attorney fees based upon the expressed testimony and statement of the witnesses and statements of the lawyers. Mabie v. Mabie, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2017).

Both parties incurred substantial fees and attorney fee expenses throughout the course of litigation, but the trial court found that each spouse had been awarded sufficient cash from which to pay these expenses, and this was not an abuse of discretion. Gant v. Gant, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 63 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2017).

Order for the husband to pay $20,000 of the wife's attorneys fees was not improper give the disparity in the parties income and the fact that the husband was not forthright about is income, misrepresenting it before the trial court. Henson v. Henson, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 257 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 24, 2017).

It was not an abuse of discretion to award a wife attorney's fees because (1) the wife did not have to deplete awarded investment accounts to pay those fees, (2) the husband did not contest findings of indiscretions and attempts to mislead the court, (3) the husband cited no evidence preponderating against the court's findings as to this award, and (4) a disparity in the parties'  financial resources and the wife's counsel's affidavit of time and charges incurred in representing the wife supported the award. Hallums v. Hallums, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 419 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 21, 2017).

Trial court abused its discretion in awarding attorney's fees and costs to the husband where it did not consider the wife's evidence of her financial status and ability to pay, and the husband had presented no proof that he was a disadvantaged spouse. Scherzer v. Scherzer, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 849 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 7, 2017).

Trial court did not err in refusing to exercise its discretion to award the wife reasonable attorney's fees at trial because, although the wife stated that she was not able to pay for her attorney, that the husband had substantial income, and that the husband was found at fault in the divorce, the wife did not include any citations to the record or otherwise expound upon her claim that she was in need of money to pay her attorney. Williams v. Williams, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 563 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 17, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 883 (Tenn. Dec. 8, 2017).

There was no reversible error in a remand court's award of attorney's fees to a husband as alimony in solido because the husband successfully sought to obtain a more equitable share of the increase in value in the wife's ownership interest in business entities that were gifted to the wife by a parent. The appellate court declined, however, to award any attorney's fees related to the appeal as the husband would, after a remand, have adequate property to pay the husband's additional attorney's fees and expenses. Telfer v. Telfer, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 120 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 5, 2018).

Attorney fees were properly awarded to the wife; she obtained employment as a law clerk, whereas the husband, with over 10 years in the United States Army, had both a stable job and income, plus the wife's student loan debt totaled $ 147,000, and she served as the primary caretaker of the two children. Sample v. Sample, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 523 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 4, 2018).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in a divorce proceeding by awarding the wife attorney's fees because the court considered all of the relevant statutory factors, including need and ability to pay, and the evidence did not preponderate against the trial court's findings. Bounds v. Bounds, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 524 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 6, 2018).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting a wife her reasonable attorney's fees as alimony in solido because the wife's income, before support, amounted to roughly one third of the husband's income; the husband's accounting of his monthly expenses did not lead to a determination that he wouild be unable to pay the amount the wife incurred in attorney's fees and costs, and the husband admitted at trial to intentionally prolonging litigation of the matter. Kanski v. Kanski, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 630 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 29, 2018).

Wife's attorney's fees award was vacated because the court (1) did not consider statutory factors, (2) did not find reasonableness, and (3) did not refer to the applicable Rule of Professional Conduct or any of the Rule's factors. Ellis v. Ellis, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 61 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2019).

It was not an abuse of discretion to order a husband to pay a wife's attorney's fees in a divorce as alimony in solido because the record demonstrated (1) the wife was unable to pay the fees and the husband was able to pay them, and, (2) statutorily, the wife's financial contributions to the marriage and the husband's total fault in the demise of the marriage, due to alcohol abuse, extramarital affairs, and psychological and physical abuse. Olinger v. Olinger, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 97 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 25, 2019).

Trial court did not err when it ordered a husband to pay the wife $4,000 as alimony in solido for her attorney fees, where the evidence demonstrated the husband's income was substantially more than the wife's income, the wife was economically disadvantaged relative to the husband, and the wife lacked sufficient funds to pay her legal expenses absent depletion of her limited resources. Williams v. Williams, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 148 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 26, 2019).

Amount of alimony in solido was proper where although the wife was awarded a larger share of the marital estate, the bulk of what she received consisted of the marital residence, which is not an income-producing asset. Moreover, the trial court found that the husband had the ability to pay his attorney's fees whereas the wife did not, and without an award of alimony in solido, the wife would be forced to sell the marital residence to pay for her attorney's fees and expert witness expenses, thereby undercutting the reason for awarding her the residence. Diffie v. Diffie, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 191 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 23, 2019).

Trial court erred by failing to award a wife attorney's fees as alimony in solido because the wife had little income and no ability to replace assets, and she was economically disadvantaged compared to the husband; the duration of the marriage was lengthy with the parties enjoying a comfortable lifestyle and both parties contributing to the marital estate, and the husband had the greater ability to pay an award of attorney's fees. Pierce v. Pierce, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 306 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 21, 2019).

Award of $73,000 in attorney's fees to the wife was affirmed where the court discussed the evidence and legal basis of the award, as alimony in solido, the wife did not dispute that approximately one-half of the amount she sought was incurred in litigating the Rule 60 portion of the proceeding, and the award was based on fees incurred during the second divorce proceeding. Middendorf v. Middendorf, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 323 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 27, 2019).

Husband's monthly income was $ 38,123, and the wife was disabled and unable to maintain employment, and further was not able to be economically rehabilitated due to her age, high school education, and poor and deteriorating health; the trial court found the husband had the ability to pay alimony to the wife and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the wife attorney fees. Wise v. Bercu, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 479 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2019).

When both parties asked the appellate court to award their respective attorneys'  fees and costs on appeal, the court exercising its discretion, declined to deviate from the trial court's findings that the wife was unable to pay the wife's legal fees without depleting the wife's assets, and that the husband had sufficient means to pay the wife's attorney's fees. Accordingly, the court granted the wife's request for appellate attorney's fees and remanded the case for determination of the wife's reasonable and necessary appellate attorney's fees. Howell v. Howell, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 554 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 13, 2019).

Trial court's award of wife's attorney's fees as alimony in solido and its upward modification of same on wife's motion to alter or amend the final decree of divorce was appropriate because the wife had few opportunities for gainful employment. Without this additional amount for attorney's fees, the wife would have had to deplete most of the wife's limited resources to pay the wife's attorney's fees, while the husband, on the other hand, had substantial assets, which provided the husband with the ability to pay both parties'  attorney's fees. Howell v. Howell, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 554 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 13, 2019).

Wife was entitled to an award of attorney's fees as alimony in solido because the wife had little income, lacked the funds to pay the fees, was economically disadvantaged compared to the husband, and would have been required to deplete any assets that the wife was awarded to pay the fees. Given that the husband was found to be at fault in causing the demise of the marriage, was not credible, and given the husband's superior earning capacity and separate property, the trial court erred in ordering each party to pay their own attorney's fees. Hunt-Carden v. Carden, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 91 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 3, 2020).

Given the equities between the parties, modifications to the trial court's order, and all relevant statutory factors, the wife had the ability and means to bear her own appellate costs, and her request for such costs were denied. Ellis v. Ellis, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 387 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 27, 2020).

4.5. Denial of Award Proper.

Circuit court, inter alia, properly divided and valued the marital property and refused to award spousal support to a husband because the parties'  printing business was well-positioned for profitability at the time of trial, the husband controlled the business, including its associated debts, the trial court made specific findings of fact relative to each of the pertinent statutory factors where he had no need of assistance to adjust to the economic consequences of a divorce, he had sufficient assets to be self-sufficient, the wife did not have the ability to pay the husband support, and he did not have the need. Morelock v. Morelock, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 569 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 18, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 864 (Tenn. Dec. 7, 2017).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion by declining to award the husband attorney fees because he received a significant property award and on remand the trial court will award him alimony to provide for his monthly needs until the wife's retires and the husband's share of her pension begins. Shackelford v. Shackelford, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 236 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 16, 2019).

Trial court did not err in failing to award alimony to wife upon entry of the divorce decree because the separation agreement was ambiguous as to whether divorce was contemplated at the time the contract was executed, nothing indicated that the trial court made any finding of fairness as to the agreement, and the court found that the wife was able to support herself and had substantial separate assets. Pless v. Pless, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 480 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2019).

5. Modification of Spousal Support.

Judgment denying the wife's petition to increase alimony was reversed because the increase in the income of the husband's company was a substantial and material change in circumstances, and that the decision not to increase alimony was an abuse of discretion. Wiser v. Wiser, 339 S.W.3d 1, 2010 Tenn. App. LEXIS 402 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 25, 2010), rehearing denied, 339 S.W.3d 1, 2010 Tenn. App. LEXIS 521 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 11, 2010), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2011 Tenn. LEXIS 153 (Tenn. Feb. 16, 2011).

Trial court trial applied an incorrect legal standard in reviewing a former husband's petition to modify alimony because it only focused on the husband's income and ignored the host of other relevant considerations. Malkin v. Malkin, 475 S.W.3d 252, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 151 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 26, 2015), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 617 (Tenn. July 21, 2015).

Upon review of the evidence, modification of a former husband's alimony obligation was not supported by the evidence because although his retirement was objectively reasonable, he still had the financial ability to pay the wife's current level of alimony. Malkin v. Malkin, 475 S.W.3d 252, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 151 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 26, 2015), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 617 (Tenn. July 21, 2015).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that a father failed to prove a substantial and material change in circumstances that would necessitate a modification in his spousal support obligation because the father had stable employment and did not present any evidence to establish that he could not afford the support payments, and the mother's ability to work declined since the time of the divorce. Langlo v. Langlo, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 232 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 20, 2015).

While the trial court found that the wife was underemployed, the husband's earning capacity increased greatly since the divorce, which constituted a substantial and material change in circumstances'  the finding of the wife's underemployment should not have ended the analysis by the trial court, and the preponderance of the evidence entitled her to an increase in her alimony. Hiatt v. Hiatt, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 47 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 28, 2016).

Trial court erred in determining that a material change in circumstances was sufficient to permit modification of the husband's alimony in futuro where his erratic income was anticipated, the husband's income increase was irrelevant to whether the term of the alimony obligation should have been extended, and the findings related to the economic recession and the wife's ability to provide for herself financially were not supported by the evidence. Cooley v. Cooley, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 56 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 29, 2016).

Changes in income on which the trial court predicated its automatic modifications of alimony were not certain to occur so soon after the decree or at any point in the near future, and thus the advantage of automatically modifying alimony was likely to be overcome by the effects of other unpredictable events; the statutory provisions governing alimony modification were better tools to manage the husband's alimony obligation than an attempt to predict the status of all modification factors at a distant point in the future. Longstreth v. Longstreth, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 271 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 20, 2016).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in having a future automatic modification order to the alimony award; the husband would retire and begin drawing his pension no later than April 2019, which was roughly three years after the trial court entered its order, and this case presented circumstances that were expected to occur in the near future, warranting the future automatic modification. McBroom v. McBroom, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 412 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 21, 2017).

Husband, while able to provide some level of support, could not continue to pay support at pre-retirement levels without accruing a substantial monthly deficit, and the order awarding the wife alimony in futuro in the amount of $ 2,990 per month under T.C.A. § 36-5-121 was not supported by the evidence; if left to stand, would result in the husband liquidating all assets and accruing insurmountable debt, so the award was modified to $ 500 per month. Wilhoit v. Wilhoit, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 91 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 16, 2018).

Trial court properly denied a former husband's request to terminate his alimony obligation because, while a substantial and material change in circumstance occurred upon the former husband's retirement, the findings concerning the former husband's ability to pay alimony and the former wife's need were properly supported by evidence in the record and within the court's range of acceptable alternative dispositions. Jekot v. Jekot, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 574 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 28, 2018).

Husband's fourth petition for modification of spousal support did not show a substantial and material change in circumstances since the disposition of the husband's third petition because (1) the new expenses the husband relied on to show a change either existed or were anticipated when the third petition was heard, (2) his wife's retention of an award of arrearages in anticipation of future legal expenses did not show a material change, and (3) the wife's reported business expenses were not a material change, as the expenses were not considered when the wife was originally awarded alimony. Malkin v. Malkin, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 494 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 7, 2019), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. LEXIS 200 (Tenn. Apr. 1, 2020).

Wife's petition for an increase in alimony did not show a substantial and material change in circumstances because (1) a temporary increase in her former husband's income and an expected increase in the value of his retirement fund did not suffice, and (2) an expected increase in her expenses was not a substantial change. Malkin v. Malkin, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 494 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 7, 2019), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. LEXIS 200 (Tenn. Apr. 1, 2020).

Husband's fourth petition for modification of spousal support had to show a substantial and material change in circumstances since the disposition of the husband's third petition because the disposition of the third petition was res judicata as to prior circumstances. Malkin v. Malkin, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 494 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 7, 2019), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. LEXIS 200 (Tenn. Apr. 1, 2020).

Record did not establish a basis to reverse the modification of the father's alimony obligation when he claimed and the trial court relied upon an unanticipated increase in financial liabilities, and no abuse of discretion was found. Kibbe v. Kibbe, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 38 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 30, 2020).

6. Award of Spousal Support Excessive.

Although the trial court was correct that the statutory factors found at T.C.A. § 36-5-121(i) were pertinent to its analysis of how much rehabilitative alimony the husband should pay, the court had applied an incorrect standard when it essentially took judicial notice that the husband was a nationally known music business attorney and set his alimony based on his potential to earn substantially more income. Mimms v. Mimms, 234 S.W.3d 634, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 65 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 30, 2007), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 601 (Tenn. June 25, 2007).

Trial court erred in only reducing a husband's monthly rehabilitative alimony obligation from seven thousand dollars to five thousand dollars and the appellate court reduced it to two thousand dollars because a decrease in the husband's income was anticipated in the MDA, and despite his reasonable efforts, the husband had incurred an eight-five percent decrease in his income since the MDA and the divorce. Mimms v. Mimms, 234 S.W.3d 634, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 65 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 30, 2007), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 601 (Tenn. June 25, 2007).

Trial court erred by failing to consider the wife's earning capacity of $ 2,333.33 in setting the husband's alimony obligation at $9,700 and the court modified the trial court's order to reflect a monthly alimony amount of $7,366.67. Pearson v. Pearson, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 288 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 6, 2019).

7. Award of Spousal Support Upheld.

Trial court's award of alimony in futuro was affirmed because the trial court retained jurisdiction over the alimony award, the trial court found the wife to be economically disadvantaged compared to husband, and the record clearly established that the parties'  marriage lasted approximately ten years. Jackman v. Jackman, 373 S.W.3d 535, 2011 Tenn. App. LEXIS 571 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 24, 2011), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 201 (Tenn. Mar. 7, 2012).

Transitional alimony award to the wife was affirmed given the age of the parties, their education, their employment history, the division of marital property, the duration of the marriage, the parties' relative contributions to the marriage and their businesses, and the absence of minor children or a physical condition that would have prevented the wife from working. Ogles v. Ogles, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 7, 2015).

While the wife was economically disadvantaged as compared to the husband, they both received a significant portion of the marital estate, the husband had to pay the wife's insurance until she was eligible for Medicare, and unlike him, the wife was capable of seeking employment if necessary, and thus the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding $ 1,500 to the wife until she reached the age of 65. Phipps v. Phipps, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 36 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 27, 2015), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 421 (Tenn. May 15, 2015), cert. denied, 193 L. Ed. 2d 290, 136 S. Ct. 360, 2015 U.S. LEXIS 6710 (U.S. 2015).

Amount of a wife's alimony award was not improper because (1) the wife had no current income, and (2) the husband had the ability to pay the award. Lunn v. Lunn, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 515 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 29, 2015).

Trial court did not err in awarding a payee spouse monthly alimony because the court considered the length of the parties'  marriage, the payee spouses'  inability to obtain employment that yielded a higher wage, the payee spouse's demonstrated need for alimony, and the payor spouse's ability to pay alimony. The court determined that, despite the parties'  tax returns, the payor spouse had the ability to pay because the parties'  standard of living was inexplicably luxurious in comparison to their reported income. McNabb v. McNabb, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 667 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 20, 2015).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding temporary alimony to the wife because the wife could not access funds from corporate debentures awarded to the wife in that, after the trial court entered its final judgment, the husband filed a motion to stay execution on the judgment pending appeal, and the motion was granted by the appellate court. Moreover, the court found that the wife established the need for the support, while the husband had the ability to pay. St. John-Parker v. Parker, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 335 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 17, 2016).

Trial court's concurrent awards of both rehabilitative alimony, for three years, and alimony in futuro, until the death of a party, or the wife's marriage or cohabitation, was both reasonable and supported by the record as the court adequately reconsidered its award of alimony in light of the complete division of marital assets, the wife's needs and expenses, and the husband's ability to pay. The husband had a successful medical practice, while the wife had stayed at home to raise the parties'  children and planned to attend law school. Mabie v. Mabie, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2017).

Award of alimony to the wife was affirmed where it was apparent from its memorandum that the trial court had not credited the testimony of the husband and his son from a previous marriage about the husband's ability to pay. Street v. Street, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 213 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 29, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 439 (Tenn. July 20, 2017).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion by awarding a wife both alimony in futuro and alimony in solido because the trial court rendered an equal distribution of marital property before addressing whether an award of spousal support to the wife was warranted. Furthermore, the alimony in solido award was not made to equalize the marital property distribution, because such purpose had already been accomplished, but to prevent the husband from voluntarily reducing the husband's income to thwart the wife's ability to collect spousal support. Stratienko v. Stratienko, 529 S.W.3d 389, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 222 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 499 (Tenn. Aug. 16, 2017).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in its alimony award; the final judgment was 10 pages long and contained numerous findings of fact pertinent to the statutory factors, and there was no merit to the husband's argument that the trial court failed to make sufficient findings of fact McBroom v. McBroom, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 412 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 21, 2017).

Assuming, without deciding, that there was error in the trial court's initial oral ruling, the court cured it by amending the court's final judgment, which did not base its award on a percentage of the husband's income. McBroom v. McBroom, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 412 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 21, 2017).

Chancery court properly awarded a wife alimony because an award of alimony in futuro and rehabilitative alimony was appropriate where the wife was relatively economically disadvantaged and could only be partially rehabilitated, and the annual figure of the in solido award approached the business's previous taxable income which allowed the couple to receive monthly distributions of $20,000. Norman v. Norman, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 579 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 28, 2017).

Trial court did not err in awarding a wife rehabilitative alimony and alimony in solido because it was clear from the trial court's orders that it considered the relevant statutory factors—the parties'  relative earning capacity, education levels, ages, health, modest standard of living, and contributions to the marriage and the duration of parties'  marriage—in determining the nature, amount, and duration of the alimony award. Alattiyat v. Qasqas, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 739 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 9, 2017).

Trial court's award of rehabilitative alimony was reasonable and supported by the record because the wife had not earned a college degree, and by agreement of the parties, she spent several years as a homemaker caring for the couple's son and had only relatively recently reentered the workforce. Kanski v. Kanski, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 630 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 29, 2018).

Trial court did not err by awarding the wife alimony in futuro of $1,000 per month in addition to seven years of rehabilitative alimony because the trial court carefully considered the relevant statutory factors, the evidence supported the trial court's finding that the wife would be unable to achieve an earning capacity that would permit her standard of living to be comparable to the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage, the trial court found that the wife's oral communication skills in English were very poor, and while the wife had a degree in computer science from a university in India, she had never worked in the United States in that field. Singla v. Singla, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 681 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 27, 2018).

Trial court did not err in determining the amount of alimony for the wife where this was a 29-year marriage, the wife was 52 years old, a homemaker, and the primary caregiver for the parties'  four children, and the husband had a much greater ability to acquire capital assets and income and his earning capacity significantly exceeded that of the wife. Tarver v. Tarver, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 128 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 13, 2019).

Wife was properly awarded alimony in futuro and rehabilitative alimony as only partial rehabilitation was feasible. Diffie v. Diffie, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 191 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 23, 2019).

Lump sum award of alimony award to a wife was appropriate, even given the relatively short duration of the parties'  marriage, because the award was to counter the impact of the sale of the wife's cosmetics franchise leading up to the marriage, which was the wife's main source of income. The trial court also took into consideration the parties'  standard of living during the marriage, in which the parties spent extravagantly. Stearns-Smith v. Smith, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 372 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 31, 2019).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the wife alimony in solido in the amount of $ 100,000 and alimony in futuro at the rate of $ 6,500 per month; the wife had a need for long-term spousal support and was unable to be economically rehabilitated, considering her age, high school education, and poor and deteriorating health, while the husband was employed as an emergency room physician, earning a monthly income of $38,123, and he had the ability to pay alimony. Wise v. Bercu, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 479 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2019).

8. Cohabitation.

Evidence did not preponderate against the conclusion that a former spouse was not cohabitating with a paramour because, although the obligor spouse presented evidence that the former spouse may have spent more than six days at a time at the paramour's house in Florida at different points in time, this alone was insufficient to prove that the former spouse was cohabitating with the paramour. Moreover, there was no proof that either the former spouse or the paramour supported the other party. Wiser v. Wiser, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 293 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2015).

Chancery court did not err in suspending an obligor parent's alimony obligation in full for the period of time in which the recipient parent lived with a paramour. Furthermore, the chancery court did not abuse its discretion or apply an incorrect legal standard in its decision to reinstate the obligor parent's original alimony obligation because the cohabitation had ceased by the time of trial. Gregory v. Gregory, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 464 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 30, 2016).

Chancery court properly awarded monthly spousal support to a wife because the trial court's award of $4,500 a month to the wife not unreasonable in light of the husband's “modest” expense amount and there was no evidence that the wife's expenses were greater while the parties adult children were temporarily living with her and they paid all of their own expenses. Yuhasz v. Yuhasz, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 294 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 24, 2018).

9. Change in Circumstances.

There was no need for husband to demonstrate a substantial and material change of circumstances in his motion to modify alimony because the parties knew a change of circumstances was likely when they executed the MDA, in that the husband's job status and future income was uncertain; therefore, the MDA provided that the parties would reevaluate their respective financial situations in or around August of 2005, and adjust the rehabilitative alimony payments accordingly. Mimms v. Mimms, 234 S.W.3d 634, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 65 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 30, 2007), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 601 (Tenn. June 25, 2007).

Although husband showed substantial and material change in his income, he failed to demonstrate that he was entitled to modification of alimony under T.C.A. § 36-5-121(i); fact he had a reduction in his income as to his rental property was not sufficient to reduce his alimony obligation, and he had the ability to pay the $1,800 per month in alimony. Evans v. Young, 280 S.W.3d 815, 2008 Tenn. App. LEXIS 447 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 31, 2008).

Taking pre-divorce earnings into account is proper and consistent with the trial court's responsibility under T.C.A. § 36-5-121(i) in determining an initial award of alimony; when the inquiry before the trial court is whether the award should be modified as provided in T.C.A. § 36-5-121(f)(2)(A), however, post-divorce earnings and other attendant circumstances are more probative of earning capacity. Bordes v. Bordes, 358 S.W.3d 623, 2011 Tenn. App. LEXIS 536 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2011).

Husband's alimony payment should have been modified in accordance with T.C.A. § 36-5-121(f)(2)(A) because the record showed a substantial and material change in circumstance since the husband's income dropped dramatically from the time of the divorce to the time of the hearing on his petition for modification; the decrease in income impaired the husband's ability to pay the amount of alimony and was a consequence of his health problems, and the husband's health problems and resulting decrease in income were not within the contemplation of the parties at the time of the divorce. Bordes v. Bordes, 358 S.W.3d 623, 2011 Tenn. App. LEXIS 536 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2011).

Trial court erred by finding that there had not been a substantial and material change in circumstances that warranted review of the husband's alimony obligation because his retirement was objectively reasonable, given that he was 64 years old when he retired, he had been practicing orthopedic surgery for 35 years, the record revealed no motive to evade his support obligation, and the evidence overwhelmingly showed that he retired on account of growing health problems. Odom v. Odom, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 217 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 14, 2015).

Denial of obligor spouse's petition to reduce alimony payments due to a substantial and material change of circumstances was appropriate because the obligor spouse failed to show a substantial and material change in circumstances regarding the obligor spouse's income to justify a modification of alimony obligation. Moreover, the obligor spouse did not show that the obligee spouse's need for alimony had changed after the obligee spouse submitted an income and expense statement at trial. Wiser v. Wiser, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 293 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2015).

Trial court properly measured a father's change in circumstance from the final decree of divorce because the agreed order only changed the bank account where alimony payments would be deposited, and such a minor change made it appropriate to look to the final decree. Cook v. Iverson, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 946 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2015).

Trial court properly modified alimony because a father's job loss was a substantial and material change in circumstances. Cook v. Iverson, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 946 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2015).

Trial court erred in reducing an ex-husband's alimony payments because he failed to demonstrate a substantial and material change in circumstances where the potential for a change in his employment was foreseeable, he chose not to renew his employment contract, had the ability to work, had no type of physical or mental inability to prevent him from working full-time, the change in his employment did not significantly affect his ability to pay his alimony obligation, and the ex-wife needed support. Hauf v. Hauf, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 635 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 26, 2016).

Trial court erred in decreasing a husband's alimony obligation because its factual findings did not support its decision, and the only significant change since the divorce was that the husband's income had increased, but the wife's income had remained the same; the fact that the wife owned a home while the husband had to sell his house and rent a home failed, on its own, to support a finding that the husband no longer had the ability to pay alimony. Covarrubias v. Baker, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 791 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 11, 2017).

Husband's retirement was objectively reasonable as he had a chronic debilitating disease, and this constituted a material and substantial change of circumstance for purposes of T.C.A. § 36-5-121(f)(2)(A). Wilhoit v. Wilhoit, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 91 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 16, 2018).

Trial court properly reduced a husband's spousal support obligation based upon a material change in circumstances because although the wife's receipt of marital property was contemplated at the time of the divorce, the husband also claimed, and the trial court relied upon, a reduction in income; the wife did not include the tax returns she claimed proved otherwise in the record on appeal. Woodard v. Woodard, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 393 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 9, 2018).

Ex-husband, who related that he had Type 1 diabetes, did not establish a substantial change in circumstances to support the modification or elimination of alimony payments. The ex-husband, an internal medicine physician, was working and was capable of generating and was generating income sufficient to continue to pay $1,000 per month. Friesen v. Friesen, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 651 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 5, 2018).

Former husband was not entitled to modify the husband's alimony obligation because any changes that occurred in the parties'  circumstances post-divorce—the husband's remarriage and slight raise in pay—were not sufficiently substantial so as to warrant a modification of the alimony provision in the parties'  marital dissolution agreement. Jones v. Jones, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 536 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 4, 2019).

10. Rehabilitative Alimony.

During the parties'  25-year marriage, the ex-wife was primarily a homemaker and parent, and her decision to stay at home eventually rendered her training and experience as a data entry person obsolete, while the ex-husband earned between $12,000 and $13,000 per month and received disability benefits as a veteran in the amount of $1,310 per month, and thus the wife was economically disadvantaged in comparison to the husband; the wife was entitled to rehabilitative alimony in accordance with T.C.A. § 36-5-121(e), but the alimony award was increased to $3,000 per month until November 2012 and would not terminate on the husband's death. Owens v. Owens, 241 S.W.3d 478, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 178 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 29, 2007), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 817 (Tenn. Sept. 17, 2007).

Award of rehabilitative and in futuro alimony to the wife in the parties'  divorce action was proper pursuant to T.C.A. § 36-5-121(d)(2), (d)(4), and (i) because the trial court's finding was derived in part from its assessment of the husband's credibility and because, with the husband earning $ 850,000 per year, despite the size of the overall debt, the amount of support awarded was not more than the husband was able to pay. Andrews v. Susie Heasook Cho Andrews, 344 S.W.3d 321, 2010 Tenn. App. LEXIS 553 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2010), appeal denied, Andrews v. Andrews, — S.W.3d —, 2011 Tenn. LEXIS 240 (Tenn. Mar. 9, 2011).

Record did not support the award of rehabilitative alimony, as a wife did not intend to pursue the wife's initial stated plan of obtaining additional educational training. Irvin v. Irvin, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 841 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2012), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 361 (Tenn. Apr. 10, 2013).

Wife was entitled to rehabilitative alimony of $1,250 per month for a period of sixty months because the husband, who had an engineering degree, believed he would make between $100,000 and $300,000 a year, the wife, who had some community college education, seldom worked outside of the home during the marriage and never earned more than $17,028 a year during the marriage, but with time, the wife could be rehabilitated to increase her marketability in the workplace. Jackson v. Kash, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. App. LEXIS 693 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 22, 2013).

There was no basis to hold that the evidence preponderated against the five-year period of rehabilitative alimony in this case; after the wife completed her education and job readiness training, it was appropriate to consider that other matters might impact her ability to enter the workforce after six years or require further adjustment, and no abuse of discretion was found. Howell v. Howell, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. App. LEXIS 881 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 30, 2014).

Husband would continue to enjoy a standard of living reasonably comparable to that enjoyed during the marriage, and the award of rehabilitative alimony would allow the wife to pursue an education to enhance her job skills and earning capacity, was consistent with the statute, and was necessary for her to increase her earning capacity. Howell v. Howell, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. App. LEXIS 881 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 30, 2014).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding rehabilitative alimony of $ 800 per month for 39 months to a mother because at the time of divorce in 2011, the mother was the economically disadvantaged spouse; the mother had since completed her degree and obtained employment while the father had been unemployed since May 2013 with no job prospects. Velez v. Velez, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 522 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 30, 2015).

Wife had been able to earn some money, from $ 609 to $ 10,000 annually, after her 2006 hospitalization, but earning this level of income did not indicate that she could be rehabilitated; a finding that she was capable of earning money and the hope that she might be able to maintain work like she did in the past were not findings that she could be rehabilitated to the extent that she would not require long-term support. Longstreth v. Longstreth, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 271 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 20, 2016).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the mother was a candidate for rehabilitative alimony; the father's imputed income was far more that the mother's current earning capacity, the mother's contributions to the marriage were made in the home and now she was disadvantaged relative to the father regarding her ability to earn income, her plan to obtain a college education was appropriate, and even with child support, she still had a shortfall of over $ 4,000 per month. Hopwood v. Hopwood, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 427 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 23, 2016).

Fifteen-year duration for rehabilitative alimony was excessive, as the parties had been married for 14 years, the mother appeared to be in good health and planned on earning her college degree in eight years, and there was no basis for the alimony to last nearly twice as long as it would take for her to complete her education. Hopwood v. Hopwood, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 427 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 23, 2016).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion by placing educational and vocational requirements on its award of rehabilitative alimony, as the wife, who wanted to go back to school and become independent, received what she requested. Treadwell v. Lamb, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 167 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 10, 2017).

Trial court's order stating that the wife would received rehabilitative alimony so long as she was enrolled full time in a teaching program and terminating alimony because the wife was only enrolled in one class during the year-and-a-half between the amended final decree and the hearing on the motion to alter or amend did not constitute reversible error. Treadwell v. Lamb, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 167 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 10, 2017).

Award of $2,500 per month in spousal support for three years was not erroneous given that the husband had monthly income of $21,632.29, and that, prior to the marriage, the wife quit her job to live with the husband in Europe and remained employed throughout the marriage, with the exception of one month of employment, which the wife left when the husband requested that she help with his two businesses. Henson v. Henson, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 257 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 24, 2017).

Trial court did not err in awarding three years of rehabilitative alimony to the wife because, prior to her accident, the wife achieved the position of director of nursing and was a respected professional in her field; the court opined that the wife could achieve, with a reasonable effort, an earning capacity that would permit her standard of living after the divorce to be reasonable comparable to the standard of living she enjoyed prior to the divorce; and the court considered the parties age, length of the marriage, the severity of the injury and slowness of recovery, the wife's need and the husband's ability to pay alimony, and that the husband would be the children's primary caregiver, but would not receive child support from the wife. Williams v. Williams, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 563 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 17, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 883 (Tenn. Dec. 8, 2017).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion by not awarding a wife rehabilitative or transitional alimony as the court considered the statutory factors and that the wife had an education, had worked before the child was born, and had been out of work for only a few years to care for the child. The wife received significant marital assets, left the marriage with little to none of the marital debt, and was to remain in the marital residence until the husband refinanced the residence and the wife received a portion of the proceeds. Vermilyea v. Vermilyea, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 236 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2018).

Trial court's determination that a mother could be rehabilitated lacked a sufficient evidentiary foundation because there was insufficient proof that the mother would be able to achieve an earning capacity that would permit her standard of living following the divorce to be reasonably comparable to the one enjoyed during the marriage, or to the post-divorce standard of living expected to be available to the father. Buchanan v. Buchanan, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 565 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 26, 2018).

Although the wife did receive a slightly greater share of the marital estate, the trial court expressly considered this allocation in its analysis of the statutory factors related to spousal support and ultimately determined that the remaining alimony factors, most notably the husband's significantly greater earning capacity, weighed in favor of an award of rehabilitative alimony to the wife, which was affirmed. Brown v. Brown, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 622 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 25, 2018).

Trial court's award of rehabilitative alimony to the wife in the amount of $ 4,000.00 per month was not erroneous simply because she received a slightly larger share of the marital estate; her share of the marital estate primarily consisted of non-liquid assets, including the equity in the marital residence and her vehicle, and the husband's share contained over $ 25,000.00 in liquid assets. Brown v. Brown, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 622 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 25, 2018).

Trial court's award of $ 4,000 per month in rehabilitative alimony to the wife was proper; the evidence supported the trial court's findings regarding the wife's need and the husband's ability to pay, as he had a monthly net income of $ 9,800.00 while the wife had no income, the husband's listed expenses appeared to be greatly inflated, and although the wife was taking classes, she did not expect to graduate for 10 months, and her employability was still uncertain given the young ages of the children and her lack of experience. Brown v. Brown, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 622 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 25, 2018).

Chancery court erred in awarding rehabilitative alimony to a wife because, while she was in need of some retraining in order to re-enter the workforce, any health insurance premium included in the wife's need resulted in an overage and nothing in the court's order specifically addressed the purpose or equity of such an overage. Brecker v. Brecker, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 625 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 26, 2018).

Trial court correctly considered the relevant factors under T.C.A. § 36-5-121(i) when it awarded a wife alimony in futuro. The wife's inability to achieve a comparable standard of living to that enjoyed during the marriage, coupled with the husband's ability to pay alimony in futuro, supported the award. Williams v. Williams, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 148 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 26, 2019).

Remand court did not abuse its discretion as to the amount of rehabilitative alimony awarded because its determination of the father's net disposable income was reasonable, the father's purported taxes and expenses notwithstanding. However, the judgment had to be modified to reduce the amount of life insurance which the father was required to carry to secure the alimony obligation because of the reduction of the alimony obligation. Hopwood v. Hopwood, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 232 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 14, 2019).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding rehabilitative alimony to the wife based on the discrepancy in the parties'  respective wages because, although the difference in the parties'  income was not widely disparate, the award of rehabilitative alimony was to assist the wife in becoming more self-sufficient following the divorce as the wife would be able to acquire additional education and/or training. The duration of four years for such rehabilitation was not beyond the trial court's discretion as a reasonable amount of time. Adams v. Adams, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 199 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 29, 2020).

11. Transitional Alimony.

Former spouse was not entitled to transitional alimony, under T.C.A. § 36-5-121(d)(4), because: (1) the spouse had a stable work history with a stable income; (2) the spouse obtained a greater share of the marital assets; (3) the spouse was young, in good health, and college educated; (4) the spouse received pendente lite spousal support for sixteen months prior to the divorce hearing; and (5) the other spouse was ordered to pay for one-half of the mortgage, taxes and insurance for the ninety days following the divorce during which spouse was permitted to remain in the marital residence. Gonsewski v. Gonsewski, 350 S.W.3d 99, 2011 Tenn. LEXIS 872 (Tenn. Sept. 16, 2011).

Former husband was properly denied transitional alimony because the 1) trial court found he was willfully underemployed and could make a living farming or in a variety of positions; 2) as he had physically abused his former wife, the relative fault of the parties weighed heavily against awarding him alimony; and 3) the wife was able to advance in her field despite his abuse, not because he did anything to assist her. Mayfield v. Mayfield, 395 S.W.3d 108, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 876 (Tenn. Dec. 3, 2012).

Trial court did not err in refusing to award rehabilitative alimony or alimony in futuro under T.C.A. § 36-5-121(e)(1) or (f)(1) because the husband was fully capable of finding suitable employment utilizing his skills in farming or in the tool and die industry and because he was fully capable of achieving an earning capacity that will allow him to maintain an appropriate standard of living. However, he was entitled to transitional alimony under § 36-5-121(g)(1) because he suffered an economic detriment for the benefit of the marriage; that award should allow him adequate time in which to adjust to the economic consequences of the divorce. Mayfield v. Mayfield, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 40 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 17, 2012), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 395 S.W.3d 108, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 876 (Tenn. Dec. 3, 2012).

Number of the support factors weighed in favor of affirming the alimony awarded to the wife, including that she needed additional education to update her nursing license, and unlike the husband, she lacked funds from other sources other than the division of marital property, plus the marriage lasted 39 years, the wife made substantial contributions to the marriage as a homemaker and caretaker of the husband, and he had the ability to support the wife, and thus the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding transitional alimony to the wife. Phipps v. Phipps, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 36 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 27, 2015), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 421 (Tenn. May 15, 2015), cert. denied, 193 L. Ed. 2d 290, 136 S. Ct. 360, 2015 U.S. LEXIS 6710 (U.S. 2015).

Award of alimony in futuro was not appropriate, as the wife was able to work, was well educated, had experience as a social worker, and had shown some success in starting her own practice; however, transitional alimony was appropriate while the wife continued to grow her practice. Holdsworth v. Holdsworth, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 974 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 10, 2015), substituted opinion, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 424 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 3, 2015).

Wife was entitled to transitional alimony where the trial court found that she showed a monthly need for $4,000 per month in support and she anticipated it would take four to five years of gradually growing the clientele of her newly established private practice to reach her goal of making $40,000 to $50,000 per year. Holdsworth v. Holdsworth, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 424 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 3, 2015), modified, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 73 (Tenn. Jan. 25, 2016).

Wife's 16-year award of transitional alimony erred because (1) such alimony was intended to be short-term, and (2) the award should have been for alimony in futuro, as the wife's income after partial rehabilitation could not equal the husband's, the marriage was long, the wife was primary residential parent, the parties'  had a high marital living standard, and the husband was at fault. Lunn v. Lunn, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 515 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 29, 2015).

Appellate court increased the amount of transitional alimony awarded the wife from $2,200 to $4,000 per month, an amount appropriate under the evidence including the parties'  relative economic circumstances. Folger v. Folger, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 70 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 28, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 460 (Tenn. June 23, 2016).

Wife's transitional alimony award was proper because (1) the husband's and the wife's earning capacities were properly found, and (2) testimony supported the award amount. Jeronimus v. Jeronimus, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 259 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 15, 2016).

Husband failed to show that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding the wife transitional alimony because the trial court applied the correct legal standard and reached a decision that is not clearly unreasonable; the trial court took into account the relevant statutory factors and explained the reason for its award of transitional alimony in its amended order. Moon v. Moon, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 270 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 21, 2016).

Award of transitional alimony to the wife was not unnecessary or unfair; the alimony was based on net income, and the alimony would diminish as each of their rental properties sold, and she needed temporary financial assistance in adjusting to the economic consequences of the divorce. Kuhlo v. Kuhlo, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 425 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 23, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 804 (Tenn. Oct. 19, 2016).

Wife was properly awarded alimony to pay the wife's COBRA transition premiums for three years to maintain the wife's health insurance because this was consistent with the purpose of transitional alimony. Davis v. Davis, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 994 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 29, 2016).

Evidence did not preponderate against a trial court's conclusion that a wife had a need for spousal support, and the husband had the ability to pay, because the wife worked part-time while taking care of the children, the husband had full-time employment, and it was not viable for the wife to become recertified as a teacher. Although the court awarded the wife rehabilitative support, an award of transitional alimony was appropriate. Slocum v. Slocum, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 705 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 17, 2017).

Plain language of T.C.A. § 36-5-121(g)(2) indicates that the parties need not have agreed in the marital dissolution agreement or final decree that the transitional alimony would be modifiable, pursuant to T.C.A. § 36-5-121(g)(2)(A), or have been ordered by the divorce court to treat the transitional alimony as modifiable, pursuant to T.C.A. § 36-5-121(g)(2)(B), for transitional alimony to be modifiable upon the recipient's cohabitation with a third party if the recipient is unable to rebut the statutory presumption pursuant to T.C.A. § 36-5--121(g)(2)(C). Scherzer v. Scherzer, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 849 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 7, 2017).

Court of Appeals of Tennessee, at Nashville, concludes that although divorcing parties may contract to forego the statutory cohabitation exception to the nonmodifiability of transitional alimony provided in T.C.A. § 36-5-121(g)(2), they need not include the exception in their marital dissolution agreement for the statute to apply. Scherzer v. Scherzer, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 849 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 7, 2017).

T.C.A. § 36-5-121(g)(2)(C) applied to a husband's request to suspend a transitional alimony award where although divorcing parties could contract to forego the statutory cohabitation exception to the nonmodifiability of transitional alimony provided in the statute, they did not need to include the exception in their marital dissolution agreement for the statute to apply. Scherzer v. Scherzer, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 849 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 7, 2017).

Wife had not rebutted the statutory presumption that she no longer needed transitional alimony because of her cohabitation where she was contributing to the fiance's support and her income exceeded her living expenses. Scherzer v. Scherzer, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 849 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 7, 2017).

Trial court erred in granting a former wife's motion to dismiss because a former husband's complaint for declaratory judgment pleaded sufficient facts to demonstrate an actual controversy existed for the trial court to address, whether the transitional alimony provision in the marital dissolution agreement (MDA) was ambiguous or void against public policy; the meaning of the provision, which contained agreed upon elements different from those contained in the statute, was clear and unambiguous. Karsonovich v. Kempe, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 104 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2018).

Although an alimony provision in a marital dissolution agreement (MDA) did not share traditional characteristics of transitional alimony, the MDA did not define “transitional alimony” in any particular way; thus, it was assumed transitional alimony had the same meaning as that set forth in the statute. Karsonovich v. Kempe, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 104 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2018).

Provision for transitional alimony in a marital dissolution agreement (MDA) did not conflict with the policy contained in the statute because the parties contracted for elements outside the statute, and those deviations did not conflict with the policy set forth in the statute because it explicitly contemplated separate agreements; because the parties agreed to different terms those laid out in the statute, the agreed terms control. Karsonovich v. Kempe, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 104 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2018).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion by not awarding a wife rehabilitative or transitional alimony as the court considered the statutory factors and that the wife had an education, had worked before the child was born, and had been out of work for only a few years to care for the child. The wife received significant marital assets, left the marriage with little to none of the marital debt, and was to remain in the marital residence until the husband refinanced the residence and the wife received a portion of the proceeds. Vermilyea v. Vermilyea, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 236 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2018).

Trial court did not err in finding the father owed the mother unpaid alimony because there was no provision in the dissolution agreement for the transitional alimony award to automatically terminate upon the mother's remarriage. Gordon v. Gordon, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 604 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 16, 2018).

Award of transitional alimony was proper; while the wife was able to be self-sufficient, she had likely come to rely upon the husband's substantial contributions in several areas of her life, and the court was unwilling to end that immediately. Finstad v. Finstad, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 612 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 19, 2018).

Trial court did not err in awarding a wife transitional alimony of $1,000 for six months and $500 for the following six months. The award would give the wife the time to find employment and the motivation to do so. April H. v. Scott H., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 228 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 13, 2019).

Trial court in a divorce proceeding did not abuse its discretion in awarding the husband transitional alimony for a limited period of time because, after the husband became unemployed, the husband was neither a homemaker, nor wage earner and the husband's contributions were minimal as the husband would not get a job or earn a GED and pursued leisurely activities in lieu of working as the wife worked. The husband had the capacity to earn a living and was not left destitute given the allocation of the assets in the marital estate. Flodin v. Flodin, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 317 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 26, 2019).

Award of transitional alimony to the wife in the amount of $ 5,500 per month for 30 months was supported by the evidence and not clearly unreasonable; she was 58 years old, had a tenth-grade education, and had no work experience or transferable job skills, whereas the husband had the ability to earn $ 11,000 per month, and the parties were married for more than 23 years. Henry v. Henry, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 84 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 26, 2020).

Trial court was not in error in awarding transitional alimony to a wife because the court found that, given the husband's superior earning capacity and the wife's need for transitional alimony, until the wife would receive the wife's interest in the marital assets, the wife was to remain in the marital residence and the husband was to continue to make the mortgage and utility payments on the home as transitional alimony. The trial court determined that once the wife received money from the wife's interest in the marital residence, the alimony would end. Hunt-Carden v. Carden, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 91 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 3, 2020).

Award of both rehabilitative and transitional alimony to a wife was in err because the wife did not need to be rehabilitated as the wife had a J.D., an L.L.M., and a Tennessee law license, but the award of transitional alimony and the duration of same was correct as the wife had cared for the parties'  child and was returning to the workforce. In view of holdings on the parties'  imputed incomes and the classification of certain marital property, the vacating of the amount of transitional alimony and remand for recalculation was appropriate. Wright v. Wright, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 99 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 6, 2020).

While the trial court considered the husband's future earning potential in denying the wife's request for transitional alimony, the trial court's denial of transitional alimony was vacated because the record reflected that husband's income information was inaccurate at the time of the hearing; and the wife's education and employment history merited a higher imputed income. Blakemore v. Blakemore, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 290 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 25, 2020).

12. Periodic Alimony.

Trial court did not err in awarding a wife alimony in futuro because it correctly recognized and discussed the statutory criteria implicated by the facts, and there was no indication it placed a heavy emphasis on the husband's fault that the judgment was rendered punitive; the wife had a very limited employment history, she spoke little English, and she had a physical condition that limited her physical capabilities that was aggravated by the domestic violence the husband committed against her. Acosta v. Acosta, 499 S.W.3d 785, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 285 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 26, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 691 (Tenn. Sept. 23, 2016).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that this was an appropriate case for an award of periodic alimony, as the wife had a need for alimony and a permanent disability that hindered her ability to work, and there was not question that the husband had the ability to pay alimony. Ingram v. Ingram, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 315 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 7, 2018).

13. Additional Support Not Awarded.

Court did not err in finding that a wife did not need additional support from her husband because, inter alia, she received nearly one million dollars in assets under the marital dissolution agreement, five hundred twenty-four thousand eight hundred eighty-eight dollars of which was in a retirement account and, by the time the wife's liquid assets were exhausted, she would be seventy-five and would have approximately three million two hundred thousand dollars in that account as well as pension and social security benefits. And, any award of alimony based upon the husband's fault would have been purely punitive in nature and thus not allowed. Tait v. Tait, 207 S.W.3d 270, 2006 Tenn. App. LEXIS 327 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 889 (Tenn. 2006).

14. Rehabilitative Alimony Denied.

Court did not err in finding that a wife did not need rehabilitative alimony because, inter alia, she received nearly one million dollars in assets under the marital dissolution agreement, five hundred twenty-four thousand eight hundred eighty-eight dollars of which was in a retirement account, nowhere in the record did the trial court impute income to the wife which could have been earned from the wife's own employment, and the wife's counsel acknowledged that the wife had no disabilities or bodily deficiencies which prohibited her from securing employment if she chose to. Tait v. Tait, 207 S.W.3d 270, 2006 Tenn. App. LEXIS 327 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 889 (Tenn. 2006).

Trial court did not err in refusing to award rehabilitative alimony or alimony in futuro under T.C.A. § 36-5-121(e)(1) or (f)(1) because the husband was fully capable of finding suitable employment utilizing his skills in farming or in the tool and die industry and because he was fully capable of achieving an earning capacity that will allow him to maintain an appropriate standard of living. However, he was entitled to transitional alimony under § 36-5-121(g)(1) because he suffered an economic detriment for the benefit of the marriage; that award should allow him adequate time in which to adjust to the economic consequences of the divorce. Mayfield v. Mayfield, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 40 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 17, 2012), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 395 S.W.3d 108, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 876 (Tenn. Dec. 3, 2012).

Neither rehabilitative nor transitional alimony would suffice to bridge the economic gap between the parties because the husband presented no evidence that the wife had the capacity for self-sufficiency with only a need for short-term financial assistance via transitional alimony; there was likewise no proof that the wife could be economically rehabilitated. Pierce v. Pierce, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 306 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 21, 2019).

Award of both rehabilitative and transitional alimony to a wife was in err because the wife did not need to be rehabilitated as the wife had a J.D., an L.L.M., and a Tennessee law license, but the award of transitional alimony and the duration of same was correct as the wife had cared for the parties'  child and was returning to the workforce. In view of holdings on the parties'  imputed incomes and the classification of certain marital property, the vacating of the amount of transitional alimony and remand for recalculation was appropriate. Wright v. Wright, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 99 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 6, 2020).

15. Factors.

Transitional alimony award to wife pursuant to T.C.A. § 36-5-121(i) was proper because husband testified to and made no secret of his extramarital relationship; also, husband further dissipated marital assets in furtherance of that affair, had a superior earning capacity, and wife had a need for financial assistance. Fickle v. Fickle, 287 S.W.3d 723, 2008 Tenn. App. LEXIS 479 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 19, 2008).

Court properly awarded alimony in futuro to wife because she suffered from a myriad of medical issues, was unable to work outside the home, had no means of future income, had a need for health insurance to cover her considerable medical bills, and husband had the ability to pay. Lofton v. Lofton, 345 S.W.3d 913, 2008 Tenn. App. LEXIS 784 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 30, 2008).

Award of rehabilitative and in futuro alimony to the wife in the parties'  divorce action was proper, in part pursuant to T.C.A. § 36-5-121(e)(1) because the husband proffered no evidence to support a finding that the wife could have been rehabilitated to a level that would have permitted her to achieve an earning capacity sufficient to support a standard of living comparable to either the standard enjoyed during the parties'  marriage or the husband's post-divorce standard. Andrews v. Susie Heasook Cho Andrews, 344 S.W.3d 321, 2010 Tenn. App. LEXIS 553 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2010), appeal denied, Andrews v. Andrews, — S.W.3d —, 2011 Tenn. LEXIS 240 (Tenn. Mar. 9, 2011).

Award of rehabilitative and in futuro alimony to the wife in the parties'  divorce action was proper pursuant to T.C.A. § 36-5-121(d)(2), (d)(4), and (i) because the trial court's finding was derived in part from its assessment of the husband's credibility and because, with the husband earning $ 850,000 per year, despite the size of the overall debt, the amount of support awarded was not more than the husband was able to pay. Andrews v. Susie Heasook Cho Andrews, 344 S.W.3d 321, 2010 Tenn. App. LEXIS 553 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2010), appeal denied, Andrews v. Andrews, — S.W.3d —, 2011 Tenn. LEXIS 240 (Tenn. Mar. 9, 2011).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding $ 250 alimony per month to a wife in futuro because the trial court considered the statutory factors in T.C.A. § 36-5-121(i), made specific findings with respect to the factors, and the wife's assertion that she received little property pursuant to the divorce was without support; in addition to the marital home, several vehicles, and half of an annuity, the wife received a distribution of $ 5,250 per month for six years for her husband's partnership interest and $ 581 per month until 2019 for a note. Forbess v. Forbess, 370 S.W.3d 347, 2011 Tenn. App. LEXIS 654 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 9, 2011), rehearing denied, 370 S.W.3d 347, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 927 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 10, 2012), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 245 (Tenn. Apr. 12, 2012).

Trial court did not err in allocating marital debts or the division of a tax refund because it held that the husband's testimony concerning his use of funds to update the marital residence was not credible and that the husband also used marital funds to entertain his paramour Kibbe v. Kibbe, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 262 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 28, 2015).

It did not appear that any of the wife's expenses were inflated so as to account for the support of two people, rather than one, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in considering the wife's need for alimony despite the fact that her adult son resided in her home. Ezekiel v. Ezekiel, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 656 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 17, 2015).

It was not clear that the wife would be in need of alimony even after her retirement, and despite the long duration of the marriage, the presumption in favor of rehabilitative or transitional alimony militated in favor of short-term support; the wife's decision to remain at her current employment was not unreasonable and it was not inequitable for the husband to provide some support if the wife maintained her current employment. Ezekiel v. Ezekiel, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 656 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 17, 2015).

Trial court failed to apply the correct standard because once it came to consider the father's obligations to pay some of the mother's expenses, it improperly treated the obligations as if they were not subject to modification. Cook v. Iverson, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 946 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2015).

Trial court did not make specific findings with respect to the wife's living expenses, nor did she offer any testimony regarding her living expenses, and thus the trial court's award appeared to be based on findings in error, plus the evidence did not support a finding that the husband earned $ 16,000 per month, that the wife had a need of $ 4,000 per month, or that Husband had the ability to pay that amount; alimony was to be reconsidered on remand. Franks v. Franks, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 152 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 29, 2016).

While the record was unclear as to whether the trial court did consider fault in making its alimony award to the wife, this error highlighted the need for the trial court to reconsider its award of alimony, and the trial court's order granting the divorce on the grounds of inappropriate marital conduct was vacated. Franks v. Franks, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 152 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 29, 2016).

Because the husband's ability to earn income was a relevant factor for the trial court to consider in making its award of alimony, the trial court had to reconsider its finding with respect to the husband's future employment in a manner consistent with a proper valuation of the company. Franks v. Franks, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 152 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 29, 2016).

Wife was awarded more alimony than her demonstrated need because although the husband had the ability to pay, the trial court's award exceeded even the wife's highest estimate of her own expenses. Wills v. Wills, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 338 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 16, 2016).

Alimony awarded to a wife was not unreasonable and unsupported by the evidence because the husband had the ability to pay. Wills v. Wills, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 338 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 16, 2016).

Father's income calculation was affirmed for alimony purposes, as the issue regarding his income had already been affirmed, including the finding that he was willfully and voluntarily underemployed. Hopwood v. Hopwood, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 427 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 23, 2016).

Trial court did not its discretion in considering the wife's need for alimony despite the fact that her adult son resided in her home because the son was unemployed and did not contribute financially to the household; the trial court specifically excluded some expenses that it found were attributable to the son in determining the wife's expenses. Naylor v. Naylor, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 494 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 15, 2016).

Record did not support the husband's allegation that the trial court disregarded the wife's fault in the divorce in determining its alimony award and it did not abuse its discretion in determining that the factor did not favor either party because, while the husband testified that the wife's struggles with pain medication played a role in the parties'  deteriorating relationship, he also admitted to having an affair; and the wife resigned from work due to chronic pain and not because of issues managing her pain medications. Bettis v. Bettis, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 783 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 24, 2016).

Although the language in the parties' antenuptial agreement evinced their intent that their separate property not be considered for purposes of the court's division of property, that language did not limit the trial court's ability to consider the separate property of the parties when assessing its award of alimony for the wife under T.C.A. § 36-5-121. Seifert v. Seifert, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 325 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 17, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 689 (Tenn. Oct. 3, 2017).

Having concluded that the trial court properly analyzed the wife's need for rehabilitative alimony and the husband's ability to pay spousal support, the trial court's consideration of fault was not inappropriate; the trial court analyzed the proof regarding the husband's fault in admitting to four affairs as merely one factor in its determination, and the alimony decision was not punitive. Brown v. Brown, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 622 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 25, 2018).

Trial court did not err in determining the husband's monthly income for purposes of determining alimony where he received over $250,000 from his father's company in salary and rent alone in the three years prior to the divorce, not to mention the benefits paid on his behalf. Tarver v. Tarver, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 128 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 13, 2019).

Record contained a statement of income and expenses submitted by the wife only, leaving the court to piece together the evidence regarding the husband's expenses, and while he discussed his responsibility for two mortgages on the marital home pending sale of the property, payment of the debts, and division of any remaining equity, the court did not include such non-continuing expenses in the husband's expenses for purposes of calculating his ability to pay alimony. Story v. Nussbaumer-Story, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 372 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 19, 2020).

Husband pointed to the wife's receipt of half of the profits from speculative homes he built during the marriage and his payment of many of her expenses during the pendency of the divorce proceedings, but these expenditures were not relevant for purposes of determining the equitableness of the alimony award as they occurred while the parties were still married. Story v. Nussbaumer-Story, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 372 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 19, 2020).

16. Award Improper.

Where the parties'  28-year marriage ended in divorce, the trial court erred by awarding the wife alimony in futuro under T.C.A. § 36-5-121, as the record did not support the trial court's finding that the wife had no ability to earn income, because she had a real estate license and had operated a candy business; while it did cost money to get started in the real estate business, rehabilitative or transitional alimony would allow the wife the funds necessary to use her license for income. Riggs v. Riggs, 250 S.W.3d 453, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 709 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 16, 2007).

Husband had only approximately $ 43.00 per month in excess income, and it was error for the trial court to award the wife alimony in an amount that caused the husband to experience a deficit, where there was no indication that his stated income was being manipulated or that his expenses were exaggerated. Ezekiel v. Ezekiel, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 656 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 17, 2015).

Combining the award of transitional alimony with child support under one maximum cap was error as child support had to remain modifiable. Lubell v. Lubell, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 904 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 12, 2015).

Trial court erred in imputing income to the father on the ground that he had the ability to earn the income because the father had received no job offers, and the trial court specifically found factors adversely impacting the father's job prospects. Cook v. Iverson, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 946 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2015).

In a divorce matter, a trial court erred by ordering a father to pay the remainder of a mother's educational expenses because the absence of an amount limitation with respect to this particular provision meant that the father's duty to support could have potentially been incommensurate with his financial ability to pay. Tidwell v. Tidwell, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 73 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 2, 2016).

Trial court did not make adequate findings regarding the determination that the husband needed alimony and that the wife had the ability to pay, that rehabilitative, transitional, or other short-term alimony was not feasible, or that the husband required long-term support; there was no factual basis of an award of $ 1,450 per month when the husband's testimony did not account for an excess of $ 1,300 per month and the wife's testimony showed an excess of approximately $ 400 per month, and thus deference to the trial court's judgment could not be given. Donaldson v. Donaldson, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 458 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 30, 2016).

Although the trial court correctly included the husband's bonus pay in making its award of alimony, it improperly awarded a percentage of that bonus income, rather than a specific amount. Bettis v. Bettis, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 783 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 24, 2016).

Because there was not a specific finding of the amount of the wife's need for alimony for appellate review, the appellate court could not determine for which of the items listed in the wife's expense sheet that the trial court intended to provide alimony; that difficulty was compounded by the fact that the trial court's original award included a non-static amount based on the husband's bonuses, which was improper. Thus, on remand, the trial court had to determine the amount of the wife's need and make its award based on that determination. Bettis v. Bettis, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 783 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 24, 2016).

As the trial court considered the asset of trail income, which had been divided as marital property, as income to the husband for the purpose of setting alimony, such determination was erroneous. Fuller v. Fuller, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 974 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 21, 2016).

Trial court did an excellent job in stating its findings of fact and identifying the relevant legal principles to support its determination that the wife was economically disadvantaged and incapable of rehabilitation, but the trial court did not state the reasoning behind its decision to award the specific sums; thus, $ 1,000 a month for two years and $ 500 a month thereafter was not within the range of a reasonable award based on the facts as found by the trial court, given that the wife had a need that was greater than the support awarded and the husband had the ability to pay more. Gant v. Gant, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 63 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2017).

Chancery court erred in denying a husband's motion to alter or amend the divorce decree wherein the wife was awarded alimony in futuro because there were no findings that economic rehabilitation was not feasible or that long-term support was necessary where the amount of the husband's “extra income” had not been imputed or otherwise determined. Buntyn v. Buntyn, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 146 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 28, 2017).

Trial court erred in awarding rehabilitative alimony and attorney's fees as alimony in solido to the ex-wife because the trial court did not explain how or why it reached its decision on the issues of alimony or attorney's fees; and the final decree lacked any discussion of the wife's need or the ex-husband's ability to pay either the rehabilitative alimony or the attorney's fees, and there was no determination that the wife had the need to be or was capable of being rehabilitated. Sibley v. Sibley, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 355 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 25, 2017).

Trial court properly granted a wife alimony for 12 years because she was economically disadvantaged where she was a homemaker and cared for the couple's children while the husband was the wage earner, relocating to a new state four different times during the first 20 years of the marriage prevented her from developing a career outside of the home, her monthly income was roughly a third of the husband's monthly income, and it was unlikely that she could obtain additional training to allow her to earn a higher salary before she reached retirement; however, the court's designation of alimony as transitional should be modified to an award of alimony in futuro because an award of alimony for 12 years constituted long-term support. Roby v. Roby, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 521 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 1, 2017).

Trial court's determination of alimony prior to calculating child support was premature because its order and permanent parenting plan contained an inconsistency as to the specific amount of the child support payment; it intended to adopt a different amount of child support than the amount the husband originally proposed, but the permanent parenting plan included payments in an amount identical to his proposed support amount in the permanent parenting plan filed with his counter-complaint. Bolt v. Bolt, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 635 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 30, 2018).

Award of rehabilitative alimony was error where the evidence preponderated against the factual findings underlying the trial court's determination that rehabilitation by attending a cosmetology school was appropriate or feasible, and thus, the discretionary decision to award rehabilitative alimony lacked an evidentiary foundation. Diffie v. Diffie, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 191 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 23, 2019).

Amount of the awards for alimony in futuro and transitional alimony was reversed where by considering that the husband would have less income in the future, the trial court artificially deflated the husband's present ability to pay alimony, which was one of the two most important factors to consider in setting the amount of alimony. Moreover, by considering speculative income as a factor in setting the amount of alimony, the trial court failed to apply the most appropriate legal principles applicable to the decision. Accordingly, the discretionary decision was not based on one of the most important factors to consider in setting the amount of alimony. Diffie v. Diffie, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 191 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 23, 2019).

Award of transitional alimony and rehabilitative alimony was error given the court's finding that partial rehabilitation was necessary. Diffie v. Diffie, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 191 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 23, 2019).

16.5 Denial Improper.

Trial court erred by failing to award the husband alimony because the evidence supported a finding that he was the economically disadvantaged spouse and incapable of rehabilitation. The parties had been married for 31 years, the husband had been the primary homemaker, the parties had been left with equal assets, he was almost 65 years old, had a limited ability to accrue assets, and had minimal retirement assets of his own. Shackelford v. Shackelford, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 236 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 16, 2019).

Trial court erred by failing to award spousal support to a wife because an analysis of the statutory factors, especially the wife's need and the husband's ability to pay, demonstrated that an award of alimony to the wife was necessary due to her relative economic disadvantage; there was a clear economic disparity between the parties, and the wife would suffer a monthly shortfall. Pierce v. Pierce, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 306 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 21, 2019).

17. Denial of Spousal Support.

Trial court did not err in failing to award a wife spousal support as reasonable minds could disagree about whether the wife, being unemployed, should have received some amount of support for the short term. The evidence showed that the husband did not have the money to pay spousal support to the wife. K.B.J. v. T.J., 359 S.W.3d 608, 2011 Tenn. App. LEXIS 474 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 26, 2011), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2011 Tenn. LEXIS 1166 (Tenn. Dec. 14, 2011).

Trial court erred in denying the wife's request for alimony in futuro given the husband's earning capacity in the form of disability and retirement income and the wife's demonstrated need, and thus, the appellate court awarded the wife $2,000 per month until she was able to access her retirement benefits at age 67.5. Jackson v. Jackson, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 835 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 4, 2016).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to award the mother spousal support because the mother would have earned a salary $42,500 as a teacher if she had stayed in Tennessee; that amount of income was imputed to her by the trial court to calculate child support; the father's child support payment was set at $549 per month; the mother's affidavit of income and expenses estimated her total expenses in California to be $3,875 per month; the trial court, recognizing the mother's excellent employment history, hard work, and marketable skills, opined that she would not have any problems getting a job in California; and the father was awarded the marital residence and ordered to pay the mother one-half the equity in the house. Purvis v. Purvis, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 280 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 22, 2018).

18. Termination of Spousal Support.

Trial court erred by not terminating the husband's alimony obligation because the parties had a substantially equal net worth, the husband's ability to pay had been reduced by his retirement, and the wife's needs appeared to be more than met by her assets. Odom v. Odom, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 217 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 14, 2015).

Trial court did not err in denying the husband's motion to terminate his spousal support obligation awarding the wife rehabilitative alimony because the wife testified that she was in the process of pursuing additional education; she alleged that she fully intended to return to the pharmaceutical field but that she lacked the requisite knowledge to apply for internships or attend courses at the present time; she had further need of support; the husband maintained the ability to remit support; and the husband failed to establish a substantial and material change in circumstances. Helton v. Helton, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 889 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 3, 2015).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in relieving a husband of the requirement to pay the wife transitional alimony where the wife sought to move to Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania based upon a job opportunity resulting in significantly increased income, and she had substantial earning capacity and the ability to work. Bidelman-Dye v. Dye, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 213 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 29, 2016).

Where the ex-husband and the ex-wife agreed that the wife was to receive monthly alimony payments from the husband for eight and a half years, the trial court properly held that the alimony awarded was transitional alimony and terminated the husband's alimony obligation based upon the wife's remarriage and cohabitation with her new husband because the parties'  agreement never mentioned a total amount due to the wife; there was no mention that the parties were awarding the wife alimony in an attempt to adjust the distribution of the parties'  marital property; and, given the conditional nature of the last four years of payments, the sum of alimony to be paid was not definitively ascertainable when awarded. Balzer v. Balzer, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 67 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 28, 2020).

In a case in which the parties executed a marital dissolution agreement (MDA) providing that the ex-husband would pay the ex-wife alimony in futuro even if she remarried, the trial court erred in terminating the husband's alimony obligation because, if a trial court approved an MDA, it became incorporated into the decree of divorce; one spouse could agree to pay more alimony to the other spouse than he or she might be statutorily required to pay; by specifying in the MDA that the husband would pay the wife alimony even if she were to remarry, the parties essentially agreed that this statute was not applicable to their MDA; and the husband's promise to pay the wife alimony in futuro after her remarriage did not violate public policy. Deluca v. Schumacher, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 102 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 6, 2020).

19. Evidence.

Spouse's need for alimony is not a fact of which judicial notice may be taken, but must be established by proof. Mayfield v. Mayfield, 395 S.W.3d 108, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 876 (Tenn. Dec. 3, 2012).

Trial court erred when it granted a former husband's petition to modify his alimony obligation due to his retirement, as the determination that his income had decreased to approximately one-third of his prior income level was factually incorrect, and the trial court did not make findings as to the husband's expenses, wife's income and expenses, or other relevant factors. Malkin v. Malkin, 475 S.W.3d 252, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 151 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 26, 2015), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 617 (Tenn. July 21, 2015).

20. Review.

Because the trial court's determinations regarding the division of marital property were subject to change on remand, any change that the trial court makes could have a significant effect on the issue of alimony, and thus the issue was pretermitted. Babcock v. Babcock, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 105 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 9, 2015).

Because an award of alimony is factually driven, the court's ability to address the wife's issues concerning the alimony award was severely hampered if not eliminated by the absence of transcripts of the hearing or the trial, or any statement of the evidence; it had to be presumed that the findings were supported by the evidence. Loewen v. Loewen, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 869 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 22, 2015).

Disputed clause of a marital dissolution agreement relieved the wife of her total alimony obligation upon the husband's noncompliance with the passport provision of the permanent parenting plan. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in granting the wife's motion for summary judgment. Cherqui v. Laor, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 709 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 25, 2017).

Although the trial court failed to make specific findings of fact concerning the evidence presented and the applicable statutory factors, the court of appeals reviewed the matter because it had the ability to “soldier on” review the appellate record, in the interest of judicial economy, as to the trial court's determination that a wife was not entitled to an award of spousal support. Pierce v. Pierce, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 306 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 21, 2019).

21. Support from A Ward's Estate.

Marriage of the ward and the spouse remained intact and there was no expectation that it would be dissolved; nevertheless, the factors in the alimony statute to the extent relevant, should be considered in determining whether the spouse of a ward is entitled to receive support from the ward's estate and, if so, in what amount. In re King, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 638 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 6, 2015).

22. Life Insurance.

Trial court's judgment was modified by reducing the amount of a husband's court-ordered life insurance obligation to an amount which the appellate court determined to be sufficient to secure the husband's alimony in futuro obligation. Furthermore, lien was to be imposed upon a portion of the husband's assets in an amount sufficient to secure the alimony in solido award to the wife, with the trial court to determine on remand which asset(s) were to be encumbered. Stratienko v. Stratienko, 529 S.W.3d 389, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 222 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 499 (Tenn. Aug. 16, 2017).

23. Overage.

Trial court's order was affirmed with regard to the recoupment of the alimony overage paid by the husband under T.C.A. § 36-5-121 while the wife was receiving her social security benefits. Wilhoit v. Wilhoit, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 91 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 16, 2018).

24. Arrearage.

Wife was entitled to a judgment representing a husband's accrued alimony arrearage because the husband admitted having never filed a petition to modify or terminate his alimony obligation; the husband failed to comply with his alimony obligation as agreed upon in the parties'  marital dissolution agreement incorporated into the divorce decree. Lattimore v. Lattimore, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 177 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 12, 2019).

36-5-122. False allegations of sexual abuse in furtherance of litigation.

Whenever a trial court finds that any person knowingly made a false allegation of sexual abuse in furtherance of litigation, in addition to any other penalties provided for by law or rule, the court may hold the accuser in contempt of court and may order the accuser to pay all litigation expenses, including, but not limited to, reasonable attorney's fees, discretionary costs and other costs incurred by the wrongly accused party in defending against the false allegation.

Acts 2010, ch. 894, § 2.

Part 2
[Reserved]

Part 3
[Reserved]

Part 4
Expedited Process for Support

36-5-401. Part definitions.

As used in this part, unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “Child” means a person entitled to support from such person's parents by virtue of such person's minority or who is entitled to support as provided in § 34-1-102(b);
  2. “Magistrate” means a duly licensed attorney who has been actively engaged in the practice of law for a period of not less than two (2) years appointed by court authority to set and enforce child support, to review the administrative hearing decisions of the department of human services pursuant to § 36-5-1003 and to administer expedited process as set out in this part;
  3. “Petitioner” means a person or governmental entity seeking to be awarded or to enforce support for a child, or seeking to modify a previous child support order;
  4. “Respondent” means a person from whom child support is sought or a person in opposition to modification of a prior order; and
  5. “Support” or “order of support” means child support and support for a spouse or ex-spouse if the obligor is responsible for the support of a child residing with the spouse or ex-spouse.

Acts 1985, ch. 477, § 13; 2000, ch. 922, § 10; Acts 2009, ch. 235, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2009, ch. 235, § 1 directed the code commission to revise appropriate references from “child support referees” and “juvenile referees” to “child support magistrates” and “juvenile magistrates” in the code as supplements are published and volumes are replaced.

Cross-References. Criminal nonsupport, §§ 39-15-10139-15-104.

Limitations period for child support payment orders, § 36-2-321.

Temporary order of support, § 36-2-310.

Termination of Acts 1985, ch. 477, which enacted this part, § 36-5-110.

Law Reviews.

Selected Tennessee Legislation of 1986, 54 Tenn. L. Rev. 457 (1987).

Attorney General Opinions. Authority of referee (now magistrate) to judicially review department of human services administrative final orders, OAG 97-076, 1997 Tenn. AG LEXIS 75 (5/21/97).

Appointment of clerk and master as child support referee (now child support magistrate) not authorized, OAG 99-087, 1999 Tenn. AG LEXIS 87 (4/8/99).

36-5-402. Commencement and termination of hearings and actions — Magistrates.

    1. Hearings in all child support cases that are not being enforced pursuant to Title IV-D of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. § 651 et seq.), shall be heard within a reasonable period of time, not to exceed forty-five (45) days of the service of process in each county in the state.
    2. Hearings in all Title IV-D support cases that seek to establish or enforce support shall be heard within the time frames established by federal child support regulations. The department of human services shall send notice of the time frames as they may be amended to the administrative director of the courts, who shall send such notice to all courts of the state with child or spousal support jurisdiction. The administrative director of the courts shall send such notice to the courts within thirty (30) days of the date of notice from the department, and the time frames shall then become effective thirty (30) days after the date of the notice from the administrative director of the courts and shall apply to all actions to establish or enforce support initiated on or after July 1, 1995.
  1. The presiding judge of each judicial district shall provide for expedited support hearings in one (1) of the following manners:
      1. The presiding judge of each judicial district, after conferring with the other judges and chancellors in the presiding judge's judicial district, shall certify to the supreme court and the administrative director of the courts the number of magistrates, if any, needed to serve each county in the district. Such certification shall include such information as may be required by the supreme court and the administrative director of the courts. The supreme court and the administrative director of the courts shall determine the number of magistrates, if any, needed for each such district, and the magistrates shall be selected and appointed by the presiding judge and shall serve at the presiding judge's pleasure. In counties having a metropolitan form of government and in counties having a population of not less than three hundred thirty-five thousand (335,000) nor more than three hundred thirty-six thousand (336,000), according to the 1990 federal census or any subsequent federal census, the magistrate or magistrates shall be selected and appointed by and serve at the pleasure of the trial court judge who hears more than fifty percent (50%) of the child support and domestic relations cases in such judicial district; provided, that this sentence does not apply to any sitting magistrate in such counties as of July 1, 1994. In determining the number of magistrates for each district, the supreme court and the administrative director of the courts shall provide for as many magistrates as are needed to provide hearings in all child support cases within the time schedule set out in subsection (a);
      2. In the event a judicial district has in effect on or before October 1, 1985, a system for the appointment of magistrates or masters to hear support cases that satisfies the requirements of the federal child support enforcement amendments of 1984 (P.L. 98-378), or subsequent federal legislation, and the regulations promulgated pursuant thereto, such district shall not be required to comply with the foregoing provisions of this part so long as such preexisting system remains in effect. Any law to the contrary notwithstanding, all magistrates or masters appointed pursuant to such system in circuit or chancery court shall be appointed by the presiding judge, with the concurrence of the other judges and chancellors in the district and shall serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority;
    1. In lieu of requesting a magistrate, the presiding judge may, with the agreement of all judges having child support jurisdiction in a particular county or counties, enter into agreements with juvenile courts to set, enforce, and modify support orders as provided in this part. In the event such an agreement is entered into, the juvenile court shall have jurisdiction over all support cases in such county, except as may otherwise be provided in the agreement, any contrary law notwithstanding;
    2. If a judicial district does not recommend the need for magistrates or if the supreme court and the administrative director of the courts do not approve such recommendation, the supreme court, the administrative director of the courts and the presiding judges of such districts shall provide such information to the commissioner of human services as may be required by the secretary of health and human services for the granting of a waiver in accordance with the federal child support enforcement amendments of 1984 (P.L. 98-378), or subsequent federal legislation, and the regulations promulgated pursuant thereto. In the event the secretary does not grant a waiver for one (1) or more judicial districts, or in the event a waiver is revoked, the supreme court and the administrative director of the courts shall proceed to appoint a magistrate in accordance with subdivision (b)(1)(A) or take such other action as may be required to comply with federal law;
    3. The presiding judge shall prescribe which county or counties within the district that a magistrate will serve. All other terms and conditions of the appointment, including, but not limited to, compensation to be paid and reimbursement of expenses and whether the position shall be full time or part time, shall be prescribed by rule of the supreme court, which is hereby granted such rulemaking authority with regard to the accomplishment of the purposes of this part as it deems appropriate in the public interest. The compensation to be paid to the magistrates shall be not less than nor more than ninety thousand dollars ($90,000). On and after July 1, 2008, the base salaries of magistrates appointed pursuant to this section shall be annually adjusted to reflect any actual percentage pay increases provided to all state employees generally, as provided for in the general appropriations act. Adjustments to annual salary increases as provided for in this subdivision (b)(4) are not to be made on the basis of any class compensation efforts, class compression efforts, or any other method of salary adjustments.
  2. If by July 1, 1986, the presiding judge fails to comply with subsection (b), the judge will be deemed to have delegated this responsibility to the supreme court and the administrative director of the courts, and the supreme court shall immediately appoint a magistrate to serve in accordance with this section, if necessary.
  3. The administrative director of the courts shall have authority to enter into contracts with the Tennessee state IV-D office of child support enforcement to obtain funding for compensation for the magistrate, support staff and other expenses necessary to provide for the performance of duties required in this part and required in part 5 of this chapter. Such contracts shall be subject to availability of funds.
  4. The appointment of magistrates in juvenile court that may be necessary to meet the provisions of this section shall be governed by title 37, chapter 1.

Acts 1985, ch. 477, § 13; 1986, ch. 890, § 11; 1993, ch. 66, §§ 45-48; 1994, ch. 801, §§ 1, 2; 1995, ch. 504, § 4; 2006, ch. 984, § 1; 2008, ch. 894, § 1; 2009, ch. 235, §  1.

Compiler's Notes. Public Law 98-378, referred to in this section, is codified primarily at 42 U.S.C. §§ 602, 603, 606, 651 et seq. and at 26 U.S.C. §§ 6103 and 6402.

For table of U.S. decennial populations of Tennessee counties, see Volume 13 and its supplement.

Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, referred to in this section, is compiled in 42 U.S.C. § 651 et seq.

Acts 2009, ch. 235, § 1 directed the code commission to revise appropriate references from “child support referees” and “juvenile referees” to “child support magistrates” and “juvenile magistrates” in the code as supplements are published and volumes are replaced.

Cross-References. Appointment of referees (now magistrates) in child support cases, Tenn. R. Sup. Ct. 22.

Rule Reference. This section is referred to in Rule 22 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Tennessee.

Attorney General Opinions. Appointment of clerk and master as child support referee (now child support magistrate) not authorized, OAG 99-087, 1999 Tenn. AG LEXIS 87 (4/8/99).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Jurisdiction by Agreement.

Title IV-D child support case was properly transferred by a circuit court to a juvenile court due to the fact that an agreement gave the county juvenile court jurisdiction over such child support matters. Specifically, the Shelby County Juvenile Court was given jurisdiction where the circuit or chancery court had previously exercised jurisdiction and one of the parties had applied for Title IV-D services. In re Chase R., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 814 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 6, 2015).

36-5-403. Powers of magistrate.

The magistrate shall have the same authority and power as a circuit court judge to issue any and all process and in conducting hearings and other proceedings in accordance with this part; provided, that all final orders of a magistrate must be reviewed by a judge as provided in § 36-5-405.

Acts 1985, ch. 477, § 13; Acts 2009, ch. 235, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2009, ch. 235, § 1 directed the code commission to revise appropriate references from “child support referees” and “juvenile referees” to “child support magistrates” and “juvenile magistrates” in the code as supplements are published and volumes are replaced.

Attorney General Opinions. Compensation for clerk and master serving as substitute judge not authorized, OAG 99-087, 1999 Tenn. AG LEXIS 87 (4/8/99).

Powers of child support expedited process referees (now magistrates), OAG 04-043, 2004 Tenn. AG LEXIS 43 (3/12/04).

36-5-404. Powers and duties of clerk.

The office of the clerk of the court shall provide a sufficient supply of the forms provided for in § 36-5-406. These forms shall be limited to use in causes filed under this part and they shall be made available to all who request assistance in filing a petition. The office of the clerk shall also assist a person who is not represented by counsel by filling in the name of the court on the petition and testimony or shall refer the person to the proper IV-D agency within the county.

Acts 1985, ch. 477, § 13.

Compiler's Notes. Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, referred to in this section, is compiled in 42 U.S.C. § 651 et seq.

36-5-405. Support actions.

  1. Any person seeking to set, enforce, modify or terminate support may commence such an action by filing a petition and testimony in the form prescribed by § 36-5-406 with the office of the clerk.
  2. When a petition is filed, the clerk shall designate a hearing date on the notice prescribed in this part or, in the alternative, shall designate a hearing date on the summons to be served by the sheriff if the petitioner elects to proceed by having the sheriff serve process to initiate this proceeding. The hearing date shall be within thirty (30) days of the date the petition is filed. If process is served by certified mail, the clerk shall then send a copy of the completed petition, testimony, and notice to respondent by certified mail, return receipt requested. The clerk shall give a copy of completed notice, petition, and testimony to petitioner.
  3. If the return receipt is not received by the hearing date, and the respondent fails to appear, then the magistrate shall direct the clerk to reissue the petition with a new notice of hearing and may direct service as set out in subsection (b), or may direct service by issuance of a summons to be served by the sheriff or process server, designated by the magistrate. If a petition is for contempt, either the magistrate or the judge may issue an attachment for the arrest of the respondent with a bond.
  4. If the respondent fails to appear after service and if the return receipt does bear the signature of respondent, the magistrate may grant the relief sought in the petition by default. If a petition is for contempt, either the magistrate or the judge may issue an attachment for the arrest of the respondent with a bond.
  5. If respondent does appear, the magistrate may enter a consent order if the parties reach an agreement and the magistrate finds the agreement to be reasonable.
  6. If the respondent appears and the parties do not agree, the magistrate shall hear testimony and issue an order granting such relief as the magistrate finds appropriate.
  7. Upon the conclusion of the hearing in each case, the magistrate shall transmit to the judge all papers relating to the case, along with the magistrate's findings and recommendations in writing. A magistrate's decision on a preliminary matter, not dispositive of the ultimate issue in the case, shall be final and not reviewable by the judge.
  8. Any party may, within five (5) days thereafter, excluding nonjudicial days, file a request for a hearing by the judge of the court having jurisdiction. The judge may, on the judge's own motion, order a rehearing of any matter heard before a magistrate, and shall allow a hearing if a request for such is filed as herein prescribed. Unless the judge orders otherwise, any recommendation of the magistrate shall be in effect pending rehearing or approval by the court.
  9. If a hearing before the judge is not requested, the findings and recommendations of the magistrate become the final decree of the court when confirmed by an order of the judge.
  10. There shall be no litigation tax and the clerk shall not refuse to file a petition for a party proceeding under this part for failure to pay a filing fee. When a party is unable to pay the filing fee, such party shall be required to take and subscribe to in writing the pauper's oath set out in § 20-12-127, and such affidavit shall be attached to such party's petition.
  11. Any party may appeal a final order entered under this section to the court of appeals. Any such appeal shall be governed by the applicable provisions of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Acts 1985, ch. 477, § 13; 1986, ch. 890, §§ 5, 10, 16; 2000, ch. 922, §§ 11, 12; Acts 2009, ch. 235, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2009, ch. 235, § 1 directed the code commission to revise appropriate references from “child support referees” and “juvenile referees” to “child support magistrates” and “juvenile magistrates” in the code as supplements are published and volumes are replaced.

Attorney General Opinions. Powers of child support expedited process referees (now magistrates), OAG 04-043, 2004 Tenn. AG LEXIS 43 (3/12/04).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Foreign Support Orders.

While this section provides the procedure to be followed when Tennessee courts modify one of their own support orders, in light of the jurisdictional limitation in former T.C.A. § 36-5-601 et seq. (repealed), it does not grant Tennessee courts jurisdiction to modify foreign support orders. Roseman v. Roseman, 890 S.W.2d 27, 1994 Tenn. LEXIS 333 (Tenn. 1994).

2. De Novo Hearing.

Father was not automatically entitled to a de novo hearing before a chancellor concerning the father's appeal of a magistrate's child support ruling because the father was not provided by statute with the right to a de novo hearing by the judge or chancellor following the magistrate's child support determination. The statute was intended to expedite and not delay support proceedings, and did not require a de novo trial before a chancellor on issues tried by a referee as a factfinder. Dawson v. Dawson, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 120 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 24, 2020).

36-5-406. Promulgation of forms.

The department of human services, in consultation with the Tennessee judicial conference, has the authority by regulation to promulgate forms, which must be available for use pursuant to this part. Such forms must be promulgated pursuant to the rulemaking provisions of the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, compiled in title 4, chapter 5.

Acts 1985, ch. 477, § 13; 1986, ch. 890, § 14; 2019, ch. 85, § 1; 2019, ch. 420, § 25.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2019, ch. 420, § 25 purported to amend this section; however, those amendments were identical to the amendments made by Acts 2019, ch. 85, § 1 so the amendments by ch. 420 were not given effect.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment by ch. 85, in the first sentence, inserted “, in consultation with the Tennessee judicial conference,” and substituted “must be available” for “shall be available”, and, in the second sentence, substituted “must be promulgated” for “shall be promulgated” and deleted “, and shall be approved by the judicial council prior to becoming effective” from the end.

Effective Dates. Acts 2019, ch. 85, § 3. April 3, 2019.

Acts 2019, ch. 420, § 27. May 21, 2019.

Cross-References. Termination of Acts 1985, ch. 477, which enacted this part, § 36-5-110.

Part 5
Assignment of Income for Support

36-5-501. Income withholding.

    1. For any order of child support issued, modified, or enforced on or after July 1, 1994, the court shall order an immediate assignment of the obligor's income, including, but not necessarily limited to: wages, salaries, commissions, bonuses, workers' compensation, disability, payments pursuant to a pension or retirement program, profit sharing, interest, annuities, and other income due or to become due to the obligor. The order of assignment shall issue regardless of whether support payments are in arrears on the effective date of the order. The court's order, shall include an amount sufficient to satisfy an accumulated arrearage, if any, within a reasonable time. The order may also include an amount to pay any medical expenses that the obligor owing the support is obligated or ordered to pay. Withholding shall not exceed fifty percent (50%) of the employee's income after FICA, withholding taxes, and a health insurance premium that covers the child, are deducted. The order shall also include an amount necessary to cover the fee due the clerk of the court or the department, if appropriate. In the event the court does not order an immediate assignment pursuant to subdivision (a)(2), every order shall be enforceable by income assignment as provided in this chapter.
      1. Income assignment under this subsection (a) shall not be required:
        1. If, in cases involving the modification of support orders, upon proof by one party, there is a written finding of fact in the order of the court that there is good cause not to require immediate income assignment and the proof shows that the obligor has made timely payment of previously ordered support. “Good cause” shall only be established upon proof that the immediate income assignment would not be in the best interests of the child. The court shall, in its order, state specifically why such assignment will not be in the child's best interests; or
        2. If there is a written agreement by both parties that provides for alternative arrangements. Such agreement must be reviewed by the court and entered in the record.
      2. If the case is being enforced under Title IV-D of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. § 651 et seq.), and is subject to an assignment of support due to receipt of public assistance, the department of human services or its contractor must be notified of the request for exemption under subdivisions (a)(2)(A)(i) and (ii) and may present evidence for purposes of subdivision (a)(2)(A)(i), or must agree in order to permit exemption from income withholding as otherwise permitted pursuant to subdivision (a)(2)(A)(ii).
      1. Unless a court or administrative order stipulates that alternative health care coverage to employer-based coverage is to be provided for a child subject to a Title IV-D child support order, in any case in which a noncustodial parent is required by a court or administrative order to provide health care coverage for such a child, and the employer of the noncustodial parent is known to the department, the department shall use any federally-required medical support notices to provide notice to the employer of the requirement for employer-based health care coverage for such child through the child's parent who has been ordered to provide health care coverage for such child. The department shall send the federal medical support notice to any employer of a noncustodial parent subject to such an order within two (2) business days of the entry of such employee who is an obligor in a Title IV-D case into the directory of new hires under part 11 of this chapter.
      2. Within twenty (20) business days after the date of the medical support notice, the employer of a noncustodial parent subject to an order for health care coverage for the child shall transfer the notice to the appropriate plan providing such health care coverage for which the child is eligible. The employer shall withhold from the noncustodial parent's compensation any employee contributions necessary for coverage of the child and shall send any amount withheld directly to the health care plan to provide such health care coverage for the child. If the employee contests the withholding of such employee contributions, the employer shall initiate withholding until the contest is resolved. The employee/obligor shall have the right to contest the withholding order issued pursuant to subdivision (a)(3) based upon a mistake of fact according to the provisions for appeal provided pursuant to  part 10 of this chapter.
        1. An employer shall notify the department promptly whenever the noncustodial parent's employment is terminated.
        2. The department shall promptly notify the employer when there is no longer a current order for medical support in effect for which the department is responsible.
      3. The liability of the noncustodial parent for employee contributions to the health care plan necessary to enroll the child in the plan shall be subject to all available enforcement mechanisms under this title or any other provision of law.
      4. Upon receipt of the notice required by this subdivision (a)(3) that appears regular on its face and that has been appropriately completed, the notice is deemed a qualified medical child support order under 29 U.S.C. § 1169(a)(5)(C)(i). The health insurance plan administrator of a participant under a group health plan who is the noncustodial parent of the child for whom the notice was received pursuant to this subdivision (a)(3), shall, within forty (40) business days:
        1. Notify the state Title IV-D agency of any state or territory that issued the notice with respect to whether coverage is available for such child under the terms of the plan, and, if so, whether such child is covered under the plan and either the effective date of the coverage or, if necessary, any steps to be taken by the custodial parent, or official of a state or political subdivision thereof substituted for the name of the child pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1169(a)(3)(A), to effectuate coverage. The department or its contractors, in consultation with the custodial parent, must promptly select from available plan options when the plan administrator reports that there is more than one (1) option available under the employer's plan; provided, however, if such response is not made to the plan administrator within twenty (20) business days, and if the plan has a default option for coverage, the plan administrator shall enroll the child in that default option. If there is no default option, the plan administrator may call the office of the department or contractor that sent the notice and seek direction as to the child's enrollment in the available plans;
        2. Provide the custodial parent or such substituted official a description of the coverage available and any forms or documents necessary to effectuate such coverage and permit the custodial parent or substituted official to file claims;
        3. Send the explanation of benefit statements to the custodial parent, substituted official and the employee;
        4. Send the reimbursement to the custodial parent, legal guardian or substituted official for expenses paid by the custodial parent, legal guardian or substituted official for which the child may be eligible under the plan;
        5. Nothing in subdivision (a)(3)(E) shall be construed as requiring a group health plan, upon receipt of a medical support notice, to provide benefits under the plan, or eligibility for benefits, under the terms of the plan in addition to, or different from, those provided immediately before receipt of such notice, except as may otherwise be required by title 56, chapter 7, part 23.
      1. In all cases in which the court has ordered immediate income assignment, the clerk of the court, or the department of human services or its contractor in Title IV-D cases, shall immediately issue an income assignment to an employer once the employer of an obligor has been identified.
      2. In all cases in which an immediate assignment of income has not been previously ordered, or in which an obligor who is ordered to pay child support in which an immediate income assignment was not required pursuant to subdivision (a)(2), and when the obligor becomes in arrears as defined in this subdivision (b)(1) as reflected in the records of the clerk of court, if the support is paid through the clerk's office or in the records of the department of human services, then the clerk of the court, or the department or its contractor in Title IV-D child support cases shall, without the necessity of an affidavit of the obligee, issue an order of income assignment to the employer of the obligor, if known, or at such time as the employer's name and whereabouts are made known to the clerk or the department or its contractor. No court order expressly authorizing an income assignment shall be required under this subdivision (b)(1)(B).
      3. The order of assignment issued by the department or its contractor pursuant to subdivisions (b)(1)(A) and (B) shall include an amount sufficient to satisfy an accumulated arrearage within a reasonable time without further order of the court. The order shall also include an amount to pay any medical expenses that the obligor owing the support is obligated or ordered to pay. Withholding shall not exceed fifty percent (50%) of the employee's income after FICA, withholding taxes, and a health insurance premium that covers the child, are deducted. The order shall also include an amount necessary to cover the fee due the clerk of the court, if appropriate.
      4. In all other cases in which the child support payments were ordered to be paid directly to a parent or guardian or custodian of the child or children, and the child support payments are in arrears as defined in this subdivision (b)(1), the parent, guardian or custodian may, by affidavit filed with the clerk, or, the department or its contractor in Title IV-D child support cases, request that an order of income assignment be sent by the clerk of the court, or by the department, to the employer, if known, or at such time as the employer's name and whereabouts are made known to the clerk, the department or its contractor. No court order expressly authorizing an income assignment shall be required under this subdivision (b)(1).
      5. The order of assignment issued by the clerk or the department or its contractor pursuant to subdivision (b)(1)(D) shall include an amount sufficient to satisfy an accumulated arrearage within a reasonable time. The order may also include an amount to pay any medical expenses that the obligor owing the support is obligated or ordered to pay. Withholding shall not exceed fifty percent (50%) of the employee's income after FICA, withholding taxes, and a health insurance premium that covers the child, are deducted. The order shall also include an amount necessary to cover the fee due the clerk of the court, if appropriate.
      6. An income assignment pursuant to this subsection (b) shall be mandatory even if subsequent to the issuance of the order of assignment the obligor pays the amount of arrearage in part or in full as long as current support or arrearages are still owed.
      7. For purposes of this part, “arrears” means any occasion on which the full amount of ordered support ordered for or on behalf of a minor child, or for a spouse or former spouse of the obligor with whom the child is living to the extent the spousal support would be included for the purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 654a(e)(4), is not paid by the due date for arrears as defined in § 36-5-101(f)(1) unless an income assignment is in effect and the payor of income is paying pursuant to subsection (g).
      8. Clerks of court are authorized to issue an order of income assignment to the employer of the obligor and to institute the process to assign income when the obligor fails to pay court costs, but shall not have priority over the income assignment for child or spousal support.
    1. When an order of income assignment has been issued pursuant to subdivision (b)(1)(B) or (b)(1)(D), the clerk, or the department in Title IV-D cases, shall send a notice to the obligor within two (2) business days of the issuance of the order of income assignment being sent to the obligor's employer. If the assignment is made pursuant to subdivisions (b)(1)(B) or (b)(1)(D), the notice must be sent to the address of the obligor, if known, or to the obligor at the address of the employer of the obligor if the obligor's address is unknown.
    2. In addition to any other required or pertinent information, all notices of assignment sent to the obligor who resides in this state pursuant to this section shall include:
      1. The amount of money owed by the obligor, including both current support and arrears;
      2. The amount of income withholding, except where otherwise ordered by the court, that shall be applied for current support, the amount that shall be applied for arrearages and the amount to be applied for alimony. The amount withheld shall be an amount reasonably sufficient to satisfy an accumulated arrearage within a reasonable time;
      3. Notice that the obligor has the right to a hearing before the court, or, in Title IV-D cases, an administrative review by the department of human services. The administrative hearing shall be conducted pursuant to part 10 of this chapter; and
      4. Notice that the obligor must request the hearing by notifying the clerk, or the department in Title IV-D cases, within fifteen (15) days of the date of the notice, or the date of personal service, if used.
    3. Orders of income assignment issued by the department of human services or its contractors shall be filed with the court.
      1. In all Title IV-D child or spousal support cases in which payment of such support is to be made by income assignment, and in all cases where payments made by income assignment based upon support orders entered on or after January 1, 1994, that are not Title IV-D support cases but must be made to the central collection and disbursement unit as provided by § 36-5-116, the court, the clerk of court, or the department or its contractors shall only order that the support payments be made by income assignment to the central collection and disbursement unit pursuant to § 36-5-116. No agreement by the parties in a parenting plan, either temporary or permanent, entered pursuant to chapter 6, part 4 of this title, or any other agreement of the parties or order of the court, except as may otherwise be allowed by subdivision (a)(2)(B), shall alter the requirements for payment by income assignment to the central collection and disbursement unit as required by § 36-5-116, and any provision of any parenting plan, agreement or court order providing for any other payment procedure contrary to the requirements of § 36-5-116, whether or not approved by the court, except as may otherwise be allowed by subdivision (a)(2)(B), shall be void and of no effect. No credit shall be given by the court, the court clerk or the department of human services for child or spousal support payments required by the support order that are made in contravention of such requirements; provided, however, the department may make any necessary adjustments to the balances owed to account for changes in the Title IV-D or central collection and disbursement status of the support case.
      2. The payment of child support through the centralized collection and disbursement unit established pursuant to § 36-5-116 does not establish the case as a Title IV-D case unless the case otherwise meets the criteria of § 71-3-124 for a case, in which the department of human services will provide child support services to an assignor of support rights or to any person who has otherwise applied for such services.
      1. If the obligor is self-employed, or if the obligor is a partner, member, owner or officer of a partnership, limited liability company, corporation or other association or business entity from which the obligor receives compensation in the form of wages, salary, commissions, bonuses or otherwise, then the court may order the obligor, or the business entity of which the obligor is a partner, member, owner or officer, if applicable, to establish a bank account for the sole purpose of complying with the order issued pursuant to subsection (a). The order issued pursuant to subsection (a) shall specify the amount of the obligor's compensation that is to be deposited into the account and the frequency by which the deposits are to be made, whether weekly, biweekly or monthly. Within ten (10) days of the issuance of the order pursuant to subsection (a), the obligor or business entity shall provide the department with written authorization for the department's central collection and disbursement unit to receive from the account, by automatic bank withdrawal, the amount ordered by the court to be deposited into the account. Failure to either deposit the required amount into the account or to authorize automatic withdrawal of the required amount by the department's central collection and disbursement unit is failure to comply with a child support order, which shall be punishable as civil contempt.
      2. As used in subdivision (b)(6)(A), “self-employed” means earning one's livelihood directly from one's own business, trade or profession rather than as a specified salary or wages from an employer.
    1. In the event the obligor requests a hearing in cases not being enforced pursuant to Title IV-D regarding the withholding as provided in subdivisions (b)(1)(B) within fifteen (15) days of the date of the notice, or the date of personal service, if used, the clerk shall promptly docket the case with the magistrate or court as provided by part 4 of this chapter, shall give notice to all parties, and shall take any other action as is necessary to ensure that the time limits provided in subsection (d) are met.
    2. If the withholding was issued by the department or its contractor in Title IV-D cases and the obligor requests an administrative hearing as permitted by part 10 of this chapter, the department shall promptly schedule the case for a hearing, shall give notice to all parties, and shall take any other action as is necessary to ensure that the time limits provided in subsection (d) are met.
  1. In all cases in which the obligor requests a hearing or administrative review, the magistrate or court, or the department, shall conduct a hearing and make a determination, and the clerk or department shall notify the obligor and the employer of the decision within forty-five (45) days of the date of the order provided in subdivision (b)(1).
  2. The obligor may contest the results of the department's administrative review by requesting a judicial review as provided in part 10 of this chapter.
  3. The amount to be withheld under the income assignment withheld for support may not be in excess of fifty percent (50%) of the income due after FICA, withholding taxes, and a health insurance premium that covers the child are deducted.
    1. The assignment or any subsequent modification is binding upon any employer, person or corporation, including successive employers, fourteen (14) days after mailing or other transmission or personal service of the order from the clerk of the court, or from the department by administrative order of income assignment, pursuant to this section. The employer, person or corporation has a fiduciary duty to send amounts withheld for payment of a child support obligation to the clerk or the department's central collection and disbursement unit as directed in the income assignment order, or, if based upon a direct withholding from another state pursuant to the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, compiled in parts 20-29 of this chapter, to the other state as directed by that order of assignment. The amount shall be sent by the employer, person or corporation within (7) days of the date the person obligated to pay support is paid, the date the person is to be paid or the date the amount due such person is to be credited. The order is binding until further notice.
    2. The employer, person, corporation or institution shall provide notice to the clerk, the department, or the entity in the other state to which the withheld income was to be sent of termination of employment or income payments to the employee. Any employer, person, corporation or institution that files for bankruptcy or ceases to operate as a business shall provide notice to the clerk or the department of the bankruptcy or cessation of business upon filing bankruptcy or at least ten (10) days prior to ceasing to operate as a business. Any notice provided pursuant to this subsection (g) shall include the names of all the affected employees subject to an income assignment, the last known address of each of those employees, and the name and address of the new employer or source of income of each of those employees, if known.
    3. Failure of any employer, person, corporation or institution to pay income withheld to the clerk or clerks, to the department, its contractor, or other entity, or Title IV-D child support agency in any other state that issued the order, as may be directed by the income assignment order, is a breach of a fiduciary duty to the obligor. Any action alleging breach of fiduciary duties by an employer, person, corporation or institution pursuant to this section shall be brought within one (1) year from the date of the breach or violation; provided, that in the event the alleged breach or violation is not discovered or reasonably should have been discovered within the one-year period, the period of limitation shall be one (1) year from the date the alleged breach or violation was discovered or reasonably should have been discovered. In no event shall an action be brought more than three (3) years after the date on which the breach or violation occurred, except where there is fraudulent concealment on the part of the defendant, in which case the action shall be commenced within one (1) year after the alleged breach or violation is, or should have been, discovered.
  4. For any order of alimony in solido, in futuro or rehabilitative issued, modified or enforced on or after April 24, 2002, the court may order immediate assignment of the obligor's income, including, but not necessarily limited to: wages, salary, commissions, bonuses, workers' compensation, disability, payments pursuant to a pension or retirement program, profit sharing, interest, annuities and other income due or to become due to the obligor. The order of assignment shall issue regardless of whether support payments are in arrears on the effective date of the order. The court's order may include an amount sufficient to satisfy an accumulative arrearage, if any, within a reasonable time. Withholding shall not exceed fifty percent (50%) of the employee's income after FICA, withholding taxes, and a health insurance premium that covers the child, if any, are deducted. The order shall also include an amount necessary to cover the fee due the clerk of the court, if appropriate.
  5. It is unlawful for an employer to use the assignment as a basis for discharge or any disciplinary action against the employee. Compliance by an employer, other person, institution or corporation with the order shall operate as a discharge of the liability of such employer, other person, institution or corporation to the affected individual as to that portion of the income so affected. An employer shall be subject to a fine for a Class C misdemeanor if the income assignment is used as a basis to refuse to employ a person or to discharge the obligor/employee or for any disciplinary action against the obligor/employee or if the employer fails to withhold from the obligor's income or to pay such amounts to the clerk or to the department as may be directed by the withholding order.
    1. An assignment under this section shall take priority over any other assignment or garnishment of wages, as described in title 26, chapter 2, or salary, commissions or other income, except those deductions made mandatory by law or hereafter made mandatory.
      1. If the employer, person, corporation, or institution receives more than one (1) order of income assignment against an individual, the employer, person, corporation, or institution must:
        1. Comply by giving first priority to all orders for amounts due for current support credited in the following order: child support, medical support, and spousal support;
        2. Comply by giving second priority to all orders for amounts due for arrearages credited in the following order: child support, medical support, and spousal support; and
        3. Honor all withholdings to the extent the total amount withheld from wages does not exceed fifty percent (50%) of the employee's wages after FICA, withholding taxes, and a health insurance premium that covers the child are deducted.
      2. Any employer, person or entity receiving an order for income withholding from another state or territory shall apply the income withholding law of the state of the obligor's principal place of employment in determining:
        1. The employer's fee for processing an income withholding order;
        2. The maximum amount permitted to be withheld from the obligor's income;
        3. The time periods within which the employer must implement the income withholding order and forward the child support payment;
        4. The priorities for withholding and allocating income withheld for multiple child support obligees; and
        5. Any withholding terms and conditions not specified in the order.
      3. The “principal place of employment” for an obligor who is employed in this state and for whom an income withholding order has been received in this state from another state or territory shall be deemed to be this state, and the provisions set forth in the requirements of this section regarding income withholding shall apply to the determinations made in subdivisions (j)(2)(B)(i)-(v).
      1. If any employer, person, or other entity receives any income assignment for current support against an individual that would cause the deduction from any two (2) or more assignments for current support to exceed fifty percent (50%) of the individual's income after FICA, withholding taxes, and a health insurance premium that covers the child are deducted, then the allocation of all current support ordered withheld by all income assignments they receive against that individual shall be determined by the employer, person, or entity as follows:
        1. The employer, person, or other entity shall determine the total dollar amount of the assignments for current support it has received involving the obligor to whom it owes any wages, salaries, commissions, bonuses, workers' compensation, disability, payments pursuant to a pension or retirement program, profit sharing, interest, annuities, and other income due or to become due to the obligor;
        2. Each individual assignment shall then be calculated as a percentage of the total obtained pursuant to subdivision (j)(3)(A)(i);
        3. The employer, person, or entity shall then allocate the available income of the obligor, subject to the limits described in this subsection (j), based on the percentage computation pursuant to subdivision (j)(3)(A)(ii) and shall, as directed by the order of income assignment, pay the amounts withheld from the obligor's income, to the clerk or clerks, or to the department, its contractor, or other entity or Title IV-D child support agency in any other state that issued such order.
      2. In the event all current support obligations are met from the assignments and support arrearages exist in more than one (1) case and there is not sufficient income to pay all ordered support arrearages, then the support arrearages shall be allocated on the same basis as set forth in subdivision (j)(3)(A).
      3. The obligor shall be responsible for seeking any modifications to the existing orders for support.
    2. An employer, person, corporation or institution may make one (1) payment to the clerk of the court, the department, its contractor or other entity in another state so long as the employer separately identifies the portion of the single payment attributable to each individual obligor parent, and, if amounts are included that represent withholdings for more than one (1) pay period, so long as the amounts representing each pay period are separately identified.
    1. “Employer, person, corporation or institution,” as used in this section, includes the federal government, the state and any political subdivision thereof and any other business entity that has in its control funds due to be paid to a person who is obligated to pay child support.
    2. “Spousal support” for purposes of enforcement of child support by the department of human services under the Title IV-D child support program means a legally enforceable obligation assessed against an individual for the support of a spouse or former spouse who is living with a child or children who are receiving child support services from the department and for whom the individual also owes support. Income assignments pursuant to this part that are enforced as part of the Title IV-D services provided by the department shall apply to spousal support obligations as defined in this subdivision (k)(2).
  6. Any employer, person, corporation or institution that is ordered to pay an income assignment on behalf of an individual may charge the obligor parent an amount of up to five percent (5%) not to exceed five dollars ($5.00) per month for such service.
  7. The notices and orders required to be issued pursuant to this section shall be transmitted to any party or person by any method chosen by the court or the department, including, but not limited to: certified mail, return receipt requested, regular mail, electronic mail, facsimile transmission, or by personal service, and may be generated by computer or on paper. The notices and orders required by this section need not be entered in the minutes of the court. If a notice or order is returned or otherwise not deliverable, then service shall be had by any alternative method chosen by the court or the department, as listed in this subsection (m). Before taking action against an employer or other payor for failure to comply with this part, the court or department shall ensure that service of the notice or order was made by certified mail or by personal service. Electronically reproduced signatures shall be effective to issue any orders or notices pursuant to this section.
  8. There shall be no litigation tax imposed on proceedings pursuant to this part.
    1. The department of human services shall have authority to establish mandatory rules, forms and any necessary standards and procedures to  implement income assignments, which shall be used by all the courts and by the department pursuant to this part. The department of human services may implement the use of such forms at any time after July 1, 1997, by emergency rule following approval by the attorney general and reporter. Permanent rules implementing the forms shall be promulgated pursuant to the rulemaking provisions of the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, compiled in title 4, chapter 5.
    2. Prior to the filing of a notice of rulemaking for permanent rules pursuant to this subsection (o), the rules shall be sent by the department for review by an advisory group composed of two (2) representatives of the state court clerks’ conference appointed by the president of the state court clerks’ conference; two (2) representatives of the judges of courts that have child support responsibilities, one (1) of whom will be appointed by the chief justice of the supreme court and one (1) of whom will be appointed by the president of the council of juvenile and family court judges; a representative of the administrative office of the courts; and two (2) representatives of the department of human services designated by the commissioner. Nothing contained herein shall be construed to prevent the department from filing any notice of rulemaking prior to or at the time the proposed permanent rules are sent to the advisory group where the department determines that immediate filing of the notice without prior review by the advisory group is necessary to meet any requirements relative to the potential expiration of emergency rules or to comply with any federal statutory or regulatory requirements or any federal policy directives.
    1. If any employer, person, corporation or institution fails or refuses to comply with the requirements of this section, then that employer, person, corporation or institution is liable for any amounts up to the accumulated amount that should have been withheld. In addition, that employer, person, corporation or institution may be subject to a civil penalty to be assessed and distributed pursuant to the requirements of this subsection (p).
    2. Upon the first failure to comply with an order of income assignment, that employer, person, corporation or institution may be subject to a civil penalty of one hundred dollars ($100) per obligor for whom an order of income assignment was received, two hundred dollars ($200) per obligor for the second failure to comply and five hundred dollars ($500) per obligor for each occurrence thereafter.
    3. The civil penalty, when assessed and collected by the department of human services, shall be prorated among the children for whom the income assignment order was issued and with which the employer, person, corporation or institution failed to comply. If there are multiple income assignments for an obligor, the prorated amounts of the civil penalty shall be distributed to the children in the proportion that each order for which the income assignment was issued is to the total amount of all income assignments with which the employer, person, corporation or institution failed to comply.
    4. The civil penalty amount received by the children shall not reduce in any manner the amount of support owed by the obligor parent, but shall be received in addition to all ordered child support.
    1. Penalties authorized by this section shall be assessed by the commissioner of human services after written notice to the employer, person, corporation or institution. The notice shall provide fifteen (15) days from the mailing date of the notice for the employer, person, corporation or institution to file a written request to the department for appeal of the civil penalty. If an appeal is timely filed with the department, the department shall set an administrative hearing on the issue of the assessment pursuant to the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, relative to contested case hearings. Failure to timely appeal the assessment of the civil penalty shall be final and conclusive of the correctness of the assessment.
    2. Any amount found owing shall be due and payable not later than fifteen (15) days after the mailing date of the determination. Failure to pay an assessment shall result in a lien against the real or personal property of the employer, person, corporation or institution in favor of the department. If an assessment is not paid when it becomes final, the department may collect the amount of the civil penalty by any available administrative enforcement procedures or by court action. The nonprevailing party shall be liable for all court costs and litigation taxes of the proceedings and shall be liable to the department for the cost of any private, contract or government attorney representing the state and for the time of any of its Title IV-D or contractor staff utilized in litigating the assessment.
    3. Any appeal of the action of the commissioner pursuant to this section shall be made in conformity with § 36-5-1003.

Acts 1985, ch. 477, § 14; 1986, ch. 890, §§ 2-4, 6, 9; 1987, ch. 306, §§ 15, 16; 1990, ch. 789, §§ 1, 2; 1994, ch. 987, §§ 8-13; 1995, ch. 504, §§ 5-7; 1997, ch. 551, § 17; 1998, ch. 1098, §§ 18-24; 2000, ch. 922, §§ 13-16; 2001, ch. 447, §§ 6, 15; 2002, ch. 651, §§ 4, 5; 2004, ch. 735, §§ 1-3; 2005, ch. 152, § 1; 2007, ch. 312, §§ 1, 2; 2007, ch. 442, § 1; 2009, ch. 235, § 1; 2009, ch. 566, § 12; 2019, ch. 85, § 2.

Code Commission Notes.

Concerning the former reference in subsection (b) to § 36-5-502(a) (which reference was deleted by authority of the code commission), Acts 1985, ch. 477, § 5 added a new part 5 to this chapter; in the bill as introduced, § 36-5-502 concerned procedures for giving notice, but the section was amended before passage and now does not appear to have any connection to the material contained in the original version of § 36-5-502.

Compiler's Notes. Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, referred to in this section, is compiled in 42 U.S.C. §§ 651 et seq.

Acts 2009, ch. 235, § 1 directed the code commission to revise appropriate references from “child support referees” and “juvenile referees” to “child support magistrates” and “juvenile magistrates” in the code as supplements are published and volumes are replaced.

Acts 2009, ch. 566, § 12 provided that the Tennessee code commission is directed to change all references to public necessity rules, wherever such references appear in this code, to emergency rules, as sections are amended and volumes are replaced.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment,  in (j)(2)(A), inserted designations (j)(2)(A)(i)-(j)(2)(A)(iii); substituted “support credited in the following order: child support, medical support, and spousal support;” for “support due child” in (j)(2)(A)(i); substituted “Comply by giving second priority to all orders for amounts due for arrearages credited in the following order: child support, medical support, and spousal support; and” for “second to all orders for amounts due for arrearages due a child, third to all orders for amounts due for current support due a spouse, and fourth to all orders for amounts due for arrearages due a spouse, and must honor” in (j)(2)(A)(ii); and added “Honor” at the beginning of (j)(2)(A)(iii).

Effective Dates. Acts 2019, ch. 85, § 3. April 3, 2019.

Cross-References. Income withholding to enforce support orders, title 36, ch. 5, part 6.

Penalty for Class C misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

Termination of Acts 1985, ch. 477, which enacted this part, § 36-5-110.

Attorney General Opinions. Application of domestic relations orders to benefits under the City of Knoxville Pension Plan, OAG 92-31, 1992 Tenn. AG LEXIS 33 (4/13/92).

Authority to issue orders income assignment orders, OAG 99-008, 1999 Tenn. AG LEXIS 6 (1/25/99).

Constitutionality of assignment of child support obligor's income, OAG 99-008, 1999 Tenn. AG LEXIS 6 (1/25/99).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Good Cause Shown.

Pursuant to T.C.A. § 36-5-501(a)(2), a father failed to show good cause to be excused from payment of child support by wage assignment, as his payments to the mother by certified mail often required her to leave work and travel to the post office, which was a burdensome, unjustified, and spiteful procedure. Reeder v. Reeder, 375 S.W.3d 268, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 126 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 24, 2012), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 440 (Tenn. June 20, 2012).

2. Wage Assignment.

Trial court erred in failing to order a father to pay child support by wage assignment because there was no written agreement between the father and the mother for alternative arrangements for the payment of child support; the trial court's order did not contain written findings setting forth good cause to excuse the father from wage assignment. Howell v. Smithwick, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 71 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 1, 2017).

3. Construction.

Trial court may withhold an amount up to but not to exceed 50 percent of the employee's income after a certain specified deduction; however, the statute does not mandate this percentage of withholding as a minimum, and instead, the court may order the withholding of an amount sufficient to satisfy an accumulated arrearage within a reasonable time, provided that amount does not exceed the 50 percent limitation. Trial court did not err in finding that 25 percent in this case was sufficient to satisfy the support judgment. Kendle v. Kendle, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 610 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 18, 2018).

36-5-502. [Reserved.]

  1. The following procedures shall apply to termination of income assignment:
    1. Any party or its agents or assignees may seek termination of an order under this section if there are no arrearages owed by the obligor to the obligee parent, any guardian or custodian of the child, the department of human services or any other agency of the state, or any other Title IV-D agency of any state, the costs of court have been paid, and there are no longer any children to whom the obligor parent is obligated to pay support because:
      1. Of the marriage of the child or children;
      2. Of the death of the child or children;
      3. The child or children have reached majority and have graduated from high school, or the class of which the child is a member when the child attains eighteen (18) years of age graduates, whichever occurs later, and no other special circumstances requiring the obligation continue to exist;
    2. If there are children to whom the obligor is still obligated to pay support, though a change of circumstances has occurred as a result of the discontinuation of the obligation to at least one (1) child, the obligor may not seek termination of the income assignment order, but must seek modification of the support order. Upon obtaining modification of the support order, the clerk of court or the department or its contractors shall issue a modified income assignment;
    3. Parties seeking a change of custody, pursuant to § 36-6-101, may not seek termination under this provision but must request termination by the trial court if there is a change in custody ordered;
    4. The clerk of the court or the department of human services or its contractor in Title IV-D cases shall send the order and notice of termination of income assignment to the obligor parent, obligee parent, and employer, person, corporation, or institution upon the decision to terminate or not to terminate; and
      1. In Title IV-D cases, when the department of human services or its contractor is informed or otherwise determines that the conditions of subdivision (a)(1) have been met, then the department or its contractor shall administratively terminate or modify the income assignment order to reflect the change in circumstances pursuant to the child support guidelines in accordance with this section. In all other circumstances, modification or termination of an income assignment shall be obtained by court order;
      2. In cases where an income assignment order may be terminated or modified by administrative order, the department or its contractor shall notify both the obligor, or other payer, and the obligee of the proposed action with respect to the termination or modification action. The notice shall give both the obligor and the obligee fifteen (15) days in which to appeal the proposed action, pursuant to the appeal provisions of part 10 of this chapter.
  2. Each parent or other individual having custody of a child who is receiving support payments under an income assignment order shall notify the clerk, or the department of human services or its contractor in Title IV-D cases, at such time as any of the following occur:
    1. A child for whom support is being paid dies;
    2. A child for whom support is being paid marries;
    3. A child for whom support is being paid reaches such child's eighteenth birthday if the child is not in high school on that date; or
    4. A child for whom support is being paid graduates from high school, or the class of which the child is a member graduates if the child does not graduate with the class, if the child is eighteen (18) years of age prior to the date such child graduates.
    1. The obligor parent may also seek termination or modification of a support order when the whereabouts of the obligee parent and child or children are unknown and the clerk of the court, or the department of human services or its contractor in Title IV-D cases, has been unable to forward past payments, and all arrearages owed to the state as a result of the custodian's receipt of public assistance have been paid.
    2. The obligor parent may either file a motion for termination or seek modification of the child support order when support payments equal to the amount due within one (1) month have been returned to the office of the clerk, or to the department or its contractor in Title IV-D cases, and all reasonable means to locate the obligee parent and child or children have been exhausted. The clerk of the court, or the department or its contractor in Title IV-D cases, shall notify the obligor parent that such payments have been returned to the clerk, or to the department or its contractor in Title IV-D cases. The obligor parent must submit an affidavit verifying that such obligor parent has exhausted reasonable efforts to locate the obligee parent and child or children.
  3. When a motion to terminate is filed, the clerk of the court shall proceed to set a hearing and serve the parties as provided in § 36-5-405. Upon receipt of a notice from the custodial parent or individual in accordance with subsection (b), or based upon the department's own records, the clerk or the department or its contractor in Title IV-D cases shall determine whether the income assignment order includes support for any other child or children and whether there are any accumulated arrearages due that have not been satisfied. If there are no other children and no arrearages, the clerk, or the department or its contractor in Title IV-D cases, after notification to the parties, shall notify the employer, person, corporation or institution withholding support that the income assignment is terminated. If there are other children and/or accumulated arrearages, the clerk or the department or its contractor in Title IV-D cases, after notification to the parties, shall send a new notice to the employer, person, corporation or institution withholding support specifying the correct amount to be withheld as a result of the change in circumstances.
  4. If the obligor parent wishes to file a motion for termination or to seek modification of the support order, such obligor parent must complete and file an affidavit affirming that such obligor parent has contacted a reasonable number of relatives and friends of the obligee parent and all lack any knowledge regarding the whereabouts of the obligee parent and child or children, and that such obligor parent has made other reasonable efforts to locate the obligee parent and child or children including:
    1. Mailing a letter to the obligee parent's last known address requesting a new mailing address;
    2. Checking the telephone directory and directory assistance for a listing of the obligee parent;
    3. Contacting the obligee parent's last attorney of record and inquiring as to whether the attorney can provide a current address;
    4. Contacting the obligee parent's last known place of employment (if known) and inquiring as to whether a current address may be provided by the employer; and
    5. Contacting the department of human services and inquiring if its records contain a current address of the obligee parent.

Acts 1985, ch. 477, § 14; 1994, ch. 987, § 14; 2000, ch. 922, §§ 17-21; 2004, ch. 906, §§ 2, 3.

Compiler's Notes. Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, referred to in this section, is compiled in 42 U.S.C. § 651 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Foreign Support Orders.

This section does not give Tennessee courts jurisdiction to modify income withholding orders entered to enforce foreign support orders except if the foreign support order be first modified by the court in which it originated. Roseman v. Roseman, 890 S.W.2d 27, 1994 Tenn. LEXIS 333 (Tenn. 1994).

Part 6
[Reserved]

Part 7
Enforcement Through License Denial, Revocation and Restriction

36-5-701. Part definitions.

As used in this part, unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “Arrears” means any child support or spousal support associated with a child support order owed under a court or administrative order that is delinquent pursuant to § 36-5-501(b)(1), or any interest owed on those arrears;
  2. “Commissioner” means the commissioner of human services;
  3. “Department” means the department of human services;
  4. “License” means a license, certification, registration, permit, approval or other similar document issued to an individual evidencing admission to or granting authority to engage in a profession, trade, occupation, business, or industry, to hunt or fish, or to operate any motor vehicle or other conveyance, but does not include a license to practice law unless the supreme court establishes guidelines pursuant to § 36-5-713 making this part applicable to such license;
  5. “Licensee” means any individual holding a license, certification, registration, permit, approval, or other similar document evidencing admission to, or granting authority to engage in a profession, trade, occupation, business, or industry, to hunt or fish, or to operate any motor vehicle or other conveyance, but “licensee” does not include an attorney only with respect to the attorney's license to practice law unless the supreme court establishes guidelines pursuant to § 36-5-713 making this part applicable to such license;
  6. “Licensing authority” means the board, commission, or agency, including the department of safety, that has been established by statute or state regulation to oversee the issuance and regulation of any license. Excluded from this definition is the supreme court, unless the supreme court acts in accordance with § 36-5-713, and any licensing authority established solely by the action and authority of a county or municipal government;
  7. “Not in compliance with an order of support” means that the obligor is five hundred dollars ($500) or more in arrears and the arrears are ninety (90) days or more past due;
  8. “Obligee” means any individual to whom a duty of support is owed or any state or political subdivision to whom such duty has been assigned or that is collecting support on behalf of an obligee;
  9. “Obligor” means any individual owing a duty of support;
  10. “Order of support” means any judgment or order for the support of dependent children issued by any court of this state or another state, including an order in a final decree of divorce, or any order issued in accordance with an administrative procedure established by state law in this or another state that affords substantial due process and is subject to judicial review; and
  11. “Restricted license” means a license that allows a person to operate a motor vehicle for the limited purposes of going to and from and working at the person's regular place of employment and going to and from the person's school and does not include a commercial driver license of any kind.

Acts 1996, ch. 892, § 2; 2014, ch. 852, § 1.

36-5-702. Agency to enforce orders — Notice of noncompliance.

    1. In Title IV-D child support enforcement cases pursuant to this part, the department shall be deemed to be the agent of the court to enforce, on behalf of the court, the court's order of support that is in arrears by using the license revocation, denial, suspension or restriction procedures provided in this part.
    2. If the court's records maintained by the court clerk on the statewide Title IV-D child support computer system, or the department's records of court ordered support if the court clerk elected, pursuant to the former provisions of § 36-5-101(a)(4)(C)(iii), not to participate in the statewide Title IV-D child support computer system, show that the obligor is in arrears and is not in compliance with an order of support, the department may serve upon an obligor a notice that informs the obligor of the department's intention to submit the obligor's name to the appropriate licensing authority as a licensee who is not in compliance with an order of support.
  1. The notice shall state that:
    1. The obligor may request an administrative hearing to contest the issue of compliance or contact the department to make an arrangement for the payment of the arrears that is satisfactory to the department, which may include eligibility for a restricted license pursuant to § 36-5-714;
    2. A request for a hearing must be made in writing and must be received by the department within twenty (20) days of service, or within twenty (20) days of service the obligor must contact the department or the local IV-D agency and pay the arrears or make an arrangement with the department for the payment of the arrears that is satisfactory to the department;
    3. If the obligor requests a hearing within twenty (20) days of service, the department shall stay the proceedings to certify the obligor to any appropriate licensing authority for noncompliance with an order of support pending a decision after a hearing. If the obligor contacts the department to make an arrangement for the payment of the arrears that is satisfactory to the department within such twenty (20) days, the department shall stay the proceedings to certify the obligor to any appropriate licensing authority for noncompliance with an order of support in accordance with the agreement entered into between the obligor and the department as provided in § 36-5-703(d);
    4. The proceedings will be dismissed if the obligor pays the arrears;
    5. If the obligor is not in compliance with an order of support and does not either request a hearing or make a satisfactory arrangement for payment with the department within twenty (20) days of service, the department may certify the obligor to any appropriate licensing authority for noncompliance with a court order of support; and
    6. If the department certifies the obligor to a licensing authority for noncompliance with an order of support, the licensing authority, notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, must deny a renewal request, revoke the obligor's license, refuse to issue or reinstate a license or issue a restricted license, as the case may be, until the obligor provides the licensing authority with a release from the department that states the obligor is in compliance with the obligor's order of support.
  2. The notice to the obligor shall include the address and telephone number of the office of the department or its contractor that issues the notice and a statement of the need to obtain a release from that office as provided in § 36-5-707 in order to allow the obligor's license to be issued, renewed or reinstated. The notice shall be served by certified mail, return receipt requested, or by personal service with an affidavit of service completed by an authorized process server.

Acts 1996, ch. 892, § 3; 2014, ch. 852, §§ 2-4.

Compiler's Notes. Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, referred to in this section, is compiled in 42 U.S.C. § 651 et seq.

36-5-703. Administrative hearing — Certification of noncompliance.

  1. An obligor may request an administrative hearing upon receiving the notice described in § 36-5-702 to contest the department's intention to issue a finding of noncompliance to a licensing authority. The request for hearing must be made in writing and must be received by the department within twenty (20) days of the date the notice is served upon the obligor as shown by the return receipt or by the return on personal service.
  2. If a hearing is requested, the department shall conduct the hearing in accordance with the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, compiled in title 4, chapter 5, part 3, except that, notwithstanding any law to the contrary, the appeal of the department's administrative order based upon the hearing pursuant to this part shall be made by the obligor in accordance with the jurisdictional and judicial review provisions of § 36-5-1003; provided, that notwithstanding any law or rule to the contrary, the sworn certificate of the department, or its agent, or the Title IV-D agency of another state, regarding the issues in subdivisions (c)(1) and (2), shall be admissible in evidence and shall constitute a rebuttable presumption of the obligor's status.
  3. The only issues for consideration at the administrative hearings shall be:
    1. Whether the licensee is an obligor required to pay child support under an order of support;
    2. Whether the obligor is not in compliance with the order of support; and
    3. Whether good cause exists in that case as to whether the sanctions of this part should be imposed.
    1. The department may enter into a consent order with the obligor, which is filed with the court, for payment of an arrearage owed by the obligor. Upon entry of such consent order by the court, the proceedings under this part shall be further stayed, unless there is noncompliance with such consent order as shown by the records pursuant to subdivision (d)(2). In the event of such noncompliance the stay shall cease and the procedures of subdivision (d)(2) shall be followed. Entry of such consent order shall constitute a waiver of the obligor's right to any hearing on the issue of noncompliance with an order of support based upon the notice of noncompliance for which the consent order has been entered.
    2. If the payment records of the clerk of the court or the department show that the obligor remains in arrears and is not in compliance with the consent order for repayment of the child support arrearage pursuant to subdivision (d)(1), the court, through the department, shall, in accordance with § 36-5-705, forthwith certify to each licensing authority that licenses the obligor that the obligor is not in compliance with an order of support.

Acts 1996, ch. 892, § 4; 1998, ch. 1098, § 69; 2000, ch. 922, § 22.

Compiler's Notes. Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, referred to in this section, is compiled in 42 U.S.C. § 651 et seq.

36-5-704. Stays of action — Issuance of decisions — Costs.

  1. If an obligor timely requests a hearing to contest the issue of compliance, or files a motion to modify support or requests that the support obligation be amended as provided in § 36-5-710, the department shall stay the action and may not certify the name of the obligor to any licensing authority for noncompliance with an order of support until the department issues a written decision after a hearing that finds the obligor is not in compliance with an order of support or until the motion to modify or request to amend is decided, as the case may be; provided, that after a decision by the department has been made in the form of a final order as provided in § 4-5-315, there will be no further stay unless a reviewing court issues a stay.
  2. The department shall issue its decision after hearing without undue delay. The department's administrative order must inform the obligor that a petition for judicial review of the department's decision must be filed within sixty (60) days of the date of the administrative order in accordance with the jurisdictional and judicial review provisions of § 36-5-1003. The department shall send an attested copy of the decision to the obligor by regular mail to the obligor's most recent address of record and to any attorney representing the obligor in connection with the hearing under this part.
  3. Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, the department is authorized to assess costs to the obligor of the unsuccessful appeal of notice of noncompliance. The department may, by motion in the court with jurisdiction over the support order, recover such costs against the obligor and the court shall direct the obligor to pay such costs to the department.
  4. Any hearings held pursuant to this part shall be held at the department of human services' office nearest the obligor's home.

Acts 1996, ch. 892, § 5; 1996, ch. 892, §§ 5, 15; 1998, ch. 1098, § 70.

36-5-705. Certification that obligor is in noncompliance.

  1. The department shall certify in writing or by electronic data exchange to each licensing authority that licenses the obligor that an obligor is not in compliance with an order of support if:
    1. The obligor does not timely request a hearing upon service of notice issued under § 36-5-702 and is not in compliance with an order of support twenty-one (21) days after service of the notice provided for in § 36-5-702;
    2. The obligor has not entered into a written agreement satisfactory to the department for payment of the arrearage within twenty (20) days after service of the notice in § 36-5-702 or within such longer period as may be agreed to by the department, or having entered into such a written agreement has failed to comply with such agreement;
    3. The department issues a decision after a hearing that finds the obligor is not in compliance with an order of support; or
    4. A court, upon a petition for judicial review of the department's decision after its issuance of a stay of that decision pending its ruling, enters a judgment that upholds the department's finding that the obligor is not in compliance with an order of support.
  2. The department shall certify in writing or by electronic data exchange to the department of safety that an obligor is not in compliance with an order of support but is eligible for a restricted license if the department enters into an agreement that includes eligibility for a restricted license, pursuant to § 36-5-714.

Acts 1996, ch. 892, § 6; 2014, ch. 852, § 5.

36-5-706. Denial, suspension or revocation of license — Refusal to reinstate or reissue — Notice.

  1. Notwithstanding any other law, rule or regulation to the contrary, the certification from the department under § 36-5-705 shall be a basis for the denial, suspension or revocation of a license, for refusal to issue or reinstate a license by a licensing authority or for the issuance of a restricted license.
  2. The licensing authority shall notify, without undue delay, by regular mail, an obligor certified from the department under § 36-5-705, that:
    1. The obligor's application for the issuance, renewal or reinstatement of a license has been denied;
    2. The obligor's current license has been suspended or revoked because the obligor's name has been certified by the department as an obligor who is not in compliance with an order of support; or
    3. The obligor's current driver license has been revoked because the obligor's name has been certified by the department as an obligor who is not in compliance with an order of support but eligible for a restricted license. The notice shall include information on the process for obtaining a restricted license and paying any restricted license fee required by the department of human services.
  3. A notice of suspension must specify the reason and statutory grounds for the suspension and the effective date of the suspension and may include any other notices prescribed by the licensing authority. The notice must also inform the individual that in order to apply for issuance, renewal or reinstatement of the license, the individual must obtain a release from the department of human services in accordance with § 36-5-707.
  4. A notice to the obligor by the licensing authority to revoke, restrict, deny, suspend, or refuse to renew or reinstate a license after receipt of the notice of noncompliance from the department shall not be appealable under the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, compiled in title 4, chapter 5, part 3.

Acts 1996, ch. 892, § 7; 2014, ch. 852, §§ 6-8.

36-5-707. Effect of compliance by obligors who have been served notice.

  1. When an obligor who is served notice under § 36-5-702 complies with the order of support, the department shall provide the licensing authority with written or electronic data exchange confirmation that the obligor is in compliance with the order and issue a release to the obligor.
    1. Upon receipt of the written confirmation of reasonable or full compliance, the licensing authority shall issue or extend the obligor's license, or withdraw any denial, revocation, restriction or suspension of the obligor's license; provided, that all other applicable licensing requirements are met by the obligor. If all other applicable licensing requirements are met by the obligor, the obligor shall not, however, be required to be retested or recertified for a license that was valid and that was held in good standing by the obligor, or for which the obligor had been determined otherwise eligible by the licensing authority to receive, prior to the revocation, restriction or suspension or denial of such license pursuant to this part, and which license was revoked, restricted, suspended or denied solely pursuant to this part.
    2. If, subsequent to the revocation, restriction, suspension or denial of the license, and prior to the date on which the next periodic licensing would be due, the license is restored or issued by the licensing authority due to reasonable or full compliance, the obligor shall not be required to pay a new periodic license fee for the period remaining before the next periodic licensing fee would be due; provided, that the licensing authority may impose a reasonable reinstatement fee not to exceed five dollars ($5.00) for processing of the restoration or issuance of the license at any time.

Acts 1996, ch. 892, § 8; 2014, ch. 852, §§ 9, 10.

36-5-708. Rules authorized to enforce part.

The department shall have authority to adopt any necessary rules to implement and enforce the requirements of this part in accordance with the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, compiled in title 4, chapter 5.

Acts 1996, ch. 892, § 9.

36-5-709. Licensing authorities — Cooperation with department — Agreements.

The various licensing authorities shall cooperate with the department in any manner necessary to effectuate this part, and the department and the various licensing authorities shall enter into any necessary agreements to carry out the purposes of this part.

Acts 1996, ch. 892, § 10.

36-5-710. Modification or amendment of support orders or obligations.

Nothing in this part prohibits an obligor from filing a motion to modify support with the court or from requesting the department to amend a support obligation established by an administrative decision.

Acts 1996, ch. 892, § 11.

36-5-711. Information about applicants or licensees — Transmittal.

  1. On or before July 1, 1996, or as soon thereafter as economically feasible and at least annually thereafter, all licensing authorities subject to this part shall provide to the department on magnetic tape or other machine-readable format the information herein specified or enter into an agreement with the commissioner for the transfer of or the access of the department to such data, according to standards established by the department, about applicants for licensure and all current licensees including licensees whose licenses are currently suspended, restricted or revoked but are subject to reinstatement upon the occurrence of an event or expiration of a period of time. The information provided must include, if available, the following:
    1. Name;
    2. Date of birth;
    3. Address of record;
    4. Federal employer identification number or social security number;
    5. Physical description;
    6. Type of license;
    7. Effective date of license or renewal;
    8. Expiration date of license; and
    9. Active or inactive status of the license.
  2. If it is not feasible to provide the information on magnetic tape or in a machine-readable format, the information shall be provided in the format agreed upon by the commissioner and the licensing authority.

Acts 1996, ch. 892, § 12; 2014, ch. 852, § 11.

Attorney General Opinions. Statistical information in domestic relations and worker's compensation cases, OAG 99-230, 1999 Tenn. AG LEXIS 226 (12/15/99).

36-5-712. Report to general assembly and governor.

In furtherance of the public policy of increasing collection of child support, the department shall report the following to the general assembly and the governor on January 31, 1998, and annually thereafter:

  1. The number of obligors identified as licensees subject to this part;
  2. The number of obligors identified by the department under this part who are not in compliance with an order of support; and
  3. The number of actions taken by the department under this part and the results of those actions.

Acts 1996, ch. 892, § 13.

36-5-713. Noncompliance with support order to affect ability to hold other licenses.

  1. In addition to other qualifications for licensure or registration and conditions for continuing eligibility to hold a license as prescribed by law, rule or regulation issued under title 43, 44, 45, 55, 56, 62, 63, 68, 70 or 71, for an individual to engage in a profession, trade, occupation, business, or industry, to hunt or fish, or to operate any motor vehicle or other conveyance, applicants for licensure, certification or registration, and licensees renewing their licenses, and existing licensees, must not then be subject to a certification that the licensee is not in compliance with an order of support.
  2. The supreme court is encouraged to establish guidelines to suspend the license of an attorney who fails to comply with the requirements of §§ 36-5-701 — 36-5-707.

Acts 1996, ch. 892, § 14.

36-5-714. Restricted license.

  1. If the obligor attempts to enter into a satisfactory arrangement with the department for the payment of arrears, the department may permit the obligor to be eligible for a restricted license for the purpose of driving to and from and working at the obligor's regular place of employment and going to and from the obligor's school.
  2. In order to be eligible for a restricted license pursuant to subsection (a), the obligor shall:
    1. Be employed for at least thirty (30) hours per week;
    2. Have a place of employment or school that is located more than one (1) mile from the obligor's place of residence;
    3. Show that the employment or educational endeavor can reasonably be expected to contribute to bringing the obligor into compliance with the support order in a timely manner;
    4. Enter into a payment plan that is satisfactory to the department; and
    5. Pay the restricted license fee required by subsection (f).
  3. If at any time the department finds the obligor is no longer in compliance with the requirements of the agreement, the obligor shall be subject to license revocation pursuant to this part.
  4. Nothing in this section shall prohibit a licensing authority from denying, suspending or revoking any license other than a license to operate a motor vehicle when an obligor is found eligible to receive a restricted license.
  5. Any time an obligor, who is eligible for a restricted license due to an agreement with the department, operates a motor vehicle, the obligor shall maintain in the obligor's possession the agreement stating the restrictions to be placed on the license. An obligor who operates a motor vehicle without the agreement in the obligor's possession or outside the restrictions imposed by the agreement shall be considered to be driving while the obligor's driver license is revoked pursuant to § 55-50-504.
  6. The department shall charge a restricted license fee, not to exceed thirty dollars ($30.00), the proceeds of which shall be used to implement this section. The department shall annually review the fees collected pursuant to this subsection (f) and the costs of implementation to determine the need for a reduction or increase in the fee. The commissioner is authorized to promulgate rules to effectuate the purposes of this subsection (f). All such rules shall be promulgated in accordance with the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, compiled in title 4, chapter 5.

Acts 2014, ch. 852, § 12.

Part 8
Child Support Enforcement Powers of Department

36-5-801. Access to records for child support enforcement.

  1. For the purpose of establishing paternity, or for the establishment, modification or enforcement of orders of support under the child support program established under Title IV-D of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. § 651 et seq.), the department of human services shall have the authority to:
    1. Subpoena, by an administrative subpoena issued by the commissioner, by any authorized representative of the commissioner, or by any contractor of the department, any financial or other information needed to establish, modify, or enforce an order of support;
    2. Require all entities in the state, including, but not limited to, for-profit, nonprofit and governmental employers, to provide promptly, in response to a request or administrative subpoena from the department, its Title IV-D contractor, or by the Title IV-D agency or contractor of any other state, information on the employment, compensation, and benefits of any individual employed by such entity as an employee or as a contractor;
      1. Obtain upon request, or by administrative subpoena if necessary, and notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, access, including automated access if available, to the following records of any state or local agency:
        1. Vital statistics, including records of voluntary acknowledgments, marriages, births, deaths and divorces;
        2. State and local tax records and revenue records, including information about the residence address, employer of any individual, and the individual's income and assets;
        3. Records of real and titled personal property;
        4. Records of occupational and professional licenses, and records concerning the ownership and control of corporations, partnerships, and other business entities;
        5. Employment security records;
        6. All records of any state or local agency administering any form of public assistance;
        7. Records relating to the registration and titling of motor vehicles;
        8. Records of state, county, or municipal correctional agencies;
    3. Obtain pursuant to an administrative subpoena, and notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, access to certain records held by private entities with respect to individuals who owe or are owed support or against or with respect to whom a support obligation is sought, consisting of the names and addresses of such individuals and the names and addresses of the employers of such individuals, as appearing in customer records of public utilities, including all electric, gas, telephone and water companies and cable television companies;
    4. Obtain upon request, and by administrative subpoena if necessary, and notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, information, including, but not limited to, information on assets and liabilities held by any financial institution regarding any individuals who owe, are owed or against or with respect to whom a support obligation is owed; and
      1. Notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, the department of human services, and any of its Title IV-D child support contractors, or the Title IV-D agency of any other state or territory, or any of their Title IV-D child support contractors and any federal agency conducting activities under Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, shall have access to any information maintained by any agency of the state that maintains any system used to locate any individual for any purpose relating to registration of any motor vehicles or law enforcement activities;
      2. For purposes of this subdivision (a)(6), “system” shall be defined as any automated, computerized or electronic system used by any state law enforcement agency, or any state agency that otherwise maintains any records of motor vehicles, in which any information relative to the location or address of any individual persons are maintained by such agencies;
      3. The department of human services shall have rulemaking authority to prescribe the information required by this subdivision (a)(6).
  2. No administrative subpoena shall issue to individuals or entities, other than the obligor or obligee, pursuant to this part without prior review and approval of the necessity for its issuance by a licensed attorney employed by the department or its contractor.
  3. A request or administrative subpoena pursuant to this section may be contested by filing an appeal pursuant to part 10 of this chapter.

Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 11.

36-5-802. Administrative orders for parentage tests.

For the purpose of establishing paternity orders of support under the child support program established under Title IV-D of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. § 651 et seq.):

    1. The department of human services shall have the authority to issue an administrative order by the commissioner, authorized representative of the commissioner or the department’s contractor directed to one (1) or more persons to order the genetic testing of the child, the mother and the putative father or fathers for the purpose of paternity establishment without the necessity of filing a paternity action;
    2. If the department orders such tests, it shall pay the costs of such tests and may recoup such costs from the putative father upon establishment of the putative father’s paternity of the child in question or upon establishment of an order of support of the child for whom paternity has been established;
  1. The department may obtain additional testing by administrative order in any case in which an original test is contested upon request of and payment of the costs of such tests by the contestant. The party requesting the tests, other than the department, shall make advance payment for such tests;
  2. The department may obtain additional tests at its request and may direct the parties by administrative order to attend and to undergo such tests. The department may recoup the costs of such tests it obtains at its request from the putative father upon establishment of the putative father’s paternity of the child in question or upon establishment of an order of support of the child for whom paternity has been established.

Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 11; 1998, ch. 1098, § 26.

36-5-803. Administrative orders to redirect child support payment.

  1. The commissioner's authorized representative, or the department's Title IV-D contractor, is authorized to issue an administrative order to direct the obligor or other payor in Title IV-D child support cases to change the payee to the clerk or to the department. Notice of the order shall be provided by the department to the obligor and the obligee.
  2. A copy of the administrative order issued pursuant to this section shall be sent to the clerk of the court that issued the original order and the administrative order shall be entered in the court record.

Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 11; 1998, ch. 1098, § 27.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 1998, ch.1098, § 27 added a second sentence to subsection (b) which read:

“No fee shall be charged for the filing of the order; provided, however, if Senate Bill 3303/House Bill 3305 is enacted and the cost reimbursement provisions are implemented as provided therein, the provisions of this sentence shall be void.” The bill was enacted as Acts 1998, ch. 1048, so the second sentence was not codified.

Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, referred to in this section, is compiled in 42 U.S.C. § 651 et seq.

36-5-804. Administrative orders to direct additional payments to reduce arrearages.

  1. For the purpose of securing overdue support, the commissioner, or the commissioner's duly authorized representatives or the department's Title IV-D contractor, shall have the authority to enter an administrative order to add an amount to the monthly support order which will reduce the arrearage by payment of a reasonable amount toward the reduction of the arrearage over a reasonable period of time.
  2. A copy of the administrative order issued pursuant to this section shall be sent to the clerk of the court which issued the original order and the administrative order shall be entered in the court record.

Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 11; 1998, ch. 1098, § 28.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 1998, ch. 1098, § 28 added a second sentence to (b) which read “No fee shall be charged for the filing of the order; provided, however, if Senate Bill 3303/House Bill 3305 is enacted and the cost reimbursement provisions are implemented as provided therein, the provisions of this sentence shall be void.” The bill was enacted as Acts 1998, ch. 1048, so the second sentence was not codified.

Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, referred to in this section, is compiled in 42 U.S.C. § 651 et seq.

36-5-805. Updating of information of parties to certain administrative actions.

  1. Each individual who is a party to any action pursuant to §§ 36-5-802, 36-5-803 and 36-5-804, or § 36-5-103(f), shall be required, and the department shall order the party to file with the local Title IV-D child support office, upon entry of an order by the department, for entry into the state registry of support cases, and to update, as appropriate, the parties' and, for subdivisions (a)(1)-(3), the child's or children's:
    1. Full name and any change in name;
    2. Social security number and date and place of birth;
    3. Residential and mailing addresses;
    4. Home telephone numbers;
    5. Driver license number;
    6. The name, address, and telephone number of the person's employer;
    7. The availability and cost of health insurance for the child; and
    8. Gross annual income.
  2. Any update must be made within ten (10) days of the date of a change in circumstances of the person and the order shall give notice of this requirement.
  3. In any subsequent child support enforcement action, the delivery of written notice as required by Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 5 to the most recent residential or employer address shown in the department's records or the Title IV-D agency's records as required in subsection (a) shall be deemed to satisfy due process requirements for notice and service of process with respect to that party if there is a sufficient showing that a diligent effort has been made to ascertain the location and whereabouts of the party.

Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 11; 1998, ch. 1098, §§ 29-31.

Compiler's Notes. Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, referred to in this section, is compiled in 42 U.S.C. § 651 et seq.

36-5-806. Administrative review of certain administrative orders.

The persons against whom the administrative orders in §§ 36-5-802, 36-5-803 and 36-5-804 were issued shall have a right to administratively appeal such orders pursuant to part 10 of this chapter.

Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 11.

36-5-807. Automated processes and service of documents.

  1. To the maximum extent feasible, the department's automated child support enforcement system shall be utilized to carry out the expedited procedures of this part and the system may be used for the issuance and service of any requests, administrative orders, or subpoenas necessary to enforce child support obligations and such automated service shall be effective for all purposes in this part. Electronically reproduced signatures shall be effective to issue any orders or subpoenas pursuant to this part.
  2. Notwithstanding subsection (a), any requests, administrative orders or administrative subpoenas required to be issued pursuant to this part may be transmitted to any party or person by any method chosen by the department, including but not limited to: certified mail, return receipt requested, regular mail, electronic mail, facsimile transmission, or by personal service, and may be generated by computer or on paper.
  3. If an administrative order or administrative subpoena is returned or otherwise not deliverable, then service shall be had by any alternative method chosen by the department, as listed in subsection (b). Before taking action against an individual or entity for failure to comply with this part, the department shall ensure that service of the administrative order, administrative subpoena, or request, was confirmed by certified mail or by personal service.

Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 11.

36-5-808. Statewide jurisdiction of department.

The department's authority and jurisdiction in issuing requests, administrative orders, or subpoenas pursuant to any administrative authority granted by law shall be statewide over all persons or entities in cases subject to its administrative procedures.

Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 11.

36-5-809. Enforcement of out-of-state requests, administrative orders and administrative subpoenas.

  1. Administrative orders, subpoenas or requests of child support enforcement agencies of other states or territories seeking to conduct any of the activities provided in this part shall receive full faith and credit and shall be enforceable against persons or entities in this state.
  2. The administrative orders, subpoenas, and requests issued by such agencies may be enforced upon their behalf, upon their request, by the department or its Title IV-D contractors pursuant to the requirements of § 36-5-811 or § 36-5-812.

Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 11; 1998, ch. 1098, §§ 32, 33.

Compiler's Notes. Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, referred to in this section, is compiled in 42 U.S.C. § 651 et seq.

36-5-810. Immunity for compliance with requests, orders and subpoenas.

All persons or entities complying with any requests, administrative orders, or administrative subpoenas issued pursuant to this part shall be absolutely immune from any liability, civil or criminal, for compliance with the terms of such requests, administrative orders or administrative subpoenas. Nothing herein shall be construed to mean, however, that such immunity applies to any person's civil or criminal liability for support or for failing to provide support as directed by any tribunal's judicial or administrative order, or by law or by regulation.

Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 11.

36-5-811. Enforcement of requests for information.

  1. Failure to comply with a request for information under § 36-5-801(a) may be enforced by the department by the imposition of a civil penalty of one hundred dollars ($100) for the failure to respond to such request.
  2. Such penalties shall be assessed by the commissioner of human services after written notice that provides fifteen (15) days to file a written request for appeal. An appeal shall be conducted by the department as provided in the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, compiled in title 4, chapter 5, part 3.
  3. Failure to timely appeal the assessment of the civil penalty shall be final and conclusive of the correctness of the penalty.
  4. Any amount found owing shall be due and payable not later than fifteen (15) days after the date of transmission of the determination.
  5. Failure to pay an assessment shall result in a lien in favor of the department against the real and personal property of the person or entity to whom or which the request was directed and shall be enforced by original attachment issued by any court having jurisdiction of the monetary amounts assessed in the county where the person resides or where the entity is located.

Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 11.

36-5-812. Enforcement of requests, administrative orders and administrative subpoenas.

  1. The department may enforce an administrative order or subpoena, or the civil penalties authorized in § 36-5-811, by filing a motion for such purpose in the chancery, circuit, juvenile court, or other domestic relations court, having jurisdiction over the support order, or at the option of the department or its Title IV-D contractor, in the county of the residence of the person or of the location of the entity against whom the request, administrative order or administrative subpoena was issued.
  2. The court may enforce any of its orders pursuant to this section by contempt orders.
  3. The department may also enforce such administrative orders, subpoenas or requests by directing the revocation, denial, or suspension of any license, as defined in § 36-5-701, of any person or entity.
  4. Such enforcement methods shall be cumulative, and not exclusive, of any other remedies provided by law for the enforcement of any orders by the court or by the department.

Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 11; 1998, ch. 1098, § 34.

Compiler's Notes. Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, referred to in this section, is compiled in 42 U.S.C. § 651 et seq.

Cross-References. Civil contempt, title 29, ch. 9.

Criminal contempt, Tenn. R. Crim. P. 42.

36-5-813. Liability for fees and costs.

The individual or entity to whom or to which the request, administrative order or administrative subpoena is issued pursuant to this part and that is enforced by the court pursuant to § 36-5-812 shall be liable for all court costs of the proceedings and shall be liable to the department for the cost of any private, contract or government attorney representing the state and for the time of any of its Title IV-D contractor staff utilized in litigating the administrative order or administrative subpoena.

Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 11.

Compiler's Notes. Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, referred to in this section, is compiled in 42 U.S.C. § 651 et seq.

36-5-814. “Financial institution” defined.

As used in this part, unless the context otherwise requires, “financial institution” means:

  1. A depository institution, as defined in Section 3(c) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. § 1813(c));
  2. An institution-affiliated party, as defined in Section 3(u) of such Act (12 U.S.C. § 1813(u)), including for purposes of § 36-5-810;
  3. Any federal credit union or state credit union as defined in Section 101 of the Federal Credit Union Act (12 U.S.C. § 1752), including, for purposes of § 36-5-810, an institution-affiliated party of such a credit union, as defined in Section 206 of such Act (12 U.S.C. § 1786); or
  4. Any benefit association, insurance company, safe deposit company, money-market mutual fund, securities broker/dealer, or similar entity authorized to conduct business in this state.

Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 11.

36-5-815. Rulemaking authority.

The department shall have authority to promulgate rules to implement any provisions of this part pursuant to the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, compiled in title 4, chapter 5.

Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 11.

36-5-816. Administrative orders to determine continuing exclusive jurisdiction.

  1. The department, when acting as the tribunal of the state pursuant to § 36-5-2102 and parts 20-29 of this chapter, in the administrative establishment or enforcement of support, shall have authority to issue an administrative order to determine which state would have continuing exclusive jurisdiction for modification of orders in any interstate cases pursuant to the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, compiled in parts 20-29 of this chapter.
  2. The determination made pursuant to subsection (a) may be appealed as provided pursuant to part 10 of this chapter.

Acts 1998, ch. 1098, § 35.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 1998, ch. 1098, § 35, enacting this section, contained a third sentence in (a) which read:

“No fee shall be charged for the filing of the order; provided, however, if Senate Bill 3303/House Bill 3305 is enacted and the cost reimbursement provisions are implemented as provided therein, the provisions of this sentence shall be void.” The bill was enacted as Acts 1998, ch. 1048, so the third sentence was not codified.

Part 9
Overdue Support

36-5-901. Liens for child support arrearages.

    1. In any case of child or spousal support enforced by the department of human services or its contractors under Title IV-D of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. § 651  et seq.), in which overdue support is owed by an obligor who resides or owns property in this state, a lien shall arise by operation of law against all real and personal property, tangible or intangible, then owned or subsequently acquired by the obligor against whom the lien arises for the amounts of overdue support owed or the amount of penalties, costs or fees as provided in this chapter. The personal or real property, tangible or intangible, of the obligor that is subjected to the lien required by this part shall include all existing property at the time of the lien's perfection, or acquired thereafter, even if a prior order for overdue support or arrears only specifies a certain amount of overdue support or arrears that was owed by the obligor at the time of such order.
    2. “Overdue support” is defined, for purposes of this part, as any occasion on which the full amount of ordered support for or on behalf of a minor child, or for a spouse or former spouse of the obligor with whom the child is living to the extent spousal support would be included for the purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 654(4), is not paid by the due date for arrears as defined in § 36-5-101(f)(1) unless an income assignment is in effect and the payer of income is paying pursuant to § 36-5-101(g). “Overdue support” shall include all amounts of support that are in arrears as defined in § 36-5-101(f)(1) and that remain unpaid by the obligor at the time the lien is perfected or that become due as arrears subsequent to the perfection of the lien.
    3. For the purposes of this part, “personal property” includes:
      1. A commissary account or any other account or fund established by or for the benefit of the inmate in a correctional institution or private prison operated by or under contract with the department of correction while the inmate is incarcerated; and
      2. Any account containing wages received for work performed while an inmate is in a correctional institution or private prison operated by or under contract with the department of correction, but does not include any portion of the account that is used to pay litigation taxes, court costs, sexual offender surcharges, fines, restitution, or other moneys related to the criminal offense for which the inmate is confined.
      1. The commissioner may cause a notice of such lien on real property or upon any personal property to be recorded or filed, as appropriate in the appropriate place for the filing of a judgment lien or security interest in the property. This notice may be filed by automated means where feasible. The department shall not be required to pay the fee for filing the notice of lien at the time the notice is filed, but shall be given credit and billed once each month for the notices that it files pursuant to this subsection (b).
      2. In addition to the notice perfected pursuant to subdivision (b)(1)(A), a notice of lien may be sent by any appropriate means, including by any automated means, by the commissioner or any authorized representative of the department, to any person or entity that holds or that may hold any assets payable or due to be paid or transferred to an obligor of overdue support to notify the person or entity of the existence of a lien for overdue support. The receipt of such notice by that person or entity shall be adequate notice of the department's lien upon the obligor's assets of any kind that are held by the person or entity or that may come into that person's or entity's possession or control. Subject to the priorities of subsections (c) and (d), or the subordination of these liens to orders or judgments pursuant to § 36-5-905(c)(1)(A) and (c)(1)(B), and subject to any exemptions allowed by § 36-5-906, payment or transfer to the obligor or other persons or entities of the funds, property, or other assets of any kind that are encumbered by the lien subsequent to the receipt of such notice, shall make the person or entity liable to the department to the extent of the overdue support, up to the value of the transferred assets, in an action in the circuit or chancery court of the county in which the order of support is being enforced.
    1. Upon request, the department shall disclose the specific amount of liability at a given date to any interested party.
      1. The department may cause a notice of lien to be filed or recorded and to be effective in any county in this state against all real or personal property of the obligor by provision by the state of a computer terminal arrangement in the office of the register of deeds or other state or local agency where the information regarding the existence, amount and date of the lien or security interest involving an obligor is made available to anyone who may be researching a title to real property or who may be seeking the status of any security interests or liens affecting any real or personal property held by an obligor. The cost for provision of the computer terminal arrangement, if used pursuant to this subdivision (b)(3)(A), shall be paid by the department of human services.
      2. In the alternative, the department may, upon agreement by the secretary of state, develop a central site for recordation of all notices of liens on all property, real or personal, that would be subject to the lien provisions of this part and the department and the secretary of state shall have authority to promulgate any rules necessary pursuant to the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, compiled in title 4, chapter 5, to implement such central recordation site.
      3. In addition, or in conjunction with or as an alternative to the methods described in subdivision (b)(3)(A) or (b)(3)(B), the department may cause the filing or recordation of liens against all real or personal property of the obligor by placing such notice on a site accessible on the internet. If the methods described in subdivision (b)(3)(A) or (b)(3)(B) are used, and if the internet process authorized pursuant to this subdivision (b)(3)(C) is also made available, the dates shown on the department's computer record and displayed in the appropriate office of recordation as provided in subdivision (b)(3), (b)(3)(A) or (b)(3)(B) and those displayed on the internet site shall be the same.
      4. The date noted in the department's computer record and that is displayed in the appropriate office of recordation as provided in subdivision (b)(3)(A) or (b)(3)(B), or that is displayed on the internet site as provided in subdivision (b)(3)(C), will serve for purposes of perfection as the recording or filing date of the lien. The recording or filing provided by this subdivision (b)(3) shall serve as notice to anyone who may be researching a title to real property or who may be seeking the status of any security interests or liens affecting any real or personal property held by an obligor and shall become the date of recordation of the notice of lien for all purposes of this part.
      5. If any of the systems or procedures described in this subdivision (b)(3) is provided by the department, the automated lien shall be effective for all purposes to give notice to persons who may be affected by the existence of such lien in the same manner as the recordation of notice in the lien book maintained by the register of deeds or in the records of any state or local agency maintaining such records.
      6. Prior to the implementation of this subdivision (b)(3), the department shall promulgate rules establishing procedures for the use of the automated system and shall, in addition to the other requirements of the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, for notice, provide specific notice to the state clerks of court conference, registers of deeds, and the Tennessee Bar Association.
    2. Nothing herein shall require the department to file a notice of lien for the seizure of an obligor's assets held by a state or local agency, by a court or administrative tribunal, by a lottery, by a financial institution or by a public or private retirement fund pursuant to § 36-5-904(1)-(3) or to obtain any income withholding from any employer or other payor of income as otherwise permitted under part 5 of this chapter.
  1. The lien of the department for child support arrearages shall be superior to all liens and security interests created under Tennessee law except:
    1. County and municipal ad valorem taxes and special assessments upon real estate by county and municipal governments;
    2. Deeds of trust that are recorded prior to the recordation of notice of the department's lien;
    3. Security interests created pursuant to Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, compiled in title 47, chapter 9, that require filing for perfection and that are properly filed prior to recordation of the notice of the department's lien;
    4. Security interests perfected under the Uniform Commercial Code without filing, as provided in title 47, chapter 9, that are properly perfected prior to recordation of the notice of the department's lien;
    5. The lien or security interest of a financial institution against an obligor's interest in a deposit account at that institution for any indebtedness to the institution, including but not limited to, that institution's security interest in accounts pledged for loans, its rights under the Uniform Commercial Code or by contract to charge back uncollected deposits, revoke settlements or take other action against the account, its right to recover overdrafts and fees, and its right of offset for mature indebtedness;
    6. Other security interests in deposit accounts at a financial institution when such interests are reflected in the records of that financial institution prior to the receipt of an administrative order of seizure;
    7. Other liens recorded prior to the recordation of the department's lien, or concerning which a judicial proceeding was initiated prior to recordation of the department's lien;
    8. Vendors' liens on real estate provided for in title 66, chapter 10 that are recorded prior to the recordation of notice of the department's lien; and
    9. The tax liens of the department of revenue filed pursuant to title 67 prior to the department's child support lien.
      1. Nothing in this section shall be interpreted to give the department priority over any deed of trust or any security interest perfected under the Uniform Commercial Code prior to the filing of the notice of the department's child support lien, irrespective of when such child support lien arises.
      2. “Filing” for purposes of this subsection (d) means that the department has recorded its notice of lien pursuant to subsection (b) by filing a document to record its notice of lien in the appropriate office for such recordation or that it has effectively recorded its lien pursuant to the automated recordation method permitted by subdivision (b)(3).
    1. No lien for child support arrearages shall be perfected against a motor vehicle unless such lien is physically noted on the certificate of title of such motor vehicle.
    2. Nothing in this part shall be deemed to give the department any priority over any possessory lien including, but not limited to, mechanics' and materialmen's liens pursuant to title 66, chapter 11, part 1; artisans liens pursuant to title 66, chapter 14; or garagekeepers' and towing firm liens pursuant to title 66, chapter 19, part 1.
  2. The notice of lien required to be filed or recorded under subsection (b), or any renewal thereof, shall be effective until the obligation is paid.

Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 12; 1998, ch. 1098, § 36; 2000, ch. 846, § 32; 2000, ch. 922, § 23; 2001, ch. 447, §§ 16, 17; 2017, ch. 300, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, referred to in this section, is compiled in 42 U.S.C. § 651 et seq.

Amendments. The 2017 amendment added (a)(3).

Effective Dates. Acts 2017, ch. 300, § 3. May 5, 2017.

Attorney General Opinions. A lien of the Department of Human Services for overdue child support under T.C.A. § 36-5-901(a)(1) is superior to the fees to which an attorney is otherwise entitled for services to a client who may also have overdue child support, OAG 07-010, 2007 Tenn. AG LEXIS 10 (1/26/07).

36-5-902. Full faith and credit to liens of other state child support agencies.

  1. Full faith and credit shall be accorded to liens arising in any other state or territory for cases of child or spousal support enforced by the Title IV-D child support enforcement agency of the other state or territory as a result of the circumstances of § 36-5-901(a) for all overdue support, as defined in the other state or territory, when that other state or territory agency or other entity complies with the procedural rules relative to the recording, filing or serving of liens that arise within this state.
  2. The department of human services may enforce the liens arising pursuant to this section by any means available for enforcement of its liens.

Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 12.

Compiler's Notes. Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, referred to in this section, is compiled in 42 U.S.C. § 651 et seq.

36-5-903. Rebuttable presumption as to ownership.

  1. There shall be a rebuttable presumption concerning property that is subject to this part, except where otherwise clearly noted by the evidence of title or otherwise, or where by law ownership of property is otherwise clearly stated, that at least one-half of all real or tangible personal property that is titled to or in the possession of the obligor is owned by the obligor who is subject to the lien provisions of this part.
  2. All jointly held accounts in any financial institution shall be rebuttably presumed to be available in whole to the obligor.

Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 12.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Illustrative Cases.

Trial court erred in presuming that one parent owned 50 percent of a rental property. On remand, the issue of the parent's income was to be reconsidered. In re Grace N., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 331 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 14, 2015).

36-5-904. Enforcement of liens.

In cases where there is an arrearage of child or spousal support in a Title IV-D child support case or in which a lien arises pursuant to § 36-5-901, the department is authorized, without further order of a court, to secure the assets of the obligor to satisfy the current obligation and the arrearage by:

  1. Intercepting or seizing periodic or lump-sum payments or benefits due the obligor:
    1. From a state or local agency;
    2. From judgments of any judicial or administrative tribunal, settlements approved by any judicial or administrative tribunal, and lottery winnings;
  2. By attaching or seizing assets of the obligor or other person or entity held in financial institutions as defined in § 36-5-910;
  3. By attaching public and private retirement funds; and
  4. By imposing liens in accordance with § 36-5-901, and, in appropriate cases, by forcing the sale of the obligor's legal or equitable interest in property and by distribution of the proceeds of such sale.

Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 12; 1998, ch. 1098, § 37.

Compiler's Notes. Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, referred to in this section, is compiled in 42 U.S.C. § 651 et seq.

36-5-905. Enforcement by administrative order of seizure.

  1. The department may enforce the lien provided by this part by issuance of an administrative order to any person or entity directing the seizure or sale of any assets of an obligor. The order shall direct the person or entity to hold, subject to any due process procedures provided the obligor, all assets of any kind of the obligor who is subject to the order pending the outcome of the administrative due process procedures. The order shall be based upon and issued pursuant to an existing judicial or administrative order that has previously established support under which an arrearage, due to overdue support, as defined in § 36-5-901, has occurred.
  2. Upon receipt of the administrative order, whether electronically or otherwise, the person or entity that has or may have the assets of the obligor shall immediately seize, hold, and encumber such assets, as directed by the department, pending further direction from the department as to the disposition of the assets or pending any further orders of any court of competent jurisdiction. The person or entity may place such funds as it has that belong to the obligor in an escrow account for such purpose and may take any other steps deemed reasonable to preserve any real or personal property.
    1. All administrative orders for seizure or sale shall be subject to and subordinate to:
      1. Any order of a United States Bankruptcy Court;
      2. An attachment or execution under any judicial process in effect at the time of the administrative seizure order, pending modification of such court's orders; or
      3. A priority under § 36-5-901(c).
    2. If the assets of the obligor are known by the person or entity that received such administrative order to be subject to any orders of the United States Bankruptcy Court, or to any attachment, execution or existing lien, the person or entity shall, within ten (10) days after receipt of the administrative order, notify the department at the address contained in the order. With respect to deposit accounts of the obligor, the depository financial institution shall inform the department of the unencumbered balances of such accounts.
  3. Upon receipt of direction from the department that all due process procedures have been completed or were waived in any manner, and subject to subsection (c) and subject to the priority for the department's liens as described in § 36-5-901(c), the person or entity shall pay or deliver to the department, pursuant to its direction, the assets of the obligor that are held or that come into the possession or control of the person or entity and that are necessary to comply with the terms of the department's administrative order.
    1. There shall be no requirement of advance judicial notice or hearing prior to the seizure of the obligor's property by administrative order, but the department of human services shall promulgate rules to provide procedures for the seizure of any property subject to the lien arising under this part and to provide post-enforcement procedures to permit the obligor to contest the seizure of any property pursuant to this part and part 10 of this chapter.
    2. Such rules shall not permit the final disposition of any property seized under the lien enforcement procedures until the exhaustion of administrative and judicial remedies as provided in this part and shall make the disposition subject to the lien priorities of § 36-5-901.
      1. A notice shall be sent to the obligor against whom the administrative order for seizure or sale of assets is directed by mail within five (5) days of the issuance of such administrative seizure order of the fact that such assets have been the subject of an administrative order and that they have been seized or are subject to sale and are being held, may be conveyed to the department or may be sold, subject to the right to an administrative hearing to contest the seizure or sale of such assets.
      2. The notice shall specify the sum demanded and shall contain, in the case of personal property, an account of the property actually seized and, in the case of real property, a description with reasonable certainty of the property seized. In the case of assets in a financial institution, it shall be sufficient to notify the obligor of the seizure of any assets of the obligor that may be held by any institution to which the order is directed.
  4. A final order of seizure or sale of the obligor's property pursuant to this part shall be effective to convey and vest title in the department or in the purchaser and shall be evidence of title for all purposes. The commissioner or the commissioner's agent may convey title to personal property by certificate of title or may execute a deed conveying title to real property to the purchaser in accordance with regulations as may be prescribed by the commissioner.
  5. All persons or entities complying with any administrative order issued pursuant to this section shall be absolutely immune from any liability, civil or criminal, for compliance with the terms of such order or attempted compliance in good faith with such order.
  6. No more than fifty percent (50%) of the total amount in a commissary account or any other account or fund established by or for the benefit of an inmate in a correctional institution or private prison operated by or under contract with the department of correction while the inmate is incarcerated or any account containing wages received for work performed while an inmate is incarcerated shall be subject to seizure by the department. Any portion of the account that is used to pay litigation taxes, court costs, sexual offender surcharges, fines, restitution, or other moneys related to the criminal offense for which the inmate is confined shall be deducted from the account before the seizure authorized by this subsection (h) is calculated.

Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 12; 1998, ch. 1098, § 38; 2017, ch. 300, § 2.

Amendments. The 2017 amendment added (h).

Effective Dates. Acts 2017, ch. 300, § 3. May 5, 2017.

36-5-906. Exemptions from sale.

  1. Enumeration.  There shall be exempt from sale of personal property subject to lien pursuant to this part:
    1. Wearing Apparel, School Books and Family Bible.  Such items of wearing apparel and such school books as are necessary for the obligor or for members of the obligor's family, and the family bible or other book containing the family's religious beliefs;
    2. Fuels, Provisions, Furniture, And Personal Effects.  If the obligor is the head of the family, so much of the fuel, provisions, furniture, and personal effects in the obligor's household, and of the arms for personal use, livestock, and poultry of the obligor, as does not exceed five thousand dollars ($5,000) in value;
    3. Books And Tools Of A Trade, Business, Or Profession.  So many of the books and tools necessary for the trade, business or profession of the obligor as do not exceed in the aggregate two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500) in value.
  2. Appraisal.  The agent of the department seizing property of the type described in subsection (a) shall appraise and set aside to the owner the amount of such property declared to be exempt. If the obligor objects at the time of the seizure to the valuation fixed by the agent making the seizure, the commissioner or the commissioner's agent shall summon three (3) disinterested individuals who shall make the valuation.
  3. No Other Property Exempt.  Notwithstanding any other law of the state, no property or rights to property shall be exempt from levy other than the property specifically made exempt by subsection (a).

Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 12.

36-5-907. Release of lien.

  1. At any time after the child support obligation has been paid, the person holding title to the property on which the lien is placed may request the department to release the lien. If the department does not release the lien within sixty (60) days of the request, it shall be liable for court costs in any action to remove the lien.
  2. The department may cause the issuance of releases of liens by filing or recording such release of lien with the register of deeds or any other appropriate state or local office as provided under any method authorized pursuant to § 36-5-901 for the filing of notices of liens, or the department may supply copies of such release of liens by the department to any person or entity requesting a release for filing or recording of the release by that person or entity.
  3. The release may be conveyed by any electronic means or by facsimile transmission. If a facsimile transmission is utilized pursuant to this subsection (c), it shall be supplemented by a copy of suitable quality if such facsimile's quality is not adequate for purposes of recording by the register or other appropriate official.

Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 12; 1998, ch. 1098, § 39.

36-5-908. Department control; real estate and personal property.

The commissioner or the commissioner's agent shall have charge of all real estate or personal property that is or shall become the property of the department by seizure or judgment under any provision of this or any other title, or that has been or shall be assigned, set off, or conveyed by purchase or otherwise to the department in payment of child support obligations, debts or penalties arising thereunder, or that has been or shall be vested in the department by mortgage or other security for the payment of such obligations, or that has been redeemed by the department, and of all trusts created for the use of the department in payment of such debts due the department.

Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 12.

36-5-909. Limitation on rights of action.

No action may be maintained against any officer or employee of the state, or former officer or employee or the officer's or employee's personal representative, with respect to any acts for which an action could be maintained under this part.

Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 12.

36-5-910. “Financial institution” defined.

As used in this part, “financial institution” shall mean:

  1. A depository institution, as defined in Section 3(c) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. § 1813(c));
  2. An institution-affiliated party, as defined in Section 3(u) of such act (12 U.S.C. § 1813(u));
  3. Any Federal credit union or state credit union as defined in Section 101 of the Federal Credit Union Act (12 U.S.C. § 1752), including an institution-affiliated party of such a credit union, as defined in Section 206 of such Act (12 U.S.C. § 1786);
  4. Any benefit association, insurance company, safe deposit company, money-market mutual fund, securities broker/dealer, or similar entity authorized to conduct business in this state.

Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 12.

36-5-911. Cooperation by state and local agencies.

All state and local agencies shall cooperate with the department of human services to carry out this part. Nothing in this section shall be construed to require or permit the shifting of the costs for provision of computer terminal hardware or software pursuant to § 36-5-901(b)(3) from the state to any local government.

Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 12.

36-5-912. Enforcement procedures — Rules and regulations for enforcement — Contracts for enforcement procedures.

  1. Except where otherwise stated in this part, and to the extent not in conflict with this part, the department shall have the same rights and duties given to the department of revenue pursuant to title 67, chapter 1, part 14 to enforce the liens established by this part against real or tangible personal property.
  2. The department has rulemaking authority to implement this part and shall promulgate any rules pursuant to the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, compiled in title 4, chapter 5, that are necessary to implement any provisions of the enforcement procedures described in this part or those procedures adapted for the department's use pursuant to title 67, chapter 1, part 14 that relate to the rights and duties necessary to seize and dispose of property subject to the liens imposed in this part to the extent those rights and duties comport with this part and with state and federal laws administering the child support program established pursuant to Title IV-D of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. § 651  et seq).
  3. The department may contract with the department of revenue, or any other state agency or with any private contractor, to provide services related to the seizure and disposition of property subject to the liens established by this part.

Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 12.

Part 10
Appeals

36-5-1001. Appeals of administrative actions by the department of human services.

  1. An appeal that is permitted by state or federal law or regulations for actions of the department of human services relative to Title IV-D child support services involving the following actions of the department shall be processed as provided in subsections (b) and (c) and §§ 36-5-1002 — 36-5-1006:
    1. A request for information or records, an administrative order or an administrative subpoena issued pursuant to part 8 of this chapter;
    2. An income withholding order pursuant to part 5 of this chapter;
    3. Notice of enrollment of a child for health care coverage upon a change of employers or as otherwise authorized pursuant to §§ 36-5-101(h)(2), 36-2-319, 36-5-501(a)(3) or 37-1-151;
    4. Review and adjustment of child support orders pursuant to § 36-5-103;
    5. The enforcement by administrative orders of liens for child support pursuant to part 9 of this chapter;
    6. Income tax refund intercepts pursuant to 45 CFR 303.72;
    7. Credit information reports pursuant to § 36-5-106;
    8. Distributions of support collections;
    9. Review of administrative orders for payments of overdue support made pursuant to §§ 36-2-322, 36-5-113, and 37-1-151(e) and orders to engage in work activities pursuant to those sections;
    10. Review of orders for administrative determination of continuing exclusive jurisdiction pursuant to § 36-5-816;
    11. Review of civil penalties for failure to provide proper information for the distribution of child support payments pursuant to § 36-5-120; and
    12. Review of income assignment orders for medical coverage entered pursuant to § 36-5-501(a)(3).
  2. Except as otherwise stated in subsections (c) and the following sections of this part, the hearings in subsection (a) shall be conducted pursuant to the provisions for contested case hearings as provided in the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, compiled in title 4, chapter 5, part 3.
  3. The person seeking administrative review of the department's actions pursuant to subsection (a) shall file a written request with the department for an administrative hearing within fifteen (15) calendar days of the date of the notice of an administrative action pursuant to this part as defined by the department.

Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 16; 1998, ch. 1098, § 40; 2000, ch. 922, §§ 24, 25, 39; 2002, ch. 873, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2002, ch. 873, § 2(a) provided that for any case to which the provisions of former subdivision (c)(2), as it existed immediately prior to September 1, 2002, would have applied, any new requests for appeals and reviews of any Title IV-D child support administrative actions of the department of human services, as otherwise permitted by the administrative appeal and review provisions of this part made either to the juvenile court in counties having a population of not less than eight hundred twenty-six thousand (826,000) and not more than eight hundred twenty-seven thousand (827,000) according to the 1990 federal census, or to the department, on, and after, September 1, 2002, shall be under the jurisdiction of the department; provided, however, that any requests that have been made by an appellant to the juvenile courts in such counties in which the appellant has sought, prior to September 1, 2002, an appeal and review of any Title IV-D child support administrative actions of the department, shall continue to be conducted by such juvenile courts according to the law existing under this part and former subdivision (c)(2) as those provisions existed immediately preceding September 1, 2002.

Acts 2002, ch. 873, § 2(b) provided that the department shall hear and determine such appeals under the contested case provisions of the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, compiled in title 4, chapter 5, part 3 and under the provisions of this part.

Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, referred to in this section, is compiled in 42 U.S.C. § 651 et seq.

36-5-1002. Scope of administrative review.

  1. Notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, the scope of administrative review of the orders at the administrative hearing provided by § 36-5-1001 shall be limited to a determination of the correct identity of the person or persons or entity or entities to whom or to which the administrative action is directed, to whether there is a mistake of fact involving the action, and, is further limited to the following specific issues set forth in the following subdivisions:
    1. An administrative subpoena for records or request for information or records, pursuant to part 8 of this chapter, shall be modified or overturned by the hearing officer only upon a showing by clear and convincing evidence of arbitrary or capricious action in the issuance of the administrative subpoena or request, or if there is clear and convincing evidence that the best interests of the child or the child's caretaker would be jeopardized by the execution of the administrative subpoena or request, or if there is clear and convincing evidence that compliance with the request or administrative subpoena would constitute a clear violation of law;
    2. Review of administrative orders for parentage tests pursuant to § 36-5-802 shall be limited to a determination of whether the department's order was arbitrary or capricious;
    3. Review of administrative orders pursuant to § 36-5-803 to redirect child support is limited to whether the case upon which the redirection order has been issued is a Title IV-D case;
    4. Review of administrative orders pursuant to § 36-5-804 to direct additional payments of child support shall be limited to a determination of whether the order is a reasonable amount that would eliminate the arrearage within a reasonable amount of time;
    5. Review of income assignment orders pursuant to § 36-5-501 is limited to:
      1. For the issuance of the initial order or income assignment:
        1. The correct identity of the individual subject to the order; and
        2. A mistake of fact;
      2. For the issuance of an income assignment due to a delinquency pursuant to § 36-5-501(b)(1)(B) or (D):
        1. The amount of support not paid; or
        2. The timeliness of the support paid;
      3. For the addition of an amount ordered pursuant to § 36-5-501(b)(1)(C) to satisfy accumulated arrears, if the court has not already determined the amount of arrears, the reasonableness of the amount ordered paid on the arrears and, in the case of accumulated arrears, the period of time over which support is ordered to be paid;
      4. For the addition of an amount ordered pursuant to § 36-5-501(b)(1)(C) for medical support, if the court has not already determined the amount of medical support, the reasonableness of the amount of medical support ordered; and
      5. For termination of an income assignment, that the conditions of § 36-5-503 have been met;
    6. Review of enrollment of a child for health insurance coverage in employer-based health coverage pursuant to § 36-5-501(a)(3) following issuance of an order to require the noncustodial parent to provide such coverage shall be limited to a mistake of fact;
    7. Review of the adjustment of child support orders pursuant to § 36-5-103 shall be limited to a determination of the appropriate application of the methods of adjustment of the order of support pursuant to § 36-5-103 that have been utilized by the department based on the income of the parties and based upon any circumstances which should permit deviation from the amount and that is justified by the application of those methods;
      1. Review of the enforcement by administrative orders of liens for child support pursuant to part 9 of this chapter shall be limited to:
        1. The correct amount of the obligation;
        2. The extent of the obligor's interest in the assets; and
        3. Whether good cause exists not to seize, sell, distribute or otherwise dispose of all or a part of such assets;
      2. Upon review pursuant to the standards of subdivision (8)(A), the hearing officer may direct that there is a mistake as to the identity or interest of the person whose assets have been seized and dismiss the order, or may direct that all or only a portion of the assets be disposed of, or that there be some other order for the disposition of the assets of the obligor in order to satisfy the child support arrearage;
      3. The department's hearing officer or the reviewing court may grant any relief of preliminary or temporary nature relative to the obligor's assets as may be appropriate under the circumstances pending the entry of the final order;
    8. Review of income tax refund intercepts shall be conducted pursuant to the department's existing rules or as they may be further amended;
    9. Review of reports of credit status shall be limited to the extent of the amount of current support and amount of arrears to be reported to the credit bureau;
      1. Administrative review of the distribution of collections shall not be conducted until such time as the party seeking redress has contacted the customer service unit in the department's state office for a conciliation process in which the customer service unit shall have thirty (30) days to resolve the issues. If the issues have not been resolved within thirty (30) days of the initiation of such effort, the customer service unit shall notify the person who sought conciliation and the person shall have the right to seek administrative review pursuant to this part;
      2. Review of distribution actions of the department shall be limited to a determination of the adequacy of efforts to resolve the issues pursuant to subdivision (11)(A) and the amount of support that is properly credited to the appellant;
    10. Review of an administrative order for payment of an overdue child support obligation made pursuant to §§ 36-2-322, 36-5-113 and 37-1-151(e) shall be limited to a determination of whether the order is a reasonable amount that would eliminate the arrearage within a reasonable period of time; or, for orders pursuant to §§ 36-2-322, 36-5-113 and 37-1-151(e) that direct the individual to engage in work activities as set forth in § 71-3-104, the appeal shall be limited to a determination of whether there is good cause to excuse the person's participation in those activities. “Good cause” for the work activities determination shall be limited to the availability to the individual of the ordered activities, or the individual's capability to participate in those activities due to disability or other circumstances effectively preventing the individual's participation;
    11. The appeal of an order to determine continuing exclusive jurisdiction pursuant to § 36-5-816 shall be limited to the correct application of the procedures for such determination pursuant to parts 20-29 of this chapter; and
    12. Review of a civil penalty for failure to comply with § 36-5-120 shall be limited to whether there is good cause for failure to comply with that section.
  2. The hearing officer may not forgive any support arrearages upon review of any of the department's administrative orders.
    1. The record of child or spousal support as certified by the clerk of the court or as shown by the department's child support computer system shall be admissible without further foundation testimony and shall constitute a rebuttable presumption as to the amount of support that is in arrears and that is owed by the obligor in any review pursuant to this part. “Spousal support,” as used in this part, means a legally enforceable obligation assessed against an individual for the support of a spouse or former spouse who is living with a child or children for whom the individual also owes support.
    2. If submitted to the opposing party ten (10) days prior to the administrative hearing, the affidavit of a keeper or custodian of any other records, including, but not limited to, the records of any financial institution or the department of human services or any other government or private entity, concerning any matter before the hearing officer shall be admitted by the hearing officer unless an objection thereto is submitted five (5) days prior to the hearing. If an objection is filed and is upheld by the hearing officer, the hearing officer shall continue the case to permit the taking of any further testimony that may be necessary to resolve the issues.
    3. In order to expedite the review of these matters, the hearing officer shall have discretion to take testimony of any party or witness by telephone or video or other electronic technology, and documents may, in the hearing officer's discretion, be submitted by facsimile transmission or by any other electronic technology.

Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 16; 1998, ch. 1098, §§ 41-43; 2000, ch. 922, §§ 26, 27, 40; 2001, ch. 447, §§ 7, 8.

Compiler's Notes. Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, referred to in this section, is compiled in 42 U.S.C. § 651 et seq.

36-5-1003. Judicial review of administrative actions.

  1. Notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, the judicial review of the administrative hearing decisions of the department of human services pursuant to this part shall be conducted by the court having jurisdiction of the support order as otherwise provided by § 4-5-322.
  2. If any administrative action of the department pursuant to this part is not based upon an existing order of support or paternity, the party seeking judicial review shall file the petition for review of the department's actions in the chancery court of the county of the person's residence, or the county where an entity was served with an administrative subpoena or was notified of a request for information. If the department is enforcing any order of a Title IV-D agency of any other state and there has been no assumption of jurisdiction of the support order by a Tennessee court, the petition for judicial review shall be filed in the county of the residence of the person in Tennessee against whom the request, administrative order or administrative subpoena is issued or the county where an entity was served with an administrative order, administrative subpoena or was notified of a request for information. No judicial review may result in the forgiveness of any support arrearages.
  3. The judicial review shall be limited to the review of the record of the department's hearing as otherwise provided in § 4-5-322.

Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 16.

Compiler's Notes. Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, referred to in this section, is compiled in 42 U.S.C. § 651 et seq.

36-5-1004. Noninterference with department's actions — Injunctive relief.

No person or entity who has been served with an administrative order, administrative subpoena, or request for information or records shall take any measures to defeat the administrative action of the department during the pendency of the review of such action by the administrative hearing officer or by the reviewing court, and the department or its contractor may seek injunctive relief to prevent any actions that would defeat its administrative actions.

Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 16.

36-5-1005. Liability for fees and costs.

The individual or entity to whom or to which the administrative order, administrative subpoena or request is issued pursuant to this part and that is enforced by the reviewing court shall be liable for all costs of the court proceedings and shall be liable to the department for the cost of any private, contract or government attorney representing the state and for the time of any of its Title IV-D state office staff or contractor staff utilized in litigating the administrative order, administrative subpoena or request.

Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 16.

Compiler's Notes. Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, referred to in this section, is compiled in 42 U.S.C. § 651 et seq.

Attorney General Opinions. Constitutionality of assessment of attorney fees and costs, OAG 99-008, 1999 Tenn. AG LEXIS 6 (1/25/99).

36-5-1006. Rules and regulations.

The department shall have authority to promulgate rules and regulations pursuant to the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, compiled in title 4, chapter 5, to implement this part.

Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 16.

Part 11
Employment Records

36-5-1101. Part definitions.

As used in this part, unless the context requires otherwise:

  1. “Business day” means a day on which state offices are open for regular business;
  2. “Commissioner” means the commissioner of human services or the commissioner's duly authorized representative;
  3. “Department” means the department of human services or its contractor or other designee;
  4. “Directory of new hires” means an automated directory of information, supplied by employers on each newly hired or rehired employee, which is maintained by the department of human services;
  5. “Employee” means an individual who is an employee within the meaning of Chapter 24 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (26 U.S.C. § 3401 et seq.), but does not include an employee of a federal or state agency performing intelligence or counterintelligence functions, if the head of that agency has determined that reporting pursuant to the requirements of this part with respect to the employee could endanger the safety of the employee or compromise an ongoing investigation or intelligence mission;
  6. “Employer” has the meaning given such term in § 3401(d) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (26 U.S.C. § 3401(d)), and includes any governmental entity and any labor organization;
  7. “Labor organization” has the meaning given such term in § 2(5) of the National Labor Relations Act (29 U.S.C. § 152(5)), and includes any entity, also known as a “hiring hall”, that is used by the organization and an employer to carry out requirements of § 8(f)(3) of such Act (29 U.S.C. § 158(f)(3)), of an agreement between the organization and the employer; and
  8. “Title IV-D agency” means the agency designated pursuant to Title IV, Part D of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. § 651 et seq.), to provide services to children and families to establish and enforce child support obligations. In Tennessee, the department of human services is the Title IV-D agency.

Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 1.

36-5-1102. Reports of new employees.

Effective October 1, 1997, each employer shall furnish to the department a report that contains the name, address, hire date and social security number of each newly hired employee, and the name, address, and identifying number of the employer assigned under § 6109 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (26 U.S.C. § 6109).

Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 1; 2001, ch. 447, § 9.

36-5-1103. Reports for employers with employees in two or more states.

An employer that has employees who are employed in two (2) or more states and that transmits reports magnetically or electronically may comply with § 36-5-1102 by designating one (1) state in which such employer has employees to which the employer will transmit the report described in § 36-5-1102 and by transmitting such report to such state. Any employer that transmits reports pursuant to this section shall notify the secretary of the United States department of health and human services, in writing, as to which state such employer designates for the purpose of sending reports under this section.

Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 1.

36-5-1104. Time frames for reports by employers.

The report provided by § 36-5-1102 shall be made not later than twenty (20) days after the date the employer hires the employee, or, in the case of an employer transmitting reports magnetically or electronically, by two (2) monthly transmissions, if necessary, not less than twelve (12) nor more than sixteen (16) days apart.

Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 1; 1998, ch. 1098, § 44.

36-5-1105. Reports on W-4 forms.

Each report required by § 36-5-1102 shall be made on a W-4 form, or at the option of the employer, an equivalent form, containing the same data as required on the W-4 form. The report may be transmitted to the department by first class mail, magnetically or electronically in a format approved by the department.

Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 1.

36-5-1106. Use of information by department.

  1. The department shall use the information received pursuant to § 36-5-1102 to locate individuals for purposes of establishing paternity and establishing, modifying and enforcing child support obligations and may disclose such information to any agent of the department that is under contract with the department to carry out such purposes.
  2. The commissioner shall make available information collected pursuant to this part to state or local agencies or their contractors, or agents in this state or their counterparts in any other state or territory who determine financial or medical assistance as permitted under § 1137(b) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. § 1320b-7(b)), as it may be amended; to any state program operated under a plan approved under Titles I, X, and XIV of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 301 et seq., 1201 et seq., and 1351 et seq.), respectively; to any agencies administering the worker's compensation program of a state or territory; to any agencies administering the Tennessee Lawful Employment Act, compiled in title 50, chapter 1, part 7; and to the Title IV-D agency in this state, its local offices and its contractors, whether public or private, and the Title IV-D agency's counterparts in other states or territories, their local offices and their contractors, whether public or private, for use in locating absent parents, and for use in establishing, enforcing and modifying child support orders; and to the federal government as required by statute or regulation. The department may charge a fee to cover the costs of the provision of such information to any other state or local government entities that may be conducting eligibility determinations or who are conducting programs under this subsection (b).
  3. No further disclosures shall be made except as authorized pursuant to this section or § 71-1-131. Disclosure in violation of this section shall be a Class C misdemeanor.

Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 1; 2016, ch. 828, § 20.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2016, ch. 828, § 22 provided that the act, which amended this section, shall apply to violations occurring on or after July 1, 2016.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class C misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

36-5-1107. Failure to make necessary reports — Penalties.

  1. If, after prior notification by the department of human services of failure to make the necessary reports required by this part, any employer fails or refuses to comply with the requirements of this part, the employer shall be subject to a civil penalty of twenty dollars ($20.00) for each employee who is not reported.
  2. Any employer and employee who conspire not to provide the report required by this part or who conspire to provide a false or incomplete report shall each be subject to a civil penalty of four hundred dollars ($400).
  3. Such penalties shall be assessed by the commissioner of human services after written notice that provides fifteen (15) days from the mailing date of such notice to file a written request for appeal.
  4. If an appeal is timely filed with the department, the employer or employee shall be entitled to an administrative hearing before the department on the issue of the assessment pursuant to the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, compiled in title 4, chapter 5, relative to contested case hearings.
  5. Failure to timely appeal the assessment of the civil penalty shall be final and conclusive of the correctness of the assessment.
  6. Any amount found owing shall be due and payable not later than fifteen (15) days after the mailing date of the determination.
    1. Failure to pay an assessment shall result in a lien against the real or personal property of the employer or the employee in favor of the department and shall be enforced by original attachment issued by the court in the county where the employer is located, or where the employee resides by any court having jurisdiction of the monetary amounts assessed.
    2. The employer or employee shall be liable for all court costs and litigation taxes of the proceedings and shall be liable to the department for the cost of any private, contract or government attorney representing the state and for the time of any of its Title IV-D or contractor staff utilized in litigating the assessment.
  7. Any appeal of the action of the commissioner pursuant to this section shall be made in conformity with § 4-5-322.

Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 1; 1998, ch. 1098, § 45.

Compiler's Notes. Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, referred to in this section, is compiled in 42 U.S.C. § 651 et seq.

36-5-1108. Rulemaking authority.

The department has authority to promulgate rules pursuant to the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, compiled in title 4, chapter 5, that it determines are necessary for the implementation of this part, and it is specifically authorized to utilize emergency rules to implement this part, effective June 23, 1997, subject to prior approval of the emergency rules by the attorney general and reporter.

Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 1; 2009, ch. 566, §  12.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2009, ch. 566, § 12 provided that the Tennessee code commission is directed to change all references to public necessity rules, wherever such references appear in this code, to emergency rules, as sections are amended and volumes are replaced.

Part 12
Assistance by Other States

36-5-1201. Administrative enforcement in interstate cases.

  1. The department of human services, as the Title IV-D child support enforcement agency of this state, shall use high-volume automated administrative enforcement, to the same extent as used for intrastate cases, in response to a request made by another state to enforce support orders, and shall promptly report the results of such enforcement procedure to the requesting state.
  2. The agencies of this or any state that enforce child support may, by electronic or other means, transmit to another state or to this state a request for assistance in enforcing support orders through high-volume, automated administrative enforcement, which request:
    1. Shall include such information as will enable the state to which the request is transmitted to compare the information about the cases to the information in the data bases of the state receiving the request; and
    2. Shall constitute a certification by the requesting state:
      1. Of the amount of support under an order the payment of which is in arrears; and
      2. That the requesting state has complied with all procedural due process requirements applicable to each case.
  3. If the department provides assistance to another state with respect to a case, or if another state seeks assistance from the department pursuant to this section, neither state shall consider the case to be transferred to the caseload of such other state.
  4. The department shall maintain records of:
    1. The number of such requests for assistance received by the department;
    2. The number of cases for which the department collected support in response to such a request; and
    3. The amount of such collected support.
  5. In this part, the term “high-volume automated administrative enforcement” in interstate cases means, on request of another state, the identification by the department, through automated data matches with financial institutions and other entities where assets may be found, of assets owned by persons who owe child support in other states, and the seizure of such assets by the department, through levy or other appropriate means.

Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 15; 1998, ch. 1098, § 46; 2001, ch. 447, § 10.

Compiler's Notes. Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, referred to in this section, is compiled in 42 U.S.C. § 651 et seq.

Part 13
Social Security Number Records

36-5-1301. Inclusion of social security numbers on certain licenses.

  1. Notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, all applications for professional licenses, driver licenses, occupational licenses, hunting and fishing licenses or recreational licenses, or marriage licenses issued by any agency or any political subdivision of the state on and after July 1, 1997, shall contain the social security number of each applicant.
  2. If the agency or office maintaining the records described in subsection (a) allows the use of a number other than the social security number on the face of the license document, and the social security number obtained on the application is kept on file with the agency or office, the agency or office shall so advise the applicant.
  3. All agencies maintaining records as required by subsection (a) shall make such records accessible to the department of human services or its contractors or agents enforcing Title IV-D of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. § 651 et seq.), and to the extent possible, in electronic or magnetic automated formats.

Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 29; 1998, ch. 1098, §§ 47, 48.

36-5-1302. Inclusion of social security numbers in certain records.

Notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, the social security number of any individual who is subject to a divorce decree, order of support issued by any court, any order of paternity or legitimation, or any voluntary acknowledgment of paternity shall be placed in the records relating to such matter.

Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 29.

Parts 14-19
[Reserved]

Part 20
Uniform Interstate Family Support Act—Short Title

36-5-2001. Short title.

Parts 20-29 of this chapter shall be known and may be cited as the “Uniform Interstate Family Support Act.”

Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Part 20, § 36-5-2001 (Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 2), concerning the short title for title 36, ch. 5, parts 20-29, was repealed and reenacted by Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1, upon completion of the provisions in § 2 of the act. Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 2, as amended by Acts 2016, ch. 664, § 4, provided that: “This act shall take effect when the department of human services files a notice with the secretary of state who shall publish the notice in the Tennessee Administrative Register on the secretary of state's web site, citing the effective date, which shall occur no later than April 1, 2016, the public welfare requiring it.”

The date published by the secretary of state in the Tennessee Administrative Register was March 31, 2016.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 20 Tenn. Juris., Parent and Child, § 11; 5 Tenn. Juris., Children Born Out of Wedlock, §§ 10, 12, 14, 15;  13 Tenn. Juris., Extradition, § 1;  16 Tenn. Juris., Judgments and Decrees, § 102; 20 Tenn. Juris., Paupers, § 1.

Law Reviews.

1985 Tennessee Survey: Selected Developments in Tennessee Law, 53 Tenn. L. Rev. 373 (1986).

Attorney General Opinions. Personal jurisdiction in paternity cases, OAG 92-42, 1992 Tenn. AG LEXIS 38 (5/6/92).

Part 21
Uniform Interstate Family Support Act — General Provisions

36-5-2101. Definitions.

As used in parts 20-29 of this chapter, unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “Child” means an individual, whether over or under the age of majority, who is or is alleged to be owed a duty of support by the individual’s parent or who is or is alleged to be the beneficiary of a support order directed to the parent;
  2. “Child support order” means a support order for a child, including a child who has attained the age of majority under the law of the issuing state or foreign country;
  3. “Convention” means the Convention on the International Recovery of Child Support and Other Forms of Family Maintenance, concluded at The Hague on November 23, 2007;
  4. “Duty of support” means an obligation imposed or imposable by law to provide support for a child, spouse, or former spouse, including an unsatisfied obligation to provide support;
  5. “Foreign country” means a country, including a political subdivision thereof, other than the United States, that authorizes the issuance of support orders and:
    1. Which has been declared under the law of the United States to be a foreign reciprocating country;
    2. Which has established a reciprocal arrangement for child support with this state as provided in § 36-5-2308;
    3. Which has enacted a law or established procedures for the issuance and enforcement of support orders which are substantially similar to the procedures under parts 20-29 of this chapter; or
    4. In which the Convention is in force with respect to the United States;
  6. “Foreign support order” means a support order of a foreign tribunal;
  7. “Foreign tribunal” means a court, administrative agency, or quasi-judicial entity of a foreign country which is authorized to establish, enforce, or modify support orders or to determine parentage of a child. The term includes a competent authority under the Convention;
  8. “Home state” means the state or foreign country in which a child lived with a parent or a person acting as parent for at least six (6) consecutive months immediately preceding the time of filing of a petition or comparable pleading for support and, if a child is less than six (6) months old, the state or foreign country in which the child lived from birth with any of them.  A period of temporary absence of any of them is counted as part of the six-month or other period;
  9. “Income” includes earnings or other periodic entitlements to money from any source and any other property subject to withholding for support under the law of this state;
  10. “Income-withholding order” means an order or other legal process directed to an obligor’s employer or other debtor, as provided for in part 5 of this chapter, to withhold support from the income of the obligor;
  11. “Initiating tribunal” means the tribunal of a state or foreign country from which a petition or comparable pleading is forwarded or in which a petition or comparable pleading is filed for forwarding to another state or foreign country;
  12. “Issuing foreign country” means the foreign country in which a tribunal issues a support order or a judgment determining parentage of a child;
  13. “Issuing state” means the state in which a tribunal issues a support order or a judgment determining parentage of a child;
  14. “Issuing tribunal” means the tribunal of a state or foreign country that issues a support order or renders a judgment determining parentage of a child;
  15. “Law” includes decisional and statutory law and rules and regulations having the force of law;
  16. “Obligee” means:
    1. An individual to whom a duty of support is or is alleged to be owed or in whose favor a support order or a judgment determining parentage of a child has been issued;
    2. A foreign country, state, or political subdivision of a state to which the rights under a duty of support or support order have been assigned or which has independent claims based on financial assistance provided to an individual obligee in place of child support;
    3. An individual seeking a judgment determining parentage of the individual’s child; or
    4. A person that is a creditor in a proceeding under part 27 of this chapter;
  17. “Obligor” means an individual, or the estate of a decedent that:
    1. Owes or is alleged to owe a duty of support;
    2. Is alleged but has not been adjudicated to be a parent of a child;
    3. Is liable under a support order; or
    4. Is a debtor in a proceeding under part 27 of this chapter;
  18. “Outside this state” means a location in another state or a country other than the United States, whether or not the country is a foreign country;
  19. “Person” means an individual, corporation, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, limited liability company, association, joint venture, public corporation, government, or governmental subdivision, agency, or instrumentality, or any other legal or commercial entity;
  20. “Record” means information that is inscribed on a tangible medium or that is stored in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable in perceivable form;
  21. “Register” means to file in a tribunal of this state a support order or judgment determining parentage of a child issued in another state or a foreign country;
  22. “Registering tribunal” means a tribunal in which a support order or judgment determining parentage of a child is registered;
  23. “Responding state” means a state in which a petition or comparable pleading for support or to determine parentage of a child is filed or to which a petition or comparable pleading is forwarded for filing from another state or a foreign country;
  24. “Responding tribunal” means the authorized tribunal in a responding state or foreign country;
  25. “Spousal support order” means a support order for a spouse or former spouse of the obligor;
  26. “State” means a state of the United States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the United States Virgin Islands, or any territory or insular possession under the jurisdiction of the United States. The term includes an Indian nation or tribe;
  27. “Support enforcement agency” means a public official, governmental entity, or private agency authorized to:
    1. Seek enforcement of support orders or laws relating to the duty of support;
    2. Seek establishment or modification of child support;
    3. Request determination of parentage of a child;
    4. Attempt to locate obligors or their assets; or
    5. Request determination of the controlling child support order;
  28. “Support order” means a judgment, decree, order, decision, or directive, whether temporary, final, or subject to modification, issued in a state or foreign country for the benefit of a child, a spouse, or a former spouse, which provides for monetary support, health care, arrearages, retroactive support, or reimbursement for financial assistance provided to an individual obligee in place of child support.  The term may include related costs and fees, interest, income withholding, automatic adjustment, reasonable attorney’s fees, and other relief; and
  29. “Tribunal” means a court, administrative agency, or quasi-judicial entity authorized to establish, enforce, or modify support orders or to determine parentage of a child.

Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1; 2016, ch. 664, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Part 20, § 36-5-2001 (Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 2), concerning the short title for title 36, ch. 5, parts 20-29, was repealed and reenacted by Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1, upon completion of the provisions in § 2 of the act. Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 2, as amended by Acts 2016, ch. 664, § 4, provided that: “This act shall take effect when the department of human services files a notice with the secretary of state who shall publish the notice in the Tennessee Administrative Register on the secretary of state's web site, citing the effective date, which shall occur no later than April 1, 2016, the public welfare requiring it.”

The date published by the secretary of state in the Tennessee Administrative Register was March 31, 2016.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

The terms defined in UIFSA receive a major makeover in the now-realized expectation that the Convention will enter into force in the United States at a future time. Six definitions of terms are completely new, sixteen existing definitions are amended to a greater or lesser degree, seven definitions remain basically untouched albeit six of these are renumbered, and one term is deleted because it no longer appears in the act.

Many crucial definitions continue to be left to local law. For example, the definitions provided by subsections (1) “child,” and (2) “child-support order,” [subdivisions (1) and (2)] refer to “the age of majority” without further elaboration. The exact age at which a child becomes an adult for different purposes is a matter for the law of each state or foreign country as is the age at which a parent’s duty to furnish child support terminates. Similarly, a wide variety of other terms of art are implicitly left to state law. The new Convention provides a more explicit definition of “child” that is entirely consistent with the laws of all states.

There is a divergence of opinion among the several states regarding the appropriate age for termination of child support. The overwhelming number of states set ages 18 (legal adulthood for most purposes), or 19, or one of those two ages and high-school graduation, whichever comes later. Relatively few states have retained the formerly popular age of 21. And, some states extend the support obligation past age 21 if the person to be supported is engaged in higher education. Allegedly some support enforcement agencies and some tribunals have been reluctant to enforce an ongoing child support obligation past age 21, but under UIFSA it is the law of the issuing state or foreign country that makes the determination of the appropriate age for termination of support from an obligor. Because the order has been established with personal jurisdiction over the parties, it is fully enforceable under the terms of the act.

Under the terms of the Convention, the standard obligation of a responding tribunal to enforce a child-support order is for a person “under the age of 21 years.” See  Convention art. 2. Scope. However, a contracting nation may make a reservation to limit enforcement of a child-support order to “persons who have not attained the age of 18 years.” Id. This possibility will not affect this act domestically because the United States does not intend to make such a reservation. Currently states will enforce another jurisdiction’s order even if such an order could not have been obtained in the responding state because the child was over 18. There is no requirement to establish an order for a child over the age of 18 if that cannot be done under the local jurisdiction’s law.

Subsection (3) [subdivision (3)] “Convention,”  identifies the Hague Maintenance Convention, the basis on which UIFSA (2008) was drafted. The text of the Convention may be accessed on the website of the Hague Convention on Private International Law, www.hcch.net/index. As noted above, the Convention was the result of negotiations involving more than 70 foreign nations or, in some instances political subdivisions of a foreign nation, conducted in a series of meetings from May 2003 to November 2007.

Subsection (4) [subdivision (4)] “Duty of support,”  means the legal obligation to provide support, whether or not that duty has been the subject of an order by a tribunal. This broad definition includes both prospective and retrospective obligations to the extent they are imposed by the relevant state law.

Subsection (5) [subdivision (5)] requires additional careful reading; under the act “foreign country” by no means includes all foreign nations. See  Section 102(5)(A)-(D) [T.C.A. § 36-5-2101(5)(A)-(D)]. Countries identified by three of the four subdivisions are reasonably ascertainable. The list of reciprocating countries that have negotiated an executive agreement with the United States as described in subdivision (5)(A), known as bilateral agreements, is found on the website of the federal Office of Child Support Enforcement (OCSE) at http://www. acf.hhs.gov/programs/cse/international/index.html.

The countries described in Section 102(5)(B) [T.C.A. § 36-5-2101(5)(B)] have entered into an agreement with the forum state, which presumptively is known to officials of that state. A combined list of all such agreements of all states is not readily available.

Countries subject to Section 102(5)(C) [T.C.A. § 36-5-2101(5)(C)] theoretically could require individualized determinations on a case-by-case basis. An alternative might be for each state to create an efficient method for identifying foreign countries whose laws are “substantially similar” to UIFSA. On the other hand, the “substantially similar” test to measure the laws of foreign nations has been around since 1968 without eliciting much controversy.

In the future, assuming that there will be a number of countries with the Convention in force with the United States under Section 102(5)(D) [T.C.A. § 36-5-2101(5)(D)], the list of those countries will be well publicized.

Finally, there are very many foreign nations that do not, and will not, fit any of the definitions of “foreign country” established in the act. At present, there are 192 member states in the United Nations. Recognition and enforcement of support orders from nations that do not meet the definition of “foreign country” may be enforceable under the doctrine of comity. See  Section 104 [T.C.A. § 36-5-2103].

Subsections (6) “foreign support order,” (7) “foreign tribunal,” and (12) “issuing foreign country” [subdivisions (6), (7) and (12)] set down parallel tracks for a foreign support order, foreign tribunal, and foreign issuing country throughout the act.

Subsection (17) “obligor,” and subsection (16) “obligee,” [subdivisions (17) and (16)] are denominated in the Convention as “debtor” and “creditor.” The terms inherently contain the legal obligation to pay or receive support, and implicitly refer to the individuals with a duty to support a child. “Obligor” includes an individual who is alleged to owe a duty of support as well as a person whose obligation has previously been determined. The one-order system of UIFSA can succeed only if the respective obligations of support are adjusted as the physical possession of a child changes between parents or involves a third-party caretaker. This must be accomplished in the context of modification, and not by the creation of multiple orders attempting to reflect each changing custody scenario. Obviously this issue is of concern not only to interstate and international child-support orders, but applies to intrastate orders as well.

Subsection (18) “outside this state,” [subdivision (18)] requires careful reading. This phrase is used in the act when the application of the provision is to be as broad as possible. Rather than limit the application of certain provisions of the act to other states, foreign countries as defined in subsection (5) [subdivision (5)], or even countries whose orders are entitled to comity under Section 104  [T.C.A. § 36-5-2103], all nations and political subdivisions are truly “outside this state.” For example, that term is found in Sections 316 through 18  [T.C.A. §§ 36-5-231636-5-2318], which allow a tribunal of this state to accept information or assistance from everywhere in the world (in the court’s discretion as to its effect).

The definitions in subsections (23) “responding state,” and (24) “responding tribunal,” [subdivisions (23) and (24)] accommodate the direct filing of a petition under UIFSA without the intervention of an initiating tribunal. Both definitions acknowledge the possibility that there may be a responding state and a responding tribunal in a situation where there is no initiating tribunal. Under current practice, the initial application for services most often will be generated by a support enforcement agency or a central authority of a foreign country and sent to the appropriate support enforcement agency in the responding state.

As discussed above in connection with subsections (5) through (7) [subdivisions (5)-(7)], the amended definition in subsection (26) “state,” [subdivision (26)] eliminates the legal fiction that a foreign country can be a state of the United States, and clarifies and implements the purpose of the act to enforce an international support order under state law. In UIFSA (2008), the term clearly is intended to refer only to a state of the United States or to other designated political entities subject to federal law.

The vast bulk of child support establishment, enforcement, and modification in the United States is performed by the state Title IV-D agencies. See  Part IV-D, Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 651 et seq. Subsection (27) “support enforcement agency,” [subdivision (27)] includes not only those entities, but also any other state or local governmental entities, or private agencies acting under contract with such agencies, charged with establishing or enforcing child support. A private agency falls within the definition of a support enforcement agency only as an outsource of a Title IV-D agency or specifically identified as such under Section 103 [T.C.A. § 36-5-2102].

Subsection (28) “support order” [subdivision (28)] is another definition that requires more careful reading than might be immediately clear. Virtually every financial aspect of a support order regarding child support or spousal support is covered. Throughout the act “support order” means both “child support” and “spousal support.” “Child support” is used when the provision applies only to support for a child. The single provision applicable solely to spousal support is Section 211 [T.C.A. § 36-5-2211]. Other forms of support that might be classified as “family support,” are not dealt with by UIFSA.

Subsection (29) “tribunal,” [subdivision (29)] takes into account that a number of states have delegated various aspects of child-support establishment and enforcement to quasi-judicial bodies and administrative agencies. The term accounts for the breadth of state variations in dealing with support orders. This usage is standard in the child-support enforcement community; private practitioners who, only rarely, are involved in such cases may still find the term unfamiliar.

36-5-2102. State tribunal and support enforcement agency.

  1. The chancery, circuit, juvenile, and any courts exercising domestic relations jurisdiction under any enactment of the general assembly, and the department of human services when, pursuant to a state or federal law, the department is acting in its capacity as the Title IV-D child support enforcement agency of the state to carry out administrative support establishment or support enforcement actions or when adjudicating administrative appeals involving the Title IV-D child support program, are the tribunals of this state.
  2. The department of human services is the support enforcement agency of this state.

Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Part 20, § 36-5-2001 (Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 2), concerning the short title for title 36, ch. 5, parts 20-29, was repealed and reenacted by Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1, upon completion of the provisions in § 2 of the act. Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 2, as amended by Acts 2016, ch. 664, § 4, provided that: “This act shall take effect when the department of human services files a notice with the secretary of state who shall publish the notice in the Tennessee Administrative Register on the secretary of state's web site, citing the effective date, which shall occur no later than April 1, 2016, the public welfare requiring it.”

The date published by the secretary of state in the Tennessee Administrative Register was March 31, 2016.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Subsection (a) provides for the identification of the tribunal or tribunals to be charged with the application of this act.

Subsection (b) performs the same function for the support enforcement agency or agencies. By its terms it indicates the legislature may designate more than one entity as authorized to enforce a support order, including a private agency. To clarify, federal law and regulations require that each state designate a “single and separate organizational unit” as the state agency that is charged with administration of the state plan and is authorized, and funded under Title IV-D of the Social Security Act. Known throughout the United States as the as the “IV-D agency,” it may delegate any of its functions to another state or local agency or may purchase services from any person or private agency. The IV-D agency, however, retains responsibility for ensuring compliance with the Title IV-D state plan. Moreover, by virtue of the receipt of a federal subsidy, the agency is subject to federal regulations. The legislature may also decide to provide services unrelated to, or not funded by the Title IV-D system. For example, the state legislature could identify (and fund) a private agency authorized to enforce a spousal-support order not involving child support, or could fund a public defender system to provide counsel for indigent defendants in IV-D cases.

36-5-2103. Remedies cumulative.

  1. Remedies provided by parts 20-29 of this chapter are cumulative and do not affect the availability of remedies under other law, or the recognition of a foreign support order on the basis of comity.
  2. Parts 20-29 of this chapter do not:
    1. Provide the exclusive method of establishing or enforcing a support order under the law of this state; or
    2. Grant a tribunal of this state jurisdiction to render judgment or issue an order relating to child custody or visitation in a proceeding under parts 20-29 of this chapter.

Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1; 2011, ch. 55, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Part 20, § 36-5-2001 (Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 2), concerning the short title for title 36, ch. 5, parts 20-29, was repealed and reenacted by Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1, upon completion of the provisions in § 2 of the act. Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 2, as amended by Acts 2016, ch. 664, § 4, provided that: “This act shall take effect when the department of human services files a notice with the secretary of state who shall publish the notice in the Tennessee Administrative Register on the secretary of state's web site, citing the effective date, which shall occur no later than April 1, 2016, the public welfare requiring it.”

The date published by the secretary of state in the Tennessee Administrative Register was March 31, 2016.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

The existence of procedures for interstate establishment, enforcement, or modification of support or a determination of parentage in UIFSA does not preclude the application of the general law of the forum. Even if the parents live in different states, for example, a petitioner may decide to file an original proceeding for child support (and most likely for other relief as well) directly in the state of residence of the respondent and proceed under that forum’s generally applicable support law. In so doing, the out-of-state petitioner submits to the personal jurisdiction of the forum and, for the most part, is unaffected by UIFSA. Once a child-support order has been issued, this option is no longer available to interstate parties. Under UIFSA, a state may not permit a party to proceed to obtain a second support order; rather, in further litigation the tribunal must apply the act’s provisions for enforcement of an existing order and limit modification to the strict standards of UIFSA.

This section facilitates the recognition and enforcement of a support order from a nation state that is entitled to have its orders recognized by comity, but is not a “foreign country” under Section 102(5) [T.C.A. § 36-5-2101(5)]. The insertion of the term “foreign support order” to replace “support order of a foreign country or political subdivision” in subsection (a) helps clarify application of “comity” for support enforcement cases. In UIFSA, four types of nation states are defined as “foreign countries”: (1) Convention countries; (2) countries with bilateral agreements with the federal government; (3) countries with bilateral agreements with particular states; and (4) countries with similar support laws. However, orders of countries that do not fall within this definition may nevertheless be enforced under “comity”. Applying comity to enforce a support order of a tribunal of another nation state intends courtesy and good will, and extends due regard for the legislative, executive, and judicial acts of another nation which is not a “foreign country” as defined in Section 102 [T.C.A. § 36-5-2101].

Although the determination by the United States Department of State that a foreign nation is a reciprocating country is binding on all states, recognition of a support order through comity is dependent on the law of each state. The reference to “remedies under other law” is intended to recognize the principle of comity as developed in the forum state by statutory or common law, rather than to create a substantive right independent of that law.

Subsection (b)(1) [subdivision (b)(1)] gives notice that UIFSA is not the only means for establishing or enforcing a support order with an interstate aspect. A potential child-support obligee may voluntarily submit to the jurisdiction of another state to seek the full range of desired relief under the law of that state using intrastate procedures, rather than resorting to the interstate procedure provided by UIFSA. A nonresident married parent may choose to file a proceeding in the forum state for dissolution of the marriage, including property division and spousal support, and in conjunction seek an order regarding child custody and visitation and child support. A parent may submit to the jurisdiction of another state for a determination of parentage and child support. A support order resulting from each of these scenarios implicates UIFSA. Invariably the issuing tribunal will have continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over its controlling child support or spousal-support order as provided by Sections 205, 207, and 211 [T.C.A. §§ 36-5-2205, 36-5-2207, 36-5-2211], infra ,  with all of the attendant application of the act to those orders. Likewise, the order or judgment of another state can be enforced without the necessity of registration under UIFSA by resort to other post-judgment enforcement remedies, such as lien, levy, execution, and filing claims in probate or bankruptcy actions.

On the other hand, subsection (b)(2) [subdivision (b)(2)] makes clear that jurisdiction to establish child custody and visitation orders is distinct from jurisdiction for child-support orders. For the former, jurisdiction generally rests on the child’s connection with the state rather than personal jurisdiction over the respondent. See  UCCJEA § 201; May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Under the Supreme Court’s case law, jurisdiction to establish a child-support order requires personal jurisdiction over the respondent. See  Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978). If the child-support order is sought under the authority of UIFSA, the most important aspect of this rule is that a child-support obligee utilizing the provisions of UIFSA to establish child support across state lines submits to jurisdiction for child support only, and does not submit to the jurisdiction of the responding state with regard to child custody or visitation.

36-5-2104. Application of parts 21-27 of this chapter to resident of foreign country and foreign support proceeding.

  1. A tribunal of this state shall apply parts 21-26 of this chapter and, as applicable, part 27 of this chapter, to a support proceeding involving:
    1. A foreign support order;
    2. A foreign tribunal; or
    3. An obligee, obligor, or child residing in a foreign country.
  2. A tribunal of this state that is requested to recognize and enforce a support order on the basis of comity may apply the procedural and substantive provisions of parts 21-26 of this chapter.
  3. Part 27 of this chapter applies only to a support proceeding under the Convention. In such a proceeding, if a provision of part 27 of this chapter is inconsistent with parts 21-26 of this chapter, then part 27 of this chapter controls.

Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Part 20, § 36-5-2001 (Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 2), concerning the short title for title 36, ch. 5, parts 20-29, was repealed and reenacted by Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1, upon completion of the provisions in § 2 of the act. Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 2, as amended by Acts 2016, ch. 664, § 4, provided that: “This act shall take effect when the department of human services files a notice with the secretary of state who shall publish the notice in the Tennessee Administrative Register on the secretary of state's web site, citing the effective date, which shall occur no later than April 1, 2016, the public welfare requiring it.”

The date published by the secretary of state in the Tennessee Administrative Register was March 31, 2016.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Four distinct entities are defined as a “foreign country” with tribunals that enter a “foreign support order.” See  Section 102(5)  [T.C.A. § 36-5-2101(5)]. With regard to the three types of proceedings identified in subsection (a), all of the provisions in this act in Articles 1 through 6 [parts 21-26] apply. Note, however, that under subsection (c), only one of these, a country “in which the Convention is in force with respect to the United States,” see  Section 102(5)(D) [T.C.A. § 36-5-2101(5)(D)], will be subject to Article 7 [part 27] as well as to Articles 1 through 6 [parts 21-26]. Thus, a support order from one of these countries may require special attention. After the Convention comes into force in the United States, a body of case law may develop if it becomes necessary to resolve unanticipated differences between this act and the Convention. As this extensive commentary and the many cross references to provisions of the Convention indicate, significant efforts have been made to avoid any such conflicts.

Under subsection (b) a tribunal of this state may apply principles of comity if appropriate to recognize a support order from a foreign nation state that does not fit the definition of a “foreign country,” see  Section 102(5)(A)-(D) [T.C.A. § 36-5-2101(5)(A)-(D)], supra .

Subsection (c) resolves that if terms of the Convention and the terms of this act, including Article 7 [part 27], are in conflict, the provision of the Convention controls. With regard to the other three statutory definitions of a “foreign country,” all the terms, this act in articles 1 through 6 [parts 1-6] control. After the Convention comes into force in the United States, a body of case law may develop to resolve unanticipated differences between this act and the Convention.

Part 22
Uniform Interstate Family Support Act — Jurisdiction

36-5-2201. Bases for jurisdiction over nonresident.

  1. In a proceeding to establish or enforce a support order or to determine parentage of a child, a tribunal of this state may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident individual or the individual’s guardian or conservator if:
    1. The individual is personally served with notice within this state;
    2. The individual submits to the jurisdiction of this state by consent in a record, by entering a general appearance, or by filing a responsive document having the effect of waiving any contest to personal jurisdiction;
    3. The individual resided with the child in this state;
    4. The individual resided in this state and provided prenatal expenses or support for the child;
    5. The child resides in this state as a result of the acts or directives of the individual;
    6. The individual engaged in sexual intercourse in this state and the child may have been conceived by that act of intercourse;
    7. The individual asserted parentage of a child in the putative father registry maintained in this state by the department of children's services; or
    8. There is any other basis consistent with the constitutions of this state and the United States for the exercise of personal jurisdiction.
  2. The bases of personal jurisdiction set forth in subsection (a) or in any other law of this state may not be used to acquire personal jurisdiction for a tribunal of this state to modify a child support order of another state unless the requirements of § 36-5-2611 are met, or, in the case of a foreign support order, unless the requirements of § 36-5-2615 are met.

Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Part 20, § 36-5-2001 (Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 2), concerning the short title for title 36, ch. 5, parts 20-29, was repealed and reenacted by Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1, upon completion of the provisions in § 2 of the act. Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 2, as amended by Acts 2016, ch. 664, § 4, provided that: “This act shall take effect when the department of human services files a notice with the secretary of state who shall publish the notice in the Tennessee Administrative Register on the secretary of state's web site, citing the effective date, which shall occur no later than April 1, 2016, the public welfare requiring it.”

The date published by the secretary of state in the Tennessee Administrative Register was March 31, 2016.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Application.

Parent who lived in California waived any objection that the parent had to a court in Tennessee exercising personal jurisdiction over the parent in a child support matter because the father's attorney failed to enter a restrictive appearance for purposes of determining jurisdiction. In re Conner F., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 505 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 26, 2017).

Decisions Under Prior Law

1. Application.

T.C.A. § 36-5-2202 is not applicable to actions to modify out-of-state orders; it is applicable, however, to actions in which long-arm personal jurisdiction is acquired via T.C.A. § 36-5-2201 to establish, enforce, or modify Tennessee support orders. Letellier v. Letellier, 40 S.W.3d 490, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 255, 90 A.L.R.5th 707 (Tenn. 2001).

Tennessee courts have subject matter jurisdiction to modify support orders issued by other states only when T.C.A. § 36-5-2611(a) has been satisfied. Letellier v. Letellier, 40 S.W.3d 490, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 255, 90 A.L.R.5th 707 (Tenn. 2001).

2. Construction With Other Sections.

While T.C.A. § 36-5-2202 is not applicable to actions to modify out-of-state orders, it is applicable to actions in which long-arm personal jurisdiction is acquired via T.C.A. § 36-5-2201 to establish, enforce, or modify Tennessee support orders. Letellier v. Letellier, 40 S.W.3d 490, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 255, 90 A.L.R.5th 707 (Tenn. 2001).

3. Federal Preemption.

The jurisdictional provisions of the Federal Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act (FFCCSOA, 28 U.S.C. § 1738B) do not conflict with the Tennessee Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA, this act, T.C.A. § 36-5-2001 et seq.), and therefore, UIFSA is not preempted by federal law. Letellier v. Letellier, 40 S.W.3d 490, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 255, 90 A.L.R.5th 707 (Tenn. 2001).

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

General Jurisdictional Principle: Sections 201 and 202 [T.C.A. §§ 36-5-2201 and 36-5-2202] contain what is commonly described as long-arm jurisdiction over a nonresident respondent for purposes of establishing a support order or determining parentage. Read together, subsections (a) and (b) provide the basic jurisdictional rules established by the act for interstate application of a support order, and are designed to be as broad as is constitutionally permissible. To sustain enforceability of a family support order in the United States the tribunal must be able to assert personal jurisdiction over the parties. See  Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 68 S. Ct. 1213, 92 L. Ed. 1561 (1948), and Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416, 77 S. Ct. 1360, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1456 (1957) (spousal support); Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 98 S. Ct. 1690, 56 L. Ed. 2d 132 (1978) (child support).

Long-arm Provisions: Inclusion of this long-arm provision in this interstate act is justified because residents of two separate states are involved in the litigation, both of whom must be subject to the personal jurisdiction of the forum. Thus, the case has a clear interstate aspect, despite the fact that the substantive and procedural law of the forum state is applicable to a lawsuit in what is a one-state case. This rationale is sufficient to invoke additional UIFSA provisions in an otherwise intrastate proceeding. See  Sections 202, 316, and 318 [T.C.A. §§ 36-5-2202, 36-5-2316, 36-5-2318], as pertaining to special rules of evidence and discovery for UIFSA cases. The intent is to ensure that every enacting state has a long-arm statute that is as broad as constitutionally permitted.

In situations in which the long-arm statute can be satisfied, the petitioner (either the obligor or the obligee) has two options: (1) utilize the long-arm statute to obtain personal jurisdiction over the respondent, or, (2) initiate a two-state proceeding under the succeeding provisions of UIFSA seeking to establish a support order in the respondent’s state of residence. Of course, a third option is also available that does not implicate UIFSA; a petitioner may initiate a proceeding in the respondent’s state of residence by filing a proceeding to settle all issues between the parties in a single proceeding.

Under RURESA, multiple support orders affecting the same parties were commonplace. UIFSA created a structure designed to provide for only one support order at a time. The new one-order regime is facilitated and combined with a broad assertion of personal jurisdiction under this long-arm provision. The frequency of a two-state procedure involving the participation of tribunals in both states has been substantially reduced by the introduction of this long-arm statute.

Subsection by subsection analyses: Subsections (1) through (8) [subdivisions (a)(1)-(8)] are derived from a variety of sources, including the Uniform Parentage Act (1973) § 8, Texas Family Code § 102.011, and New York Family Court Act § 154.

Subsection (1) [subdivision (a)(1)] codifies the holding of Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990), which reaffirms the constitutional validity of asserting personal jurisdiction based on personal service within a state.

Subsection (2) [subdivision (a)(2)] expresses the principle that a nonresident party concedes personal jurisdiction by seeking affirmative relief or by submitting to the jurisdiction by answering or entering an appearance. However, the power to assert jurisdiction over an issue involving child support under the act does not necessarily extend the tribunal’s jurisdiction to other matters. As noted above, family law is rife with instances of bifurcated jurisdiction. For example, a tribunal may have jurisdiction to establish a child-support order based on personal jurisdiction over the obligor under Section 201 [T.C.A. § 36-5-2201], but lack jurisdiction over child custody, which is a matter of status adjudication usually based on the home state of the child.

Subsections (3) through (6) [subdivisions (a)(3)-(6)] identify specific fact situations justifying the assertion of long-arm jurisdiction over a nonresident. Each provides an appropriate affiliating nexus for such an assertion, when judged on a case-by-case basis with an eye on procedural and substantive due process. Further, each subsection [subdivision] does contain a possibility that an overly literal construction of the terms of the statute will overreach due process. For example, subsection (3) [subdivision (a)(3)] provides that long-arm jurisdiction to establish a support order may be asserted if “the individual resided with the child in this state.” The typical scenario contemplated by the statute is that the parties lived as a family unit in the forum state, separated, and one of the parents subsequently moved to another state while the other parent and the child continued to reside in the forum. No time frame is stated for filing a proceeding; this is based on the fact that the absent parent has a support obligation that extends for at least the minority of the child (and longer in some states).

On the other hand, suppose that the two parents and their child lived in State A for many years and then decided to move the family to State B to seek better employment opportunities. Those opportunities did not materialize and, after several weeks or a few months of frustration with the situation, one of the parents returned with the child to State A. Under these facts, a tribunal of State A may conclude it has long-arm jurisdiction to establish the support obligation of the absent parent. But, suppose that the family’s sojourn in State B lasted for many years, and then one parent unilaterally decides to return to State A. It is reasonable to expect that a tribunal will conclude that assertion of personal jurisdiction over the absent parent immediately after the return based on subsection (3) [subdivision (a)(3)] would offend due process. Note the provisions of UIFSA are available to the returning parent to establish child support in State B, and that state will have long-arm jurisdiction to establish support binding on the moving parent under Section 201 [T.C.A. § 36-5-2201]. See  also Section 204 [T.C.A. § 36-5-2204] for the resolution of simultaneous proceedings provided by the act.

The factual situations catalogued in the first seven subsections are appropriate and constitutionally acceptable grounds upon which to exercise personal jurisdiction over an individual. Subsection (7) [subdivision (a)(7)] is bracketed because not all states maintain putative father registries.

Finally, subsection (8) [subdivision (a)(8)] tracks the broad, catch-all provisions found in many state statutes, including Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 410.10 (1973), and Tex. Family Code § 102.011. Note, however, that the California provision, standing alone, was found to be inadequate to sustain a child-support order under the facts presented in Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978).

Limit on Asserting Long-arm Jurisdiction to Modify Child-Support Order: Subsection (b) elaborates on the principle by providing that modification of an existing child-support order goes beyond the usual rules of personal jurisdiction over the parties. Amended in UIFSA (2001), subsection (b) makes clear long-arm personal jurisdiction over a respondent, standing alone, is not sufficient to grant subject matter jurisdiction to a responding tribunal of the state of residence of the petitioner for that tribunal to modify an existing child-support order. See  the extended commentaries to Sections 609 through 616 [T.C.A. §§ 36-5-260936-5-2616]. The limitations on modification of a child-support order provided by Section 611 [T.C.A. § 36-5-2611] must be observed irrespective of the existence of personal jurisdiction over the parties.

For tribunals of the United States, these sections integrate the concepts of personal jurisdiction and its progeny, continuing jurisdiction, and controlling orders. Note that the long-arm provisions of UIFSA (1992) were originally written with only domestic cases in mind. If the tribunal of a state has personal jurisdiction over an individual residing in another state (or, by implication, a foreign country), the application of local law is entitled to recognition and enforcement. See  Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act, a.k.a. FFCCSOA, 28 U.S.C. § 1738B. Integrating this federal law based on the Constitution with the statutory rule of subject matter jurisdiction for modification of an existing child-support order is a major accomplishment of UIFSA. Obviously, the federal act is applicable to a child-support order issued by a state tribunal, but is not applicable to a foreign support order. Nor does FFCCSOA in any way affect a foreign country, which will apply its local law of recognition, enforcement, and modification to a child-support order originating from a state of the United States. When the Convention enters into force, the integration of UIFSA and the law of some foreign countries will be international in scope. At that time the jurisdictional rules of all concerned become significantly more complex. See  Section 708 [T.CA. § 36-5-2708]. Nonetheless, it seems likely the complexity will be more theoretical than actually troublesome.

Applicability of Long-Arm Jurisdiction to Spousal Support: Although this long-arm statute applies to a spousal-support order, almost all of the specific provisions of this section relate to a child-support order or a determination of parentage. This derives from the fact that the focus of UIFSA is primarily on child support. Only subsections (1), (2), and (8) [subdivisions (a)(1), (2), and (8)] are applicable to an action for spousal support asserting long-arm jurisdiction over a nonresident. The first two subsections [subdivisions] are wholly noncontroversial insofar as an assertion of personal jurisdiction is concerned. Moreover, as a practical matter, an assertion of personal jurisdiction under UIFSA will almost always also yield jurisdiction over all matters to be decided between the spouses, including division of property on divorce. Thus, the most obvious possible basis for asserting long-arm jurisdiction over spousal support, i.e., “last matrimonial domicile,” is not included in Section 201 [T.C.A. § 36-5-2201] to avoid the potential problem of another instance of bifurcated jurisdiction. This restraint avoids a situation in which UIFSA would arguably grant long-arm jurisdiction for a spousal-support order when the forum state has no correlative statute for property division in divorce.

Potential Application of Long-arm Jurisdiction to Foreign Support Order: If the facts of a case warrant, whether in an interstate or an international context, a state tribunal shall apply long-arm jurisdiction to establish a support order without regard to the physical location or residence of a party outside the United States. Interestingly, under certain fact situations involving a request to recognize and enforce or modify a foreign support order, a state tribunal may be called upon to determine the applicability of long-arm jurisdiction under UIFSA to the facts of the case in order to decide the enforceability of the foreign support order.

For example, a challenge to a request for enforcement of a foreign support order may be made by a respondent based on an allegation that the foreign issuing tribunal lacked personal jurisdiction over the respondent. A respondent may acknowledge that the obligee or the child resides in France, and that a French tribunal issued a support order. But, in the Kulko  decision the Court accepted the respondent’s allegation that under the state law then available there was no nexus between himself and California and therefore no personal jurisdiction over him as required by the opinion. From the perspective of the French tribunal under the facts above, an asserted lack of personal jurisdiction is of no consequence. Under the law of France, like the law of virtually all other foreign nations, the child-based jurisdiction stemming from the residence of the obligee or child is sufficient to sustain a child-support order against the noncustodial parent. But, meshing the world-wide system of child-based jurisdiction with the U.S. requirement of in persona m jurisdiction presented an easily resolved challenge to the drafters of the new Hague Maintenance Convention.

Thus, under the Convention, a state tribunal may be called upon to determine whether the facts underlying the support order would have provided the issuing foreign tribunal with personal jurisdiction over the respondent under the standards of this section. In effect, the question is whether the foreign tribunal would have been able to exercise jurisdiction in accordance with Section 201 [T.C.A. § 36-5-2201]. The foregoing fact situation illustrates that it is for the state tribunal to determine if the order of the French tribunal would have complied with UIFSA Section 201 [T.C.A. § 36-5-2201] on the facts of the case. If so, the foreign support order is entitled to recognition and enforcement. For example, the facts of the case may show that the father lived with the child in France, supported the mother or child in France, or perhaps was responsible for, or agreed to the movement of the child to France.

On the other hand, if the issuing French tribunal would have lacked personal jurisdiction over the respondent if Section 201 [T.C.A. § 36-5-2201] had been applicable, the support order cannot be enforced because there was no nexus between France and the respondent. The United States will make a reservation to Convention article 20, declining to recognize or enforce a foreign support order on child-based jurisdiction founded solely on the location or residence of the obligee or the child in the foreign country.

Interestingly, if the responding state tribunal finds the French tribunal lacked personal jurisdiction over the respondent, additional action may be taken. In a Convention case, the responding state tribunal may establish a child-support order if it has personal jurisdiction over the respondent without requesting a separate application for establishment of a new order.

Related to Convention: art. 2. Scope; art. 19. Scope of the chapter; art. 20. Bases for recognition and enforcement; art. 32. Enforcement under internal law; art. 62. Reservations.

36-5-2202. Duration of personal jurisdiction.

Personal jurisdiction acquired by a tribunal of this state in a proceeding under parts 20-26 of this chapter or other law of this state relating to a support order continues as long as a tribunal of this state has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to modify its order or continuing jurisdiction to enforce its order as provided by §§ 36-5-2205, 36-5-2206 and 36-5-2211.

Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Part 20, § 36-5-2001 (Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 2), concerning the short title for title 36, ch. 5, parts 20-29, was repealed and reenacted by Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1, upon completion of the provisions in § 2 of the act. Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 2, as amended by Acts 2016, ch. 664, § 4, provided that: “This act shall take effect when the department of human services files a notice with the secretary of state who shall publish the notice in the Tennessee Administrative Register on the secretary of state's web site, citing the effective date, which shall occur no later than April 1, 2016, the public welfare requiring it.”

The date published by the secretary of state in the Tennessee Administrative Register was March 31, 2016.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

It is a useful legal truism after a tribunal of a state issues a support order binding on the parties, which must be based on personal jurisdiction by virtue of Kulko v. Superior Cour t, 436 U.S. 84 (1978) and Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt , 354 U.S. 416 (1957), jurisdiction in personam continues for the duration of the support obligation absent the statutorily specified reasons to terminate the order. The rule established by UIFSA is that the personal jurisdiction necessary to sustain enforcement or modification of an order of child support or spousal support persists as long as the order is in force and effect, even as to arrears, see  Sections 205-207, 211 [T.C.A. §§ 36-5-220536-5-2207, 36-5-2211], infra . This is true irrespective of the context in which the support order arose, e.g., divorce, UIFSA support establishment, parentage establishment, modification of prior controlling order, etc. Insofar as a child-support order is concerned, depending on specific factual circumstances a distinction is made between retaining continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to modify an order and having continuing jurisdiction to enforce an order, see  Sections 205 and 206  [T.C.A. §§ 36-5-2205 and 36-5-2206], infra . Authority to modify a spousal-support order is permanently reserved to the issuing tribunal, Section 211  [T.C.A. § 36-5-2211], infra .

36-5-2203. Initiating and responding tribunal of state.

Under parts 20-26 of this chapter, a tribunal of this state may serve as an initiating tribunal to forward proceedings to a tribunal of another state, and as a responding tribunal for proceedings initiated in another state or a foreign country.

Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Part 20, § 36-5-2001 (Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 2), concerning the short title for title 36, ch. 5, parts 20-29, was repealed and reenacted by Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1, upon completion of the provisions in § 2 of the act. Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 2, as amended by Acts 2016, ch. 664, § 4, provided that: “This act shall take effect when the department of human services files a notice with the secretary of state who shall publish the notice in the Tennessee Administrative Register on the secretary of state's web site, citing the effective date, which shall occur no later than April 1, 2016, the public welfare requiring it.”

The date published by the secretary of state in the Tennessee Administrative Register was March 31, 2016.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

This section identifies the two roles a tribunal of the forum may serve: acting as either an initiating or a responding tribunal. See  Sections 304 and 305 [T.C.A. §§ 36-5-2304 and 36-5-2305] for the duties and powers of the tribunal in each of these capacities. Under UIFSA, a tribunal may serve as a responding tribunal even when there is no initiating tribunal. This accommodates the direct filing of a proceeding in a responding tribunal by a nonresident of the forum, whether residing in a state or anywhere else in the world. Note, however, that the section does not deal with whether an initiating tribunal of a state may forward a proceeding to a tribunal in a foreign country, which may be left to the individual support enforcement agency.

Related to Convention: art. 2. Scope; art. 37. Direct requests to competent authorities.

36-5-2204. Simultaneous proceedings.

  1. A tribunal of this state may exercise jurisdiction to establish a support order if the petition or comparable pleading is filed after a pleading is filed in another state or a foreign country only if:
    1. The petition or comparable pleading in this state is filed before the expiration of the time allowed in the other state or the foreign country for filing a responsive pleading challenging the exercise of jurisdiction by the other state or the foreign country;
    2. The contesting party timely challenges the exercise of jurisdiction in the other state or the foreign country; and
    3. If relevant, this state is the home state of the child.
  2. A tribunal of this state may not exercise jurisdiction to establish a support order if the petition or comparable pleading is filed before a petition or comparable pleading is filed in another state or a foreign country if:
    1. The petition or comparable pleading in the other state or foreign country is filed before the expiration of the time allowed in this state for filing a responsive pleading challenging the exercise of jurisdiction by this state;
    2. The contesting party timely challenges the exercise of jurisdiction in this state; and
    3. If relevant, the other state or foreign country is the home state of the child.

Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Part 20, § 36-5-2001 (Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 2), concerning the short title for title 36, ch. 5, parts 20-29, was repealed and reenacted by Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1, upon completion of the provisions in § 2 of the act. Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 2, as amended by Acts 2016, ch. 664, § 4, provided that: “This act shall take effect when the department of human services files a notice with the secretary of state who shall publish the notice in the Tennessee Administrative Register on the secretary of state's web site, citing the effective date, which shall occur no later than April 1, 2016, the public welfare requiring it.”

The date published by the secretary of state in the Tennessee Administrative Register was March 31, 2016.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Under the one-order system established by UIFSA, it was necessary to provide a procedure to eliminate the multiple orders so common under RURESA and URESA. This requires cooperation between, and deference by, state tribunals in order to avoid issuance of competing support orders. To this end, tribunals are expected to take an active role in seeking out information about support proceedings in another state or foreign country concerning the same child. Depending on the circumstances, one of the two tribunals considering the same support obligation should decide to defer to the other. The inclusion of a foreign country in this investigation facilitates the goal of a “one-order world” for a support obligation.

UIFSA (1992) took a significant departure from the approach adopted by the UCCJA (1986) (“first filing”), by choosing the “home state of the child” as the primary factual basis for resolving competing jurisdictional disputes. Not coincidentally, this had previously been the choice for resolving jurisdiction conflicts of the federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, 28 U.S.C. Section 1738A (1980). Given the pre-emptive nature of the PKPA, and the possibility that custody and support will both be involved in some cases, the PKPA/UIFSA choice for resolving disputes between competing jurisdictional assertions was followed in 1997 by the decision of NCCUSL to replace the UCCJA with the UCCJEA. If the child has no home state, however, “first filing” will control.

36-5-2205. Continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to modify child support order.

  1. A tribunal of this state that has issued a child support order consistent with the law of this state has and shall exercise continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to modify its child support order if the order is the controlling order and:
    1. At the time of the filing of a request for modification this state is the residence of the obligor, the individual obligee, or the child for whose benefit the support order is issued; or
    2. Even if this state is not the residence of the obligor, the individual obligee, or the child for whose benefit the support order is issued, the parties consent in a record or in open court that the tribunal of this state may continue to exercise jurisdiction to modify its order.
  2. A tribunal of this state that has issued a child support order consistent with the law of this state may not exercise continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to modify the order if:
    1. All of the parties who are individuals file consent in a record with the tribunal of this state that a tribunal of another state that has jurisdiction over at least one of the parties who is an individual or that is located in the state of residence of the child may modify the order and assume continuing, exclusive jurisdiction; or
    2. Its order is not the controlling order.
  3. If a tribunal of another state has issued a child support order pursuant to the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act or a law substantially similar to that Act which modifies a child support order of a tribunal of this state, tribunals of this state shall recognize the continuing, exclusive jurisdiction of the tribunal of the other state.
  4. A tribunal of this state that lacks continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to modify a child support order may serve as an initiating tribunal to request a tribunal of another state to modify a support order issued in that state.
  5. A temporary support order issued ex parte or pending resolution of a jurisdictional conflict does not create continuing, exclusive jurisdiction in the issuing tribunal.

Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Part 20, § 36-5-2001 (Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 2), concerning the short title for title 36, ch. 5, parts 20-29, was repealed and reenacted by Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1, upon completion of the provisions in § 2 of the act. Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 2, as amended by Acts 2016, ch. 664, § 4, provided that: “This act shall take effect when the department of human services files a notice with the secretary of state who shall publish the notice in the Tennessee Administrative Register on the secretary of state's web site, citing the effective date, which shall occur no later than April 1, 2016, the public welfare requiring it.”

The date published by the secretary of state in the Tennessee Administrative Register was March 31, 2016.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Decisions Under Prior Law

1. Loss of Jurisdiction.

Pursuant to T.C.A. § 36-5-2205(a)(1), the District of Columbia, which is considered a state under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA, T.C.A. § 36-5-2001 et seq.), lost continuing exclusive jurisdiction when the father, mother and son were no longer residents of that state. Letellier v. Letellier, 40 S.W.3d 490, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 255, 90 A.L.R.5th 707 (Tenn. 2001).

Uniform Interstate Family Support Act did not apply to a father's motion to modify the duration of child support set out in a Hawaii divorce decree as, by the time the father filed his motion, the trial court had already entered an order enrolling the Hawaii decree, making the decree an order of the Tennessee court and resulting in the Hawaii court's loss of jurisdiction. Thus, the father's motion did not seek to modify an our-of-state support order. Johnston v. Harwell, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. App. LEXIS 464 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 16, 2013), appeal denied, Johnston v. Johnston, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 905 (Tenn. Nov. 18, 2013).

2. Continuing Jurisdiction.

Although a wife instituted divorce proceedings in Texas, a Tennessee court did not lack subject matter jurisdiction to extend a husband's child support obligation in an order of protection issued in Tennessee because the husband remained a resident of Tennessee, the Texas divorce court had not taken any action regarding child support, and, as such, there was no jurisdictional issue under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, T.C.A. § 36-5-2205(a). Ferrari-Bullock v. Randall, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 447 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 28, 2012).

Because the Tennessee court had issued the controlling child support order and the father remained a resident of Tennessee, the court retained jurisdiction to modify the support. Moritz v. Tulay, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. App. LEXIS 663 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 17, 2014).

Trial court erred in dismissing the mother's petition to modify child support because Tennessee retained continuing exclusive jurisdiction to modify support under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act; Tennessee issued the original child support order, the father, the obligor, continued to reside in Tennessee, and the father had not filed a written consent with the Tennessee court to confer jurisdiction on the Nevada court to modify the order. Blake v. Blake, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 178 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 30, 2015).

Trial court possessed subject matter jurisdiction to enforce its orders pursuant to the Tennessee Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, T.C.A. § 36-5-2001 et seq. The loss of continuing exclusive jurisdiction did not deprive the tribunal of the power to enforce arrearages that had accrued during the existence of a valid order. In re Justin H., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 414 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 29, 2015), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 863 (Tenn. Oct. 14, 2015).

3. Enforcement.

Trial court did not impermissibly modify an original child support order by changing only the intermediary designated to receive the adoptive parent's child support payment. Regardless of whether the Tennessee trial court maintained continuing exclusive jurisdiction to modify the child support order, it remained valid and enforceable. In re Justin H., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 414 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 29, 2015), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 863 (Tenn. Oct. 14, 2015).

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

This section is perhaps the most crucial provision in UIFSA. Consistent with the precedent of the federal PARENTAL KIDNAPPING PREVENTION ACT, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A, except in very narrowly defined circumstances the issuing tribunal retains continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over a child-support order, commonly known as CEJ. First introduced by UIFSA in 1992, this principle is in force and widely accepted in all states. Indeed CEJ is fundamental to the principle of one-child-support-order-at-a-time.

As long as one of the individual parties or the child continues to reside in the issuing state, and as long as the parties do not agree to the contrary, the issuing tribunal has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over its child-support order—which in practical terms means that it may modify its order. The statute takes an even-handed approach. The identity of the party remaining in the issuing state—obligor or obligee—does not matter. Indeed, if the individual parties have left the issuing state but the child remains behind, CEJ remains with the issuing tribunal. Even if the parties and the child no longer reside in the issuing state, the support order continues in existence and is fully enforceable unless and until a modification takes place in accordance with the requirements of Article 6 [part 6], infra . Note, however, that the CEJ of the issuing tribunal over a spousal-support order is permanent, see  Section 211 [T.C.A. § 36-5-2211], infra .

Subsection (a)(1) [subdivision (a)(1)] states the basic rule, and subsection (a)(2) [subdivision (a)(2)] states an exception to that rule. First, the time to measure whether the issuing tribunal has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to modify its order, or whether the parties and the child have left the state, is explicitly stated to be at the time of filing a proceeding to modify the child-support order. Second, the term in subsection (a)(1) [subdivision (a)(1)] “is the residence” makes clear that any interruption of residence of a party between the date of the issuance of the order and the date of filing the request for modification does not affect jurisdiction to modify. Thus, if there is but one order, it is the controlling order in effect and enforceable throughout the United States, notwithstanding the fact that everyone at one time had left the issuing state. If the order is not modified during this time of mutual absence, a return to reside in the issuing state by a party or child immediately identifies the proper forum at the time of filing a proceeding for modification. Although the statute does not speak explicitly to the issue, temporary absence should be treated in a similar fashion. Temporary employment in another state may not forfeit a claim of residence in the issuing state. Of course, residence is a fact question for the trial court, keeping in mind that the question is residence, not domicile.

From the beginning of the implementation of the CEJ principle, questions have been raised about why a tribunal may not modify its own order if the parties agree that it should do so even after the parties have left the state. The move of the parties and the child from the state may have been of a very short distance and, although the parties no longer reside in the issuing state, they may prefer to continue to have the child-support order be governed by the same issuing tribunal because they continue to have a strong affiliation with it. For example, the child-support order may have been issued by a tribunal of Washington, D.C. Subsequently the obligee and child have moved to Virginia, the obligor now resides in Maryland, and perhaps one or both parties continue to be employed in Washington. Subsection (a)(2) [subdivision (a)(2)] authorizes retention of CEJ by the issuing state when the parties reasonably may prefer to continue to deal with the issuing tribunal even though the state is “not the residence” of the parties or child as an exception to the general rules of CEJ for modifications of a support order.

The other side of the coin follows logically. Just as subsection (a) defines the retention of continuing, exclusive jurisdiction, by clear implication the subsection also identifies how jurisdiction to modify may be lost. That is, if all the relevant persons—the obligor, the individual obligee, and the child—have permanently left the issuing state, absent an agreement the issuing tribunal no longer has an appropriate nexus with the parties or child to justify the exercise of jurisdiction to modify its child-support order. Further, the issuing tribunal will have no current evidence readily available to it about the factual circumstances of anyone involved, and the taxpayers of that state will have no reason to expend public funds on the process. Note, however, that the original order of the issuing tribunal remains valid and enforceable. That order is in effect not only in the issuing state, but also in those states in which the order has been registered. The order also may be registered and enforced in additional states even after the issuing tribunal has lost its power to modify its order, see  Sections 601-604 [T.C.A. §§ 36-5-260136-5-2604], infra . In sum, the original order remains in effect until it is properly modified in accordance with the narrow terms of Sections 609-612 [T.C.A. §§ 36-5-260936-5-2612], infra .

Subsection (b)(1) [subdivision (b)(1)] explicitly provides that the parties may agree in a record that the issuing tribunal should relinquish its continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to modify so that a tribunal in another state may assume CEJ to modify the child-support order. It is believed that such consent seldom occurs because of the almost universal desire of each party to prefer his or her local tribunal. The principle that the parties should be allowed to agree upon an alternate forum if they so choose also extends to a situation in which all the parties and the child have left the issuing state and are in agreement that a tribunal of the state in which only the movant resides shall assume modification jurisdiction, see  Section 611 [T.C.A. § 36-5-2611].

Although subsections (a) and (b) identify the methods for the retention and the loss of continuing, exclusive jurisdiction by the issuing tribunal, this section does not confer jurisdiction to modify on another tribunal. Modification requires that a tribunal have personal jurisdiction over the parties and meet other criteria as provided in Sections 609 through 615 [T.C.A. §§ 36-5-260936-5-2615], infra .

Related to Convention: art. 18. Limit on proceedings.

36-5-2206. Continuing jurisdiction to enforce child support order.

  1. A tribunal of this state that has issued a child support order consistent with the law of this state may serve as an initiating tribunal to request a tribunal of another state to enforce:
    1. The order if the order is the controlling order and has not been modified by a tribunal of another state that assumed jurisdiction pursuant to the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act; or
    2. A money judgment for arrears of support and interest on the order accrued before a determination that an order of a tribunal of another state is the controlling order.
  2. A tribunal of this state having continuing jurisdiction over a support order may act as a responding tribunal to enforce the order.

Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Part 20, § 36-5-2001 (Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 2), concerning the short title for title 36, ch. 5, parts 20-29, was repealed and reenacted by Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1, upon completion of the provisions in § 2 of the act. Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 2, as amended by Acts 2016, ch. 664, § 4, provided that: “This act shall take effect when the department of human services files a notice with the secretary of state who shall publish the notice in the Tennessee Administrative Register on the secretary of state's web site, citing the effective date, which shall occur no later than April 1, 2016, the public welfare requiring it.”

The date published by the secretary of state in the Tennessee Administrative Register was March 31, 2016.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

This section is the correlative of the continuing, exclusive jurisdiction described in the preceding section. It makes the relatively subtle distinction between the CEJ “to modify a support order” established in Section 205 and the “continuing jurisdiction to enforce” established in this section. A keystone of UIFSA is that the power to enforce the order of the issuing tribunal is not “exclusive” with that tribunal. Rather, on request one or more responding tribunals may also exercise authority to enforce the order of the issuing tribunal. Secondly, under the one-order-at-a-time system, the validity and enforceability of the controlling order continues unabated until it is fully complied with, unless it is replaced by a modified order issued in accordance with the standards established by Sections 609-616 [T.C.A. §§ 36-5-260936-5-2616]. That is, even if the individual parties and the child no longer reside in the issuing state, the controlling order remains in effect and may be enforced by the issuing tribunal or any responding tribunal without regard to the fact that the potential for its modification and replacement exists.

Subsection (a) authorizes the issuing tribunal to initiate a request for enforcement of its order by a tribunal of another state if its order is controlling, see  Section 207 [T.C.A. § 36-5-2207], or to request reconciliation of the arrears and interest due on its order if another order is controlling.

Subsection (b) reiterates that the issuing tribunal has jurisdiction to serve as a responding tribunal to enforce its own order at the request of another tribunal.

Related to Convention: art. 19. Scope of the Chapter.

36-5-2207. Determination of controlling child support order.

  1. If a proceeding is brought under parts 20-29 of this chapter and only one (1) tribunal has issued a child support order, the order of that tribunal controls and must be recognized.
  2. If a proceeding is brought under parts 20-29 of this chapter and two (2) or more child support orders have been issued by tribunals of this state, another state, or a foreign country with regard to the same obligor and same child, a tribunal of this state having personal jurisdiction over both the obligor and individual obligee shall apply the following rules and by order shall determine which order controls and must be recognized:
    1. If only one (1) of the tribunals would have continuing, exclusive jurisdiction under parts 20-29 of this chapter, the order of that tribunal controls and must be so recognized;
    2. If more than one (1) of the tribunals would have continuing, exclusive jurisdiction under parts 20-29 of this chapter:
      1. An order issued by a tribunal in the current home state of the child controls; but
      2. If an order has not been issued in the current home state of the child, the order most recently issued controls.
    3. If none of the tribunals would have continuing, exclusive jurisdiction under parts 20-29 of this chapter, the tribunal of this state shall issue a child support order, which controls.
  3. If two (2) or more child support orders have been issued for the same obligor and same child, upon request of a party who is an individual or that is a support enforcement agency, a tribunal of this state having personal jurisdiction over both the obligor and the obligee who is an individual shall determine which order controls under subsection (b).  The request may be filed with a registration for enforcement or registration for modification pursuant to part 26, or may be filed as a separate proceeding.
  4. A request to determine which is the controlling order must be accompanied by a copy of every child support order in effect and the applicable record of payments.  The requesting party shall give notice of the request to each party whose rights may be affected by the determination.
  5. The tribunal that issued the controlling order under subsection (a), (b), or (c) has continuing jurisdiction to the extent provided in § 36-5-2205 or § 36-5-2206.
  6. A tribunal of this state that determines by order which is the controlling order under subdivision (b)(1) or (b)(2) or subsection (c), or that issues a new controlling order under subdivision (b)(3), shall state in that order:
    1. The basis upon which the tribunal made its determination;
    2. The amount of prospective support, if any; and
    3. The total amount of consolidated arrears and accrued interest, if any, under all of the orders after all payments made are credited as provided by § 36-5-2209.
  7. Within thirty (30) days after issuance of an order determining which is the controlling order, the party obtaining the order shall file a certified copy of it in each tribunal that issued or registered an earlier order of child support.  A party or support enforcement agency obtaining the order that fails to file a certified copy is subject to appropriate sanctions by a tribunal in which the issue of failure to file arises.  The failure to file does not affect the validity or enforceability of the controlling order.
  8. An order that has been determined to be the controlling order, or a judgment for consolidated arrears of support and interest, if any, made pursuant to this section must be recognized in proceedings under parts 20-29 of this chapter.

Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Part 20, § 36-5-2001 (Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 2), concerning the short title for title 36, ch. 5, parts 20-29, was repealed and reenacted by Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1, upon completion of the provisions in § 2 of the act. Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 2, as amended by Acts 2016, ch. 664, § 4, provided that: “This act shall take effect when the department of human services files a notice with the secretary of state who shall publish the notice in the Tennessee Administrative Register on the secretary of state's web site, citing the effective date, which shall occur no later than April 1, 2016, the public welfare requiring it.”

The date published by the secretary of state in the Tennessee Administrative Register was March 31, 2016.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

In addition to the introduction of the concepts of one-order and continuing, exclusive jurisdiction in Section 205, another dramatic founding principle of UIFSA was to establish a system whereby the multiple orders created by URESA and RURESA could be reconciled in the transition from a world with multiple child-support orders to a one-order-at-a-time world. This principle introduced by Section 207 [T.C.A. § 36-5-2207] was subsequently incorporated into the requirements of 28 USC 1738B, Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders, a.k.a. FFCCSOA.

The combination of FFCCSOA becoming effective on October 20, 1994 and the adoption of UIFSA (1996) being mandated for all states by January 1, 1998, has made this section almost never used. The existence of multiple, valid orders for ongoing support have all but disappeared.

Sections 209-210 [T.C.A. §§ 36-5-2209 and 36-5-2210], and especially Section 207 [T.C.A. § 36-5-2207], are designed to span the gulf between the one-order system created by UIFSA and the multiple-order system previously in place under RURESA and URESA. These transitional procedures necessarily must provide for the eventual elimination of existing multiple support orders in an expeditious and efficient manner. Although FFCCSOA was effective October 20, 1994 and all U.S. jurisdictions enacted UIFSA by 1998, considerable time is required to pass before its one-order system could be completely in place. For example, multiple 21-year child-support orders issued for an infant in 1996 and 1997 would, by their terms, not end the conflict until the first expires 2017—absent resolution of the conflict by a tribunal under this section. Nonetheless, at least on the appellate level, the problem of multiple orders is fast disappearing. This section provides a relatively simple procedure to identify a single viable order that will be entitled to prospective enforcement in every state.

Subsection (a) declares that if only one child-support order exists, it is to be denominated the controlling order, irrespective of when and where it was issued and whether any of the individual parties or the child continue to reside in the issuing state.

Subsection (b) establishes the priority scheme for recognition and prospective enforcement of a single order among existing multiple orders regarding the same obligor, obligee, and child. A tribunal requested to sort out the multiple orders and determine which one will be prospectively controlling of future payments must have personal jurisdiction over the litigants in order to ensure that its decision is binding on all concerned. For UIFSA to function, one order must be denominated as the controlling order, and its issuing tribunal must be recognized as having continuing, exclusive jurisdiction. In choosing among existing multiple orders, none of which can be distinguished as being in conflict with the principles of UIFSA, subsection (b)(1) [subdivision (b)(1)] gives first priority to an order issued by the only tribunal that is entitled to continuing, exclusive jurisdiction under the terms of UIFSA, i.e., an individual party or the child continues to reside in that state and no other state meets this criterion. If two or more tribunals would have continuing, exclusive jurisdiction under the act, subsection (b)(2) [subdivision (b)(2)] first looks to the tribunal of the child's current home state. If that tribunal has not issued a support order, subsection (b)(2) [subdivision (b)(2)] looks next to the order most recently issued. Finally, subsection (b)(3) [subdivision (b)(3)] provides that if none of the existing multiple orders are entitled to be denominated as the controlling order because none of the preceding priorities apply, the forum tribunal is directed to issue a new order, given that it has personal jurisdiction over the obligor and obligee. The new order becomes the controlling order, establishes the continuing, exclusive jurisdiction of the tribunal, and fixes the support obligation and its nonmodifiable aspects, primarily duration of support, see  Sections 604 and 611(c) [T.C.A. §§ 36-5-2604 and 36-5-2611(c)], infra . The rationale for creating a new order to replace existing multiple orders is that there is no valid reason to prefer the terms of any one of the multiple orders over another in the absence of a fact situation described in subsections (b)(1) or (b)(2) [subdivisions (b)(1) or (b)(2)].

As originally promulgated, UIFSA did not come to grips with whether existing multiple orders issued by different states might be entitled to full faith and credit without regard to the determination of the controlling order under the act. The drafters took the position that state law, however uniform, could not interfere with the ultimate interpretation of a constitutional directive. Fortunately, this question has almost certainly been mooted by the 1996 amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1738B, Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders. Congress incorporated the multiple order recognition provisions of Section 207 of UIFSA into FFCCSOA virtually word for word in the PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND WORK OPPORTUNITY RECONCILIATION ACT OF 1996. Pub. L. 104-193, Aug. 22, 1996, 110 Stat. 2221.

It is not altogether clear whether the terms of UIFSA apply to a strictly intrastate case; that is, a situation in which multiple child-support orders have been issued by multiple tribunals of a single state and the parties and the child continue to reside in that state. This is not an uncommon situation, often traceable to the intrastate applicability of RURESA. A literal reading of the statutory language suggests the section applies. Further, FFCCSOA does not make a distinction regarding the tribunals that issued multiple orders. If multiple orders have been issued by different tribunals in the home state of the child, most likely the most recent will be recognized as the controlling order, notwithstanding the fact that UIFSA Section 207 (b)(2)(B) [T.C.A. § 36-5-2207(b)(2)(B)], and FFCCSOA 42 U.S.C. § 1738B(f)(3), literally do not apply. At the very least, this section, together with FFCCSOA, provide a template for resolving such conflicts.

Subsection (c) clarifies that any party or a support enforcement agency may request a tribunal of the forum state to identify the controlling order. That party is directed to fully inform the tribunal of all existing child-support orders.

Subsection (d) seeks to assure the tribunal is furnished with all the information needed to make a proper determination of the controlling order, as well as the information needed to make a calculation of the consolidated arrears. The party or support enforcement agency requesting the determination of controlling order and determination of consolidated arrears is also required to notify all other parties and entities who may have an interest in either of those determinations. Those with such an interest most likely are support agencies and the obligee.

Subsection (e) provides that the determination of the controlling order under this section has the effect of establishing the tribunal with continuing, exclusive jurisdiction; only the order of that tribunal is entitled to prospective enforcement by a sister state.

Subsection (f) directs the forum tribunal to identify the details upon which it makes its determination of the controlling order. In addition, the tribunal is also directed to state specifically the amount of the prospective support, and to reconcile and consolidate the arrears and interest due on all of the multiple orders to the extent possible.

The party obtaining the determination is directed by subsection (g) to notify all interested tribunals of the decision after the fact. Although tribunals need not be given original notice of the proceeding, all tribunals that have contributed an order to the determination must be informed regarding which order was determined to be controlling, and should also be informed of the consolidated arrears and interest so that the extent of possible subsequent enforcement will be known with regard to each of the orders. The act does not deal with the resolution of potential conflicting claims regarding arrears; this is left to case-by-case decisions or to federal regulation.

Section 207 [T.C.A. § 36-5-2207] presumes that the parties are accorded notice and opportunity to be heard by the tribunal. It also presumes that the tribunal will be fully informed about all existing orders when it is requested to determine which one of the existing multiple child-support orders is to be accorded prospective enforcement. If this does not occur and one or more existing orders is not considered by the tribunal, the finality of its decision is likely to turn on principles of estoppel on a case-by-case basis.

Finally, subsection (h), affirms the concept that when a fully informed tribunal makes a determination of the controlling order for prospective enforcement, or renders a judgment for the amount of the consolidated arrears, the decision is entitled to full faith and credit.

36-5-2208. Child support orders for two or more obligees.

In responding to registrations or petitions for enforcement of two (2) or more child support orders in effect at the same time with regard to the same obligor and different individual obligees, at least one (1) of which was issued by a tribunal of another state or a foreign country, a tribunal of this state shall enforce those orders in the same manner as if the orders had been issued by a tribunal of this state.

Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Part 20, § 36-5-2001 (Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 2), concerning the short title for title 36, ch. 5, parts 20-29, was repealed and reenacted by Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1, upon completion of the provisions in § 2 of the act. Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 2, as amended by Acts 2016, ch. 664, § 4, provided that: “This act shall take effect when the department of human services files a notice with the secretary of state who shall publish the notice in the Tennessee Administrative Register on the secretary of state's web site, citing the effective date, which shall occur no later than April 1, 2016, the public welfare requiring it.”

The date published by the secretary of state in the Tennessee Administrative Register was March 31, 2016.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

This section is concerned with those multiple orders that involve two or more families of the same obligor. Although all such orders are entitled to enforcement, practical difficulties frequently exist. For example, full enforcement of each of the multiple orders may exceed the maximum allowed for income withholding. The federal statute, 42 U.S.C. § 666(b)(1), requires that to be eligible for the federal funding for enforcement, states must provide a ceiling for child-support withholding expressed in a percentage that may not exceed the federal law limitations on wage garnishment, Consumer Credit Protection Act of 1968, 15 U.S.C. § 1673(b). In order to allocate resources between competing families, UIFSA refers to state law. The basic principle is that one or more support orders for an out-of-state family of the obligor, and one or more orders for an in-state family, are of equal dignity. In allocating payments to different obligees, every child-support order should be treated as if it had been issued by a tribunal of the forum state, that is, preferential treatment for a local family over an out-of-state family is prohibited by local law. The addition of a foreign support order to the formula supplied by this section should assure that all children will have equal ability to obtain their share of child support.

36-5-2209. Credit for payments.

A tribunal of this state shall credit amounts collected for a particular period pursuant to any child support order against the amounts owed for the same period under any other child support order for support of the same child issued by a tribunal of this state, or another state, or a foreign country.

Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Part 20, § 36-5-2001 (Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 2), concerning the short title for title 36, ch. 5, parts 20-29, was repealed and reenacted by Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1, upon completion of the provisions in § 2 of the act. Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 2, as amended by Acts 2016, ch. 664, § 4, provided that: “This act shall take effect when the department of human services files a notice with the secretary of state who shall publish the notice in the Tennessee Administrative Register on the secretary of state's web site, citing the effective date, which shall occur no later than April 1, 2016, the public welfare requiring it.”

The date published by the secretary of state in the Tennessee Administrative Register was March 31, 2016.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

The issuing tribunal is ultimately responsible for the overall control of the enforcement methods employed and for accounting for the payments made on its order from multiple sources. Until that scheme is fully in place, however, it will be necessary to continue to mandate pro tanto credit for actual payments made against all existing orders. The addition to include a foreign support order in the calculation should assure all payments of support are properly credited. This section does not attempt to impact the way support paid in an individual case is apportioned or distributed between the obligee and one or more states asserting a claim to the monies.

36-5-2210. Application of parts 20-29 of this chapter to nonresident subject to personal jurisdiction.

A tribunal of this state exercising personal jurisdiction over a nonresident in a proceeding under parts 20-29 of this chapter, under other law of this state relating to a support order, or recognizing a foreign support order may receive evidence from outside this state pursuant to § 36-5-2316, communicate with a tribunal outside this state pursuant to § 36-5-2317, and obtain discovery through a tribunal outside this state pursuant to § 36-5-2318.  In all other respects, parts 23-26 do not apply, and the tribunal shall apply the procedural and substantive law of this state.

Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Part 20, § 36-5-2001 (Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 2), concerning the short title for title 36, ch. 5, parts 20-29, was repealed and reenacted by Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1, upon completion of the provisions in § 2 of the act. Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 2, as amended by Acts 2016, ch. 664, § 4, provided that: “This act shall take effect when the department of human services files a notice with the secretary of state who shall publish the notice in the Tennessee Administrative Register on the secretary of state's web site, citing the effective date, which shall occur no later than April 1, 2016, the public welfare requiring it.”

The date published by the secretary of state in the Tennessee Administrative Register was March 31, 2016.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Assertion of long-arm jurisdiction over a nonresident results in a one-state proceeding without regard to the fact that one of the parties resides in a different state or in a foreign country. On obtaining personal jurisdiction the tribunal must apply the law of the forum. Once personal jurisdiction has been asserted over a nonresident, the issuing tribunal retains continuing, exclusive jurisdiction (CEJ) to modify, and continuing jurisdiction to enforce a support order in accordance with the provisions of the act. Of course, it is far more common for a support order to be issued in conjunction with a divorce or determination of parentage in which both the obligor and obligee are residents of the forum than to be issued as a result of an assertion of long-arm jurisdiction. Note that either the petitioner or the respondent may be the nonresident party (either of whom may be the obligor or the obligee). Also note that absent this provision, the ordinary intrastate substantive and procedural law of the forum would apply to either fact situation without reference to the fact that one of the parties is a nonresident. Thus, CEJ applies whether the matter at hand involves establishment of an original support order or enforcement or modification of an existing order. In any event, if one of the parties resides outside the forum state, the nonresident may avail himself or herself of the special evidentiary and discovery provisions provided by UIFSA.

This section makes clear that the special rules of evidence and procedure identified in Sections 316, 317, and 318 [T.C.A. §§ 36-5-2316, 36-5-2317, and 36-5-2318] are applicable in a case involving a nonresident of the forum state. Section 316 [T.C.A. § 36-5-2316] facilitates decision-making when a party or a child resides “outside this state” by providing special rules to recognize the impediments to presenting evidence caused by nonresident status. Note the terminology has the broadest possible application, i.e., worldwide. The improved interstate and international exchange of information enables the nonresident to participate as fully as possible in the proceedings without the necessity of personally appearing in the forum state. The same considerations account for authorizing interstate and international communications between tribunals as per Section 317 [T.C.A. § 36-5-2317]. Finally, the discovery procedures of Section 318 [T.C.A. § 36-5-2318] are made applicable in a one-state proceeding when another tribunal may assist in that process. Of course, “may assist” is entirely at the discretion of the other tribunal. Note, a foreign tribunal may be completely unfamiliar with discovery procedures as known in the United States.

Generally, however, the ordinary substantive and procedural law of the forum state applies in a one-state proceeding. In sum, the parties and the tribunal in a one-state case may utilize those procedures that contribute to economy, efficiency, and fair play.

Related to Convention: art. 20. Bases for recognition and enforcement.

36-5-2211. Continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to modify spousal support order.

  1. A tribunal of this state issuing a spousal support order consistent with the law of this state has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to modify the spousal support order throughout the existence of the support obligation.
  2. A tribunal of this state may not modify a spousal support order issued by a tribunal of another state or a foreign country having continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over that order under the law of that state or foreign country.
  3. A tribunal of this state that has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over a spousal support order may serve as:
    1. An initiating tribunal to request a tribunal of another state to enforce the spousal support order issued in this state; or
    2. A responding tribunal to enforce or modify its own spousal support order.

Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Part 20, § 36-5-2001 (Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 2), concerning the short title for title 36, ch. 5, parts 20-29, was repealed and reenacted by Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1, upon completion of the provisions in § 2 of the act. Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 2, as amended by Acts 2016, ch. 664, § 4, provided that: “This act shall take effect when the department of human services files a notice with the secretary of state who shall publish the notice in the Tennessee Administrative Register on the secretary of state's web site, citing the effective date, which shall occur no later than April 1, 2016, the public welfare requiring it.”

The date published by the secretary of state in the Tennessee Administrative Register was March 31, 2016.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

The amendment to subsection (b) ensures that the restriction on modification of an out-of-state spousal-support order extends to a foreign order. At the same time, subsection (b) provides that the question of continuing, exclusive jurisdiction be resolved under the law of the issuing tribunal. Thus, if a foreign spousal- support order were subject to modification in another country by the law of the issuing tribunal, this section would permit modification in a tribunal of this state.

Related to Convention: art. 2. Scope.

Part 23
Uniform Interstate Family Support Act — Civil Provisions of General Application

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

This article [part] adds a wide variety of procedural provisions to existing statutory and procedural rules for civil cases. If there is a conflict between those provisions found for other litigation and UIFSA rules set forth in this article, obviously UIFSA rules prevail. For example, it is unlikely that a state will have a provision for testimony by telephone or audiovisual means in a final hearing. Section 316 of this act [T.C.A. § 36-5-2316] creates such a right for an out-of-state individual. Revisions in this article [part] shift the perspective slightly to accommodate the inclusion of a foreign support order in the equation. Many, but not all, of the provisions in this article [part] are based upon the fact that a party does not “reside in this state.” Application of these provisions is not solely based on whether the absent party resides in “another state,” as formerly was the case. Rather, three distinct formulations are employed depending on the intended application of the provisions: “residing in a state;” “residing in … a foreign country;” or “residing outside this state.” The third alternative is intentionally the broadest because it includes persons residing anywhere and is not limited to persons residing in a “foreign country” as defined in Section 102 [T.C.A. § 36-5-2101].

36-5-2301. Proceedings under parts 20-29 of this chapter.

  1. Except as otherwise provided in parts 20-29 of this chapter, this part applies to all proceedings under parts 20-29 of this chapter.
  2. An individual petitioner or a support enforcement agency may initiate a proceeding authorized under parts 20-29 of this chapter by filing a petition in an initiating tribunal for forwarding to a responding tribunal or by filing a petition or a comparable pleading directly in a tribunal of another state or a foreign country which has or can obtain personal jurisdiction over the respondent.

Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Part 20, § 36-5-2001 (Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 2), concerning the short title for title 36, ch. 5, parts 20-29, was repealed and reenacted by Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1, upon completion of the provisions in § 2 of the act. Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 2, as amended by Acts 2016, ch. 664, § 4, provided that: “This act shall take effect when the department of human services files a notice with the secretary of state who shall publish the notice in the Tennessee Administrative Register on the secretary of state's web site, citing the effective date, which shall occur no later than April 1, 2016, the public welfare requiring it.”

The date published by the secretary of state in the Tennessee Administrative Register was March 31, 2016.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Decisions Under Prior Law

1. Illustrative Cases.

Where chancery court enforced parts of the Kansas court's divorce decree by reducing the husband's share of the parties' Tennessee marital property by the amounts of the child support arrearage and discovery-related sanction assessed by the Kansas court, that enforcement violated the registration and notice provisions of the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act's (UIFSA), specifically T.C.A. § 36-5-2601 to T.C.A.§ 36-5-2607, because the Kansas court's decree was never registered in Tennessee and the husband was never provided notice of the registration or an opportunity to contest the validity and enforcement of the decree. Jolly v. Jolly, 130 S.W.3d 783, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 251 (Tenn. 2004), rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 332 (Tenn. 2004), review or rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 591 (Tenn. 2005).

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Subsection (a) mandates application of the general provisions of this article [part] to all UIFSA proceedings, including those affecting a foreign support order.

The statement in subsection (b) is axiomatic that the tribunal in which a petition is filed for establishment or enforcement of a support order, or for modification of a child-support order, must be able to assert personal jurisdiction over the respondent. It is also axiomatic that an individual petitioner requesting affirmative relief under this act submits to the personal jurisdiction of the tribunal. Subsection (b) also continues reference to the basic two-state procedure long employed by the former reciprocal acts to establish a support order in the interstate context, but expands it to recognize foreign countries. Direct filing of a petition in a state tribunal by an individual or a support enforcement agency without reference to an initiating tribunal in another state was introduced by UIFSA (1992). UIFSA (2008) extends the direct filing capability to foreign countries as well.

Although the filing of a petition in an initiating tribunal to be forwarded to a responding tribunal is still recognized as an available procedure, the direct filing procedure has proven to be one of the most significant improvements in efficient interstate case management. The promulgation and use of the federally mandated, or substantially conforming, forms, Section 311(b) [T.C.A. § 36-5-2311(b)], further serves to eliminate any role for the initiating tribunal. Incidentally, the Convention contains approved forms for use in Convention cases processed through a Central Authority.

Related to Convention: art. 2. Scope; art. 10. Available applications; art. 19. Scope of the chapter; art. 20. Bases for recognition and enforcement; art. 32. Enforcement under internal law; art. 33. Non-discrimination; art. 34. Enforcement measures; art.37. Direct requests to competent authorities; Annex 1. Transmittal form under Article 12(2); Annex 2. Acknowledgement form under Article 12(3).

36-5-2302. Proceeding by minor parent.

A minor parent, or a guardian or other legal representative of a minor parent, may maintain a proceeding on behalf of or for the benefit of the minor’s child.

Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Part 20, § 36-5-2001 (Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 2), concerning the short title for title 36, ch. 5, parts 20-29, was repealed and reenacted by Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1, upon completion of the provisions in § 2 of the act. Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 2, as amended by Acts 2016, ch. 664, § 4, provided that: “This act shall take effect when the department of human services files a notice with the secretary of state who shall publish the notice in the Tennessee Administrative Register on the secretary of state's web site, citing the effective date, which shall occur no later than April 1, 2016, the public welfare requiring it.”

The date published by the secretary of state in the Tennessee Administrative Register was March 31, 2016.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

A minor parent may maintain a proceeding under UIFSA without the appointment of a guardian ad litem, even if the law of the forum jurisdiction requires a guardian for an in-state case. If a guardian or legal representative has been appointed, he or she may act on behalf of the minor's child in seeking support.

36-5-2303. Application of law of state.

Except as otherwise provided in parts 20-29 of this chapter, a responding tribunal of this state shall:

  1. Apply the procedural and substantive law generally applicable to similar proceedings originating in this state and may exercise all powers and provide all remedies available in those proceedings; and
  2. Determine the duty of support and the amount payable in accordance with the law and support guidelines of this state.

Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Part 20, § 36-5-2001 (Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 2), concerning the short title for title 36, ch. 5, parts 20-29, was repealed and reenacted by Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1, upon completion of the provisions in § 2 of the act. Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 2, as amended by Acts 2016, ch. 664, § 4, provided that: “This act shall take effect when the department of human services files a notice with the secretary of state who shall publish the notice in the Tennessee Administrative Register on the secretary of state's web site, citing the effective date, which shall occur no later than April 1, 2016, the public welfare requiring it.”

The date published by the secretary of state in the Tennessee Administrative Register was March 31, 2016.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Historically states have insisted that forum law be applied to support cases whenever possible. This continues to be a key principle of UIFSA. In general, a responding tribunal has the same powers in a proceeding involving parties in a case with interstate or international effect as it has in an intrastate case. This inevitably means that the act is not self-contained; rather, it is supplemented by the forum’s statutes and procedures governing support orders. To insure the efficient processing of the huge number of interstate support cases, it is vital that decision makers apply familiar rules of law to the maximum degree possible. This must be accomplished in a manner consistent with the overriding principle of UIFSA that enforcement is of the issuing tribunal’s order, and that the responding state does not make the order its own as a condition of enforcing it.

36-5-2304. Duties of initiating tribunal.

  1. Upon the filing of a petition authorized by parts 20-29 of this chapter an initiating tribunal of this state shall forward the petition and its accompanying documents:
    1. To the responding tribunal or appropriate support enforcement agency in the responding state; or
    2. If the identity of the responding tribunal is unknown, to the state information agency of the responding state with a request that they be forwarded to the appropriate tribunal and that receipt be acknowledged.
  2. If requested by the responding tribunal, a tribunal of this state shall issue a certificate or other document and make findings required by the law of the responding state.  If the responding tribunal is in a foreign country, upon request the tribunal of this state shall specify the amount of support sought, convert that amount into the equivalent amount in the foreign currency under applicable official or market exchange rate as publicly reported, and provide any other documents necessary to satisfy the requirements of the responding foreign tribunal.

Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Part 20, § 36-5-2001 (Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 2), concerning the short title for title 36, ch. 5, parts 20-29, was repealed and reenacted by Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1, upon completion of the provisions in § 2 of the act. Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 2, as amended by Acts 2016, ch. 664, § 4, provided that: “This act shall take effect when the department of human services files a notice with the secretary of state who shall publish the notice in the Tennessee Administrative Register on the secretary of state's web site, citing the effective date, which shall occur no later than April 1, 2016, the public welfare requiring it.”

The date published by the secretary of state in the Tennessee Administrative Register was March 31, 2016.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Subsection (a) was designed primarily to facilitate interstate enforcement between UIFSA states and URESA and RURESA states, with some applicability to cases involving foreign jurisdictions. Since 1998, by which time UIFSA had been enacted nationwide, the procedure described has gradually become an anachronism. Note, however, that the last RURESA child-support order may not expire until 2017 or 2018. See  Prefatory Note.

Subsection (b), however, retains its utility with regard to a support order of a foreign nation. Supplying documentation required by a foreign jurisdiction, which is not otherwise required by UIFSA procedure, is appropriate in the international context. For example, a venerable process in British Commonwealth countries is known as provisional and confirming orders. A “provisional order” is a statement of the nonbinding amount of support being requested by a Canadian tribunal for establishment of a support order by a state responding tribunal. A state responding tribunal will receive information about the amount of support provisionally calculated by a tribunal in Canada. It needs to be borne in mind that a request to establish support from a Canadian tribunal will be accomplished in accordance with the law of the responding state. Thus, the Canadian provisional order is informative, but not binding on the responding tribunal. An order issued by the responding tribunal, whether for the amount suggested in the provisional order or another amount based on the local law of the responding tribunal, is known as a confirming order. Similarly, the initiating state’s tribunal, knowing that a provisional order will be required by the Canadian tribunal, is directed to cooperate and provide a statement of the amount of support being provisionally requested.

The initiating tribunal of this state also has a duty to identify the amount of foreign currency equivalent to its request to the Canadian tribunal and a corresponding duty for a responding tribunal to convert the foreign currency into dollars if the foreign initiating tribunal has not done so, Section 305(f) [T.C.A. § 36-5-2305(f)]. The reference to “the applicable official or market exchange rate” takes into account the present practices of international money markets. A few countries continue to maintain an official exchange rate for their currency. The vast majority of countries recognize the fact that the value of their currency is subject to daily market fluctuations that are reported on the financial pages of many daily newspapers. Thus, in the example described above, a request for a specific amount of support in U.S. dollars, which is to be translated into Canadian dollars on a specific date, will inevitably have a variable value as the foreign currency rises or falls against the U.S. dollar.

Related to Convention: art. 31. Decisions produced by the combined effect of provisional and confirmation orders.

36-5-2305. Duties and powers of responding tribunal.

  1. When a responding tribunal of this state receives a petition or comparable pleading from an initiating tribunal or directly pursuant to § 36-5-2301(b), it shall cause the petition or pleading to be filed and notify the petitioner where and when it was filed.
  2. A responding tribunal of this state, to the extent not prohibited by other law, may do one (1) or more of the following:
    1. Establish or enforce a support order, modify a child support order, determine the controlling child support order, or determine parentage of a child;
    2. Order an obligor to comply with a support order, specifying the amount and the manner of compliance;
    3. Order income withholding;
    4. Determine the amount of any arrearages, and specify a method of payment;
    5. Enforce orders by civil or criminal contempt, or both;
    6. Set aside property for satisfaction of the support order;
    7. Place liens and order execution on the obligor’s property;
    8. Order an obligor to keep the tribunal informed of the obligor’s current residential address, electronic-mail address, telephone number, employer, address of employment, and telephone number at the place of employment;
    9. Issue an attachment pro corpus or capias for an obligor who has failed after proper notice to appear at a hearing ordered by the tribunal and enter the attachment pro corpus in any local and state computer systems for criminal warrants;
    10. Order the obligor to seek appropriate employment by specified methods;
    11. Award reasonable attorney’s fees and other fees and costs; and
    12. Grant any other available remedy.
  3. A responding tribunal of this state shall include in a support order issued under parts 20-29 of this chapter or in the documents accompanying the order, the calculations on which the support order is based.
  4. A responding tribunal of this state may not condition the payment of a support order issued under parts 20-29 of this chapter upon compliance by a party with provisions for visitation.
  5. If a responding tribunal of this state issues an order under parts 20-29 of this chapter, the tribunal shall send a copy of the order to the petitioner and the respondent and to the initiating tribunal, if any.
  6. If requested to enforce a support order, arrears, or judgment or modify a support order stated in a foreign currency, a responding tribunal of this state shall convert the amount stated in the foreign currency to the equivalent amount in dollars under the applicable official or market exchange rate as publicly reported.

Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Part 20, § 36-5-2001 (Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 2), concerning the short title for title 36, ch. 5, parts 20-29, was repealed and reenacted by Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1, upon completion of the provisions in § 2 of the act. Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 2, as amended by Acts 2016, ch. 664, § 4, provided that: “This act shall take effect when the department of human services files a notice with the secretary of state who shall publish the notice in the Tennessee Administrative Register on the secretary of state's web site, citing the effective date, which shall occur no later than April 1, 2016, the public welfare requiring it.”

The date published by the secretary of state in the Tennessee Administrative Register was March 31, 2016.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

This section establishes a wide variety of duties for a responding tribunal. It contains: ministerial functions, subsection (a); judicial functions, subsection (b); and, substantive rules applicable to interstate cases, subsections (c)-(e). Because a responding tribunal may be an administrative agency rather than a court, the act explicitly states that a tribunal is not granted powers that it does not otherwise possess under state law. For example, authority to enforce a support order by contempt generally is limited to courts.

Subsection (a) directs the filing of the documents received without regard to whether an initiating tribunal in another state was involved in forwarding the documentation. It also directs that the individual or entity requesting the filing be notified, but leaves the means of that notification to local law. The advent of a variety of swifter, and perhaps even more reliable, forms of notice in the modern era justifies the deletion of a particular form of notice. For example, many states now authorize notice by telephone facsimile (FAX), or by an express delivery service, and many legal documents are transmitted by electronic mail (email).

Subsection (b) lists duties that, if possessed under state law in connection with intrastate cases, are extended to the responding tribunal in UIFSA cases. Thus, each subdivision purposefully avoids mention of substantive rules. For example, subsection (b)(7) [subdivision (b)(7)] does not identify the type, nature, or priority of liens that may be issued under UIFSA. As is generally true under the act, those details will be determined by applicable state law concerning support enforcement remedies of local orders.

Subsection (c) clarifies that the details of calculating the child-support order are to be included along with the order. Local law generally requires that variation from the child support guidelines must be explained, see  42 U.S.C. § 667; this requirement is extended to interstate cases.

Subsection (d) states that an interstate support order may not be conditioned on compliance with a visitation order. While this may be at variance with state law governing intrastate cases, under a UIFSA proceeding the petitioner generally is not present before the tribunal. This distinction justifies prohibiting visitation issues from being litigated in the context of a support proceeding. All states have enacted some version of either the UCCJA or the UCCJEA providing for resolution of visitation issues in interstate cases.

Subsection (e) introduces the policy determination that the petitioner, the respondent, and the initiating tribunal, if any, shall be kept informed about actions taken by the responding tribunal.

Subsection (f) is designed to facilitate enforcement of a foreign support order. Note that the language directing a conversion to a monetary equivalence in dollars is intended to make clear the equivalence is not a modification of the original order to an absolute dollar figure; rather, satisfaction of the obligation is to be determined by the order-issuing tribunal based on the present dollar value of the currency in which the order is denominated.

Related to Convention: art. 19. Scope of the Chapter; art. 34. Enforcement measures; art. 35. Transfer of funds; art. 43. Recovery of costs.

36-5-2306. Inappropriate tribunal.

If a petition or comparable pleading is received by an inappropriate tribunal of this state, the tribunal shall forward the pleading and accompanying documents to an appropriate tribunal of this state or another state and notify the petitioner where and when the pleading was sent.

Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Part 20, § 36-5-2001 (Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 2), concerning the short title for title 36, ch. 5, parts 20-29, was repealed and reenacted by Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1, upon completion of the provisions in § 2 of the act. Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 2, as amended by Acts 2016, ch. 664, § 4, provided that: “This act shall take effect when the department of human services files a notice with the secretary of state who shall publish the notice in the Tennessee Administrative Register on the secretary of state's web site, citing the effective date, which shall occur no later than April 1, 2016, the public welfare requiring it.”

The date published by the secretary of state in the Tennessee Administrative Register was March 31, 2016.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

If a [petition] or comparable pleading is received by an inappropriate tribunal of this state, the tribunal shall forward the pleading and accompanying documents to an appropriate tribunal of this state or another state and notify the [petitioner] where and when the pleading was sent. A tribunal receiving UIFSA documents in error is to forward the original documents to their proper destination without undue delay. This section was originally intended to apply both to initiating and responding tribunals receiving such documents, but the practical elimination of the role of initiating tribunals under modern practice now limits the notice requirement to the petitioner, i.e., the individual party or support enforcement agency, that filed (or misfiled) the document directly. For example, if a tribunal is inappropriately designated as the responding tribunal, it shall forward the petition to the appropriate responding tribunal wherever located, if known, and notify the petitioner of its action. Such a procedure is much to be preferred to returning the documents to the petitioner to begin the process anew.

Cooperation of this sort will facilitate the ultimate goals of the act. Although by its terms this section applies only to a tribunal of this state, it can be anticipated that the support enforcement agency will also assist in transferring documents to the appropriate tribunal. Note the section does not contemplate that a state tribunal will forward documents to a tribunal in a foreign country.

36-5-2307. Duties of support enforcement agency.

  1. A support enforcement agency of this state, upon request, shall provide services to a petitioner in a proceeding under parts 20-26 of this chapter.
  2. A support enforcement agency of this state that is providing services to the petitioner shall:
    1. Take all steps necessary to enable an appropriate tribunal of this state, another state, or a foreign country to obtain jurisdiction over the respondent;
    2. Request an appropriate tribunal to set a date, time, and place for a hearing;
    3. Make a reasonable effort to obtain all relevant information, including information as to income and property of the parties;
    4. Within two (2) days, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays, after receipt of notice in a record from an initiating, responding, or registering tribunal, send a copy of the notice to the petitioner;
    5. Within two (2) days, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays, after receipt of communication in a record from the respondent or the respondent’s attorney, send a copy of the communication to the petitioner; and
    6. Notify the petitioner if jurisdiction over the respondent cannot be obtained.
  3. A support enforcement agency of this state that requests registration of a child support order in this state for enforcement or for modification shall make reasonable efforts:
    1. To ensure that the order to be registered is the controlling order; or
    2. If two (2) or more child support orders exist and the identity of the controlling order has not been determined, to ensure that a request for such a determination is made in a tribunal having jurisdiction to do so.
  4. A support enforcement agency of this state that requests registration and enforcement of a support order, arrears, or judgment stated in a foreign currency shall convert the amounts stated in the foreign currency into the equivalent amounts in dollars under the applicable official or market exchange rate as publicly reported.
  5. A support enforcement agency of this state shall issue or request a tribunal of this state to issue a child support order and an income-withholding order that redirect payment of current support, arrears, and interest if requested to do so by a support enforcement agency of another state pursuant to § 36-5-2319.
  6. Parts 20-29 of this chapter do not create or negate a relationship of attorney and client or other fiduciary relationship between a support enforcement agency or the attorney for the agency and the individual being assisted by the agency.

Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Part 20, § 36-5-2001 (Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 2), concerning the short title for title 36, ch. 5, parts 20-29, was repealed and reenacted by Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1, upon completion of the provisions in § 2 of the act. Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 2, as amended by Acts 2016, ch. 664, § 4, provided that: “This act shall take effect when the department of human services files a notice with the secretary of state who shall publish the notice in the Tennessee Administrative Register on the secretary of state's web site, citing the effective date, which shall occur no later than April 1, 2016, the public welfare requiring it.”

The date published by the secretary of state in the Tennessee Administrative Register was March 31, 2016.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Federal legislation signed on Sept. 29, 2014 (P.L. 113-183) authorizes states to enact Alternative A or Alternative B of subsection (a). The focus of subsection (a) is on providing services to a petitioner. Either the obligee or the obligor may request services, and that request may be in the context of the establishment of an initial child-support order, enforcement or review and adjustment of an existing child-support order, or a modification of that order (upward or downward). Note that the section does not distinguish between child support and spousal support for purposes of providing services. Note also, the services available may differ significantly; for example, modification of spousal support is limited to the issuing tribunal. See  Section 205(f).

Alternative A continues the longstanding rule that this state’s support enforcement agency shall provide services upon request to a petitioner seeking relief under this act. Under Alternative B, the support agency may exercise discretion to provide or not provide assistance to an applicant: (1) from a reciprocating country or Convention country who does not apply through the Central Authority of his or her own country, but rather applies directly to the support enforcement agency; and (2) residing overseas in a country other than a reciprocating country or Convention country. The lack of services, of course, may impact the means by which an individual is able to obtain assistance in pursuing an action in the appropriate tribunal.

Subsection (b) responds to the past complaints of many petitioners that they were not properly kept informed about the progress of their requests for services.

Subsection (c) is a procedural clarification reflecting actual practice of the support agencies developed after years of experience with the act. It imposes a duty on all support enforcement agencies to facilitate the UIFSA one-order world by actively searching for cases with multiple orders and obtaining a determination of the controlling order as expeditiously as possible. This agency duty correlates to new Subsection 602(d) [T.C.A. § 36-5-2602(d)] regarding the registration process and cases with multiple orders.

Subsection (d) imposes a duty of currency conversion on a support enforcement agency similar to that imposed on an initiating tribunal in Section 304(b) [T.C.A. § 36-5-2304(b)].

Read in conjunction with Section 319, subsection (e) requires the state support enforcement agency to facilitate redirection of the stream of child support in order that payments be more efficiently received by the obligee.

Subsection (f) explicitly states that UIFSA neither creates nor rejects the establishment of an attorney-client or fiduciary relationship between the support enforcement agency and a petitioner receiving services from that agency. This once-highly controversial issue is left to otherwise applicable state law, which generally has concluded that attorneys employed by a state support enforcement agency do not form an attorney-client relationship with either the parties or the child as the ultimate obligee.

Related to Convention: art. 35. Transfer of funds.

36-5-2308. Duty of attorney general and reporter.

  1. If the attorney general and reporter determines that the support enforcement agency is neglecting or refusing to provide services to an individual, the attorney general and reporter may order the agency to perform its duties under parts 20-29 of this chapter or may provide those services directly to the individual.
  2. The attorney general and reporter may determine that a foreign country has established a reciprocal arrangement for child support with this state and take appropriate action for notification of the determination.

Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Part 20, § 36-5-2001 (Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 2), concerning the short title for title 36, ch. 5, parts 20-29, was repealed and reenacted by Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1, upon completion of the provisions in § 2 of the act. Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 2, as amended by Acts 2016, ch. 664, § 4, provided that: “This act shall take effect when the department of human services files a notice with the secretary of state who shall publish the notice in the Tennessee Administrative Register on the secretary of state's web site, citing the effective date, which shall occur no later than April 1, 2016, the public welfare requiring it.”

The date published by the secretary of state in the Tennessee Administrative Register was March 31, 2016.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Subsection (b) makes clear that a state has a variety of options in determining the international scope of its IV-D support enforcement program. Of course, a federal declaration that a foreign jurisdiction is a reciprocating country or political subdivision is controlling. See  Section 102(5)(A) [T.C.A. § 36-5-2101(5)(A)]. However, each state may designate an official with authority to make a statewide, binding determination recognizing a foreign country, foreign nation state, or political subdivision as having a reciprocal arrangement with that state. See  Section 102(5)(B) [T.C.A. § 36-5-2101(5)(B)].

36-5-2309. Private counsel.

An individual may employ private counsel to represent the individual in proceedings authorized by parts 20-29 of this chapter.

Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Part 20, § 36-5-2001 (Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 2), concerning the short title for title 36, ch. 5, parts 20-29, was repealed and reenacted by Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1, upon completion of the provisions in § 2 of the act. Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 2, as amended by Acts 2016, ch. 664, § 4, provided that: “This act shall take effect when the department of human services files a notice with the secretary of state who shall publish the notice in the Tennessee Administrative Register on the secretary of state's web site, citing the effective date, which shall occur no later than April 1, 2016, the public welfare requiring it.”

The date published by the secretary of state in the Tennessee Administrative Register was March 31, 2016.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

The right of a party to retain private counsel in a proceeding brought under UIFSA is explicitly recognized. The failure to clearly recognize that power under the prior uniform acts led to confusion and inconsistent decisions. The Convention implicitly recognizes that the right to employ an attorney is to be available in every Convention country, but does not explicitly mention retaining private counsel. A “competent authority” in Convention terminology is equivalent to a tribunal.

Related to Convention: art. 37. Direct requests to competent authorities.

36-5-2310. Duties of the department of human services.

  1. The department of human services is the state information agency under parts 20-29 of this chapter.
  2. The state information agency shall:
    1. Compile and maintain a current list, including addresses, of the tribunals in this state which have jurisdiction under parts 20-29 of this chapter and any support enforcement agencies in this state and transmit a copy to the state information agency of every other state;
    2. Maintain a register of names and addresses of tribunals and support enforcement agencies received from other states;
    3. Forward to the appropriate tribunal in the county in this state in which the obligee who is an individual or the obligor resides, or in which the obligor’s property is believed to be located, all documents concerning a proceeding under parts 20-29 of this chapter received from another state or a foreign country; and
    4. Obtain information concerning the location of the obligor and the obligor’s property within this state not exempt from execution, by such means as postal verification and federal or state locator services, examination of telephone directories, requests for the obligor’s address from employers, and examination of governmental records, including, to the extent not prohibited by other law, those relating to real property, vital statistics, law enforcement, taxation, motor vehicles, driver’s licenses, and social security.

Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Part 20, § 36-5-2001 (Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 2), concerning the short title for title 36, ch. 5, parts 20-29, was repealed and reenacted by Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1, upon completion of the provisions in § 2 of the act. Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 2, as amended by Acts 2016, ch. 664, § 4, provided that: “This act shall take effect when the department of human services files a notice with the secretary of state who shall publish the notice in the Tennessee Administrative Register on the secretary of state's web site, citing the effective date, which shall occur no later than April 1, 2016, the public welfare requiring it.”

The date published by the secretary of state in the Tennessee Administrative Register was March 31, 2016.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Subsection (a) identifies the state information agency.

Subsection (b) details the duties of that agency insofar as interstate proceedings are concerned. Subsection (b)(4) [subdivision (b)(4)] does not provide independent access to the information sources or to the governmental documents listed. Because states have different requirements and limitations concerning such access based on differing views of the privacy interests of individual citizens, the agency is directed to use all lawful means under the relevant state law to obtain and disseminate information.

36-5-2311. Pleadings and accompanying documents.

  1. In a proceeding under parts 20-29 of this chapter, a petitioner seeking to establish a support order, to determine parentage of a child, or to register and modify a support order of a tribunal of another state or a foreign country must file a petition.  Unless otherwise ordered under § 36-5-2312, the petition or accompanying documents must provide, so far as known, the name, residential address, and social security numbers of the obligor and the obligee or the parent and alleged parent, and the name, sex, residential address, social security number, and date of birth of each child for whose benefit support is sought or whose parentage is to be determined.  Unless filed at the time of registration, the petition must be accompanied by a copy of any support order known to have been issued by another tribunal.  The petition may include any other information that may assist in locating or identifying the respondent.
  2. The petition must specify the relief sought. The petition and accompanying documents must conform substantially with the requirements imposed by the forms mandated by federal law for use in cases filed by a support enforcement agency.

Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Part 20, § 36-5-2001 (Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 2), concerning the short title for title 36, ch. 5, parts 20-29, was repealed and reenacted by Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1, upon completion of the provisions in § 2 of the act. Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 2, as amended by Acts 2016, ch. 664, § 4, provided that: “This act shall take effect when the department of human services files a notice with the secretary of state who shall publish the notice in the Tennessee Administrative Register on the secretary of state's web site, citing the effective date, which shall occur no later than April 1, 2016, the public welfare requiring it.”

The date published by the secretary of state in the Tennessee Administrative Register was March 31, 2016.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

This section establishes the basic requirements for drafting and filing interstate pleadings. Subsection (a) should be read in conjunction with Section 312 [T.C.A. § 36-5-2312], which provides for the confidentiality of certain information if disclosure is likely to result in harm to a party or a child. The goal of this section is to improve efficiency of the process by attaching all known support orders to the petition, coupled with the elimination of the requirement that such copies be certified. If a dispute arises over the authenticity of a purported order, the tribunal must, of necessity, sort out conflicting claims at that time. Another improvement is the deletion of the requirement for verified pleadings originated in URESA and carried forward in the original version of UIFSA. Note, however, that a request for registration of a foreign support order for which the Convention is in force is subject to Section 706 [T.C.A. § 36-5-2706]. This is due to the fact that the list of documents comprising the required record in subsection (a) differs in a measurable degree with Convention articles 11 and 25.

Subsection (b) provides authorization for the use of the federally authorized forms to be used in interstate cases in connection with the IV-D child-support enforcement program and mandates substantial compliance with those forms. Although the use of other forms is not prohibited, standardized documents have resulted in substantial improvement in the efficient processing of UIFSA proceedings. The Convention also contains annexed forms for international use.

Related to Convention: art. 10. Available applications; art. 11. Application contents; art. 12. Transmission, receipt and processing of applications and cases through Central Authorities; art. 25. Documents; Annex 1. Transmittal form under Article 12(2); Annex 2. Acknowledgement form under Article 12(3).

36-5-2312. Nondisclosure of information in exceptional circumstances.

If a party alleges in an affidavit or a pleading under oath that the health, safety, or liberty of a party or child would be jeopardized by disclosure of specific identifying information, that information must be sealed and may not be disclosed to the other party or the public.  After a hearing in which a tribunal takes into consideration the health, safety, or liberty of the party or child, the tribunal may order disclosure of information that the tribunal determines to be in the interest of justice.

Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Part 20, § 36-5-2001 (Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 2), concerning the short title for title 36, ch. 5, parts 20-29, was repealed and reenacted by Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1, upon completion of the provisions in § 2 of the act. Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 2, as amended by Acts 2016, ch. 664, § 4, provided that: “This act shall take effect when the department of human services files a notice with the secretary of state who shall publish the notice in the Tennessee Administrative Register on the secretary of state's web site, citing the effective date, which shall occur no later than April 1, 2016, the public welfare requiring it.”

The date published by the secretary of state in the Tennessee Administrative Register was March 31, 2016.

Cross-References. Confidentiality of public records, § 10-7-504.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

UIFSA (1992) recognized that enforcement of child support across state lines might have an unintended consequence of putting a party or child at risk if domestic violence was involved in the past. This section is a substantial revision of the statutory formulation originally developed in UIFSA (1992). It conforms to the comparable provision in the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act Section 209 [T.C.A. § 36-5-2209]. Public awareness of and sensitivity to the dangers of domestic violence has significantly increased since interstate enforcement of support originated. This section authorizes confidentiality in instances where there is a risk of domestic violence or child abduction. Section 712 [T.C.A. § 36-5-2712], infra , incorporates language from the Convention to restrict dissemination of personal jurisdiction to protect victims of domestic violence.

Although local law generally governs the conduct of the forum tribunal, state law may not provide for maintaining secrecy about the exact whereabouts of a litigant or other information ordinarily required to be disclosed under state law, i.e., Social Security number of the parties or the child. If so, this section creates a confidentiality provision that is particularly appropriate in light of the intractable problems associated with interstate parental kidnapping, see  the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA), 28 U.S.C. § 1738A.

Related to Convention: art. 38. Protection of personal data; art. 39. Confidentiality; art. 40. Non-disclosure of information.

36-5-2313. Costs and fees.

  1. The petitioner may not be required to pay a filing fee or other costs.
  2. If an obligee prevails, a responding tribunal of this state may assess against an obligor filing fees, reasonable attorney’s fees, other costs, and necessary travel and other reasonable expenses incurred by the obligee and the obligee’s witnesses.  The tribunal may not assess fees, costs, or expenses against the obligee or the support enforcement agency of either the initiating or responding state or foreign country, except as provided by other law.  Attorney’s fees may be taxed as costs, and may be ordered paid directly to the attorney, who may enforce the order in the attorney’s own name.  Payment of support owed to the obligee has priority over fees, costs, and expenses.
  3. The tribunal shall order the payment of costs and reasonable attorney’s fees if it determines that a hearing was requested primarily for delay.  In a proceeding under part 26 of this chapter, a hearing is presumed to have been requested primarily for delay if a registered support order is confirmed or enforced without change.

Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Part 20, § 36-5-2001 (Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 2), concerning the short title for title 36, ch. 5, parts 20-29, was repealed and reenacted by Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1, upon completion of the provisions in § 2 of the act. Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 2, as amended by Acts 2016, ch. 664, § 4, provided that: “This act shall take effect when the department of human services files a notice with the secretary of state who shall publish the notice in the Tennessee Administrative Register on the secretary of state's web site, citing the effective date, which shall occur no later than April 1, 2016, the public welfare requiring it.”

The date published by the secretary of state in the Tennessee Administrative Register was March 31, 2016.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Subsection (a) permits either party, i.e., as petitioner, to file without payment of a filing fee or other costs. This provision dates back to UIFSA (1992) when the term “unfunded mandate” was basically unknown.

Subsection (b), however, provides that only the support obligor may be assessed the authorized costs and fees by a tribunal. Federal law permits a state support enforcement agency to charge limited fees and to recover administrative costs from applicants for Title IV-D services, but many states have opted not to do so, or only to seek recovery from the obligor.

Subsection (c) provides a sanction to deal with a frivolous contest regarding compliance with an interstate withholding order, registration of a support order, or comparable delaying tactics regarding an appropriate enforcement remedy.

Related to Convention: art. 14. Effective access to procedures; art. 43. Recovery of costs.

36-5-2314. Limited immunity of petitioner.

  1. Participation by a petitioner in a proceeding under parts 20-29 of this chapter before a responding tribunal, whether in person, by private attorney, or through services provided by the support enforcement agency, does not confer personal jurisdiction over the petitioner in another proceeding.
  2. A petitioner is not amenable to service of civil process while physically present in this state to participate in a proceeding under parts 20-29 of this chapter.
  3. The immunity granted by this section does not extend to civil litigation based on acts unrelated to a proceeding under parts 20-29 of this chapter committed by a party while physically present in this state to participate in the proceeding.

Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Part 20, § 36-5-2001 (Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 2), concerning the short title for title 36, ch. 5, parts 20-29, was repealed and reenacted by Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1, upon completion of the provisions in § 2 of the act. Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 2, as amended by Acts 2016, ch. 664, § 4, provided that: “This act shall take effect when the department of human services files a notice with the secretary of state who shall publish the notice in the Tennessee Administrative Register on the secretary of state's web site, citing the effective date, which shall occur no later than April 1, 2016, the public welfare requiring it.”

The date published by the secretary of state in the Tennessee Administrative Register was March 31, 2016.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Under subsection (a), direct or indirect participation in a UIFSA proceeding does not subject a petitioner to an assertion of personal jurisdiction over the petitioner by the forum state in other litigation between the parties. The primary object of this prohibition is to preclude joining disputes over child custody and visitation with the establishment, enforcement, or modification of child support. This prohibition strengthens the ban on visitation litigation established in Section 305(d) [T.C.A. § 36-5-2305(d)]. A petition for affirmative relief under UIFSA limits the jurisdiction of the tribunal to the boundaries of the support proceeding. In sum, proceedings under UIFSA are not suitable vehicles for the relitigation of all of the issues arising out of a foreign divorce or custody case. Only enforcement or modification of the support portion of such decrees or orders are relevant. Other issues, such as custody and visitation, or matters relating to other aspect of the divorce decree, are collateral and have no place in a UIFSA proceeding.

Subsection (b) grants a litigant a variety of limited immunity from service of process during the time that party is physically present in a state for a UIFSA proceeding. The immunity provided is in no way comparable to diplomatic immunity, however, which should be clear from reading subsection (c) in conjunction with the other subsections.

Subsection (c) does not extend immunity to civil litigation unrelated to the support proceeding which stems from contemporaneous acts committed by a party while present in the state for the support litigation. For example, a petitioner involved in an automobile accident or a contract dispute over the cost of lodging while present in the state does not have immunity from a civil suit on those issues.

36-5-2315. Nonparentage as defense.

A party whose parentage of a child has been previously determined by or pursuant to law may not plead nonparentage as a defense to a proceeding under parts 20-29 of this chapter.

Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Part 20, § 36-5-2001 (Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 2), concerning the short title for title 36, ch. 5, parts 20-29, was repealed and reenacted by Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1, upon completion of the provisions in § 2 of the act. Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 2, as amended by Acts 2016, ch. 664, § 4, provided that: “This act shall take effect when the department of human services files a notice with the secretary of state who shall publish the notice in the Tennessee Administrative Register on the secretary of state's web site, citing the effective date, which shall occur no later than April 1, 2016, the public welfare requiring it.”

The date published by the secretary of state in the Tennessee Administrative Register was March 31, 2016.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Arguably this section does no more than restate the basic principle of res judicata. However, there is a great variety of state law regarding presumptions of parentage and available defenses after a prior determination of parentage. As long as a proceeding is brought in an appropriate forum, this section is intended neither to discourage nor encourage collateral attacks in situations in which the law of another jurisdiction is at significant odds with local law. If a collateral attack on a parentage decree is permissible under the law of the issuing jurisdiction, such a proceeding must be pursued in that forum and not in a UIFSA proceeding.

This section mandates that a parentage decree rendered by another tribunal “pursuant to law” is not subject to collateral attack in a UIFSA proceeding. Of course, an attack on an alleged final order based on a fundamental constitutional defect in the parentage decree is permissible in the forum state. For example, a responding tribunal may find that another tribunal acted unconstitutionally by denying a party due process due to a failure of notice and opportunity to be heard or a lack of personal jurisdiction over a party who did not answer or appear. Insofar as the latter ground is concerned, the universal enactment of the long-arm statute asserting personal jurisdiction over a respondent if the child “may have been conceived” in the forum state may greatly reduce successful attacks on a parentage determination. See  Section 201(a)(6). [T.C.A. § 36-5-2201(a)(6)].

Similarly, the law of the issuing state or foreign country may provide for a determination of parentage based on certain specific acts of the obligor, such as voluntarily acknowledging parentage as a substitute for a decree. UIFSA also is neutral regarding a collateral attack on such a parentage determination filed in the issuing tribunal. In the meantime, however, the responding tribunal must give effect to such an act of acknowledgment of parentage if it is recognized as determinative in the issuing state or foreign country. The consistent theme is that a collateral attack on a parentage determination cannot be made in a UIFSA proceeding other than on fundamental due-process grounds.

36-5-2316. Special rules of evidence and procedure.

  1. The physical presence of a nonresident party who is an individual in a tribunal of this state is not required for the establishment, enforcement, or modification of a support order or the rendition of a judgment determining parentage of a child.
  2. An affidavit, a document substantially complying with federally mandated forms, or a document incorporated by reference in any of them, which would not be excluded under the hearsay rule if given in person, is admissible in evidence if given under penalty of perjury by a party or witness residing outside this state.
  3. A copy of the record of child support payments certified as a true copy of the original by the custodian of the record may be forwarded to a responding tribunal.  The copy is evidence of facts asserted in it, and is admissible to show whether payments were made.
  4. Copies of bills for testing for parentage of a child, and for prenatal and postnatal health care of the mother and child, furnished to the adverse party at least ten (10) days before trial, are admissible in evidence to prove the amount of the charges billed and that the charges were reasonable, necessary, and customary.
  5. Documentary evidence transmitted from outside this state to a tribunal of this state by telephone, telecopier, or other electronic means that do not provide an original record may not be excluded from evidence on an objection based on the means of transmission.
  6. In a proceeding under parts 20-29 of this chapter, a tribunal of this state shall permit a party or witness residing outside this state to be deposed or to testify under penalty of perjury by telephone, audiovisual means, or other electronic means at a designated tribunal or other location.  A tribunal of this state shall cooperate with other tribunals in designating an appropriate location for the deposition or testimony.
  7. If a party called to testify at a civil hearing refuses to answer on the ground that the testimony may be self-incriminating, the trier of fact may draw an adverse inference from the refusal.
  8. A privilege against disclosure of communications between spouses does not apply in a proceeding under parts 20-29 of this chapter.
  9. The defense of immunity based on the relationship of husband and wife or parent and child does not apply in a proceeding under parts 20-29 of this chapter.
  10. A voluntary acknowledgment of paternity, certified as a true copy, is admissible to establish parentage of the child.

Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1; 2016, ch. 664, § 2.

Compiler's Notes. Part 20, § 36-5-2001 (Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 2), concerning the short title for title 36, ch. 5, parts 20-29, was repealed and reenacted by Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1, upon completion of the provisions in § 2 of the act. Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 2, as amended by Acts 2016, ch. 664, § 4, provided that: “This act shall take effect when the department of human services files a notice with the secretary of state who shall publish the notice in the Tennessee Administrative Register on the secretary of state's web site, citing the effective date, which shall occur no later than April 1, 2016, the public welfare requiring it.”

The date published by the secretary of state in the Tennessee Administrative Register was March 31, 2016.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Applicability.

Mother's request to modify in Tennessee a child support order issued by a Tennessee court was not a proceeding under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA), and even without the UIFSA, Tennessee courts had jurisdiction to modify their own child support orders; because the case involved a request to modify a Tennessee child support order, not an order from another jurisdiction, the UIFSA did not apply, and the mother could not avail herself of the special evidence rules applicable only to proceedings under the UIFSA. State ex rel. Malmquist v. Malmquist, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 698 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 29, 2018).

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Note that the special rules of evidence and procedure are applicable to a party or witness “residing outside this state,” substituting for “residing in another state.” This is the broadest application possible because the utility of these special rules is not limited to parties in other states, or in foreign countries, as defined in the act, but extends to an individual residing anywhere. This extremely broad application of the special rules is to facilitate the processing of a support order in this state or elsewhere. This section combines many time-tested procedures with innovative methods for gathering evidence in interstate cases.

Subsection (a) ensures that a nonresident petitioner or a nonresident respondent may fully participate in a proceeding under the act without being required to appear personally. Subsection (b) recognizes the pervasive effect of the federal forms promulgated by the Office of Child Support Enforcement, which replace the necessity of swearing to a document “under oath” with the simpler requirement that the document be provided “under penalty of perjury,” as has long been required by federal income tax Form 1040.

Subsections (b) through (f) provide special rules of evidence designed to take into account the virtually unique nature of the interstate proceedings under this act. These subsections provide exceptions to the otherwise guiding principle of UIFSA, i.e., local procedural and substantive law should apply. Because the out-of-state party, and that party’s witnesses, necessarily do not ordinarily appear in person at the hearing, deviation from the ordinary rules of evidence is justified in order to assure that the tribunal will have available to it the maximum amount of information on which to base its decision. The intent throughout these subsections is to eliminate by statute as many potential hearsay problems as possible in interstate litigation, with the goal of providing each party with the means to present evidence, even if not physically present.

Subsection (d) provides a simplified means for proving health-care expenses related to the birth of a child. Because ordinarily the amount of these charges is not in dispute, this is designed to obviate the cost of having health-care providers appear in person or of obtaining affidavits of business records from each provider.

Subsections (e) and (f) encourage tribunals and litigants to take advantage of modern methods of communication in interstate support litigation; most dramatically, the out-of-state party is authorized to testify by the full panoply of audio and audiovisual technologies currently available for direct personal communication and to supply documents by fax, email, or direct transfer between computers or other electronic devices. One of the most useful applications of these subsections is to provide an enforcing tribunal with up-to-date information concerning the amount of arrears.

Subsection (f) unambiguously mandates that telephone or audiovisual testimony in depositions and hearings must be allowed. It anticipates that every courtroom is equipped with a speakerphone. In a day when laptop computers often come equipped with a video camera, live testimony from a remote location is not only possible, but almost as reliable as if the testimony was given in person. No doubt a demeanor is better judged in person than by viewing a video screen, but the latter is certainly preferable to only a disembodied voice.

Subsection (g) codifies the rule in effect in many states that in civil litigation an adverse inference may be drawn from a litigant’s silence—that restriction of the Fifth Amendment does not apply. A related analogy is that a refusal to submit to genetic testing may be admitted into evidence and a trier of fact may resolve the question of parentage against the refusing party on the basis of an inference that the results of the test would have been unfavorable to the interest of that party.

Subsection (j), new in 2001, complies with the federally mandated procedure that every state must honor the “acknowledgment of paternity” validly made in another state.

Related to Convention: art. 13. Means of communication; art. 14. Effective access to procedures; art. 29. Physical presence of the child or the applicant not required.

36-5-2317. Communications between tribunals.

A tribunal of this state may communicate with a tribunal outside this state in a record or by telephone, electronic mail, or other means, to obtain information concerning the laws, the legal effect of a judgment, decree, or order of that tribunal, and the status of a proceeding.  A tribunal of this state may furnish similar information by similar means to a tribunal outside this state.

Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Part 20, § 36-5-2001 (Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 2), concerning the short title for title 36, ch. 5, parts 20-29, was repealed and reenacted by Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1, upon completion of the provisions in § 2 of the act. Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 2, as amended by Acts 2016, ch. 664, § 4, provided that: “This act shall take effect when the department of human services files a notice with the secretary of state who shall publish the notice in the Tennessee Administrative Register on the secretary of state's web site, citing the effective date, which shall occur no later than April 1, 2016, the public welfare requiring it.”

The date published by the secretary of state in the Tennessee Administrative Register was March 31, 2016.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

This section explicitly authorizes a state tribunal to communicate with a tribunal of another state, foreign country, or in a foreign nation state not defined as a foreign country. It was derived from UCCJA § 110 authorizing such communications to facilitate a fully informed decision. The amendment in UIFSA (2008) not only expands the authorization to worldwide scope, i.e., “outside this state,” but specifically adds email to the select modes of communication. Broad cooperation by tribunals is strongly encouraged in order to expedite establishment and enforcement of a support order. American judges are very familiar with this procedure. It remains to be seen whether overseas communication between judges will be received with similar cooperation.

36-5-2318. Assistance with discovery.

A tribunal of this state may:

  1. Request a tribunal outside this state to assist in obtaining discovery; and
  2. Upon request, compel a person over which it has jurisdiction to respond to a discovery order issued by a tribunal outside this state.

Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Part 20, § 36-5-2001 (Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 2), concerning the short title for title 36, ch. 5, parts 20-29, was repealed and reenacted by Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1, upon completion of the provisions in § 2 of the act. Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 2, as amended by Acts 2016, ch. 664, § 4, provided that: “This act shall take effect when the department of human services files a notice with the secretary of state who shall publish the notice in the Tennessee Administrative Register on the secretary of state's web site, citing the effective date, which shall occur no later than April 1, 2016, the public welfare requiring it.”

The date published by the secretary of state in the Tennessee Administrative Register was March 31, 2016.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

This section takes a logical step to facilitate interstate and international cooperation by enlisting the power of the forum to assist a tribunal of another state or country with the discovery process. The grant of authority is quite broad, enabling the tribunal of the enacting state to fashion its remedies to facilitate discovery consistent with local practice.

36-5-2319. Receipt and disbursement of payments.

  1. A support enforcement agency or tribunal of this state shall disburse promptly any amounts received pursuant to a support order, as directed by the order.  The agency or tribunal shall furnish to a requesting party or tribunal of another state or a foreign country a certified statement by the custodian of the record of the amounts and dates of all payments received.
  2. If neither the obligor, nor the obligee who is an individual, nor the child resides in this state, upon request from the support enforcement agency of this state or another state, the support enforcement agency of this state or a tribunal of this state shall:
    1. Direct that the support payment be made to the support enforcement agency in the state in which the obligee is receiving services; and
    2. Issue and send to the obligor’s employer a conforming income-withholding order or an administrative notice of change of payee, reflecting the redirected payments.
  3. The support enforcement agency of this state receiving redirected payments from another state pursuant to a law similar to subsection (b) shall furnish to a requesting party or tribunal of the other state a certified statement by the custodian of the record of the amount and dates of all payments received.

Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Part 20, § 36-5-2001 (Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 2), concerning the short title for title 36, ch. 5, parts 20-29, was repealed and reenacted by Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1, upon completion of the provisions in § 2 of the act. Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 2, as amended by Acts 2016, ch. 664, § 4, provided that: “This act shall take effect when the department of human services files a notice with the secretary of state who shall publish the notice in the Tennessee Administrative Register on the secretary of state's web site, citing the effective date, which shall occur no later than April 1, 2016, the public welfare requiring it.”

The date published by the secretary of state in the Tennessee Administrative Register was March 31, 2016.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

The first sentence of subsection (a) is truly hortatory in nature, although its principle is implemented insofar as support enforcement agencies are required by federal regulations promulgated by the Office of Child Support Enforcement (OCSE). The second sentence confirms the duty of the agency or tribunal to furnish payment information in interstate or international cases.

As an exception to the usual provisions in Article 3 [part 3], subsections (b) and (c) are applicable only to interstate cases. The procedure described was inspired by the Office of Child Support Enforcement (OCSE), U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, and is designed to speed up receipt of support payments. Support enforcement agencies are directed to cooperate in the efficient and expeditious collection and transfer of child support from obligor to obligee. Over two-thirds of all child support payments currently are made through direct income withholding actions, whereby an out-of-state IV-D agency sends direct notice to an employer in the obligor’s state to withhold funds to satisfy the support obligation. Nonetheless, this section remains viable for those situation in which the direct withholding encounters a glitch. Further, there are ongoing problems in states not having income withholding payments go to the state disbursement unit. This section is intended to solve the problem by directing the payments to the most logical disbursement unit, i.e., the state with continuing exclusive jurisdiction.

Part 24
Uniform Interstate Family Support Act — Establishment of Support Order or Determination of Parentage

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

A fundamental principle of U.S. jurisprudence is that our courts are open to litigants with a valid cause of action. This article [part] makes clear this principle applies to support actions, whether initiated by a resident of the United States or of a foreign nation.

36-5-2401. Establishment of support order.

  1. If a support order entitled to recognition under parts 20-29 of this chapter has not been issued, a responding tribunal of this state with personal jurisdiction over the parties may issue a support order if:
    1. The individual seeking the order resides outside this state; or
    2. The support enforcement agency seeking the order is located outside this state.
  2. The tribunal may issue a temporary child support order if the tribunal determines that such an order is appropriate and the individual ordered to pay is:
    1. A presumed father of the child;
    2. Petitioning to have his paternity adjudicated;
    3. Identified as the father of the child through genetic testing;
    4. An alleged father who has declined to submit to genetic testing;
    5. Shown by clear and convincing evidence to be the father of the child;
    6. An acknowledged father as provided by this title;
    7. The mother of the child; or
    8. An individual who has been ordered to pay child support in a previous proceeding and the order has not been reversed or vacated.
  3. Upon finding, after notice and opportunity to be heard, that an obligor owes a duty of support, the tribunal shall issue a support order directed to the obligor and may issue other orders pursuant to § 36-5-2305.

Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Part 20, § 36-5-2001 (Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 2), concerning the short title for title 36, ch. 5, parts 20-29, was repealed and reenacted by Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1, upon completion of the provisions in § 2 of the act. Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 2, as amended by Acts 2016, ch. 664, § 4, provided that: “This act shall take effect when the department of human services files a notice with the secretary of state who shall publish the notice in the Tennessee Administrative Register on the secretary of state's web site, citing the effective date, which shall occur no later than April 1, 2016, the public welfare requiring it.”

The date published by the secretary of state in the Tennessee Administrative Register was March 31, 2016.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

This section authorizes a responding tribunal of this state to issue temporary and permanent support orders binding on an obligor over whom the tribunal has personal jurisdiction when the person or entity requesting the order is “outside this state,” i.e., anywhere else in the world. UIFSA does not permit such orders to be issued when another support order entitled to recognition exists, thereby prohibiting a second tribunal from establishing another support order and the accompanying continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over the matter. See  Sections 205 and 206 [T.C.A. §§ 36-5-2205 and 36-5-2206].

Related to Convention: art. 11. Application contents; art. 14. Effective access to procedures; art. 15. Free legal assistance for child support applications; art. 16. Declaration to permit use of child-centered means test; art. 17. Applications not qualifying under 15 or 16; art. 20. Bases for recognition and enforcement; art. 25. Documents; art. 27. Findings of fact; art. 28. No review of the merits; art. 37. Direct requests to competent authorities; art. 56. Transitional provisions.

36-5-2402. Proceeding to determine parentage.

A tribunal of this state authorized to determine parentage of a child may serve as a responding tribunal in a proceeding to determine parentage of a child brought under parts 20-29 of this chapter or a law or procedure substantially similar to parts 20-29 of this chapter.

Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Part 20, § 36-5-2001 (Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 2), concerning the short title for title 36, ch. 5, parts 20-29, was repealed and reenacted by Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1, upon completion of the provisions in § 2 of the act. Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 2, as amended by Acts 2016, ch. 664, § 4, provided that: “This act shall take effect when the department of human services files a notice with the secretary of state who shall publish the notice in the Tennessee Administrative Register on the secretary of state's web site, citing the effective date, which shall occur no later than April 1, 2016, the public welfare requiring it.”

The date published by the secretary of state in the Tennessee Administrative Register was March 31, 2016.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

This article authorizes a “pure” parentage action in the interstate context, i.e., an action not joined with a claim for support. The mother, an alleged father of a child, or a support enforcement agency may bring such an action. Typically an action to determine parentage across a state line or international border will also seek to establish a support order. See  Section 401 [T.C.A. § 36-5-2401]. An action to establish parentage under UIFSA is to be treated identically to such an action brought in the responding state.

In a departure from the rest of this act, in UIFSA (2001) the term “tribunal” was replaced by “court” in this section. The several states have a variety of combinations of judicial or administrative entities that are authorized to establish, enforce, and modify a child-support order. Because the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA) (2000) § 104 restricts parentage determinations to “a court,” see  UPA (2000) § 104, the drafters took the view that only a judicial officer should determine parentage as a matter of public policy. This conclusion was in error insofar as some states are concerned and is reversed in this iteration of the act.

Related to Convention: art. 2. Scope; art. 6. Specific functions of Central Authorities; art. 10. Available applications.

Part 25
Uniform Interstate Family Support Act — Enforcement of Order Without Registration

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

This article [part] governs direct filing of an income withholding order from one state to an employer in another state. Except as provided in Section 507 [T.C.A. 36-5-2507], the provisions of this article [part] only apply to an interstate case and do not apply to an income-withholding order from a foreign country. While U.S. employers routinely enforce sister state income-withholding orders, enforcement of the wide variety of possible foreign support orders would provide too many complexities and challenges to justify requiring an employer to interpret and enforce an ostensible foreign income-withholding order. Indeed, income-withholding orders from a foreign country are quite rare at this time, although instances of that enforcement remedy probably will increase in the future.

36-5-2501. Employer's receipt of income-withholding order of another state.

An income-withholding order issued in another state may be sent by or on behalf of the obligee, or by the support enforcement agency, to the person considered as the obligor’s employer pursuant to part 5 of this chapter without first filing a petition or comparable pleading or registering the order with a tribunal of this state.

Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Part 20, § 36-5-2001 (Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 2), concerning the short title for title 36, ch. 5, parts 20-29, was repealed and reenacted by Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1, upon completion of the provisions in § 2 of the act. Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 2, as amended by Acts 2016, ch. 664, § 4, provided that: “This act shall take effect when the department of human services files a notice with the secretary of state who shall publish the notice in the Tennessee Administrative Register on the secretary of state's web site, citing the effective date, which shall occur no later than April 1, 2016, the public welfare requiring it.”

The date published by the secretary of state in the Tennessee Administrative Register was March 31, 2016.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

In 1984 Congress mandated that all states adopt procedures for enforcing income-withholding orders of sister states. Direct recognition by the out-of-state obligor's employer of a withholding order issued by another state long was sought by support enforcement associations and other advocacy groups. UIFSA (1992) recognized such a procedure. This article [part] was extensively amended in 1996, but was the subject only of clarifying amendments in 2001.

Section 501 [T.C.A. § 36-5-2501] is deliberately written in the passive voice; the act does not restrict those who may send an income-withholding order across state lines. Although the sender will ordinarily be a child support enforcement agency or the obligee, the obligor or any other person may supply an employer with the income-withholding order. “Sending a copy” of a withholding order to an employer is clearly distinguishable from “service” of that order on the same employer. Service of an order necessarily intends to invoke a tribunal’s authority over an employer doing business in the state. Thus, for there to be valid “service” of a withholding order on an employer in a state, the tribunal must have authority to bind the employer. In most cases, this requires the assertion of the authority of a local responding tribunal in a “registration for enforcement” proceeding. In short, the formality of “service” defeats the whole purpose of direct income withholding across state lines.

The process contemplated in this article [part] is direct “notification” of an employer in another state of a withholding order without the involvement of initiating or responding tribunals. Therefore, receipt of a copy of a withholding order by facsimile, regular first class mail, registered or certified mail, or any other type of direct notice is sufficient to provide the requisite notice to trigger direct income withholding in the absence of a contest by the employee-obligor. This process is now widely used by not only child support enforcement agencies, but also by private collection agencies or private attorneys acting on behalf of obligees.

Except as provided in Section 507  [T.C.A. § 36-5-2507], Administrative Enforcement of Orders, none of the sections in Article 5 [part 5] are intended to apply to foreign support orders. While it is appropriate for U.S. employers to enforce sister state income-withholding orders routinely, enforcement of the wide variety of possible foreign support orders provides too many complexities and challenges to require an employer to interpret and enforce ostensible foreign income-withholding orders.

36-5-2502. Employer’s compliance with income-withholding order of another state.

  1. Upon receipt of an income-withholding order, the obligor’s employer shall immediately provide a copy of the order to the obligor.
  2. The employer shall treat an income-withholding order issued in another state which appears regular on its face as if it had been issued by a tribunal of this state.
  3. Except as otherwise provided in subsection (d) and § 36-5-2503, the employer shall withhold and distribute the funds as directed in the withholding order by complying with terms of the order which specify:
    1. The duration and amount of periodic payments of current child support, stated as a sum certain;
    2. The person designated to receive payments and the address to which the payments are to be forwarded;
    3. Medical support, whether in the form of periodic cash payment, stated as a sum certain, or ordering the obligor to provide health insurance coverage for the child under a policy available through the obligor’s employment;
    4. The amount of periodic payments of fees and costs for a support enforcement agency, the issuing tribunal, and the obligee’s attorney, stated as sums certain; and
    5. The amount of periodic payments of arrearages and interest on arrearages, stated as sums certain.
  4. An employer shall comply with the law of the state of the obligor’s principal place of employment for withholding from income with respect to:
    1. The employer’s fee for processing an income-withholding order;
    2. The maximum amount permitted to be withheld from the obligor’s income; and
    3. The times within which the employer must implement the withholding order and forward the child support payment.

Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Part 20, § 36-5-2001 (Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 2), concerning the short title for title 36, ch. 5, parts 20-29, was repealed and reenacted by Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1, upon completion of the provisions in § 2 of the act. Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 2, as amended by Acts 2016, ch. 664, § 4, provided that: “This act shall take effect when the department of human services files a notice with the secretary of state who shall publish the notice in the Tennessee Administrative Register on the secretary of state's web site, citing the effective date, which shall occur no later than April 1, 2016, the public welfare requiring it.”

The date published by the secretary of state in the Tennessee Administrative Register was March 31, 2016.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

In 1996 major employers and national payroll associations urged NCCUSL to supply more detail regarding the rights and duties of an employer on receipt of an income-withholding order from another state. The Conference obliged with amendments to UIFSA establishing a series of steps for employers to follow.

When an employer receives an income withholding order from another state, the first step is to notify the employee that an income withholding order has been received naming the employee as the obligor of child support, and that income withholding will begin within the time frame specified by local law. In other words, the employer will initially proceed just as if the withholding order had been received from a tribunal of the employer’s state. It is the responsibility of the employee to take whatever protective measures are necessary to prevent the withholding if the employee asserts a defense as provided in Section 506 [T.C.A. § 36-5-2506], infra .

At this point neither an initiating nor a responding tribunal is directly involved. The withholding order may have been forwarded by the obligee, the obligee’s attorney, or the out-of-state IV-D agency. In fact, there is no prohibition against anyone sending a valid copy of an income-withholding order, even a stranger to the litigation, such as the child’s grandparent. Subsection (a) does not specify the method for sending this relatively informal notice for direct income withholding, but rather makes the assumption that the employer’s communication to the employee regarding receipt of the order will cause an employee-obligor to act to prevent a wrongful invasion of his or her income if it is not owed as current child support or arrears.

Subsection (b) directs an employer of the enacting state to recognize a withholding order of a sister state, subject to the employee's right to contest the validity of the order or its enforcement. Prior to the promulgation of UIFSA, agencies in several states adopted a procedure of sending direct withholding requests to out-of-state employers. A contemporaneous study by the federal General Accounting Office reported that employers in a second state routinely recognized withholding orders of sister states despite an apparent lack of statutory authority to do so. UIFSA marked the first official sanction of this practice. Subsection (b) does not define “regular on its face,” but the term should be liberally construed, see U.S. v. Morton , 467 U.S. 822 (1984) (“legal process regular on its face”). The rules governing intrastate procedure and defenses for withholding orders will apply to interstate orders.

Subsection (c) answered employers’ complaints that insufficient direction for action was given by the original UIFSA. Prior to the 1996 amendments an employer was merely told to “distribute the funds as directed in the withholding order.” This section clarifies the terms of the out-of-state order with which the employer must strictly comply. As a general principle, an employer is directed to comply with the specific terms contained in the order, but there are exceptions. Moreover, many income-withholding orders received at that time did not provide the detail necessary for the employer to comply with every directive. Since then, however, the long-anticipated federal forms were promulgated throughout 1997 and 1998, with periodic updates to the present time. Most recently, the text of income withholding orders for child support is fast conforming to a nationwide norm. To the extent that an order is silent, the employer is not required to respond to unstated demands of the issuing tribunal. Formerly, employers often were so concerned about ambiguous or incomplete orders that they telephoned child support enforcement agencies in other states to attempt to understand and comply with unstated terms. Employers should not be expected to become investigators or shoulder the responsibility of learning the law of 50 states.

Subsection (c)(1) [subdivision (c)(1)] directs that the amount and duration of periodic payments of current child support must be stated in a sum certain in order to elicit compliance. The amount of current support and duration of the support obligation are fixed by the controlling order and should be stated in the withholding order so that the employer is informed of the date on which the withholding is anticipated to terminate. The “sum certain” requirement is crucial to facilitating the employer’s compliance. For example, an order for a “percentage of the obligor’s net income,” does not satisfy this requirement and is not entitled to compliance from an employer receiving an interstate income-withholding order.

Subsection (c)(2) [subdivision (c)(2)] states the obvious: information necessary for compliance must be clearly stated. For example, the destination of the payments must correspond to the destination originally designated or subsequently authorized by the issuing tribunal, such as by the redirection of payments pursuant to Section 319 [T.C.A. § 36-5-2319], supra .

Subsection (c)(3) [subdivision (c)(3)] provides that medical support for the child must be stated either by a periodic cash payment or, alternatively, by an order directing the employee-obligor to provide health insurance coverage from his employment. In the absence of an order for payment of a sum certain, issuance of an order for medical support as child support is required to ensure the employer enrolls the obligor’s child for coverage if medical insurance is available through the obligor’s employment. Failure to enroll the child should elicit, at the least, registration of an order for enforcement in the responding state, to be implemented by an order of a tribunal directing either the employee or the employer to comply to furnish insurance coverage for the child. If the employer is so directed by a medical support order, enrollment of the child in the health care plan at the employee-obligor’s expense is not dependent on the obligor’s consent, any more than withholding a sum certain from the obligor’s income is subject to a veto. It is up to the employee-obligor to assert any defense to prevent the employer from abiding by the medical support order.

Subsection (c)(4) [subdivision (c)(4)] identifies certain costs and fees incurred in conjunction with the support enforcement that may be added to the withholding order.

Subsection (c)(5) [subdivision (c)(5)] requires that the amount of periodic payments for arrears and interest on arrears also must be stated as a sum certain. If the one-order system is to function properly, the issuing tribunal ultimately must be responsible to account for payments and maintain the record of arrears and interest rate on arrears. Full compliance with the support order will only be achieved when the issuing tribunal determines that the obligation no longer exists. The amount of periodic payments for arrears is also fixed by the controlling order unless the law of the issuing state or the state where the order is being enforced provides a procedure for redetermination of the amount.

Subsection (d) identifies those narrow provisions in which the law of the employee’s work state applies, rather than the law of the issuing state. A large employer will almost certainly have a number of employees subject to income-withholding orders. From the employer’s perspective, the procedural requirements for compliance should be uniform for all of those employees. Certain issues should be matters for the law of the employee’s work state, such as the employer’s fee for processing, the maximum amount to be withheld, and the time in which to comply. The latter necessarily includes the frequency with which income withholding must occur. This is also consistent with regard to the tax consideration imposed by choice of law considerations. The only element in the list of local laws identified in subsection (d) which stirred any controversy whatsoever was the fact that the maximum amount permitted to be withheld is to be subject to the law of the employee’s work state. Demands of equal treatment for all obligees, plus the practical concern that large employers require uniform computer programming mandate this solution.

36-5-2503. Employer’s compliance with two or more income-withholding orders.

If an obligor’s employer receives two (2) or more income-withholding orders with respect to the earnings of the same obligor, the employer satisfies the terms of the orders if the employer complies with the law of the state of the obligor’s principal place of employment to establish the priorities for withholding and allocating income withheld for two (2) or more child support obligees.

Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Part 20, § 36-5-2001 (Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 2), concerning the short title for title 36, ch. 5, parts 20-29, was repealed and reenacted by Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1, upon completion of the provisions in § 2 of the act. Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 2, as amended by Acts 2016, ch. 664, § 4, provided that: “This act shall take effect when the department of human services files a notice with the secretary of state who shall publish the notice in the Tennessee Administrative Register on the secretary of state's web site, citing the effective date, which shall occur no later than April 1, 2016, the public welfare requiring it.”

The date published by the secretary of state in the Tennessee Administrative Register was March 31, 2016.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Consistent with the act’s general problem-solving approach, the employer is directed to deal with multiple income orders for multiple families in the same manner as required by local law for orders of the forum state.

In addition to income withholding orders issued by tribunals of other states, state support enforcement agencies may also issue income withholding orders to enforce foreign child-support orders.

36-5-2504. Immunity from civil liability.

An employer that complies with an income-withholding order issued in another state in accordance with this part is not subject to civil liability to an individual or agency with regard to the employer’s withholding of child support from the obligor’s income.

Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Part 20, § 36-5-2001 (Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 2), concerning the short title for title 36, ch. 5, parts 20-29, was repealed and reenacted by Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1, upon completion of the provisions in § 2 of the act. Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 2, as amended by Acts 2016, ch. 664, § 4, provided that: “This act shall take effect when the department of human services files a notice with the secretary of state who shall publish the notice in the Tennessee Administrative Register on the secretary of state's web site, citing the effective date, which shall occur no later than April 1, 2016, the public welfare requiring it.”

The date published by the secretary of state in the Tennessee Administrative Register was March 31, 2016.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Because employer cooperation is a key element in interstate child support enforcement, it is sound policy to state explicitly that an employer who complies with an income-withholding order from another state is immune from civil liability.

36-5-2505. Penalties for noncompliance.

An employer that willfully fails to comply with an income-withholding order issued in another state and received for enforcement is subject to the same penalties that may be imposed for noncompliance with an order issued by a tribunal of this state.

Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Part 20, § 36-5-2001 (Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 2), concerning the short title for title 36, ch. 5, parts 20-29, was repealed and reenacted by Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1, upon completion of the provisions in § 2 of the act. Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 2, as amended by Acts 2016, ch. 664, § 4, provided that: “This act shall take effect when the department of human services files a notice with the secretary of state who shall publish the notice in the Tennessee Administrative Register on the secretary of state's web site, citing the effective date, which shall occur no later than April 1, 2016, the public welfare requiring it.”

The date published by the secretary of state in the Tennessee Administrative Register was March 31, 2016.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Only an employer who willfully fails to comply with an interstate order will be subject to enforcement procedures. Local law is the appropriate source for the applicable sanctions and other remedies available under state law.

36-5-2506. Contest by obligor.

  1. An obligor may contest the validity or enforcement of an income-withholding order issued in another state and received directly by an employer in this state by registering the order in a tribunal of this state and filing a contest to that order as provided in part 26, or otherwise contesting the order in the same manner as if the order had been issued by a tribunal of this state.
  2. The obligor shall give notice of the contest to:
    1. A support enforcement agency providing services to the obligee;
    2. Each employer that has directly received an income-withholding order relating to the obligor; and
    3. The person designated to receive payments in the income-withholding order or, if no person is designated, to the obligee.

Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Part 20, § 36-5-2001 (Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 2), concerning the short title for title 36, ch. 5, parts 20-29, was repealed and reenacted by Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1, upon completion of the provisions in § 2 of the act. Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 2, as amended by Acts 2016, ch. 664, § 4, provided that: “This act shall take effect when the department of human services files a notice with the secretary of state who shall publish the notice in the Tennessee Administrative Register on the secretary of state's web site, citing the effective date, which shall occur no later than April 1, 2016, the public welfare requiring it.”

The date published by the secretary of state in the Tennessee Administrative Register was March 31, 2016.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

This section incorporates into the interstate context the local law regarding defenses an employee-obligor may raise to an income-withholding order. Generally, states have accepted the IV-D requirement that the only viable defense is a mistake of fact, 42 U.S.C. § 666(b)(4)(A). This apparently includes errors in the amount of current support owed, in the amount of accrued arrearage, or mistaken identity of the alleged obligor. Other grounds are excluded, such as inappropriate amount of support ordered, changed financial circumstances of the obligor, or lack of visitation. H.R. Rep. No. 98-527, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 33 (1983). The latter claims must be pursued in a separate proceeding in the appropriate state, not in a UIFSA proceeding.

This procedure is based on the assumption that valid defenses to income withholding for child support are few and far between. Experience has shown that in relatively few cases does an employee-obligor have a complete defense, e.g., the child has died, another contingency ending the support has occurred, the order has been superseded, or there is a case of mistaken identity and the employee is not the obligor. An employee’s complaint that “The child support is too high” must be ignored.

As noted frequently above, instances of multiple orders have become increasingly rare over the past two decades plus. Situations do arise, however, in which an employer has received multiple withholding notices regarding the obligor-employee and the same obligee. The notices may even allege conflicting amounts due, especially for payments on arrears. Additionally, many employees claim to have only learned of default orders when the withholding notice is delivered to the employer. This claim often is based on an assertion that the order being enforced through income withholding was entered without personal jurisdiction over the obligor-employee. A variety of similar fundamental defenses may be asserted, such as mistaken identity, full payment, another order controlling, etc.

Subsection (a) provides for a simple, efficient, and cost-effective method for an employee-alleged obligor to assert a defense. For example, if the existence of a support obligation is acknowledged but the details are at issue, the obligor may register the underlying “controlling” support order with a local tribunal and seek temporary protection pending resolution of the contest. This may be accomplished pro se, employment of private counsel, or by a request for services from the child support enforcement agency of the responding state. Some states provide administrative procedures for challenging the income withholding that may provide quicker resolution of a dispute than a judicially-based registration and hearing process. In the absence of expeditious action by the employee to assert a defense and contest the direct filing of a notice for withholding, however, the employer must begin income withholding in a timely fashion.

Another issue the employee-obligor may raise is that the withholding order received by the employer is not based on the controlling child-support order issued by the tribunal with continuing, exclusive jurisdiction, see  Section 207 [T.C.A. § 36-5-2207], supra . Such a claim does not constitute a defense to the obligation of child support, but does put at issue the identity of the order to which the employer must respond.

The one order system initiated by UIFSA effectively has eliminated the multiple-order system of RURESA, which primarily involved multiple orders by different courts for the same child. At present most “duplicate income withholding orders” involve one state seeking state assigned arrears and another state also seeking arrears, and possibly ongoing support as well. Clearly the employer is in no position to make a decision on how to proceed to resolve such conflicting claims. When multiple orders involve the same employee-obligor and child, or multiple children (including those with other mothers), as a practical matter resort to a responding tribunal to resolve the resulting dispute almost certainly will be necessary.

36-5-2507. Administrative enforcement of orders.

  1. A party or support enforcement agency seeking to enforce a support order or an income-withholding order, or both, issued in another state or a foreign support order may send the documents required for registering the order to a support enforcement agency of this state.
  2. Upon receipt of the documents, the support enforcement agency, without initially seeking to register the order, shall consider and, if appropriate, use any administrative procedure authorized by the law of this state to enforce a support order or an income-withholding order, or both.  If the obligor does not contest administrative enforcement, the order need not be registered.  If the obligor contests the validity or administrative enforcement of the order, the support enforcement agency shall register the order pursuant to parts 20-29 of this chapter.

Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Part 20, § 36-5-2001 (Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 2), concerning the short title for title 36, ch. 5, parts 20-29, was repealed and reenacted by Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1, upon completion of the provisions in § 2 of the act. Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 2, as amended by Acts 2016, ch. 664, § 4, provided that: “This act shall take effect when the department of human services files a notice with the secretary of state who shall publish the notice in the Tennessee Administrative Register on the secretary of state's web site, citing the effective date, which shall occur no later than April 1, 2016, the public welfare requiring it.”

The date published by the secretary of state in the Tennessee Administrative Register was March 31, 2016.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Sections 501 through 506 [T.C.A. §§ 36-5-250136-5-2506] are posited on the belief that U.S. employers ought not be burdened with enforcement of foreign income-withholding orders received directly from overseas. This view is inapplicable if a support enforcement agency is involved. The procedural safeguards built into the Title IV-D system of processing requests between Central Authorities provide reasonable assurance that the income withholding order to be enforced is genuine.

This section authorizes summary enforcement of an interstate or foreign child-support order through the administrative means available for intrastate orders if the agency deems it “appropriate” to do so. Under subsection (a), an interested party in another state or foreign country, which necessarily includes a private attorney or a support enforcement agency, may forward a support order or income-withholding order to a support enforcement agency of the responding state. The term “responding state” in this context does not necessarily contemplate resort to a tribunal as an initial step.

Subsection (b) directs the support enforcement agency in the responding state to consider and, if appropriate, to use that state’s regular administrative procedures to process an out-of-state order. Thus, a local employer accustomed to dealing with the local agency need not change its procedure to comply with an out-of-state order. Similarly, the administrative agency is authorized to apply its ordinary rules equally to both intrastate and interstate orders. For example, if the administrative hearing procedure must be exhausted for an intrastate order before a contesting party may seek relief in a tribunal, the same rule applies to an interstate order received for administrative enforcement. This subsection also makes it clear that filing liens or submitting claims in legal actions do not require the initial registration of the order.

Part 26
Uniform Interstate Family Support Act — Registration, Enforcement, and Modification of Support Order

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Sections 601 through 604 [T.C.A. §§ 36-5-260136-5-2604] establish the basic procedure for the registration of a support order from another state or a foreign support order. Under RURESA when a tribunal of a responding state was requested to register and enforce an existing child-support order, the common practice was to ignore the request; rather, a separate proceeding would be initiated for the establishment of a new support order. This practice was specifically rejected by UIFSA; this practice under RURESA created the multiple support-order system that UIFSA was specifically designed to eliminate. Under Sections 205 through 207  [T.C.A. §§ 36-5-220536-5-2207] the one-order system allows only one existing order to be enforced prospectively.

Sections 605 through 608 [T.C.A. §§ 36-5-260536-5-2608] provide the procedure for the nonregistering party to contest registration of an order, either because the order is allegedly invalid, superseded, or no longer in effect, or because the enforcement remedy being sought is opposed by the nonregistering party. Other enforcement remedies may be available without resort to the UIFSA process under the law of the responding state. See  Section 104 [T.C.A. § 36-5-2103].

The registration and enforcement provisions in Sections 601 through 608 [T.C.A. §§ 36-5-260136-5-2608] are consistent with the “recognition and enforcement” provisions of the Convention. The terms of this article part] and Article 7 [part 7] suffice to direct international support orders into the proper channels.

36-5-2601. Registration of order for enforcement.

A support order or income-withholding order issued in another state or a foreign support order may be registered in this state for enforcement.

Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Part 20, § 36-5-2001 (Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 2), concerning the short title for title 36, ch. 5, parts 20-29, was repealed and reenacted by Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1, upon completion of the provisions in § 2 of the act. Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 2, as amended by Acts 2016, ch. 664, § 4, provided that: “This act shall take effect when the department of human services files a notice with the secretary of state who shall publish the notice in the Tennessee Administrative Register on the secretary of state's web site, citing the effective date, which shall occur no later than April 1, 2016, the public welfare requiring it.”

The date published by the secretary of state in the Tennessee Administrative Register was March 31, 2016.

Attorney General Opinions. Registration and enforcement of foreign child support orders, OAG 99-163, 1999 Tenn. AG LEXIS 145 (8/19/99).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Decisions Under Prior Law

1. Illustrative Cases.

Where chancery court enforced parts of the Kansas court's divorce decree by reducing the husband's share of the parties' Tennessee marital property by the amounts of the child support arrearage and discovery-related sanction assessed by the Kansas court, that enforcement violated the registration and notice provisions of the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act's (UIFSA), specifically T.C.A. § 36-5-2601 to T.C.A.§ 36-5-2607, because the Kansas court's decree was never registered in Tennessee and the husband was never provided notice of the registration or an opportunity to contest the validity and enforcement of the decree. Jolly v. Jolly, 130 S.W.3d 783, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 251 (Tenn. 2004), rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 332 (Tenn. 2004), review or rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 591 (Tenn. 2005).

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Registration of an order in a tribunal of the responding state is the first step to enforce a support order from another state or foreign country. If a prior support order has been validly issued by a tribunal with continuing, exclusive jurisdiction, see  Section 205 [T.C.A. § 36-5-2205], such an order is to be prospectively enforced against the obligor in the absence of narrow, strictly defined fact situations in which an existing order may be modified. See  Sections 609 through 614 [T.C.A. §§ 36-5-260936-5-2614]. Until and unless that order is modified, however, it remains an order of the issuing tribunal and is fully enforceable in the responding state.

Although registration that is not accompanied by a request for the affirmative relief of enforcement is not prohibited, the act does not contemplate registration as serving a purpose in itself. In that regard, registration is a process, and the failure to register does not deprive an otherwise appropriate forum of subject matter jurisdiction. Note that either or both a state support order or a state income-withholding order may be registered. However, although a foreign support order also may be registered, this section does not contemplate recognition of a foreign income-withholding order.

Related to Convention: art. 23. Procedure on an application for recognition and enforcement; art. 26. Procedure on an application for recognition.

36-5-2602. Procedure to register order for enforcement.

  1. Except as otherwise provided in § 36-5-2706, a support order or income-withholding order of another state or a foreign support order may be registered in this state by sending the following records to the appropriate tribunal in this state:
    1. A letter of transmittal to the tribunal requesting registration and enforcement;
    2. Two (2) copies, including one (1) certified copy, of the order to be registered, including any modification of the order;
    3. A sworn statement by the person requesting registration or a certified statement by the custodian of the records showing the amount of any arrearage;
    4. The name of the obligor and, if known:
      1. The obligor’s address and social security number;
      2. The name and address of the obligor’s employer and any other source of income of the obligor; and
      3. A description and the location of property of the obligor in this state not exempt from execution; and
    5. Except as otherwise provided in § 36-5-2312, the name and address of the obligee and, if applicable, the person to whom support payments are to be remitted.
  2. On receipt of a request for registration, the registering tribunal shall cause the order to be filed as an order of a tribunal of another state or a foreign support order, together with one (1) copy of the documents and information, regardless of their form.
  3. A petition or comparable pleading seeking a remedy that must be affirmatively sought under other law of this state may be filed at the same time as the request for registration or later.  The pleading must specify the grounds for the remedy sought.
  4. If two (2)  or more orders are in effect, the person requesting registration shall:
    1. Furnish to the tribunal a copy of every support order asserted to be in effect in addition to the documents specified in this section;
    2. Specify the order alleged to be the controlling order, if any; and
    3. Specify the amount of consolidated arrears, if any.
  5. A request for a determination of which is the controlling order may be filed separately or with a request for registration and enforcement or for registration and modification.  The person requesting registration shall give notice of the request to each party whose rights may be affected by the determination.

Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Part 20, § 36-5-2001 (Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 2), concerning the short title for title 36, ch. 5, parts 20-29, was repealed and reenacted by Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1, upon completion of the provisions in § 2 of the act. Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 2, as amended by Acts 2016, ch. 664, § 4, provided that: “This act shall take effect when the department of human services files a notice with the secretary of state who shall publish the notice in the Tennessee Administrative Register on the secretary of state's web site, citing the effective date, which shall occur no later than April 1, 2016, the public welfare requiring it.”

The date published by the secretary of state in the Tennessee Administrative Register was March 31, 2016.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Decisions Under Prior Law

1. Illustrative Cases.

Where chancery court enforced parts of the Kansas court's divorce decree by reducing the husband's share of the parties' Tennessee marital property by the amounts of the child support arrearage and discovery-related sanction assessed by the Kansas court, that enforcement violated the registration and notice provisions of the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act's (UIFSA), specifically T.C.A. § 36-5-2601 to  T.C.A.§ 36-5-2607, because the Kansas court's decree was never registered in Tennessee and the husband was never provided notice of the registration or an opportunity to contest the validity and enforcement of the decree. Jolly v. Jolly, 130 S.W.3d 783, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 251 (Tenn. 2004), rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 332 (Tenn. 2004), review or rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 591 (Tenn. 2005).

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Subsection (a) outlines the mechanics for registration of an interstate or foreign support order. Substantial compliance with the requirements is expected. The procedure for registration and enforcement set forth in this section is basically unchanged for a foreign support order; indeed, all of Sections 601 through 608 [T.C.A. §§ 36-5-260136-5-2608] apply. The requirement that the order be “issued by a tribunal” has been subtly modified. Although the vast majority of enforceable support orders will be from a tribunal, in relatively rare instances an enforceable “foreign support order” from a Convention country will not have been issued by a tribunal, see e.g. , Section 710 [T.C.A. § 36-5-2710], infra . Note, however, that a request for registration of a foreign support order for which the Convention is in force is subject to Section 706 [T.C.A. § 36-5-2706]. This is because the list of documents comprising the required record in subsection (a) differs in a measurable degree with Convention art. 11 and 25.

Millions of interstate domestic cases have been, and will continue to be, processed under the procedure specified in this section. It has been estimated that only approximately one-tenth of one percent (0.1%) of the Title IV-D caseload involve a foreign support order. Thus, the documentation specified by this section is the same for interstate and non-Convention foreign support orders. A support order from a Convention country is covered by the separate list of specifications in Section 706 [T.C.A. § 36-5-2706] to accommodate the differences between this act and the Convention. Because child-support enforcement agencies have successfully dealt with foreign support orders with increasing frequency during the UIFSA era, this may well prove to be a distinction without much difference.

Subsection (b) confirms that the support order being registered is not converted into an order of the responding state; rather, it continues to be an order of the tribunal of the issuing state or foreign country.

Subsection (c) warns that if a particular enforcement remedy must be specifically sought under local law, the same rules of procedure and substantive law apply to an interstate or international case. For example, if license suspension or revocation is sought as a remedy for alleged noncompliance with an order, the substantive and procedural rules of the responding state apply. Whether the range of application of the remedy in the responding state is wider or narrower than that available in the issuing state or foreign country is irrelevant. The responding tribunal will apply the familiar law of its state, and is neither expected nor authorized to consider the enforcement laws of the issuing state or foreign country. In short, the responding tribunal follows the identical path for enforcing the order of a tribunal of another state or foreign country as it would when enforcing an order of the responding state. The authorization of a later filing to comply with local law contemplates that interstate or international pleadings may be liberally amended to conform to local practice.

Subsections (d) and (e) amplify the procedures to be followed when two or more child-support orders exist and registration for enforcement is sought. In such instances, the requester is directed to furnish the tribunal with sufficient information and documentation so that the tribunal may make a determination of the controlling order for prospective support and of the amount of consolidated arrears and interest accrued under all valid orders. See  Section 207 [T.C.A. § 36-5-2207].

Related to Convention: art. 11. Application contents; art. 20. Bases for recognition and enforcement; art. 21. Severability and partial recognition and enforcement; art. 22. Grounds for refusing recognition and enforcement; art. 23. Procedure on an application for recognition and enforcement; art. 25. Documents.

36-5-2603. Effect of registration for enforcement.

  1. A support order or income-withholding order issued in another state or a foreign support order is registered when the order is filed in the registering tribunal of this state.
  2. A registered support order issued in another state or a foreign country is enforceable in the same manner and is subject to the same procedures as an order issued by a tribunal of this state.
  3. Except as otherwise provided in parts 20-29 of this chapter, a tribunal of this state shall recognize and enforce, but may not modify, a registered support order if the issuing tribunal had jurisdiction.

Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Part 20, § 36-5-2001 (Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 2), concerning the short title for title 36, ch. 5, parts 20-29, was repealed and reenacted by Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1, upon completion of the provisions in § 2 of the act. Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 2, as amended by Acts 2016, ch. 664, § 4, provided that: “This act shall take effect when the department of human services files a notice with the secretary of state who shall publish the notice in the Tennessee Administrative Register on the secretary of state's web site, citing the effective date, which shall occur no later than April 1, 2016, the public welfare requiring it.”

The date published by the secretary of state in the Tennessee Administrative Register was March 31, 2016.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Initially the text of the registration procedure under UIFSA (1992) was nearly identical to that set forth in RURESA. But, the intent of UIFSA registration was always radically different. Under UIFSA, registration of a support order of State A continues to be an order of that state, which is to be enforced by a tribunal of State B. The ordinary rules of evidence and procedure of State B apply to hearings, except as local law may be supplemented or specifically superseded by other local law, i.e., UIFSA. The purpose of the registration procedure in sections 601 through 604 [T.C.A. §§ 36-5-260136-5-2604] is that the order being registered remains a State A order until modified.

First, note that subsection (a) is phrased in the passive voice; “A support order … is registered when the order is filed in the registering tribunal ….” This drafting is deliberate. By indirection, in effect UIFSA provides that either the obligor, the obligee, or a support enforcement agency, may register a support order of another state or a foreign support order. In fact, even a stranger to the litigation, for example a grandparent or an employer of an alleged obligor, may register a support order. Presumptively, the order registered is the valid, controlling order. If not, the act depends on the respondent to contest the registration. See  Sections 605 through 608 [T.C.A. §§ 36-5-260536-5-2608].

Subsection (b) provides that a support order of another state or a foreign support order is to be enforced and satisfied in the same manner as if it had been issued by a tribunal of the registering state. Conceptually, the responding tribunal is enforcing the order of a tribunal of another state or a foreign support order, not its own order.

Subsection (c) mandates enforcement of the registered order, but forbids modification unless the terms of Sections 609 through 614 [T.C.A. §§ 36-5-260936-5-2614] are met. Under UIFSA there will be only one order in existence at any one time. That order is enforceable in a responding state irrespective of whether the order may be modified. In most instances, a child-support order will be subject to the continuing, exclusive jurisdiction of the issuing tribunal. Sometimes the issuing tribunal will not be able to exercise its authority to modify the order because neither the child nor the parties reside in the issuing state. Nonetheless, the order may be registered and is fully enforceable in a responding state until the potential for modification actually occurs in accordance with the strict terms for such a proceeding. See  Section 611 [T.C.A. § 36-5-2611]. Thus, the registering tribunal always must bear in mind that the enforcement procedures taken, whether to enforce current support or to assist collecting current and future arrears and interest, are made on behalf of the issuing tribunal, and are not a modification of the controlling order.

Related to Convention: art. 11. Application contents; art. 20. Bases for recognition and enforcement; art. 21. Severability and partial recognition and enforcement; art. 22. Grounds for refusing recognition and enforcement; art. 23. Procedure on an application for recognition and enforcement; art. 25. Documents.

36-5-2604. Choice of law.

  1. Except as otherwise provided in subsection (d), the law of the issuing state or foreign country governs:
    1. The nature, extent, amount, and duration of current payments under a registered support order;
    2. The computation and payment of arrearages and accrual of interest on the arrearages under the support order; and
    3. The existence and satisfaction of other obligations under the support order.
  2. In a proceeding for arrears under a registered support order, the statute of limitation of this state, or of the issuing state or foreign country, whichever is longer, applies.
  3. A responding tribunal of this state shall apply the procedures and remedies of this state to enforce current support and collect arrears and interest due on a support order of another state or a foreign country registered in this state.
  4. After a tribunal of this state or another state determines which is the controlling order and issues an order consolidating arrears, if any, a tribunal of this state shall prospectively apply the law of the state or foreign country issuing the controlling order, including its law on interest on arrears, on current and future support, and on consolidated arrears.

Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Part 20, § 36-5-2001 (Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 2), concerning the short title for title 36, ch. 5, parts 20-29, was repealed and reenacted by Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1, upon completion of the provisions in § 2 of the act. Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 2, as amended by Acts 2016, ch. 664, § 4, provided that: “This act shall take effect when the department of human services files a notice with the secretary of state who shall publish the notice in the Tennessee Administrative Register on the secretary of state's web site, citing the effective date, which shall occur no later than April 1, 2016, the public welfare requiring it.”

The date published by the secretary of state in the Tennessee Administrative Register was March 31, 2016.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Subsection (a) is intended to clarify the wide range of subjects that are governed by the choice-of-law rules established in this section. The task is to identify those aspects of the case for which local law is inapplicable. A basic principle of UIFSA is that throughout the process the controlling order remains the order of the tribunal of the issuing state or foreign country until a valid modification. The responding tribunal only assists in the enforcement of that order. Absent a loss of continuing, exclusive jurisdiction by the issuing tribunal and a subsequent modification of the order, the order never becomes an order of a responding tribunal.

Subsection (a) first identifies those aspects of the initial child-support order that are governed by the term’s original decision and the function of the issuing tribunal. First and foremost, ultimate responsibility for enforcement and final resolution of the obligor’s compliance with all aspects of the support order belongs to the issuing tribunal. Thus, calculation of whether the obligor has fully complied with the payment of current support, arrears, and interest on arrears is also the duty of the issuing tribunal.

In UIFSA (1992) the decision was made by NCCUSL that the duration of child support should be fixed by the initial controlling child-support order. See  Section 611(c) [T.C.A. § 36-5-2611(c)]. This policy decision was somewhat controversial at the time, especially given the general rule that “local law controls.” But, case law regarding issues created by movement from one state with one duration to a state with another policy was hopelessly muddled, so a solution was sought. Then, as now, the policies of states on this subject varied greatly: today, a few states continue to set the once most-common age of 21 as the cut-off date; some continue the obligation past 21, dependent on enrollment in higher education (often with limited time specified); at the other end of the spectrum, some states end the obligation of child support at age 18; in others at 19; and, most popularly, at one or the other of either age 18 or 19, plus graduation from high school, whichever is later.

Under subsection (a), if the initial issuing tribunal sets the age for termination of child support at 18, a responding state must recognize and enforce that child-support order. If the responding state sets its child support to age 21, the responding tribunal may not apply that time duration to require additional support to that age. The converse is also true. If the controlling order of another state ends the support obligation at 21, the responding tribunal in a state with 18 as the maximum duration for child support must enforce the controlling order until age 21. The dissent on this policy decision in UIFSA has abated over time. Interestingly, the Convention establishes age 21 as the hallmark. At the same time, under Convention art. 2(2), a country may reserve the right to limit the application of the Convention with regard to child support to persons who have not reached the age of 18. The United States does not intend to make such a reservation.

Similarly, subsection (a) directs that the law of the issuing state or foreign country governs the answer to questions such as whether a payment made for the benefit of a child, such as a Social Security benefit for a child of a disabled obligor, should be credited against the obligor’s child support obligation. In sum, on these subjects the consistent rule is that a controlling order from State A is enforced in State B (and State C as well).

Note that as soon as a general proposition is identified, an exception may well be presented. Subsection (b) contains a choice-of-law provision that often diverges from other local law. In situations in which the statutes of limitation differ from state to state, the statute with the longer term is to be applied. In interstate cases, arrearages often will have accumulated over a considerable period of time before enforcement is perfected. The rationale for this exception to the general rule of “local law applies” is that the obligor should not gain an undue benefit from his or her choice of residence if the forum state, as the obligor’s state of residence, has a shorter statute of limitations for arrearages than does the controlling order state. On the other side of the coin, i.e., if the forum has a longer statute of limitations, the obligor will be treated in an identical manner as all other obligors in that state. This choice of limitations also applies to the time period after the accrual of the arrears in which to bring an enforcement action.

Subsection (c) mandates that local law controls with regard to enforcement procedures. For example, if the issuing state or foreign country has enacted a wide variety of license suspension or revocation statutes, while the responding state has a much narrower list of licenses subject to suspension or revocation, local law prevails.

Subsection (d) may initially appear only to express a truism—the law of the issuing state is superior with regard to the terms of the support order. The last clause in the sentence, however, contains an important clarifying provision; that is, the law of the issuing state or foreign country is to be applied to the consolidated arrears, most particularly to the interest to be charged prospectively, even if the support orders of other states contributed a portion to those arrears. In sum, the local tribunal applies its own familiar procedures to enforce a support order, but it is clearly enforcing an order of a tribunal of another state and not an order of the forum.

Related to Convention: art. 2. Scope; art. 11. Application contents; art. 20. Bases for recognition and enforcement; art. 21. Severability and partial recognition and enforcement; art. 22. Grounds for refusing recognition and enforcement; art. 23. Procedure on an application for recognition and enforcement; art. 25. Documents.

36-5-2605. Notice of registration of order.

  1. When a support order or income-withholding order issued in another state or a foreign support order is registered, the registering tribunal of this state shall notify the nonregistering party.  The notice must be accompanied by a copy of the registered order and the documents and relevant information accompanying the order.
  2. A notice must inform the nonregistering party:
    1. That a registered support order is enforceable as of the date of registration in the same manner as an order issued by a tribunal of this state;
    2. That a hearing to contest the validity or enforcement of the registered order must be requested within twenty (20) days after notice unless the registered order is under § 36-5-2707;
    3. That failure to contest the validity or enforcement of the registered order in a timely manner will result in confirmation of the order and enforcement of the order and the alleged arrearages; and
    4. Of the amount of any alleged arrearages.
  3. If the registering party asserts that two (2) or more orders are in effect, a notice must also:
    1. Identify the two (2) or more orders and the order alleged by the registering party to be the controlling order and the consolidated arrears, if any;
    2. Notify the nonregistering party of the right to a determination of which is the controlling order;
    3. State that the procedures provided in subsection (b) apply to the determination of which is the controlling order; and
    4. State that failure to contest the validity or enforcement of the order alleged to be the controlling order in a timely manner may result in confirmation that the order is the controlling order.
  4. Upon registration of an income-withholding order for enforcement, the support enforcement agency or the registering tribunal shall notify the obligor’s employer pursuant to part 5 of this chapter.

Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Part 20, § 36-5-2001 (Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 2), concerning the short title for title 36, ch. 5, parts 20-29, was repealed and reenacted by Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1, upon completion of the provisions in § 2 of the act. Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 2, as amended by Acts 2016, ch. 664, § 4, provided that: “This act shall take effect when the department of human services files a notice with the secretary of state who shall publish the notice in the Tennessee Administrative Register on the secretary of state's web site, citing the effective date, which shall occur no later than April 1, 2016, the public welfare requiring it.”

The date published by the secretary of state in the Tennessee Administrative Register was March 31, 2016.

Attorney General Opinions. Registration and enforcement of foreign child support orders, OAG 99-163, 1999 Tenn. AG LEXIS 145 (8/19/99).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Decisions Under Prior Law

1. Illustrative Cases.

Where chancery court enforced parts of the Kansas court's divorce decree by reducing the husband's share of the parties' Tennessee marital property by the amounts of the child support arrearage and discovery-related sanction assessed by the Kansas court, that enforcement violated the registration and notice provisions of the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act's (UIFSA), specifically T.C.A. § 36-5-2601 to T.C.A.§ 36-5-2607, because the Kansas court's decree was never registered in Tennessee and the husband was never provided notice of the registration or an opportunity to contest the validity and enforcement of the decree. Jolly v. Jolly, 130 S.W.3d 783, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 251 (Tenn. 2004), rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 332 (Tenn. 2004), review or rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 591 (Tenn. 2005).

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Subsection (a) requires the registering tribunal to provide notice to the nonregistering party of the effect of registration. After such notice is given, absent a successful contest by the nonregistering party, the order will be confirmed and future contest will be precluded. The notice contemplates far more than merely announcing an intent to initiate enforcement of an existing support order. The registered order or orders and other relevant documents and information must accompany the notice, including details about the alleged arrears.

Subsection (b) provides the nonregistering party with a wealth of information about the proceeding, including that: (1) the order is immediately enforceable; (2) a hearing must be requested within a relatively short time; (3) failure to contest “will result” in a confirmation of the order (roughly the equivalent of a default judgment); and (4) the amount of arrears, if any. Initially subsection (b) made the suggestion, via brackets, that [20] days be the time within which a request for a hearing to contest the support order be made. The rationale for this relatively short period was that the matter had already been litigated, and the obligor had already had the requisite “day in court,” and was allegedly in default of a known order. Moreover, advocates of child-support enforcement stressed the necessity of quick resolution of an instance of nonsupport.

On the other hand, the Convention requires notice of hearing to be within a fixed time of 30 days, and further a fixed time of 60 days if the respondent resides in a foreign country. See  Convention art. 23(6). This difference between UIFSA and the Convention is accommodated in Section 707 [T.C.A. § 36-5-2707]. The time frame for notice of registration for an interstate support order and a foreign support order not subject to the Convention will be established by local law.

Subsection (c) is the correlative to Section 602 [T.C.A. § 36-5-2602] regarding the notice to be given to the nonregistering party if determination of a controlling order must be made because of the existence of two or more child-support orders. The petitioner requesting this affirmative relief is directed to identify the order alleged to be controlling under Section 207 [T.C.A. § 36-5-2207].

Subsection (d) states the obvious; i.e., the obligor’s employer also must be notified if income is to be withheld. Often this will not be necessary if the employer has already been notified by the responding state’s enforcement agency via the administrative process established in Section 507 [T.C.A. § 36-5-2507].

Related to Convention: art. 20. Bases for recognition and enforcement; art. 23. Procedure on an application for recognition and enforcement.

36-5-2606. Procedure to contest validity or enforcement of registered support order.

  1. A nonregistering party seeking to contest the validity or enforcement of a registered support order in this state shall request a hearing within the time required by § 36-5-2605. The nonregistering party may seek to vacate the registration, to assert any defense to an allegation of noncompliance with the registered order, or to contest the remedies being sought or the amount of any alleged arrearages pursuant to § 36-5-2607.
  2. If the nonregistering party fails to contest the validity or enforcement of the registered support order in a timely manner, the order is confirmed by operation of law.
  3. If a nonregistering party requests a hearing to contest the validity or enforcement of the registered support order, the registering tribunal shall schedule the matter for hearing and give notice to the parties of the date, time, and place of the hearing.

Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Part 20, § 36-5-2001 (Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 2), concerning the short title for title 36, ch. 5, parts 20-29, was repealed and reenacted by Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1, upon completion of the provisions in § 2 of the act. Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 2, as amended by Acts 2016, ch. 664, § 4, provided that: “This act shall take effect when the department of human services files a notice with the secretary of state who shall publish the notice in the Tennessee Administrative Register on the secretary of state's web site, citing the effective date, which shall occur no later than April 1, 2016, the public welfare requiring it.”

The date published by the secretary of state in the Tennessee Administrative Register was March 31, 2016.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Subsection (a) directs the “nonregistering party” to contest the registration of an interstate support order or a foreign support order not subject to the Convention within a short period of time or forfeit the opportunity to contest. As noted in Section 605 [T.C.A. § 36-5-2605], that time frame is extended for cases subject to the Convention.

Notice of registration is the first step for enforcement or modification of another state’s child-support order. Once the nonregistering party is put on notice of the registration, if an error allegedly has been made, the second step is crucial. The nonregistering party is required to assert any existing defense to the alleged controlling order, or forfeit the opportunity to contest the allegations. Note that either the obligor or the obligee may have objections to the registered order, although in the vast majority of cases the obligor is the nonregistering party.

On the other hand, there is a possibility that in multiple-order situations either party may register the order most favorable to that party rather than register the likely controlling order, thus triggering a contest. Deliberately furnishing misinformation regarding the controlling order doubtless constitutes chicanery, which is contrary to Section 605(c) [T.C.A. § 36-5-2605(c)]. When a support enforcement agency requests registration, Section 307(c) [T.C.A. § 36-5-2307(c)] requires reasonable efforts to ensure registration of the proper controlling order. Nonetheless, there may be an honest difference of opinion as to which order controls. The nonregistering obligor has a significant stake in assuring that both the order and the arrears are correctly stated.

Under UIFSA a contest of the fundamental provisions of the registered order is not permitted in the responding state. The nonregistering party must return to the issuing state or foreign country to prosecute such a contest (only as the law of that state or foreign country permits). This approach is akin to the prohibition found in Section 315 [T.C.A. § 36-5-2315] against asserting a nonparentage defense in a UIFSA proceeding. There is no attempt by UIFSA to preclude a collateral attack on the support order from being litigated in the appropriate forum.

Subsection (b) precludes an untimely contest of a registered support order.

Subsection (c) directs that a hearing be scheduled when the nonregistering party contests some aspect of the registration.

Related to Convention: art. 20. Bases for recognition and enforcement; art. 22. Grounds for refusing recognition and enforcement; art. 23. Procedure on an application for recognition and enforcement; art. 26. Procedure on an application for recognition.

36-5-2607. Contest of registration or enforcement.

  1. A party contesting the validity or enforcement of a registered support order or seeking to vacate the registration has the burden of proving one (1) or more of the following defenses:
    1. The issuing tribunal lacked personal jurisdiction over the contesting party;
    2. The order was obtained by fraud;
    3. The order has been vacated, suspended, or modified by a later order;
    4. The issuing tribunal has stayed the order pending appeal;
    5. There is a defense under the law of this state to the remedy sought;
    6. Full or partial payment has been made;
    7. The statute of limitation under § 36-5-2604 precludes enforcement of some or all of the alleged arrearages; or
    8. The alleged controlling order is not the controlling order.
  2. If a party presents evidence establishing a full or partial defense under subsection (a), a tribunal may stay enforcement of the registered support order, continue the proceeding to permit production of additional relevant evidence, and issue other appropriate orders.  An uncontested portion of the registered support order may be enforced by all remedies available under the law of this state.
  3. If the contesting party does not establish a defense under subsection (a) to the validity or enforcement of a registered support order, the registering tribunal shall issue an order confirming the order.

Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Part 20, § 36-5-2001 (Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 2), concerning the short title for title 36, ch. 5, parts 20-29, was repealed and reenacted by Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1, upon completion of the provisions in § 2 of the act. Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 2, as amended by Acts 2016, ch. 664, § 4, provided that: “This act shall take effect when the department of human services files a notice with the secretary of state who shall publish the notice in the Tennessee Administrative Register on the secretary of state's web site, citing the effective date, which shall occur no later than April 1, 2016, the public welfare requiring it.”

The date published by the secretary of state in the Tennessee Administrative Register was March 31, 2016.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Decisions Under Prior Law

1. Illustrative Cases.

Where chancery court enforced parts of the Kansas court's divorce decree by reducing the husband's share of the parties' Tennessee marital property by the amounts of the child support arrearage and discovery-related sanction assessed by the Kansas court, that enforcement violated the registration and notice provisions of the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act's (UIFSA), specifically T.C.A. § 36-5-2601 to T.C.A.§ 36-5-2607, because the Kansas court's decree was never registered in Tennessee and the husband was never provided notice of the registration or an opportunity to contest the validity and enforcement of the decree. Jolly v. Jolly, 130 S.W.3d 783, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 251 (Tenn. 2004), rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 332 (Tenn. 2004), review or rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 591 (Tenn. 2005).

Trial court had subject matter jurisdiction under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act to register and enforce a child support order entered in a California divorce proceeding against a father because there was no evidence to establish the father had a defense under T.C.A. § 36-5-2607 to set aside the order; the father owed $ 114,033 in child support arrears. State ex rel. Saucier v. Parker, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. App. LEXIS 243 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 9, 2013).

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Subsection (a) places the burden on the nonregistering party to assert narrowly defined defenses to registration of a support order. The first of the listed defenses, lack of personal jurisdiction over the nonregistering party in the original proceeding, is undoubtedly the most widely discussed topic. It appears that at the appellate level, several of the other listed defenses are more commonly asserted. The decision in Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978) was somewhat controversial when delivered, and has remained so, at least in the international context. As a practical matter, however, the requirement that a support order be based on personal jurisdiction over both parties—but primarily the obligor—is a well-established fixture in the jurisprudence of the United States; relatively few appellate cases on this subject have been reported.

A nonregistering obligor may assert a wide variety of listed defenses, such as “payment” or “the obligation has terminated,” in response to allegations of noncompliance with the registered order. There is no defense, however, to registration of a valid foreign support order. The nonregistering party also may contest the allegedly controlling order because its terms have been modified. Or, the defense may be based on the existence of a different controlling order. See  Section 207 [T.C.A. § 36-5-2207]. Presumably this defense must be substantiated by registration of the alleged controlling order to be effective.

While subsection (a)(6) [subdivision (a)(6)] is couched in terms that imply the defense to the amount of alleged arrears can only be that they are less, the converse is also available. For example, if the registering party is the obligor and asserts an amount of arrears that the obligee believes is too low, as the nonregistering party the obligee must contest to preclude confirmation of the alleged amount.

In the absence of a valid defense, if the obligor is found to be liable for current support, the registering tribunal must enter an order to enforce that obligation. Additional proof of arrearages must also result in enforcement under the Bradley Amendment, 42 U.S.C. Section 666(a)(10), which requires all states to treat child-support payments as final judgments as they come due (or lose federal funding). Therefore, federal law precludes arrearages from being subject to retroactive modification. Future modification of a child support order from another state is governed by Sections 609-614 [T.C.A. §§ 36-5-260936-5-2614], and Sections 615-616 [T.C.A. §§ 36-5-2615, 36-5-2616] regulate modification of foreign child support orders.

Subsection (c) provides that failure to contest a registered order successfully requires the tribunal to confirm the validity of the registered order.

Related to Convention: art. 26. Procedure on an application for recognition.

36-5-2608. Confirmed order.

Confirmation of a registered support order, whether by operation of law or after notice and hearing, precludes further contest of the order with respect to any matter that could have been asserted at the time of registration.

Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Part 20, § 36-5-2001 (Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 2), concerning the short title for title 36, ch. 5, parts 20-29, was repealed and reenacted by Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1, upon completion of the provisions in § 2 of the act. Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 2, as amended by Acts 2016, ch. 664, § 4, provided that: “This act shall take effect when the department of human services files a notice with the secretary of state who shall publish the notice in the Tennessee Administrative Register on the secretary of state's web site, citing the effective date, which shall occur no later than April 1, 2016, the public welfare requiring it.”

The date published by the secretary of state in the Tennessee Administrative Register was March 31, 2016.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

If, after notice, the nonregistering party fails to contest, the registered support order is confirmed by operation of law and no further action by a responding tribunal is necessary. Although the statute is not explicit on the subject, it seems likely in the absence of a contest both the registering and nonregistering party would be estopped from subsequently collaterally attacking the confirmed order, whether on the basis that “the wrong order was registered” or otherwise.

If contested, a registered support order must be confirmed by the responding tribunal if, after a hearing, the defenses authorized in Section 607 [T.C.A. § 36-5-2607] are rejected. Thus, either scenario precludes the nonregistering party from raising any issue that could have been asserted in a hearing. Confirmation of a support order, whether by action or as the result of inaction, validates both the terms of the order and the asserted arrearages.

Related to Convention: art. 22. Grounds for refusing recognition and enforcement; art. 26. Procedure on an application for recognition.

C.
Registration and Modification of Child Support Order of Another State

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Authority to modify a child-support order of another state depends on the interaction of these sections with the continuing, exclusive jurisdiction of the issuing tribunal. See  Sections 205 through 206 [T.C.A. §§ 36-5-2205, 36-5-2206]. This also might involve the determination of the controlling order in a situation involving multiple child-support orders. These concepts are not present in the international context. See  Sections 615, 616, and 711 [T.C.A. §§ 36-5-2615, 36-5-2616, 36-5-2711]. Thus, modification of a support order from a foreign country other than a Convention country is not governed by Sections 609-614 [T.C.A. §§ 36-5-2609 —36-5-2614], but is subject to Sections 615-616 [T.C.A. §§ 36-5-2615, 36-5-2616], infra .

Sections 609 through 614 [T.C.A. §§ 36-5-2609 —36-5-2614] apply only to modification of an interstate child-support order. Most of the act applies to “a support order,” which includes both child-support and spousal support. Both categories are generally subject to interstate enforcement under UIFSA. But, as a practical matter, the actual process of that enforcement is quite different. Child support is enforced almost exclusively by governmentally sponsored Title IV-D agencies, which also may enforce spousal support if it is included in the same order. In some states, local funds are appropriated for enforcement of spousal support as well. Only occasionally will a private attorney be involved in a child-support case, but spousal support not issued in conjunction with a child-support order generally requires representation pro se or by private counsel. More importantly, a tribunal of a responding state may enforce spousal support, but it does not have authority to modify a spousal-support order of another state or foreign country unless the law of that jurisdiction does not assert continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over its order. See  Section 211 [T.C.A. § 36-5-2211].

36-5-2609. Procedure to register child support order of another state for modification.

A party or support enforcement agency seeking to modify, or to modify and enforce, a child support order issued in another state shall register that order in this state in the same manner provided in §§ 36-5-260136-5-2608 if the order has not been registered.  A petition for modification may be filed at the same time as a request for registration, or later.  The pleading must specify the grounds for modification.

Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Part 20, § 36-5-2001 (Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 2), concerning the short title for title 36, ch. 5, parts 20-29, was repealed and reenacted by Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1, upon completion of the provisions in § 2 of the act. Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 2, as amended by Acts 2016, ch. 664, § 4, provided that: “This act shall take effect when the department of human services files a notice with the secretary of state who shall publish the notice in the Tennessee Administrative Register on the secretary of state's web site, citing the effective date, which shall occur no later than April 1, 2016, the public welfare requiring it.”

The date published by the secretary of state in the Tennessee Administrative Register was March 31, 2016.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Sections 609 through 614  [T.C.A. §§ 36-5-2609 —36-5-2614] deal with situations in which it is permissible for a registering state to modify the existing child-support order of another state. The first step for modification of another state’s child-support order is registration in the responding tribunal under Sections 601 to 604 [T.C.A. §§ 36-5-2601 —36-5-2604]. In some situations, this may also involve identification of the controlling order. A petitioner wishing to register a support order of another state for purposes of modification must conform to the general requirements for pleadings in Section 311 [T.C.A. § 36-5-2311], and follow the procedure for registration set forth in Section 602 [T.C.A. § 36-5-2602]. If the tribunal has the requisite personal jurisdiction over the parties and may assume subject matter jurisdiction as provided in Sections 611 or 613 [T.C.A. §§ 36-5-2611 or 36-5-2613, modification may be sought independently, in conjunction with registration and enforcement, or at a later date after the order has been registered and enforced if circumstances have changed.

36-5-2610. Effect of registration for modification.

A tribunal of this state may enforce a child support order of another state registered for purposes of modification, in the same manner as if the order had been issued by a tribunal of this state, but the registered support order may be modified only if the requirements of § 36-5-2611 or § 36-5-2613 have been met.

Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Part 20, § 36-5-2001 (Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 2), concerning the short title for title 36, ch. 5, parts 20-29, was repealed and reenacted by Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1, upon completion of the provisions in § 2 of the act. Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 2, as amended by Acts 2016, ch. 664, § 4, provided that: “This act shall take effect when the department of human services files a notice with the secretary of state who shall publish the notice in the Tennessee Administrative Register on the secretary of state's web site, citing the effective date, which shall occur no later than April 1, 2016, the public welfare requiring it.”

The date published by the secretary of state in the Tennessee Administrative Register was March 31, 2016.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

An order issued in another state registered for purposes of modification may be enforced in the same manner as an order registered for purposes of enforcement. But, the power of the forum tribunal to modify a child-support order of another tribunal is limited by the specific factual preconditions set forth in Sections 611 and 613 [T.C.A. §§ 36-5-2611 and 36-5-2613].

36-5-2611. Modification of child support order of another state.

  1. If § 36-5-2613 does not apply, upon petition a tribunal of this state may modify a child support order issued in another state which is registered in this state if, after notice and hearing, the tribunal finds that:
    1. The following requirements are met:
      1. Neither the child, nor the obligee who is an individual, nor the obligor resides in the issuing state;
      2. A petitioner who is a nonresident of this state seeks modification; and
      3. The respondent is subject to the personal jurisdiction of the tribunal of this state; or
    2. This state is the state of residence of the child, or a party who is an individual is subject to the personal jurisdiction of the tribunal of this state, and all of the parties who are individuals have filed consents in a record in the issuing tribunal for a tribunal of this state to modify the support order and assume continuing, exclusive jurisdiction.
  2. Modification of a registered child support order is subject to the same requirements, procedures, and defenses that apply to the modification of an order issued by a tribunal of this state and the order may be enforced and satisfied in the same manner.
  3. A tribunal of this state may not modify any aspect of a child support order that may not be modified under the law of the issuing state, including the duration of the obligation of support.  If two or more tribunals have issued child support orders for the same obligor and same child, the order that controls and must be so recognized under § 36-5-2207 establishes the aspects of the support order which are nonmodifiable.
  4. In a proceeding to modify a child support order, the law of the state that is determined to have issued the initial controlling order governs the duration of the obligation of support.  The obligor’s fulfillment of the duty of support established by that order precludes imposition of a further obligation of support by a tribunal of this state.
  5. On the issuance of an order by a tribunal of this state modifying a child support order issued in another state, the tribunal of this state becomes the tribunal having continuing, exclusive jurisdiction.
  6. Notwithstanding subsections (a)-(e) and § 36-5-2201(b), a tribunal of this state retains jurisdiction to modify an order issued by a tribunal of this state if:
    1. One party resides in another state; and
    2. The other party resides outside the United States.

Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Part 20, § 36-5-2001 (Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 2), concerning the short title for title 36, ch. 5, parts 20-29, was repealed and reenacted by Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1, upon completion of the provisions in § 2 of the act. Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 2, as amended by Acts 2016, ch. 664, § 4, provided that: “This act shall take effect when the department of human services files a notice with the secretary of state who shall publish the notice in the Tennessee Administrative Register on the secretary of state's web site, citing the effective date, which shall occur no later than April 1, 2016, the public welfare requiring it.”

The date published by the secretary of state in the Tennessee Administrative Register was March 31, 2016.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Subject Matter Jurisdiction.

Tennessee courts have subject matter jurisdiction to modify support orders issued by other states only when T.C.A. § 36-5-2611(a) has been satisfied. Letellier v. Letellier, 40 S.W.3d 490, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 255, 90 A.L.R.5th 707 (Tenn. 2001).

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

The Play-away Rule.  As long as the issuing tribunal has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over its child-support order, a responding tribunal is precluded from modifying the controlling order. See  Sections 205 through 207 [T.C.A. §§ 36-5-2205 —36-5-2207]. UIFSA (1992) made critical choices regarding modification of an existing child-support order. First, the “one-order” rule was to be paramount. Second, the issuing tribunal had continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to modify its order as long as a party or the child continued to reside in the issuing state. The original order remained in force as the controlling order until modified by another tribunal. Third, a separate procedure was created for modification of an existing child-support order when all parties and the child moved from the issuing state and acquired new residences. The key was that the movant seeking modification be “a nonresident of this state.” The deciding factor, determined after extended debate, centered on curbing or eliminating the undesirable effect of “ambush or tag” jurisdiction, e.g., the likelihood that the parties would vie to strike first to obtain a home-town advantage. Although constitutional under Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990), such lawsuits would discourage continued contact between the child and the obligor, or between the parties for fear of a lawsuit in a distant forum. Thus, the goal was to avoid the situation in which modification would be available in a forum having personal jurisdiction over both parties based solely on the ground that service of process was made in the would-be forum state.

Under subsection (a)(1) [subdivision (a)(1)], before a responding tribunal may modify the existing controlling order, three specific criteria must be satisfied. First, the individual parties and the child must no longer reside in the issuing state. Second, the party seeking modification, usually the obligee, must register the order as a nonresident of the forum. That forum is almost always the state of residence of the other party, usually the obligor. A colloquial (but easily understood) description is that the nonresident movant for modification must “play an away game on the other party’s home field.” Third, the forum must have personal jurisdiction over the parties. By registering the support order, the movant submits to the personal jurisdiction of the forum through seeking affirmative relief. On rare occasion, personal jurisdiction over the respondent may be supplied by long-arm jurisdiction. See  Section 201 [T.C.A. § 36-5-2201].

The underlying policies of this procedure contemplate that the issuing tribunal no longer has an interest in exercising its continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to modify its order, nor information readily available to it to do so. The play-away rule achieves rough justice between the parties in the majority of cases by preventing ambush in a local tribunal. Moreover, it takes into account the factual realities of the situation. In the overwhelming majority of cases the movant is the obligee who is receiving legal assistance in the issuing and responding states from Title IV-D support enforcement agencies. Further, evidence about the obligor’s ability to pay child support and enforcement of the support order is best accomplished in the obligor’s state of residence.

Fairness requires that an obligee seeking to modify the existing child-support order in the state of residence of the obligor will not be subject to a cross-motion to modify custody merely because the issuing tribunal has lost its continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over the support order. The same restriction applies to an obligor who moves to modify the support order in a state other than that of his or her residence.

There are exceptions to the play-away rule. Under subsection (a)(2) [subdivision (a)(2)], the parties may agree that a particular forum may serve to modify the order, even if the issuing tribunal has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction. Subsection (a)(2) [subdivision (a)(2)] also applies if the individual parties agree to submit the modification issue to a tribunal in the petitioner’s state of residence. Implicit in this shift of jurisdiction is that the agreed tribunal has subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction over at least one of the parties or the child, and that the other party submits to the personal jurisdiction of that forum. UIFSA does not contemplate that parties may agree to confer jurisdiction on a tribunal without a nexus to the parties or the child.

Proof that neither individual party nor the child continues to reside in the issuing state is made directly in the responding tribunal. No purpose is served by requiring the movant to return to the original issuing tribunal for a hearing to elicit confirmation of fact that none of the relevant persons still lives in the issuing state. Thus, the issuing tribunal is not called upon to transfer or surrender its continuing, exclusive jurisdiction or otherwise participate in the process, nor does it have discretion to refuse to yield jurisdiction.

There is a distinction between the processes involved under subsection (a). Once the requirements of subsection (a)(1) [subdivision (a)(1)] are met for assumption of jurisdiction, the responding tribunal acts on the modification and then notifies the issuing tribunal that the prior controlling order has been replaced by a new controlling order. In contrast, for another tribunal to assume modification jurisdiction by agreement under subsection (a)(2) [subdivision (a)(2)], the individual parties first must agree in a record to modification in the responding tribunal and file the record with the issuing tribunal. Thereafter they may proceed in the responding tribunal.

A similar exception is found in Section 205(a)(2) [T.C.A. § 36-5-2205(a)(2)], which enables the parties to agree in a record of the original issuing tribunal that it may retain jurisdiction over the order even if all parties have left that state. Note that such an agreement can be incorporated in the initial order of the issuing tribunal.

Section 613 [T.C.A. § 36-5-2613] also is an exception to subsection (a)(1) [subdivision (a)(1)]: it supplants the play-away rule if all parties have left the original issuing state and now reside in the same state, whether by chance or design.

Subsection (b) provides that when a responding tribunal assumes modification jurisdiction because the issuing tribunal has lost continuing, exclusive jurisdiction, the proceedings will generally follow local law with regard to modification of a child-support order, except as provided in subsections (c) and (d).

Duration of the Child Support Obligation.  Prior to 1993 American case law was thoroughly in chaos over modification of the duration of a child-support obligation when an obligor or obligee moved from one state to another state and the states had different ages for the duration of child support. The existing duration usually was ignored by the issuance of a new order applying local law, which elicited a variety of appellate court opinions. UIFSA (1992) determined that a uniform rule should be proposed, to wit, duration of the child-support obligation would be fixed by the initial controlling order. Subsection (c) provides the original time frame for support is not modifiable unless the law of the issuing state provides for its modification. After UIFSA (1996) was universally enacted, some tribunals sought to subvert this policy by holding that completion of the obligation to support a child through age 18 established by a now-completed controlling order did not preclude the imposition of a new obligation to support the child through age 21, or beyond.

Subsection (d) prohibits imposition of multiple, albeit successive, support obligations. The initial controlling order may be modified and replaced by a new controlling order in accordance with the terms of Sections 609 through 614 [T.C.A. §§ 36-5-260936-5-2614]. But, the duration of the child support obligation remains constant, even though other aspects of the original order may be changed.

Sometimes a domestic-violence protective order includes a provision for child support that will be in force for a specific time. The duration of the protective order often is less than the general law of the state for duration of the child-support obligation. Under these facts the general law of the issuing state regarding duration controls a subsequent child-support order.

Subsection (e) provides that on modification the new child-support order becomes the controlling order to be recognized by all UIFSA states. Good practice mandates that the responding tribunal should explicitly state in its order that it is assuming responsibility for the controlling child-support order. Neither the parties nor other tribunals should be required to speculate about the effect of the action.

International Effect.  Prohibiting modification based on the play-away principle in the international context is problematic. The issue arises because the United States is wedded to personal jurisdiction over the individual parties at a state level, rather than the child-based, national jurisdiction found virtually everywhere else. For example, a foreign country typically regards a support order to be of the country, not an order from a political subdivision, e.g., an order from Germany. In some important instances, however, a foreign support order is indeed made in a political subdivision, e.g., a support order from a Canadian province. Although consideration was given to labeling a support order issued in a state to be an order of the United States, conforming modification of child support to the general principles of state law through UIFSA is the only practical choice.

Subsection (f) creates a necessary exception to the play-away concept when the parties and the child no longer reside in the issuing state and one party resides outside the United States. The play-away principle makes sense when the tribunals involved have identical laws regarding continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to modify a child-support order. See  Sections 205 through 207 [T.C.A. §§ 36-5-220536-5-2207]. If one party resides in a foreign country, a pure play-away rule would deny modification in a forum subject to UIFSA rules to the party or child who has moved from the issuing state, but continues to reside in the United States. This result does not occur under Convention art.18, which places restrictions on modification of a support order in another Convention country if the obligee remains in the issuing Convention country. That article does not mention an effect when only the obligor remains in the issuing country, perhaps because the Convention makes clear that under a child-based system modification jurisdiction will follow the obligee and the child.

Subsection (f) identifies the tribunal that issued the controlling order as the logical choice for an available forum in which UIFSA will apply. This exception to the play-away rule provides assured personal jurisdiction over the parties, which in turn enables the issuing tribunal to retain continuing jurisdiction to modify its order. Of course, the party residing outside the United States has the option to pursue a modification in the state where the other party or child currently reside.

In sum, under this section personal service on either the custodial or noncustodial party found within the state borders, by itself, does not yield jurisdiction to modify. A party seeking to exercise rights of visitation, delivering or picking-up the child for such visitation, or engaging in unrelated business activity in the state, will not be involuntarily subjected to protracted litigation in an inconvenient forum. The play-away rule avoids the possible chilling effect on the exercise of parental contact with the child that the possibility of such litigation might have. The vast majority of disputes about whether a tribunal has jurisdiction will be eliminated. Moreover, submission by the petitioner to the state of residence of the respondent obviates this issue. Finally, because there is an existing order, the primary focus will shift to enforcement, thereby curtailing unnecessary modification efforts.

UIFSA Relationship to UCCJEA . Jurisdiction for modification of child support under subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2) [subdivisions (a)(1) and (a)(2)] is distinct from modification of custody under the federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA), 42 U.S.C. § 1738A, and the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) §§ 201–202. These acts provide that the court of exclusive, continuing jurisdiction may “decline jurisdiction.” Declining jurisdiction, thereby creating a potential vacuum, is not authorized under UIFSA. Once a controlling child-support order is established under UIFSA, at all times thereafter there is an existing order in effect to be enforced. Even if the issuing tribunal no longer has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction, its order remains fully enforceable until a tribunal with modification jurisdiction issues a new order in conformance with this article [part].

UIFSA and UCCJEA seek a world in which there is but one order at a time for child support and custody and visitation. Both have similar restrictions on the ability of a tribunal to modify the existing order. The major difference between the two acts is that the basic jurisdictional nexus of each is founded on different considerations. UIFSA has its focus on the personal jurisdiction necessary to bind the obligor to payment of a child-support order. UCCJEA places its focus on the factual circumstances of the child, primarily the “home state” of the child; personal jurisdiction to bind a party to the custody decree is not required. An example of the disparate consequences of this difference is the fact that a return to the decree state does not reestablish continuing, exclusive jurisdiction under the UCCJEA. See  UCCJEA § 202. Under similar facts UIFSA grants the issuing tribunal continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to modify its child-support order if, at the time the proceeding is filed, the issuing tribunal “is the residence” of one of the individual parties or the child. See  Section 205 [T.C.A. § 36-5-2205].

Related to Convention:  art. 18. Limit on proceedings.

36-5-2612. Recognition of order modified in another state.

If a child support order issued by a tribunal of this state is modified by a tribunal of another state which assumed jurisdiction pursuant to the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, a tribunal of this state:

  1. May enforce its order that was modified only as to arrears and interest accruing before the modification;
  2. May provide appropriate relief for violations of its order which occurred before the effective date of the modification; and
  3. Shall recognize the modifying order of the other state, upon registration, for the purpose of enforcement.

Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Part 20, § 36-5-2001 (Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 2), concerning the short title for title 36, ch. 5, parts 20-29, was repealed and reenacted by Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1, upon completion of the provisions in § 2 of the act. Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 2, as amended by Acts 2016, ch. 664, § 4, provided that: “This act shall take effect when the department of human services files a notice with the secretary of state who shall publish the notice in the Tennessee Administrative Register on the secretary of state's web site, citing the effective date, which shall occur no later than April 1, 2016, the public welfare requiring it.”

The date published by the secretary of state in the Tennessee Administrative Register was March 31, 2016.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

A key aspect of UIFSA is the deference to the controlling child-support order of a sister state demanded from a tribunal of the forum state. This applies not just to the original order, but also to a modified child-support order issued by a second state under the standards established by Sections 611 and 613 [T.C.A. §§ 36-5-2611 and 36-5-2613]. For the act to function properly, the original issuing tribunal must recognize and accept the modified order as controlling, and must regard its prior order as prospectively inoperative. Because the UIFSA system is based on an interlocking series of state laws, it is fundamental that a modifying tribunal of one state lacks the authority to direct the original issuing tribunal to release its continuing, exclusive jurisdiction. That result is accomplished through the enactment of UIFSA by all states, which empowers a modifying tribunal to assume continuing, exclusive jurisdiction from the original issuing tribunal and requires an issuing tribunal to recognize such an assumption of jurisdiction. This explains why the U.S. Congress took the extraordinary measure in PRWORA of mandating universal passage of UIFSA (1996), as amended. See  Prefatory Note.

The original issuing tribunal retains authority post-modification to take remedial enforcement action directly connected to its now-modified order.

36-5-2613. Jurisdiction to modify child support order of another state when individual parties reside in this state.

  1. If all of the parties who are individuals reside in this state and the child does not reside in the issuing state, a tribunal of this state has jurisdiction to enforce and to modify the issuing state’s child support order in a proceeding to register that order.
  2. A tribunal of this state exercising jurisdiction under this section shall apply the provisions of parts 21 and 22 of this chapter and the procedural and substantive law of this state to the proceeding for enforcement or modification.  Parts 23, 24, 25, 27 and 28 of this chapter do not apply.

Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Part 20, § 36-5-2001 (Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 2), concerning the short title for title 36, ch. 5, parts 20-29, was repealed and reenacted by Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1, upon completion of the provisions in § 2 of the act. Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 2, as amended by Acts 2016, ch. 664, § 4, provided that: “This act shall take effect when the department of human services files a notice with the secretary of state who shall publish the notice in the Tennessee Administrative Register on the secretary of state's web site, citing the effective date, which shall occur no later than April 1, 2016, the public welfare requiring it.”

The date published by the secretary of state in the Tennessee Administrative Register was March 31, 2016.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

It is not unusual for the parties and the child subject to a child-support order to no longer reside in the issuing state, and for the individual parties to have moved to the same new state. The result is that the child-support order remains enforceable, but the issuing tribunal no longer has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to modify its order. A tribunal of the state of mutual residence of the individual parties has jurisdiction to modify the child-support order and assume continuing, exclusive jurisdiction. Although the individual parties must reside in the forum state, there is no requirement that the child must also reside in the forum state (although the child must have moved from the issuing state).

Finally, because modification of the child-support order when all parties reside in the forum is essentially an intrastate matter, subsection (b) withdraws authority to apply most of the substantive and procedural provisions of UIFSA, i.e., those found in the act other than in Articles 1, 2, and 6 [parts 21, 22 and 26]. Note the duration of the support obligation is a nonmodifiable aspect of the original controlling order, see  Section 611(c)-(d) [T.C.A. § 36-5-2611(c)-(d)].

36-5-2614. Notice to issuing tribunal of modification.

Within thirty (30) days after issuance of a modified child support order, the party obtaining the modification shall file a certified copy of the order with the issuing tribunal that had continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over the earlier order, and in each tribunal in which the party knows the earlier order has been registered.  A party who obtains the order and fails to file a certified copy is subject to appropriate sanctions by a tribunal in which the issue of failure to file arises.  The failure to file does not affect the validity or enforceability of the modified order of the new tribunal having continuing, exclusive jurisdiction.

Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Part 20, § 36-5-2001 (Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 2), concerning the short title for title 36, ch. 5, parts 20-29, was repealed and reenacted by Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1, upon completion of the provisions in § 2 of the act. Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 2, as amended by Acts 2016, ch. 664, § 4, provided that: “This act shall take effect when the department of human services files a notice with the secretary of state who shall publish the notice in the Tennessee Administrative Register on the secretary of state's web site, citing the effective date, which shall occur no later than April 1, 2016, the public welfare requiring it.”

The date published by the secretary of state in the Tennessee Administrative Register was March 31, 2016.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

For the act to function properly, the prevailing party in a proceeding that modifies a controlling order must inform the original issuing tribunal about its loss of continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over its child-support order. Thereafter, the original tribunal may not modify, or review and adjust, the amount of child support. Notice to the issuing tribunal and other affected tribunals that the continuing, exclusive jurisdiction of the former controlling order has been modified is crucial to avoid the confusion and chaos of the multiple-order system UIFSA replaced.

The new issuing tribunal has authority to impose sanctions on a party who fails to comply with the requirement to give notice of a modification to all interested tribunals. Note, however, that failure to notify a displaced tribunal of the modification of its order does not affect the validity of the modified order.

36-5-2615. Jurisdiction to modify child support order of foreign country.

  1. Except as otherwise provided in § 36-5-2711, if a foreign country lacks or refuses to exercise jurisdiction to modify its child support order pursuant to its laws, a tribunal of this state may assume jurisdiction to modify the child support order and bind all individuals subject to the personal jurisdiction of the tribunal whether or not the consent to modification of a child support order otherwise required of the individual pursuant to § 36-5-2611 has been given or whether the individual seeking modification is a resident of this state or of the foreign country.
  2. An order issued by a tribunal of this state modifying a foreign child support order pursuant to this section is the controlling order.

Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Part 20, § 36-5-2001 (Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 2), concerning the short title for title 36, ch. 5, parts 20-29, was repealed and reenacted by Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1, upon completion of the provisions in § 2 of the act. Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 2, as amended by Acts 2016, ch. 664, § 4, provided that: “This act shall take effect when the department of human services files a notice with the secretary of state who shall publish the notice in the Tennessee Administrative Register on the secretary of state's web site, citing the effective date, which shall occur no later than April 1, 2016, the public welfare requiring it.”

The date published by the secretary of state in the Tennessee Administrative Register was March 31, 2016.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Subsection (a) provides that a state tribunal may modify a foreign child-support order, other than a Convention order, when the foreign issuing tribunal lacks or refuses to exercise jurisdiction to modify its order. The standard example cited for the necessity of this special rule involved the conundrum posed when an obligor has moved to the responding state from the issuing country and the law of that country requires both parties to be physically present at a hearing before the tribunal in order to sustain a modification of child support. In that circumstance, the foreign issuing tribunal is unable to exercise jurisdiction to modify under its law. Ordinarily, under Section 611 [T.C.A. § 36-5-2611] the responding state tribunal is not authorized to issue a new order, in effect modifying the foreign support order, because the child or the obligee continues to reside in the issuing country. To remedy the perceived inequity in such a fact situation, this section provides an exception to the rule of Section 611 [T.C.A. § 36-5-2611]. If both parties are subject to the personal jurisdiction of a state by the obligee’s submission and the obligor’s residence, or other grounds under Section 201 [T.C.A. § 36-5-2201], the responding state tribunal may modify the foreign child-support order. Modification of a Convention order is governed by Section 711 [T.C.A. § 36-5-2711].

The ability of a state tribunal to modify when the foreign country refuses to exercise its jurisdiction should be invoked with circumspection, as there may be a cogent reason for such refusal. Note, Section 317 [T.C.A. § 36-5-2317] empowers tribunals to communicate regarding this issue, rather than rely upon representations of one or more of the parties.

Subsection (b) states that if a new order is issued under subsection (a), it becomes the UIFSA controlling order insofar as other states are concerned. Obviously this act cannot dictate the same result to the issuing foreign tribunal, although it seems highly likely that either through child-based jurisdiction or an action filed by the obligee recognition by the foreign tribunal will occur.

Related to Convention: art. 18. Limit on proceedings.

36-5-2616. Procedure to register child support order of foreign country for modification.

A party or support enforcement agency seeking to modify, or to modify and enforce, a foreign child support order not under the Convention may register that order in this state under §§ 36-5-2601—36-5-2608 if the order has not been registered.  A petition for modification may be filed at the same time as a request for registration, or at another time.  The petition must specify the grounds for modification.

Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Part 20, § 36-5-2001 (Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 2), concerning the short title for title 36, ch. 5, parts 20-29, was repealed and reenacted by Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1, upon completion of the provisions in § 2 of the act. Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 2, as amended by Acts 2016, ch. 664, § 4, provided that: “This act shall take effect when the department of human services files a notice with the secretary of state who shall publish the notice in the Tennessee Administrative Register on the secretary of state's web site, citing the effective date, which shall occur no later than April 1, 2016, the public welfare requiring it.”

The date published by the secretary of state in the Tennessee Administrative Register was March 31, 2016.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

The procedure for registration and enforcement set forth in Sections 601 through 608 [T.C.A. §§ 36-5-260136-5-2608] is applicable to a child-support order from a non-Convention country. This section provides coverage for modification in that situation. Presumptively, the general law of the state regarding modification of a child-support order will apply because, by their terms, Sections 609 through 614 [T.C.A. §§ 36-5-260936-5-2614] apply only to modification of a child-support order by a state tribunal. The rationale is that modification is available because the foreign order is not founded on the UIFSA principles of continuing, exclusive jurisdiction and a controlling order. See  Sections 205 through 207 [T.C.A. §§ 36-5-220536-5-2207].

Part 27
Support Proceeding under Convention

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

This article [part] contains provisions adapted from the Convention that could not be readily integrated into the existing body of Articles 1 through 6 [parts 1-6]. For the most part, extending the coverage of UIFSA (2008) to foreign countries was a satisfactory solution to merge the appropriate Convention terms into this act. In understanding this process, it must be clearly stated that the terms of the Convention are not substantive law.

The Convention is a multilateral treaty which binds the United States and the other Convention countries to assure compliance. As such, it will be the law of the land; but the treaty is not self-executing. See , Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 170 L. Ed. 2d 190 (2008). Thus, the ultimate enforcement of the treaty in the United States is dependent on the key implementing federal law and the enactment of both federal and state legislation which provide the mechanism for enforcing the requirements of the Convention. This act is predicated on the principle that the enactment of UIFSA (2008) in all States and federal jurisdictions will effectively implement the Convention through state law by amending Articles 1 through 6 [parts 1-6], plus the addition of this article [part]. The treaty, in essence, establishes the framework for a system of international cooperation by emulating the interstate effect of UIFSA for international cases, especially those affected by the Convention.

In relatively few instances, the provisions of the Convention are sufficiently specific that a choice was made between amending UIFSA accordingly, with a disproportionate effect on all support orders enforced under state law, or accommodating potential conflicts by creating a separate article [part] to apply only to Convention support orders. The choice was to draft this article [part] as state law to minimize disruption to interstate support orders, which constitute the vast majority of orders processed under UIFSA. Note that this act is the substantive and procedural state law for: (1) responding to an application for establishment, recognition and enforcement, or modification of a Convention support order; and, (2) initiating an application to a Convention country for similar action.

The four Hague maintenance conventions that preceded the 2007 Convention, and the three prior versions of UIFSA, have common goals. The distinctions between the jurisdictional rules in the common-law tradition in the United States, and the civil law systems in most of the countries that were parties to the earlier maintenance conventions, were obstacles to participation of the United States in any of the multilateral maintenance treaties. As the world has grown smaller and globalization has become the order of the day, reconciling the differences has become more and more important. Understanding the necessity for accommodation has made the task easier. This is not to say easy, as evidenced by the fact that the formal negotiations leading to the final text of the Convention spanned from May, 2003, to November, 2007.

The United States signed the Convention on November 23, 2007 and the Senate gave its advice and consent to ratification in 2010. Enabling federal legislation was enacted on September 29, 2014 which requires all states to enact UIFSA (2008) by the end of 2015. At that point the United States will deposit its instrument of ratification and the Convention will enter into force in the United States.

UIFSA (2008) and the 2007 Convention have far more in common than did former uniform acts and maintenance conventions, and, in fact, many provisions of the Convention are modeled on UIFSA principles. The negotiations demonstrated that it is possible to draft an international convention, which incorporates core UIFSA principles into a system for the establishment and enforcement of child support and spousal-support orders across international borders, and creates an efficient, economical, and expeditious procedure to accomplish these goals. Matters in common, however, go far beyond identical goals. The negotiations provided an opportunity for an extended interchange of ideas about how to adapt legal mechanisms to facilitate child support enforcement between otherwise disparate legal systems

International cross-border enforcement has been far more important in Western Europe, and more recently, throughout the countries of the European Union than has been the case in the United States. On the other hand, experience with establishment and enforcement of interstate child-support orders in the United States has been building since 1950, and accelerated rapidly with enactment of Title IV-D of the Social Security Act in 1975. Clearly, the issues are far easier to deal with nationally because of the common language, currency, and legal system, and, since 1996, with the Title IV-D requirement that all states enact the same version of UIFSA. In fact, since the advent of UIFSA and Title IV-D, millions of interstate cases have been processed through the child support enforcement system and thousands of support orders from other countries have also been registered and enforced in the United States because UIFSA treated such orders as if they had been entered by one of the states. In the future, in Convention countries, this country’s orders will be entitled to similar treatment. The entry into force of the Convention is designed to further improve the process and will most certainly lead in a few years to a substantial increase in international cases, both incoming and outgoing.

To create UIFSA (2008), it was necessary to integrate the texts of UIFSA (2001) and the Convention. This did not present a significant drafting challenge for the most part. By far the most common amendment in Articles 1 through 6 is to substitute “state or foreign country” for the term “state.” These simple amendments expanded a majority of this act to cover foreign support orders. In this article [part] statutory directions are given to “a tribunal of this state,” and also to a “governmental entity, individual petitioner, support enforcement agency, or a party.”

36-5-2701. Part definitions.

In this part:

  1. “Application” means a request under the Convention by an obligee or obligor, or on behalf of a child, made through a central authority for assistance from another central authority;
  2. “Central authority” means the entity designated by the United States or a foreign country described in § 36-5-2101(5)(D) to perform the functions specified in the Convention;
  3. “Convention support order” means a support order of a tribunal of a foreign country described in § 36-5-2101(5)(D);
  4. “Direct request” means a petition filed by an individual in a tribunal of this state in a proceeding involving an obligee, obligor, or child residing outside the United States;
  5. “Foreign central authority” means the entity designated by a foreign country described in § 36-5-2101(5)(D) to perform the functions specified in the Convention;
  6. “Foreign support agreement”:
    1. Means an agreement for support in a record that:
      1. Is enforceable as a support order in the country of origin;
      2. Has been:
  1. Formally drawn up or registered as an authentic instrument by a foreign tribunal; or
  2. Authenticated by, or concluded, registered, or filed with a foreign tribunal; and

May be reviewed and modified by a foreign tribunal; and

Includes a maintenance arrangement or authentic instrument under the Convention; and

“United States central authority” means the secretary of the United States department of health and human services.

Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Part 20, § 36-5-2001 (Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 2), concerning the short title for title 36, ch. 5, parts 20-29, was repealed and reenacted by Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1, upon completion of the provisions in § 2 of the act. Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 2, as amended by Acts 2016, ch. 664, § 4, provided that: “This act shall take effect when the department of human services files a notice with the secretary of state who shall publish the notice in the Tennessee Administrative Register on the secretary of state's web site, citing the effective date, which shall occur no later than April 1, 2016, the public welfare requiring it.”

The date published by the secretary of state in the Tennessee Administrative Register was March 31, 2016.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

A readily apparent difference between UIFSA (2008) and the Convention is the perceived need for definitions in the former, and the very limited number of definitions in the latter. This act contains twenty-nine definitions in Section 102 [T.C.A. § 36-5-2101], and an additional seven for this article [part]. In contrast, the Convention contains only seven official definitions. Some of these are synonyms for definitions in UIFSA, i.e., “creditor and debtor” for “obligor and obligee,” and “agreement in writing” for “record.”

Subsection (1) [subdivision (1)], “application” refers to the process for an individual obligor or obligee to request assistance from a central authority under the Convention.

Subsections (2) and (5) [subdivisions (2) and (5)] identify the governmental entities, i.e., central authority, in each contracting country or political subdivisions thereof, that will function as the operating agencies to facilitate contacts between Convention countries. The Convention is a treaty between the countries in which it is in force thus creating mutual obligations. The duties assigned in the Convention to the central authority of each country will be performed according to the choice of each country. It is crucial to recognize that in the United States it will be the Title IV-D agency of each state that will be designated by the U.S. central authority to perform most of the functions specified in the Convention. It appears likely that in many foreign countries the central authority will serve in the role of a clearinghouse, rather than as the operative enforcement entity, while some countries may assign all central authority functions to one agency.

Subsection (3) [subdivision (3)], “Convention support order” narrows the term “foreign support order,” as employed in Articles 1 through 6 [parts 1-6]. The provisions in those articles also apply to Convention support orders, but when this act is not congruent with the Convention, support orders under the Convention are subject to this article [part]. This article [part] has no application to a support order from a non-Convention foreign country, as defined in Section 102(5)(A) and (B) [T.C.A. § 36-5-2101(5)(A) and (B)] or a support order entitled to comity, Section 102(5)(C)  [T.C.A. § 36-5-2101(5)(C)], except to the extent that a Convention country may request enforcement of a non-Convention support order that has been recognized in the United States under some other procedure, see  Section 704 [T.C.A. § 36-5-2704].

Subsection (4) [subdivision (4)] integrates the “direct request” authorized by the Convention with the provisions for filing a petition in Articles 1 through 6 [parts 1-6].

The definition in the Convention for “maintenance arrangement” has been rephrased in Subsection (6) [subdivision (6)], and must be read together with Section 710 [T.C.A. § 36-5-2710] to understand the process authorized in the Convention.

Convention source: art. 3. Definitions; art. 30. Maintenance arrangements.

Related to Convention: art. 4. Designation of Central Authorities; art. 37. Direct requests to competent authorities.

36-5-2702. Applicability.

This part applies only to a support proceeding under the Convention.  In such a proceeding, if a provision of this part is inconsistent with parts 21-26, this part controls.

Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Part 20, § 36-5-2001 (Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 2), concerning the short title for title 36, ch. 5, parts 20-29, was repealed and reenacted by Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1, upon completion of the provisions in § 2 of the act. Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 2, as amended by Acts 2016, ch. 664, § 4, provided that: “This act shall take effect when the department of human services files a notice with the secretary of state who shall publish the notice in the Tennessee Administrative Register on the secretary of state's web site, citing the effective date, which shall occur no later than April 1, 2016, the public welfare requiring it.”

The date published by the secretary of state in the Tennessee Administrative Register was March 31, 2016.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

The first sentence definitively states that this article [part] applies only to a proceeding involving a Convention country, as defined in Section 102(5)(D) [T.C.A. § 36-5-2101(5)(D)]. This article [part] does not generally apply to a support order from a non-Convention foreign country as defined in Section 102(5)(A) and (B) [T.C.A. § 36-5-2101(5)(A) and (B)] or to a support order entitled to comity. The second sentence resolves a situation in which there is a conflict between a section in this article [part] and a provision in Articles 1 through 6 [parts 1-6], in which case this article [part] controls.

Related to Convention:  art. 1. Object; art. 2. Scope; art. 4. Designation of Central Authorities.

36-5-2703. Relationship of state department of human services to United States central authority.

The department of human services of this state is recognized as the agency designated by the United States central authority to perform specific functions under the Convention.

Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Part 20, § 36-5-2001 (Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 2), concerning the short title for title 36, ch. 5, parts 20-29, was repealed and reenacted by Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1, upon completion of the provisions in § 2 of the act. Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 2, as amended by Acts 2016, ch. 664, § 4, provided that: “This act shall take effect when the department of human services files a notice with the secretary of state who shall publish the notice in the Tennessee Administrative Register on the secretary of state's web site, citing the effective date, which shall occur no later than April 1, 2016, the public welfare requiring it.”

The date published by the secretary of state in the Tennessee Administrative Register was March 31, 2016.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

The Secretary of Health and Human Services has designated the state Title IV-D child support agencies as the governmental entities that will carry out many of the central authority’s functions under the Convention. Each state determines which public office or administrative agency will perform the Title IV-D services for child support enforcement. Because the federal government provides a significant subsidy for this effort, the actions of the agency must comply with federal statutes and regulations and the state legislature must enact certain mandatory laws. The relationship is symbiotic in that states choose to participate in the Title IV-D program, and do so by following their own state procedures and legislative enactments that recognize and authorize the state officer or agency to function under these conditions.

Related to Convention: ch. II. Administrative co-operation, arts. 4-8; ch. III. Applications through central authorities, arts. 9-17.

36-5-2704. Initiation by department of human services of support proceeding under Convention.

  1. In a support proceeding under this part, the department of human services of this state shall:
    1. Transmit and receive applications; and
    2. Initiate or facilitate the institution of a proceeding regarding an application in a tribunal of this state.
  2. The following support proceedings are available to an obligee under the Convention:
    1. Recognition or recognition and enforcement of a foreign support order;
    2. Enforcement of a support order issued or recognized in this state;
    3. Establishment of a support order if there is no existing order, including, if necessary, determination of parentage of a child;
    4. Establishment of a support order if recognition of a foreign support order is refused under § 36-5-2708(b)(2), (4), or (9);
    5. Modification of a support order of a tribunal of this state; and
    6. Modification of a support order of a tribunal of another state or a foreign country.
  3. The following support proceedings are available under the Convention to an obligor against which there is an existing support order:
    1. Recognition of an order suspending or limiting enforcement of an existing support order of a tribunal of this state;
    2. Modification of a support order of a tribunal of this state; and
    3. Modification of a support order of a tribunal of another state or a foreign country.
  4. A tribunal of this state may not require security, bond, or deposit, however described, to guarantee the payment of costs and expenses in proceedings under the Convention.

Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Part 20, § 36-5-2001 (Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 2), concerning the short title for title 36, ch. 5, parts 20-29, was repealed and reenacted by Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1, upon completion of the provisions in § 2 of the act. Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 2, as amended by Acts 2016, ch. 664, § 4, provided that: “This act shall take effect when the department of human services files a notice with the secretary of state who shall publish the notice in the Tennessee Administrative Register on the secretary of state's web site, citing the effective date, which shall occur no later than April 1, 2016, the public welfare requiring it.”

The date published by the secretary of state in the Tennessee Administrative Register was March 31, 2016.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

This section is designed to enable lawyers and non-lawyers to better understand proceedings under the Convention, which itself is written in terminology unfamiliar to legal proceedings in the United States.

Subsection (a) lists the rights and duties of a support enforcement agency.

Subsection (b) lists what rights and duties are available to an obligee, whether the proceeding is inbound from a Convention country or outbound to a Convention country.

In contrast to the general rule in UIFSA, which attempts to maintain something of parity between the obligor and obligee, subsection (c) limits  the rights and duties available to an obligor under the Convention. This reflects the equal treatment ideal espoused by UIFSA in Articles 1 through 6 [parts 1-6], and the pro-obligee philosophy of the Convention. In actual practice, the results may not be that different. Recall that until replaced by UIFSA, an informal subtitle given to URESA by its leading proponents was “The Runaway Pappy Act.”

Subsection (d) tracks Convention art. 14 (5).

Convention source: art. 6. Specific functions of Central Authorities; art. 10. Available applications; art. 14. Effective access to procedures.

Related to Convention: ch. II. Administrative co-operation, arts. 4-7; ch. III. Applications through central authorities, arts. 9-17.

36-5-2705. Direct request.

  1. A petitioner may file a direct request seeking establishment or modification of a support order or determination of parentage of a child. In the proceeding, the law of this state applies.
  2. A petitioner may file a direct request seeking recognition and enforcement of a support order or support agreement. In the proceeding, §§ 36-5-2706 — 36-5-2713 apply.
  3. In a direct request for recognition and enforcement of a Convention support order or foreign support agreement:
    1. A security, bond, or deposit is not required to guarantee the payment of costs and expenses; and
    2. An obligee or obligor that in the issuing country has benefited from free legal assistance is entitled to benefit, at least to the same extent, from any free legal assistance provided for by the law of this state under the same circumstances.
  4. A petitioner filing a direct request is not entitled to assistance from the department of human services.
  5. This part does not prevent the application of laws of this state that provide simplified, more expeditious rules regarding a direct request for recognition and enforcement of a foreign support order or foreign support agreement.

Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Part 20, § 36-5-2001 (Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 2), concerning the short title for title 36, ch. 5, parts 20-29, was repealed and reenacted by Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1, upon completion of the provisions in § 2 of the act. Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 2, as amended by Acts 2016, ch. 664, § 4, provided that: “This act shall take effect when the department of human services files a notice with the secretary of state who shall publish the notice in the Tennessee Administrative Register on the secretary of state's web site, citing the effective date, which shall occur no later than April 1, 2016, the public welfare requiring it.”

The date published by the secretary of state in the Tennessee Administrative Register was March 31, 2016.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Given the long history of open courts in the United States, this section may seem axiomatic, redundant, or unnecessary. In fact, because this principle has not always been universal, it is important to recognize that the Convention confirms that an individual residing in a Convention country may file a petition directly in a tribunal of another Convention country without requesting the assistance of a central authority or a support enforcement agency. Given the variety of legal systems that may be involved under the Convention, this freedom of choice is explicitly protected. A person residing in a Convention county, whether a citizen or a noncitizen of the United States, may apply to a tribunal in the United States for establishment, recognition, and enforcement of a child-support order for enforcement of a spousal support order, for recognition and enforcement of a foreign support agreement, and in some situations, for modification of an existing support order. Of course, the freedom of an individual to petition for relief in a tribunal says nothing about the nature of legal representation, if any, implicit in the right of access to a tribunal, is that representation may be pro se or by private counsel. See  Section 309 [T.C.A. § 36-5-2309].

Subsection (a) provides that an individual party may file a proceeding directly in a tribunal, thus submitting to the jurisdiction of the tribunal and to state law. The object of the proceeding may be establishment of a support order, determination of parentage of a child, or modification of an existing support order.

Subsection (b) recognizes that an individual party may file a proceeding in a tribunal requesting recognition and enforcement of a Convention support order, or a foreign support agreement as defined in Section 710 [T.C.A. § 36-5-2710]. The party thereby chooses not to seek the services of a central authority or support enforcement agency. Nonetheless, the individual will be affected indirectly by the terms of the Convention because the proceeding is subject to Sections 706 through 713 [T.C.A. §§ 36-5-270636-5-2713], which are drawn from the Convention. This effect applies to an individual residing in a Convention country and to an individual residing elsewhere who is seeking to enforce a Convention support order.

Subsection (c) contains two provisions drawn from the Convention specifically applicable to a petition for recognition and enforcement of a Convention support order. First, a guarantee of payment of costs may not be required. Second, if the individual has benefited from free legal assistance in a Convention country, that individual is entitled to free legal assistance if it is available in similar circumstances under the law of the responding state.

Under subsection (d) an individual party who files a direct request regarding a Convention support order in a tribunal is not entitled to assistance from the governmental entity, i.e. the support enforcement agency.

Subsection (e) echoes Article 52 of the Convention. An individual party who files a petition in a tribunal may take advantage of any “simplified, more expeditious procedures” which may be available in the requested state, so long as they are “compatible with the protection offered to the parties under articles 23 and 24” of the Convention.

Convention source: art. 14. Effective access to procedures; art. 17. Applications not qualifying under Article 15 or Article 16; art. 37. Direct requests to competent authorities; art.52, Most effective rule.

Related to Convention: ch. II. Administrative co-operation, arts.4-8; ch. III. Applications through central authorities, arts. 9-17; art. 20. Bases for recognition and enforcement; art. 25. Documents; art. 27. Findings of fact; art. 28. No review of the merits; art. 37. Direct requests to competent authorities; art. 56. Transitional provisions.

36-5-2706. Registration of Convention support order.

  1. Except as otherwise provided in this part, a party who is an individual or a support enforcement agency seeking recognition of a Convention support order shall register the order in this state as provided in part 26.
  2. Notwithstanding §§ 36-5-2311 and 36-5-2602(a), a request for registration of a Convention support order must be accompanied by:
    1. A complete text of the support order or an abstract or extract of the support order drawn up by the issuing foreign tribunal, which may be in the form recommended by the Hague Conference on Private International Law;
    2. A record stating that the support order is enforceable in the issuing country;
    3. If the respondent did not appear and was not represented in the proceedings in the issuing country, a record attesting, as appropriate, either that the respondent had proper notice of the proceedings and an opportunity to be heard or that the respondent had proper notice of the support order and an opportunity to be heard in a challenge or appeal on fact or law before a tribunal;
    4. A record showing the amount of arrears, if any, and the date the amount was calculated;
    5. A record showing a requirement for automatic adjustment of the amount of support, if any, and the information necessary to make the appropriate calculations; and
    6. If necessary, a record showing the extent to which the applicant received free legal assistance in the issuing country.
  3. A request for registration of a Convention support order may seek recognition and partial enforcement of the order.
  4. A tribunal of this state may vacate the registration of a Convention support order without the filing of a contest under § 36-5-2707 only if, acting on its own motion, the tribunal finds that recognition and enforcement of the order would be manifestly incompatible with public policy.
  5. The tribunal shall promptly notify the parties of the registration or the order vacating the registration of a Convention support order.

Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Part 20, § 36-5-2001 (Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 2), concerning the short title for title 36, ch. 5, parts 20-29, was repealed and reenacted by Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1, upon completion of the provisions in § 2 of the act. Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 2, as amended by Acts 2016, ch. 664, § 4, provided that: “This act shall take effect when the department of human services files a notice with the secretary of state who shall publish the notice in the Tennessee Administrative Register on the secretary of state's web site, citing the effective date, which shall occur no later than April 1, 2016, the public welfare requiring it.”

The date published by the secretary of state in the Tennessee Administrative Register was March 31, 2016.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Subsection (a) integrates the Convention support order into the registration for enforcement procedure set forth in Sections 601 through 608 [T.C.A. §§ 36-5-260136-5-2608]. A state support enforcement agency and a tribunal will use basically the same procedures for a Convention order under this article [part] as would be used in a non-Convention proceeding.

From inception, UIFSA contained detailed provisions for substantive procedures for interstate child-support orders. To facilitate expedited processing, detailed statutory instructions have encouraged uniformity of legal documents. The Convention follows this precedent. The list of documents to be provided, however, is somewhat different than the documents described in Sections 311 and 602 [T.C.A. §§ 36-5-2311 and 36-5-2602]. In order to ensure that a document satisfying the requirements of the Convention will be accepted by a support enforcement agency or tribunal, subsection (a) identifies the documents required to accompany an application under the Convention.

Several of the required documents may be unfamiliar in the United States, e.g., the authority to provide an abstract or an extract of an order rather than the complete text of an order under paragraph (b)(1) [subdivision (b)(1)]; the requirement for a statement of enforceability of the order under paragraph (b)(2) [subdivision (b)(2)]; proof that the respondent had proper notice of the proceedings and an opportunity to be heard if the respondent did not appear and was not represented under (b)(3) [subdivision (b)(3)]; and proof that the applicant received free legal assistance in the issuing country under paragraph (b)(6) [subdivision (b)(6)].

Subsection (c) provides that a petitioner may request only partial enforcement of a support order, see  Section 709 [T.C.A. § 36-5-2709]. infra , which speaks to partial enforcement by a tribunal.

Subsections (d) and (e) authorize action by a tribunal available under the Convention that may not be available under other state law. Subsection (d) permits the tribunal to vacate registration, acting on its own motion, under certain exceptional circumstances, and subsection (e) requires that notice be promptly provided of any such order vacating registration. Such ex officio  review, if used to refuse recognition of an order, is in tension with the core UIFSA policy of requiring recognition. In any event, the subsections are not a vehicle for a review of the merits of the decision. An example would be useful here, but there is none in the Explanatory Report to the Convention, just the negative reference that a country could not use this to enforce a policy against ordering support for a child born out of wedlock. http://www.hcch.net/upload/expl38.pdf. Perhaps an example could be that the court might reject an application to establish support from a biological parent whose rights had been terminated and the child was subsequently adopted.

Convention source: art. 25. Documents; art. 21. Severability and partial recognition and enforcement; art. 22. Grounds for refusing recognition and enforcement; art. 23. Procedure on an application for recognition and enforcement; art. 25. Documents.

Related to Convention: art. 11. Application contents; art. 20. Bases for recognition and enforcement.

36-5-2707. Contest of registered Convention support order.

  1. Except as otherwise provided in this part, §§ 36-5-2605—36-5-2608 apply to a contest of a registered Convention support order.
  2. A party contesting a registered Convention support order shall file a contest not later than thirty (30) days after notice of the registration, but if the contesting party does not reside in the United States, the contest must be filed not later than sixty (60) days after notice of the registration.
  3. If the nonregistering party fails to contest the registered Convention support order by the time specified in subsection (b), the order is enforceable.
  4. A contest of a registered Convention support order may be based only on grounds set forth in § 36-5-2708. The contesting party bears the burden of proof.
  5. In a contest of a registered Convention support order, a tribunal of this state:
    1. Is bound by the findings of fact on which the foreign tribunal based its jurisdiction; and
    2. May not review the merits of the order.
  6. A tribunal of this state deciding a contest of a registered Convention support order shall promptly notify the parties of its decision.
  7. A challenge or appeal, if any, does not stay the enforcement of a Convention support order unless there are exceptional circumstances.

Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Part 20, § 36-5-2001 (Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 2), concerning the short title for title 36, ch. 5, parts 20-29, was repealed and reenacted by Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1, upon completion of the provisions in § 2 of the act. Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 2, as amended by Acts 2016, ch. 664, § 4, provided that: “This act shall take effect when the department of human services files a notice with the secretary of state who shall publish the notice in the Tennessee Administrative Register on the secretary of state's web site, citing the effective date, which shall occur no later than April 1, 2016, the public welfare requiring it.”

The date published by the secretary of state in the Tennessee Administrative Register was March 31, 2016.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Subsection (a) states the general rule that a contest of a registration is generally governed by Sections 605 through 608 [T.C.A. §§ 36-5-260536-5-2608], supra . Subsection (b), however, establishes separate, longer time frames to contest the registration of a Convention support order than for filing a contest as established in Section 605 [T.C.A. § 36-5-2605]. If notice of contest is to be given in the United States, the time difference is relatively modest, i.e., 30 days instead of 20. A more significant difference is created for out-of-country notice, i.e., 60 days instead of 20. Arguably this takes into account that providing notice to a party in a foreign country may take longer than ordinarily expected. In any event, the longer time frames are specifically required in connection with a Convention order. Note that while the principle may always be true that notice to a party situated in a foreign country may take longer, the additional times for notice apply only to an order subject to the Convention.

Subsections (c)-(g) transform Convention language into UIFSA terminology. Subsection (g), which prohibits a stay in enforcement pending a challenge or appeal except in exceptional circumstances, is another substantive provision required by the Convention. It does not apply in non-Convention cases, in which domestic law determines whether a stay of enforcement should be granted pending an appeal or other challenge.

Convention source: art. 23. Procedure on an application for recognition and enforcement; art. 27. Findings of fact; art. 28. No review of the merits.

Related to Convention: art. 20. Bases for recognition and enforcement; art. 21. Severability and partial recognition and enforcement; art. 23. Procedure on an application for recognition and enforcement; art. 27. Findings of fact; art. 28. No review of the merits.

36-5-2708. Recognition and enforcement of registered Convention support order.

  1. Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b), a tribunal of this state shall recognize and enforce a registered Convention support order.
  2. The following grounds are the only grounds on which a tribunal of this state may refuse recognition and enforcement of a registered Convention support order:
    1. Recognition and enforcement of the order is manifestly incompatible with public policy, including the failure of the issuing tribunal to observe minimum standards of due process, which include notice and an opportunity to be heard;
    2. The issuing tribunal lacked personal jurisdiction consistent with § 36-5-2201;
    3. The order is not enforceable in the issuing country;
    4. The order was obtained by fraud in connection with a matter of procedure;
    5. A record transmitted in accordance with § 36-5-2706 lacks authenticity or integrity;
    6. A proceeding between the same parties and having the same purpose is pending before a tribunal of this state and that proceeding was the first to be filed;
    7. The order is incompatible with a more recent support order involving the same parties and having the same purpose if the more recent support order is entitled to recognition and enforcement under parts 20-29 of this chapter in this state;
    8. Payment, to the extent alleged arrears have been paid in whole or in part;
    9. In a case in which the respondent neither appeared nor was represented in the proceeding in the issuing foreign country:
      1. If the law of that country provides for prior notice of proceedings, the respondent did not have proper notice of the proceedings and an opportunity to be heard; or
      2. If the law of that country does not provide for prior notice of the proceedings, the respondent did not have proper notice of the order and an opportunity to be heard in a challenge or appeal on fact or law before a tribunal; or
    10. The order was made in violation of § 36-5-2711.
  3. If a tribunal of this state does not recognize a Convention support order under subdivision (b)(2), (b)(4), or (b)(9):
    1. The tribunal may not dismiss the proceeding without allowing a reasonable time for a party to request the establishment of a new Convention support order; and
    2. The governmental entity shall take all appropriate measures to request a child support order for the obligee if the application for recognition and enforcement was received under § 36-5-2704.

Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1; 2016, ch. 664, § 3.

Compiler's Notes. Part 20, § 36-5-2001 (Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 2), concerning the short title for title 36, ch. 5, parts 20-29, was repealed and reenacted by Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1, upon completion of the provisions in § 2 of the act. Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 2, as amended by Acts 2016, ch. 664, § 4, provided that: “This act shall take effect when the department of human services files a notice with the secretary of state who shall publish the notice in the Tennessee Administrative Register on the secretary of state's web site, citing the effective date, which shall occur no later than April 1, 2016, the public welfare requiring it.”

The date published by the secretary of state in the Tennessee Administrative Register was March 31, 2016.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Enforceability; the general rule, with exceptions. Subsection (a) states the general proposition that if a child-support order is issued by a tribunal in a Convention country, except as otherwise provided in subsection (b), the order shall be recognized and enforced. In domestic cases UIFSA requires recognition of child-support order of a sister state, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738B, Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act (FFCCSOA). Receipt of a child-support order from a sister state is routinely processed and enforced. Critical examination of the sister state order for defects is not called for; it is the responsibility of the respondent to assert any defenses available. Moreover, experience has shown that child-support orders are generally valid, for relatively modest amounts, and seldom subject to claims of fraud. The most common defect is one of mistake, rather than deliberate misconduct.

Subsection (b) combines provisions from four separate articles in the Convention. These articles provide an extensive number of specific reasons for a tribunal or support enforcement agency of one Convention country to refuse to recognize a child-support order from another Convention country. For this act to be consistent with the Convention, it is necessary to identify the potential defects of a support order from a Convention country in which a defendant might raise a challenge based on lack of jurisdiction, due process, or enforceability of an order for arrearages. The majority of these defects arguably are self-explanatory, and almost all are subject to factual dispute to be resolved by the tribunal, to wit: (b)(1) “manifestly incompatible” with public policy, including violation of minimum standards of due process; (b)(2) issued without personal jurisdiction over the individual party (discussed at length below ); (b)(3) unenforceable in the issuing country; (b)(4) obtained by fraud in connection with a matter of procedure; (b)(5) the record lacks authenticity or integrity, e.g., forged; (b)(6) a prior proceeding is pending; (b)(7) a more recent support order is controlling; (b)(8) full or partial payment; (b)(9)(A),(B), no appearance, notice, or opportunity to be heard (discussed below ); and, (b)(10) exceeds limitations and restraints on modification. As with domestic cases, the norm will be to recognize and enforce a foreign order absent a challenge by the respondent. Three provisions most likely to trigger a tribunal to refuse to recognize and enforce a foreign support order require more attention, i.e., subsections [subdivisions] (b)(2), (4) and (9)(A), (B).

Of particular note, subsection (c) applies to a refusal to recognize and enforce a Convention order under any of these grounds. From the perspective of the United States, subsection (b)(2) [subdivision (b)(2)] is likely to be the primary reason for a tribunal to refuse to recognize and enforce a registered Convention support order. Key to its participation in the negotiations leading to the Convention, the United States insisted that a support order may be refused recognition by a tribunal if the issuing foreign tribunal lacked personal jurisdiction over the respondent. The facts underlying the Convention support order must be measured by a tribunal as consistent with the long-arm jurisdictional provisions of UIFSA. See Sections 201-202 [T.C.A. §§ 36-5-2201, 36-5-2202]. A potential problem occurs only if a Convention support order cannot be enforced by a tribunal because there was no appropriate nexus between the foreign country and the respondent,

Subsection (c) provides that any of the reasons enumerated for not recognizing and enforcing a registered Convention support order, i.e., (b)(2), (4) and (9), will trigger the obligation of the tribunal not to dismiss the proceeding before allowing a reasonable time for a party to seek the establishment of a new child-support order. Moreover, if the Title IV-D support enforcement agency is involved, it must “take all appropriate measures to request a child-support order;” i.e., file a petition seeking to establish an initial child-support order by the tribunal. In that case, the tribunal shall treat the request for recognition and enforcement as a petition for establishment of a new order.

Two systems; direct and indirect jurisdiction.  In drafting the Convention, the subject of the requisite jurisdiction to issue a support order generated considerable discussion. The choice divided itself into two distinct categories; rules of direct and indirect jurisdiction. Direct jurisdiction provides explicit bases on which a tribunal is vested with the power to assert its authority and enter a support order. See  Section 201 [T.C.A. § 36-5-2201].

The UIFSA long-arm provisions are paradigm rules of direct jurisdiction. Section 201 [T.C.A. § 36-5-2201] identifies the bases on which a tribunal may assert personal jurisdiction over a nonresident individual, obligor or obligee, without regard to the current residence of the individual or child. As discussed in the comment to Section 201 [T.C.A. § 36-5-2201], supra , these long-arm jurisdictional rules for child support and spousal support orders were fashioned case-by-case by the Supreme Court, see Estin v. Estin , 334 U.S. 541, 68 S. Ct. 1213, 92 L. Ed. 1561 (1948); Vanderbilt v. Vanderbil t, 354 U.S. 416, 77 S. Ct. 1360, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1456 (1957) (spousal support); Kulko v. Superior Court , 436 U.S. 84, 98 S. Ct. 1690, 56 L. Ed. 2d 132 (1978) (child support).

An initial difficulty arose because some authorities from foreign countries expressed concern about the UIFSA long-arm statute. This was especially true regarding Section 201(a)(1)  [T.C.A. § 36-5-2201(a)(1)], i.e., service of legal process that creates personal jurisdiction, sometimes called “tag or ambush jurisdiction.” Some experts in civil law countries regard the claim that jurisdiction can be acquired merely by serving documents on an individual passing through, with no fundamental ties to the jurisdiction, as “exorbitant,” and fundamentally unfair. Another provision eliciting criticism was Section 201(a)(6)  [T.C.A. § 36-5-2201(a)(6)], which literally reads that an allegation of engaging in sexual intercourse in the state that “may have" resulted in conception will suffice to support a basis for issuing a child support-order.

Similarly, rules of jurisdiction recognized by civil law countries are contrary to the principles that apply to proceedings in the United States. The fact that residence of a child or an obligee in a forum is sufficient basis in most foreign countries to support a child-support order, even though the obligor has no personal nexus with the forum, is generally viewed as wholly inconsistent with notions of due process in the United States. Assuming the obligor has never been physically present in the forum and has not participated in any of the acts described in Section 201 [T.C.A. § 36-5-2201], an assertion of jurisdiction to establish a support order based solely on the residence of the obligee or child in that forum is widely regarded in the United States as unconstitutional.

The Convention adopts a rule of indirect jurisdiction which requires a tribunal to register and enforce the order of another tribunal if certain basic jurisdictional requirements have been satisfied. The Convention does not actually prescribe the bases on which the tribunal may assert jurisdiction, as UIFSA does in Section 201  [T.C.A. § 36-5-2201]. Most commonly, in countries other than the United States if a child is a “habitual resident” of a country, a support order of a tribunal of that country will be recognized in another country. As a practical matter, although “habitual residence” of the obligee provides no basis for assertion of personal jurisdiction over the obligor in the United States, the home tribunal is almost always the preferred forum if the obligee has any basis under Section 201 [T.C.A. § 36-5-2201] to obtain long-arm jurisdiction over a non-resident obligor. That is, the actual custodian of the child is almost always the person who seeks to establish and enforce child support and, if possible, chooses to bring a proceeding in the state of residence of the obligee and the child. A tribunal that recognizes “habitual residence” as a basis for indirect jurisdiction would, accordingly, register and enforce an order from a tribunal in the “habitual residence” of the obligee or child without concern about whether the obligor has a nexus with that tribunal. Thus, most foreign concerns about the tenuous reaches of long-arm jurisdiction in the United States are obviated in practice.

The Convention eschews rules of direct jurisdiction, choosing instead to rely on half-a-dozen indirect rules of jurisdiction, “habitual residence” of any of the parties (respondent, creditor or child) being the most common. The focus of the Convention is to identify the bases on which a tribunal of one Convention country will be required to recognize the assertion of jurisdiction by a tribunal of another Convention country. When the Convention is in force in both countries, a support order issued by a tribunal of Country A will be enforced by a tribunal of Country B, provided that the order is enforceable in Country A, plus the host of other possible considerations discussed above. There are a limited number of exceptions, or “reservations,” to such rules permitted under the Convention, which give rise to additional procedures noted below. Once recognition is accorded to a support order, the normal procedures available to enforce the order come into play. The routes to arrive at enforcement by way of direct or indirect jurisdiction are different, but the destination is the same.

Virtually all foreign countries recognize and enforce a child-support order based on the residence of the obligee or the child. The U.S. requirement of personal jurisdiction over the obligor is often regarded abroad as idiosyncratic. Nonetheless, the new Convention requires recognition of U.S. orders based on long-arm jurisdiction asserted over the obligor, a.k.a. “debtor” if the forum state is also the state of residence of the obligee, a.k.a. “creditor.” From the perspective of a foreign tribunal, such an order should be considered valid, if only for creditor- or child-based jurisdictional reasons. The fact that the state tribunal requires a personal nexus between the parties and the tribunal is irrelevant to the foreign tribunal.

These distinct views of appropriate jurisdiction presented a genuine issue for resolution. The United States delegation took the position that, as a matter of constitutional law, its tribunals could not recognize and enforce creditor- or child-based support orders under certain factual circumstances accepted in other countries as providing appropriate jurisdiction. The conclusion of the delegation was that this approach conflicts with the Kulko  decision, supra . The potential lack of nexus with the obligor, if jurisdiction was based solely on the ”habitual residence” of the obligee, would present an impenetrable barrier to participation in the Convention by the United States.

Fairly early on in the Convention negotiations, a consensus developed that these different systems of jurisdiction could be accommodated. On the U.S. side, a challenge to a foreign child-support order will be rejected if the factual circumstances are sufficient to support an assertion of long-arm jurisdiction in the foreign tribunal. Rather obviously, the foreign tribunal need not, and almost certainly will not, consider whether there is a factual basis for establishing personal jurisdiction over the absent obligor based upon “minimum contacts” with the forum. This is not a part of the jurisprudence of the foreign tribunal. If a challenge to a support order is raised by the obligor when the order is sought for enforcement in a United States tribunal, however, that tribunal shall undertake a determination of whether the jurisdictional bases of Section 201 [T.C.A. § 36-5-2201] would have been applicable if that issue had been raised in the foreign tribunal. If so, the order is enforceable in this country, notwithstanding that the foreign tribunal based its decision on jurisdiction on the fact that the child or the obligee resided in that forum. See  Convention art. 20(1)(c)-(d).

Asserting long-arm jurisdiction to establish a support order by a tribunal in a proceeding under UIFSA will be unaffected by the entry into force of the Convention. This will be true irrespective of whether the nonresident respondent resides in another state or in a foreign country, or even resides in a non-Convention foreign nation.

The term “habitually resident” is used in a number of private international law conventions, including the 2007 Maintenance Convention. The term is not defined in any of them. Rather, in common law countries its meaning is determined on a case-by-case basis by the practice and case law of each country. In the United States and elsewhere there is no consistent interpretation of the term by the courts considering it in the context of the 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. The negotiators of the Convention from the United States made it clear that case law on the meaning of “habitually resident” in the child abduction context should not automatically be applied to child support cases. That is because the effect of the use of “habitual residence” in the 1980 Child Abduction Convention is intended to restrict the ability of a person to obtain a new custody order shortly after arriving in another country. In fact, one of the objects of the 1980 Convention is to limit the ability of a parent unhappy with the custody order of one court to “forum shop” by moving to another country and seeking a new order. In the 2007 Maintenance Convention, the object is to make it easier for an obligee to recover child support in an international case, not to restrict the ability of an obligee to apply for that support.

Due process under the Convention.  Subsection (b)(9)(A) [subdivision (b)(9)(A)] applies to a failure to give a party prior notice of the proceedings and an opportunity to be heard, which is the classic denial of due process in a proceeding in the United States.

Subsection (b)(9)(B) [subdivision (b)(9)(B)] will be unfamiliar to practitioners in this country and requires some explanation. This provision recognizes the legitimacy of, and provides a method for challenge of, a support order which may be routinely entered in some administrative systems in an ex parte proceeding. The support order is issued without prior notice to the obligor or opportunity to be heard. The due process opportunity is provided after the ex parte decision. This system is currently in use in administrative proceedings in Australia and New Zealand. Because the respondent will not have participated in the original proceeding, the post facto due process allows the obligor an opportunity to challenge the decision on fact or law.

Convention source: art. 20. Bases for recognition and enforcement; art. 21. Severability and partial recognition and enforcement; art. 22. Grounds for refusing recognition and enforcement; art. 23. Procedure on an application for recognition and enforcement; art. 25. Documents.

Related to Convention: art. 11. Application contents.

36-5-2709. Partial enforcement.

If a tribunal of this state does not recognize and enforce a Convention support order in its entirety, it shall enforce any severable part of the order.  An application or direct request may seek recognition and partial enforcement of a Convention support order.

Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Part 20, § 36-5-2001 (Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 2), concerning the short title for title 36, ch. 5, parts 20-29, was repealed and reenacted by Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1, upon completion of the provisions in § 2 of the act. Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 2, as amended by Acts 2016, ch. 664, § 4, provided that: “This act shall take effect when the department of human services files a notice with the secretary of state who shall publish the notice in the Tennessee Administrative Register on the secretary of state's web site, citing the effective date, which shall occur no later than April 1, 2016, the public welfare requiring it.”

The date published by the secretary of state in the Tennessee Administrative Register was March 31, 2016.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

This section transforms Convention language into UIFSA terminology. If a responding tribunal is unable to enforce the entirety of a Convention support order, it shall enforce a severable part of the order. For example, a mother of a child may have another woman as her registered partner in a Convention country. If a support order provides support for both the mother and child support for the child, that part of the order awarding support to the mother from the registered partner may not be enforceable in some states. Nonetheless, a tribunal is obligated to recognize and enforce that part of the order for support of the child. The second sentence authorizes the mother to request enforcement only of the child support portion, see also  Section 706 (c) [T.C.A. § 36-5-2706(c)], supra .

Convention source: art. 21. Severability and partial recognition and enforcement.

Related to Convention: art. 20. Bases for recognition and enforcement.

36-5-2710. Foreign support agreement.

  1. Except as otherwise provided in subsections (c) and (d), a tribunal of this state shall recognize and enforce a foreign support agreement registered in this state.
  2. An application or direct request for recognition and enforcement of a foreign support agreement must be accompanied by:
    1. A complete text of the foreign support agreement; and
    2. A record stating that the foreign support agreement is enforceable as an order of support in the issuing country.
  3. A tribunal of this state may vacate the registration of a foreign support agreement only if, acting on its own motion, the tribunal finds that recognition and enforcement would be manifestly incompatible with public policy.
  4. In a contest of a foreign support agreement, a tribunal of this state may refuse recognition and enforcement of the agreement if it finds:
    1. Recognition and enforcement of the agreement is manifestly incompatible with public policy;
    2. The agreement was obtained by fraud or falsification;
    3. The agreement is incompatible with a support order involving the same parties and having the same purpose in this state, another state, or a foreign country if the support order is entitled to recognition and enforcement under parts 20-29 of this chapter in this state; or
    4. The record submitted under subsection (b) lacks authenticity or integrity.
  5. A proceeding for recognition and enforcement of a foreign support agreement must be suspended during the pendency of a challenge to or appeal of the agreement before a tribunal of another state or a foreign country.

Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Part 20, § 36-5-2001 (Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 2), concerning the short title for title 36, ch. 5, parts 20-29, was repealed and reenacted by Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1, upon completion of the provisions in § 2 of the act. Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 2, as amended by Acts 2016, ch. 664, § 4, provided that: “This act shall take effect when the department of human services files a notice with the secretary of state who shall publish the notice in the Tennessee Administrative Register on the secretary of state's web site, citing the effective date, which shall occur no later than April 1, 2016, the public welfare requiring it.”

The date published by the secretary of state in the Tennessee Administrative Register was March 31, 2016.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Section 701(6) [T.C.A. § 36-5-2701(6)] provides an extensive definition of a “foreign support agreement,” which is UIFSA terminology to make more readily understandable for U.S. bench and bar a process that is denominated as a “maintenance arrangement” in the Convention. Subsection (a) requires a state tribunal to recognize and enforce a foreign support agreement if the terms of this section are met. Most crucially, such an agreement must be accompanied by a document stating that the foreign support agreement is as enforceable as a support order would be in the country of origin.

This section basically translates into common parlance the procedure identified in Convention art. 30, which was the result of a very extended discussions about “authentic instruments and private agreements” during the negotiations on the Convention. In many countries, such an agreement is unknown insofar as enforcement by a tribunal is concerned. In the United States, a purely private agreement is treated as a form of contract, rather than as an order of a tribunal. Under the Convention, however, a foreign support agreement meeting the standards established in this section, and as defined in Section 701(6) [T.C.A. § 36-5-2701(6)], is entitled to enforcement by the tribunal. Advantages for enforcement of child support binding on the parties in the country of origin stem from the inclusion of a foreign support agreement because there is a growing tendency internationally to promote amicable solutions and avoid contentious procedures. In view of the movement towards alternative methods of dispute resolution in the United States, this mechanism provides for recognition and enforcement of a dispute resolution system in some of the likely Convention countries. The absence of this provision would have been a loss for the Convention, and limited its usefulness for support agreements, particularly in the Scandinavian countries. Although the possibility of a reservation is available, the United States has not indicated that it intends to make such a reservation.

To reiterate, the key to enforcement is that the foreign support agreement must be “enforceable as a decision” in the foreign country of its origin (quoting the Convention). If such an agreement is enforceable only as a contract, it will not fall within the scope of this section. Another key provision is that under subsection (e) the enforcement proceeding will be suspended if the respondent challenges the underlying agreement in a tribunal that has jurisdiction to hear challenges to the agreement.

Convention source: art. 3. Definitions; art. 30. Maintenance arrangements.

36-5-2711. Modification of Convention child support order.

  1. A tribunal of this state may not modify a Convention child support order if the obligee remains a resident of the foreign country where the support order was issued unless:
    1. The obligee submits to the jurisdiction of a tribunal of this state, either expressly or by defending on the merits of the case without objecting to the jurisdiction at the first available opportunity; or
    2. The foreign tribunal lacks or refuses to exercise jurisdiction to modify its support order or issue a new support order.
  2. If a tribunal of this state does not modify a Convention child support order because the order is not recognized in this state, § 36-5-2708(c) applies.

Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Part 20, § 36-5-2001 (Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 2), concerning the short title for title 36, ch. 5, parts 20-29, was repealed and reenacted by Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1, upon completion of the provisions in § 2 of the act. Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 2, as amended by Acts 2016, ch. 664, § 4, provided that: “This act shall take effect when the department of human services files a notice with the secretary of state who shall publish the notice in the Tennessee Administrative Register on the secretary of state's web site, citing the effective date, which shall occur no later than April 1, 2016, the public welfare requiring it.”

The date published by the secretary of state in the Tennessee Administrative Register was March 31, 2016.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

One goal of the Convention was to limit the number of multiple foreign orders with respect to the same parties to the extent possible. But, given differing laws and jurisdictional bases, consensus on limiting modification was reached only on the fact patterns presented by Section 711(a) [T.C.A. § 36-5-2711(a)].

First, this section transforms Convention language into UIFSA terminology. The restriction identified on modification of a child-support order in subsection (a) strikes a familiar note. Similar to Section 611 [T.C.A. § 36-5-2611], supra , a restriction is placed on modification of a support order if the obligee remains in the issuing Convention country. Subsection (a)(1) [subdivision (a)(1)] provides an exception if, by failure to object, the obligee submits to the jurisdiction of another tribunal. Subsection (a)(2) [subdivision (a)(2)] is similar to Section 615 [T.C.A. § 36-5-2615], supra . From the perspective of the obligee, the restriction has virtually the same effect as found in Sections 205 and 611 [T.C.A. §§ 36-5-2205 and 36-5-2611]. That is, in effect the issuing foreign tribunal has a form of continuing, exclusive jurisdiction that it maintains over modification of the order so long as the obligee remains a resident of the country. The difference is that the protection against modification is accorded only to the obligee, and not to the obligor. Thus, under the Convention the obligee may be free to seek a modification in another forum notwithstanding the fact that the obligor remains in the issuing country but the obligee moves to another country, with the implicit requirement that the issuing foreign tribunal must have personal jurisdiction over the obligor to sustain the enforcement of modification by a state tribunal.

Subsection (b) requires a state tribunal to issue a new child-support order if the Convention order was founded on child-based jurisdiction, the foreign tribunal lacked personal jurisdiction over the obligor, and there is a request to establish an order in accordance with Section 708 [T.C.A. § 36-5-2708].

Convention source: art. 18. Limit on proceedings; art. 21. Severability and partial recognition and enforcement.

Related to Convention: art. 18. Limit on proceedings; art. 20. Bases for recognition and enforcement.

36-5-2712. Personal information — Limitation on use.

Personal information gathered or transmitted under this part may be used only for the purposes for which it was gathered or transmitted.

Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Part 20, § 36-5-2001 (Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 2), concerning the short title for title 36, ch. 5, parts 20-29, was repealed and reenacted by Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1, upon completion of the provisions in § 2 of the act. Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 2, as amended by Acts 2016, ch. 664, § 4, provided that: “This act shall take effect when the department of human services files a notice with the secretary of state who shall publish the notice in the Tennessee Administrative Register on the secretary of state's web site, citing the effective date, which shall occur no later than April 1, 2016, the public welfare requiring it.”

The date published by the secretary of state in the Tennessee Administrative Register was March 31, 2016.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

This section is an almost word-for-word tracking of the Convention provision, rephrased in UIFSA terminology. This single sentence is illustrative of the different drafting rules for a uniform act and an international treaty. Although certainly not always adhered to, cardinal rules for drafting a uniform act include writing in the active voice, identifying the intended actor, and specifying the consequences for failure to follow the directive or ignore the proscription. Convention provisions, such as this one, are generally written in passive voice, the actor is not identified, and no penalty is specified for noncompliance. Insofar as the admirable goals of the provision are concerned, ambiguity in the statute, or an exception to the rule, must be resolved case-by-case.

Confidentiality is highly prized in the United States in many circumstances, e.g., the attorney-client privilege is protected to the maximum extent possible. Under other circumstances, the opposite is true, e.g., records of litigation are generally available, and a judicial decision is ordinarily in open court or public record. Neither goal is absolute. Section 312 [T.C.A. § 36-5-2312], supra , adds another exception, i.e., nondisclosure of information is sometimes required to protect the health, safety, or liberty of a party or a child. In a case in which there is a risk of domestic violence or parental kidnapping, nondisclosure may be crucial.

The anticipated breadth of application of this provision is to constrain individuals and entities subject to a Convention support order. Protection of personal information in this computerized world is increasingly important, whatever the medium or means of communication. Both the sender and recipient of personal information transmitted electronically are expected to take appropriate measures vis-`-vis their service providers to meet the requirements of this section. The exact meaning of the statutory phrase “for the purpose for which it was gathered or transmitted” will necessarily remain ambiguous until elaborated by statute, caselaw, or regulation.

Convention source: art. 38. Protection of personal data.

36-5-2713. Record in original language — English translation.

A record filed with a tribunal of this state under this part must be in the original language and, if not in English, must be accompanied by an English translation.

Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Part 20, § 36-5-2001 (Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 2), concerning the short title for title 36, ch. 5, parts 20-29, was repealed and reenacted by Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1, upon completion of the provisions in § 2 of the act. Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 2, as amended by Acts 2016, ch. 664, § 4, provided that: “This act shall take effect when the department of human services files a notice with the secretary of state who shall publish the notice in the Tennessee Administrative Register on the secretary of state's web site, citing the effective date, which shall occur no later than April 1, 2016, the public welfare requiring it.”

The date published by the secretary of state in the Tennessee Administrative Register was March 31, 2016.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

The United States will declare that English is the official language for transmittals to this country. Further, the United States will make a reservation objecting to the use of French, the other official language of the Convention, as a default translation. Of course, the original order may be in French. The cost of translation is borne by the issuing state or Convention country.

Convention source: art. 44. Language requirements; art. 62. Reservations; art. 63. Declarations.

Related to Convention: art. 45. Means and costs of translation.

Part 28
Uniform Interstate Family Support Act — Interstate Rendition

36-5-2801. Grounds for rendition.

  1. For purposes of this part, “governor” includes an individual performing the functions of governor or the executive authority of a state covered by parts 20-29 of this chapter.
  2. The governor of this state may:
    1. Demand that the governor of another state surrender an individual found in the other state who is charged criminally in this state with having failed to provide for the support of an obligee; or
    2. On the demand by the governor of another state, surrender an individual found in this state who is charged criminally in the other state with having failed to provide for the support of an obligee.
  3. A provision for extradition of individuals not inconsistent with parts 20-29 of this chapter applies to the demand even if the individual whose surrender is demanded was not in the demanding state when the crime was allegedly committed and has not fled therefrom.

Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Part 20, § 36-5-2001 (Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 2), concerning the short title for title 36, ch. 5, parts 20-29, was repealed and reenacted by Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1, upon completion of the provisions in § 2 of the act. Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 2, as amended by Acts 2016, ch. 664, § 4, provided that: “This act shall take effect when the department of human services files a notice with the secretary of state who shall publish the notice in the Tennessee Administrative Register on the secretary of state's web site, citing the effective date, which shall occur no later than April 1, 2016, the public welfare requiring it.”

The date published by the secretary of state in the Tennessee Administrative Register was March 31, 2016.

Textbooks. Tennessee Criminal Practice and Procedure (Raybin), § 2.9.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

This section has not been amended substantively since 1968. Virtually no controversy has been generated regarding this procedure. Arguably application of subsection (c) is problematic in situations in which the obligor neither was present in the demanding state at the time of the commission of the crime nor fled from the demanding state. The possibility that an individual may commit a crime in a state without ever being physically present there has elicited considerable discussion and some case law. See  L. BRILMAYER, AN INTRODUCTION TO JURISDICTION IN THE AMERICAN FEDERAL SYSTEM,” 329-335 (1986) (discussing minimum contacts theory for criminal jurisdiction); Rotenberg, Extraterritorial Legislative Jurisdiction and the State Criminal Law , 38 TEX. L. REV. 763, 784-87 (1960) (due process requires that the behavior of the defendant must be predictably subject to state's criminal jurisdiction); cf. Ex parte Boetscher , 812 S.W.2d 600 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (Equal Protection Clause limits disparate treatment of nonresident defendants); In re King , 3 Cal.3d 226, 90 Cal. Rptr. 15, 474 P.2d 983 (1970), cert. denied 403 U.S. 931 (enhanced offense for nonresidents impacts constitutional right to travel).

36-5-2802. Conditions of rendition.

  1. Before making a demand that the governor of another state surrender an individual charged criminally in this state with having failed to provide for the support of an obligee, the governor of this state may require a prosecutor of this state to demonstrate that at least sixty (60) days previously the obligee had initiated proceedings for support pursuant to parts 20-29 of this chapter or that the proceeding would be of no avail.
  2. If, under parts 20-29 of this chapter or a law substantially similar to parts 20-29 of this chapter, the governor of another state makes a demand that the governor of this state surrender an individual charged criminally in that state with having failed to provide for the support of a child or other individual to whom a duty of support is owed, the governor may require a prosecutor to investigate the demand and report whether a proceeding for support has been initiated or would be effective. If it appears that a proceeding would be effective but has not been initiated, the governor may delay honoring the demand for a reasonable time to permit the initiation of a proceeding.
  3. If a proceeding for support has been initiated and the individual whose rendition is demanded prevails, the governor may decline to honor the demand. If the petitioner prevails and the individual whose rendition is demanded is subject to a support order, the governor may decline to honor the demand if the individual is complying with the support order.

Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Part 20, § 36-5-2001 (Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 2), concerning the short title for title 36, ch. 5, parts 20-29, was repealed and reenacted by Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1, upon completion of the provisions in § 2 of the act. Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 2, as amended by Acts 2016, ch. 664, § 4, provided that: “This act shall take effect when the department of human services files a notice with the secretary of state who shall publish the notice in the Tennessee Administrative Register on the secretary of state's web site, citing the effective date, which shall occur no later than April 1, 2016, the public welfare requiring it.”

The date published by the secretary of state in the Tennessee Administrative Register was March 31, 2016.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

This section has not undergone significant change since 1968. Interstate rendition remains the last resort for support enforcement, in part because a governor may exercise considerable discretion in deciding whether to honor a demand for rendition of an obligor.

Part 29
Uniform Interstate Family Support Act — Miscellaneous Provisions

36-5-2901. Uniformity of application and construction.

In applying and construing this uniform act, codified in parts 20-29 of this chapter, consideration must be given to the need to promote uniformity of the law with respect to its subject matter among states that enact it.

Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Part 20, § 36-5-2001 (Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 2), concerning the short title for title 36, ch. 5, parts 20-29, was repealed and reenacted by Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1, upon completion of the provisions in § 2 of the act. Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 2, as amended by Acts 2016, ch. 664, § 4, provided that: “This act shall take effect when the department of human services files a notice with the secretary of state who shall publish the notice in the Tennessee Administrative Register on the secretary of state's web site, citing the effective date, which shall occur no later than April 1, 2016, the public welfare requiring it.”

The date published by the secretary of state in the Tennessee Administrative Register was March 31, 2016.

36-5-2902. Applicability.

Parts 20-29 of this chapter apply to proceedings begun on or after the effective date of this act to establish a support order or determine parentage of a child or to register, recognize, enforce, or modify a prior support order, determination, or agreement, whenever issued or entered.

Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Part 20, § 36-5-2001 (Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 2), concerning the short title for title 36, ch. 5, parts 20-29, was repealed and reenacted by Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1, upon completion of the provisions in § 2 of the act. Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 2, as amended by Acts 2016, ch. 664, § 4, provided that: “This act shall take effect when the department of human services files a notice with the secretary of state who shall publish the notice in the Tennessee Administrative Register on the secretary of state's web site, citing the effective date, which shall occur no later than April 1, 2016, the public welfare requiring it.”

The date published by the secretary of state in the Tennessee Administrative Register was March 31, 2016.

36-5-2903. Severability.

If any provision of parts 20-29 of this chapter or their application to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the invalidity does not affect other provisions or applications of parts 20-29 of this chapter which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of parts 20-29 of this chapter are severable.

Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Part 20, § 36-5-2001 (Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 2), concerning the short title for title 36, ch. 5, parts 20-29, was repealed and reenacted by Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 1, upon completion of the provisions in § 2 of the act. Acts 2010, ch. 901, § 2, as amended by Acts 2016, ch. 664, § 4, provided that: “This act shall take effect when the department of human services files a notice with the secretary of state who shall publish the notice in the Tennessee Administrative Register on the secretary of state's web site, citing the effective date, which shall occur no later than April 1, 2016, the public welfare requiring it.”

The date published by the secretary of state in the Tennessee Administrative Register was March 31, 2016.

Part 30
Intercounty Enforcement and Modification

36-5-3001. Purposes and construction of part and limitation of scope of part.

  1. The purpose of this part is to provide procedures for the intercounty enforcement and modification of child support and child custody cases and shall be liberally construed to effectuate its purposes.
  2. The provisions for transfer in this part shall not apply to cases in any court regarding petitions for dependency and neglect, delinquency, unruly behavior, terminations of parental rights or adoptions pursuant to this title and title 37.

Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 5.

36-5-3002. Part definitions.

As used in this part, unless the context clearly requires otherwise:

  1. “Child's county” means the county in which the child who is subject to a support or custody order resides;
  2. “Clerk” means the clerk of the transferor or transferee court, or the clerk of any court who has been designated by either of those courts to collect support payments for such court;
  3. “Court” means, except as provided in § 36-5-3001(b), a juvenile, circuit, or chancery court or other court of this state with jurisdiction to enter support or custody orders;
  4. “Department” means the department of human services or its contractor or designee;
  5. “Filing” means the initiation of judicial action by the completion of a motion or petition seeking to order the alteration of a legal status through the act of sending or bringing the motion or petition to the office of the clerk of the court;
  6. “Issuing county” means the county in which a court issues a support or custody order or that renders a judgment determining parentage or to which a support or custody order has been previously transferred;
  7. “Issuing court” means the court that issues a support or custody order or renders a judgment determining parentage or to which a support or custody order has been previously transferred;
  8. “Obligor's county” means the county in which the obligor or non-custodial parent resides;
  9. “Request” means a statement of a requesting party seeking transfer of a custody or child support case to the court of another county;
  10. “Requesting party” means custodial parent, noncustodial parent or, in Title IV-D child support cases, the department or its contractor;
  11. “Service of process” means the act of bringing or sending notice of the filing of a motion or petition to the attention of the opposing party by delivery of a copy of the motion or pleading to the opposing party;
  12. “Transfer” means the process by which the transferor court, upon request, moves the case to a court where the child resides thereby conferring jurisdiction on the transferee court;
  13. “Transferee court” means the court that assumes jurisdiction upon a transfer of a case; and
  14. “Transferor court” means the court from which a case is transferred to another court.

Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 5; 2000, ch. 922, § 30.

Compiler's Notes. Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, referred to in this section, is compiled in 42 U.S.C. § 651 et seq.

36-5-3003. Transfer of support or custody cases.

    1. Except as provided in § 36-5-3001(b), a case that includes child support or custody provisions may be transferred between counties in this state without the need for any additional filing by the party seeking transfer by the filing of a request by the requesting party if:
      1. The requesting party has served the nonrequesting party with the filing seeking the transfer; and
      2. The nonrequesting party has not filed an objection within fifteen (15) days from the date the notice of the filing was mailed.(2)  If the nonrequesting party files an objection pursuant to subdivision (a)(1)(B), the objection shall be in the form of a motion for review of the request in the transferor court. If an objection has been filed, the transferor court shall determine whether there is good cause for the transfer. If the court finds good cause for the transfer, it shall transfer the case.
  1. Upon receipt of a request, the case must be transferred by the clerk of the issuing court, without order of the court, to a court of competent jurisdiction in the county where the child or children reside if each of the following applies:
    1. Neither the child or children, custodial parent/obligee, nor the noncustodial parent/obligor currently reside in the issuing county;
    2. The child or children who are subject to the support or custody order currently reside in the county to which the case is to be transferred and have resided there for at least six (6) months; and
    3. No objection has been filed pursuant to subdivision (a)(2).
  2. A case may also be transferred for modification of support or custody to any court of competent jurisdiction in the county in which the noncustodial parent/obligor resides in this state with no six-month residency period if both the child or children subject to the support or custody order and the custodial parent/obligee reside outside this state and the custodial parent/obligee does not object after the provision of notice pursuant to § 36-5-3004. If objection is made, or if the requesting party does not seek immediate transfer without the six (6) month residency period, the requesting party may obtain transfer for modification of the order by demonstrating that the custodial parent/obligee and the child or children have resided outside this state for at least six (6) months. A transfer pursuant to this subsection (c) shall be initiated by written request of the requesting party or department pursuant to this part.
  3. If the case has been transferred pursuant to this part, the fact that one of the parties or the child returns to the transferor county does not, by that fact alone, confer jurisdiction upon the previous transferor court. A transfer to the original issuing court requires compliance with the procedures of this part.
    1. “Custodial parent” for purposes of this part means the person with whom the child resides a majority of the time in a situation where there is an order of joint custody or where there exist parenting plans pursuant to chapter 6, part 4 of this title that address issues of custody.
    2. “Custodial parent” for purposes of this part also includes, in addition to a biological or legal parent having legal custody of a child, an individual to whom legal custody of the child or children has been given by a court of competent jurisdiction.

Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 5; 1998, ch. 1098, § 50; 2000, ch. 922, § 31; 2016, ch. 668, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2016, ch. 668, § 3, provided that the act, which amended this section, shall apply to requests for transfer filed on or after July 1, 2016.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Applicability.

Where a mother filed a divorce action in the county where the parties lived at the time of separation but the mother subsequently moved to another county, the father's motion under T.C.A. § 36-5-3004 to transfer the case to the mother's new county of residence was properly denied because the divorce action was still pending and no custody or support order was the subject of a request for enforcement or modification; hence, T.C.A. § 36-5-3003 for transferring custody and enforcement cases did not apply. Buss-Flinn v. Flinn, 121 S.W.3d 383, 2003 Tenn. App. LEXIS 351 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 1032 (Tenn. 2003).

36-5-3004. Procedure to transfer case.

A case may be transferred by the clerk of the issuing court following a request by a requesting party sending the request for the transfer to the clerk of the transferor court. The request shall include the following information:

    1. A sworn statement by the party or the department seeking transfer that, to the best of the requesting party's or the department's knowledge, neither the child or children, the custodial parent/obligee nor the noncustodial parent/obligor resides in the transferor county, and that the child or children currently reside in the transferee county and the child or children have resided in the transferee county for at least six (6) months; or
    2. That the noncustodial parent/obligor resides in the county to which the case is to be transferred and that the custodial parent/obligee and the child or children reside outside this state:
      1. And the requesting party seeks an immediate transfer of the case without the six-month residency period if the custodial parent/obligee does not object; or
      2. That the child or children and the custodial parent/obligee have resided outside this state for at least six (6) months;
  1. The issuing court's docket number of the case to be transferred;
  2. The name of the other party and, if known, the other party's address and social security number;
  3. The name of the court and address of the clerk of the court to whom the case is to be transferred;
  4. The name and address, if known, of the employer of the obligor if the order has been or may be subject to an income assignment;
  5. That the request for transfer can be contested by the nonrequesting party within fifteen (15) days of the date the notice was mailed by filing a motion for review of the request in the transferor court;
  6. Certification by the requesting party or the department that a copy of the request with the information in subdivisions (1)-(6) has been mailed to the nonrequesting party; and
  7. A copy of a notice, with the address of the nonrequesting party, to be sent by the clerk of the transferor court or the department in Title IV-D child support cases to the nonrequesting party in the event that the case is transferred, which states that the case has been transferred and that all child support payments of the obligor are to be sent, as appropriate, to the clerk of the transferee court or to the department of human services, as the case may be.

Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 5; 1998, ch. 1098, § 51; 2000, ch. 922, §§ 32, 33; 2016, ch. 668, § 2.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2016, ch. 668, § 3, provided that the act, which amended this section, shall apply to requests for transfer filed on or after July 1, 2016.

Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, referred to in this section, is compiled in 42 U.S.C. § 651 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Applicability.

Where a mother filed a divorce action in the county where the parties lived at the time of separation but the mother subsequently moved to another county, the father's motion under T.C.A. § 36-5-3004 to transfer the case to the mother's new county of residence was properly denied because the divorce action was still pending and no custody or support order was the subject of a request for enforcement or modification; hence, § 36-5-3004 did not apply. Buss-Flinn v. Flinn, 121 S.W.3d 383, 2003 Tenn. App. LEXIS 351 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 1032 (Tenn. 2003).

36-5-3005. Duties of the transferor court.

  1. If no request for contest of the request for transfer is filed within fifteen (15) days pursuant to § 36-5-3004(6), or if the contest of the transfer is denied by the transferor court, the clerk of the transferor court shall, within fifteen (15) days thereafter:
    1. Remove from the court file the original pleadings, orders and any other filed documents, or make certified copies of such documents;
    2. Prepare a certified, complete child support payment record, unless the case is being enforced by the department of human services pursuant to Title IV-D of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. § 651 et seq.), in which situation the department's child support computer system, if operative for the transferor and transferee court at the time of the transfer, shall be used as the child support payment record and the clerk shall not be required to prepare the certified child support payment record;
      1. Mail the originals, or certified copies of the originals, of all documents and, if necessary, the certified child support payment record, to the clerk of the court of the transferee court. The computer record, if operative, shall be used as the official record of the child support obligation;
      2. Mail the notice supplied pursuant to § 36-5-3004(8) to the non-requesting party. The department shall mail the notice in Title IV-D child support cases.
  2. The clerk of the transferor court shall not be required to maintain the copies of the original pleadings or other original documents in the record, but may do so if certified copies are sent.
  3. Upon receipt of the transferred documents and assignment of a docket number by the transferee court, the jurisdiction of the transferor court is terminated.

Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 5; 1998, ch. 1098, § 52; 2000, ch. 922, § 34.

36-5-3006. Duties and powers of transferee clerk and transferee court.

  1. A transferee court, upon receipt of the transferred documents from the transferor court shall assign a docket number to the case and establish a case file, and shall create a child support payment record, unless the case is being enforced under Title IV-D of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. § 651 et seq.), in which case the department's child support computer system, if operative for the transferor and transferee court at the time of the transfer, shall be used as the child support payment record and the clerk shall not be required to create a separate child support payment record.
  2. A transferred order of child support or custody is enforceable and modifiable in the same manner and is subject to the same procedures as if the order had been originally issued by the transferee court.
    1. Upon receipt of the certified payment record from the transferor court, the transferee court shall admit the certified copy as evidence of payments made or not made. Testimony of the record keeper from the transferor court shall not be required. If the case is being enforced under Title IV-D of the Social Security Act the department's child support computer system, if operative for the transferor and transferee court at the time of the transfer, shall be used as the child support payment record, and no further evidence of the record keeper shall be required.
    2. The certified copy of the custody and parental access or visitation orders shall be admitted as evidence of the current custodial and parental access or visitation status of the child without testimony of the record keeper of the transferor court.

Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 5.

36-5-3007. Contest of transfer.

  1. A party may contest the transfer of the case by filing a motion in the transferor court for that purpose within fifteen (15) days of the mailing date of the notice from the requesting party. Unless it is shown by the nonrequesting party that notice of the request for transfer was not received, failure to contest the transfer request within the fifteen-day period waives an objection to the transfer request.
  2. The contest of the transfer shall be limited to whether:
    1. One (1) party or the child or children continue to reside in the transferor county;
    2. The child or children have resided in the transferee county for at least six (6) months; or
    3. In the case of a request for transfer alleging the child or children are residing outside this state:
      1. The noncustodial parent/obligor resides in the county to which the case is to be transferred; or
        1. If the child or children have not resided outside this state for at least six (6) months, the custodial parent/obligee objects to the transfer; or
        2. The child or children and their custodial parent/obligee have resided outside this state for at least six (6) months.

Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 5; 1998, ch. 1098, §§ 53, 54; 2000, ch. 922, § 35.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Intercounty Transfer Required.

In light of the undisputed evidence in the record regarding the current residence of the father, the mother, and their three children, the mother's petition for an intercounty transfer, if filed, had to be granted and the case had to be transferred to a court of competent jurisdiction in the county where the mother, father, and children now lived. Boyer v. Heimermann, 238 S.W.3d 249, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 185 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 30, 2007), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 737 (Tenn. Aug. 13, 2007).

36-5-3008. Acceptance of transfer.

The transferee court shall accept the transfer and shall not have the discretion to refuse the transfer.

Acts 2000, ch. 922, § 36.

Compiler's Notes. Former § 36-5-3008, concerning costs and fees, was transferred to § 36-5-3009 in 2000.

36-5-3009. Costs and fees.

  1. When a transfer request is made by the department of human services or its contractors, the fee and all taxes shall be waived for the department or its contractors.
  2. Costs of court and for making copies and for providing certifications, fees and taxes shall be adjudged by the transferee court for both the clerks of the transferor court and the transferee court against the noncustodial parent/obligor and shall be apportioned between each clerk as to the costs, fees and taxes due for each clerk.
  3. The clerk shall file any request for transfer and carry out the requirements of this part, even without receiving the appropriate fee for such request. If not paid, such sum shall be added to the cost bill to be assessed by the transferee court.

Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 5; 1998, ch. 1098, § 55; T.C.A. § 36-5-3008; Acts 2000, ch. 922, § 36; 2005, ch. 429, §§ 7, 8.

Compiler's Notes. Former § 36-5-3008 was transferred to this location in 2000.

Part 31
Enforcement Without Transfer of Jurisdiction

36-5-3101. Purpose and construction of part.

The purpose of this part is to provide a procedure for the enforcement of support obligations arising under the law against an obligor without a transfer of jurisdiction to modify the order. This part shall be liberally construed to effectuate its purposes.

Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 6.

36-5-3102. Part definitions.

As used in this part, unless the context otherwise clearly requires:

  1. “Clerk” means the clerk of the original or registering court, or the clerk of any court who has been designated by either of those courts to collect support payments for such court;
  2. “Court” means a juvenile, circuit, or chancery court or other court of this state with jurisdiction to enter support or custody orders;
  3. “Department” means the department of human services or its contractor;
  4. “Issuing court” means the court that entered the order sought to be enforced in the registering court;
  5. “Nonrequesting party” means the party against whom a registered order is sought to be enforced;
  6. “Obligee” means an individual or agency to whom a support obligation is owed by an obligor;
  7. “Obligor” means an individual against whom a support order has been entered; and
  8. “Registering court” means the court in which a support order is registered for enforcement only.

Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 6.

36-5-3103. Registration of order for enforcement.

  1. A support order issued by a court of this state may be registered in the county in this state where the child or children reside, for enforcement purposes only. If the case is a Title IV-D support case, at the option of the department, it may be enforced in the county of the residence of the obligor. The order may be modified in this state in a court other than the issuing court only if transferred pursuant to part 30 of this chapter. A support order issued by a court in one county may be registered in another county by the person or agency seeking only enforcement of the original order against a support obligor by sending the following documents and information to the appropriate court in the registering county:
    1. One (1) certified copy of all orders to be registered, including any modification of an order;
    2. A letter or transmittal document that includes the following information:
      1. The name of the obligor, and if known:
        1. The obligor's address and social security number;
        2. The name and address of the obligor's employer and any other source of income of the obligor; and
      2. The name and address of the obligee and, if applicable, the agency or person to whom support payments are to be paid;
    3. A sworn statement by the party seeking registration or a certified statement of the clerk of the court or custodian of the records showing the amount of any arrearage being sought to be enforced unless the case is being enforced by the department of human services pursuant to Title IV-D of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. § 651 et seq.), in which situation the department's child support computer system, if operative for the transferor and transferee court at the time of the transfer, shall be used as the child support payment record and the clerk or custodian shall not be required to prepare the certified statement of the child support payment record;
    4. A copy of a notice, with the address of the nonrequesting party, to be sent by the clerk of the registering court or the department in Title IV-D child support cases to the nonrequesting party pursuant to § 36-5-3105, that states:
      1. That a registered order is enforceable as of the date of registration in the same manner as an order issued by a court of the registering county;
      2. That a hearing to contest the validity or enforcement of the registered order must be requested to the registering court within fifteen (15) days after the date of mailing of the notice;
      3. That failure to contest the validity or enforcement of the registered order in a timely manner will result in confirmation of the order by operation of law, will result in enforcement of the order and the alleged arrearages, and will preclude further contest of that order with respect to any matter that could have been asserted;
      4. The amount of any alleged arrearages; and
      5. That, if the registered order is confirmed by operation of law or by court order, all payments made under the order shall be made to the clerk of the registering court or to the department of human services, or another clerk, as appropriate.
  2. On receipt of a request for registration, the registering court shall cause the order to be filed, together with one (1) copy of the documents and information, regardless of their form.
  3. A petition seeking a remedy that must be affirmatively sought may be filed at the same time as the request for registration or may be filed later.
  4. All payments received by the issuing court after the order has been registered shall be sent by the clerk of the issuing court to the clerk of the registering court, or the department of human services if the clerk of the registering court is not participating in the child support enforcement system, without credit being given to the obligor by the clerk of the issuing court.

Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 6; 1998, ch. 1098, § 56.

36-5-3104. Effect of registration of order.

  1. A support order issued in another county is registered for enforcement pursuant to this part when the order is filed in the registering court and the requirements of § 36-5-3103(a) are met.
  2. A registered order originally issued in another county is enforceable in the same manner and is subject to the same procedures as an order issued by a court of the registering county.
  3. Except as otherwise provided in this part, a court of the registering county shall recognize and enforce, but may not modify, a registered order.

Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 6.

36-5-3105. Notice of registration of order.

When a support order issued in another county is registered, the registering court or the department in Title IV-D child support cases shall send the notice required by § 36-5-3103(a)(4) to the nonregistering party within two (2) days of the registration.

Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 6.

Compiler's Notes. Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, referred to in this section, is compiled in 42 U.S.C. § 651 et seq.

36-5-3106. Procedure to contest validity or enforcement of registered order.

  1. A nonregistering party seeking to contest the validity or enforcement of a registered order pursuant to this part shall request a hearing within fifteen (15) days after the date of mailing of the notice of the registration. The nonregistering party may seek to vacate the registration, to assert any defense to an allegation of noncompliance with the registered order, or to contest the remedies being sought or the amount of any alleged arrearages.
  2. If the nonregistering party fails to contest the validity or enforcement of the registered order in a timely manner, the order is confirmed by operation of law.
  3. If a nonregistering party requests a hearing to contest the validity or enforcement of the registered order, the registering court shall schedule the matter for hearing and give notice to the parties of the date, time and place of the hearing.

Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 6.

36-5-3107. Contest of registration or enforcement.

  1. A party contesting the validity or enforcement of a registered order or seeking to vacate the registration has the burden of proving one or more of the following defenses:
    1. The registered order was obtained by fraud;
    2. The registered order has been vacated, suspended, or modified by a later order;
    3. The issuing court has stayed the registered order pending appeal; or
    4. The statement of arrears is incorrect.
  2. If a party presents evidence establishing a full or partial defense under subsection (a), the court where the order is registered may stay enforcement of the registered order until the issues have been resolved by the court that issued the order. Any uncontested portion of the registered order may be enforced by all remedies available pursuant to law.
  3. If a contesting party does not establish a defense pursuant to subsection (a) regarding the validity or enforcement of the order, the registering court shall issue an order confirming the order. An order confirming registration of the order is not required if no contest to the registration is made.

Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 6.

36-5-3108. Effect of confirmed order.

Unless it is shown by the nonrequesting party that notice of the request for transfer was not received, confirmation of an order by operation of law or following a hearing precludes further contest of the order with respect to any matter that could have been asserted at the time of registration.

Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 6.

36-5-3109. Rights of the department of human services.

Whenever the department of human services is acting upon any application for Title IV-D services, whether by assignment of rights of support pursuant to § 71-3-124 or otherwise, it shall have the same right to invoke this part as the obligee who has made application for such services.

Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 6; 1998, ch. 1098, § 57.

Compiler's Notes. Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, referred to in this section, is compiled in 42 U.S.C. § 651 et seq.

36-5-3110. Disbursement of collections.

In cases not subject to the centralized collection and disbursement unit pursuant to § 36-5-116, when the clerk of the court of the registering county collects the support that has been enforced by the court of the registering county pursuant to this part, the clerk shall send the support amount, less the statutory fee of the clerk, directly to the obligee, but the clerk shall not send the support amount to the issuing court from which the original order was issued and that was registered for enforcement pursuant to this part.

Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 6; 2000, ch. 922, § 37.

36-5-3111. Costs.

  1. When an order is registered by the department of human services or its contractors, the fee shall be waived for the department or its contractors.
  2. The respondent shall be liable for the costs of the issuing court and the registering court together with the required filing fee, upon the court finding the respondent liable for the failure to pay the support as required by the registered order. The costs shall be apportioned between the clerks of the issuing court and the registering court according to their fees, costs and the taxes due.
  3. The clerk shall file any request for registration and carry out the requirements of this part, even without receiving the appropriate fee for such request. If not paid, such sum shall be added to the cost bill to be assessed by the registering court.

Acts 1997, ch. 551, § 6; 2005, ch. 429, §§ 9, 10.

36-5-503. Termination of income assignment.

Chapter 6
Child Custody and Visitation

Part 1
General Custody Provisions

36-6-101. Decree for custody and support of child — Enforcement — Juvenile court jurisdiction — Presumption of parental fitness — Educational seminars.

    1. In a suit for annulment, divorce or separate maintenance, where the custody of a minor child or minor children is a question, the court may, notwithstanding a decree for annulment, divorce or separate maintenance is denied, award the care, custody and control of such child or children to either of the parties to the suit or to both parties in the instance of joint custody or shared parenting, or to some suitable person, as the welfare and interest of the child or children may demand, and the court may decree that suitable support be made by the natural parents or those who stand in the place of the natural parents by adoption. Such decree shall remain within the control of the court and be subject to such changes or modification as the exigencies of the case may require.
        1. Except as provided in this subdivision (a)(2)(A), neither a preference nor a presumption for or against joint legal custody, joint physical custody or sole custody is established, but the court shall have the widest discretion to order a custody arrangement that is in the best interest of the child. Unless the court finds by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, there is a presumption that joint custody is in the best interest of a minor child where the parents have agreed to joint custody or so agree in open court at a hearing for the purpose of determining the custody of the minor child. For the purpose of assisting the court in making a determination whether an award of joint custody is appropriate, the court may direct that an investigation be conducted. The burden of proof necessary to modify an order of joint custody at a subsequent proceeding shall be by a preponderance of the evidence.
        2. Unless the court finds by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, there is a presumption that custody shall not be awarded to a parent who has been convicted of a criminal offense under title 39, chapter 13, part 5, against a child less than eighteen (18) years of age.
        3. Subdivision (a)(2)(A)(ii) shall apply only to persons who are convicted on or after July 1, 2006. Subdivision (a)(2)(A)(ii) and this subdivision (a)(2)(A)(iii) shall not be construed to prevent a parent from being granted visitation with the child; provided, however, that any visitation shall be supervised.
        4. If it is determined by the court, based upon a prior order or reliable evidence, that a parent has willfully abandoned a child for a period of eighteen (18) months, as the term is used in § 36-6-406(a)(1), then, unless the court finds by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, the abandoning parent's residential time, as provided in the permanent or temporary parenting plan or other court order, shall be limited. This subdivision (a)(2)(A)(iv) shall not be construed to prevent such a parent from being granted limited visitation with the child. Nothing in this subdivision (a)(2)(A)(iv) shall be construed to apply to children in the legal custody of the department of children's services.
        5. If prior to awarding joint legal custody, joint physical custody, or sole custody, the court finds one (1) parent is under indictment for the offense of aggravated child abuse under § 39-15-402, child sexual abuse under § 37-1-602, or severe child sexual abuse under § 36-1-113(g)(11), the court shall not award the parent under indictment any type of custody during the pendency of the indictment unless the presumption created by § 36-6-112(c)(2) is overcome; provided, however, that the court may grant the parent supervised visitation with the child. If the court finds that a parent to whom some form of custody has been ordered is indicted for one (1) of the offenses set out in this subdivision (a)(2)(A)(v), that finding shall constitute a material change in circumstance for the purpose of modifying any existing child custody orders.
        1. If the issue before the court is a modification of the court's prior decree pertaining to custody, the petitioner must prove by a preponderance of the evidence a material change in circumstance. A material change of circumstance does not require a showing of a substantial risk of harm to the child. A material change of circumstance may include, but is not limited to, failures to adhere to the parenting plan or an order of custody and visitation or circumstances that make the parenting plan no longer in the best interest of the child.
        2. In each contested case, the court shall make such a finding as to the reason and the facts that constitute the basis for the custody determination.
        3. Nothing contained within this subdivision (a)(2) shall interfere with the requirement that parties to an action for legal separation, annulment, absolute divorce or separate maintenance incorporate a parenting plan into the final decree or decree modifying an existing custody order.
        4. Nothing in this subsection (a) shall imply a mandatory modification to the child support order.
      1. If the issue before the court is a modification of the court's prior decree pertaining to a residential parenting schedule, then the petitioner must prove by a preponderance of the evidence a material change of circumstance affecting the child's best interest. A material change of circumstance does not require a showing of a substantial risk of harm to the child. A material change of circumstance for purposes of modification of a residential parenting schedule may include, but is not limited to, significant changes in the needs of the child over time, which may include changes relating to age; significant changes in the parent's living or working condition that significantly affect parenting; failure to adhere to the parenting plan; or other circumstances making a change in the residential parenting time in the best interest of the child.
      1. Except when the court finds it not to be in the best interests of the affected child, each order pertaining to the custody or possession of a child arising from an action for absolute divorce, divorce from bed and board or annulment shall grant to each parent the rights listed in subdivisions (a)(3)(B)(i)-(vi) during periods when the child is not in that parent's possession or shall incorporate such rights by reference to a prior order. Other orders pertaining to custody or possession of a child may contain the rights listed in subdivisions (a)(3)(B)(i)-(vi).
      2. The referenced rights are as follows:
        1. The right to unimpeded telephone conversations with the child at least twice a week at reasonable times and for reasonable durations. The parent exercising parenting time shall furnish the other parent with a telephone number where the child may be reached at the days and time specified in a parenting plan or other court order or, where days and times are not specified, at reasonable times;
        2. The right to send mail to the child which the other parent shall not destroy, deface, open or censor. The parent exercising parenting time shall deliver all letters, packages and other material sent to the child by the other parent as soon as received and shall not interfere with their delivery in any way, unless otherwise provided by law or court order;
        3. The right to receive notice and relevant information as soon as practicable but within twenty-four (24) hours of any hospitalization, major illness or injury, or death of the child. The parent exercising parenting time when such event occurs shall notify the other parent of the event and shall provide all relevant healthcare providers with the contact information for the other parent;
        4. The right to receive directly from the child's school any educational records customarily made available to parents. Upon request from one (1) parent, the parent enrolling the child in school shall provide to the other parent as soon as available each academic year the name, address, telephone number and other contact information for the school. In the case of children who are being homeschooled, the parent providing the homeschooling shall advise the other parent of this fact along with the contact information of any sponsoring entity or other entity involved in the child's education, including access to any individual student records or grades available online. The school or homeschooling entity shall be responsible, upon request, to provide to each parent records customarily made available to parents. The school may require a written request which includes a current mailing address and may further require payment of the reasonable costs of duplicating such records. These records include copies of the child's report cards, attendance records, names of teachers, class schedules, and standardized test scores;
        5. Unless otherwise provided by law, the right to receive copies of the child's medical, health or other treatment records directly from the treating physician or healthcare provider. Upon request from one (1) parent, the parent who has arranged for such treatment or health care shall provide to the other parent the name, address, telephone number and other contact information of the physician or healthcare provider. The keeper of the records may require a written request including a current mailing address and may further require payment of the reasonable costs of duplicating such records. No person who receives the mailing address of a requesting parent as a result of this requirement shall provide such address to the other parent or a third person;
        6. The right to be free of unwarranted derogatory remarks made about such parent or such parent's family by the other parent to or in the presence of the child;
        7. The right to be given at least forty-eight (48) hours' notice, whenever possible, of all extracurricular school, athletic, church activities and other activities as to which parental participation or observation would be appropriate, and the opportunity to participate in or observe them. The parent who has enrolled the child in each such activity shall advise the other parent of the activity and provide contact information for the person responsible for its scheduling so that the other parent may make arrangements to participate or observe whenever possible, unless otherwise provided by law or court order;
        8. The right to receive from the other parent, in the event the other parent leaves the state with the minor child or children for more than forty-eight (48) hours, an itinerary which shall include the planned dates of departure and return, the intended destinations and mode of travel and telephone numbers. The parent traveling with the child or children shall provide this information to the other parent so as to give that parent reasonable notice; and
        9. The right to access and participation in the child's education on the same basis that are provided to all parents including the right of access to the child during lunch and other school activities; provided, that the participation or access is legal and reasonable; however, access must not interfere with the school's day-to-day operations or with the child's educational schedule.
      3. Any of the foregoing rights may be denied in whole or in part to one or both parents by the court upon a showing that such denial is in the best interests of the child. Nothing herein shall be construed to prohibit the court from ordering additional rights where the facts and circumstances so require.
      4. All parenting plans submitted to the court by one (1) party only shall contain the notarized signature of that party. All parenting plans submitted to the court by both parties jointly shall contain the notarized signature of both parties.
    2. Notwithstanding any common law presumption to the contrary, a finding under former § 36-6-106(a)(8), that child abuse, as defined in § 39-15-401 or § 39-15-402, or child sexual abuse, as defined in § 37-1-602, has occurred within the family shall give rise to a rebuttable presumption that it is detrimental to the child and not in the best interests of the child to award sole custody, joint legal or joint physical custody to the perpetrator of such abuse.
    3. If the issue before the court is modification of a prior decree pertaining to custody pursuant to subdivision (a)(2)(B) or a residential parenting schedule pursuant to subdivision (a)(2)(C), and the parties either announce to the court and place on the record an agreement specifying the terms of the modification, or execute a permanent parenting plan modifying a prior order of the court with respect to custody or a residential parenting schedule which is approved through entry of an agreed order, then the court is not required to inquire further and make an independent determination as to whether the modification is in the best interest of the child. An order of the court approving the agreement and stating that the modification is made by agreement of the parties satisfies the requirements of Rule 52.01 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. The court is not required to accept an agreement of the parties modifying a permanent parenting plan, and this subdivision (a)(5) does not diminish the authority of the court to make inquiry and ensure that the modification of the permanent parenting plan is in the best interest of the child, is entered into freely and voluntarily by both parents, and is not the product of duress, coercion, or undue influence.
  1. Notwithstanding any provision of this section to the contrary, the party, or parties, or other person awarded custody and control of such child or children shall be entitled to enforce the court's decree concerning the suitable support of such child or children in the appropriate court of any county in this state in which such child or children reside; provided, that such court shall have divorce jurisdiction, if service of process is effectuated upon the obligor within this state. Jurisdiction to modify or alter such decree shall remain in the exclusive control of the court that issued such decree.
  2. Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to alter, modify or restrict the exclusive jurisdiction of the juvenile court pursuant to § 37-1-103.
  3. It is the legislative intent that the gender of the party seeking custody shall not give rise to a presumption of parental fitness or cause a presumption or constitute a factor in favor or against the award of custody to such party.
    1. In an action for dissolution of marriage involving minor children, or in a post-judgment proceeding involving minor children, if the court finds, on a case by case basis, that it would be in the best interest of the minor children, the court may on its own motion, or on the motion of either party, order the parties, excluding the minor children, to attend an educational seminar concerning the effects of the dissolution of marriage on the children. The program may be divided into sessions, which in the aggregate shall not exceed four (4) hours in duration. The program shall be educational in nature and not designed for individual therapy.
    2. The fees or costs of the educational sessions under this section, which shall be reasonable, shall be borne by the parties and may be assessed by the court as it deems equitable. Fees may be waived upon motion for indigent persons.
    3. No court shall deny the granting of a divorce from the bonds of matrimony for failure of a party or both parties to attend the educational session. Refusal to attend the educational session may be punished by contempt and may be considered by the court as evidence of the parent's lack of good faith in proceedings under part 4 of this chapter.

Code 1932, § 8454; Acts 1971, ch. 438, § 1; 1973, ch. 387, § 1; 1979, ch. 187, § 3; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 36-828; Acts 1985, ch. 382, §§ 1, 2; 1987, ch. 145, § 9; 1987, ch. 266, § 1; 1994, ch. 818, § 1; 1996, ch. 1046, § 1; 1997, ch. 208, § 1; 1997, ch. 351, § 1; 1998, ch. 1059, § 7; 1998, ch. 1095, § 1; 1999, ch. 250, § 1; 2000, ch. 751, § 1; 2000, ch. 885, § 1; 2002, ch. 616, § 1; 2002, ch. 859, § 1; 2003, ch. 245, § 1; 2004, ch. 759, §§ 1, 2; 2006, ch. 652, § 1; 2006, ch. 979, § 1; 2014, ch. 617, §§ 2, 3; 2015, ch. 238, § 2; 2020, ch. 520, § 2.

Compiler's Notes. For the Preamble to the act concerning domestic relations, please refer to Acts 2014, ch. 617.

Section 36-6-106(a), referred to in this section, was rewritten by Acts 2014 ch. 617, § 4, effective July 1, 2014. There are no current provisions comparable to subdivision (a)(8) in this section as rewritten.

Acts 2015, ch. 238, § 3 provided that the act, which added (a)(2)(A)(v), shall apply to persons who are indicted for an applicable offense committed on or after July 1, 2015.

Amendments. The 2020 amendment added (a)(5).

Effective Dates. Acts 2020, ch. 520, § 6. March 6, 2020.

Cross-References. Alimony and child support, title 36, ch. 5.

Assignment of income by a court for child support, § 50-2-105.

Assignment of income for support, title 36, ch. 5, part 5.

Support of child over 18 in high school, § 34-1-102.

Law Reviews.

Adoption and Custody: Current Trends in Tennessee Family Law: Bridge Over Troubled Water: Changing the Custody Laws in Tennessee, 27 U. Mem. L. Rev. 769 (1997).

Alternative Dispute Resolution- Tuetken v. Tuetken: Reinforcing the Duty of the Court to Protect the Best Interests of the Child (Joshua Baker), 42 U. Mem. L. Rev. 831 (2012).

Family Law — Hawk v. Hawk: Grandparent Visitation Rights — Court Protects Parental Privacy Rights Over “Child's Best Interests” (Alicia C. Klyman), 24 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 413 (1994).

Family Matter: Helping Children Endure Divorce (Marlene Eskind Moses), 49 Tenn. B.J. 34 (2013).

Family Matters: Modification of Permanent Parenting Plans In Tennessee, 49 Tenn. B.J. 27 (2013).

Family Support and Supporting Families, 68 Vand. L. Rev. En Banc 153   (2015).

For the Children's Sake: How the New Parenting Plan Will Work (Hon. Don R. Ash), 36 No. 9 Tenn. B.J. 12 (2000).

Protecting the Child's Interests (Janet Leach Richards), 29 No. 4 Tenn. B.J. 16 (1993).

“Where Have You Been Fran?” The Right of Siblings to Seek Court Access To Override Parental Denial of Visitation, 66 Tenn. L. Rev. 977 (1999).

Attorney General Opinions. Constitutionality, OAG 94-032, 1994 Tenn. AG LEXIS 28 (3/15/94).

Standard of proof in child custody cases, OAG 96-068, 1996 Tenn. AG LEXIS 66 (4/10/96).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

Spouse's argument that T.C.A. § 36-6-101(a)(1) is facially unconstitutional was without merit. Lee v. Lee, 66 S.W.3d 837, 2001 Tenn. App. LEXIS 465 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001).

1.5 Due Process.

Because neither party petitioned the court to modify the existing permanent parenting plan or the designation of the primary residential parent and due process required, at a minimum, notice reasonably calculated to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections, it was error for the juvenile court to modify the permanent parenting plan and change the primary residential parent. In re Ky'Auri M., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 402 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 18, 2018).

2. Construction.

Exigencies under this section are facts and conditions which have emerged since the decree or new facts and changed conditions that were not determined and could not be anticipated by the decree. Hicks v. Hicks, 26 Tenn. App. 641, 176 S.W.2d 371, 1943 Tenn. App. LEXIS 117 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1943).

This section and § 36-5-101 are remedial and should be liberally construed to include the power of the court to cancel or modify delinquent installments of child support on petition of the respondent. Gossett v. Gossett, 34 Tenn. App. 654, 241 S.W.2d 934, 1951 Tenn. App. LEXIS 108 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1951).

Section 36-5-101 and this section and Private Acts 1963, ch. 124 creating a probate court for Davidson County and giving the same certain jurisdiction including concurrent jurisdiction with chancery and circuit courts in domestic relations matters, were in pari materia and were to be construed together. Mayhew v. Mayhew, 52 Tenn. App. 459, 376 S.W.2d 324, 1963 Tenn. App. LEXIS 106 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1963).

Where the court entered a custody and support order for the minor children of the parties without determining the ability of the father to meet the order, taking into consideration the number of minor children in the home, considering the ability of the wife to assist in the support of the children or determining the needs of the children, and entered an erroneous finding for the amount of support due based solely on the figures submitted by the plaintiff and the father was never given a hearing, such a finding was in violation of this section that allows modification of a support decree, even as to past due and unpaid installments. Mayer v. Mayer, 532 S.W.2d 54, 1975 Tenn. App. LEXIS 194 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1975).

An award or determination of custody of a minor child does not amount to a vesting, but an entrustment until further order of court. Bush v. Bush, 684 S.W.2d 89, 1984 Tenn. App. LEXIS 3203 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984).

Trial court erred by awarding the grandmother four of the nine parental rights listed in this section because the statute only applied to visitation and custody determinations between parents, not to grandparent visitation. In re Diawn B., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 422 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 23, 2018).

3. Purpose.

The intention of the provisions of this section and § 36-5-101 for the retention of control of decrees or orders made under such sections was to incorporate into every divorce decree without express recitation therein, a retention of control over the decree by the court as to all questions involving the custody or support of the minor children of the parent parties with the power to make “all such changes or modification” in the decree “as the exigencies of the case may require.” Davenport v. Davenport, 178 Tenn. 517, 160 S.W.2d 406, 1941 Tenn. LEXIS 84 (1942).

Under the provisions of this section, the cause is not retained in court for the purpose of making an order with reference to something that has already happened but for the purpose of entering future orders effective in the future. Coleman v. Coleman, 190 Tenn. 286, 229 S.W.2d 341, 1950 Tenn. LEXIS 480 (1950).

3.5. Invocation of Exclusive Original Jurisdiction.

Trial court properly denied a father's motion to dismiss the mother's petition for modification of their parenting plan-to include a provision, inter alia, precluding the father from any direct or indirect contact with the children-because the mother invoked the court's subject matter jurisdiction when she filed her petition, the petition raised allegations that the children were abused and neglected, the father administered excessive beatings on the children with various objects, and the court then considered the statutory factors to make the best interest determination. Massey v. Massey, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 173 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 17, 2020).

4. Jurisdiction.

Under this section the case remains within the control of court and is subject to such changes or modifications as the exigencies of the case require. Cravens v. Cravens, 30 Tenn. App. 487, 207 S.W.2d 593, 1947 Tenn. App. LEXIS 105 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1947).

In suit by mother in chancery court against divorced husband for reimbursement for expenses incurred in support of child, chancery court could not, without consent of the parties, transfer cross-bill for custody to circuit court where the divorce was granted but was required to dismiss the proceeding. Coleman v. Coleman, 190 Tenn. 286, 229 S.W.2d 341, 1950 Tenn. LEXIS 480 (1950).

Chancery court, which entered an order for custody of child in divorce proceeding, retained exclusive jurisdiction over future custody of child and was entitled to enjoin adoption of child in county court proceeding. Williamson v. Laughlin, 192 Tenn. 580, 241 S.W.2d 576, 1950 Tenn. LEXIS 591 (1951).

In suit for divorce where defendant was a nonresident, the court could not on motion determine status of children for future support. Watkins v. Watkins, 194 Tenn. 621, 254 S.W.2d 735, 1953 Tenn. LEXIS 279 (1953).

Fact that divorce decree made no provision for custody and support of minor child who was in custody of the mother at the time of the decree was immaterial in proceeding by the mother for order for support of the child since the effect of this section and § 36-5-101 is to retain the case in the court and to preserve its jurisdiction to make such an order at any time on the application of either of the divorced parents. Roble v. Roble, 41 Tenn. App. 412, 295 S.W.2d 817, 1956 Tenn. App. LEXIS 96 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1956).

Court other than court granting divorce decree was without jurisdiction to make award for future support of child. Snodgrass v. Snodgrass, 49 Tenn. App. 607, 357 S.W.2d 829, 1961 Tenn. App. LEXIS 128 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1961).

Circuit court that awarded wife divorce and custody of minor child retained jurisdiction for the purpose of changing custody of the child even though wife had become a nonresident. Talley v. Talley, 51 Tenn. App. 622, 371 S.W.2d 152, 1962 Tenn. App. LEXIS 126 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1962).

The various divisions of the circuit court of Hamilton County are treated as a single court for the purposes of this section. Talley v. Talley, 51 Tenn. App. 622, 371 S.W.2d 152, 1962 Tenn. App. LEXIS 126 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1962).

Circuit court that granted divorce and entered order as to custody of children, alimony and support, had exclusive jurisdiction of the matter and probate court could not punish for contempt even though by statute it had concurrent jurisdiction on domestic relations matters. Mayhew v. Mayhew, 52 Tenn. App. 459, 376 S.W.2d 324, 1963 Tenn. App. LEXIS 106 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1963).

Probate court of Davidson County lacked jurisdiction to punish for contempt for violation of decree of circuit court of Davidson County in divorce proceeding even though statute provided that such probate court had concurrent jurisdiction with circuit and chancery court in domestic relations matters. Mayhew v. Mayhew, 52 Tenn. App. 459, 376 S.W.2d 324, 1963 Tenn. App. LEXIS 106 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1963).

Every divorce decree wherein an order is made for support and maintenance of wife and children remains in the court where the divorce decree was granted, regardless of whether or not decree specifically provides for such retention. Morrissey v. Morrissey, 214 Tenn. 112, 377 S.W.2d 944, 1964 Tenn. LEXIS 455 (1964).

Modification or enforcement of decree providing for alimony and support may only be had in court issuing the decree. Morrissey v. Morrissey, 214 Tenn. 112, 377 S.W.2d 944, 1964 Tenn. LEXIS 455 (1964).

The court that in a divorce, annulment or separate maintenance action awards custody and support of a child retains all decrees for custody and support in its control to make such future changes or modifications as the exigencies of the case may require. Sutton v. Sutton, 220 Tenn. 410, 417 S.W.2d 786, 1967 Tenn. LEXIS 422 (1967).

The exclusive jurisdiction of the question as to whom the custody of a child should be awarded is in the court wherein the divorce was granted and custody of the child first awarded. Sutton v. Sutton, 220 Tenn. 410, 417 S.W.2d 786, 1967 Tenn. LEXIS 422 (1967).

Pending an appeal the trial court has the jurisdiction and authority to make all such orders as may be necessary for support, custody, and welfare of children in divorce cases. Smith v. Haase, 521 S.W.2d 49, 1975 Tenn. LEXIS 680 (Tenn. 1975).

The trial court is without jurisdiction, during the pendency of appellate review, to entertain a petition to modify a child support decree where the petition merely challenges the procedural aspects of the decree or does not allege a change in circumstances. Smith v. Haase, 521 S.W.2d 49, 1975 Tenn. LEXIS 680 (Tenn. 1975).

Pending appellate review trial court was without jurisdiction to entertain petition that challenged procedural aspects of child support decree and asserted that expense of rearing child was beyond petitioner's financial ability. Smith v. Haase, 521 S.W.2d 49, 1975 Tenn. LEXIS 680 (Tenn. 1975).

Pending an appeal the trial court has continuing power, jurisdiction and authority to make all such orders as may be necessary touching on the custody, support and welfare of children in divorce cases subject only to the extraordinary remedy of certiorari and supersedeas in proper cases. Smith v. Haase, 521 S.W.2d 49, 1975 Tenn. LEXIS 680 (Tenn. 1975).

The trial court exercises continuing control over the custody of a minor child after the divorce decree otherwise becomes final. Smith v. Haase, 521 S.W.2d 49, 1975 Tenn. LEXIS 680 (Tenn. 1975).

A court in which an action for divorce is brought and that renders a decree respecting the care, custody and support of minor children continues to have exclusive jurisdiction of such matters until the children reach majority. Kane v. Kane, 547 S.W.2d 559, 1977 Tenn. LEXIS 561 (Tenn. 1977).

This section is not a jurisdictional statute as between the courts of different states. Boyd v. Boyd, 653 S.W.2d 732, 1983 Tenn. App. LEXIS 582 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983).

Circuit court had jurisdiction to modify child support decree where the court granting the original decree was abolished. Jarvis v. Jarvis, 664 S.W.2d 694, 1983 Tenn. App. LEXIS 715 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983).

Chancery court has jurisdiction of divorce actions, and has the authority to decree custody of minor children under the control of either of the parties. The grant of custody can be to one or both of the parties, or to some suitable agency or person, as the welfare and interest of the minor children may require. Lentz v. Lentz, 717 S.W.2d 876, 1986 Tenn. LEXIS 795 (Tenn. 1986).

Court entering decree that provided for custody and for grandparents' visitation retained exclusive jurisdiction to modify or alter such decree. In re Tate, 797 S.W.2d 618, 1990 Tenn. App. LEXIS 316 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990).

In a child custody dispute, the juvenile court had jurisdiction to issue orders addressing new facts and changed conditions which arose after the issuance of the order being appealed because the father's petition for a change in custody was clearly based on events that occurred after entry of the order being appealed; namely, the mother's actions related to the Ritalin, failing to consult with the father, and concealing medical information from the father. Myers v. Brown, 259 S.W.3d 124, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 444 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 19, 2007).

In a child custody dispute, the juvenile court had jurisdiction to issue orders addressing new facts and changed conditions which arose after the issuance of the order being appealed because the father's petition for a change in custody was based on events that occurred after entry of the order that was the subject of the first appeal; specifically, the mother's trips taken with the child, the father's missed parenting time, and the mother's angry telephone remarks. Myers v. Brown, 259 S.W.3d 124, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 444 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 19, 2007).

Trial court had subject matter jurisdiction to hear a father's petition for change of custody because the statute was not applicable; the allegations in the petition were not tantamount to allegations of dependency and neglect under the statute but were more in the nature of a disagreement over the long-term manner of addressing the children's psychological, behavioral, and educational issues. Holley v. Holley, 420 S.W.3d 756, 2013 Tenn. App. LEXIS 361 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 31, 2013), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 794 (Tenn. Oct. 16, 2013).

Mother's request to modify in Tennessee a child support order issued by a Tennessee court was not a proceeding under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA), and even without the UIFSA, Tennessee courts had jurisdiction to modify their own child support orders; because the case involved a request to modify a Tennessee child support order, not an order from another jurisdiction, the UIFSA did not apply, and the mother could not avail herself of the special evidence rules applicable only to proceedings under the UIFSA. State ex rel. Malmquist v. Malmquist, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 698 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 29, 2018).

Although a father was required to submit a new proposed parenting plan, his petition to modify the plan was sufficient to invoke the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction because all of the trial court's orders were final judgments; after the entry of each final judgment, the trial court lost the ability to exercise its authority over the case until the father “invoked” its jurisdiction, and he attempted to invoke its jurisdiction by filing a motion to modify the parenting plan. Freeman v. Freeman, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 721 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 14, 2018).

Mother was not entitled to relief from the circuit court's judgment entering a modified Permanent Parenting Plan (PPP) because the father appropriately filed his petition seeking modification of the PPP in the circuit court, which possessed continuing, exclusive subject matter jurisdiction of divorce decrees. Cox v. Lucas, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. LEXIS 218 (Tenn. May 29, 2019).

5. —Power of Court on Dismissal of Divorce Suit.

Where a petition and cross petition for a divorce were both dismissed but the judge provided for the temporary custody and support of the petitioner's children and kept the case on the docket for future action in respect to custody of the children, the decree of dismissal left the court with full power to control the future custody of the children and provide for their support. Branch v. Branch, 35 Tenn. App. 552, 249 S.W.2d 581, 1952 Tenn. App. LEXIS 77 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1952).

6. Welfare of Child.

Ordinarily, the father is entitled to the custody of the children, but the real interest and welfare of the children will be consulted, and they will be given into the custody of the one who will best promote their moral and mental training, and will be given to the mother where she is better qualified and more competent than the father, especially where the children are of tender age. Robinson v. Robinson, 26 Tenn. 440, 1846 Tenn. LEXIS 151 (1846); Lyle v. Lyle, 86 Tenn. 372, 6 S.W. 878, 1887 Tenn. LEXIS 55 (1888); Cureton v. Cureton, 117 Tenn. 103, 96 S.W. 608, 1906 Tenn. LEXIS 35 (1906); Brandon v. Brandon, 3 Tenn. Civ. App. (3 Higgins) 517 (1912).

In determining the question of custody of infant children, the primary inquiry concerns their welfare rather than the technical legal right of the father to their possession and services. Kenner v. Kenner, 139 Tenn. 211, 201 S.W. 779, 1917 Tenn. LEXIS 99, L.R.A. (n.s.) 1918E587 (1918), rehearing denied, 139 Tenn. 700, 202 S.W. 723, 1917 Tenn. LEXIS 139 (1918); Graham v. Graham, 140 Tenn. 328, 204 S.W. 987, 1918 Tenn. LEXIS 46 (1918).

Where a divorce decree dividing the custody of a child between the mother and the paternal grandparents resulted in much deep and serious ensuing litigation, the litigation and the fact that the child was growing older and would be harmed in his development by further litigation were exigencies authorizing the court to decree exclusive custody in the mother. Logan v. Logan, 26 Tenn. App. 667, 176 S.W.2d 601, 1943 Tenn. App. LEXIS 115 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1943), superseded by statute as stated in, DeVault v. DeVault, — S.W.2d —, 1996 Tenn. App. LEXIS 536 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 28, 1996).

Where proceedings involve the custody of children they are not decided according to the strict legal right of the petitioner but are dependent upon the child's welfare. Strube v. Strube, 53 Tenn. App. 88, 379 S.W.2d 44, 1963 Tenn. App. LEXIS 131 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1963).

In determining custody of children in divorce proceedings the welfare of the child is the paramount consideration of the trial and appellate courts and parent has no absolute right to custody. Bevins v. Bevins, 53 Tenn. App. 403, 383 S.W.2d 780, 1964 Tenn. App. LEXIS 110 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1964).

The ultimate goal of the court was to find in the best interest of the children; and changed circumstances was something that might or might not be found in that search. Dantzler v. Dantzler, 665 S.W.2d 385, 1983 Tenn. App. LEXIS 657 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983).

In child custody cases, the welfare and best interests of the children are the paramount concerns. Malone v. Malone, 842 S.W.2d 621, 1992 Tenn. App. LEXIS 605 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992).

7. Award of Custody Proper.

Juvenile court did not err in designating a father as the primary residential parent where the mother refused to accept that her accusations of sexual abuse against the father were unfounded, but the juvenile court's factual findings did not justify precluding the mother from having any visitation whatsoever. Byars v. Young, 327 S.W.3d 42, 2010 Tenn. App. LEXIS 344 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 20, 2010), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2010 Tenn. LEXIS 1053 (Tenn. Nov. 10, 2010).

8. Examination of Children.

The examination of the children in the presence of attorneys for both litigants was proper to ascertain their attitude. Prior statements and letters of the children were admissible on point of their custodianship. Newburger v. Newburger, 10 Tenn. App. 555, — S.W.2d —, 1930 Tenn. App. LEXIS 2 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1930).

Failure to permit examination of children of tender years, the oldest being ten, was not reversible error. Strube v. Strube, 53 Tenn. App. 88, 379 S.W.2d 44, 1963 Tenn. App. LEXIS 131 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1963).

On hearing wherein husband sought to keep wife from removing children to Toronto, Canada, and to have a change of custody, trial court properly exercised discretion in refusing to allow psychological evaluation of children, whose mental and physical condition was not at issue, in order to predict the impact of the proposed move on them. Walker v. Walker, 656 S.W.2d 11, 1983 Tenn. App. LEXIS 597 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983), overruled, Seessel v. Seessel, 748 S.W.2d 422, 1988 Tenn. LEXIS 55 (Tenn. 1988), overruled, Webster v. Webster, — S.W.3d —, 2006 Tenn. App. LEXIS 685 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 24, 2006).

The vacating of a judgment and the remand of a case for further proceedings was appropriate because the trial court in modifying the parties'  permanent parenting plan erred in refusing to consider all of the applicable best interest factors set forth by statute, specifically the preference of the parties'  child who was then 13 years old. Roberts v. Roberts, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 758 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 22, 2017).

9. Rights of Parent to Whom Custody Not Awarded.

Where a decree for a separate maintenance of the wife awarded the custody of young children to the wife and mother, with the privilege granted to the father to see them and to have them with him at stated or agreed times, a further provision in the decree permitting the father to take the children out of the state for stipulated periods, upon executing a bond for their return, was improper, because it authorized a removal of the children beyond the jurisdiction of the court. Cureton v. Cureton, 117 Tenn. 103, 96 S.W. 608, 1906 Tenn. LEXIS 35 (1906).

Although the custody of the child is awarded to the mother in her divorce suit, the father should be accorded, by court order, as a matter of right, permission to see his child on proper occasions. Kenner v. Kenner, 139 Tenn. 211, 201 S.W. 779, 1917 Tenn. LEXIS 99, L.R.A. (n.s.) 1918E587 (1918), rehearing denied, 139 Tenn. 700, 202 S.W. 723, 1917 Tenn. LEXIS 139 (1918).

Pursuant to T.C.A. § 36-6-101(a)(3)(A), there was no “drastic change” to the parties'  parenting plan where the mother was granted the right to make most major decisions concerning various issues of the child, and the father still retained the authority to make decisions as to day-to-day care of the child when she was with him, just as previously applied. Reeder v. Reeder, 375 S.W.3d 268, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 126 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 24, 2012), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 440 (Tenn. June 20, 2012).

Pursuant to T.C.A. § 36-6-101, there was no modification with respect to the income tax deduction for the parties'  child where the mother was previously granted the exemption, and as no exception applied, the exemption was properly awarded to the mother as the custodial parent pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 152(e). Reeder v. Reeder, 375 S.W.3d 268, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 126 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 24, 2012), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 440 (Tenn. June 20, 2012).

Trial court erred in adopting one parent's parenting plan because the other parent's parenting time was to be increased to at least the minimum 80 days presumed by the Tennessee Child Support Guidelines. In re Grace N., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 331 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 14, 2015).

10. Joint Custody.

In a divorce action, where divorce was granted the husband on cross-complaint, the court ordered divided custody of the children, rather than granting exclusive custody with visiting rights to either parent, in view of the effect of paragraph (4) of (former) § 31-201 on intestate succession of personal property of children subject to exclusive custody orders. Baggett v. Baggett, 512 S.W.2d 292, 1973 Tenn. App. LEXIS 260 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1973).

Joint legal custody and its necessarily implied sharing of parental responsibility for decisions regarding care, abode, education, health, and other matters of general welfare of the child, is not appropriate between parents separated by 1,000 miles and a bitterly fought custody dispute. Shepherd v. Metcalf, 794 S.W.2d 348, 1990 Tenn. LEXIS 300 (Tenn. 1990).

The trial court erred in awarding the parties joint custody of their three minor children; instead, wife was awarded custody of the children and husband was given reasonable visitation rights. Malone v. Malone, 842 S.W.2d 621, 1992 Tenn. App. LEXIS 605 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992).

Although joint child custody is generally disfavored, there is no invariable rule against joint custody that is expressly provided by statute. Gray v. Gray, 885 S.W.2d 353, 1994 Tenn. App. LEXIS 145 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994), rehearing denied, — S.W.2d —, 1994 Tenn. App. LEXIS 203 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 13, 1994).

11. Liability.

12. —Child in Custody of Mother.

Where the wife obtained an absolute divorce and was given the exclusive custody of their child, that the husband and father was ordered to support, she may, at a subsequent term, file a petition in the cause for a more specific allowance for the support of the child, to be paid monthly, and such relief will be granted. Dews v. Dews, 6 Tenn. Civ. App. (6 Higgins) 154 (1915). See Cureton v. Cureton, 117 Tenn. 103, 96 S.W. 608, 1906 Tenn. LEXIS 35 (1906).

A father cannot evade his legal duty to support his children, though on his complaint, the mother was divorced from him and the custody of the children was first awarded to him, but was subsequently awarded to her, by an order requiring her to support and maintain them. When she subsequently became incapable to support them, and petitioned the court to require him to contribute to their support, he could not evade such duty on the grounds that he could not be required to support them unless awarded their custody where he did not question the previous order as to custody. Graham v. Graham, 140 Tenn. 328, 204 S.W. 987, 1918 Tenn. LEXIS 46 (1918); Carey v. Carey, 163 Tenn. 486, 43 S.W.2d 498, 1931 Tenn. LEXIS 138 (1931). See Madison v. State, 163 Tenn. 198, 42 S.W.2d 209, 1931 Tenn. LEXIS 98 (1931).

The legal liability of the father for the support of his minor children continues after divorce and an award of custody to the mother and independent of any specific decree to this effect in any given case. Davenport v. Davenport, 178 Tenn. 517, 160 S.W.2d 406, 1941 Tenn. LEXIS 84 (1942).

Where circuit court entered a divorce decree but decree failed to provide for custody of child, the mother could file a proceeding in chancery court against father to recover amount expended by her in supporting child, since it was a suit to recover for money already spent and not a suit to obtain a decree for support. Coleman v. Coleman, 190 Tenn. 286, 229 S.W.2d 341, 1950 Tenn. LEXIS 480 (1950).

Husband's obligation to support minor child continued after divorce notwithstanding fact that mother had actual custody of the child and fact that no provision was made in the divorce decree for its custody and support. Roble v. Roble, 41 Tenn. App. 412, 295 S.W.2d 817, 1956 Tenn. App. LEXIS 96 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1956).

Where actual custody of minor child was in the mother at the time of divorce there was no necessity of any decree awarding the child to her and the right of the child to support by the father and the right of the mother to look to him to help support the child was not affected by omission of the court to enter a formal decree awarding custody to the mother. Roble v. Roble, 41 Tenn. App. 412, 295 S.W.2d 817, 1956 Tenn. App. LEXIS 96 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1956).

The civil liability of the father for the support of his child continues even though custody is committed to the mother. Damron v. Damron, 212 Tenn. 14, 367 S.W.2d 476, 1963 Tenn. LEXIS 394 (1963).

Refusal of mother who has been awarded custody of children to permit visitation of father in accordance with decree does not relieve the father of duty to support. Hester v. Hester, 59 Tenn. App. 613, 443 S.W.2d 28, 1969 Tenn. App. LEXIS 349 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1969).

In Tennessee, denial of visitation rights is no defense in an action for child support and it can only be determined whether the mother is in contempt or whether alimony payments should be disallowed, if at all, by determining whether her denial of visitation rights was willful or in good faith. Hester v. Hester, 59 Tenn. App. 613, 443 S.W.2d 28, 1969 Tenn. App. LEXIS 349 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1969).

Separation agreement between husband and wife providing that husband pay support for the children until they reached the age of 21 was within the husband's legal obligations and therefore lost its contractual nature when approved by the court and could be enforced only so long as he had a legal duty to support his children and the statute lowering the age of majority to 18 cut short his support obligations under the agreement. Blackburn v. Blackburn, 526 S.W.2d 463, 1975 Tenn. LEXIS 601 (Tenn. 1975).

13. —Child in Custody of Father.

After divorce a mother cannot be required to contribute to the support of minor children whose custody has been placed in the father. Hilton v. Hilton, 62 Tenn. App. 480, 463 S.W.2d 955, 1970 Tenn. App. LEXIS 325 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1970).

14. Custody as Between Parents and Nonparents.

Until it be shown that neither parent is a suitable custodian, it is improper to consider entrusting custody to a nonparent. Bush v. Bush, 684 S.W.2d 89, 1984 Tenn. App. LEXIS 3203 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984).

In a choice between a mother of young children and third parties, even grandparents, equal fitness by the parties cannot overcome the law's preference for the mother. Doles v. Doles, 848 S.W.2d 656, 1992 Tenn. App. LEXIS 915 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992).

Where the record showed that the natural mother previously was not a proper custodial parent, but that at the time of trial she had a stable home-life and was in a position to care for children, the trial court erred in awarding custody to the children's paternal grandparents. Doles v. Doles, 848 S.W.2d 656, 1992 Tenn. App. LEXIS 915 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992).

Trial court erred by using the best interest of the child standard in awarding custody to two guardians, because a father is entitled to a presumption of superior rights where he was not a party to a prior custody order; further, the trial court should have examined the nature of the custody order to determine whether the mother only intended to grant temporary or informal custody. Means v. Ashby, 130 S.W.3d 48, 2003 Tenn. App. LEXIS 712 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 161 (Tenn. Mar. 1, 2004).

15. Education of Children.

The decision to determine which school a child should attend usually rests with the custodial parent. Lewis v. Lewis, 741 S.W.2d 900, 1987 Tenn. App. LEXIS 2803 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987).

The courts should not countermand a custodial parent's decisions regarding a child's education unless they: (1) Are contrary to an existing custody order; (2) Impose an increased, involuntary burden on the noncustodial parent; (3) Are illegal; or (4) Will affirmatively harm the child. Rust v. Rust, 864 S.W.2d 52, 1993 Tenn. App. LEXIS 447 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993).

Home schooling is not inherently inimical to a child's health or welfare and does not necessarily impose a substantial social burden on a child. Accordingly, noncustodial parent challenging the custodial parent's decision to educate a child through home schooling cannot prevail solely on such ground. Rust v. Rust, 864 S.W.2d 52, 1993 Tenn. App. LEXIS 447 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993).

16. Kidnapping Child by Parent.

A parent who takes child of tender years from the custody of the other parent to whom decree awarded the child is guilty of kidnapping, but a parent taking without knowledge of the decree was not guilty. Hicks v. State, 158 Tenn. 204, 12 S.W.2d 385, 1928 Tenn. LEXIS 140 (1928).

17. Suits Seeking Custody.

Suits seeking custody of child should be made in the court and in the cause wherein the divorce was granted and the custody of the child awarded. Johnson v. Johnson, 185 Tenn. 400, 206 S.W.2d 400, 1947 Tenn. LEXIS 344 (1947); Coleman v. Coleman, 190 Tenn. 286, 229 S.W.2d 341, 1950 Tenn. LEXIS 480 (1950); State ex rel. Bolden v. Woodring, 194 Tenn. 628, 254 S.W.2d 737, 1953 Tenn. LEXIS 281 (1953).

18. —Habeas Corpus.

Where circuit court of one county in divorce proceeding awarded custody of child to father, such award could not be modified by chancellor in a subsequent proceeding by father for a writ of habeas corpus in another county for purpose of obtaining child from mother, but chancellor was required to grant writ and order child returned to custody of father. Johnson v. Johnson, 185 Tenn. 400, 206 S.W.2d 400, 1947 Tenn. LEXIS 344 (1947).

Where parents of child were divorced and custody of the child awarded to the father in such proceeding, mother was not entitled to maintain habeas corpus for custody of the child but should have sought the custody of the court and cause in which custody was awarded to the father. State ex rel. Bolden v. Woodring, 194 Tenn. 628, 254 S.W.2d 737, 1953 Tenn. LEXIS 281 (1953).

19. Finality of Decree.

This section does not deprive decrees for custody and support of their quality of finality as adjudications. They are final for the purpose of execution or appeal, and final as res judicata upon the facts then existing. Hicks v. Hicks, 26 Tenn. App. 641, 176 S.W.2d 371, 1943 Tenn. App. LEXIS 117 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1943); Darty v. Darty, 33 Tenn. App. 321, 232 S.W.2d 59, 1949 Tenn. App. LEXIS 127 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1949).

Ordinarily a former decree of custody is regarded as res judicata upon the facts then existing and in the absence of any changed conditions requiring a change of the custody. Dunavant v. Dunavant, 31 Tenn. App. 634, 219 S.W.2d 910, 1949 Tenn. App. LEXIS 75 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1949); Darty v. Darty, 33 Tenn. App. 321, 232 S.W.2d 59, 1949 Tenn. App. LEXIS 127 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1949).

Refusal of court of appeals to modify or change award of custody to mother in divorce proceedings would not affect the right of either party to ask for a modification of the decree under this section. Grant v. Grant, 39 Tenn. App. 539, 286 S.W.2d 349, 1954 Tenn. App. LEXIS 92 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1954).

Mere fact that divorce decree providing for custody and support is retained in court for the purpose of future orders does not deprive such decree of its quality of finality. Damron v. Damron, 212 Tenn. 14, 367 S.W.2d 476, 1963 Tenn. LEXIS 394 (1963).

Divorce decree could not be amended four and one half months after it was entered so as to require husband to make monthly payments on automobile since such relief was not within the contemplation of this section as child support. Ellis v. Ellis, 212 Tenn. 116, 368 S.W.2d 292, 1963 Tenn. LEXIS 403 (1963).

Provision that decree remain within control of court, subject to such changes or modification as the exigencies of the case may require, is incorporated into every divorce decree, without express recitation therein; therefore, such decrees are not abrogated by appeal. Harris v. Turner, 329 F.2d 918, 1964 U.S. App. LEXIS 5804 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 907, 85 S. Ct. 202, 13 L. Ed. 2d 180, 1964 U.S. LEXIS 290 (1964).

Under this section, trial court exercises continuing control over custody of a minor child after divorce decree otherwise has become final. Harris v. Turner, 329 F.2d 918, 1964 U.S. App. LEXIS 5804 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 907, 85 S. Ct. 202, 13 L. Ed. 2d 180, 1964 U.S. LEXIS 290 (1964).

Where divorce decree awarded wife custody of minor child, provided for weekly payment as alimony and support, gave wife possession of home held as tenants in common for the next two years and retained jurisdiction so that either party could have the matter of possession reviewed, award of possession of the house was in the nature of alimony in futuro rather than alimony in solido and circuit court had jurisdiction to subsequently modify decree to give wife an additional six years of exclusive possession of the house. Pendergrass v. Pendergrass, 56 Tenn. App. 227, 405 S.W.2d 666, 1966 Tenn. App. LEXIS 221 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1966).

In case involving custody dispute, decree of divorce remained within the control of the court subject to such changes or modification as the exigencies of the case required, and under the provisions of T.C.A. § 36-6-101(a), the court could award the care, custody and control of the child to either of the parties, to both, or to some suitable person, as the welfare and interest of the child demanded. Shepherd v. Metcalf, 794 S.W.2d 348, 1990 Tenn. LEXIS 300 (Tenn. 1990).

Father's motion to dismiss a mother's appeal for lack of a final judgment was denied because the trial court's judgment and parenting plan became final and appealable following its order disposing of the the parties'  motions seeking amendment of the judgment; the trial court appropriately treated the parenting plan as final and afforded it res judicata effect during the subsequent modification proceedings because its order demonstrated that it required proof of a material change in circumstance. Buchanan v. Buchanan, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 565 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 26, 2018).

20. Custody on Appeal.

The grant of custody of a child of tender years to wife who had not asked for custody in her answer in husband's action for divorce was not ground for complaint on her part as appellant in the court of appeals. Stargel v. Stargel, 21 Tenn. App. 193, 107 S.W.2d 520, 1937 Tenn. App. LEXIS 20 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1937).

21. Children Having Reached Majority.

Nothing in this section either expressly or by implication limits the power of the court under this section to children under the age of majority. Sayne v. Sayne, 39 Tenn. App. 422, 284 S.W.2d 309, 1955 Tenn. App. LEXIS 78 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1955).

Under this section court could properly provide for support of disabled child who had reached majority but who was incapacitated from earning a living. Sayne v. Sayne, 39 Tenn. App. 422, 284 S.W.2d 309, 1955 Tenn. App. LEXIS 78 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1955).

The authority of the court to order appellee to make payments for support of his children was for that period when appellee was required by law to support his children, which was during their minority. Whitt v. Whitt, 490 S.W.2d 159, 1973 Tenn. LEXIS 514 (Tenn. 1973); Parker v. Parker, 497 S.W.2d 572, 1973 Tenn. LEXIS 466 (Tenn. 1973).

22. Modification.

Any agreement or arrangement concerning the custody of minor children is subject to modification. Hill v. Robbins, 859 S.W.2d 355, 1993 Tenn. App. LEXIS 362 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993).

The courts will change a custody or visitation arrangement if the party seeking the change proves: (1) That the child's circumstances have changed materially in a way that could not reasonably have been foreseen at the time of the original custody decision, and (2) That the child's interests will be better served by changing the existing custody or visitation arrangement. Solima v. Solima, 7 S.W.3d 30, 1998 Tenn. App. LEXIS 694 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998).

It was imperative that a mother from whom child custody was removed, even temporarily, had to have been provided with notice sufficient to meet due process requirements that custody was going to have been addressed at the hearing; T.C.A. § 36-6-101(a)(2)(B) defines the proper standard for modifying custody from one parent to the other parent. Keisling v. Keisling, 92 S.W.3d 374, 2002 Tenn. LEXIS 640 (Tenn. 2002).

Court properly denied a father's request to modify child custody where the court found that the parties remained “at war,” they had been in court 35 times over the child's custody, the parties lacked a “cooperative spirit,” and therefore an award of joint custody was inappropriate under the circumstances. Hooker v. Johnson (In re M.J.H.), 196 S.W.3d 731, 2005 Tenn. App. LEXIS 787 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005), appeal denied, In re M. J. H., — S.W.3d —, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 547 (Tenn. June 5, 2006).

Trial court erred in finding that a material change of circumstances had occurred justifying a change in primary custody from the mother to the father because of the absence of proof that the mother's sexual indiscretions and other alleged misconduct had affected or would affect the children adversely, nor had the father presented evidence that the mother had undermined his relationship with his daughters. Curtis v. Hill, 215 S.W.3d 836, 2006 Tenn. App. LEXIS 531 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 1101 (Tenn. 2006).

Trial court erred in finding that a material change of circumstances had occurred justifying a change in primary custody from the mother to the father because, inter alia, while the mother's decision not to attend church regularly might not have been one that a court approved or condoned, the appellate court did not believe that it was an appropriate role of the courts to punish a parent for such a decision by taking custody of his or her children away. Curtis v. Hill, 215 S.W.3d 836, 2006 Tenn. App. LEXIS 531 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 1101 (Tenn. 2006).

Trial court erred in granting a father's petition to modify child custody under T.C.A. § 36-6-101(a)(2)(B), because he presented no evidence regarding how his marriage and his decision to quit smoking marijuana affected his daughter; he failed to meet his burden of proof to establish that a material change of circumstance occurred, and the trial court should not have moved past that threshold inquiry to consider whether a change in the parenting plan was in the child's best interests. Caldwell v. Hill, 250 S.W.3d 865, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 396 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 27, 2007), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 1066 (Tenn. Nov. 19, 2007).

Trial court erred in finding that a father's remarriage and the fact that he had quit smoking marijuana were both material changes of circumstance and granting his petition to modify a parenting plan under T.C.A. § 36-6-101(a)(2)(B), because the father's drug use was not a factor at the time of the 2004 parenting plan; therefore, his marijuana cessation did not constitute a material change of circumstance. Caldwell v. Hill, 250 S.W.3d 865, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 396 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 27, 2007), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 1066 (Tenn. Nov. 19, 2007).

Trial court erred in finding that a father's remarriage and the fact that he had quit smoking marijuana were both material changes of circumstance and granting his petition to modify a parenting plan under T.C.A. § 36-6-101(a)(2)(B); it was foreseeable that the father might have married his girlfriend, because he was living with her when he and the mother negotiated the terms of the 2004 parenting plan and it was not a sufficient material change of circumstance. Caldwell v. Hill, 250 S.W.3d 865, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 396 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 27, 2007), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 1066 (Tenn. Nov. 19, 2007).

Where there was a material change in circumstances relating to a residential parenting plan due to a mother's permissible relocation under T.C.A. § 36-6-108, a trial court erred by re-examining the comparative fitness of the parents under T.C.A. § 36-6-101(a)(2)(B), (C) since there was no material change on that issue, and the mother could not have been penalized for her relocation or for her sexual orientation; moreover, since the father failed to submit a proposed parenting plan, and the mother's proposal addressed the concerns that gave rise to the need for a modification, it was adopted. Massey-Holt v. Holt, 255 S.W.3d 603, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 668 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 31, 2007), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2008 Tenn. LEXIS 309 (Tenn. Apr. 14, 2008).

Mother's marrying a man who admitted to a felony conviction for child abuse and a history of domestic violence constituted a chance in circumstances for modification of child custody, because there was evidence presented that the child had already been taught inappropriate conduct and language by his new stepfather that was clearly related to the stepfather's criminal history. In re T.C.D., 261 S.W.3d 734, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 802 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 27, 2007), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2008 Tenn. LEXIS 457 (Tenn. June 23, 2008).

Pursuant to T.C.A. § 36-6-101(a)(2)(C), there was a material change in circumstances that justified modification of the parties'  parenting plan, based on the child's age, changing interests, and success as a student and an athlete, as well as the father's failure to exercise visitation. Reeder v. Reeder, 375 S.W.3d 268, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 126 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 24, 2012), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 440 (Tenn. June 20, 2012).

Trial court erred in finding a material change of circumstances that justified modification of a prior permanent parenting plan under T.C.A. § 36-6-101(a)(2)(C) because a father's move and remarriage were not unanticipated, and the father failed to show that the children's well being were affected in a meaningful way. Armbrister v. Armbrister, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 507 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 27, 2012), rev'd, 414 S.W.3d 685, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 782 (Tenn. Oct. 21, 2013).

Fact that a child got a year older every year, inevitable as it was, could not be regarded on its own as inherently a material change of circumstances for purposes of altering the primary residential parent. Rigsby v. Edmonds, 395 S.W.3d 728, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 551 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 9, 2012), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 911 (Tenn. Dec. 11, 2012).

Material change of circumstances occurred sufficient to require that a parenting schedule be modified to account for the Child's school schedule as the evidence preponderated in favor of a finding that the parents alternating parenting times on a weekly or bi-weekly basis was no longer workable because the child was in school. Rigsby v. Edmonds, 395 S.W.3d 728, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 551 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 9, 2012), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 911 (Tenn. Dec. 11, 2012).

Mother's pattern of behavior constituted a material change in circumstance warranting custody modification because her decision to associate with her boyfriend, to engage in volatile behavior with the boyfriend at her home with her three-year-old child present, and to continue an intimate relationship with her boyfriend indicated a pattern of poor decision making, and the court could not rely on the mother's alcohol and drug assessment because she had self-reported to the counselor a lower use of alcohol than the other evidence would indicate. Muhonen v. Muhonen, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 78 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 20, 2015).

Trial court properly applied the less-demanding material change of circumstance standard found in T.C.A. § 36-6-101(a)(2)(C), as the mother's petition requested a change in the residential parenting schedule, not one in the primary residential custodian; Broadrick v. Broadrick, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 275 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 29, 2015).

Modification of the residential parenting schedule was supported by evidence that the child would be the child had a half-sibling that lived with the mother, the child would be primarily supervised by his paternal grandparents during the father's parenting time, and the child would have a lengthy commute to school from the father's home, which would be detrimental. Broadrick v. Broadrick, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 275 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 29, 2015).

No material change in circumstance, for purposes of modifying a primary residential parent, occurred when a mother brought foster children into the mother's home because nothing showed this materially affected the subject child's well-being. In re Jacob B., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 514 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 26, 2015).

Statute was not in effect when this modification case was filed or at the time of trial, and to the extent the father specifically relied upon this statute to attack the validity of the order, his argument was without merit. Stricklin v. Stricklin, 490 S.W.3d 8, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 754 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 21, 2015).

Concerning the lack of a finding pertaining to a material change of circumstance, the absence of such did not invalidate the trial court's modification order, given the consent of the parties to modify; although the threshold inquiry is whether a material change in circumstance has occurred, such an inquiry is not required when parties agree to modify a parenting plan, and the language in the statute is not controlling, but this does not negate the importance of proving a material change of circumstance in contested cases. Stricklin v. Stricklin, 490 S.W.3d 8, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 754 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 21, 2015).

Trial court's finding that a material change in circumstances had occurred was supported by evidence that the parties were unable to adhere to the parenting plan and engage in joint decision-making with regard to education, causing the child to unnecessarily attend three different school during a two-week period, and resulting in a lack of stability that was detrimental to the child. Colley v. Colley, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 444 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 28, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 878 (Tenn. Nov. 17, 2016).

Threshold issue in proceedings to modify a parenting plan is whether a material change in circumstances affecting a child's best interest has occurred since the adoption of the existing parenting plan. Howard v. Howard, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 490 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 13, 2016).

Evidence preponderated against a finding that a mother's alleged deceit in not disclosing the mother's occupation as a licensed prostitute was a material change in circumstances warranting a parenting plan modification because there was no finding that (1) the alleged deceit affected the children, or (2) the mother's work affected the children. C.W.H. v. L.A.S., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 808 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 31, 2016), rev'd, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 825 (Tenn. Dec. 19, 2017).

Evidence preponderated against a finding that a mother's occupation as a licensed prostitute was a material change in circumstances warranting parenting plan modification because nothing showed (1) the children were exposed to prostitution, or (2) the mother still worked as a prostitute. C.W.H. v. L.A.S., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 808 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 31, 2016), rev'd, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 825 (Tenn. Dec. 19, 2017).

Evidence preponderated against a finding that a mother's hostility toward the mother's children's father and the father's wife warranted a parenting plan modification because, while this was a material change in circumstances, the evidence did not show a modification was in the children's best interest, as (1) the trial court's contrary finding was based on an unsupported finding that the mother continued to work as a prostitute, (2) the father's child support and medical support arrearages were not taken into account, and (3) the father admitted using illegal drugs in the family home when the children were present. C.W.H. v. L.A.S., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 808 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 31, 2016), rev'd, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 825 (Tenn. Dec. 19, 2017).

Record supported the trial court's modification of the residential schedule, the court having crafted a plan that adequately represented the child's best interest, while also ensuring that the mother was given specific and consistent co-parenting time before the child reached the age of majority. Kennedy v. Kennedy, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 423 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 23, 2017).

Juvenile court abused its discretion in modifying a residential parenting schedule to give the father more parenting time where it placed its focus on the father's interests, especially in light of his unwillingness or inability to manage the responsibilities that came with the child residing with him on school nights. In re Emmett D., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 458 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 7, 2017).

Approval of a modification order was appropriate to the extent the trial court adopted the parents'  compromise between them regarding their transportation arrangement. However, because the parties agreed to a Catholic education for their children, the father was not liable for private school tuition costs, and because the father paid an amount more than the father's share of the children's extracurricular expenses, the trial court erred in finding the father in contempt of its order regarding those expenses. Pua-vines v. Vines, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 526 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 2, 2017).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion by determining that the reassignment of a father, who was in the active duty military, to a military base in another state constituted a material change of circumstances justifying modification of the parenting plan. Furthermore, the court did not err in naming the mother to be primary residential parent because the court considered the statutory factors in determining that the modification was in the children's best interest. Dalrymple v. Dalrymple, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 743 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 14, 2017).

Trial court did not err in granting the father's motion for vacation time, as the change to a more clearly defined coparenting schedule was in the child's best interest. In re Ava B., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 819 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 20, 2017).

Trial court was considering a petition to modify when no final order on custody or parenting issues existed. Without a final order entitled to res judicata effect, it was not necessary for the mother to show a material change of circumstance. In re Samuel P., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 102 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 23, 2018).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion by modifying the parties'  residential parenting schedule in light of the best-interest factors because it recognized the importance of stability and consistency and clearly attempted to fashion a parenting plan to minimize conflict in the child's life and ensure each parent could continue to have a close relationship with the child; the modifications were clearly reasonable in light of the evidence in the record. Bowen v. Wiseman, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 375 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 29, 2018).

Trial court did not err in modifying a parenting plan because it properly found that there had been a material change in circumstances and that modification was in the child's best interest; the evidence supported the trial court's finding that the mother would be more likely to respect the parenting plan because the evidence in the record revealed multiple instances in which the father approached the mother with a condescending and uncooperative attitude. Bowen v. Wiseman, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 375 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 29, 2018).

Trial court's reliance on a doctor's opinion in determining that there had been a material change in circumstances and that modification of the parties'  parenting plan was in the child's best interest was appropriate because the father cited no reason whey the reliance was improper other than his personal belief that the report was “biased” and “speculative.” Bowen v. Wiseman, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 375 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 29, 2018).

Denial of a father's petition to modify a permanent parenting plan was appropriate because the only change alleged by the father was that the father's attitude toward the mother had not affected the parties'  child as originally suspected by the trial court. The record belied any such assertion as evidenced by the father's repeated filings and general contempt toward the mother and as reflected by the child's exhibition of signs of distress resulting from the parents'  inability to work together. Barmmer v. Staininger, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 400 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 19, 2019).

Court's ability to review the trial court's decision was hindered by the father's failure to provide the court with transcripts of the multiple hearings or a statement of the evidence presented; in the absence of a transcript or statement of the evidence, the court had to presume that there was sufficient evidence before the trial court to support its custody modification decision as related to the child's best interest. Rawson v. Monroe, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 286 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 24, 2020).

23. Removal of Child from Jurisdiction.

The mere fact that decree awarding one parent custody of child grants the other parent the right of visitation does not impliedly prohibit the removal of the child from the state. Thomas v. Thomas, 206 Tenn. 584, 335 S.W.2d 827, 1960 Tenn. LEXIS 396 (1960).

Where mother of children was granted custody of children with father being granted right of visitation, mother's removal of children from state upon remarriage did not relieve father of duty to support of children in accordance with decree. Thomas v. Thomas, 206 Tenn. 584, 335 S.W.2d 827, 1960 Tenn. LEXIS 396 (1960).

Where Tennessee court granted husband divorce and awarded custody of children to wife and wife and children became domiciled in Ohio, Ohio court rather than Tennessee court had jurisdiction to determine whether manifest best interest of children would be served by changing custody of the children. Hines v. Hines, 220 Tenn. 437, 418 S.W.2d 253, 1965 Tenn. LEXIS 645 (1965).

In matters involving the removal of children from the jurisdiction in which custody was awarded, the court is still bound by the paramount rule that whatever is done must be in the best interest of the child. However, this rule must be amplified and be what is reasonable under the circumstances in the best interest of the child. Walker v. Walker, 656 S.W.2d 11, 1983 Tenn. App. LEXIS 597 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983), overruled, Seessel v. Seessel, 748 S.W.2d 422, 1988 Tenn. LEXIS 55 (Tenn. 1988), overruled, Webster v. Webster, — S.W.3d —, 2006 Tenn. App. LEXIS 685 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 24, 2006).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing removal of children from Memphis to Toronto, Canada, where children had no family in Memphis other than their divorced father and mother but in Toronto had maternal grandparents, aunts, uncles and cousins, where cultural and educational advantages appeared to be equal, and where mother desired to leave environment that had been almost completely dominated for her by her children and the entertaining of her husband's business associates and to return to her family and ancestral home. Walker v. Walker, 656 S.W.2d 11, 1983 Tenn. App. LEXIS 597 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983), overruled, Seessel v. Seessel, 748 S.W.2d 422, 1988 Tenn. LEXIS 55 (Tenn. 1988), overruled, Webster v. Webster, — S.W.3d —, 2006 Tenn. App. LEXIS 685 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 24, 2006).

A noncustodial parent contesting the change of domicile of a child of the parties does not carry the burden of proving that the relocation is not in the child's best interests. The burden of proof in such cases remains with the applicant to show that the best interests of the child will be better served by its relocation. Seessel v. Seessel, 748 S.W.2d 422, 1988 Tenn. LEXIS 55 (Tenn. 1988).

Spouse, who met the burden of proof necessary to show that the removal of the children was in the best interest of the children under all the circumstances, was allowed to remove the children from the state against the other spouse's wishes, despite joint custody agreement that allowed removal only by mutual agreement of the parties. Rogero v. Pitt, 759 S.W.2d 109, 1988 Tenn. LEXIS 179 (Tenn. 1988).

Custodial parent's petition to remove child to Iowa should have been granted where the custodial parent had remarried, where her new husband intended to attend school in Iowa, and where remaining with the custodial parent was not shown to be against the best interests of the child. Taylor v. Taylor, 849 S.W.2d 319, 1993 Tenn. LEXIS 60 (Tenn. 1993).

The evidence preponderated that it was in the children's best interest to approve modification of a custody agreement that included their relocation with their mother. Hill v. Robbins, 859 S.W.2d 355, 1993 Tenn. App. LEXIS 362 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993).

24. —Burden of Proof.

In the typical situation where the court in awarding custody enjoins the custodial parent from removing the children from the jurisdiction of the court without the court's permission, the burden of showing that the move is in the best interest of the children should be on the custodial parent seeking the relocation. Walker v. Walker, 656 S.W.2d 11, 1983 Tenn. App. LEXIS 597 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983), overruled, Seessel v. Seessel, 748 S.W.2d 422, 1988 Tenn. LEXIS 55 (Tenn. 1988), overruled, Webster v. Webster, — S.W.3d —, 2006 Tenn. App. LEXIS 685 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 24, 2006).

Where no injunction has been issued in the award of custody, the parent contesting relocation of children should bear the burden of showing that relocation is not in the best interest of the children. Walker v. Walker, 656 S.W.2d 11, 1983 Tenn. App. LEXIS 597 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983), overruled, Seessel v. Seessel, 748 S.W.2d 422, 1988 Tenn. LEXIS 55 (Tenn. 1988), overruled, Webster v. Webster, — S.W.3d —, 2006 Tenn. App. LEXIS 685 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 24, 2006).

In case where the mother was seeking approval to remove the children from the state, she had the burden to establish her case by a preponderance of the evidence. Hill v. Robbins, 859 S.W.2d 355, 1993 Tenn. App. LEXIS 362 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993).

25. Death of Party.

Where wife or child support payments are represented by contract and the divorce decree recognized this agreement, then such payment provisions survive the death of the husband when the language of the agreement anticipates support payments from the estate of the husband. In re Estate of Kerby, 49 Tenn. App. 329, 354 S.W.2d 814, 1961 Tenn. App. LEXIS 115 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1961).

Where in divorce proceedings custody of child was awarded to father and father was subsequently killed, death of father did not defeat jurisdiction of court in which divorce proceeding was brought to make suitable provision for custody of the child. Sutton v. Sutton, 220 Tenn. 410, 417 S.W.2d 786, 1967 Tenn. LEXIS 422 (1967).

26. Foreign Decrees.

While it is true that a decree of a court of another state granting a divorce to a husband or wife with custody of the children is binding on the courts of this state, this rule is qualified by the proposition that, if the children are domiciled in Tennessee and there is such a change in circumstances surrounding them as would call for action on the part of the local courts to protect them, jurisdiction is assumed by the courts of this state. Dearing v. Dearing, 50 Tenn. App. 394, 362 S.W.2d 45, 1962 Tenn. App. LEXIS 154 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1962).

The courts of this state may enforce by contempt or other equitable process decrees of foreign courts awarding custody of children and/or child support. Strube v. Strube, 53 Tenn. App. 88, 379 S.W.2d 44, 1963 Tenn. App. LEXIS 131 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1963).

Where Georgia court awarded custody of children to wife in divorce decree and ordered child support payments by husband and husband wrongfully deprived wife, subsequently domiciled in Florida, of custody and removed himself and children to Tennessee, Tennessee court could hear issue of custody of children insofar as it related to the welfare of the children but could properly limit the issues to question as to whether there had been any agreement to change custody and whether conduct of wife showed she was so unfit as to shock the conscience of the court to enforce the Georgia decree. Strube v. Strube, 53 Tenn. App. 88, 379 S.W.2d 44, 1963 Tenn. App. LEXIS 131 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1963).

The supreme court of Oklahoma has held that the courts of that state have jurisdiction to determine the custody of children there and that orders as to their custody made by a sister state after the children are brought into Oklahoma are not binding on Oklahoma courts; similarly, when an Oklahoma court granted custody of children to a mother and an order permitting her to move to Memphis with the children, where they resided with her new husband, the presumption was that they were domiciled in Memphis, giving Tennessee courts jurisdiction of the children. Coury v. State, 213 Tenn. 454, 374 S.W.2d 397, 1964 Tenn. LEXIS 405 (1964).

Divorced mother was not precluded from bringing suit in Tennessee to recover deficiency allegedly due under Georgia divorce decree for alimony and child support even though she had received benefit of Tennessee reciprocal support judgment for less than the amount of child support provided in the Georgia decree. Hester v. Hester, 59 Tenn. App. 613, 443 S.W.2d 28, 1969 Tenn. App. LEXIS 349 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1969).

Under the public policy of Tennessee the accumulated amount due under foreign alimony decrees will be enforced in Tennessee to the same extent as decrees of Tennessee courts even to the extent of holding the respondent in contempt for failure to pay the entire amount. Hester v. Hester, 59 Tenn. App. 613, 443 S.W.2d 28, 1969 Tenn. App. LEXIS 349 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1969).

27. Minor Wife or Husband.

Minors may prosecute or defend divorce actions without the necessity of a guardian ad litem or next friend. Talley v. Talley, 51 Tenn. App. 622, 371 S.W.2d 152, 1962 Tenn. App. LEXIS 126 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1962).

Where minor was complainant or petitioner in a divorce proceeding that was filed by her without intervention of guardian or next friend she was required to be treated as if she were an adult in subsequent proceedings in or growing out of that cause. Talley v. Talley, 51 Tenn. App. 622, 371 S.W.2d 152, 1962 Tenn. App. LEXIS 126 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1962).

28. Review of Action of Trial Court.

There was no appeal from action of trial court in dismissing contempt proceedings against husband for alleged failure to comply with provisions of divorce decree as to child support. Plumb v. Plumb, 52 Tenn. App. 267, 372 S.W.2d 771, 1962 Tenn. App. LEXIS 135 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1962).

An appeal in a divorce case does not abrogate the decree of the trial court awarding custody of children. Smith v. Haase, 521 S.W.2d 49, 1975 Tenn. LEXIS 680 (Tenn. 1975).

In child custody cases the scope of review is de novo with a presumption of correctness of the ruling of the trial judge. Hass v. Knighton, 676 S.W.2d 554, 1984 Tenn. LEXIS 915 (Tenn. 1984).

Custody and visitation arrangements are customarily left to the trial court's discretion. Sherrod v. Wix, 849 S.W.2d 780, 1992 Tenn. App. LEXIS 848 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992).

Decisions of the trial court in respect to custody come to the appeals court for review de novo upon the record accompanied by a presumption of correctness unless the evidence preponderates otherwise. Dalton v. Dalton, 858 S.W.2d 324, 1993 Tenn. App. LEXIS 163 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993).

Husband had not established that the trial court abused its discretion in adopting large portions of the proposed permanent parenting plan originally agreed to by the parties. Olson v. Beck, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 99 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2015).

Although a parenting plan removed days from one parent's parenting time, it did not amount to an abuse of discretion because the record did not reflect that the trial court applied an incorrect legal standard, reached an illogical conclusion, based its decision on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence, or employed reasoning that caused an injustice to the parent. Solima v. Solima, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 116 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 11, 2015).

Court of appeals declined to consider a mother's argument that the evidence at least established a material change in circumstance for purposes of modifying the residential parenting schedule because the trial court chose not to address the issue; thus, the record was inadequate to make any determination on the issue. Burnett v. Burnett, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 705 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2015).

Appellate court found that the vacating and remand of a trial court's order was appropriate because the court failed to make appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law to permit the appellate court to conduct an adequate review of the trial court's decision regarding modification of a permanent parenting plan and child support. The trial court was to enter a complete order accompanied by sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law. Howard v. Howard, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 490 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 13, 2016).

29. Religious Beliefs.

The religious beliefs of the parents are not controlling in custody cases. Mollish v. Mollish, 494 S.W.2d 145, 1972 Tenn. App. LEXIS 274 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1972).

30. Exigencies.

“Exigencies” as used in this section means new facts and changed conditions that have emerged since the decree that were not determined and could not have been anticipated by the decree. Smith v. Haase, 521 S.W.2d 49, 1975 Tenn. LEXIS 680 (Tenn. 1975).

31. Power to Modify Judgment for Delinquent Payment.

Final judgments for delinquent alimony and/or support are not subject to forgiveness or modification in amount, whereas judgments less than final may be forgiven or modified under the general powers of a divorce court. Zeitlin v. Zeitlin, 544 S.W.2d 103, 1976 Tenn. App. LEXIS 231 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1976), superseded by statute as stated in, Aubin v. Aubin, — S.W.2d —, 1989 Tenn. App. LEXIS 101 (1989), superseded by statute as stated in, State ex rel. Woody v. Morris, — S.W.2d —, 1990 Tenn. App. LEXIS 22 (1990).

32. Modification of Visitation Privilege.

Court order modifying father's visiting privileges was proper, since it was important for the children's welfare that they have a meaningful relationship with their father. Dillow v. Dillow, 575 S.W.2d 289, 1978 Tenn. App. LEXIS 320 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1978), superseded by statute as stated in, Wilson v. Wilson, — S.W.2d —, 1991 Tenn. App. LEXIS 375 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 22, 1991).

Mother had established a material change in the children's circumstances where the divorce decree was more than a decade old, the children's interests and focuses had changed as they grew older, and they had not been permitted to pursue those interests, take jobs, or spend time with their friends during the summer when they were living with their father given the father's hectic work schedule and his inflexibility in accommodating the children's outside activities or interests. Boyer v. Heimermann, 238 S.W.3d 249, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 185 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 30, 2007), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 737 (Tenn. Aug. 13, 2007).

Material change in circumstances supported modifying a child's parenting time because the child's mother's new living situation greatly increased the child's father's transportation time required to exercise parenting time. Leonardo v. Leonardo, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 486 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 18, 2015), modified, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 943 (Tenn. Nov. 24, 2015).

Material change of circumstance occurred, for purposes of modifying residential parenting time, because (1) the parenting plan was over 11 years old, (2) the child's needs had changed significantly, and (3) the father and mother added people to their respective households, requiring consideration of whether it was in the child's best interest to grant the father more parenting time. In re Jacob B., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 514 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 26, 2015).

In a petition for modification of visitation time, the trial court did not err in naming the father as the primary residential parent and awarding him increased visitation time with the children because and it was in the children's best interest as the father testified about the mother's and the children's excessive emphasis on rock climbing while under the mother's care to the exclusion of other activities, including their education, and the mother's own testimony reinforced that conclusion; and the trial court was concerned with the mother's financial dependence upon a close friend, while the father was independent and relatively stable. Bell v. Bell, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 335 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 18, 2017).

Modification of parenting time sharing arrangements to eliminate father's time with children during school week was appropriate because the father missed numerous visits with the children and consistently did not attend or get the children to their extra-curricular activities and sporting events. The children often stayed at different people's homes when visiting the father due to the father's lack of maintaining a consistent residence—which instability led to school tardiness—and one child stated that this had negatively affected the child. Harmon v. Gricunas, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 9 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2020).

33. Change in Custody.

Material facts that were not known at time of award that may affect welfare of child may be subsequently considered in hearing petition for change of custody. Dailey v. Dailey, 635 S.W.2d 391, 1981 Tenn. App. LEXIS 580 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981).

Where award of custody of minor is made which has no restrictions or limitations it will support a plea of res judicata and to justify petition for change in custody there must have been such change in circumstances as will directly affect welfare of the minor. Dailey v. Dailey, 635 S.W.2d 391, 1981 Tenn. App. LEXIS 580 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981).

For case dealing with change in custody based on custodial mother's lesbian living arrangement, see Dailey v. Dailey, 635 S.W.2d 391, 1981 Tenn. App. LEXIS 580 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981).

Where at time of divorce proceeding husband and court were aware of wife's intention to eventually remove children to Toronto, the court's order awarding permanent custody to the wife was res judicata as to husband's subsequent petition for change of custody based on alleged change in circumstances involved in proposed move to Toronto. Walker v. Walker, 656 S.W.2d 11, 1983 Tenn. App. LEXIS 597 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983), overruled, Seessel v. Seessel, 748 S.W.2d 422, 1988 Tenn. LEXIS 55 (Tenn. 1988), overruled, Webster v. Webster, — S.W.3d —, 2006 Tenn. App. LEXIS 685 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 24, 2006).

At any time it should appear to the trial court that the welfare of the children requires, the trial court has statutory authority to change its custody order. Bush v. Bush, 684 S.W.2d 89, 1984 Tenn. App. LEXIS 3203 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984).

The trial court retains jurisdiction to entertain a petition for change of custody; however, it has no power to enjoin or stay the order of an appellate court. The appropriate procedure to secure such relief should be by petition to rehear in the court of appeals (T.R.A.P. 39) or, in the alternative, application for permission to appeal to the supreme court (T.R.A.P. 42). Seessel v. Seessel, 748 S.W.2d 422, 1988 Tenn. LEXIS 55 (Tenn. 1988).

Primary consideration in modification of child custody award is the best interest of the children and where circumstances of the parents had changed in that both had remarried, both had new homes and both had new children, but where there was no proof that it would be in the best interest of the children to change the original custody decree, the original decree should be left undisturbed. Woodard v. Woodard, 783 S.W.2d 188, 1989 Tenn. App. LEXIS 670 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989).

It is only that behavior of a parent that clearly posits or causes danger to the mental or emotional well-being of a child (whether such behavior is immoral or not), that is a sufficient basis to seriously consider the drastic legal action of changing custody. Musselman v. Acuff, 826 S.W.2d 920, 1991 Tenn. App. LEXIS 857 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991), superseded by statute as stated in, Gullett v. Hopkins, — S.W.3d —, 2005 Tenn. App. LEXIS 474 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 9, 2005), superseded by statute as stated in, Boyer v. Heimermann, 238 S.W.3d 249, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 185 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 30, 2007).

In a modification proceeding, the trial judge must find a material change in circumstances that is compelling enough to warrant the dramatic remedy of changed custody. Musselman v. Acuff, 826 S.W.2d 920, 1991 Tenn. App. LEXIS 857 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991), superseded by statute as stated in, Gullett v. Hopkins, — S.W.3d —, 2005 Tenn. App. LEXIS 474 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 9, 2005), superseded by statute as stated in, Boyer v. Heimermann, 238 S.W.3d 249, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 185 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 30, 2007).

Despite mother's past history of cohabitation and step-father's failure to testify at the custody hearing, father failed to prove a change in circumstances sufficient to merit a change in custody. Musselman v. Acuff, 826 S.W.2d 920, 1991 Tenn. App. LEXIS 857 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991), superseded by statute as stated in, Gullett v. Hopkins, — S.W.3d —, 2005 Tenn. App. LEXIS 474 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 9, 2005), superseded by statute as stated in, Boyer v. Heimermann, 238 S.W.3d 249, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 185 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 30, 2007).

“Changed circumstances” includes any material change of circumstances affecting the welfare of the child or children including new facts or changed conditions that could not be anticipated by a former decree. Dalton v. Dalton, 858 S.W.2d 324, 1993 Tenn. App. LEXIS 163 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993).

The unworkability of joint custody because of the recalcitrance of one or both parents was not a change of circumstances anticipated in former decree. Such was therefore a proper ground for re-evaluating custody arrangements in the former decree. Dalton v. Dalton, 858 S.W.2d 324, 1993 Tenn. App. LEXIS 163 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993).

The courts will order a change of custody when the party seeking the change proves: (1) That the child's circumstances have materially changed in a way that could not have been reasonably foreseen at the time of the original custody decision, and; (2) That the child's best interests will be served by changing the existing custody arrangement. Adelsperger v. Adelsperger, 970 S.W.2d 482, 1997 Tenn. App. LEXIS 855 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997).

Court did not err by denying a father's request for custody where the father did not raise the issue of custody until after six days of hearings regarding visitation, he repeatedly stated that custody was not an issue, and a change in custody would have a potentially negative effect on the child. Woodroof v. Fisher, 180 S.W.3d 542, 2005 Tenn. App. LEXIS 169 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 813 (Tenn. Oct. 3, 2005).

Trial court properly denied a father's second petition to change custody as the children's actual admission to private schools, the mother's claimed refusal to discuss their attending private school, and the son's stated preference as to which school he wanted to attend were not material changes of circumstances; also, because the father's petition sought a change of primary residential parent status, i.e., a change of “custody,” the lower threshold contained in T.C.A. § 36-6-101(a)(2)(C) did not apply. Pippin v. Pippin, 277 S.W.3d 398, 2008 Tenn. App. LEXIS 339 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 4, 2008), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2008 Tenn. LEXIS 954 (Tenn. Dec. 15, 2008).

Although the change in the designation of primary residential parent was not specifically challenged by the mother, the evidence did not preponderate against the majority of the trial court's findings, and there was no abuse of discretion in the determination that the father should be named the primary residential parent. In re Emily M., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 906 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2016).

Modification of permanent parental plan to make a father the primary residential parent was appropriate because a material change in circumstance occurred that affected the child's well-being in a meaningful way because the mother admitted in an answer that there had been a material change of circumstances, and, following the divorce, the mother chose to engage in a pattern of angry and hostile conduct toward the father and stepmother that interfered with the father's ability to parent the child and caused the child anxiety, fear, and distress. Fiala v. Fiala, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 556 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 21, 2018).

34. —Remarriage of Spouse.

The remarriage of either parent did not of itself constitute a change of circumstance that would warrant a change of custody; however, the possible change in home environment caused by such remarriage was a factor to be considered in determining whether or not there had been a material change in circumstance that would warrant an alteration of custody arrangements. Tortorich v. Erickson, 675 S.W.2d 190, 1984 Tenn. App. LEXIS 2863 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984).

35. Child of Tender Years.

A mother of a child of tender years is not afforded a presumption of parental fitness. Varley v. Varley, 934 S.W.2d 659, 1996 Tenn. App. LEXIS 459 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996).

36. Findings of Fact.

Trial court's order modifying the permanent parenting plan was vacated as there were no appropriate findings evidencing that the mother had met the required evidentiary proof or that the trial court performed the requisite two-step analysis. Roberts v. Roberts, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 992 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2015).

Trial court's order modifying the parents'  permanent parenting plan entered when the mother and the father divorced was improperly granted as the order contained no actual findings of fact, and without specific findings of fact, the appellate court was left to wonder about the basis upon which the trial court based its decision that a material change in circumstances had occurred requiring the modification and that the modification was in the children's best interests. Sisco v. Howard, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 949 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 12, 2016).

Order denying a mother's petition to modify the parenting plan was vacated because the trial court did not make any factual findings on the mother's request or otherwise explain why it declined to modify the plan as requested. Reid v. Reid, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 471 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 15, 2018).

Trial court failed to elaborate the basis for its deviating from the parties'  agreed parenting plan before concluding that the parents could not jointly parent, and, more egregiously, was silent concerning the child's best interest. Thus, the vacating of the trial court's permanent parenting plan and remand for further findings were necessary because the trial court's findings were not sufficient either to support its refusal to enter the parties'  proposed parenting plan, or to support the parenting plan arrived at by the trial court. Wright v. Wright, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 99 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 6, 2020).

37. Contempt.

In a dispute involving a parenting plan, a trial court did not err in finding a mother in contempt because the mother's violation of an order by removing her children from the state was willful. The mother's decision to abide by the standard rights provided by T.C.A. § 36-6-101 in lieu of the trial court's order did not negate the willfulness of her violation. O'Rourke v. O'Rourke, 337 S.W.3d 189, 2009 Tenn. App. LEXIS 315 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 5, 2009), appeal denied, O'Rourke v. O'Rourke, — S.W.3d —, 2010 Tenn. LEXIS 230 (Tenn. Jan. 25, 2010).

38. Best Interests.

Change of child custody was in the child's best interests, because the evidence showed that the mother intentionally interfered with the father's visitation with his son, failed to adhere to the terms of the parenting plan, and was unwilling to encourage or facilitate a close and continuing relationship between the father and his son; the father was permitted to visit with his young son only at the house of the mother's family or in the driveway, and they were basically forced to sit in the father's truck or to play in the gravel driveway for the entire visitation period. In re T.C.D., 261 S.W.3d 734, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 802 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 27, 2007), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2008 Tenn. LEXIS 457 (Tenn. June 23, 2008).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that a change in the primary residential parent from the mother to the father was not in the child's best interest because each parent presented a different version of the facts, and the trial court necessarily relied upon its assessment of the parties'  credibility, concluding the mother's intentions were not to alienate the father and the child. Watson v. Myers, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 826 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 7, 2015), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 149 (Tenn. Feb. 18, 2016).

Trial court did not err in finding that a modification of custody was in the child's best interest, as the record showed that the child had not lived in a stable, satisfactory environment, the child's frequent school changes created a lack of stability, and the mother's moved without notifying the father evidenced an unwillingness to support a close relationship between the child and the father. Skowronski v. Wade, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 876 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 27, 2015).

Preponderance of the evidence supported the trial court's finding that modification of the residential parenting schedule was in the child's best interest because the father consumed alcohol when he recognized the risk, and the father consumed alcohol to excess and denied it. Davis v. Hood, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 459 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 30, 2016).

In a case involving a modification of an agreed parenting plan, the juvenile court did not err by naming the father the primary residential parent and by granting the father sole decision-making authority as the parties had stipulated that there had been a material change of circumstance, and it was in the child's best interests because the mother was unwilling to cooperate with the father in making educational decisions; the mother continued to share inappropriate information with the child concerning the parents'  relationship and the details of the custody dispute; the mother admitted to having physical and mental health issues; and the mother made a habit of sending the father inappropriate and occasionally threatening emails. Gider v. Hubbell, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 211 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 29, 2017).

Trial court's finding of a material change did not predetermine the outcome of the best interest analysis because after consideration of the statutory factors, it determined that naming the father the primary residential parent was in the child's best interest Skelton v. Skelton, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 318 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 16, 2017).

Evidence preponderated against the trial court's finding that the father should remain the primary residential parent, given the children's stressful relationship with the stepmother and their positive relationship with the stepfather, the father's failure to attend to the children's health care needs, the father's failure to comply with the parenting plan, and the father's lack of willingness to facilitate and encourage the mother's relationship with the children. Wilson v. Phillips, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 747 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 15, 2017).

Trial court did not err in considering evidence concerning events that took place before the entry of an agreed order because it was permitted to consider all evidence relevant to the best-interest factors; res judicata did not apply to bar evidence concerning events that took place before the previous order was entered when the trial court already determined a change of circumstances occurred and was tasked with determining how to modify a parenting plan consistent with a child's best interest. Bowen v. Wiseman, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 375 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 29, 2018).

Res judicata does not bar a respondent/parent opposing a residential parenting schedule modification from putting on countervailing proof relevant to the best-interest analysis concerning the petitioner/parent's history of bad behavior just because that behavior took place before the entry of the last parenting plan. Bowen v. Wiseman, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 375 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 29, 2018).

39. Change of Circumstances.

Mother's alleged failure to grant a father time and contact with a child pursuant to mediated agreements did not constitute a material change in circumstances sufficient to warrant a change in custody under T.C.A. § 36-6-101(a)(2)(B) because there was no indication that the child's well-being was affected in any meaningful way and the father continued to spend time with the child every other weekend and had contact with the child by telephone. H.A.S. v. H.D.S., 414 S.W.3d 115, 2013 Tenn. App. LEXIS 218 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 1, 2013), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 760 (Tenn. Sept. 10, 2013).

T.C.A. § 36-6-101(a)(2)(C) abrogates any prior Tennessee decision, including Blair, Kendrick, and Cranston, which may be read as requiring a party requesting modification of a residential parenting schedule to prove that the alleged material change in circumstances could not reasonably have been anticipated when the initial residential parenting schedule was established. Armbrister v. Armbrister, 414 S.W.3d 685, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 782 (Tenn. Oct. 21, 2013).

Father satisfied his burden of proving a material change in circumstances through proof that his remarriage significantly affected his parenting in a positive way. Armbrister v. Armbrister, 414 S.W.3d 685, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 782 (Tenn. Oct. 21, 2013).

When the issue is modification of a residential parenting schedule, T.C.A. § 36-6-101(a)(2)(C) provides the governing standard for determining whether a material change in circumstances has occurred. Armbrister v. Armbrister, 414 S.W.3d 685, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 782 (Tenn. Oct. 21, 2013).

Facts or changed conditions which reasonably could have been anticipated when the initial residential parenting schedule was adopted may support a finding of a material change in circumstances, so long as the party seeking modification has proven by a preponderance of the evidence a material change of circumstance affecting the child's best interest. T.C.A. § 36-6-101(a)(2)(C) (2010). Armbrister v. Armbrister, 414 S.W.3d 685, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 782 (Tenn. Oct. 21, 2013).

Trial court did not err in changing the designation of the primary residential parent for a teenage child because (1) a material change in circumstance occurred based on the child's recent athletic development and its impact on the child's social development; (2) the court properly considered the relevant factors, including the importance of continuity, when it made its determination of the child's best interests; and (3) the court did not err in its consideration of the child's expressed preference. Robinson v. Robinson, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 121 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 16, 2015).

Record did not preponderate against the trial court's finding that the wife established a material change of circumstances by the discovery of a marijuana plant in the husband's home and modifying the parties'  parenting plan where he admitted he knew his girlfriend was growing marijuana on their property and he never attempted to prevent or discourage her from doing so and he admitted the party's child could have accessed a box of drug paraphernalia found in the carport. Holdsworth v. Holdsworth, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 424 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 3, 2015), modified, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 73 (Tenn. Jan. 25, 2016).

If decisions to modify custody were based solely on meeting the child's best interests without regard for whether a material change of circumstances had occurred, parents could force modification of their custody arrangement as often as the child's custodial preference changed in a case where the other best interest factors weighed equally in favor of each parent; the requirement that petitioning parents demonstrate a material change of circumstances prevents such a scenario. Canada v. Canada, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 720 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 4, 2015).

Evidence did not preponderate against the finding that the father failed to prove a material change of circumstances sufficient to modify custody; one disagreement between the mother and the daughter and the daughter's subsequent extended stay with the father was not evidence of a material change of circumstances, the daughter's testimony that she would prefer to live with the father was not sufficient alone to constitute a material change of circumstances, and there was insufficient evidence regarding the mother's alleged role in the son's academic struggles. Canada v. Canada, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 720 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 4, 2015).

Father's argument was premised on an interpretation that would allow petitioning parents to prove a material change of circumstances by establishing that modification was in the child's best interest, but this interpretation would nullify the change of circumstances prong of the two-part test to modify custody; the decision to modify custody is a two-part test, and a petitioning parent must prove each part separately before a prior custody determination may be modified, and as the father failed to prove a material change of circumstances in this case, the trial court correctly denied his petition to modify. Canada v. Canada, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 720 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 4, 2015).

While the mother's single move did not support a finding of a material change in circumstances, the subject move coupled with the prior eleven years of moves did, and thus, the trial court did not err in finding that there had been a material change in circumstances. Skowronski v. Wade, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 876 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 27, 2015).

In a custody case, a trial court failed to state what the material change of circumstances was, and simply stating the trial court's decision, without more, did not fulfil the mandate for findings of fact under the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure; a remand was not available because the trial judge had since retired. The trial court made two relevant findings on the material change issue: that there was no physical, sexual, or emotional abuse and that a child had a somewhat strained relationship with the mother, but these findings did not provide the appellate court with a clear understanding of the basis for the trial court's decision. Jones v. Jones, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 199 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 18, 2016).

Trial court properly determined that, while a mother established that a material change of circumstances had occurred, modification of the parenting schedule was not in the child's best interest because the court fully considered the father's conduct and whether it would have an adverse effect on the child's best interest and, although the order did not include specific findings of fact relative to the statutory factors the mother and the father spent effectively the same amount of time and engaged in the same activities with the child between the time she came home from school and the time she went to bed. Wheeler v. Wheeler, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 373 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 24, 2016).

Trial court properly modified the residential parenting schedule because the mother met her burden of proving a material change of circumstance; the father's increasingly erratic behavior and alcohol use was a material change because the father admitted to abusing alcohol and refused to stop drinking entirely, and instead, he pledged to not drink alcohol while exercising visitation with the child. Davis v. Hood, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 459 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 30, 2016).

Evidence supported the trial court's finding that the mother lacked an ability to care for the child, and that a material change in circumstances had occurred due to the nature and severity of the mother's mental health issues. In re Emily M., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 906 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2016).

evidence did not preponderate against the trial court's finding that there was a material change of circumstances warranting modification of parenting time, as there was evidence that the parties did not cooperate with each other, the stepfather gave the minors shots without the father's consent, and the children preferred to live with the father. Lanier v. Lanier, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 943 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 9, 2016).

Trial court did not err in naming a father the primary residential parent because a mother's move was a material change in circumstance that made the parenting plan no longer in the best interest of the child; the trial court determined that the proximity of both parents to the child's school was an important feature of the joint parenting arrangement, and the evidence did not preponderate against the finding that the mother's move adversely affected the child's academic progress. Skelton v. Skelton, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 318 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 16, 2017).

Trial court erred in granting a mother's motion for involuntary dismissal because the father met the initial burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, a material change in circumstance for modifying the primary residential parent as the mother lost the mother's husband, job, and home. The burden of proof shifted to the mother, and, while the mother's evidence may have demonstrated that the changed circumstances were only temporary and did not warrant a modification, the record did not contain evidence to support that conclusion. In re Jonathan S., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 510 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 24, 2017).

Trial court did not err in determining that a material change of circumstance existed to modify the residential parenting schedule because the parents had not been following the existing parenting plan once the minor child started school in August 2012; the evidence was undisputed that the father's work schedule had changed; and the child had been spending considerably more time with the mother since the parties informally modified their parenting plan in 2012. Steakin v. Steakin, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2018).

Modification of a permanent parenting plan, by changing the primary residential parent and modifying the visitation schedule, was inappropriate because the evidence preponderated against the trial court's finding that the father showed a material change of circumstances sufficient to change the primary residential parent. The father's desire to enroll the children in a different school, precipitated by the father's own voluntary decision to move further from mother and the children, did not rise to the level of such a change in circumstances. Newberry v. Newberry, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 340 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 20, 2018).

Modification of permanent parental plan to make a father the primary residential parent was appropriate because a material change in circumstance occurred that affected the child's well-being in a meaningful way because the mother admitted in an answer that there had been a material change of circumstances, and, following the divorce, the mother chose to engage in a pattern of angry and hostile conduct toward the father and stepmother that interfered with the father's ability to parent the child and caused the child anxiety, fear, and distress. Fiala v. Fiala, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 556 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 21, 2018).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion by modifying a father's parenting time because the residential parenting schedule was implemented when the child was seven years old, but the child had increased in age to fifteen years old, the father's work schedule had changed, the father's living conditions had changed with the addition of a new wife and stepchild, and it was undisputed that the residential parenting schedule was not working. Iveson v. Iveson, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 130 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 18, 2019).

Trial court's designation of the father as the primary residential parent was affirmed where the children had established healthy relationships with both parents although they had resided exclusively with the father for the past four years, he had provided excellent care for them and allowed them to flourish in their environment, and he had indicated an intent to encourage the children's relationship with the mother even though he had failed to communicate and facilitate the mother's involvement since 2014. Hall v. Williams, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 491 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 4, 2019).

Trial court did not err by finding that the father failed to present sufficient evidence of a material change in circumstances to support a modification of the primary residential parent because the court found that incidents between the parties'  child and his brother, including an incident during which the brother broke the child's arm, were normal teenage provocations between siblings and the mother did not intentionally interfere with the communication between the child and the father by temporarily taking away the child's cell phone for disciplinary purposes. McAdams v. McAdams, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 364 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 13, 2020).

Mother's move to another county and the child's enrollment in a new school did not amount to a material change in circumstances because the mother's residence was less than 50 miles from the father's residence and did not violate the parties'  parenting plan. McAdams v. McAdams, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 364 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 13, 2020).

40. Material Change of Circumstances.

It was not error to find a material change in circumstances warranted changing a child's residential parent to the child's father because (1) the child's mother used a false address to enroll the child in a school program without the father's required consent, let a perpetrator of domestic violence against the mother live in the home, exposed the child to inappropriate paramours, and asked the father to increase parenting time, and (2) the father's changed work schedule let the father increase time with the child. Thomas v. Miller, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 102 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2015).

Evidence did not preponderate against the trial court's finding that the discovery of the marijuana plant at a home shared by the husband and his paramour constituted a material change in circumstances. Holdsworth v. Holdsworth, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 974 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 10, 2015), substituted opinion, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 424 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 3, 2015).

Evidence did not preponderate against the trial court's finding that the child's maturation from two to five years old and her readiness to begin attending school constituted a material change in circumstance, but although a material change in circumstance had occurred, it did not rise to the level required for a change in the primary residential parent; each party had experienced financial difficulty, the trial court found that the father had not demonstrated any risk of harm to the child due to the presence of the mother's boyfriend, and the father waived any objection in this regard by not raising the issue. In re Jesslyn C., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 173 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2015).

Having found that a material change in circumstance had occurred that affected the child in regard to the residential schedule, the trial court was required to apply the statutory best interest factors to determine whether a modification of the residential co-parenting schedule was in the best interest of the child. In re Jesslyn C., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 173 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2015).

Trial court properly determined not to modify the parties'  parenting plan or schedule because the trial court implicitly found that a material change in circumstances had not occurred and expressly found that it was not in the children's best interests to modify the parenting schedule or plan; even if a material change had occurred, the trial court made the specific affirmative finding that the children had thrived during the parenting time schedule from the time of the divorce. Velez v. Velez, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 522 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 30, 2015).

Trial court properly denied a mother's request for a change in the primary residential parent designation because the evidence preponderated against finding a a material change in circumstance; although violation of a non-custodial parent's visitation rights could establish a material change in circumstance, the record lacked evidence that the father's violations affected the children's well-being in a meaningful way. Burnett v. Burnett, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 705 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2015).

Trial court properly denied a mother's request for a change in the primary residential parent designation because the mother failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the change in the children's education affected their well-being in a meaningful way. Burnett v. Burnett, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 705 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2015).

Subsection (a)(2)(B) contemplates that a violation of the parenting plan can constitute a material change in circumstance; however, not every such violation will rise to the level of a material change in circumstance necessary to change the primary residential parent designation. Burnett v. Burnett, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 705 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2015).

Child's testimony about her future intention to restrict her visits with the father would have been speculative, and as parenting time is modified when a material change of circumstances has occurred, not when it might occur, there was no error in the trial court's decision not to hear the child's testimony and the decision not to reduce the father's parenting time to zero for purposes of the child support calculation. Carter v. Carter, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 919 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 18, 2015), substituted opinion, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 130 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 19, 2016).

Material change in circumstances warranting a change in the parties'  residential schedule occurred because the significant change in one parent's work schedule, the parties'  admitted failure to adhere strictly to the parenting plan, and the parent's remarriage, when taken together, constituted a material change affecting the child's best interest. Remand of the case to the trial court was necessary for the court to determine whether a modification of the residential schedule was in the child's best interest. Cook v. Cook, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 960 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 20, 2015), substituted opinion, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 961 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 9, 2015).

Trial court erred by failing to find a material change in circumstances warranting a change in a residential parenting schedule based on a significant change in a father's work schedule, a failure to adhere strictly to the parenting plan, and the father's remarriage. A remand was necessary because the trial court did not engage in an analysis of the child's best interests. Cook v. Cook, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 961 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 9, 2015).

Father did not meet his burden of proving a material change in circumstances justifying a change in the primary residential parent; the child's absences and tardiness did not rise to the level of a material change in circumstances because they did not affect the child's school work, the mother's failure to comply with a parenting plan did not amount to a material change in circumstances since a “right of first refusal” provision left plenty of room for interpretation, and there was no proof that the child was lacking necessities or had otherwise been adversely impacted by the mother's income reduction. Although the lower standard for modifying a residential parenting schedule was met, the best interests of the child were not addressed. Gentile v. Gentile, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 962 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 9, 2015).

It was not an abuse of discretion to modify a parenting plan's primary residential parent designation because a father showed a material change in circumstances as the parties did not follow a parenting plan, which was the order the father sought to modify based on the mother's unanticipated move and desire to change the children's schools. Masse v. Cottar, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 202 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 21, 2016).

Trial court did not err in holding that there had not been a material change of circumstance warranting a change in the primary residential parent of the child because the father failed to demonstrate that changes affected the child's well-being in a meaningful way; not every change in a child's life or the life of his or her parents rose to the level of a material or significant change warranting a change in his or her primary residential parent. Galaway v. Galaway, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 232 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2016).

Trial court properly modified a permanent parenting plan to make the father the designated primary residential parent because a material change in circumstances was established by the mother's overall pattern of instability, moving rapidly between paramours, and engaging in illicit drug activity. Harrell v. Harrell, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 239 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 4, 2016).

Trial court erred in finding that there was a material change of circumstances so that a change of primary residential parent was in the best interest of the parties'  younger children because the court applied the standard for the modification of the residential parenting schedule, rather than the standard for the modification of the primary residential parent. Newberry v. Newberry, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 302 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 2, 2016).

Evidence did not preponderate against the finding of no material change of circumstance sufficient to justify a change in the primary residential parent; although the children had been held back in school, their grades were improving according to the mother, and poor grades alone did not necessarily constitute a material change, and although the father claimed the mother interfered with his parenting time, and the mother could not comply with the travel expense provision of the parenting plan, such did not amount to a material change of circumstance sufficient to change the primary residential parent. Wilkerson v. Wilkerson, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 349 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 19, 2016).

Given that the parents agreed at mediation that a material change of circumstance had occurred, they both testified that the parenting plan was no longer workable, and there had been additions to both parents' families and the father was no longer eligible to deploy with the Army, these changes were material, and the trial court should have considered whether a change in parenting time was in the children's best interests. Wilkerson v. Wilkerson, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 349 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 19, 2016).

Trial court held that a finding of a material change in circumstances was unnecessary when modifying a permanent parenting plan, but this threshold finding was statutorily required; in the absence of a finding of a material change by the trial court, the court reviewed the record de novo to determine where the preponderance of the evidence was Williamson v. Lamm, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 744 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2016).

Preponderance of the evidence did not establish that a material change had occurred sufficient to modify the primary residential parent, as the child's changing age did not constitute a material change, nor did testimony that the child was permitted to miss phone calls with the father and was permitted to call his stepfather “Dad.” Williamson v. Lamm, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 744 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2016).

Proof established a material change that met the lower standard required for modification of the residential parenting schedule; given the distance between the parents'  homes, the need to enroll the child in school, and the failure of the parents to reach an agreement, the alternating weekly residential schedule in the current plan was unworkable, and on remand, the trial court was to consider the statutory best interest factors. Williamson v. Lamm, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 744 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2016).

Trial court did not err in denying a father's petition to modify the parties'  parenting plan because the father failed to meet his burden to prove that a material change in circumstance occurred with respect to both the issue of primary residential parent and of visitation; while the father testified he was concerned about his daughter's use of social media and her academic performance, he failed to present evidence of any kind that the mother had failed to supervise the daughter in those areas. Kelly v. Kelly, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 779 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 19, 2016).

Trial court erred in changing the designation of the primary residential parent to the father because the evidence did not show the child's well-being had been adversely affected by the difficulties the father and mother encountered in complying with the parenting plan or that the modification was in the child's best interest; the evidence preponderated against the finding that the mother's trip to Canada or the difficulties with the father's phone visitation constituted a material change. In re Braylin D., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 81 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 7, 2017).

Juvenile court did not err in changing a child's primary residential parent from the mother to the father because a material change in circumstance occurred sufficient to warrant examining whether a change in primary residential parent was in the child's best interest; the mother's failure to adhere to the parenting plan or communicate adequately with the father when appropriate regarding the child's medical needs impacted the child's well-being in a significant manner. In re Wyatt B., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 501 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 26, 2017).

Material change in circumstances had occurred at the time the mother filed for modification of custody where parental alienation against the mother was exacerbated for one child, that child had been admitted to a psychiatric hospital, and both children expressed an extreme preference for residing with the father full-time. McClain v. McClain, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 634 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 21, 2017).

Father's request to modify a current parenting plan was properly denied where the trial testimony showed that the child was intelligent, affectionate with both parents, polite, well-mannered, excelling in school, and well-rounded socially, and thus, there was no showing that the mother's violations of the parenting plan affected the child's well-being. Ballard v. Cayabas, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 683 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 12, 2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support a finding of a material change in circumstance warranting that the mother become the children's primary residential parent, including a change in the parents'  work schedules where the mother was home more and the father was not available during the day, the father's failure to comply with the parenting plan, and his lack of attention to the children's medical needs. Wilson v. Phillips, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 747 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 15, 2017).

Court of Appeals erred in reversing a juvenile court and in awarding custody of the parties'  minor children to the mother because both courts agreed that the mother's hostility toward the father constituted a material change in circumstance, the mother's filing of a “sur-reply” brief to the father's reply brief was not allowed, the juvenile court properly applied the statutory factors governing the children's best interests, and the Court of Appeals erred in mandating an immediate change in custody without giving the father an opportunity to appeal. C.W.H. v. L.A.S., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 825 (Tenn. Dec. 19, 2017).

Trial court properly determined that the father's move from Alabama to Florida amounted to a material change in circumstances, as the parents could no longer meet halfway between their residences to exchange the children and the children had to fly back and forth for each visit and the children had become involved in more school and extracurricular activities as they got older. Irvin v. Irvin, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 8, 2018).

Mother did not meet the mother's burden for modification of a primary residential parent or a residential parenting schedule because (1) the mother admitted the mother could receive the children's educational and medical information, (2) the mother did not show the mother's new job significantly affected the mother's parenting or made the current parenting plan unworkable, and (3) proof as to the mother's new home did not address a parenting impact. Null v. Cummins, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 480 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 17, 2018).

Although the father argued that the trial court's finding of a material change in circumstance was implicit in its decision to modify the father's child support obligation, the court disagreed; it does not follow that an obligor parent's increased income, warranting an upward modification of child support, would result in a material change of circumstance affecting the best interest of the children in such a way as to establish an increased burden on the primary residential parent. Pierce v. Pierce, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 671 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 19, 2018).

Trial court properly denied a father's request to revise the permanent parenting plan because, while there was a significant change that affected the father's parenting, it did not affect it in a manner that the case law required inasmuch as he failed to prove that his eating and sleeping habits, the flexibility of his employment, or the relationship with the step-mother affected the child's well being in a meaningful way, the changes were present or occurring at the time of the original petition to modify, and were considered during the prior agreement between the parties. Akins v. Akins, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 337 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 3, 2019).

Material change of circumstance did not require modification of an agreed parenting plan, which was incorporated into a final decree of divorce, because it appeared that the only circumstance that changed between the entry of the final decree and the filing of the mother's petition for modification was the birth of the mother's child with someone other than the mother's former spouse. Hartmann v. Hartmann, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 435 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 4, 2019).

Juvenile court did not err in finding that the mother failed to show a material change of circumstance warranting a change of the primary residential parent designation from the father to herself because the father had not interfered with the mother's parenting time as the circuit court and juvenile court imposed limitations on her contact with the child, not the father, after he observed problems with the child's behavior at school or at home that he believed stemmed from the child's interactions with the mother. Gider v. Hubbell, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 303 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 1, 2020).

41. Burden of Proof.

Because the trial court failed to delineate between the burden of proof for modification of custody and the burden of proof for modification of parenting schedule, the trial court's order was vacated; the father sought a change in custody, and thus his burden of proof to show a material change in circumstance was greater than the mother's, who sought only a modification of the parenting schedule. In mischaracterizing the parties'  averments as stipulations, the trial court failed to enforce the parties'  respective burdens of proof. Tutor v. Tutor, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 108 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 10, 2020).

Reversal of trial court's ruling excusing a father from proving a material change in circumstances due to the young age of the child if the father sought a change in parenting time in the future was appropriate because, even if the father only sought a change in the residential parenting schedule, the father had to prove by a preponderance of the evidence a material change of circumstance affecting the child's best interest. Knipper v. Enfinger, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 393 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2020).

36-6-102. Custody, visitation and inheritance rights denied to parent convicted of rape where child conceived from crime — Exception — Child support obligation.

  1. Except as provided in subsection (b), any person who has been convicted of aggravated rape pursuant to § 39-13-502, rape pursuant to § 39-13-503, or rape of a child pursuant to § 39-13-522, from which crime a child was conceived shall not have custody or visitation rights, or the rights of inheritance with respect to that child.
  2. The other parent of the child may waive the protection afforded under subsection (a) regarding visitation and request that the court grant reasonable visitation rights with the child if paternity has been acknowledged.
  3. Unless waived by the other parent and, if contributing toward support of the child, the department of human services, a court shall establish a child support obligation against the father of the child pursuant to chapter 5, part 1 of this title.

Acts 2015, ch. 167, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Former § 36-6-102 (Acts 1983, ch. 297, § 1; T.C.A., § 36-828; Acts 1988, ch. 670, § 1; 1994, ch. 969, §§ 1, 2), concerning custody preference of child, was repealed by Acts 1995, ch. 428, § 1, effective June 12, 1995. For new law, see § 36-6-106.

Act 2015, ch. 167, § 2 provided that the act, which enacted this section, shall apply to custody determinations made on or after July 1, 2015.

36-6-103. Child's medical records.

    1. A copy of a child's medical records shall be furnished by the treating physician or treating hospital upon a written request by any of the following:
      1. The noncustodial parent;
      2. In the case of parents having joint custody of a child, the parent with whom the child is not residing; or
      3. In the case of a child in the custody of a legal guardian, then either parent.
    2. Such request must contain the current address of the requesting party.
    3. Upon receiving such a request, the treating physician or hospital shall send a copy of the medical records to the requesting party unless furnished with a court order closing the records.
    4. All expenses for records shall be paid by the requesting party.
  1. Any judge having jurisdiction over the custody of such child may close the medical records of the child to the requesting parent upon a showing that the best interests of the child will be harmed if the records are released.

Acts 1987, ch. 237, § 1; 1989, ch. 381, § 1.

36-6-104. Copy of child's school records — Furnishing to noncustodial or nonresident parents.

  1. Any parent who does not have custody of a child, or in the case of parents having joint custody of a child, the parent not residing with the child, or in the case of a child in the custody of a legal guardian, both parents, may request, in writing, that a copy of the child's report card, notice of school attendance, names of teachers, class schedules, standardized test scores and any other records customarily available to parents be furnished directly to such noncustodial or nonresident parent, and such request shall be accompanied by the parent's or parents' current mailing address, and the local education agency (LEA) shall send a copy of the report card, notice of school attendance, names of teachers, class schedules, standardized test scores and any other records customarily available to parents to such address.
  2. The LEA shall provide proof of a child's graduation from high school to the department of human services, the department's contractor, or either of the child's parents within twenty (20) business days of the department's, the department's contractor, or the parent's or parents' written request for such proof. The LEA shall not include any information that would violate any provisions protecting the child's privacy, or § 36-5-101(c)(2)(B)(iv).
  3. Any judge having jurisdiction over the custody of such a child may, upon a showing of good cause, deny any information concerning the residence of the child to the noncustodial or nonresident parent.

Acts 1986, ch. 579, § 1; 1987, ch. 372, §§ 1, 2; 1997, ch. 351, § 2; 2004, ch. 906, § 4.

Code Commission Notes.

The statutory provisions of this section are similar to those found in § 49-6-902 and have been set out here as an aid to the code user.

Cross-References. Copy of child's report card, furnishing to noncustodial parents, § 49-6-902.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Education of Child.

The decision to determine which school a child should attend usually rests with the custodial parent. Lewis v. Lewis, 741 S.W.2d 900, 1987 Tenn. App. LEXIS 2803 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987).

36-6-105. Schools or day care centers — Change in physical custody of child.

No school official shall permit a change in the physical custody of a child at such official's school or day care center unless:

  1. The person seeking custody of the child presents the school official with a certified copy of a valid court order from a Tennessee court placing custody of such child in such person; and
  2. The person seeking custody gives the school official reasonable advance notice of such person's intent to take custody of such child at such official's school or day care center.

Acts 1992, ch. 963, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 1992, ch. 963, § 2 provided that this section applies to each order changing child custody on or after July 1, 1992.

Cross-References. Custodial interference, § 39-13-306.

36-6-106. Child custody.

  1. In a suit for annulment, divorce, separate maintenance, or in any other proceeding requiring the court to make a custody determination regarding a minor child, the determination shall be made on the basis of the best interest of the child. In taking into account the child’s best interest, the court shall order a custody arrangement that permits both parents to enjoy the maximum participation possible in the life of the child consistent with the factors set out in this subsection (a), the location of the residences of the parents, the child’s need for stability and all other relevant factors. The court shall consider all relevant factors, including the following, where applicable:
    1. The strength, nature, and stability of the child's relationship with each parent, including whether one (1) parent has performed the majority of parenting responsibilities relating to the daily needs of the child;
    2. Each parent's or caregiver's past and potential for future performance of parenting responsibilities, including the willingness and ability of each of the parents and caregivers to facilitate and encourage a close and continuing parent-child relationship between the child and both of the child's parents, consistent with the best interest of the child. In determining the willingness of each of the parents and caregivers to facilitate and encourage a close and continuing parent-child relationship between the child and both of the child's parents, the court shall consider the likelihood of each parent and caregiver to honor and facilitate court ordered parenting arrangements and rights, and the court shall further consider any history of either parent or any caregiver denying parenting time to either parent in violation of a court order;
    3. Refusal to attend a court ordered parent education seminar may be considered by the court as a lack of good faith effort in these proceedings;
    4. The disposition of each parent to provide the child with food, clothing, medical care, education and other necessary care;
    5. The degree to which a parent has been the primary caregiver, defined as the parent who has taken the greater responsibility for performing parental responsibilities;
    6. The love, affection, and emotional ties existing between each parent and the child;
    7. The emotional needs and developmental level of the child;
    8. The moral, physical, mental and emotional fitness of each parent as it relates to their ability to parent the child. The court may order an examination of a party under Rule 35 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure and, if necessary for the conduct of the proceedings, order the disclosure of confidential mental health information of a party under § 33-3-105(3). The court order required by § 33-3-105(3) must contain a qualified protective order that limits the dissemination of confidential protected mental health information to the purpose of the litigation pending before the court and provides for the return or destruction of the confidential protected mental health information at the conclusion of the proceedings;
    9. The child's interaction and interrelationships with siblings, other relatives and step-relatives, and mentors, as well as the child's involvement with the child's physical surroundings, school, or other significant activities;
    10. The importance of continuity in the child's life and the length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory environment;
    11. Evidence of physical or emotional abuse to the child, to the other parent or to any other person. The court shall, where appropriate, refer any issues of abuse to juvenile court for further proceedings;
    12. The character and behavior of any other person who resides in or frequents the home of a parent and such person's interactions with the child;
    13. The reasonable preference of the child if twelve (12) years of age or older. The court may hear the preference of a younger child upon request. The preference of older children should normally be given greater weight than those of younger children;
    14. Each parent's employment schedule, and the court may make accommodations consistent with those schedules; and
    15. Any other factors deemed relevant by the court.
  2. Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, the court has jurisdiction to make an initial custody determination regarding a minor child or may modify a prior order of child custody upon finding that the custodial parent has been convicted of or found civilly liable for the intentional and wrongful death of the child's other parent or legal guardian.
  3. As used in this section, “caregiver” has the meaning ascribed to that term in § 37-5-501.
  4. Nothing in subsections (a) and (c) shall be construed to affect or diminish the constitutional rights of parents that may arise during and are inherent in custody proceedings.
  5. The disability of a parent seeking custody shall not create a presumption for or against awarding custody to such a party but may be a factor to be considered by the court.
  6. If the petitioner knows whether a child has ever been adjudicated by a court as a dependent and neglected or abused child or whether any party to the action has ever been adjudicated by a court as the perpetrator of dependency and neglect or abuse of a minor child, any petition regarding child custody shall include an affirmative statement setting out all applicable adjudications. If an adjudication has occurred as a result of a child protective services investigation, the court may order the department of children's services to disclose information regarding the investigation to protect the child from abuse or neglect consistent with § 37-1-612(h). The court shall consider any such information as a factor in determining the child's best interest.

Acts 1995, ch. 428, § 2; 1998, ch. 1003, § 1; 1998, ch. 1095, §§ 2, 3; 2000, ch. 683, § 2; 2007, ch. 245, §§ 1-3; 2011, ch. 433, § 1; 2012, ch. 897, § 1; 2013, ch. 220, § 1; 2013, ch. 385, § 1; 2014, ch. 617, § 4; 2016, ch. 1074, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2000, ch. 683, § 4 provided that subsection (b) shall apply to all proceedings and petitions pending on May 8, 2000, and all arising on or after May 8, 2000.

Acts 2012, ch. 897, § 2 provided that the act, which amended subdivision (a)(10), shall apply to all custody determinations on or after July 1, 2012.

For the Preamble to the act concerning custody determinations involving disabled parents, please refer to Acts 2013, ch. 385.

For the Preamble to the act concerning domestic relations, please refer to Acts 2014, ch. 617.

Acts 2016, ch. 1074, § 2 provided that the act, which amended this section, shall apply to  custody determinations made on or after July 1, 2016.

Rule Reference. This section is referred to in Rule 40 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Tennessee.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 14 Tenn. Juris., Divorce and Alimony § 31; 20 Tenn. Juris., Parent and Child, §§ 2, 5, 6.

Law Reviews.

Adoption and Custody: Current Trends in Tennessee Family Law: Bridge Over Troubled Water: Changing the Custody Laws in Tennessee, 27 U. Mem. L. Rev. 769 (1997).

Alternative Dispute Resolution- Tuetken v. Tuetken: Reinforcing the Duty of the Court to Protect the Best Interests of the Child (Joshua Baker), 42 U. Mem. L. Rev. 831 (2012).

Best Interest of the Child? A Critique of Judicially Sanctioned Arguments Denying Child Custody to Gays and Lesbians, 68 Tenn. L. Rev. 361 (2001).

Covenant Marriage: Should Tennessee Join the Noble Experiment?, 29 U. Mem. L. Rev. 397 (1999).

Family Matter: Helping Children Endure Divorce (Marlene Eskind Moses), 49 Tenn. B.J. 34 (2013).

Family Matters: Modification of Permanent Parenting Plans In Tennessee, 49 Tenn. B.J. 27 (2013).

Mother May I…Live? Parental Refusal of Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment for Children Based on Religious Objections, 66 Tenn. L. Rev. 499 (1999).

The Art of Having Three Biological Parents, 50 Tenn. B.J. 36 (2014).

When a Child's Best Interests Are At Issue: Privacy of Mental Health Records In Divorce and Custody Proceedings, 49 Tenn. B.J. 21 (2013).

“Where Have You Been Fran?” The Right of Siblings to Seek Court Access To Override Parental Denial of Visitation, 66 Tenn. L. Rev. 977 (1999).

Attorney General Opinions. Standard of proof in child custody cases, OAG 96-068, 1996 Tenn. AG LEXIS 66 (4/10/96).

Obtaining a parent’s mental-health information in child-custody cases. OAG 14-55, 2014 Tenn. AG Lexis 57 (5/14/14)

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Change in Custody.

If a child is under 14 years of age the court may, but is not required to, consider the preference of the child as a factor in determining whether to order a change in custody. Harris v. Harris, 832 S.W.2d 352, 1992 Tenn. App. LEXIS 116 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992) (decided under prior law).

If there has not been a material change in circumstances, the court is not required to make a best interest determination and must deny the request for a change of custody. Caudill v. Foley, 21 S.W.3d 203, 1999 Tenn. App. LEXIS 730 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999).

Where one parent's change of custody request did not allege that the parties' joint custody arrangement had become unworkable, but rather the request appeared to have been triggered by the other parent's intention to relocate with the child, the trial court's finding of a material change in circumstances was contrary to the preponderance of the evidence. Caudill v. Foley, 21 S.W.3d 203, 1999 Tenn. App. LEXIS 730 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999).

Court did not err by denying a father's request for custody where the father did not raise the issue of custody until after six days of hearings regarding visitation, he repeatedly stated that custody was not an issue, and a change in custody would have a potentially negative effect on the child. Woodroof v. Fisher, 180 S.W.3d 542, 2005 Tenn. App. LEXIS 169 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 813 (Tenn. Oct. 3, 2005).

Court rejected a mother's argument that finding a material change in circumstances based on one parent reporting the other for suspected child sexual abuse was against public policy because anyone, including a parent, was required by law to report a child's accusations of sexual abuse to the appropriate authorities; any concern about reporting allegations of child sexual abuse had to be balanced with the awareness that false accusations of such abuse can be a “reprehensible tool” against an ex-spouse, remarkable for its “brutal effectiveness.” Keisling v. Keisling, 196 S.W.3d 703, 2005 Tenn. App. LEXIS 747 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 474 (Tenn. 2006).

Court affirmed trial court's decision to change custody where the trial court found that the false accusations of sexual abuse constituted a material change of circumstances which required a change of custody and that the change was in the best interest of the children pursuant to T.C.A. § 36-6-106(a); the continued conduct by the mother and grandparents was clearly harmful to the children and their relationship with the father. Keisling v. Keisling, 196 S.W.3d 703, 2005 Tenn. App. LEXIS 747 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 474 (Tenn. 2006).

Mother's pattern of behavior constituted a material change in circumstance warranting custody modification because her decision to associate with her boyfriend, to engage in volatile behavior with the boyfriend at her home with her three-year-old child present, and to continue an intimate relationship with her boyfriend indicated a pattern of poor decision making, and the court could not rely on the mother's alcohol and drug assessment because she had self-reported to the counselor a lower use of alcohol than the other evidence would indicate. Muhonen v. Muhonen, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 78 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 20, 2015).

Trial court did not err in changing the designation of the primary residential parent from the mother to the father because the evidence did not preponderate against its findings of the factors that favored the father; the mother's parents took care of the child while the mother was at work, and the parents'  health created a legitimate concern that affected the mother's ability to provide a stable and satisfactory environment for the child. In re Jayden C., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 142 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 23, 2015).

Trial court did not err in changing the designation of the primary residential parent from the mother to the father because the evidence did not preponderate against its findings that the father was in a better position to provide the child with a stable, satisfactory environment and that the father had a structured job that allowed him to be home with the child each evening, while the mother's work schedule required her to rely on her parents to care for the child during the week. In re Jayden C., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 142 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 23, 2015).

Preponderance of the evidence supported the trial court's finding that modification of the residential parenting schedule was in the child's best interest because the father consumed alcohol when he recognized the risk, and the father consumed alcohol to excess and denied it. Davis v. Hood, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 459 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 30, 2016).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in modifying a permanent parental plan to make a father the primary residential parent and decrease the mother's time with the parties'  child because, following the parties'  divorce, the mother showed a marked inability to facilitate the child's relationship with the father and the father's family as the mother engaged in a pattern of angry and hostile conduct toward the father and stepmother that interfered with the father's ability to parent the child and caused the child anxiety, fear, and distress. Fiala v. Fiala, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 556 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 21, 2018).

2. Basis for Determination of Custody.

Chancellor erred in basing his custody determination solely upon the testimony of the minor child. Harris v. Harris, 832 S.W.2d 352, 1992 Tenn. App. LEXIS 116 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992) (decided under prior law).

Trial court did not err in awarding custody to father based on wife's boyfriend's conduct, which gave rise to a reasonable inference that wife's continued exercise of her custodial rights in her boyfriend's household would severely limit, and adversely affect, husband's relationship with his child. Rice v. Rice, 983 S.W.2d 680, 1998 Tenn. App. LEXIS 219 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998), review or rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 1999 Tenn. LEXIS 8 (Tenn. 1999).

In considering all relevant circumstances, a court may not consider the effects or alleged effects of racial prejudice. Parker v. Parker, 986 S.W.2d 557, 1999 Tenn. LEXIS 126 (Tenn. 1999).

Tennessee courts have based modification of child custody decrees on the following criteria: the character of the custodian, the conduct of the custodian, and the child's welfare. Hoalcraft v. Smithson, 19 S.W.3d 822, 1999 Tenn. App. LEXIS 825 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999).

The child's preference is only one factor to be considered in deciding which parent acquires custody of the child. Hoalcraft v. Smithson, 19 S.W.3d 822, 1999 Tenn. App. LEXIS 825 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999).

There was no evidence that the husband was an unfit parent; however, such a finding was not necessary to award custody to the wife, whom the trial court found was the more fit parent. Lee v. Lee, 66 S.W.3d 837, 2001 Tenn. App. LEXIS 465 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001).

In a divorce action, where the mother testified as to her relationship with and ability to care for the parties' infant, the father offered no evidence regarding the factors under T.C.A. § 36-6-106(a) except for the testimony of a woman who saw him three times with the child, and the trial court in its opinion noted that it was in the best position to evaluate the credibility of the parties, a judgment awarding primary residential custody of the child to the mother was affirmed on appeal. Buss-Flinn v. Flinn, 121 S.W.3d 383, 2003 Tenn. App. LEXIS 351 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 1032 (Tenn. 2003).

Mother was properly designated as primary residential parent of the parties'  child where the trial court appropriately weighed all of the relevant factors as required under T.C.A. § 36-6-106; the father was averse to traditional healthcare and preferred home schooling, the mother was more willing to facilitate and encourage a close and continuing parent-child relationship between the father and their child while the father's intent was to never again allow the mother to see or communicate with their child, and the father had refused to allow the mother to see the child for ten months. Chaffin v. Ellis, 211 S.W.3d 264, 2006 Tenn. App. LEXIS 200 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 867 (Tenn. 2006).

In a child custody case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding primary parenting responsibility to the mother; there was no evidence that the trial court applied the tender years doctrine, and the evidence did not preponderate against the trial court's finding that the mother had repented of her prior attempts to interfere with the relationship between the father and the child. The trial court gave careful attention to the proof presented and reached its decision after appropriate analysis of such proof in the context of all relevant factors, including those set forth at T.C.A. § 36-6-106(a); the trial court found that, while both the mother and the father were comparatively fit, the child had resided with the mother since he was born, and the mother had provided a stable and satisfactory environment for the child and he had thrived in her home. Hodson v. Griffin, 210 S.W.3d 568, 2006 Tenn. App. LEXIS 399 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006), appeal denied, — S.W.3d—, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 1021 (Tenn. 2006).

Modification of the parties'  parenting plan in favor of the mother was appropriate because the trial court was justifiably concerned by the self-centered behavior and character of the father's new wife, and the willingness of the father to allow the new wife to alienate the children from their mother by trying to assume that role for herself. Marlow v. Parkinson, 236 S.W.3d 744, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 243 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 23, 2007), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 867 (Tenn. Sept. 17, 2007).

Designation of the wife as the primary residential parent of the parties'  two minor children was proper under T.C.A. §§ 36-6-106(a) and 36-6-404(b) because of the husband's prolonged abuse of the wife and because the daughter alleged abuse against her and there was also evidence that the husband failed to ensure that the son received his medication for a life-threatening medical condition. Mayfield v. Mayfield, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 40 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 17, 2012), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 395 S.W.3d 108, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 876 (Tenn. Dec. 3, 2012).

Trial court established a parenting schedule without identifying the legal principles applied or the factual basis, and thus the trial court failed to satisfy the rule's mandate; no evidence to support a finding that either parent was better suited to have substantially more parenting time than the other, and given this, and the fact that the General Assembly has established the aspirational goal for the courts to maximize each parent's participation in the life of the child, the judgment was reversed and the case was remanded with instructions. Gooding v. Gooding, 477 S.W.3d 774, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 276 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 29, 2015).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in naming the mother the primary residential parent and awarding equal parenting time because both parties were allowed to enjoy the maximum participation possible in the life of the child; the trial court determined that the mother's desire to have more parenting time with the child was unreasonable, and the result was not outside the spectrum of rulings that reasonably resulted from applying the correct legal standards to the evidence. Spencer v. Spencer, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 149 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 25, 2016).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding a father primary custody of the parties'  children because the trial court noted that the mother had unilaterally restricted the father's parenting time in the past and that the mother would not facilitate a relationship with the father if the mother was designated the primary residential parent. The trial court also expressed concern over the mother's emotional stability in contrast to the father's calm, rational, organized, and clear demeanor. Pack v. Rothchild, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 492 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 21, 2017).

Evidence supported award to a father of most of the visitation time with the parties'  daughter because the daughter's relationship with the father was stronger than the daughter's volatile relationship with the mother, the father had become the primary caregiver, and the daughter preferred living with the father. The evidence supported the award to both parties of 50/50 visitation with the parties'  son, with the father to make the major decisions for the son except religion, because the father appeared to be a comparatively more stable parent. Carter v. Carter, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 452 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 7, 2018).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in designating a father the primary residential parent and in limiting the mother to supervised visitation because, although it was unclear which version of the statute the court used in making its child-custody determination, the court enumerated sufficient factual findings to support a conclusion that its holding was in the minor child's best interest. Additionally, the evidence did not preponderate against the finding that the mother's mental-health condition placed the child in persistent danger. In re M.M., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 295 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 11, 2019).

3. Best Interests Analysis.

The best interest rule trumps all other custody principles, including the one generally disfavoring separation of siblings. Rice v. Rice, 983 S.W.2d 680, 1998 Tenn. App. LEXIS 219 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998), review or rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 1999 Tenn. LEXIS 8 (Tenn. 1999).

If there has not been a material change in circumstances, the court is not required to make a best interest determination and must deny the request for a change of custody. Caudill v. Foley, 21 S.W.3d 203, 1999 Tenn. App. LEXIS 730 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999).

As the mother had deliberately interfered with the father's visitation rights by interfering and monitoring the children's telephone conversations with their father and refusing to allow the children to speak with the father on the telephone, and by refusing to speak with the father, refusing to provide him with relevant information about the children, and making derogatory remarks about him in front of the children, the state supreme court found that a material change in circumstances existed that made a change in custody in the children's best interests. Cranston v. Combs, 106 S.W.3d 641, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 540 (Tenn. 2003).

Because of the negative influence a father's drinking had on his young son, the trial court did not err when it ordered the parents not to drink alcohol when they were in possession of their child, because having both parents abstain from drinking alcohol when in possession of their child was in the child's best interest. Buckles v. Riggs, 106 S.W.3d 668, 2003 Tenn. App. LEXIS 24 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 474 (Tenn. May 19, 2003).

Court did not err in awarding primary custodial care to a father where he admitted his shortcomings and had been actively seeking outside assistance to improve his parenting skills, the separation of two siblings was in their best interests as one sibling exhibited aggressive behavior towards the other, and the parenting plan allowed for the children to spend every weekend together and granted both parents liberal visitation rights. Shofner v. Shofner, 181 S.W.3d 703, 2004 Tenn. App. LEXIS 865 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004), rehearing denied, 181 S.W.3d 703, 2005 Tenn. App. LEXIS 854 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005), appeal denied, Shofner v. Kalisz, — S.W.3d —, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 943 (Tenn. Oct. 24, 2005).

Finding in favor of the mother in the parties'  dispute involving child support and custody was proper pursuant to T.C.A. § 36-6-106(a) because the supreme court, on review of the record, found no reason to alter the determination concerning the bests interests of the children; it was determined that both parents were good parents and joint custody was in order, with the mother being the primary custodial parent. In re C.K.G., 173 S.W.3d 714, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 812 (Tenn. 2005).

Court properly denied a father's request to modify child custody where the court found that the parties remained “at war,” they had been in court 35 times over the child's custody, the parties lacked a “cooperative spirit,” and therefore an award of joint custody was inappropriate under the circumstances. Hooker v. Johnson (In re M.J.H.), 196 S.W.3d 731, 2005 Tenn. App. LEXIS 787 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005), appeal denied, In re M. J. H., — S.W.3d —, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 547 (Tenn. June 5, 2006).

Court properly denied a father's motion to modify child custody because the children's best interests were served by remaining in the custody of the mother where the mother's bipolar disorder posed no threat to the children, they thrived while in her custody and care, and if the father were awarded custody it was unlikely that the mother would ever have a decent relationship with any of the children because of the father's repeated attempts to thwart such a relationship. Kellett v. Stuart, 206 S.W.3d 8, 2006 Tenn. App. LEXIS 212 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 916 (Tenn. 2006).

Change of child custody was in the child's best interests, because the evidence showed that the mother intentionally interfered with the father's visitation with his son, failed to adhere to the terms of the parenting plan, and was unwilling to encourage or facilitate a close and continuing relationship between the father and his son; the father was permitted to visit with his young son only at the house of the mother's family or in the driveway, and they were basically forced to sit in the father's truck or to play in the gravel driveway for the entire visitation period. In re T.C.D., 261 S.W.3d 734, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 802 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 27, 2007), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2008 Tenn. LEXIS 457 (Tenn. June 23, 2008).

Judgment naming grandparents as the guardians of a child was affirmed because the grandparents had priority pursuant to T.C.A. § 34-2-103 as the deceased father left no valid will and the evidence on the best interest analysis under T.C.A. § 36-6-106 pointed to the grandparents remaining as the child's guardians. In re R.D.M., 306 S.W.3d 731, 2009 Tenn. App. LEXIS 556 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 18, 2009), appeal denied, In re Rory M., — S.W.3d —, 2010 Tenn. LEXIS 338 (Tenn. Mar. 1, 2010).

Evidence did not preponderate against a trial court's findings that a child's paternal grandparents were fit, that they were capable of providing for the child financially, and that the child's best interests would be served by granting their petition to adopt her pursuant to T.C.A. § 36-1-120(a)(10), (11), (13); the best interests of the child were considered based on the statutory factors pursuant to T.C.A. § 36-6-106(a). In re Sidney J., 313 S.W.3d 772, 2010 Tenn. LEXIS 433 (Tenn. May 10, 2010).

In a dependency and neglect case, the finding that the child was dependent and neglected and that the child's best interests were served by remaining in the custody of his maternal uncle and aunt was proper because the trial court set forth a 22-page judgment that clearly detailed its findings of fact and conclusions of law. The court determined both that the child was dependent and neglected and that it was in his best interest to remain in the custody of the aunt and uncle; the father's arguments placed form over substance and ignored the overwhelming and articulated reasons for the trial court's judgment, T.C.A. § 36-6-106(a). In re Caleb L. C., 362 S.W.3d 581, 2011 Tenn. App. LEXIS 225 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 4, 2011), appeal denied, In re Caleb L.C., — S.W.3d —, 2011 Tenn. LEXIS 789 (Tenn. Aug. 25, 2011).

Trial court erred in adopting a mother's proposed permanent parenting plan because the trial court focused almost entirely on the father's alleged need for the companionship of the child, rather than the issue of whether the child's best interests were furthered by enrolling her in preschool, T.C.A. §§ 36-6-401 and 36-6-404(b); there was no basis for the trial court to restrict the father's parenting time so as to accommodate preschool. Rountree v. Rountree, 369 S.W.3d 122, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 69 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 1, 2012), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 355 (Tenn. May 16, 2012).

As the determination of the best interests of the children in a parental termination proceeding required consideration of a different set of factors than those that were considered in a prior custody and grandparent visitation proceeding, the doctrine of collateral estoppel was inapplicable because the issues in the two cases were not identical. In re B. W., 397 S.W.3d 105, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 199 (Tenn. Feb. 21, 2013).

Trial court properly found that modification of the residential parenting schedule to increase the father's time with the children from 85 days to 143 days was in the children's best interest. The trial court preserved, to the extent possible, the original residential parenting schedule, and it also structured the schedule so that it reflected the way the father and the mother had already been cooperating with each other to afford the father additional time. Armbrister v. Armbrister, 414 S.W.3d 685, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 782 (Tenn. Oct. 21, 2013).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion by determining that a permanent parenting plan, which did not award a father any parenting time and conditioned any future parenting time on recommendations by the children's therapists, was in the children's best interests because there was sufficient evidence of the father's pattern of emotional abuse of the children, T.C.A. §§ 36-6-106(a), 36-6-404(b) (see now 36-6-106(a)), 36-6-406(a)(2); the father had a history of becoming verbally and physically aggressive with the children. Beyer v. Beyer, 428 S.W.3d 59, 2013 Tenn. App. LEXIS 229 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 5, 2013), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 827 (Tenn. Oct. 16, 2013).

Evidence clearly preponderated against the trial court's best interest finding as to the custody of the parties' son as the 15-year-old son unequivocally testified that he wished to remain with his father, the evidence showed that the son and the husband had a positive bond and relationship, and there was a need for the son to have stability following years of movement and the turbulence created by his parents' marital discord. Kelly v. Kelly, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. App. LEXIS 514 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 6, 2013), modified, 445 S.W.3d 685, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 664 (Tenn. Sept. 10, 2014).

Appellate court erred by reversing a trial court's custody decision because, while the telephonic testimony of a school counselor inhibited a trial court's ability to gauge her credibility, the trial court was better-situated to gauge her credibility than the appellate court, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in designating the mother as the child's primary residential parent where it found that the best interests of the child outweighed his own preference. Kelly v. Kelly, 445 S.W.3d 685, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 664 (Tenn. Sept. 10, 2014).

Juvenile court's judgment entering a permanent parenting plan designating the father as the children's primary residential parent was vacated where nothing in the record indicated that the court had conducted a best interest analysis, as required by T.C.A. § 36-6-106(a), and the reviewing court refused to overlook that absence and search for evidence in the record to support the juvenile court's decision. Hendricks v. Smith, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 9 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 8, 2015).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the children's best interest would not be served in granting the father custody, as the father's behavior was calculated to manipulate the children's love an affection and was emotionally damaging to the children and the father would not be willing to facilitate and encourage a close relationship between the mother and the children. In re Tyler P., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 32 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 27, 2015).

Trial court in a guardianship proceeding for a child upon the death of one of the child's parents erred in awarding a maternal grandparent guardianship of the child because the court did not first conduct a thorough best interest analysis. In re Taylour L., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 42 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 29, 2015).

Decision that it was not in a child's best interest to change the primary residential parent was proper, as the court considered the effect on the child's physical and emotional safety of a incident in which the mother slapped the child and did not appear to have found abuse. Zahn v. Logan, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 54 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 2, 2015).

Change in custody was in the child's best interests because the trial court found an instability in the mother's family, the mother had emotional ill health, the mother emotionally abused the child, the mother's boyfriend had a bad character and erratic behavior, and the father had a greater potential for future performance of parenting responsibilities. Muhonen v. Muhonen, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 78 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 20, 2015).

Having examined the evidence with respect to all of the statutory factors, the evidence did not preponderate against the trial court's determination that it was in the child's best interest for the wife to be the primary residential parent; certain factors were not applicable, certain factors favored both parties, and others favored the wife, including the factor on evidence of abuse to her by the husband. Olson v. Beck, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 99 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2015).

Having found that a material change in circumstance had occurred that affected the child in regard to the residential schedule, the trial court was required to apply the statutory best interest factors to determine whether a modification of the residential co-parenting schedule was in the best interest of the child. In re Jesslyn C., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 173 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2015).

Trial court set forth clear parameters for the co-parenting residential schedule, and while the trial court did not in its final judgment set forth a factor-by-factor analysis of its consideration of the child's best interest in formulating the modification to the co-parenting residential schedule, the trial court properly addressed the continuity of care each parent could provide, the approximately equal difficulty each parent had experienced financially in maintaining a stable home, and the presence of others in each home, and trial court carefully considered the applicable factors to modify the schedule. In re Jesslyn C., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 173 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2015).

Certain best interest factors weighed in the mother's favor, as she had been the child's primary caregiver, her family unit was stable, and the child thrived in her home; the father offered no proof demonstrating his parental fitness and ability, the mother offered evidence showing the father's prior drug use, inadequate supervision of the child, and inappropriate communications with the mother, and there was no abuse of discretion in the award of 80 days of residential parenting time to the father. In re Jake S., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 277 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 29, 2015).

Modification of a child's parenting time schedule was in the child's best interests because it was reasonable to infer the child's mother had purposely inconvenienced the father's exercise of parenting time. Leonardo v. Leonardo, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 486 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 18, 2015), modified, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 943 (Tenn. Nov. 24, 2015).

Trial court did not list and discuss each of the statutory factors, but the trial court was not required to do so; the statute requires the court to consider all of the listed factors that are applicable, but the statute does not require the court, in its memorandum opinion or final judgment, to list each applicable factor along with its conclusion as to how that particular factor impacted the overall judgment. Whitten v. Whitten, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 487 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 18, 2015).

Trial court, after its best interests analysis, did not abuse its discretion in designating the father as the primary residential parent of the children; the record supported the findings in part that the mother was unreasonable and confrontational, had attempted to alienate the father's parents from the children, and had a temper and volatility for which the trial court recommended counseling. Whitten v. Whitten, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 487 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 18, 2015).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that a change in the primary residential parent from the mother to the father was not in the child's best interest because each parent presented a different version of the facts, and the trial court necessarily relied upon its assessment of the parties'  credibility, concluding the mother's intentions were not to alienate the father and the child. Watson v. Myers, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 826 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 7, 2015), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 149 (Tenn. Feb. 18, 2016).

Juvenile court properly found that it was in a child's best interests to designate the father as primary residential parent because it considered the statutory factors and found that, while some of the factors weighed equally in favor of both parents, not one weighed in favor of the mother, the father put the interests of the child as his top priority, whereas the mother's interest appeared to be one of convenience, additionally, the court expressed concern with the mother's ability to effectively co-parent. In re William K., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 857 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 20, 2015).

Trial court erred by failing to find a material change in circumstances warranting a change in a residential parenting schedule based on a significant change in a father's work schedule, a failure to adhere strictly to the parenting plan, and the father's remarriage. A remand was necessary because the trial court did not engage in an analysis of the child's best interests. Cook v. Cook, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 961 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 9, 2015).

Children's best interest was considered when modifying a parenting plan's designation of a primary residential parent because the court considered statutory factors and found (1) the father provided continuity, stability, and a satisfactory environment for the children during the mother's moves, and (2) the children did well in the children's current schools. Masse v. Cottar, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 202 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 21, 2016).

Best interest of the children was served by the modification of a permanent parenting plan to make the father the primary residential parent as the father offered more stability for the children, while the mother engaged in illicit drug activity and showed a marked instability in her moving both herself and the children between paramours. Harrell v. Harrell, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 239 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 4, 2016).

Although the relocation statute did not apply in this case, the juvenile court applied the correct standard, best interest of the child, in its determination that the child should remain in Tennessee. In re Lukas S.-M., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 463 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 30, 2016).

Court's ability to deal with the best interests issue was hampered by the absence of a full transcript, and in the event that no full transcript was available, it was incumbent on the mother to prepare a statement conveying a complete account of what transpired; because no such account was available, it had to be assumed that the record contained sufficient evidence to support the trial court's factual findings, and thus the judgment with respect to the parenting plan and the child's best interests had to be affirmed. In re Lukas S.-M., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 463 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 30, 2016).

Change of the primary residential parent for the children to the father was affirmed; the trial court considered the best interest factors, the record supported the findings that the mother failed to foster a good relationship between the father and the children and appeared to be incapable of doing so, and any benefit of continuity was outweighed by the negative influence of the mother on the children. Roberts v. Forrest, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 548 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 29, 2016).

Trial court's best interest analysis was not flawed, as it found that the children loved and shared a bond with both parents, could participate in their extracurricular activities in nearly any area, the father was more stable and ran his own business with more flexible work hours, the mother made visitation difficult for the father and thwarted his visitation for over a month after she moved, and the mother failed to advise the father where the children lived or attended school. Dayhoff v. Cathey, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 619 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 25, 2016).

Proof established a material change that met the lower standard required for modification of the residential parenting schedule; given the distance between the parents'  homes, the need to enroll the child in school, and the failure of the parents to reach an agreement, the alternating weekly residential schedule in the current plan was unworkable, and on remand, the trial court was to consider the statutory best interest factors. Williamson v. Lamm, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 744 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2016).

Evidence supported certain of the trial court's best interest findings, as the characterization of her mental conditions as being undertreated was not inconsistent with the evidence, the evidence and medical records reflected her erratic behavior; however, the evidence did not support the finding that the father was better positioned to deal with the child's needs. In re Emily M., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 906 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2016).

Evidence regarding the children's best interests, including the stepfather's use of corporal punishment, the father's belief that the children needed counseling, and the youngest child's threat to commit suicide if she had to live with the mother, did not preponderate against the determination that the father be named primary residential parent. Lanier v. Lanier, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 943 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 9, 2016).

Juvenile court properly denied a mother's request to modify the existing parenting plan because her proposed parenting plan would almost surely limit the child's visitation time with the father, the child's best interest was not served by forcing the father to choose between his career and a fixed visitation schedule, and a flexible visitation schedule served to maximize the child's time with the father where he was an airline pilot who had to bid for his work schedule and was not currently in a position to guarantee specific days for his availability to visit the child. In re Maddox P., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 26 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 17, 2017).

There was no error in finding that it was in the best interest of a child for a father to have primary custody; inter alia, the trial court found that the child had lived in the same place since the father was awarded temporary custody and that stability was one of the most important factors. Moreover, the mother left with the child and refused to allow the father to have any visitation with him, the mother's emphasis on the father's lack of stability failed to address the child's need for stability and other relative factors, and the best interest rule trumped all other custody principals, including the one generally disfavoring separation of siblings. Grigsby v. Alvis-Crawford, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 58 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2017).

Trial court did not err by denying the father's request to change the primary residential parent because it appropriately considered the best interest factors of this section and the evidence did not weigh against its factual findings that the mother had been the primary caregiver since the parties'  divorce, she provided adequate explanations for her multiple moves since moving to Maryland, and it appeared that the father was not thoroughly convinced of the severity of the child's mental health issues. Colley v. McBee, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 68 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 2, 2017).

Record did not contain sufficient evidence to support the trial court's reduction of the father's parenting time, plus the order contravenes the directives of the statute; given the mother's failure to seek increased parenting time, to submit a proposed parenting plan, and to present sufficient evidence showing that decreasing the father's parenting time would serve the child's best interest, the evidence preponderated against the reduction of the father's parenting time. Hart v. Hart, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 131 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 23, 2017).

In a case involving a modification of an agreed parenting plan, the juvenile court did not err by naming the father the primary residential parent and by granting the father sole decision-making authority as the parties had stipulated that there had been a material change of circumstance, and it was in the child's best interests because the mother was unwilling to cooperate with the father in making educational decisions; the mother continued to share inappropriate information with the child concerning the parents'  relationship and the details of the custody dispute; the mother admitted to having physical and mental health issues; and the mother made a habit of sending the father inappropriate and occasionally threatening emails. Gider v. Hubbell, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 211 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 29, 2017).

It was in the child's best interest to remain in Tennessee with the mother as her primary residential parent because, although both parents had a strong, healthy, and stable relationship with the child, the mother performed the vast majority of the daily needs of the child, while the father delegated those responsibilities to his current wife; the mother, as the primary caregiver, had performed the day-in-and-day-out rigorous parental responsibilities of taking care and managing a five-year old child at every level needed in order to maintain a stable and healthy environment for her; and, except for the period of time of the mother's abuse of alcohol, the environment she had provided for the child was a stable and satisfactory environment. Sansom v. Sansom, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 298 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 10, 2017).

In a petition for modification of visitation time, the trial court did not err in naming the father as the primary residential parent and awarding him increased visitation time with the children because and it was in the children's best interest as the father testified about the mother's and the children's excessive emphasis on rock climbing while under the mother's care to the exclusion of other activities, including their education, and the mother's own testimony reinforced that conclusion; and the trial court was concerned with the mother's financial dependence upon a close friend, while the father was independent and relatively stable. Bell v. Bell, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 335 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 18, 2017).

In a divorce case, the trial court did not err in finding that it was in the children's best interests that the father be the children's primary residential parent because the children testified without hesitation that they desired to live with their father; the children loved both of their parents and desired to have a good relationship with both, but the relationship between the mother and the children had become strained; and, although both parents loved their children, and both were able to nurture and parent their children, the trial court had concerns with the present emotional stability of the mother given her slow recovery from her accident, her anxiety issues and the stress of a protracted divorce. Williams v. Williams, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 563 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 17, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 883 (Tenn. Dec. 8, 2017).

Trial court had properly considered the children's best interests in modifying the permanent parental plan where it had considered the children's emotional needs and development levels in making the mother the primary residential parent, had appointed a forensic psychologist to obtain insight into the reasons for the children's psychiatric hospitalizations and the mental and emotional fitness of each parent, and closely considered the children's respective relationships with each parent, including the history of the father as the primary residential parent and primary caregiver with close emotional ties to the children. McClain v. McClain, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 634 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 21, 2017).

Trial court did not err in holding that the best interest of the child weighed against relocation and in favor of designating the father as the primary residential parent where the mother's arguments were that she simply did not agree with the conclusion reached by the trial court, the trial court found that both parties loved the Child and were both excellent parents, and the factors that tipped the scales against allowing the child to relocate and changing the primary residential parent seemed to be the child's involvement with the community, the continuity of his education in an environment where he had flourished, and the presence and support of extended family members on both sides of the family who lived in and around the current community. Gensmer v. Gensmer, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 775 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2017).

Juvenile court did not err in splitting parenting time evenly and designating the father as primary residential parent, and the juvenile court properly analyzed the best interest factors under T.C.A. § 36-6-106 (a)(1)-(15); the juvenile court had reason to characterize the mother's behavior as acrimonious in nature, and the juvenile court properly considered an incident in which the mother's older son inflicted an injury on the child that resulted in an emergency room visit. In re Autumn B., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 810 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 19, 2017).

Court of Appeals erred in reversing a juvenile court and in awarding custody of the parties'  minor children to the mother because both courts agreed that the mother's hostility toward the father constituted a material change in circumstance, the mother's filing of a “sur-reply” brief to the father's reply brief was not allowed, the juvenile court properly applied the statutory factors governing the children's best interests, and the Court of Appeals erred in mandating an immediate change in custody without giving the father an opportunity to appeal. C.W.H. v. L.A.S., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 825 (Tenn. Dec. 19, 2017).

Trial court properly determined that the modification of the permanent parenting plan was in the child's best interest because it provided continuity in the child's life and a stable, satisfactory environment; the mother had performed the majority of parenting responsibilities relating to the daily needs of the child since 2012; there had been no issues raised by the father until the final hearing; and there was considerable proof that the father was the one who asked that the schedule be changed to every other weekend in the first place. Steakin v. Steakin, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2018).

There was no error in the trial court's parenting plan determination because it expressly considered all of the statutory factors, and it conducted a thoughtful and thorough and unbiased assessment of the relevant facts and made a custody determination that was in the best interests of the child; the trial court made findings that the wife's therapist was helpful and credible and observed that she would have no concerns about the wife appropriately parenting the child. Potts v. Potts, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 69 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 8, 2018).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding equal parenting time because five of the best interest factors weighed equally in favor of both a mother and a father and one weighed slightly more against the father; the trial court found that both parents had a strong relationship with the child, each developed emotional closeness with the child, both demonstrated a disposition to provide the child with necessaries, and both had contributed significantly to care giving responsibilities. Woolbright v. Woolbright, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 90 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 16, 2018).

Father claimed that the circumstances that led to the protective order should not be used against him, but his actions limited his ability to perform his parenting responsibilities, and thus the trial court did not err in its determination that the best interest factor under T.C.A. § 36-6-106(a)(1) favored the mother. In re Britton H-S, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 101 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 23, 2018).

Regarding the seventh best interest factor, the father claimed that the trial court placed undue emphasis on socialization, but this claim was rejected; the trial court relied on both the greater amount of socialization the child experienced while in the mother's care and the child's changes in behavior after visiting the father in determining that this factor favored the mother, and the evidence did not preponderate against this determination. In re Britton H-S, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 101 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 23, 2018).

After considering the best interest factors in T.C.A. § 36-6-106(a), the trial court did not abuse its discretion in naming the mother the primary residential parent and awarding the father 150 days of residential parenting time; eight factors favored the mother while only one favored the father and the trial court applied the correct law. In re Britton H-S, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 101 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 23, 2018).

Father contended that factor twelve under T.C.A. § 36-6-106(a)(12) did not favor the mother because her roommate admitted to smoking marijuana before the child was born, but the trial court accepted the roommate's testimony that her drug use was in the past, there was no contrary evidence presented, and the evidence did not preponderate against the trial court's finding. In re Britton H-S, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 101 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 23, 2018).

Child had extended family members in close proximity to both parents'  residences and interacted regularly with his maternal and paternal grandmothers, and thus the best interest factor under T.C.A. § 36-6-106(a)(9) favored both parents equally. In re Britton H-S, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 101 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 23, 2018).

Father disputed the trial court's finding that the eighth factor best interest factor under T.C.A. § 36-6-106(a)(8) weighed heavily against him because of the presence of drugs in his home and his behavior towards the mother, but the trial court credited the testimony of the mother's witnesses on this issue, and the record lacked sufficient evidence to overturn this finding. In re Britton H-S, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 101 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 23, 2018).

Evidence did not preponderate against the trial court's finding that the fifth best interest factor under T.C.A. § 36-6-106(a)(5) favored the mother because she had been the primary caregiver for the child. In re Britton H-S, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 101 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 23, 2018).

Multiple witnesses described the father's behavior toward the mother and her family, and the evidence did not preponderate against the trial court's finding that the best interest factor under T.C.A. § 36-6-106(a)(11) favored the mother based on the father's emotional abuse. In re Britton H-S, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 101 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 23, 2018).

Mother's decision to move was found to be reasonable in light of the father's behavior, and the evidence did not preponderate against the finding that even with her multiple moves, the mother provided a more stable environment for the child, for purposes of the best interest factor under T.C.A. § 36-6-106(a)(10). In re Britton H-S, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 101 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 23, 2018).

There was no reason to overturn the trial court's finding that the second best interest factor under T.C.A. § 36-6-106(a)(1) favored the mother; the father argued the mother kept the child hidden from him for 42 days in spite of his admission that he refused her offer to allow him visitation during this time, and the trial court credited the mother's testimony on this issue. In re Britton H-S, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 101 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 23, 2018).

Juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the past and potential for future performance of parenting responsibilities factor favored the father where it apparently credited the father's testimony that the mother had stopped cooperating, faced with her refusal to allow visitation, the father filed the petition for parentage and parenting time, and the mother acknowledged that she was able to talk with the child at least twice a week during the father's parenting time. In re McKenzie Z., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 162 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 27, 2018).

Juvenile court's finding that a child's interactions with siblings and other relatives was equal between the mother and the father where the child had a close relationship with her maternal grandparents, contrary to the mother's claims, the record reflected that the child was getting to know her paternal grandmother and other relatives through overnight visits and family gatherings, the child enjoyed a good relationship with her new siblings, and one bite mark from a three-year-old did not compel a different conclusion. In re McKenzie Z., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 162 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 27, 2018).

Juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the ability to provide the child with necessary care factor favored neither the mother nor the father where, since filing his petition for parentage and parenting time, the father had resumed paying child support, and there was no indication in the record that he had ever failed to provide the child with food, clothing, and other necessary care during his parenting time. In re McKenzie Z., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 162 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 27, 2018).

Juvenile court's finding that both parents shared a loving relationship with the child was not an abuse of discretion where the father and his witnesses testified to the loving relationship the child was developing with her new family, the child had a strong bond with her mother, and the court was not bound by the mother's expert's testimony the relationship between the father and the child wasn't as good as hoped. In re McKenzie Z., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 162 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 27, 2018).

Res judicata does not bar a respondent/parent opposing a residential parenting schedule modification from putting on countervailing proof relevant to the best-interest analysis concerning the petitioner/parent's history of bad behavior just because that behavior took place before the entry of the last parenting plan. Bowen v. Wiseman, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 375 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 29, 2018).

Trial court did not err in considering evidence concerning events that took place before the entry of an agreed order because it was permitted to consider all evidence relevant to the best-interest factors; res judicata did not apply to bar evidence concerning events that took place before the previous order was entered when the trial court already determined a change of circumstances occurred and was tasked with determining how to modify a parenting plan consistent with a child's best interest. Bowen v. Wiseman, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 375 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 29, 2018).

Trial court did not err in modifying a parenting plan because it properly found that there had been a material change in circumstances and that modification was in the child's best interest; the evidence supported the trial court's finding that the mother would be more likely to respect the parenting plan because the evidence in the record revealed multiple instances in which the father approached the mother with a condescending and uncooperative attitude. Bowen v. Wiseman, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 375 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 29, 2018).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion by modifying the parties'  residential parenting schedule in light of the best-interest factors because it recognized the importance of stability and consistency and clearly attempted to fashion a parenting plan to minimize conflict in the child's life and ensure each parent could continue to have a close relationship with the child; the modifications were clearly reasonable in light of the evidence in the record. Bowen v. Wiseman, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 375 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 29, 2018).

There was no error with the trial court's decision to consider the proximities of the parties'  homes to the child's school when considering the child's best interest because the distance between the father's house and the child's school was capable of accurate and ready determination from sources whose accuracy could be reasonably questioned; it was the conscious decision of the father to move and place himself in a position to make the location of the residences a factor to be considered. Bowen v. Wiseman, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 375 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 29, 2018).

Trial court's reliance on a doctor's opinion in determining that there had been a material change in circumstances and that modification of the parties'  parenting plan was in the child's best interest was appropriate because the father cited no reason whey the reliance was improper other than his personal belief that the report was “biased” and “speculative.” Bowen v. Wiseman, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 375 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 29, 2018).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in its formulation and entry of the permanent parenting plan as being in the best interest of the children; they were well-adjusted to life in Michigan, the husband's claims that the children were brainwashed by their mother were rejected, and the evidence did not preponderate against the trial court's findings. Robbins v. Robbins, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 476 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 16, 2018).

Comments by the judge created an appearance of bias against the wife and her counsel that required recusal; the judge improperly consulted Twitter to resolve disputes surrounding how and when an online media outlet obtained the wife's trial brief, then used the results of his independent investigation to influence his custody decision. Nothing about the providing of a copy of the brief to the media outlet violated the Tennessee Rules of Professional Conduct, and nothing should have colored his view of the wife regarding custody. Beaman v. Beaman, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 609 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 19, 2018).

Finding that the child had a genuine fear of his father was being emotionally scarred by enforcement of visitation provided a basis for limiting parenting time to therapeutic supervised visitation, but a remand was necessary because the order did not refer to T.C.A. § 36-6-301 or discuss T.C.A. § 36-6-106(a) factors. In re Jaxon W., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 87 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 15, 2019).

Trial court did not err by determining that modification of the residential schedule was in the best interest of the children because the court deferred to the trial court's determination that the counselor's testimony that reducing the father's parenting time would harm the children was biased and lacked analytical cohesion. Burchfield v. Burchfield, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 248 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 21, 2019).

Trial court's designation of the father as the primary residential parent was supported by the evidence when viewed in light of the best interest factors of this section because four of the facts weighed slightly in the father's favor while only one factor weighed in the mother's favor. In re Lennon R., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 256 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 23, 2019).

In modifying the residential parenting schedule, there was insufficient evidence that the trial court performed an appropriate best interest analysis, as there was no indication that the best interest factors were given any serious consideration. Scot v. Scot, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 278 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 31, 2019).

Trial court properly denied a father's motion to dismiss the mother's petition for modification of their parenting plan-to include a provision, inter alia, precluding the father from any direct or indirect contact with the children-because the mother invoked the court's subject matter jurisdiction when she filed her petition, the petition raised allegations that the children were abused and neglected, the father administered excessive beatings on the children with various objects, and the court then considered the statutory factors to make the best interest determination. Massey v. Massey, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 173 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 17, 2020).

It was in the children's best interests for the father to be the primary residential parent because the mother was livid with the father for notifying the police about the maternal grandfather's sexual abuse of the daughter; the daughter was receiving the necessary counseling while in the father's care; the mother did not initially report the sexual abuse after the daughter made the disclosure, and she waited some time before considering counseling for the daughter; and the mother had shown an unwillingness or inability to encourage a continuing relationship between the children and the father, but the father ensured that the children had telephone contact with the mother. Gillam v. Ballew, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 229 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 21, 2020).

Court's ability to review the trial court's decision was hindered by the father's failure to provide the court with transcripts of the multiple hearings or a statement of the evidence presented; in the absence of a transcript or statement of the evidence, the court had to presume that there was sufficient evidence before the trial court to support its custody modification decision as related to the child's best interest. Rawson v. Monroe, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 286 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 24, 2020).

Trial court's order did not specifically mention the best interest factors, but the findings and conclusions were sufficient to facilitate appellate review and contained the requisite best interest analysis; the trial court found that the mother had served as the primary residential parent since the child was 26 months old, the father never completed the steps necessary to have more parenting time under that original plan, he was residentially unstable, and his actions, in part calling the police on the mother, were vindictive and malicious. Rawson v. Monroe, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 286 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 24, 2020).

It was readily apparent that the trial court did conduct a best interest analysis; the order spanned 13 pages and contained 96 separately numbered findings and conclusions, and the trial court specifically concluded that standard visitation was not in the child's best interest. Rawson v. Monroe, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 286 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 24, 2020).

Residential parenting plan was affirmed as there was no error of law in the trial court's application of the best interest factors; while the father challenged the trial court's weighing of the factors relative to the fact that he did not learn he was the father of the child until she was 18 months old and his efforts to see the child had been frustrated by the mother, the record showed the father's concerns were considered and given substantial weight. In re Khrystchan D., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 297 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 26, 2020).

4. Continuity of Placement.

Where both parents were fit to have custody of child, custody remained with the father due to the strong presumption in favor of continuity of placement that exists under Tennessee law. Placencia v. Placencia, 3 S.W.3d 497, 1999 Tenn. App. LEXIS 232 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999).

In maintaining the mother as the primary residential parent, the evidence did not preponderate against the trial court's finding regarding continuity and stability because the trial court concluded that, although the mother consumed alcohol, she had not done so in excess or put the child's safety at risk, and while the prospect of relocating to Texas inflicted physical or psychological damage on the child, the proposed relocation did not occur. Solima v. Solima, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 628 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 30, 2015).

5. Material Change of Circumstances.

The material change of circumstances must occur after the entry of the order sought to be modified and the change cannot be one that was known or reasonably anticipated when the order was entered. Hoalcraft v. Smithson, 19 S.W.3d 822, 1999 Tenn. App. LEXIS 825 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999).

The material change of circumstances must be a change in the child's circumstances, not the circumstances of either or both of the parents. Hoalcraft v. Smithson, 19 S.W.3d 822, 1999 Tenn. App. LEXIS 825 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999).

A showing of risk of substantial harm is not essential to establishing a material change of circumstances in child custody modifications. Buckles v. Riggs, 106 S.W.3d 668, 2003 Tenn. App. LEXIS 24 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 474 (Tenn. May 19, 2003).

Court did not err by denying a father's petition for modification of child custody, where the father failed to prove a material change in circumstances, and the evidence did not preponderate against that finding. Smith v. Smith, 165 S.W.3d 279, 2004 Tenn. App. LEXIS 686 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004).

Court properly denied a father's motion to modify child custody where he failed to show that the mother's hospitalization for bipolar disorder was a material change in circumstance as she was in the hospital for a shorter period of time than when she was hospitalized during the parties'  marriage. In addition, the trial court properly concluded that the children were thriving after moving to North Carolina with their mother, and any problems started only after the children began living with the father in Tennessee. Kellett v. Stuart, 206 S.W.3d 8, 2006 Tenn. App. LEXIS 212 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 916 (Tenn. 2006).

Trial court erred in finding that a father's remarriage and the fact that he had quit smoking marijuana were both material changes of circumstance and granting his petition to modify child custody under T.C.A. § 36-6-101(a)(2)(B), because the father's drug use was not a factor at the time of the 2004 parenting plan; therefore, his marijuana cessation did not constitute a material change of circumstance. Caldwell v. Hill, 250 S.W.3d 865, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 396 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 27, 2007), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 1066 (Tenn. Nov. 19, 2007).

Trial court erred in granting a father's petition to modify child custody under T.C.A. § 36-6-101(a)(2)(B), because he presented no evidence regarding how his marriage and his decision to quit smoking marijuana affected his daughter; he failed to meet his burden of proof to establish that a material change of circumstance occurred, and the trial court should not have moved past that threshold inquiry to consider whether a change in the parenting plan was in the child's best interest. Caldwell v. Hill, 250 S.W.3d 865, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 396 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 27, 2007), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 1066 (Tenn. Nov. 19, 2007).

Trial court erred in finding that a father's remarriage and the fact that he had quit smoking marijuana were both material changes of circumstance and granting his petition to modify a parenting plan under T.C.A. § 36-6-101(a)(2)(B); it was foreseeable that the father might have married his girlfriend, because he was living with her when he and the mother negotiated the terms of the 2004 parenting plan and it was not a sufficient material change of circumstance. Caldwell v. Hill, 250 S.W.3d 865, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 396 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 27, 2007), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 1066 (Tenn. Nov. 19, 2007).

Mother's marrying a man who admitted to a felony conviction for child abuse and a history of domestic violence constituted a chance in circumstances for modification of child custody, because there was evidence presented that the child had already been taught inappropriate conduct and language by his new stepfather that was clearly related to the stepfather's criminal history. In re T.C.D., 261 S.W.3d 734, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 802 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 27, 2007), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2008 Tenn. LEXIS 457 (Tenn. June 23, 2008).

Trial court properly denied a father's second petition to change custody as the children's actual admission to private schools, the mother's claimed refusal to discuss their attending private school, and the son's stated preference as to which school he wanted to attend were not material changes of circumstances. Pippin v. Pippin, 277 S.W.3d 398, 2008 Tenn. App. LEXIS 339 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 4, 2008), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2008 Tenn. LEXIS 954 (Tenn. Dec. 15, 2008).

Material change of circumstance occurred, for purposes of modifying residential parenting time, because (1) the parenting plan was over 11 years old, (2) the child's needs had changed significantly, and (3) the father and mother added people to their respective households, requiring consideration of whether it was in the child's best interest to grant the father more parenting time. In re Jacob B., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 514 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 26, 2015).

Trial court properly determined not to modify the parties'  parenting plan or schedule because the trial court implicitly found that a material change in circumstances had not occurred and expressly found that it was not in the children's best interests to modify the parenting schedule or plan; even if a material change had occurred, the trial court made the specific affirmative finding that the children had thrived during the parenting time schedule from the time of the divorce. Velez v. Velez, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 522 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 30, 2015).

Material change in circumstances warranting a change in the parties'  residential schedule occurred because the significant change in one parent's work schedule, the parties'  admitted failure to adhere strictly to the parenting plan, and the parent's remarriage, when taken together, constituted a material change affecting the child's best interest. Remand of the case to the trial court was necessary for the court to determine whether a modification of the residential schedule was in the child's best interest. Cook v. Cook, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 960 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 20, 2015), substituted opinion, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 961 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 9, 2015).

Father did not meet his burden of proving a material change in circumstances justifying a change in the primary residential parent; the child's absences and tardiness did not rise to the level of a material change in circumstances because they did not affect the child's school work, the mother's failure to comply with a parenting plan did not amount to a material change in circumstances since a “right of first refusal” provision left plenty of room for interpretation, and there was no proof that the child was lacking necessities or had otherwise been adversely impacted by the mother's income reduction. Although the lower standard for modifying a residential parenting schedule was met, the best interests of the child were not addressed. Gentile v. Gentile, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 962 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 9, 2015).

Trial court erred in changing the designation of the primary residential parent to the father because the evidence did not show the child's well-being had been adversely affected by the difficulties the father and mother encountered in complying with the parenting plan or that the modification was in the child's best interest; there was no evidence that the mother's trip to Canada or the difficulties with the father's phone visitation affected the child's well-being. In re Braylin D., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 81 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 7, 2017).

In a case concerning a mother's petition to modify an agreed order granting custody of her children to their maternal grandparents, the trial court did not err in granting the mother custody pursuant to T.C.A. § 36-6-106, where the mother met her burden of establishing a material change in circumstance and that a change in custody was in her children's best interest. Holley v. Ortiz, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 126 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 24, 2017).

Juvenile court did not err in changing a child's primary residential parent from the mother to the father because a material change in circumstance occurred sufficient to warrant examining whether a change in primary residential parent was in the child's best interest; the juvenile court properly considered all the relevant best interest factors, and the evidence did not preponderate against its findings. In re Wyatt B., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 501 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 26, 2017).

Modification of permanent parental plan to make a father the primary residential parent was appropriate because a material change in circumstance occurred in that, following the divorce, the mother showed a marked inability to facilitate the child's relationship with the father and the father's family as the mother chose to engage in a pattern of angry and hostile conduct toward the father and stepmother that interfered with the father's ability to parent the child and caused the child anxiety, fear, and distress. Fiala v. Fiala, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 556 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 21, 2018).

6. Burden of Proof.

The party seeking a change in custody has the initial burden to show a material change of circumstances that affects the welfare of the child. Hoalcraft v. Smithson, 19 S.W.3d 822, 1999 Tenn. App. LEXIS 825 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999).

The burden remains on the moving party to show that he is comparatively more fit than the party with custody under the challenged custody decree and to show that it would be in the child's best interest for the moving party to be the custodial parent. Hoalcraft v. Smithson, 19 S.W.3d 822, 1999 Tenn. App. LEXIS 825 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999).

7. Factors.

Although the trial court should have applied the factors at T.C.A. § 36-6-106 instead of the factors set forth in T.C.A. § 36-6-404(b), the analysis and result would be substantially similar if not the same regardless of which set of factors the trial court applied. Spencer v. Spencer, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 149 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 25, 2016).

Trial court properly designated the mother as the primary residential parent because the evidence did not preponderate against its finding that the statutory factors weighed in the mother's favor; the evidence in the record preponderates in favor of the trial court's finding that stability and security was paramount to the child's best interest, and the mother had offered that stability as the primary care giver, attending to her basic daily needs, healthcare, and education. Madden v. Madden, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 546 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 28, 2016).

Trial court did not err in naming a mother as the primary residential parent because no matters were ignored or overlooked by the trial court; consideration of the father's relocation was not a “relitigation” of matters resolved in the divorce, and the evidence did not preponderate against the trial court's holding that the mother's criminal record did not make her a bad mother. Norman v. Norman, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 768 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 28, 2017).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in devising a residential parenting schedule that allowed both parties to enjoy the maximum participation possible in the life of the child because the evidence did not preponderate against its findings that the mother's living situation was temporary and that she would seek separate housing when possible; the trial court considered the mother's move to as it related to the child's need for stability. Woolbright v. Woolbright, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 90 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 16, 2018).

Father's petition in opposition to the mother's proposed relocation with the parties'  minor child was granted because relocation was not in the child's best interests as the appellate court questioned whether the mother was prepared to truly honor and facilitate court ordered parenting arrangements; should the child relocate, she would be deprived of a significant amount of family support from the father's and the step-mother's family; the child had a healthy, established routine in which many family members contributed to the child's care and support; and the child enjoyed a close, loving relationship with her step-mother. Jean v. Harmon, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 687 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 27, 2018).

Trial court, which awarded the husband received 233 days of parenting time and the wife 132 days, did not err in fashioning the parental schedule. The trial court found that the statutory factor involving the character and behavior of persons who reside in or frequent the home of a parent and interact with the children favored the husband, and the record supported this finding. April H. v. Scott H., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 228 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 13, 2019).

Juvenile court erred in designating a father as the primary residential parent and in adopting his proposed parenting plan because, although the court was concerned with the child's injuries while in the mother's care, it failed to consider her performance of the majority of the parenting responsibilities, her status as the primary caregiver, the importance of continuity in the child's life, and the length of time in which he had lived in a stable, satisfactory environment where the mother sought medical treatment when necessary, expressed remorse, and the parties had shared co-parenting time since the child's birth without major incident. Deaton v. Williams, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 73 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 21, 2020).

8. Findings of Fact.

Trial court's permanent award of custody to the father was vacated because the trial court failed to make findings of fact concerning the mother's allegations of spousal abuse. Nelson v. Nelson, 66 S.W.3d 896, 2001 Tenn. App. LEXIS 788 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001).

Because it was undisputed that a Tennessee county circuit court, having acquired personal jurisdiction over the father, entered an order concluding that the mother was intentionally and wrongfully killed by the father, this evidence provided a sufficient factual predicate for the juvenile court's conclusion that it had jurisdiction to enter custody orders granting the maternal grandparents temporary custody over the two children. In re S.L.M., 207 S.W.3d 288, 2006 Tenn. App. LEXIS 487 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006).

Trial court failed to make supporting findings of fact with respect to each of the statutory factors; with the trial court's credibility determination, the court was equipped to determine the preponderance of the evidence with respect to the statutory factors on whether the husband or the wife was to be the primary residential parent. Olson v. Beck, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 99 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2015).

In a case in which a father challenged the juvenile court's decision to make the mother the primary residential parent, the appellate court concluded that the father's failure to provide a transcript of the evidence or a statement of the evidence precluded it from reviewing the findings of the juvenile court. In light of the fact that the record contained neither a transcript nor a statement of the evidence of the hearing before the juvenile court judge, the appellate court conclusively presumed that the evidence supported the juvenile court's findings and decree. In re Darius S., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 942 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2015).

Juvenile court's adoption of a permanent parenting plan was vacated because (1) the court made no specific findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding adopting a mother's proposed plan and did not find the plan was in the child's best interest, and (2) the lack of conclusions and credibility assessments precluded independent appellate review of the record. In re Briley R., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 721 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 31, 2017).

Appellate court's ability to review a trial court's designation of a primary residential parent and adoption of a parenting plan was limited because the findings of fact and conclusions of law entered by the trial court did not include a discussion of the impact on the finding by the trial court of domestic violence. Accordingly, the decision had to be vacated, and the case remanded for the court to make appropriate findings in that regard. Carr v. Carr, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 117 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 1, 2018).

Because the trial court's custody order failed to make sufficient findings and conclusions, the order was vacated and the case was remanded; the trial court stated that it considered the factors regarding custody, but did not weigh the facts against the factors, the trial court did not specifically conclude that one parent was more emotionally fit to care for the child, and it was unclear whether the trial court followed the mandate of T.C.A. § 36-6-406 in deciding to designate the father as the primary residential parent. Williams v. Williams, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 415 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 23, 2018).

Trial court did not err in designating the mother as primary residential parents given the father's history of physical and psychological abuse toward the mother and psychological abuse toward child, a finding that the father was not likely to foster a relationship between the child and the mother, and the father's pattern of manipulation, controlling and bullying of others in his life. Nelson v. Justice, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 35 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 25, 2019).

Because the trial court, in naming the husband the primary residential parent, only considered the stable environment offered by the husband in the marital home, and it did not enumerate or discuss the statutory factors of this section or the best interests of the children, and it made virtually no findings of fact regarding the abuse allegations against the husband as required, the court remanded to the trial court to make appropriate findings. Mangum v. Mangum, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 192 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 24, 2019).

Because of the lack of findings by a trial court regarding the best interest of the child in the modification of an existing parenting plan, the appellate court vacated the order of the trial court and remanded the case for the trial court to make additional findings of fact. In re Makinna B., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 285 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 6, 2019).

Because the record did not contain required findings as to either the existence of a material change of circumstances or an analysis of the best interest of the child, the court remanded the matter to the trial court for failure to comply with Tenn. R. Civ. P. 52.01. Cantey v. Cantey, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 342 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 9, 2019).

Trial court's order did not contain sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law as to the best interest factors of this section, and therefore the order denying the father equal time was vacated, because the trial court used a standardized form in which the only judicial analysis as to 14 factors was checking a box in favor of one parent or the other. The trial court chose to provide a factual analysis with regard to only one of the 15 factors but its findings were somewhat inconsistent and it did not state which testimony it credited. Nelvis v. Baptist, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 524 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 29, 2019).

Trial court failed to elaborate the basis for its deviating from the parties'  agreed parenting plan before concluding that the parents could not jointly parent, and, more egregiously, was silent concerning the child's best interest. Thus, the vacating of the trial court's permanent parenting plan and remand for further findings were necessary because the trial court's findings were not sufficient either to support its refusal to enter the parties'  proposed parenting plan, or to support the parenting plan arrived at by the trial court. Wright v. Wright, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 99 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 6, 2020).

9. Improper Order.

In a child custody case, there was no basis for the court's order that the mother had to relocate to Tennessee with the parties' child, because the law was not designed to give the courts the authority to dictate where divorced parents must live. Johnson v. Johnson, 165 S.W.3d 640, 2004 Tenn. App. LEXIS 733 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 503 (Tenn. May 23, 2005).

Court erred by awarding joint child custody, because it was undisputed that the husband's psychological problems negatively impacted the child, the husband sometimes physically hit the wife in the presence of the child, the court's opinion failed to follow the statutory imperative to prioritize the best interest of the child ahead of the parents'  interests, and it effectively rejected, without adequate evidentiary support for doing so, the duly submitted report of the court's own expert; there was considerable evidence of a stronger relationship between the wife and the child than between the husband and the child. Burden v. Burden, 250 S.W.3d 899, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 611 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 26, 2007), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2008 Tenn. LEXIS 133 (Tenn. Feb. 25, 2008).

Trial court erred in adopting one parent's parenting plan because the other parent's parenting time was to be increased to at least the minimum 80 days presumed by the Tennessee Child Support Guidelines. In re Grace N., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 331 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 14, 2015).

Trial court order modifying a custody order was vacated where it had accepted the mother's revised parenting plan by default, but took no evidence and did not consider any of the factors required by T.C.A. § 36-6-106 in concluding that there was a material change in circumstances or that modification of the custody plan was in the child's best interest. Stewart v. Stewart, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 656 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 28, 2017).

Trial court, in a divorce case, erred by designating the father as the primary residential parent of the parties'  child because the appellate court concluded that the court-ordered permanent parenting plan was not in the best interest of the child as the appellate court, pursuant to the statutory best interest of the child factors, concluded that the mother was to be the primary residential parent. Therefore, on remand the trial court was to establish a new permanent parenting plan that included the mother as the primary residential parent. Brown v. Brown, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 513 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 30, 2018).

10. Child's Preference.

Nothing supported the father's claim that the guardian ad litem's representation was ineffective; no matter how precocious a child may be, it is usually not the policy of a court to consider the preference of the child in custody matters until the child is at least 12 years old, and the mere fact that the guardian did not speak to the child on the ramifications of the proceeding and did not ascertain the child's wishes was not dispositive on whether the guardian performed her duties, and her representation was thorough. In re S.S.-G., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 917 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 16, 2015).

The vacating of a judgment and the remand of a case for further proceedings was appropriate because the trial court in modifying the parties'  permanent parenting plan erred in refusing to consider all of the applicable best interest factors set forth by statute, specifically the preference of the parties'  child who was then 13 years old. Roberts v. Roberts, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 758 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 22, 2017).

Declining the mother's request that the child speak with the court was affirmed given the concern about the appropriateness of asking the child, who was nine and a half years old and well-loved by both parents, to state a preference about living primarily with one parent or the other. Gensmer v. Gensmer, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 775 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2017).

11. Illustrative Cases.

Evidence preponderated against the parenting schedule ordered by the trial court because it did not maximize the father's participation in the child's life, the court did not make specific findings of fact or state the statutory factors upon which it relied, there was no justification for limiting the father's continuous parenting time during the summer months in the manner ordered, and the statutes favored a parenting schedule that gave each parent the maximum amount of time in accordance with the child's best interests. In re Blaklyn M., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 87 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 24, 2015).

Dismissal of maternal grandparents'  complaint was appropriate because, although the grandparents were allowed to intervene when a parent surrendered parental rights to the parent's minor child to adoptive parents, the grandparents failed to present clear and convincing evidence that the child's best interest was served by taking the child away from the adoptive parents. In re R.S.M., 466 S.W.3d 766, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 93 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2015), appeal denied, In re Rebecca M., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 479 (Tenn. June 11, 2015).

Trial court's lack of confidence in the parties' ability to work together, and in the husband's good faith in particular, justified the decision not to award a shared parenting arrangement. Olson v. Beck, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 99 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2015).

Trial court did not err in changing the designation of the primary residential parent for a teenage child because (1) a material change in circumstance occurred based on the child's recent athletic development and its impact on the child's social development; (2) the court properly considered the relevant factors, including the importance of continuity, when it made its determination of the child's best interests; and (3) the court did not err in its consideration of the child's expressed preference. Robinson v. Robinson, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 121 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 16, 2015).

Evidence did not preponderate against the trial court's decision regarding the division of parenting time because the father was able to provide more stability as the primary residential parent, and the mother's work schedule caused her to heavily rely on her parents in caring for the child. In re Jayden C., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 142 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 23, 2015).

It was not error for a trial court to find no evidence of child abuse because (1) any undue significance the court gave to the use of first names by a father's expert, who found abuse, was harmless given evidence that the expert was biased in favor of the father, and (2) the evidence did not support the expert's abuse finding. In re Jordin M., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 215 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 9, 2015).

Trial court's erroneous consideration of parents'  criminal records under former T.C.A. § 36-6-106(a)(9), on the character of others residing in or frequenting a parent's home, was harmless because T.C.A. § 36-6-106(a) allowed the court to consider all relevant evidence. In re Jordin M., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 215 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 9, 2015).

When considering a father's petition to modify custody, former T.C.A. § 36-6-106(a)(3) favored the mother because (1) the mother's reliance on others did not necessarily affect the child's well-being, (2) the mother took the child to doctor's appointments, and (3) the father spent less time with the child. In re Jordin M., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 215 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 9, 2015).

It was not error to deny a father's petition to modify custody because the evidence did not preponderate against the trial court's findings that (1) the mother had “made strides” in making the child's best interest the mother's primary focus, and (2) the credibility of the father's desire to co-parent was doubtful. In re Jordin M., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 215 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 9, 2015).

Trial court did not err by granting a mother unsupervised, regular visitation with her child because visitation with the mother was in the child's best interest; the mother's testimony showed that she loved the child and was working on improving her emotional and financial stability so she could care for him full-time, and she also testified that she was able to financially support the child. In re Kane H., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 359 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 20, 2015).

Father was properly allowed to visit the father's child at daycare because this fostered the father's relationship with the child. Leonardo v. Leonardo, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 486 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 18, 2015), modified, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 943 (Tenn. Nov. 24, 2015).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering the residential schedule set forth in the parenting plan because of the lengthy travel time between the mother's home in California and the father's home in Tennessee. In re Gabriel V., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 506 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 24, 2015), appeal denied, In re Gabriel, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 961 (Tenn. Nov. 24, 2015).

Evidence did not preponderate against the trial court's finding that it was in a child's best interest that the parent in California be the child's primary residential parent, instead of the parent in Tennessee, because the parent in California had been more of a constant in the child's life, that parent's family unit was more stable, that parent had visited the child when the child was in Tennessee, and that parent was willing to facilitate and encourage a relationship between the child and the other parent. In re Gabriel V., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 506 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 24, 2015), appeal denied, In re Gabriel, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 961 (Tenn. Nov. 24, 2015).

In maintaining the mother as the primary residential parent, the evidence did not preponderate against the trial court's finding regarding the willingness to a foster a continuing relationship because there was ample evidence that the mother and the father were equally unable or unwilling to co-parent, and the inability of both parents to co-parent did not favor one parent over the other in such a decisive manner that a change in custody was in the child's best interests. Solima v. Solima, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 628 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 30, 2015).

Designating a father as the children's primary residential parent was not an abuse of discretion where the evidence showed, inter alia, that the father was more financially stable, provided more continuity in the children's day-to-day living situation, and had learned to control his anger. Roland v. Roland, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 797 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 29, 2015).

Adopting the residential schedule and parenting plan was an abuse of discretion as it was based entirely on the father's unorthodox work schedule, had no regularity to it, did not specify where the children were to spend holidays and school vacations, and essentially relegated the mother to the position of babysitter while the father was working without a meaningful opportunity to parent the children. Roland v. Roland, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 797 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 29, 2015).

Trial court did not err in setting the residential schedule in the parenting plan where it considered the relevant factors set forth in T.C.A. § 36-6-106(a), and the schedule provided the wife with the opportunity to provide care for the child, via the maternal grandparents, in an appropriate manner during her workday. McCloud v. McCloud, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 959 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 9, 2015).

Evidence did not preponderate against the juvenile court's findings and conclusions with respect to designating a child's father the primary residential parent or the juvenile court's finding that the best interests of the child were served by changing the child's last name to that of the father. In re Izzabella B., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 276 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 22, 2016).

Trial court did not err in awarding the father only every other weekend and Wednesday night visitation with the children; the trial court made an exhaustive review of the factors and found, in part, that the mother had served as the primary caretaker for the children, she had a greater bond with the children, and there was substantial evidence of the father's emotionally and sometimes physically abusive behavior. Hopwood v. Hopwood, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 427 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 23, 2016).

It was not error to award a child's parents equal parenting time because such an award gave both parents maximum participation in the child's life consistent with the factors in T.C.A. § 36-6-106(a). Henegar v. Henegar, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 450 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 29, 2016).

Given the impact of newly enacted legislation, which amended T.C.A. § 36-6-106, the appellate court could not conclude that a judge's impartiality could reasonably be questioned because he had knowledge of the evidence and information adduced during a previous investigation conducted by the Department of Children's Services. Garner v. Garner, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 581 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 10, 2016).

Trial court did not err in failing to order a custody arrangement that permitted both parents to enjoy the maximum participation possible in the child's life after finding that a schedule requiring frequent communication and collaboration by the mother and the father would not serve the child's best interests in light of the vitriolic relationship between the parents. In re Cannon H., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 749 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 5, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 135 (Tenn. Feb. 21, 2017).

Trial court did not err in failing to order a custody arrangement that permitted both parents to enjoy the maximum participation possible in the child's life after finding that a schedule requiring frequent communication and collaboration by the mother and the father would not serve the child's best interests in light of the vitriolic relationship between the parents. In re Piper H., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 750 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 5, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 142 (Tenn. Feb. 21, 2017).

Evidence preponderated against a finding that a mother's hostility toward the mother's children's father and the father's wife warranted a parenting plan modification because, while this was a material change in circumstances, the evidence did not show a modification was in the children's best interest, as (1) the trial court's contrary finding was based on an unsupported finding that the mother continued to work as a prostitute, (2) the father's child support and medical support arrearages were not taken into account, (3) the father admitted using illegal drugs in the family home when the children were present, and (4) the mother had been the children's custodian for more of the children's lives. C.W.H. v. L.A.S., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 808 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 31, 2016), rev'd, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 825 (Tenn. Dec. 19, 2017).

Trial court erred by failing to make specific findings relative to the mother's parenting time during vacation periods. Lanier v. Lanier, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 943 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 9, 2016).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion by designating the mother as the primary residential parent for the parties'  daughter because it applied the factors in this section and the testimony supported the trial court's finding that the mother acted as the primary caregiver, had formed a stronger emotional bond with her daughter, had provided her daughter with a stable environment, and appeared willing to foster a continuing, close relationship between her daughter and the father. Engh v. Engh, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 12 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 10, 2017).

Denying the mother's request for sole decision-making authority was not an abuse of discretion where there was no evidence that the parents were unable to make decisions jointly, and the only disagreement was over counseling. In re Emmett D., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 458 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 7, 2017).

Trial court did not err in regard to determining a father's parenting time because there were no serious concerns about the parenting ability of either parent, both parents had strong relationships with the children and loved the children dearly, both parents had suitable homes, both parents were able to take the children to school and to their extracurricular activities, and both parents were able to provide the children with food, clothing, medical care, and other necessities. Watts v. Watts, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 461 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 11, 2017).

Parenting schedule entered on remand was undisturbed because (1) the schedule did not exceed the scope of remand, (2) a mother's designation as primary residential parent with authority to make major decisions was unchanged, and (3) the schedule satisfied the child's best interest. In re Grace N., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 650 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 27, 2017).

Trial court did not err in awarding the mother 64 days of residential time with the child in the new parenting plan where considering the fact that the child attended school in a Tennessee county and that the mother had relocated to a house that was eight to nine hours away from the child, it appeared that the trial court had, in fact, complied with T.C.A. § 36-6-106(a) by making an effort to permit the mother to enjoy the maximum participation possible in the life of the child. Mother offers no suggestions regarding how the trial court could have awarded her more days during the year under the circumstances Gensmer v. Gensmer, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 775 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2017).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion by determining that the reassignment of a father, who was in the active duty military, to a military base in another state constituted a material change of circumstances justifying modification of the parenting plan. Furthermore, the court did not err in naming the mother to be primary residential parent because the court considered the statutory factors in determining that the modification was in the children's best interest. Dalrymple v. Dalrymple, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 743 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 14, 2017).

Remand of the case was necessary, because the juvenile court failed to make specific findings of fact as required by Tenn. R. Civ. P. 52.01, including failing to make findings regarding the father's allegations of the mother's interference with his parenting time, failure to assess witnesses'  credibility, and failure to mention the statutory best interest factors that should have directed its decision. In re Caleb F., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 769 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 28, 2017).

In a divorce case, the trial court erred in granting the husband only 80 days per year with the child because, despite the wife's contentions, the trial court found no evidence of any physical abuse perpetrated by the husband; the husband's late work schedule in itself did not justify such a minimal award of parenting time; and the statutory goal of maximum participation for both parents in the life of the child was not met. Wafa Badawi Hindiyeh v. Waleed Fawzi Abed, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 207 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 25, 2018).

Trial court did not err in making the father the primary residential parent, as the trial court considered the statutory factors and nothing preponderated against the findings; the father had been the children's primary caregiver since birth, while the mother worked, and while the father moved to Tennessee with the children, he invited the mother there and complied with the parenting schedule, while the mother refused for a time to tell the father where she was living or where the children were when they were with her. Bolin v. Bolin, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 214 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 26, 2018).

Trial court did not err in determining the parties'  parenting schedule; the mother chose to increase the distance between the two parties'  residences by moving to Ohio, and given the distance between the two parties'  homes, the trial court crafted a parenting schedule giving the mother a generous amount of parenting time. Bolin v. Bolin, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 214 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 26, 2018).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that it was not in the best interest of a child for the child to relocate with the wife to the wife's former home in Canada as the court considered the statutory factors and determined that it appeared that the wife had control issues and that the move to Canada was part of the wife's desire to control or deter visitation with the father. Also, the child had a close relationship with a half-sibling and had the benefit of an extended family on both sides of the family in Tennessee. Vermilyea v. Vermilyea, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 236 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2018).

Trial court did not err in designating the mother as the primary residential parent and giving her permission to move to California because the mother had a family support system there, and her relationships with church and community members in Cleveland had been undermined by the father, leaving her with little support. Purvis v. Purvis, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 280 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 22, 2018).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion by increasing the father's parenting time by only 10 days annually instead of dividing coparenting time equally after considering all the factors in T.C.A. § 36-6-106(a) and finding that the mother had provided a more stable home and performed a majority of the parenting responsibilities, and the children had thrived in school, activities, and relationships with the mother as the primary residential parent. Brunetz v. Brunetz, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 553 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 20, 2018).

In a custody dispute between the paternal and maternal grandparents, the juvenile court did not err in granting all grandparents joint legal custody of the child, because, although the maternal grandmother admitted to experiencing anxiety and depression and taking anti-anxiety medication, and the court demonstrated how the maternal grandmother's mental health issues affected her parenting ability, other relevant factors favored both parties equally. In re E.W.N., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 668 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 19, 2018).

In a custody dispute between the paternal and maternal grandparents, the juvenile court did not err in granting all grandparents joint legal custody of the child, because, although some factors weighed in favor of the paternal grandparents, including that being in one home for the majority of the time rather than two homes would enable the child to form a stronger connection to his physical surroundings and the family members that he did encounter, maintaining the juvenile court's custody arrangement was the surest means of maintaining continuity, and not having to pass the child back and forth on weeknights after the child gotten out of school would be in the child's best interests, other factors favored both parties equally. In re E.W.N., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 668 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 19, 2018).

In a custody dispute between the paternal and maternal grandparents, the juvenile court did not err in granting all grandparents joint legal custody of the child, because, although the paternal grandparents had already demonstrated a willingness to facilitate a relationship between the child and maternal grandparents and would likely continue to do so, and the maternal grandmother seemed less likely to facilitate and encourage that relationship, other relevant factors favored both parties equally. In re E.W.N., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 668 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 19, 2018).

In a custody dispute between the paternal and maternal grandparents, the juvenile court did not err in granting all grandparents joint legal custody of the child, because the some relevant factors in this statute favored both parties equally as neither set of grandparents had taken the greater responsibility for performing parental responsibilities; both sets of grandparents loved the child, and the child had emotional ties to each of them; and the appellate court could not say that the paternal grandfather's two violent outbursts, which occurred 10 and 12 years ago, were enough to cause factor (11) to weigh in favor of maternal grandparents. In re E.W.N., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 668 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 19, 2018).

Parents had strong disagreements about the children's medical care, and to minimize conflict, the trial court allocated decision-making authority for non-emergency medical care to the father; in making its determination, the trial court relied on a number of factors in determining the best interests of the children, and as there was no transcript or statement of the evidence, it was presumed that there was sufficient evidence before the trial court to support its decision. King v. Daily, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 699 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2018).

Trial court's decision to change custody to the father was supported by the court's consideration of the factors in T.C.A. § 36-6-106(a), and its determination that the father was more stable and had a support network in New Jersey, the mother, who had been sober for 18 months, placed her drug addiction before the well-being of the children for a few years. Haak v. Haak, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 735 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 17, 2018).

Trial court had not based its decision to designate the father as the primary residential parent solely on the fact that the mother engaged in an extramarital affair where her decision to expose the child to her relationship with another man while she was still married to the father, coupled with her dishonesty throughout the litigation, tipped the scales against her, and the evidence showed that the father was loving, devoted, and encouraged the child's relationship with the mother. Stokes v. Stokes, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 118 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 7, 2019).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion by reducing and restricting a father's parenting time because, in addition to the father's past failure to exercise parenting time, a stepsister's unfortunate drug dependency and the stepmother's combustible temper constituted a substantial threat to the child's welfare justifying the restrictive provisions in the parenting plan both as to the fashioning of the residential parenting schedule and as to the exclusion of the stepmother and stepsister from the father's parenting time. Iveson v. Iveson, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 130 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 18, 2019).

Although the trial court indicated which T.C.A. § 36-6-106 factors favored each parent, remand was required because the trial court provided no factual basis whatsoever for its decision, as to each individual factor or as to its overall decision to name the father as primary residential parent. Grissom v. Grissom, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 240 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 17, 2019).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering that the father have visitation with the parties'  children during the school every other weekend because in their agreed order the parties adopted the same schedule as the one ordered by the trial court, by so agreeing the father indicated that he believed those provisions to be in the children's best interest, and he admitted that he only decided to fight for school-year 50/50 custody upon learning that he would have to pay more in child support. Wightman v. Wightman, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 247 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 21, 2019).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the father a disproportionate amount of school-free days with the child given the parties'  locations, the father in Texas and the mother in New Jersey, because it was the only way to facilitate the father's participation in the child's life. Mitra v. Irigreddy, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 265 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 29, 2019).

Trial court made sufficient findings of fact to support its conclusion that guardianship should be placed with the paternal grandparents because it recognized that the maternal grandmother and the child loved each other, but it found that the child was more stable and performed better at school and home during times that the child was not exposed to the grandmother. The trial court also agreed with the recommendation that the child not visit the grandmother due to her maladaptive behaviors and the psychological harm that has occurred to the child during times of visitation. In re Alexis S., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 526 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 29, 2019).

Trial court did not err in awarding the husband equal parenting time because an award of parenting time did not need to be equal but needed to be in the child's best interest and the parents lived an hour apart, the wife had been the child's primary caregiver, and continuity and stability was important to the four-year-old child. Poole v. Kinslow, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 539 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 5, 2019).

Trial court did not err in designating the mother as the primary residential parent of the minor child after determining which factors favored the mother, that the mother had been the child's full-time, primary caregiver and the mother had a great deal of family in Washington where the mother was relocating, and which favored the father, that the mother had been trying to keep the dad out of the child's life. Singer v. Singer, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 148 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 9, 2020).

Trial court considered the relevant factors before crafting a residential schedule to accommodate the unique circumstances of the case; while each parent exhibited concerning behavior and would likely benefit from regular counseling, each parent enjoyed a loving relationship with the children and were capable of caring for them on a regular basis, and limiting the mother's parenting time as suggested by the father and children would not allow her the maximum participation possible with the children, which would benefit them. Turk v. Turk, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 285 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 24, 2020).

Trial court did not err by failing to maximize the mother's parenting time because the mother would be able to resume visitation with the child in her home once she completed a full psychological examination and parenting assessment, and allowed the Tennessee Department of Children's Services, the guardian ad litem, and any other provider agencies to visit her home to assess its suitability. Gider v. Hubbell, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 303 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 1, 2020).

Ex-wife was properly designated the primary residential parent, despite the fact that the children would have to change schools, because, for most of the marriage, the ex-husband spent only 30-40% of each year at home as he toured heavily with his band and for his songwriting career; the wife had been the primary caregiver for the children since they were born; she took them to almost all of their medical appointments; she took them to and from their extracurricular activities and procured the necessary equipment for those activities; she participated at the children's school; and, although the husband began spending more time at home, he still spent about 50% of the year traveling, and his travel schedule often changed with little notice. Griffin v. Griffin, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 371 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 19, 2020).

12. Permanent Parenting Plan.

Trial court erred by including provisions in a permanent parenting plan because there was no evidence that a parent's unsupervised visitation would be harmful to the parties'  child. The provisions were modified to delete requiring supervision of the parent's visitation, disallowing the parent's paramour from spending overnight during visitation, ruling that the parent was to have no additional co-parenting time for holidays or otherwise without agreement, and granting the other parent sole authority to make major decisions regarding the child. Mashburn v. Mashburn, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 445 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 30, 2016).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to adopt the parenting schedule the mother proposed and in adopting the parenting schedule incorporated in the final order because the trial analyzed all of the statutory factors, and under its permanent parenting plan, the mother and father had equal parenting time and an equal number of overnight visits; the evidence support the trial court's finding that breastfeeding did not prohibit the father's co-parenting time. Howell v. Smithwick, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 71 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 1, 2017).

Mother's move to a town eight to nine hours away constituted a material change in circumstances warranting a change in the permanent parenting plan where the trial court's determination that it was not in the child's best interest to relocate with the mother had been affirmed, and the mother had decided to relocate despite the fact that the child would not be relocating with her. Gensmer v. Gensmer, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 775 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2017).

Trial court properly formulated a parenting plan because, while most of the statutory factors weighed in favor of both parents equally, several factors favored the mother, and no factors favored the father, the trial court's decision to deviate from the agreed permanent parenting plan was reasonable, the version that was finally approved by the trial court was consistent with the father's proposal, requiring parents who precipitated custody or support proceeding to underwrite the costs if their claims were ultimately found to be unwarranted was appropriate as a matter of policy, and the mother was entitled to recover the reasonable and necessary attorney's fees she incurred on appeal. Kincade v. Kincade, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 173 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 4, 2018).

Trial court erred by awarding the mother only every other weekend with the child because the mere fact that the parties lived in different counties is an insufficient reason to justify such a drastic limitation on the mother's parenting time. The record showed that the mother had historically been the child's primary caretaker, the child was bonded with the mother and with her half-sister who resided with the mother, and the testimony demonstrated that neither party was burdened by the exchange location or the drive. In re Lennon R., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 256 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 23, 2019).

Trial court erred in failing to conduct a best interest analysis or make a finding that the permanent parenting plan it was ordering was in the child's best interest at the time and the prior best interest finding, made when the temporary parenting plan was ordered, was not sufficient to satisfy the court's obligations at the time it made the permanent plan. Ash v. Ash, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 437 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 6, 2019).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in formulating a parenting plan where it conducted a thorough and unbiased assessment of the evidence, its findings were supported by the evidence, and it weighed the appropriate factors in concluding that the children should be with the wife during the school year. Sullivan v. Sullivan, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 492 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 4, 2019).

36-6-107. Mediation in cases involving domestic abuse.

  1. In any proceeding concerning the custody of a child, if an order of protection issued in or recognized by this state is in effect or if there is a court finding of domestic abuse or any criminal conviction involving domestic abuse within the marriage that is the subject of the proceeding for divorce or separate support and maintenance, the court may order mediation or refer either party to mediation only if:
    1. Mediation is agreed to by the victim of the alleged domestic or family violence;
    2. Mediation is provided by a certified mediator who is trained in domestic and family violence in a specialized manner that protects the safety of the victim; and
    3. The victim is permitted to have in attendance at mediation a supporting person of the victim's choice, including, but not limited to, an attorney or advocate. No victim may provide monetary compensation to a nonattorney advocate for attendance at mediation.
  2. Where the court makes findings of child abuse or child sexual abuse under former § 36-6-106(a)(8), the court may only award visitation under circumstances that guarantee the safety of the child. In order to guarantee the safety of the child, the court may order:
    1. That all visits be supervised by a responsible adult or agency, the costs to be primarily borne by the perpetrating parent;
    2. That the perpetrating parent attend and complete a program of counseling or other intervention as a precondition to visitation;
    3. That overnight visitation be prohibited until such time that the perpetrating parent has completed court ordered counseling or intervention, or otherwise demonstrated a change in circumstances that guarantees the safety of the child;
    4. That the address of the child and the nonperpetrating parent be kept confidential; and
    5. Any other conditions the court deems necessary and proper to guarantee the safety of the child.

Acts 1997, ch. 350, § 2; 1998, ch. 1095, § 4.

Compiler's Notes. Section 36-6-106(a), referred to in this section, was rewritten by Acts 2014 ch. 617, § 4, effective July 1, 2014. There are no current provisions comparable to subdivision (a)(8) in this section as rewritten.

Cross-References. Confidentiality of public records, § 10-7-504.

Law Reviews.

Adoption and Custody: Current Trends in Tennessee Family Law: Bridge Over Troubled Water: Changing the Custody Laws in Tennessee, 27 U. Mem. L. Rev. 769 (1997).

Family Mediation in Tennessee (Judge Marietta Shipley), 26 U. Mem. L. Rev. 1085 (1996).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Best Interests Analysis.

As the determination of the best interests of the children in a parental termination proceeding required consideration of a different set of factors than those that were considered in a prior custody and grandparent visitation proceeding, the doctrine of collateral estoppel was inapplicable because the issues in the two cases were not identical. In re B. W., 397 S.W.3d 105, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 199 (Tenn. Feb. 21, 2013).

Trial court in a guardianship proceeding for a child upon the death of one of the child's parents erred in awarding a maternal grandparent guardianship of the child because the court did not first conduct a thorough best interest analysis. In re Taylour L., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 42 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 29, 2015).

36-6-108. Parental relocation.

  1. After custody or co-parenting has been established by the entry of a permanent parenting plan or final order, if a parent who is spending intervals of time with a child desires to relocate outside the state or more than fifty (50) miles from the other parent within the state, the relocating parent shall send a notice to the other parent at the other parent's last known address by registered or certified mail. Unless excused by the court for exigent circumstances, the notice shall be mailed not later than sixty (60) days prior to the move. The notice shall contain the following:
    1. Statement of intent to move;
    2. Location of proposed new residence;
    3. Reasons for proposed relocation; and
    4. Statement that absent agreement between the parents or an objection by the non-relocating parent within thirty (30) days of the date notice is sent by registered or certified mail in accordance with subsection (a), the relocating parent will be permitted to do so by law.
  2. Absent agreement by the parents on a new visitation schedule within thirty (30) days of the notice or upon a timely objection in response to the notice, the relocating parent shall file a petition seeking approval of the relocation. The non-relocating parent has thirty (30) days to file a response in opposition to the petition. In the event no response in opposition is filed within thirty (30) days, the parent proposing to relocate with the child shall be permitted to do so.
    1. If a petition in opposition to relocation is filed, the court shall determine whether relocation is in the best interest of the minor child.
    2. In determining whether relocation is in the best interest of the minor child, the court shall consider the following factors:
      1. The nature, quality, extent of involvement, and duration of the child's relationship with the parent proposing to relocate and with the non-relocating parent, siblings, and other significant persons in the child's life;
      2. The age, developmental stage, needs of the child, and the likely impact the relocation will have on the child's physical, educational, and emotional development, taking into consideration any special needs of the child;
      3. The feasibility of preserving the relationship between the non-relocating parent and the child through suitable visitation arrangements, considering the logistics and financial circumstances of the parties;
      4. The child's preference, if the child is twelve (12) years of age or older. The court may hear the preference of a younger child upon request. The preference of older children should normally be given greater weight than those of younger children;
      5. Whether there is an established pattern of conduct of the relocating parent, either to promote or thwart the relationship of the child and the non-relocating parent;
      6. Whether the relocation of the child will enhance the general quality of life for both the relocating parent and the child, including, but not limited to, financial or emotional benefit or educational opportunity;
      7. The reasons of each parent for seeking or opposing the relocation; and
      8. Any other factor affecting the best interest of the child, including those enumerated in § 36-6-106(a).
    3. If, upon consideration of factors in subdivision (c)(2), the court finds that relocation is in the best interest of the minor child, the court shall modify the permanent parenting plan as needed to account for the distance between the non-relocating parent and the relocating parent.
    4. If the court finds that relocation is not in the best interest of the minor child, the court shall deny the petition for approval and, utilizing the factors provided in § 36-6-106(a), enter a modified permanent parenting plan that shall become effective only if the parent proposing to relocate elects to do so despite the court's decision denying the parent's petition for approval.
  3. In fashioning a modified parenting plan under subdivisions (c)(3) and (4), the court shall consider and utilize available alternative arrangements to foster and continue the child's relationship with and access to the other parent. The court shall also assess the costs of transporting the child for visitation, and determine whether a deviation from the child support guidelines should be considered in light of all factors, including, but not limited to, additional costs incurred for transporting the child for visitation.
  4. Nothing in this section shall prohibit either parent from petitioning the court at any time to address issues other than a change of custody related to the move, including, but not limited to, visitation.
  5. Either parent in a parental relocation matter may recover reasonable attorney fees and other litigation expenses from the other parent in the discretion of the court.
  6. The procedure and best interest standard of this section shall also apply to a parent who is subject to an injunction pursuant to § 36-6-116(a)(4) or § 36-4-106(d)(5).

Acts 1998, ch. 910, § 1; 2007, ch. 187, § 7; 2013, ch. 352, § 1; 2014, ch. 617, §§ 5, 6; 2016, ch. 734, § 2; 2016, ch. 814, § 1; 2018, ch. 853, §§ 1, 2.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2013, ch. 352, § 2 provided that the act, which amended this section,  shall only apply to relocations occurring on or after July 1, 2013.

For the Preamble to the act concerning domestic relations, please refer to Acts 2014, ch. 617.

Amendments. The 2018 amendment rewrote (a)(4) which read: “(4) Statement that the other parent may file a petition in opposition to the move within thirty (30) days of receipt of the notice.”; rewrote (b)-(g) which read: “(b) Unless the parents can agree on a new visitation schedule, the relocating parent shall file a petition seeking to alter visitation. The court shall consider all relevant factors, including those factors enumerated within subsection (d). The court shall also consider the availability of alternative arrangements to foster and continue the child's relationship with and access to the other parent. The court shall assess the costs of transporting the child for visitation and determine whether a deviation from the child support guidelines should be considered in light of all factors including, but not limited to, additional costs incurred for transporting the child for visitation.“(c) If the parents are actually spending substantially equal intervals of time with the child and the relocating parent seeks to move with the child, the other parent may, within thirty (30) days of receipt of notice, file a petition in opposition to removal of the child. No presumption in favor of or against the request to relocate with the child shall arise. The court shall determine whether or not to permit relocation of the child based upon the best interests of the child. The court shall consider all relevant factors including those factors found in § 36-6-106(a)(1)–(15).“(d)(1) If the parents are not actually spending substantially equal intervals of time with the child and the parent spending the greater amount of time with the child proposes to relocate with the child, the other parent may, within thirty (30) days of receipt of the notice, file a petition in opposition to removal of the child. The other parent may not attempt to relocate with the child unless expressly authorized to do so by the court pursuant to a change of custody or primary custodial responsibility. The parent spending the greater amount of time with the child shall be permitted to relocate with the child unless the court finds:“(A) The relocation does not have a reasonable purpose;“(B) The relocation would pose a threat of specific and serious harm to the child that outweighs the threat of harm to the child of a change of custody; or“(C) The parent's motive for relocating with the child is vindictive in that it is intended to defeat or deter visitation rights of the noncustodial parent or the parent spending less time with the child.“(2) Specific and serious harm to the child includes, but is not limited to, the following:“(A) If a parent wishes to take a child with a serious medical problem to an area where no adequate treatment is readily available;“(B) If a parent wishes to take a child with specific educational requirements to an area with no acceptable education facilities;“(C) If a parent wishes to relocate and take up residence with a person with a history of child or domestic abuse or who is currently abusing alcohol or other drugs;“(D) If the child relies on the parent not relocating who provides emotional support, nurturing and development such that removal would result in severe emotional detriment to the child;“(E) If the custodial parent is emotionally disturbed or dependent such that the custodial parent is not capable of adequately parenting the child in the absence of support systems currently in place in this state, and such support system is not available at the proposed relocation site; or“(F) If the proposed relocation is to a foreign country whose public policy does not normally enforce the visitation rights of noncustodial parents, that does not have an adequately functioning legal system or that otherwise presents a substantial risk of specific and serious harm to the child.“(e) If the court finds one (1) or more of the grounds designated in subsection (d), the court shall determine whether or not to permit relocation of the child based on the best interest of the child. If the court finds it is not in the best interests of the child to relocate as defined herein, but the parent with whom the child resides the majority of the time elects to relocate, the court shall consider all relevant factors including those factors found in § 36-6-106(a)(1)–(15).“(f) The court shall consider the availability of alternative arrangements to foster and continue the child's relationship with and access to the other parent. The court shall assess the costs of transporting the child for visitation, and determine whether a deviation from the child support guidelines should be considered in light of all factors including, but not limited to, additional costs incurred for transporting the child for visitation.“(g) Nothing in this section shall prohibit either parent from petitioning the court at any time to address issues, such as, but not limited to, visitation, other than a change of custody related to the move. In the event no petition in opposition to a proposed relocation is filed within thirty (30) days of receipt of the notice, the parent proposing to relocate with the child shall be permitted to do so.”; and deleted former (h)-(j) which read: “(h) It is the legislative intent that the gender of the parent who seeks to relocate for the reason of career, educational, professional, or job opportunity, or otherwise, shall not be a factor in favor or against the relocation of such parent with the child.“(i) Either parent in a parental relocation matter may recover reasonable attorney fees and other litigation expenses from the other parent in the discretion of the court.“(j) This section shall also apply to a parent who is subject to an injunction pursuant to § 36-6-116 or § 36-4-106(d)(5).”

Effective Dates. Acts 2018, ch. 853, § 3. July 1, 2018.

Cross-References. Certified mail in lieu of registered mail, § 1-3-111.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

This section is remedial in nature and does not impair any vested right; thus, its retrospective application is not prohibited by Tenn. Const., Art. I, § 20. Caudill v. Foley, 21 S.W.3d 203, 1999 Tenn. App. LEXIS 730 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999).

T.C.A. § 36-6-108(c), (d), and (e) of this section do not violate the separation of powers doctrine contained in Tenn. Const., Art. II, §§ 1 and 2 and Art. VI., § 1. Caudill v. Foley, 21 S.W.3d 203, 1999 Tenn. App. LEXIS 730 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999).

This section is not unconstitutional under the equal protection clause contained in Tenn. Const., Art. XI, § 8 because the state's interest in protecting the best interests of the child is a reasonable basis for the legislative classification contained in T.C.A. § 36-6-108(c) and (d) and the preference that these provisions give to the parent spending the greater amount of time with the child. Caudill v. Foley, 21 S.W.3d 203, 1999 Tenn. App. LEXIS 730 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999).

It would be a violation of the parent's constitutional rights if the parent were denied day in court on either the other parent's petition to modify or the original petition to relocate the children. Placencia v. Placencia, 48 S.W.3d 732, 2000 Tenn. App. LEXIS 824 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000).

2. Construction.

Legislature intended the statute to restrict a trial court's authority to interfere with a parent's proposed relocation unless the parent opposing the move files a petition within 30 days of receiving notice. Ross v. Rosswoods, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 348 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 19, 2016).

Supreme Court of Tennessee overrules Webster v. Webster, 2006 Tenn. App. LEXIS 685(Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 24, 2006), insofar as it interpreted the term reasonable purpose in T.C.A. § 36-6-108 to mean a significant purpose, substantial when weighed against the gravity of the loss of the non-custodial parent's ability to participate fully in their children's lives in a more meaningful way. The term reasonable purpose should be given its ordinary meaning. Aragon v. Aragon, 513 S.W.3d 447, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 159 (Tenn. Mar. 16, 2017).

Even were the statute applicable in this case, the parental relocation statute did not grant courts the authority to dictate where divorced parents must live. Caton v. Caton, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 666 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 16, 2018).

3. Application.

Parties agreed that the mother spent more time with the child than the father, and thus there was a presumption in favor of the mother's desire to relocate unless the father could establish one of the three factors set out in the statute. Dahl v. Young, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 88 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 24, 2015).

Two subsections speak of the time parents are or are not “actually spending” with the child; because the father was actually spending substantially more time with the child than the mother, the standards for relocation set forth in the fourth subsection applied. Aragon v. Aragon, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 947 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2015), rev'd, 513 S.W.3d 447, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 159 (Tenn. Mar. 16, 2017).

Because relocation would not have been appropriate as measured by the factors applicable at the time the decision was made, consideration of other factors was pretermitted. Aragon v. Aragon, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 947 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2015), rev'd, 513 S.W.3d 447, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 159 (Tenn. Mar. 16, 2017).

Because the final hearing in this case was for an initial custody determination and no permanent parenting plan previously existed, the relocation statute did not apply. In re Lukas S.-M., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 463 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 30, 2016).

Although the relocation statute did not apply in this case, the juvenile court applied the correct standard, best interest of the child, in its determination that the child should remain in Tennessee. In re Lukas S.-M., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 463 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 30, 2016).

Trial court erred in concluding that the parental relocation statute was applicable to its decision because the parental relocation statute was inapplicable when the trial court made an initial custody decision or parenting arrangement even if a parent was relocating. Dayhoff v. Cathey, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 619 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 25, 2016).

Because the mother did not spend substantially equal intervals of time with the children, the applicable statutory provision was the fourth section of the statute. Stanley v. Stanley, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 1004 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 30, 2016).

Trial court did not err in failing to apply the standards in the parental relocation statute, T.C.A. § 36-6-108, as it did not apply to initial custody determinations, as in this case. In re Britton H-S, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 101 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 23, 2018).

Tennessee parental relocation statute is not to be applied when a court is making an initial custody determination. Furthermore, the parental relocation statute itself provides that it is to be applied after custody or co-parenting has been established by the entry of a permanent parenting plan or final order. Vermilyea v. Vermilyea, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 236 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2018).

Trial court erred in prohibiting the mother's move when the distance was less than 50 miles; there was no legal basis for restricting her ability to move, as the permanent parenting plan did not restrict either parent from relocating, and the parental relocation statute in effect at the time did not apply. Caton v. Caton, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 666 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 16, 2018).

Father's claim that the trial court erred in designating the mother as primary residential parent and allowing her to relocate without making a determination in accordance with the relocation statute lacked merit because the relocation was inapplicable since the determination at issue was an initial custody determination governed by T.C.A. § 36-6-106(a). Singer v. Singer, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 148 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 9, 2020).

4. Procedure.

Trial court cited the relevant statutory provisions before determining that was section of the statute was the only ground at issue, and the claim that the trial court erroneously phased the issue was without merit. Lawrence v. Broadnax, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 623 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 31, 2015).

Trial court's finding that the mother did not receive written notice of the father's intent to relocate was supported by the e-mail exchange indicating that the mother received documents in the mail that did not relate to the father's relocation and by the father's own testimony he refused to give the mother a copy of the notice when she came to his house to ask for one. Mackey v. Mayfield, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 822 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 8, 2015).

It was clear that the trial court, having found that the father's proposed relocation did not have a reasonable purpose, correctly considered the factors and implicitly determined that relocation was not in the child's best interest, and thus the father's petition was denied in accordance with the procedure set forth in the relocation statute. Aragon v. Aragon, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 947 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2015), rev'd, 513 S.W.3d 447, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 159 (Tenn. Mar. 16, 2017).

Father failed to prove that he sent the mother notice of the relocation, and the court of appeals did not consider the contents of a sealed envelope that was made an exhibit at trial because the evidence did not concern something that occurred after judgment and thus, would not properly be considered a post-judgment fact. McDonough v. McDonough, 499 S.W.3d 401, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 368 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 26, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 689 (Tenn. Sept. 23, 2016).

Trial court did not err in determining that a mother's petition in opposition to the father's relocation was filed timely because the father failed to meet his burden to prove his full compliance with the notice requirement of the statute; because the father failed to prove that he sent the mother notice of the relocation pursuant to, and in full compliance with, the statute the thirty-day response period never was triggered. McDonough v. McDonough, 499 S.W.3d 401, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 368 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 26, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 689 (Tenn. Sept. 23, 2016).

Trial court erroneously placed the burden on the father to prove that his relocation served a reasonable purpose, rather than placing the burden on the mother to show that the relocation did not serve a reasonable purpose, and this required remand. Stanley v. Stanley, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 1004 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 30, 2016).

Mother was the custodian of the child and had no obligation to notify the father of her intent to move with the child to another state, as there was no custody order or parenting plan establishing the father's custodial rights; his acknowledgment of paternity did not vest in him any custodial rights as a legal father, the point of the proceedings below was to establish him as the legal father, and until such an order was entered, there was no legal relationship between them, plus irreparable harm was not shown that justified an injunction changing custody. Milton v. Harness, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 154 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 3, 2017).

5. Evidence.

In connection with the mother's notice of intent to relocate, the supportive documentation offered by her was inadmissible as a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted, but she also attested in her affidavit that she had accepted an offer of employment in New Jersey, which statement was admissible; the trial court did not abuse its discretion in considering the fact that the mother had accepted an offer of employment in New Jersey. Lawrence v. Broadnax, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 623 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 31, 2015).

There were nursing positions available in Tennessee, which the father chose not to pursue, and he had a strong support network in the Clarksville area; given the nature of the trial court inquiry and the facts presented, the fact that the mother did not introduce evidence of pay rates for nursing positions in the Clarksville area, standing alone, was not determinative of the issue. Aragon v. Aragon, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 947 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2015), rev'd, 513 S.W.3d 447, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 159 (Tenn. Mar. 16, 2017).

Circuit court erred in finding that a mother did not have a reasonable purpose in relocating to Colorado because her prospective employer had experience with start-up companies and had already contributed substantial capital and raised additional capital for the venture at issue, there was no evidence that the mother could not find other job opportunities if necessary, the cost of living was only slightly higher in Colorado, and the father did not produce evidence of available jobs for the mother in Tennessee. Mouton v. Mouton, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 873 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 16, 2016).

6. Material Change of Circumstances.

Where there was a material change in circumstances relating to a residential parenting plan due to a mother's permissible relocation under T.C.A. § 36-6-108, a trial court erred by re-examining the comparative fitness of the parents under T.C.A. § 36-6-101(a)(2)(B), (C) since there was no material change on that issue, and the mother could not have been penalized for her relocation or for her sexual orientation; moreover, since the father failed to submit a proposed parenting plan, and the mother's proposal addressed the concerns that gave rise to the need for a modification, it was adopted. Massey-Holt v. Holt, 255 S.W.3d 603, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 668 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 31, 2007), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2008 Tenn. LEXIS 309 (Tenn. Apr. 14, 2008).

7. Best Interests.

Once the trial court determined that the mother's purpose for relocating was unreasonable, it was then tasked with determining whether the proposed relocation was in the best interest of the child; the trial court failed to make a comprehensive best interest analysis and the matter was remanded. Lawrence v. Broadnax, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 623 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 31, 2015).

In determining whether a proposed relocation is in the best interest of the child, trial courts need not articulate each factor and its application to the case at hand; however, the court must at least consider the factors to make a proper decision regarding the child. Lawrence v. Broadnax, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 623 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 31, 2015).

Evidence did not preponderate against the determination that relocation was not in the child's best interest; four factors favored the mother, six factors favored neither party, one was inapplicable, and the mother cited evidence that supported certain factors while the father did not cite to anything that preponderated against the findings. Aragon v. Aragon, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 947 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2015), rev'd, 513 S.W.3d 447, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 159 (Tenn. Mar. 16, 2017).

Trial court failed to address the best interest analysis in its order; because it was necessary to remand the case for consideration of the father's purposes for relocating in light of the mother's burden of proof, the court declined to conduct a de novo review of the record to determine the best interest of the children, which was to be considered by the trial court if the mother met her burden of proof. Stanley v. Stanley, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 1004 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 30, 2016).

8. Child's Wishes.

In a case where a mother sought relocation due to employment, a trial court allowed testimony from a six-year-old minor child about his wishes to remain with the father; however, this was just one factor considered by the court. Watson v. Watson, 196 S.W.3d 695, 2005 Tenn. App. LEXIS 525 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005).

9. Motive for Objection to Relocation.

Trial court's finding of vindictiveness was reversed where it appeared to have been based solely on its conclusion that the mother disliked the father's new wife. Caudill v. Foley, 21 S.W.3d 203, 1999 Tenn. App. LEXIS 730 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999).

Trial court did not err when it found that the mother's proposed relocation had a reasonable purpose; the mother's husband received a significant salary increase at a stable, growing company and there would be opportunities for career advancement, plus the job the mother was offered paid more than the job she currently had. Kephart v. Kephart, 520 S.W.3d 563, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 796 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 26, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 98 (Tenn. Feb. 15, 2017).

Evidence supported the trial court's finding that the mother's motive for relocating was not vindictive; she and her husband offered to help the father move and maintain contact with the children, plus if they intended to relocate in order to prevent the father from visiting his children, it seemed unlikely that the husband would purchase a house only two blocks away from where the father lived just months before relocation was considered. Kephart v. Kephart, 520 S.W.3d 563, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 796 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 26, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 98 (Tenn. Feb. 15, 2017).

10. Delay in Opposition.

Father's delay in filing the petition in opposition to relocation permitted the mother to relocate to Germany; the language is clear and mandatory, and stating one's opposition to a proposed move, without more, is not in compliance with the statute and is not sufficient to invoke the adjudicatory powers of the court, plus whether the mother was prejudiced by the father's failure to timely file the petition was not an appropriate consideration. Katja v. Buchanan, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 627 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 16, 2015).

11. Custody Change Based on Relocation.

To determine whether the parties in a relocation case are spending substantially equal intervals of time with their child, the “time actually spent” with each parent should be computed in units of a day; the number of days to be credited to each parent should be based upon an examination of the residential schedule, additional time not reflected in the residential schedule, and adjustments for any violations to the residential schedule. Kawatra v. Kawatra, 182 S.W.3d 800, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 1052 (Tenn. 2005).

To allocate a day for which both parents claim credit for spending with the child, the trial court should examine the hours that each parent actually spent with the child on that day, the activities in which each parent participated with the child, the resources that each parent expended on the child's behalf, and any other factor that the trial court considers to be relevant. Kawatra v. Kawatra, 182 S.W.3d 800, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 1052 (Tenn. 2005).

After the parties'  divorce, the mother was named primary residential custodian and she was spending a greater amount of time with the child; the court allowed her to relocate to California with the child, and the relocation had a reasonable purpose and would not result in specific and serious harm to the child. Kawatra v. Kawatra, 182 S.W.3d 800, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 1052 (Tenn. 2005).

Where the mother petitioned to relocate to California with her child, the trial court calculated the time the parties spent with the child; the trial court erred in relying solely upon an hourly unit of time and in excluding the time the child spent in school from the total parenting time. Kawatra v. Kawatra, 182 S.W.3d 800, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 1052 (Tenn. 2005).

Judgment which granted the mother's request to relocate was affirmed where: (1) The mother was only moving about 60 miles to be near her mother and other relatives who have lived in Hopkinsville for some time; and (2) Although the mother's timing concerning the father's resignation and her decision to relocate was slightly suspicious, it was not enough to give rise to an inference of vindictiveness or preponderate against the trial court's findings. Hudson v. Hudson, — S.W.3d —, 2009 Tenn. App. LEXIS 749 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 3, 2009), rehearing denied, Hudson v. Larson, — S.W.3d —, 2009 Tenn. App. LEXIS 762 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 5, 2009), appeal dismissed, 328 S.W.3d 863, 2010 Tenn. LEXIS 1152 (Tenn. Dec. 17, 2010).

Where the parents are not spending substantially equal periods of time with their child, the parent seeking to relocate must notify the other parent of the intent to relocate and state his or her reasons for the proposed relocation. Former T.C.A. § 36-6-108(a)(3) (amended 2013). The burden then falls to the parent opposing the move to file a petition and prove one of the enumerated grounds. Former T.C.A. § 36-6-108(d)(1)(A) (amended 2013). If this burden of proof is carried, the trial court may consider the best interest of the child and decide whether to permit the relocation. T.C.A. § 36-6-108(e). If this burden of proof is not carried, the trial court is obliged to grant permission for the relocation. T.C.A. § 36-6-108(d)(1). Aragon v. Aragon, 513 S.W.3d 447, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 159 (Tenn. Mar. 16, 2017).

Under the natural and ordinary meaning of the term reasonable purpose, a father had stated a reasonable purpose for relocating to Arizona with the parties'  child where he had secured an advantageous job there, he and the child would be living near and have the support of both parties'  extended family, and the mother presented virtually no evidence that the father's purpose for the proposed relocation was not a reasonable one. Aragon v. Aragon, 513 S.W.3d 447, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 159 (Tenn. Mar. 16, 2017).

For purposes of T.C.A. § 36-6-108(c), the parents spent substantially equal intervals of time with the child where the 12 months immediately preceding the start of the trial was the appropriate time frame, and the mother failed to contradict the father's evidence of time each parent spent with the child. Gensmer v. Gensmer, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 775 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2017).

12. Denial of Request to Move Improper.

Denial of the mother's request to relocate with her children to Knoxville was improper because, although allowing the mother to move with the children would require the children to adapt to new teammates and new friends, the children were well-adjusted and fully equipped to deal with this adjustment. Moreover, the father failed to establish that the children relied on their father to such an extent that relocating to Knoxville would result in severe emotional detriment to the children, T.C.A. § 36-6-108(d)(2)(D). Mann v. Mann, 299 S.W.3d 69, 2009 Tenn. App. LEXIS 168 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2009).

Mother had a reasonable purpose for desiring to relocate with the parties'  children because the mother (1) had a better chance for dual licensures, (2) preferred a college at the new residence, and (3) wanted to remain the children's primary care-giver by attending day classes, instead of attending night classes and depending on the father for child care. Sanko v. Sanko, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 496 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 16, 2015), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 998 (Tenn. Nov. 24, 2015).

In a case in which the trial court failed to find the facts specially and to state separately its conclusions of law, because remanding the parental relocation case to the trial court would only further prolong the litigation and potentially result in a second appeal, thereby frustrating the ability of the children to achieve closure and finality in an already tenuous situation, the appellate court conducted a de novo review of the matter given the record and the specific framework provided by the parental relocation statute. Slavko v. Slavko, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 669 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 9, 2016).

Father's petition in opposition to the requested relocation of the mother and the parties'  children to Pennsylvania was improperly granted as the stated purposes for relocating were reasonable and substantial when considered together and the purposes outweighed the father's loss of co-parenting time because the mother cited numerous reasons in support of her relocation, including proximity to her husband; availability of support from extended family; an employment opportunity with an increased income; the ability to pursue post-graduate education; the absence of reliable family support in Tennessee; the reduction in the financial strain of maintaining two households; and specific educational and extracurricular activities for the children. Slavko v. Slavko, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 669 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 9, 2016).

13. Improper Order.

In a child custody case, there was no basis for the court's order that the mother had to relocate to Tennessee with the parties' child because the law was not designed to give the courts the authority to dictate where divorced parents must live. Johnson v. Johnson, 165 S.W.3d 640, 2004 Tenn. App. LEXIS 733 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 503 (Tenn. May 23, 2005).

14. Attorney's Fees.

Trial court's reasoning that the mother was absurd to request her attorney fees was rejected, but the statute does not grant the mother the right as the prevailing party to recover her fees either; the statute does not provide parameters directing trial courts to consider particular factors in deciding whether to award attorney fees to one party or another in a relocation case, the mother provided no evidence that she was unable to pay her fees, and the denial of her request was not an abuse of discretion. Dahl v. Young, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 88 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 24, 2015).

Reversal of one parent's award of attorney fees at trial and denial of that parent's request for attorney fees on appeal was appropriate because that parent was no longer the prevailing party as a result of the appellate court's decision to reverse the trial court's judgment. The other parent's request for attorney fees on appeal was not subject to waiver, when that parent requested attorney fees on appeal after not requesting attorney fees at trial; however, the appellate court decided to deny the request. Sanko v. Sanko, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 496 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 16, 2015), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 998 (Tenn. Nov. 24, 2015).

Father was no longer entitled to attorney fees for successfully objecting to a mother's request to relocate with the parties'  children because, when the trial court's judgment was reversed, the father was no longer the prevailing party. Sanko v. Sanko, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 496 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 16, 2015), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 998 (Tenn. Nov. 24, 2015).

Reversal of one parent's award of attorney fees at trial and denial of that parent's request for attorney fees on appeal was appropriate because that parent was no longer the prevailing party as a result of the appellate court's decision to reverse the trial court's judgment. The other parent's request for attorney fees on appeal was not subject to waiver, when that parent requested attorney fees on appeal after not requesting attorney fees at trial; however, the appellate court decided to deny the request. Sanko v. Sanko, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 496 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 16, 2015), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 998 (Tenn. Nov. 24, 2015).

Mother was not entitled to an award of attorney's fees under the parental relocation statute because she abandoned her planned relocation; the statute allowing attorney fees did not permit the recovery of attorney's fees in litigation relating to the relocation of a minor child. In re Jasmine G., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 194 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 16, 2016).

There was no error in a trial court's decision to award attorney fees separately to the father regarding the mother's proposed relocation to another state and to the mother regarding modification of the parties'  parenting plan because courts regularly distinguished between issues in post-divorce actions when awarding attorney fees. Dale v. Dale, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 619 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 20, 2019).

Because a mother did not contest that the father prevailed on the father's petition in opposition to the mother's relocation request, the trial court's determination that the father was a prevailing party for the purposes of awarding attorney fees was appropriate. The court found that the mother had no reasonable purpose for the move—as the mother's job prospects in another state were too speculative and the mother sought to get away from the conflict between the parties—and the move would not have been in the children's best interests. Dale v. Dale, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 619 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 20, 2019).

15. Transportation Costs.

Parties would essentially be splitting the transportation costs of the father's visitation with the child between them, and the trial court followed the statute's direction to assess the costs of transporting the child for visitation and chose not to deviate from the guidelines after considering the relevant factors in this case; the mother was permitted to relocate with the child to Virginia, as she requested, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by requiring her to share the father's cost of exercising his visitation with the child once he was there. Dahl v. Young, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 88 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 24, 2015).

Order requiring the mother to be responsible for transporting the child to and from the father's residence was affirmed where the mother had not presented any evidence regarding the costs of transporting the child back and forth, and the mother failed to ask the trial court to provide her with a deviation to account for her transportation costs either at trial or in her motion to alter or amend. Gensmer v. Gensmer, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 775 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2017).

16. Illustrative Cases.

Parent should have been allowed an evidentiary hearing on the other parent's proposed relocation of the children; given the fundamental nature of the interests involved, the trial court should at least have addressed the issues of “reasonable purpose” and “specific and serious” harm in its opinion. Placencia v. Placencia, 48 S.W.3d 732, 2000 Tenn. App. LEXIS 824 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000).

Where the evidence showed that two parents spent substantially equal time with a child under a joint custody agreement, a trial court properly utilized the standard under T.C.A. § 36-6-108(c) in designating the mother the primary residential parent and permitting a relocation for the mother's new employment. Watson v. Watson, 196 S.W.3d 695, 2005 Tenn. App. LEXIS 525 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005).

Father's appeal from a trial court's grant of a mother's petition to relocate to Kentucky was dismissed as moot because the mother showed that she had remarried and had returned to Tennessee to live with the parties' children. The court vacated the order granting the petition to relocate to ensure that matters concerning the future relocation of either parent would be governed by the parties' original Parenting Plan and by T.C.A. § 36-6-108(d)(1). Hudson v. Hudson, 328 S.W.3d 863, 2010 Tenn. LEXIS 1152 (Tenn. Dec. 17, 2010).

Evidence did not preponderate against the trial court's finding that the father failed to prove that the mother's relocation to Virginia with the child posed a threat of specific and serious harm to him, in part as the father did not suggest that any situation identified on the statutory list applied to the child, plus the threat to the child's safety from a stepbrother who abused him in the past was lessened if the child was living in Virginia. Dahl v. Young, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 88 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 24, 2015).

Trial court did not err in allowing the father to relocate with the parties'  child to Toccoa, Georgia in order to assume new employment because the mother actually spent 147 days, or 40% of the time, with the child in the 12 months preceding her petition; the trial court correctly held that a 60% to 40% split between the parents did not amount to substantially equal parenting time under the relocation statute; and the mother failed to prove that the relocation did not have a reasonable purpose, that the relocation would pose a threat of specific and serious harm to the child, or that the father's motive was vindictive. Heilig v. Heilig, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 471 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 15, 2015).

Trial court erred finding that one parent's relocation with the parties'  children did not have a reasonable purpose and that the motive for relocating was vindictive. The purposes for relocating provided by the parent, to pursue an advanced degree at an accredited faith based university, to be eligible for dual licenses in counseling following two years of schooling, and to establish a career in counseling, were reasonable and substantial and outweighed the other parent's loss of co-parenting time. Sanko v. Sanko, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 496 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 16, 2015), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 998 (Tenn. Nov. 24, 2015).

It was error to find a mother's motive for desiring to relocate with the parties'  children was vindictive because (1) the mother understandably sought to pursue a preferred educational opportunity and best financial outcome when faced with single parenthood, (2) the mother's anger at the father did not show vindictiveness as defined in T.C.A. § 36-6-108, and (3) the mother did not hinder the father's co-parenting time. Sanko v. Sanko, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 496 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 16, 2015), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 998 (Tenn. Nov. 24, 2015).

Trial court erred finding that one parent's relocation with the parties'  children did not have a reasonable purpose and that the motive for relocating was vindictive. The purposes for relocating provided by the parent, to pursue an advanced degree at an accredited faith based university, to be eligible for dual licenses in counseling following two years of schooling, and to establish a career in counseling, were reasonable and substantial and outweighed the other parent's loss of co-parenting time. Sanko v. Sanko, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 496 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 16, 2015), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 998 (Tenn. Nov. 24, 2015).

It was error to find a mother's motive for desiring to relocate with the parties'  children was vindictive because (1) the mother understandably sought to pursue a preferred educational opportunity and best financial outcome when faced with single parenthood, (2) the mother's anger at the father did not show vindictiveness as defined in T.C.A. § 36-6-108 the mother did not hinder the father's co-parenting time. Sanko v. Sanko, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 496 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 16, 2015), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 998 (Tenn. Nov. 24, 2015).

Trial court misstated the mother's testimony, however, this misstatement had no bearing on the ultimate ruling when the mother never submitted proximity to family as a reason supporting her proposed relocation. Lawrence v. Broadnax, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 623 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 31, 2015).

Mother merely claimed that she could not obtain a comparable salary in Tennessee, and her testimony concerning the opportunity for career advancement was unsubstantiated and subjective; the child enjoyed a loving relationship with the father and his extended family in Tennessee, and the trial court's determination that the mother's purpose for relocating was unreasonable when weighed against the child's loss of the father's ability to participate fully in his life was affirmed. Lawrence v. Broadnax, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 623 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 31, 2015).

Father's proposed reasons for relocating, so that his wife could care for her mother and he could pursue improved economic opportunities, were not reasonable for purposes, as the father's wife evaded questions about her mother's health and the father was evasive about his job in Wisconsin. Mackey v. Mayfield, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 822 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 8, 2015).

Evidence did not preponderate against the determination that the father's move served no reasonable purpose, given that he chose not to seek opportunities in the Clarksville area before relocating, his decision that he would not apply for nursing positions in Tennessee undermined his claim that he moved because he had an opportunity for greater income over his options in Tennessee, and while it appeared he had a rational basis for his move, the move was nonetheless not reasonable under all the circumstances. Aragon v. Aragon, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 947 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2015), rev'd, 513 S.W.3d 447, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 159 (Tenn. Mar. 16, 2017).

Therapist's testimony did not support a finding that the mother';s relocating to Arkansas would have a specific and serious threat of harm to the children; although the therapist stated that the children had been exposed to inappropriate sexual behavior, without any evidence about the source of the exposure, there was no factual basis for finding that relocating with the mother would subject the children to such, plus the therapist's testimony that relocation would cause the children emotional harm did not amount to evidence that removal would result in severe emotional detriment to the children. Kephart v. Kephart, 520 S.W.3d 563, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 796 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 26, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 98 (Tenn. Feb. 15, 2017).

17. Untimely Petition In Opposition.

Mother was not required to raise the untimely filing of the father's petition in opposition to relocation as an affirmative defense; once the mandatory 30-day filing period passed without Father filing a petition opposing the mother's relocation, she was free to relocate with the child without the father's consent or a court order as long as her notice met the requirements of the statute, and thus the trial court erred in excusing the father's untimely filing and proceeding to consider the merits of the mother's proposed relocation. Ross v. Rosswoods, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 348 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 19, 2016).

18. Presumption.

To rebut the presumption in favor of allowing the mother's relocation, the father had the burden of proving that the relocation lacked a reasonable purpose, would pose a threat of specific and serious harm to the child that outweighed the threat of harm from a change in custody, or the parent's motive was vindictive. Kephart v. Kephart, 520 S.W.3d 563, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 796 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 26, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 98 (Tenn. Feb. 15, 2017).

Mother, the parent desiring to relocate, was spending a substantially greater amount of time with the children than the father, and thus, a presumption in favor of allowing the relocation existed. Kephart v. Kephart, 520 S.W.3d 563, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 796 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 26, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 98 (Tenn. Feb. 15, 2017).

While the trial court's order did state that the father's notice of relocation to the mother did not alert her that he intended to relocate with the child, and that the first time the father requested that he be allowed to relocate with the child was 27 days before trial, that did not appear to have affected the trial court's analysis or conclusion that the father could not relocate with the child. Sansom v. Sansom, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 298 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 10, 2017).

For purposes of the parental relocation statute, the trial court did not erroneously conclude that the mother was spending substantially more time with the child than the father as the father was given 140 days of parenting time under the parties'  parenting plan, which was 38% of the time; thus, the father was not able to take advantage of the statutory provision that the parent spending the greater amount of time with the child would be permitted to relocate with the child. Sansom v. Sansom, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 298 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 10, 2017).

19. Vindictiveness.

Trial court properly found that a mother's motive for relocation was not vindictive because she always encouraged the relationship between the child and the father, there was no pattern by the mother unreasonably to disrupt or refuse any parenting time to which the father was entitled, the mother denied any intent to deny the father parenting time with the child, and proposed a parenting plan granting the father additional time with the child. Mouton v. Mouton, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 873 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 16, 2016).

36-6-109. Notice of hearing.

If a parent or other suitable person is awarded sole or joint custody of a child by a court pursuant to this chapter; and

If such parent or person is subsequently arrested, confined or otherwise detained by law enforcement officials or a court of competent jurisdiction; and

If, as a result of the arrest, confinement or detainment of such parent or person, such child temporarily comes to the care and custody of the department of children's services or any public or private agency, institution or home providing shelter care as defined in § 37-1-102; then

Prior to the hearing required by § 37-1-114, such department, agency, institution or home must undertake reasonable efforts to provide adequate notice of the time, place and purpose of such hearing to any other parent or person awarded joint custody or visitation rights by the court at the time the custody of the child was initially established.

Acts 1998, ch. 1006, § 1.

36-6-110. Rights of noncustodial parents.

Except when the juvenile court or other appropriate court finds it not in the best interests of the affected child, upon petition by a noncustodial, biological parent whose parental rights have not been terminated, the court shall grant the rights set forth in § 36-6-101(a)(3)(A).

Acts 1998, ch. 1087, § 1; 2011, ch. 119, § 4.

36-6-111. Stay of interlocutory or final judgment.

Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, in all actions that award, change, or affect the custody of a minor child, an interlocutory, or final judgment by any court in this state shall not be stayed after entry, unless otherwise ordered by that court and upon such terms as to bond or otherwise as it deems proper to secure the other party.

Acts 2004, ch. 647, § 1.

36-6-112. Parent alleging abuse.

  1. This section shall be known and may be cited as the “Protective Parent Reform Act.”
  2. If a parent makes a good faith allegation based on a reasonable belief supported by facts that the child is the victim of child abuse, child neglect, or the effects of domestic violence, and if that parent acts lawfully and in good faith in response to that reasonable belief to protect the child or seek treatment for the child, then that parent shall not be deprived of custody, visitation, or contact with the child, or restricted in custody, visitation, or contact, based solely on that belief or the reasonable actions taken based on that belief.
    1. If an allegation that a child is abused is supported by a preponderance of the evidence, then the court shall consider such evidence of abuse in determining the visitation arrangement that is in the best interest of the child, and the court shall not place a child in the custody of a parent who presents a substantial risk of harm to that child.
    2. A parent is presumed to present a substantial risk of harm to the child if the parent is under indictment for the offense of aggravated child abuse under § 39-15-402, child sexual abuse under § 37-1-602, or severe child sexual abuse under § 36-1-113(g)(11). The parent shall remain a risk of harm during the pendency of the indictment; provided, however, that the court may grant the parent supervised visitation with the child.

Acts 2004, ch. 781, § 1; 2006, ch. 694, § 1; 2015, ch. 238, § 1.

Compiler's Notes Acts 2015, ch. 238, § 3 provided that the act, which added (c)(2), shall apply to persons who are indicted for an applicable offense committed on or after July 1, 2015.

36-6-113. [Repealed.]

Acts 2008, ch. 793, § 1; 2011, ch. 86, §§ 1, 2; repealed by Acts 2014, ch. 798, § 2, effective July 1, 2014.

Compiler's Notes. Former section § 36-6-113 concerned temporary modification of decree for child custody or visitation for children of mobilized parent.

36-6-114. False allegations of sexual abuse in furtherance of litigation.

Whenever a trial court finds that any person knowingly made a false allegation of sexual abuse in furtherance of litigation, in addition to any other penalties provided for by law or rule, the court may hold the accuser in contempt of court and may order the accuser to pay all litigation expenses, including, but not limited to, reasonable attorney's fees, discretionary costs and other costs incurred by the wrongly accused party in defending against the false allegation.

Acts 2010, ch. 894, § 3.

Compiler's Notes. Former § 36-6-102 (Acts 1983, ch. 297, § 1; T.C.A., § 36-828; Acts 1988, ch. 670, § 1; 1994, ch. 969, §§ 1, 2), concerning custody preference of child, was repealed by Acts 1995, ch. 428, § 1. For new law, see § 36-6-106.

36-6-115. Requirements to be met by parent for return of child removed from custody due to parent's drug abuse.

When, in a private custody case not involving the department of children's services or a child-placing agency, a court has removed a child from the custody of the child's parent due primarily or solely to drug abuse by the parent, the court shall not return the child to the parent's custody until the parent has demonstrated a sustained commitment to responsible parenting by:

  1. Not being the subject of criminal charges or a criminal investigation for at least ninety (90) days;
  2. Resolving any former and pending investigations by child protective services to the satisfaction of the court; and
  3. Passing two (2) consecutive monthly drug screens to be paid for by the parent.

Acts 2015, ch. 236, § 1.

36-6-116. Temporary injunctions upon service of complaint other than complaint for divorce or legal separation.

  1. When a petition related to child custody is filed, other than a complaint for divorce or legal separation, and upon personal service of the complaint and summons on the respondent or upon waiver and acceptance of service by the respondent, the following temporary injunctions shall be in effect against both parties:
    1. An injunction restraining and enjoining both parties from voluntarily canceling, modifying, terminating, assigning, or allowing to lapse for nonpayment of premiums, any insurance policy, including, but not limited to, life and health, where such insurance policy provides coverage to a child who is the subject of the custody action, or that names either of the parties or the child as beneficiaries without the consent of the other party or an order of the court. For the purposes of this section, “modifying” includes any change in beneficiary status;
    2. An injunction restraining both parties from harassing, threatening, assaulting, or abusing the other and from making disparaging remarks about the other to or in the presence of any children of the parties or to either party's employer;
    3. An injunction restraining and enjoining both parties from hiding, destroying, or spoiling, in whole or in part, any evidence that may be relevant to the custody proceeding, whether electronically stored on computer hard drives or other memory storage devices; and
    4. An injunction restraining both parties from relocating any child of the parties outside this state, or more than fifty (50) miles from the other parent, without the permission of the other party or a court order pursuant to § 36-6-108, except in the case of a removal based upon a well-founded fear of physical abuse against either the fleeing parent or the child. In such case, upon request of the nonrelocating parent, the court shall conduct an expedited hearing, by telephone conference if appropriate, to determine the reasonableness of the relocation and to make such other orders as appropriate.
  2. To the extent that a current valid court order or parenting plan provides protections equal to or greater than those contained in the injunction, that order shall apply instead. The injunctions shall remain in effect until:
    1. A final order in the custody proceeding is entered;
    2. The petition is dismissed;
    3. An agreed order is entered; or
    4. The court modifies or dissolves the injunctions, written notice of which shall be served with the complaint.
  3. The injunctions shall be attached to the summons and the complaint and shall be served with the complaint. The injunctions shall become an order of the court upon being served; provided, however, that nothing in this section shall preclude either party from applying to the court for further temporary orders, an expanded temporary injunction, or modification or revocation of the temporary injunction.
  4. The temporary injunctions provided in this section shall only apply to the parties named in the petition and shall not apply to any third party; provided, however, that nothing in this subsection (d) shall preclude any party from applying to the court for an order of injunctive or extraordinary relief against any other party named in any petition as provided by law.

Acts 2016, ch. 734, § 1.

Part 2
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act

36-6-201. Short title.

This part may be cited as the “Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act.”

Acts 1999, ch. 389, § 2.

Compiler's Notes. The comments appearing under the sections of this part were provided by the Tennessee code commission and were derived from the comments set forth under similar provisions of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (U.L.A.) § 101 et seq. References in the comments have been revised to correspond to §§ 36-6-20136-6-243, which comprise this part.

Former part 2, §§ 36-6-20136-6-225 (Acts 1979, ch. 383, §§ 1-25; 1981, ch. 483, § 1; T.C.A., §§ 36-1301 — 36-1325), the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, was repealed and replaced by the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act by Acts 1999, ch. 389, § 1, effective June 14, 1999. For current provisions, see this part.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 14 Tenn. Juris., Divorce and Alimony, § 31; 20 Tenn. Juris., Parent and Child, § 2.

Law Reviews.

Adoption and Custody: Current Trends in Tennessee Family Law: A Roadmap Through Tennessee's New Adoption Statute, 27 U. Mem. L. Rev. 885 (1997).

Interstate Child Custody Disputes: A Practical Guide for Tennessee Attorneys on the Law of Jurisdiction (Kimberly H. Harris), 24 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 533 (1994).

Attorney General Opinions. Enforcement of out-of-state and ex parte orders of protection. OAG 14-101, 2014 Tenn. AG LEXIS 104 (11/26/14).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Purpose.

The former Tennessee Child Custody Act was designed and intended to resolve custody disputes involving parties in different states, not different counties. McElhaney v. Chipman, 647 S.W.2d 643, 1982 Tenn. App. LEXIS 445 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982) (decided under prior law).

Purpose of the former Tennessee Child Custody Act was to discourage the abduction and other unilateral removals of children from one state to another, and to give the states a reasonable basis upon which to determine which state has jurisdiction in deciding custody disputes when the contestants are residents of different states. Boyd v. Boyd, 653 S.W.2d 732, 1983 Tenn. App. LEXIS 582 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983) (decided under prior law).

When construing the former Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) in light of the general purposes stated in T.C.A. § 36-6-201, a termination of parental rights proceeding constitutes a “custody proceeding” within the meaning of T.C.A. § 36-6-202(3). Graham v. Copeland (In re Copeland), 43 S.W.3d 483, 2000 Tenn. App. LEXIS 221 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000), review or rehearing denied, In re Adoption of Copeland, — S.W.3d —, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 352 (Tenn. Apr. 16, 2001).

2. Federal Preemption.

The Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980, compiled in 28 U.S.C. § 1738A, through federal preemption takes precedence over conflicting state laws. Boyd v. Boyd, 653 S.W.2d 732, 1983 Tenn. App. LEXIS 582 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983); Voninski v. Voninski, 661 S.W.2d 872, 1982 Tenn. App. LEXIS 501 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982), overruled, State ex rel. Cooper v. Hamilton, 688 S.W.2d 821, 1985 Tenn. LEXIS 504 (Tenn. 1985) (decided under prior law).

3. Jurisdiction.

Tennessee courts could adjudicate child custody issues under the former Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) even if one of the parents did not have minimum contacts with Tennessee. Graham v. Copeland (In re Copeland), 43 S.W.3d 483, 2000 Tenn. App. LEXIS 221 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000), review or rehearing denied, In re Adoption of Copeland, — S.W.3d —, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 352 (Tenn. Apr. 16, 2001).

Where children lived in Tennessee with petitioners for at least six consecutive months prior to the filing of the petition, the trial court did not err in finding that it had jurisdiction to determine whether father's parental rights should be terminated pursuant to the former Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA). Graham v. Copeland (In re Copeland), 43 S.W.3d 483, 2000 Tenn. App. LEXIS 221 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000), review or rehearing denied, In re Adoption of Copeland, — S.W.3d —, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 352 (Tenn. Apr. 16, 2001).

Outside of a reference in T.C.A. § 36-6-202, there is no language within the statutory scheme of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act that broadens its application to purely intrastate custody disputes. Keyt v. Keyt, 244 S.W.3d 321, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 1082 (Tenn. Dec. 19, 2007).

36-6-202. Construction and purpose.

This part shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes and policies. This part should be construed according to its purposes, which are to:

  1. Avoid jurisdictional competition and conflict with courts of other states in matters of child custody which have in the past resulted in the shifting of children from state to state with harmful effects on their well-being;
  2. Promote cooperation with the courts of other states to the end that a custody decree is rendered in that state which can best decide the case in the interest of the child;
  3. Discourage the use of the interstate system for continuing controversies over child custody;
  4. Deter abductions of children;
  5. Avoid relitigation of custody decisions of other states in this state; and
  6. Facilitate the enforcement of custody decrees of other states.

Acts 1999, ch. 389, § 3.

Compiler's Notes. Former part 2, §§ 36-6-20136-6-225 (Acts 1979, ch. 383, §§ 1-25; 1981, ch. 483, § 1; T.C.A., §§ 36-1301 — 36-1325), the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, was repealed and replaced by the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act by Acts 1999, ch. 389, § 1, effective June 14, 1999. For current provisions, see this part.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 20 Tenn. Juris., Parent and Child, § 2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Jurisdiction.

Outside of a reference in T.C.A. § 36-6-202, there is no language within the statutory scheme of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act that broadens its application to purely intrastate custody disputes. Keyt v. Keyt, 244 S.W.3d 321, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 1082 (Tenn. Dec. 19, 2007).

Trial court erred in dismissing a mother's contempt petition as it related to the parties'  marital debt as ordered in the final divorce decree because jurisdiction was not conferred on a Nevada court pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act; the parties'  respective duties regarding marital debt were outlined in the final decree of divorce, and those obligations had nothing to do with the custody of their daughter. Blake v. Blake, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 178 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 30, 2015).

Trial court erred in dismissing a father's counter-petition for contempt because a Nevada court was the appropriate venue to consider his petition for contempt based on the mother's alleged interference with his visitation; the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act and the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) may create parallel proceedings in different states regarding custody and support, but the UCCJEA squarely addresses issues related to custody and visitation. Blake v. Blake, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 178 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 30, 2015).

Trial court did not have jurisdiction over the custody proceedings a father initiated because a proceeding concerning the custody of the child had been commenced in the courts of Scotland, and until the court in Scotland ceded jurisdiction, it had exclusive jurisdiction of the custody matters; two custody proceedings were being litigated at the same time, contrary to the purpose and construction of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Enforcement Act. Hagans v. Hagans, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 178 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 5, 2018).

36-6-203. Evidentiary use of official comments.

In any dispute as to the proper construction of one (1) or more sections of this part, the official comments pertaining to the corresponding sections of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, Official Text, as adopted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws as in effect on June 14, 1999, shall constitute evidence of the purposes and policies underlying such sections, unless:

  1. The sections of this part that are applicable to the dispute differ materially from the sections of the Official Text that would be applicable thereto; or
  2. The Official Comments are inconsistent with the plain meaning of the applicable sections of this part.

Acts 1999, ch. 389, § 4.

Compiler's Notes. Former part 2, §§ 36-6-20136-6-225 (Acts 1979, ch. 383, §§ 1-25; 1981, ch. 483, § 1; T.C.A., §§ 36-1301 — 36-1325), the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, was repealed and replaced by the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act by Acts 1999, ch. 389, § 1, effective June 14, 1999. For current provisions, see this part.

36-6-204. Official comments to be included in this part.

The Tennessee code commission is hereby authorized and directed to include as Official Comments those comment provisions pertaining to the corresponding sections of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, which shall be transmitted to the commission with this act.

Acts 1999, ch. 389, § 5.

Compiler's Notes. Former part 2, §§ 36-6-20136-6-225 (Acts 1979, ch. 383, §§ 1-25; 1981, ch. 483, § 1; T.C.A., §§ 36-1301 — 36-1325), the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, was repealed and replaced by the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act by Acts 1999, ch. 389, § 1, effective June 14, 1999. For current provisions, see this part.

36-6-205. Part definitions.

As used in this part, unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “Abandoned” means left without provision for reasonable and necessary care or supervision;
  2. “Child” means an individual who has not attained eighteen (18) years of age;
  3. “Child custody determination” means a judgment, decree, or other order of a court providing for the legal custody, physical custody, or visitation with respect to a child. “Child custody determination” includes a permanent, temporary, initial, and modification order. “Child custody determination” does not include an order relating to child support or other monetary obligation of an individual;
  4. “Child custody proceeding” means a proceeding in which legal custody, physical custody, or visitation with respect to a child is an issue. “Child custody proceeding” includes a proceeding for divorce, separation, neglect, abuse, dependency, guardianship, paternity, termination of parental rights, and protection from domestic violence, in which the issue may appear. “Child custody proceeding” does not include a proceeding involving juvenile delinquency, contractual emancipation, or enforcement under part 3 of this chapter;
  5. “Commencement” means the filing of the first pleading in a proceeding;
  6. “Court” means an entity authorized under the law of a state to establish, enforce, or modify a child custody determination;
  7. “Home state” means the state in which a child lived with a parent or a person acting as a parent for at least six (6) consecutive months immediately before the commencement of a child custody proceeding. In the case of a child less than six (6) months of age, “home state” means the state in which the child lived from birth with any of the persons mentioned. A period of temporary absence of any of the mentioned persons is part of the period;
  8. “Initial determination” means the first child custody determination concerning a particular child;
  9. “Issuing court” means the court that makes a child custody determination for which enforcement is sought under this part;
  10. “Issuing state” means the state in which a child custody determination is made;
  11. “Modification” means a child custody determination that changes, replaces, supersedes, or is otherwise made after a previous determination concerning the same child, whether or not it is made by the court that made the previous determination;
  12. “Person” means an individual, corporation, business, trust estate, trust, partnership, limited liability company, association, joint venture, government, governmental subdivision, agency, or instrumentality, public corporation, or any other legal or commercial entity;
  13. “Person acting as a parent” means a person, other than a parent, who:
    1. Has physical custody of the child or has had physical custody for a period of six (6) consecutive months, including any temporary absence, within one (1) year immediately before the commencement of a child custody proceeding; and
    2. Has been awarded legal custody by a court or claims a right to legal custody under the law of this state;
  14. “Petitioner” means a person who seeks enforcement of an order for return of a child under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction or enforcement of a child custody determination;
  15. “Physical custody” means the physical care and supervision of a child;
  16. “Respondent” means a person against whom a proceeding has been commenced for enforcement of an order for return of a child under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction or enforcement of a child custody determination;
  17. “State” means a state of the United States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the United States Virgin Islands, or any territory or insular possession subject to the jurisdiction of the United States;
  18. “Tribe” means an Indian tribe or band, or Alaskan native village, which is recognized by federal law or formally acknowledged by a state; and
  19. “Warrant” means an order issued by a court authorizing law enforcement officers to take physical custody of a child.

Acts 1999, ch. 389, § 6.

Compiler's Notes. The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of Child Abduction (CTIA No. 8303.000), referred to in this section, was completed October 25, 1990, entered into force December 1, 1983, and was signed by the United States July 1, 1998.

Former part 2, §§ 36-6-20136-6-225 (Acts 1979, ch. 383, §§ 1-25; 1981, ch. 483, § 1; T.C.A., §§ 36-1301 — 36-1325), the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, was repealed and replaced by the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act by Acts 1999, ch. 389, § 1, effective June 14, 1999. For current provisions, see this part.

Attorney General Opinions. Enforcement of out-of-state and ex parte orders of protection. OAG 14-101, 2014 Tenn. AG LEXIS 104 (11/26/14).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Home State.

If another state has satisfied the definition of “home state” set out in this section, that state may assert jurisdiction to the exclusion of Tennessee even if Tennessee has significant connections and it is in the child's best interest that Tennessee courts assert such jurisdiction. Finney v. Finney, 619 S.W.2d 130, 1981 Tenn. App. LEXIS 471 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981), overruled, State ex rel. Cooper v. Hamilton, 688 S.W.2d 821, 1985 Tenn. LEXIS 504 (Tenn. 1985) (decided under prior law).

The period during which a child has resided in this state pending resolution of a custody dispute may not be considered in reckoning the time necessary to establish “home state” jurisdiction. Boyd v. Boyd, 653 S.W.2d 732, 1983 Tenn. App. LEXIS 582 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983) (opinion on petition to rehear) (decided under prior law).

The definition of “home state” under the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980, compiled in 28 U.S.C. § 1738A, is identical to that found in this section. Salisbury v. Salisbury, 657 S.W.2d 761, 1983 Tenn. App. LEXIS 698 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983) (decided under prior law).

Tennessee was home state in situation where wife sued for divorce, child support and alimony in Tennessee, received temporary decree not to her liking, moved to Texas, sued for divorce, child support and alimony and received decree to her liking before Tennessee proceedings became final, and Texas courts were without subject matter jurisdiction and should have given Tennessee temporary decree full faith and credit. Salisbury v. Salisbury, 657 S.W.2d 761, 1983 Tenn. App. LEXIS 698 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983) (decided under prior law).

Where child's “home state” was clearly and undeniably Tennessee, and Hawaii court purported to exercise jurisdiction on the basis of a “significant connection,” that court was not acting substantially in compliance with the federal Parental Kidnapping Protection Act (28 U.S.C. § 1738A). Brown v. Brown, 847 S.W.2d 496, 1993 Tenn. LEXIS 47 (Tenn. 1993) (decided under prior law).

Where a Hawaii court lacked jurisdiction to enter a custody decree, because the child's “home state” was Tennessee, the subsequent judgment in the Tennessee court was either an “initial decree” or a “modification decree,” but in any event it was a valid and enforceable order. Brown v. Brown, 847 S.W.2d 496, 1993 Tenn. LEXIS 47 (Tenn. 1993) (decided under prior law).

Where Georgia had become child's “home state” under former T.C.A. § 36-6-205(5), then Tennessee trial court did not have jurisdiction to determine the propriety of modification, because the Tennessee statute, unlike the Georgia version of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, did not permit a Tennessee court to exercise “significant connection” jurisdiction unless it appeared that no state has jurisdiction as the “home state.” Brown v. Brown, 847 S.W.2d 496, 1993 Tenn. LEXIS 47 (Tenn. 1993) (decided under prior law).

Where both parents and their children lived in Indiana until the parents' divorce, after which time mother and children moved to Tennessee, the “commencement of the proceeding” (see former T.C.A. § 36-6-203(a)(1)(A)) and “time involved” did not refer to the initial filing in a Tennessee court. Rather, because there were ongoing proceedings in Indiana, the relevant time period was when the parties filed for divorce in Indiana. Thus the Indiana court at all times retained and continued to exercise custody jurisdiction under the Indiana UCCJA (I.C. § 31-17-3-1 et seq.), and, since the Tennessee UCCJA (T.C.A. § 36-6-201 et seq.) restricts jurisdiction to one state at a time, Tennessee never became the home state, and had no jurisdiction over action to modify the custody decree. Wilcox v. Wilcox, 862 S.W.2d 533, 1993 Tenn. App. LEXIS 389 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993) (decided under prior law).

Even though, under a joint custody arrangement, the father was allowed visitation during holidays, including six weeks in the summer, where the children lived with the mother in Texas for nearly three years before the filing of the modification petition, the scattered days spent in Tennessee with the father were not enough to establish Tennessee as the children's home state, and Tennessee could not assert jurisdiction over the custody dispute. Gutzke v. Gutzke, 908 S.W.2d 198, 1995 Tenn. App. LEXIS 268 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995) (decided under prior law).

Where the father had commenced a divorce proceeding in Alabama prior to the mother's filing of an action in Tennessee, Alabama had jurisdiction to make a child custody determination because it had been the child's home state within six months before the father filed a divorce action, and the child was absent from that state because of his removal by his mother. Culp v. Culp, 917 S.W.2d 233, 1995 Tenn. App. LEXIS 446 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995) (decided under prior law).

In a child custody proceeding brought by the father in Tennessee, the appellate court determined that Wisconsin was not the minor child's “home state” because the child did not live with his custodial mother in Wisconsin for at least six consecutive months immediately before the commencement of the custody proceeding, and because the mother had effected a change of domicile for the child in Tennessee within the past six months. Parrott v. Abraham, 146 S.W.3d 623, 2003 Tenn. App. LEXIS 115 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003).

In an interstate custody dispute under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), T.C.A. § 36-6-20136-6-243, the Tennessee court properly exercised jurisdiction pursuant to T.C.A. §§ 36-6-217(a)(1), 36-6-218(1) because it had been more than 11 months since the child or either of the parents had lived in Florida. Furthermore, under T.C.A. §§ 36-6-205(7), 36-6-216(a)(1), Tennessee was the child's home state because the child had lived there for more than six months. Staats v. McKinnon, 206 S.W.3d 532, 2006 Tenn. App. LEXIS 292 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006).

Tennessee trial court did not err in denying the mother's motion to dismiss the father's action in Tennessee to modify an original custody determination in Florida because Florida no longer had exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over the child custody determination as provided in UCCJEA, and Tennessee had home state jurisdiction because when the father filed his modification petition in Tennessee, neither of the parents had been living in Florida, and the child had been living with the father in Tennessee for more than six consecutive months as provided in T.C.A. § 36-6-205(7). Staats v. McKinnon, 206 S.W.3d 532, 2006 Tenn. App. LEXIS 292 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006).

Trial court found that there was not a home state for a child born in Colorado because the child lived in Colorado less than six months, but resided outside of Colorado for a considerable length of time, and then lived in Tennessee with the mother. However, Tennessee was a convenient forum as the parties had substantial connections with Tennessee in that the mother owned a home in Tennessee and the child had strong relationships with local family members. In re Conner F., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 505 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 26, 2017).

Tennessee court had jurisdiction to make an initial child custody determination because Tennessee was the child's home state when the father filed the father's original petition to establish parentage and obtain parenting time. In re Arabella L., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 764 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 28, 2017).

Juvenile court had subject matter jurisdiction to determine custody because Tennessee was the child's home state on the date of the commencement of the juvenile court action; the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction to terminate the father's parental rights because when the foster parents filed their termination petition, Tennessee remained the home state and exercised continuing jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act. In re Rilyn S., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 124 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 12, 2019).

Evidence preponderated in favor of the trial court's finding that the Tennessee was no longer the home state of either parent or the child on November 17, 2016, the date the father filed his petition to modify custody, and therefore the trial court did not err by granting the mother's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, because the father acknowledged that he had relocated to North Carolina four years prior to trial and the trial court credited the mother's testimony that she and the child had relocated to Alabama in 2015 and had been living there ever since. Hernandez v. Hernandez, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 371 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 30, 2019).

2. Temporary Absence.

Mexican courts could not claim home state jurisdiction because the father and his children were expelled from the country for at least ten years and the children's and their father's absences from Mexico were not the sort of temporary absence envisioned by T.C.A. § 36-6-205(7). In re S.L.M., 207 S.W.3d 288, 2006 Tenn. App. LEXIS 487 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006).

3. Child Custody Proceeding.

Court of Appeals of Tennessee concludes that the Tennessee Legislature did not intend to exclude grandparent visitation proceedings from the Tennessee Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act's (TUCCJEA's), T.C.A. § 36-6-201 et seq., definition of child custody proceeding. Moorcroft v. Stuart, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 52 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 30, 2015).

Trial court did not have jurisdiction over the custody proceedings a father initiated because a proceeding concerning the custody of the child had been commenced in the courts of Scotland, and until the court in Scotland ceded jurisdiction, it had exclusive jurisdiction of the custody matters; two custody proceedings were being litigated at the same time, contrary to the purpose and construction of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Enforcement Act. Hagans v. Hagans, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 178 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 5, 2018).

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

The UCCJA did not contain a definition of “child.” The definition here is taken from the PKPA.

The definition of “child custody determination” now closely tracks the Parental Kidnapping (“PKPA”) definition. It encompasses any judgment, decree or other order which provides for the custody of, or visitation with, a child, regardless of local terminology, including such labels as “managing conservatorship” or “parenting plan.”

The definition of “child custody proceeding” has been expanded from the comparable definition in the UCCJA. These listed proceedings have generally been determined to be the type of proceeding to which the UCCJA and PKPA are applicable. The list of examples removes any controversy about the types of proceedings where a custody determination can occur. Proceedings that affect access to the child are subject to this act. The inclusion of proceedings related to protection from domestic violence is necessary because in some states domestic violence proceedings may affect custody of and visitation with a child. Juvenile delinquency or proceedings to confer contractual rights are not “custody proceedings” because they do not relate to civil aspects of access to a child. While a determination of paternity is covered under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, the custody and visitation aspects of paternity cases are custody proceedings. Cases involving the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction have not been included at this point because custody of the child is not determined in a proceeding under the International Child Abductions Remedies Act. Those proceedings are specially included in the enforcement process in this act.

“Commencement” has been included in the definitions as a replacement for the term “pending” found in the UCCJA. Its inclusion simplifies some of the simultaneous proceedings provisions of this act.

The definition of “home state” has been reworded slightly. No substantive change is intended from the UCCJA.

The term “issuing state” is borrowed from UIFSA. In UIFSA, it refers to the court that issued the support or parentage order. Here, it refers to the state, or the court, which made the custody determination that is sought to be enforced.

The term “person” has been added to ensure that the provisions of this act apply when the state is the moving party in a custody proceeding or has legal custody of a child. The definition of “person” is the one that is mandated for all Uniform Acts.

The term “person acting as a parent” has been slightly redefined. It has been broadened from the definition in the UCCJA to include a person who has acted as a parent for a significant period of time prior to the filing of the custody proceeding as well as a person who currently has physical custody of the child. In addition, a person acting as a parent must either have legal custody or claim a right to legal custody under the law of this state. The reference to the law of this state means that a court determines the issue of whether someone is a “person acting as a parent” under its own law. This reaffirms the traditional view that a court in a child-custody case applies its own substantive law. The court does not have to undertake a choice-of-law analysis to determine whether the individual who is claiming to be a person acting as a parent has standing to seek custody of the child.

The definition of “tribe” is the one mandated for use in Uniform Acts. Should a state choose to apply this act to tribal adjudications, this definition should be enacted as well as the entirety of section 8 [§ 36-6-207].

The term “contestant” has been omitted from this revision. It was defined in the UCCJA § 2(I) as “a person, including a parent who claims a right to custody or visitation rights with respect to a child.” It seems to have served little purpose over the years, and whatever function it once had has been subsumed by state laws on who has standing to seek custody of or visitation with a child. In addition UCCJA § 2(5) which defined “decree” and “custody decree” has been eliminated as duplicative of the definition of “custody determination.”

36-6-206. Applicability to adoption or emergency medical care proceedings.

This part does not govern an adoption proceeding or a proceeding pertaining to the authorization of emergency medical care for a child.

Acts 1999, ch. 389, § 7.

Compiler's Notes. Former part 2, §§ 36-6-20136-6-225 (Acts 1979, ch. 383, §§ 1-25; 1981, ch. 483, § 1; T.C.A., §§ 36-1301 — 36-1325), the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, was repealed and replaced by the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act by Acts 1999, ch. 389, § 1, effective June 14, 1999. For current provisions, see this part.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Two proceedings are governed by other acts. Adoption cases are excluded from this act because adoption is a specialized area which is thoroughly covered by the Uniform Adoption Act (UAA) (1994). Most states either will adopt that act or will adopt the jurisdictional provisions of that act. Therefore the jurisdictional provisions governing adoption proceeding are generally found elsewhere.

However, there are likely to be a number of instances where it will be necessary to apply this act in an adoption proceeding. For example, if a state adopts the UAA then Section 3-101 of the act specifically refers in places to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act which will become a reference to this act. Second, the UAA requires that if an adoption is denied or set aside, the court is to determine the child's custody. See UAA § 3-704. Those custody proceedings would be subject to this act. See Joan Heifetz Hollinger, The Uniform Adoption Act:

Reporter's Ruminations, 30 Fam.L.Q. 345 (1996).

Children that are the subject of interstate placements for adoption or foster care are governed by the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC). The UAA § 2-107 provides that the provisions of the compact, although not jurisdictional, supply the governing rules for all children who are subject to it. As stated in the Comments to that section: “Once a court exercises jurisdiction, the ICPC helps determine the legality of an interstate placement.” For a discussion of the relationship between the UCCJA and the ICPC see Doe v. Franks, 893 P.2d 732 (Ariz. 1995).

Proceedings pertaining to the authorization of emergency medical care for children are outside the scope of this act since they are not custody determinations.

All states have procedures which allow the state to temporarily supersede parental authority for purposes of emergency medical procedures. Those provisions will govern without regard to this act.

36-6-207. Native American children.

  1. A child-custody proceeding that pertains to an Indian child as defined in the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) is not subject to this part to the extent that it is governed by the Indian Child Welfare Act.
  2. A court of this state shall treat a tribe as if it were a state of the United States for the purpose of applying parts 1 and 2 of this chapter.
  3. A child-custody determination made by a tribe under factual circumstances in substantial conformity with the jurisdictional standards of this part must be recognized and enforced under part 3 of this chapter.

Acts 1999, ch. 389, § 8.

Compiler's Notes. Former part 2, §§ 36-6-20136-6-225 (Acts 1979, ch. 383, §§ 1-25; 1981, ch. 483, § 1; T.C.A., §§ 36-1301 — 36-1325), the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, was repealed and replaced by the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act by Acts 1999, ch. 389, § 1, effective June 14, 1999. For current provisions, see this part.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

This section allows states the discretion to extend the terms of this act to Indian tribes by removing the brackets. The definition of “tribe” is found at section 6(18) [§ 36-6-205(18)]. This act does not purport to legislate custody jurisdiction for tribal courts. However, a tribe could adopt this act as enabling legislation by simply replacing references to “this state” with “this tribe.”

36-6-208. Foreign countries — Human rights.

  1. A court of this state shall treat a foreign country as if it were a state of the United States for the purpose of applying this part.
  2. Except as otherwise provided in subsection (c), a child-custody determination made in a foreign country under factual circumstances in substantial conformity with the jurisdictional standards of this part must be recognized and enforced under this part.
  3. A court of this state need not apply this part if the child custody law of a foreign country violates fundamental principles of human rights.

Acts 1999, ch. 389, § 9.

Compiler's Notes. Former part 2, §§ 36-6-20136-6-225 (Acts 1979, ch. 383, §§ 1-25; 1981, ch. 483, § 1; T.C.A., §§ 36-1301 — 36-1325), the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, was repealed and replaced by the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act by Acts 1999, ch. 389, § 1, effective June 14, 1999. For current provisions, see this part.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Jurisdiction.

Trial court did not have jurisdiction over the custody proceedings a father initiated because a proceeding concerning the custody of the child had been commenced in the courts of Scotland, and until the court in Scotland ceded jurisdiction, it had exclusive jurisdiction of the custody matters; two custody proceedings were being litigated at the same time, contrary to the purpose and construction of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Enforcement Act. Hagans v. Hagans, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 178 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 5, 2018).

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

The provisions of this act have international application to child custody proceedings and determinations of other countries. Another country will be treated as if it were a state of the United states for purposes of this act. Custody determinations of other countries will be enforced if the facts of the case indicate that jurisdiction was in substantial compliance with the requirements of this act.

In this section, the term “child-custody determination” should be interpreted to include proceedings relating to custody or analogous institutions of the other country. See generally, Part 3 of The Hague Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement and Cooperation in Respect of Parental Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of Children. 35 I.L.M. 1391(1996). A court of this state may refuse to apply this act when the child custody law of the other country violates basic principles relating to the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms. The same concept is found in Section 20 of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction [CTIA No. 8303.000] (return of the child may be refused if this would not be permitted by the fundamental principles of the requested state relating to the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms). In applying subsection (c), the court's scrutiny should be on the child custody law of the foreign country and not on other aspects of the other legal system. This act takes no position on what laws relating to child custody would violate fundamental freedoms. While the provision is a traditional one in international agreements, it is invoked only in the most egregious cases.

This section is derived from Section 23 of the UCCJA.

36-6-209. Binding nature of state court decisions.

  1. A child-custody determination made by a court of this state that had jurisdiction under this part binds all persons who have been served in accordance with the laws of this state or notified in accordance with this part or who have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court, and who have been given an opportunity to be heard.
  2. As to those persons, the determination is conclusive as to all decided issues of law and fact except to the extent the determination is modified.

Acts 1999, ch. 389, § 10.

Compiler's Notes. Former part 2, §§ 36-6-20136-6-225 (Acts 1979, ch. 383, §§ 1-25; 1981, ch. 483, § 1; T.C.A., §§ 36-1301 — 36-1325), the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, was repealed and replaced by the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act by Acts 1999, ch. 389, § 1, effective June 14, 1999. For current provisions, see this part.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Unclean Hands.

Tennessee court acted within its discretion when it declined jurisdiction due to the wife's violation of the visitation provisions of a North Carolina custody decree. Marcus v. Marcus, 993 S.W.2d 596, 1999 Tenn. LEXIS 277 (Tenn. 1999), rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 1999 Tenn. LEXIS 341 (Tenn. June 28, 1999).

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

No substantive changes have been made to this section which was Section 12 of the UCCJA.

36-6-210. Priority of jurisdictional question in proceedings.

If a question of existence or exercise of jurisdiction under this part is raised in a child-custody proceeding, the question, upon request of a party, must be given priority on the calendar and handled expeditiously.

Acts 1999, ch. 389, § 11.

Compiler's Notes. Former part 2, §§ 36-6-20136-6-225 (Acts 1979, ch. 383, §§ 1-25; 1981, ch. 483, § 1; T.C.A., §§ 36-1301 — 36-1325), the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, was repealed and replaced by the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act by Acts 1999, ch. 389, § 1, effective June 14, 1999. For current provisions, see this part.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

No substantive change was made to this section which was Section 24 of the UCCJA. The section is placed toward the beginning of this act to emphasize its importance.

The language change from “case” to “question” is intended to clarify that it is the jurisdictional issue which must be expedited and not the entire custody case. Whether the entire custody case should be given priority is a matter of local law.

36-6-211. Requirements for notice.

  1. Notice required for the exercise of jurisdiction when a person is outside this state may be given in a manner prescribed by the law of this state for service of process or by the law of the state in which the service is made. Notice must be given in a manner reasonably calculated to give actual notice, but may be by publication if other means are not effective.
  2. Proof of service may be made in the manner prescribed by the law of this state or by the law of the state in which the service is made.
  3. Notice is not required for the exercise of jurisdiction with respect to a person who submits to the jurisdiction of the court.

Acts 1999, ch. 389, § 12.

Compiler's Notes. Former part 2, §§ 36-6-20136-6-225 (Acts 1979, ch. 383, §§ 1-25; 1981, ch. 483, § 1; T.C.A., §§ 36-1301 — 36-1325), the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, was repealed and replaced by the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act by Acts 1999, ch. 389, § 1, effective June 14, 1999. For current provisions, see this part.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

This section authorizes notice and proof of service to be made by any method allowed by either the state which issues the notice or the state where the notice is received. This eliminates the need to specify the type of notice in the act and therefore the provisions of Section 5 of the UCCJA which specified how notice was to be accomplished were eliminated. The change reflects an approach in this act to use local law to determine many procedural issues. Thus, service by facsimile is permissible if allowed by local rule in either state. In addition, where special service or notice rules are available for some procedures, in either jurisdiction, they could be utilized under this act. For example, if a case involves domestic violence and the statute of either state would authorize notice to be served by a peace officer, such service could be used under this act.

Although section 9 [§ 36-6-208] requires foreign countries to be treated as states for purposes of this act, attorneys should be cautioned about service and notice in foreign countries. Countries have their own rules on service which must usually be followed. Attorneys should consult the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, 20 U.S.T. 36, T.I.A.S. 6638 (1965).

36-6-212. Personal jurisdiction over a party — Immunity from jurisdiction for unrelated matters.

  1. A party to a child-custody proceeding, including a modification proceeding, or a petitioner or respondent in a proceeding to enforce or register a child-custody determination, is not subject to personal jurisdiction in this state for another proceeding or purpose solely by reason of having participated, or of having been physically present for the purpose of participating, in the proceeding.
  2. A person who is subject to personal jurisdiction in this state on a basis other than physical presence is not immune from service of process in this state. A party present in this state who is subject to the jurisdiction of another state is not immune from service of process allowable under the laws of that state.
  3. The immunity granted by subsection (a) does not extend to civil litigation based on acts unrelated to the participation in a proceeding under this part committed by an individual while present in this state.

Acts 1999, ch. 389, § 13.

Compiler's Notes. Former part 2, §§ 36-6-20136-6-225 (Acts 1979, ch. 383, §§ 1-25; 1981, ch. 483, § 1; T.C.A., §§ 36-1301 — 36-1325), the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, was repealed and replaced by the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act by Acts 1999, ch. 389, § 1, effective June 14, 1999. For current provisions, see this part.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

This section establishes a general principle that participation in a custody proceeding does not, by itself, give the court jurisdiction over any issue for which personal jurisdiction over the individual is required. The term “participate” should be read broadly. For example, if jurisdiction is proper, a respondent in an original custody determination, or a party in a modification determination, should be able to request custody without this constituting the seeking of affirmative relief that would waive personal jurisdictional objections. Once jurisdiction is proper, a party should not be placed in the dilemma of choosing between seeking custody or protecting a right not to be subject to a monetary judgment by a court with no other relationship to the party.

This section is comparable to the immunity provision of UIFSA § 314. A party who is otherwise not subject to personal jurisdiction can appear in a custody proceeding or an enforcement action without being subject to the general jurisdiction of the state by virtue of the appearance. However, if the petitioner would otherwise be subject to the jurisdiction of the state, appearing in a custody proceeding or filing an enforcement proceeding will not provide immunity. Thus, if the non-custodial parent moves from the state that decided the custody determination, that parent is still subject to the state's jurisdiction for enforcement of child support if the child or an individual obligee continues to reside there. See UIFSA § 205. If the non-custodial parent returns to enforce the visitation aspects of the custody determination, the state can utilize any appropriate means to collect the back-due child support. However, the situation is different if both parties move from state A after the determination, with the custodial parent and the child establishing a new home state in state B, and the non-custodial parent moving to state C. The non-custodial parent is not, at this point, subject to the jurisdiction of state B for monetary matters. See Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978). If the non-custodial parent comes into state B to enforce the visitation aspects of the determination, the non-custodial parent is not subject to the jurisdiction of state B for those proceedings and issues requiring personal jurisdiction by filing the enforcement action.

A party also is immune from service of process during the time in the state for an enforcement action except for those claims for which jurisdiction could be based on contacts other than mere physical presence. Thus, when the non-custodial parent comes into state B to enforce the visitation aspects of the decree, state B cannot acquire jurisdiction over the child support aspects of the decree by serving the non-custodial parent in the state. Cf. UIFSA § 611. (Personally serving the obligor in the state of the residence of the obligee is not by itself a sufficient jurisdictional basis to authorize a modification of child support.) However, a party who is in this state and subject to the jurisdiction of another state may be served with process to appear in that state, if allowable under the laws of that state.

As the Comments to UIFSA § 314 note, the immunity provided by this section is limited. It does not provide immunity for civil litigation unrelated to the enforcement action. For example, a party to an enforcement action is not immune from service regarding a claim that involves an automobile accident occurring while the party is in the state.

36-6-213. Communication among courts and parties — Records of communications.

  1. A court of this state may communicate with a court in another state concerning a proceeding arising under this part.
  2. The court may allow the parties to participate in the communication. If the parties are not able to participate in the communication, they must be given the opportunity to present facts and legal arguments before a decision on jurisdiction is made.
  3. Communication between courts on schedules, calendars, court records, and similar matters may occur without informing the parties. A record need not be made of the communication.
  4. Except as otherwise provided in subsection (c), a record must be made of a communication under this section. The parties must be informed promptly of the communication and granted access to the record.
  5. For the purposes of this section, “record” means information that is inscribed on a tangible medium or that is stored in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable in perceivable form.

Acts 1999, ch. 389, § 14.

Compiler's Notes. Former part 2, §§ 36-6-20136-6-225 (Acts 1979, ch. 383, §§ 1-25; 1981, ch. 483, § 1; T.C.A., §§ 36-1301 — 36-1325), the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, was repealed and replaced by the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act by Acts 1999, ch. 389, § 1, effective June 14, 1999. For current provisions, see this part.

Law Reviews.

Six Months or Six Days: When Can You File For Divorce in Tennessee?, 50 Tenn. B.J. 24 (2014).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Abuse of Discretion.

Vacating of a Tennessee juvenile court's decision to decline to exercise jurisdiction and remand of the case for further proceedings was appropriate because the court abused its discretion in declining to exercise jurisdiction on the basis that Alabama was the more convenient forum without allowing the parties an opportunity to present evidence. Furthermore, from the record, the appellate court could not determine whether the Tennessee court considered the requisite statutory factors in reaching its decision. In re Arabella L., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 764 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 28, 2017).

2. Practice And Procedure.

Although a Tennessee juvenile court erred by failing to provide access to the record of its communication with an Alabama court in determining that the Alabama court was the more convenient forum, the appellate court considered the issue waived as the appellant did not raise the issue in the proceedings below. In re Arabella L., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 764 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 28, 2017).

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

This section emphasizes the role of judicial communications. It authorizes a court to communicate concerning any proceeding arising under this act. This includes communication with foreign tribunals and tribal courts. Communication can occur in many different ways such as by telephonic conference and by online or other electronic communication. The act does not preclude any method of communication and recognizes that there will be increasing use of modem communication techniques.

Communication between courts is required under sections 20, 22 and 31 [§§ 36-6-219, 36-6-221 and 36-6-230] and strongly suggested in applying section 23 [§ 36-6-222]. Apart from those sections, there may be less need under this act for courts to communicate concerning jurisdiction due to the prioritization of home state jurisdiction. Communication is authorized, however, whenever the court finds it would be helpful. The court may authorize the parties to participate in the communication. However, the act does not mandate participation. Communication between courts is often difficult to schedule and participation by the parties may be impractical. Phone calls often have to be made after-hours or whenever the schedules of judges allow.

This section does require that a record be made of the conversation and that the parties have access to that record in order to be informed of the content of the conversation. The only exception to this requirement is when the communication involves relatively inconsequential matters such as scheduling, calendars, and court records. Included within this latter type of communication would be matters of cooperation between courts. A record includes notes or transcripts of a court reporter who listened to a conference call between the courts, an electronic recording of a telephone call, a memorandum or an electronic record of the communication between the courts, or a memorandum or an electronic record made by a court after the communication.

The second sentence of subsection (b) protects the parties against unauthorized ex parte communications. The parties' participation in the communication may amount to a hearing if there is an opportunity to present facts and jurisdictional arguments. However, absent such an opportunity, the participation of the parties should not to be considered a substitute for a hearing and the parties must be given an opportunity to fairly and fully present facts and arguments on the jurisdictional issue before a determination is made. This may be done through a hearing or, if appropriate, by affidavit or memorandum. The court is expected to set forth the basis for its jurisdictional decision, including any court-to-court communication which may have been a factor in the decision.

36-6-214. Testimony of witnesses residing out of state — Acceptance of electronically transmitted documents as evidence.

  1. In addition to other procedures available to a party, a party to a child custody proceeding may offer testimony of witnesses who are located in another state, including testimony of the parties and the child, by deposition or other means allowable in this state for testimony taken in another state. The court on its own motion may order that the testimony of a person be taken in another state and may prescribe the manner in which and the terms upon which the testimony is taken.
  2. A court of this state may permit an individual residing in another state to be deposed or to testify by telephone, audiovisual means, or other electronic means before a designated court or at another location in that state. A court of this state shall cooperate with courts of other states in designating an appropriate location for the deposition or testimony.
  3. Documentary evidence transmitted from another state to a court of this state by technological means that do not produce an original writing may not be excluded from evidence on an objection based on the means of transmission.

Acts 1999, ch. 389, § 15.

Compiler's Notes. Former part 2, §§ 36-6-20136-6-225 (Acts 1979, ch. 383, §§ 1-25; 1981, ch. 483, § 1; T.C.A., §§ 36-1301 — 36-1325), the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, was repealed and replaced by the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act by Acts 1999, ch. 389, § 1, effective June 14, 1999. For current provisions, see this part.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

No substantive changes have been made to subsection (a) which was Section 18 of the UCCJA.

Subsections (b) and (c) merely provide that modem modes of communication are permissible in the taking of testimony and the transmittal of documents. See UIFSA § 316.

36-6-215. Request for hearing in, or evidence from another state — Holding hearings or obtaining evidence for other states — Expenses — Preservation of records.

  1. A court of this state may request the appropriate court of another state to:
    1. Hold an evidentiary hearing;
    2. Order a person to produce or give evidence pursuant to procedures of that state;
    3. Order that an evaluation be made with respect to the custody of a child involved in a pending proceeding;
    4. Forward to the court of this state a certified copy of the transcript of the record of the hearing, the evidence otherwise presented, and any evaluation prepared in compliance with the request; and
    5. Order a party to a child-custody proceeding or any person having physical custody of the child to appear in the proceeding with or without the child.
  2. Upon request of a court of another state, a court of this state may hold a hearing or enter an order described in subsection (a).
  3. Travel and other necessary and reasonable expenses incurred under subsections (a) and (b) may be assessed against the parties according to the law of this state.
  4. A court of this state shall preserve the pleadings, orders, decrees, records of hearings, evaluations, and other pertinent records with respect to a child-custody proceeding until the child attains eighteen (18) years of age. Upon appropriate request by a court or law enforcement official of another state, the court shall forward a certified copy of those records.

Acts 1999, ch. 389, § 16.

Compiler's Notes. Former part 2, §§ 36-6-20136-6-225 (Acts 1979, ch. 383, §§ 1-25; 1981, ch. 483, § 1; T.C.A., §§ 36-1301 — 36-1325), the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, was repealed and replaced by the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act by Acts 1999, ch. 389, § 1, effective June 14, 1999. For current provisions, see this part.

Law Reviews.

Six Months or Six Days: When Can You File For Divorce in Tennessee?, 50 Tenn. B.J. 24 (2014).

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

This section is the heart of the judicial cooperation provision of this act. It provides mechanisms for courts to cooperate with each other in order to decide cases in an efficient manner without causing undue expense to the parties. Courts may request assistance from courts of other states and may assist courts of other states.

The provision on the assessment of costs for travel provided in the UCCJA § 19 has been changed. The UCCJA provided that the costs may be assessed against the parties or the state or county. Assessment of costs against a government entity in a case where the government is not involved is inappropriate and therefore that provision has been removed. In addition, if the state is involved as a party, assessment of costs and expenses against the state must be authorized by other law. It should be noted that the term “expenses” means out-of-pocket costs. Overhead costs should not be assessed as expenses.

No other substantive changes have been made. The term “social study” as used in the UCCJA was replaced with the modern term: “custody evaluation.” The act does not take a position on the admissibility of a custody evaluation that was conducted in another state. It merely authorizes a court to seek assistance of, or render assistance to, a court of another state.

This section combines the text of Sections 19-22 of the UCCJA.

36-6-216. Jurisdiction to make custody determination.

  1. Except as otherwise provided in § 36-6-219, a court of this state has jurisdiction to make an initial child custody determination only if:
    1. This state is the home state of the child on the date of the commencement of the proceeding, or was the home state of the child within six (6) months before the commencement of the proceeding and the child is absent from this state but a parent or person acting as a parent continues to live in this state;
    2. A court of another state does not have jurisdiction under subdivision (a)(1), or a court of the home state of the child has declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that this state is the more appropriate forum under §§ 36-6-221 or 36-6-222, and:
      1. The child and the child's parents, or the child and at least one (1) parent or a person acting as a parent, have a significant connection with this state other than mere physical presence; and
      2. Substantial evidence is available in this state concerning the child's care, protection, training, and personal relationships;
    3. All courts having jurisdiction under subdivision (a)(1) or (a)(2) have declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that a court of this state is the more appropriate forum to determine the custody of the child under §§ 36-6-221 or 36-6-222; or
    4. No court of any other state would have jurisdiction under the criteria specified in subdivision (a)(1), (a)(2), or (a)(3).
  2. Subsection (a) is the exclusive jurisdictional basis for making a child-custody determination by a court of this state.
  3. Physical presence of, or personal jurisdiction over, a party or a child is not necessary or sufficient to make a child-custody determination.

Acts 1999, ch. 389, § 17.

Compiler's Notes. Former part 2, §§ 36-6-20136-6-225 (Acts 1979, ch. 383, §§ 1-25; 1981, ch. 483, § 1; T.C.A., §§ 36-1301 — 36-1325), the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, was repealed and replaced by the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act by Acts 1999, ch. 389, § 1, effective June 14, 1999. For current provisions, see this part.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Home State.

In a child custody proceeding, subject matter jurisdiction concerning the minor child's custody was properly vested in Montgomery County, Tennessee, juvenile court pursuant to T.C.A. § 36-6-216(a)(4) because the child's domicile had changed with his custodial mother's change of domicile from Wisconsin to Tennessee. Parrott v. Abraham, 146 S.W.3d 623, 2003 Tenn. App. LEXIS 115 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003).

In an interstate custody dispute under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), T.C.A. §§  36-6-20136-6-243, the Tennessee court properly exercised jurisdiction pursuant to T.C.A. §§ 36-6-217(a)(1), 36-6-218(1) because it had been more than eleven months since the child or either of the parents had lived in Florida. Furthermore, under T.C.A. §§ 36-6-205(7), 36-6-216(a)(1), Tennessee was the child's home state because the child had lived there for more than six months. Staats v. McKinnon, 206 S.W.3d 532, 2006 Tenn. App. LEXIS 292 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006).

Appellate court rejected the mother's claim that the Tennessee erred in determining that it had home state jurisdiction under T.C.A. § 36-6-216 of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), because when the father filed his petition in Tennessee to modify the original Florida custody determination, neither of the parents had been living in Florida and the child had been living with the father in Tennessee for more than six consecutive months. Staats v. McKinnon, 206 S.W.3d 532, 2006 Tenn. App. LEXIS 292 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006).

Tennessee court had jurisdiction to make an initial child custody determination because Tennessee was the child's home state when the father filed the father's original petition to establish parentage and obtain parenting time. In re Arabella L., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 764 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 28, 2017).

Juvenile court had subject matter jurisdiction to determine custody because Tennessee was the child's home state on the date of the commencement of the juvenile court action; the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction to terminate the father's parental rights because when the foster parents filed their termination petition, Tennessee remained the home state and exercised continuing jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act. In re Rilyn S., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 124 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 12, 2019).

Evidence preponderated in favor of the trial court's finding that the Tennessee was no longer the home state of either parent or the child on November 17, 2016, the date the father filed his petition to modify custody, and therefore the trial court did not err by granting the mother's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, because the father acknowledged that he had relocated to North Carolina four years prior to trial and the trial court credited the mother's testimony that she and the child had relocated to Alabama in 2015 and had been living there ever since. Hernandez v. Hernandez, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 371 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 30, 2019).

2. Jurisdiction in Another State.

Juvenile court properly exercised its jurisdiction in awarding temporary custody of two children to their maternal grandparents while their father was incarcerated on charges of murdering their mother because both the juvenile court and the grandparents concluded that the juvenile court met the requirements for significant connection/substantial evidence jurisdiction under T.C.A. § 36-6-216(a)(2), the father did not take issue with the conclusion, and the court's review of the record led it to conclude that substantial evidence supported the juvenile court's exercise of jurisdiction. In addition, no other court qualified for § 36-6-216(a)(1) jurisdiction. In re S.L.M., 207 S.W.3d 288, 2006 Tenn. App. LEXIS 487 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006).

Tennessee trial court correctly asserted jurisdiction when a father lived in Colorado while the mother was a resident of Tennessee because, although the child was born in Colorado, the child had no home state at the time of the proceeding, Colorado declined to exercise jurisdiction, and the child and the mother had a significant connection with Tennessee due to the mother's changing the mother's domicile to the state. There was also substantial evidence in Tennessee concerning the child's care, protection, training, and personal relationships. In re Conner F., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 505 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 26, 2017).

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

This section provides mandatory jurisdictional rules for the original child custody proceeding. It generally continues the provisions of the UCCJA § 3. However, there have been a number of changes to the jurisdictional bases.

1. Home state Jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of the home state has been prioritized over other jurisdictional bases. Section 3 of the UCCJA provided four (4) independent and concurrent bases of jurisdiction. The PKPA provides that full faith and credit can only be given to an initial custody determination of a “significant connection” state when there is no home state. This act prioritizes home state jurisdiction in the same manner as the PKPA thereby eliminating any potential conflict between the two acts.

The six-month extended home state provision of subsection (a)(l) has been modified slightly from the UCCJA. The UCCJA provided that home state jurisdiction continued for six (6) months when the child had been removed by a person seeking the child's custody or for other reasons and a parent or a person acting as a parent continues to reside in the home state. Under this act, it is no longer necessary to determine why the child has been removed. The only inquiry relates to the status of the person left behind. This change provides a slightly more refined home state standard than the UCCJA or the PKPA, which also requires a determination that the child has been removed by a contestant or for other reasons. The scope of the PKPA's provision is theoretically narrower than this act. However, the phrase “or for other reasons” covers most fact situations where the child is not in the home state and, therefore, the difference has no substantive effect.

In another sense, the six-month extended home state jurisdiction provision in this act is narrower than the comparable provision in the PKPA. The PKPA's definition of extended home state is more expansive because it applies whenever a “contestant” remains in the home state. That class of individuals has been eliminated in this act. This act retains the original UCCJA classification of “parent or person acting as parent” to define who must remain for a state to exercise the six (6) month extended home state jurisdiction. This eliminates the undesirable jurisdictional determinations which would occur as a result of differing state substantive laws on visitation involving grandparents and others. For example, if state A's law provided that grandparents could obtain visitation with a child after the death of one of the parents, then the grandparents, who would be considered contestants under the PKPA, could file a proceeding within six months after the remaining parent moved and have the case heard in state A.

However, if state A did not provide that grandparents could seek visitation under such circumstances, the grandparents would not be considered contestants and state B where the child acquired a new home state would provide the only forum. This act bases jurisdiction on the parent and child or person acting as a parent and child relationship without regard to grandparents or other potential seekers of custody or visitation. There is no conflict with the broader provision of the PKPA. The PKPA in § (c)(1) authorizes states to narrow the scope of their jurisdiction.

2. Significant connection jurisdiction. This jurisdictional basis has been amended in four (4) particulars from the UCCJA. First, the “best interest” language of the UCCJA has been eliminated. This phrase tended to create confusion between the jurisdictional issue and the substantive custody determination. Since the language was not necessary for the jurisdictional issue, it has been removed.

Second, the UCCJA based jurisdiction on the presence of a significant connection between the child and the child's parents or the child and at least one (1) contestant. This act requires that the significant connections be between the child, the child's parents or the child and a person acting as a parent.

Third, a significant connection state may assume jurisdiction only when there is no home state or when the home state decides that the significant connection state would be a more appropriate forum.

Fourth, the determination of significant connections has been changed to eliminate the language of “present or future care.” The jurisdictional determination should be made by determining whether there is sufficient evidence in the state for the court to make an informed custody determination. That evidence might relate to the past as well as to the “present or future.”

Emergency jurisdiction has been moved to a separate section. This is to make it clear that the power to protect a child in crisis does not include the power to enter a permanent order for that child except as provided by that section.

Paragraph (a)(3) provides for jurisdiction when all states with jurisdiction under paragraphs (a)(l) and (2) determine that this state is a more appropriate forum. The determination would have to be made by all states with jurisdiction under subsection (a)(1) and (2). Jurisdiction would not exist under this paragraph because the home state determined it is a more appropriate place to hear the case if there is another state that could exercise significant connection jurisdiction under subsection (a)(2).

Paragraph (a)(4) retains the concept of jurisdiction by necessity as found in the UCCJA and in the PKPA. This default jurisdiction only occurs if no other state would have jurisdiction under subsections (a)(1) through (a)(3).

Subsections (b) and (c) clearly state the relationship between jurisdiction under this act and other forms of jurisdiction. Personal jurisdiction over, or the physical presence of, a parent or the child is neither necessary nor required under this act. In other words, neither minimum contacts nor service within the state is required for the court to have jurisdiction to make a custody determination.

Further, the presence of minimum contacts or service within the state does not confer jurisdiction to make a custody determination. Subject to section 20 [§ 36-6-219], satisfaction of the requirements of subsection (a) is mandatory.

The requirements of this section, plus the notice and hearing provisions of the act, are all that is necessary to satisfy due process. This act, like the UCCJA and the PKPA is based on Justice Frankfurter's concurrence in May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953). As pointed out by Professor Bodenheimer, the reporter for the UCCJA, no “workable interstate custody law could be built around Justice Burton's plurality opinion … Bridgette Bodenheimer, The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act: A Legislative Remedy for Children Caught in the Conflict of Laws, 22 Vand. L. Rev. 1207, 1233 (1969). It should also be noted that since jurisdiction to make a child custody determination is subject matter jurisdiction, an agreement of the parties to confer jurisdiction on a court that would not otherwise have jurisdiction under this act is ineffective.

36-6-217. Continuing jurisdiction of state courts — Jurisdiction to modify own decrees.

  1. Except as otherwise provided in § 36-6-219, a court of this state which has made a child-custody determination consistent with this part has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over the determination until:
    1. A court of this state determines that neither the child, nor the child and one (1) parent, nor the child and a person acting as a parent have a significant connection with this state and that substantial evidence is no longer available in this state concerning the child's care, protection, training, and personal relationships; or
    2. A court of this state or a court of another state determines that the child, the child's parents, and any person acting as a parent do not presently reside in this state.
  2. A court of this state which has made a child-custody determination and does not have exclusive, continuing jurisdiction under this section may modify that determination only if it has jurisdiction to make an initial determination under § 36-6-216.

Acts 1999, ch. 389, § 18.

Compiler's Notes. Former part 2, §§ 36-6-20136-6-225 (Acts 1979, ch. 383, §§ 1-25; 1981, ch. 483, § 1; T.C.A., §§ 36-1301 — 36-1325), the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, was repealed and replaced by the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act by Acts 1999, ch. 389, § 1, effective June 14, 1999. For current provisions, see this part.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Loss of Continuing Jurisdiction.

In an interstate custody dispute under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), T.C.A. §§ 36-6-20136-6-243, the Tennessee court properly exercised jurisdiction pursuant to T.C.A. §§ 36-6-217(a)(1), 36-6-218(1) because it had been more than eleven months since the child or either of the parents had lived in Florida. Furthermore, under T.C.A. §§ 36-6-205(7), 36-6-216(a)(1), Tennessee was the child's home state because the child had lived there for more than six months. Staats v. McKinnon, 206 S.W.3d 532, 2006 Tenn. App. LEXIS 292 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006).

Tennessee trial court did not err in denying the mother's motion to dismiss the father's petition in Tennessee to modify an original custody determination in Florida because Florida no longer had exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over the child custody determination; when the father filed his petition in Tennessee to modify the original Florida custody determination, neither of the parents had been living in Florida and the child had been living with the father in Tennessee for more than six consecutive months. Staats v. McKinnon, 206 S.W.3d 532, 2006 Tenn. App. LEXIS 292 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006).

2. Subject Matter Jurisdiction.

Although a father was required to submit a new proposed parenting plan, his petition to modify the plan was sufficient to invoke the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction because all of the trial court's orders were final judgments; after the entry of each final judgment, the trial court lost the ability to exercise its authority over the case until the father “invoked” its jurisdiction, and he attempted to invoke its jurisdiction by filing a motion to modify the parenting plan. Freeman v. Freeman, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 721 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 14, 2018).

Mother was not entitled to relief from the circuit court's judgment entering a modified Permanent Parenting Plan (PPP) because the father appropriately filed his petition seeking modification of the PPP in the circuit court, which possessed continuing, exclusive subject matter jurisdiction of divorce decrees. Cox v. Lucas, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. LEXIS 218 (Tenn. May 29, 2019).

Juvenile court had subject matter jurisdiction to determine custody because Tennessee was the child's home state on the date of the commencement of the juvenile court action; the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction to terminate the father's parental rights because when the foster parents filed their termination petition, Tennessee remained the home state and exercised continuing jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act. In re Rilyn S., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 124 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 12, 2019).

Trial court no longer maintained subject matter jurisdiction to modify its own initial custody determination because Tennessee was no longer the home state of the child when the modification proceeding commenced and the child's current home state of Alabama had not declined to exercise jurisdiction. Hernandez v. Hernandez, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 371 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 30, 2019).

Appellate court could not properly review the trial court's decision to exercise subject matter jurisdiction over the grandmother's petition for visitation because the record contained no specific findings by the trial court resolving the father's residence at the time the petition was filed and his family's ongoing connection to Tennessee and the county, and the record was wholly silent as to any adjudication of the father's challenge to the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction. In re Paisley H., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 407 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 10, 2020).

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

This is a new section addressing continuing jurisdiction. Continuing jurisdiction was not specifically addressed in the UCCJA. Its absence caused considerable confusion, particularly because the PKPA, § 1738(d), requires other states to give full faith and credit to custody determinations made by the original decree state pursuant to the decree state's continuing jurisdiction so long as that state has jurisdiction under its own law and remains the residence of the child or any contestant.

This section provides the rules of continuing jurisdiction and borrows from UIFSA as well as recent UCCJA case law. The continuing jurisdiction of the original decree state is exclusive. It continues until one (1) of two (2) events occurs:

1. If a parent or a person acting as a parent remains in the original decree state, continuing jurisdiction is lost when neither the child, the child and a parent, nor the child and a person acting as a parent continue to have a significant connection with the original decree state and there is no longer substantial evidence concerning the child's care, protection, training and personal relations in that state.

In other words, even if the child has acquired a new home state, the original decree state retains exclusive, continuing jurisdiction, so long as the general requisites of the substantial connection jurisdiction provisions are met. If the relationship between the child and the person remaining in the state with exclusive, continuing jurisdiction becomes so attenuated that the court could no longer find significant connections and substantial evidence, jurisdiction would no longer exist. The use of the phrase “a court of this state” under subsection (a)(1) makes it clear that the original decree state is the sole determinant of whether jurisdiction continues. A party seeking to modify a custody determination must obtain an order from the original decree state stating that it no longer has jurisdiction.

2. Continuing jurisdiction is lost when the child, the child's parents, and any person acting as a parent no longer reside in the original decree state. The exact language of subparagraph (a)(2) was the subject of considerable debate.

Ultimately the Conference settled on the phrase that “a court of this state or a court of another state determines that the child, the child's parents, and any person acting as a parent do not presently reside in this state” to determine when the exclusive, continuing jurisdiction of a state ended. The phrase is meant to be identical in meaning to the language of the PKPA which provides that full faith and credit is to be given to custody determinations made by a state in the exercise of its continuing jurisdiction when that “state remains the residence of.” The phrase is also the equivalent of the language “continues to reside” which occurs in UIFSA § 205(a)(1) to determine the exclusive, continuing jurisdiction of the state that made a support order. The phrase “remains the residence of” in the PKPA has been the subject of conflicting case law. It is the intention of this act that paragraph (a)(2) of this section means that the named persons no longer continue to actually live within the state. Thus, unless a modification proceeding has been commenced, when the child, the parents, and all persons acting as parents physically leave the state to live elsewhere, the exclusive, continuing jurisdiction ceases.

The phrase “do not presently reside” is not used in the sense of a technical domicile. The fact that the original determination state still considers one parent a domiciliary does not prevent it from losing exclusive, continuing jurisdiction after the child, the parents, and all persons acting as parents have moved from the state.

If the child, the parents, and all persons acting as parents have all left the state which made the custody determination prior to the commencement of the modification during the transition from the UCCJA to this act, some states may continue to base continuing jurisdiction on the continued presence of a contestant, such as a grandparent. The PKPA will require that such decisions be enforced. The problem will disappear as states adopt this act to replace the UCCJA.

Jurisdiction attaches at the commencement of a proceeding. If state A had jurisdiction under this section at the time a modification proceeding was commenced there, it would not be lost by all parties moving out of the state prior to the conclusion of a proceeding. State B would not have jurisdiction to hear a modification unless state A decided that state B was more appropriate under section 23 [§ 36-6-222].

Exclusive, continuing jurisdiction is not reestablished if, after the child, the parents, and all persons acting as parents leave the state, the non-custodial parent returns. As subsection (b) provides, once a state has lost exclusive, continuing jurisdiction, it can modify its own determination only if it has jurisdiction under the standards of section 17 [§ 36-6-216]. If another state acquires exclusive continuing jurisdiction under this section, then its orders cannot be modified even if this state has once again become the home state of the child.

In accordance with the majority of UCCJA case law, the state with exclusive, continuing jurisdiction may relinquish jurisdiction when it determines that another state would be a more convenient forum under the principles of section 23 [§ 36-6-222].

36-6-218. Jurisdiction to modify foreign decrees.

Except as otherwise provided in § 36-6-219, a court of this state may not modify a child-custody determination made by a court of another state unless a court of this state has jurisdiction to make an initial determination under § 36-6-216(a)(1) or (2), and:

  1. The court of the other state determines it no longer has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction under § 36-6-217 or that a court of this state would be a more convenient forum under § 36-6-221; or
  2. A court of this state or a court of the other state determines that the child, the child's parents, and any person acting as a parent do not presently reside in the other state.

Acts 1999, ch. 389, § 19.

Compiler's Notes. Former part 2, §§ 36-6-20136-6-225 (Acts 1979, ch. 383, §§ 1-25; 1981, ch. 483, § 1; T.C.A., §§ 36-1301 — 36-1325), the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, was repealed and replaced by the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act by Acts 1999, ch. 389, § 1, effective June 14, 1999. For current provisions, see this part.

Law Reviews.

Jurisdiction of Tennessee Courts to Modify the Child Custody Decrees and Visitation Orders of Sister States (W. Walton Garrett), 16 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 255 (1986).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Jurisdiction.

In an interstate custody dispute under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), T.C.A. § 36-6-20136-6-243, the Tennessee court properly exercised jurisdiction pursuant to T.C.A. §§ 36-6-217(a)(1), 36-6-218(1) because it had been more than eleven months since the child or either of the parents had lived in Florida. Furthermore, under T.C.A. §§ 36-6-205(7), 36-6-216(a)(1), Tennessee was the child's home state because the child had lived there for more than six months. Staats v. McKinnon, 206 S.W.3d 532, 2006 Tenn. App. LEXIS 292 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006).

Tennessee trial court did not err in denying the mother's motion to dismiss the father's petition in Tennessee to modify an original custody determination in Florida because Florida no longer had exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over the child custody determination; when the father filed his petition in Tennessee to modify the original Florida custody determination, neither of the parents had been living in Florida and the child had been living with the father in Tennessee for more than six consecutive months. Staats v. McKinnon, 206 S.W.3d 532, 2006 Tenn. App. LEXIS 292 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006).

Appellate court properly vacated the trial court's order that continued its temporary emergency jurisdiction indefinitely and for all purposes because T.C.A. § 36-6-219 only authorized emergency jurisdiction on a temporary basis; however, under T.C.A. § 36-6-221(c), Tennessee courts possessed jurisdiction to modify the Hawaii court's order that terminated the services of the child's therapist. Button v. Waite, 208 S.W.3d 366, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 1132 (Tenn. 2006).

In a child custody case where the parties were divorced in Ohio and the mother moved to Tennessee with the parties' child, the trial court erred by modifying the father's co-parenting time, as the trial court did not have jurisdiction to modify the Ohio child custody decree where the father had remained a resident of Ohio at all times relevant to the action, and the Ohio court had not relinquished its jurisdiction to Tennessee. Kelso v. Decker, 262 S.W.3d 307, 2008 Tenn. App. LEXIS 3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 7, 2008), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2008 Tenn. LEXIS 486 (Tenn. June 23, 2008).

Trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to modify the child custody determination of the Montana court because the father still lived in Montana when he filed the petition to modify custody. Stack v. Stack, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 561 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 4, 2016).

Trial court had subject matter jurisdiction under the UCCJEA to adjudicate a termination petition where although Alabama made the initial custody determination, the child and the potential adoptive parents lived in Tennessee, the father lived in Florida, and the mother, who was the only connection to Alabama, wanted to surrender her parental rights. In re Apex R., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 366 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 29, 2018).

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

This section complements section 18 [§ 36-6-217] and is addressed to the court that is confronted with a proceeding to modify a custody determination of another state. It prohibits a court from modifying a custody determination made consistently with this act by a court in another state unless a court of that state determines that it no longer has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction under section 18 [§ 36-6-217] or that this state would be a more convenient forum under section 23 [§ 36-6-222]. The modification state is not authorized to determine that the original decree state has lost its jurisdiction. The only exception is when the child, the child's parents, and any person acting as a parent do not presently reside in the other state. In other words, a court of the modification state can determine that all parties have moved away from the original state. The court of the modification state must have jurisdiction under the standards of section 17 [§ 36-6-216].

The provisions of this section are an elaboration of what was formerly Section 3(a)(3) of the UCCJA. It remains, as Professor Bodenheimer's comments to that section noted, an extraordinary jurisdiction reserved for extraordinary circumstances.

This section codifies and clarifies several aspects of what has become common practice in emergency jurisdiction cases under the UCCJA and PKPA. First, a court may take jurisdiction to protect the child even though it can claim neither home state nor significant connection jurisdiction. Second, the duties of states to recognize, enforce and not modify a custody determination of another state do not take precedence over the need to enter a temporary emergency order to protect the child.

Third, a custody determination made under the emergency jurisdiction provisions of this section is a temporary order. The purpose of the order is to protect the child until the state that has jurisdiction under sections 17-19 [§§ 36-6-21636-6-218] enters an order.

Under certain circumstances, however, subsection (b) provides that an emergency custody determination may become a final custody determination. If there is no existing custody determination, and no custody proceeding is filed in a state with jurisdiction under sections 17-19 [§§ 36-6-21636-6-218], an emergency custody determination made under this section becomes a final determination, if it so provides, when the state that issues the order becomes the home state of the child.

Subsection (c) is concerned with the temporary nature of the order when there exists a prior custody order that is entitled to be enforced under this act or when a subsequent custody proceeding is filed in a state with jurisdiction under sections 17-19 [§§ 36-6-21636-6-218]. Subsection (c) allows the temporary order to remain in effect only so long as is necessary for the person who obtained the determination under this section to present a case and obtain an order from the state with jurisdiction under sections 17-19 [§§ 36-6-21636-6-218]. That time period must be specified in the order. If there is an existing order by a state with jurisdiction under sections 17-19 [§§ 36-6-216 — 36-6-218], that order need not be reconfirmed. The temporary emergency determination would lapse by its own terms at the end of the specified period or when an order is obtained from the court with jurisdiction under sections 18-19 [§§ 36-6-217 — 36-6-218]. The court with appropriate jurisdiction also may decide, under the provisions of section 23 [§ 36-6-222] of this part, that the court that entered the emergency order is in a better position to address the safety of the person who obtained the emergency order, or the child, and decline jurisdiction under section 23 [§ 36-6-222].

Any hearing in the state with jurisdiction under sections 17-19 [§§ 36-6-21636-6-218] on the temporary emergency determination is subject to the provisions of sections 15-16 [§§ 36-6-21436-6-215]. These sections facilitate the presentation of testimony and evidence taken out of state. If there is a concern that the person obtaining the temporary emergency determination under this section would be in danger upon returning to the state with jurisdiction under sections 17-19 [§§ 36-6-21636-6-218], these provisions should be used.

Subsection (d) requires communication between the court of the state that is exercising jurisdiction under this section and the court of another state that is exercising jurisdiction under sections 17-19 [§§ 36-6-21636-6-218]. The pleading rules of section 25 [§ 36-6-224] apply fully to determinations made under this section. Therefore, a person seeking a temporary emergency custody determination is required to inform the court pursuant to section 25(d) [§ 36-6-224(d)] of any proceeding concerning the child that has been commenced elsewhere. The person commencing the custody proceeding under sections 17-19 [§§ 36-6-21636-6-218] is required under section 25(a) [§ 36-6-224(a)] to inform the court about the temporary emergency proceeding. These pleading requirements are to be strictly followed so that the courts are able to resolve the emergency, protect the safety of the parties and the child, and determine a period for the duration of the temporary order.

Relationship to the PKPA. The definition of emergency has been modified to harmonize it with the PKPA. The PKPA's definition of emergency jurisdiction does not use the term “neglect.” It defines an emergency as “mistreatment or abuse.” Therefore “neglect” has been eliminated as a basis for the assumption of temporary emergency jurisdiction. Neglect is so elastic a concept that it could justify taking emergency jurisdiction in a wide variety of cases. Under the PKPA, if a state exercised temporary emergency jurisdiction based on a finding that the child was neglected without a finding of mistreatment or abuse, the order would not be entitled to federal enforcement in other states.

Relationship to Protective Order Proceedings. The UCCJA and the PKPA were enacted long before the advent of state procedures on the use of protective orders to alleviate problems of domestic violence. Issues of custody and visitation often arise within the context of protective order proceedings since the protective order is often invoked to keep one parent away from the other parent and the children when there is a threat of violence. This act recognizes that a protective order proceeding will often be the procedural vehicle for invoking jurisdiction by authorizing a court to assume temporary emergency jurisdiction when the child's parent or sibling has been subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse.

In order for a protective order that contains a custody determination to be enforceable in another state it must comply with the provisions of this act and the PKPA. Although the Violence Against Women's Act (VAWA), 18 U.S.C. § 2265, does provide an independent basis for the granting of full faith and credit to protective orders, it expressly excludes “custody” orders from the definition of “protective order,” 22 U.S.C. § 2266 [18 U.S.C. § 2266(5)].

Many states authorize the issuance of protective orders in an emergency without notice and hearing. This act does not address the propriety of that procedure. It is left to local law to determine the circumstances under which such an order could be issued, and the type of notice that is required, in a case without an interstate element. However, an order issued after the assumption of temporary emergency jurisdiction is entitled to interstate enforcement and no modification under this act and the PKPA only if there has been notice and a reasonable opportunity to be heard as set out in section 21 [§ 36-6-220]. Although VAWA does require that full faith and credit be accorded to ex parte protective orders if notice will be given and there will be a reasonable opportunity to be heard, it does not include a “custody” order within the definition of “protective order.” VAWA does play an important role in determining whether an emergency exists. That act requires a court to give full faith and credit to a protective order issued in another state if the order is made in accordance with the VAWA. This would include those findings of fact contained in the order. When a court is deciding whether an emergency exists under this section, it may not relitigate the existence of those factual findings.

36-6-219. Temporary emergency jurisdiction — Order enforcement — Communication with foreign courts.

  1. A court of this state has temporary emergency jurisdiction if the child is present in this state and the child has been abandoned or it is necessary in an emergency to protect the child because the child, or a sibling or parent of the child, is subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse.
  2. If there is no previous child custody determination that is entitled to be enforced under this part and a child custody proceeding has not been commenced in a court of a state having jurisdiction under §§ 36-6-216 — 36-6-218, a child-custody determination made under this section remains in effect until an order is obtained from a court of a state having jurisdiction under §§ 36-6-216 — 36-6-218. If a child custody proceeding has not been or is not commenced in a court of a state having jurisdiction under §§ 36-6-216 — 36-6-218, a child custody determination made under this section becomes a final determination, if it so provides and this state becomes the home state of the child.
  3. If there is a previous child custody determination that is entitled to be enforced under this part, or a child-custody proceeding has been commenced in a court of a state having jurisdiction under §§ 36-6-216 — 36-6-218, any order issued by a court of this state under this section must specify in the order a period that the court considers adequate to allow the person seeking an order to obtain an order from the state having jurisdiction under §§ 36-6-216 — 36-6-218. The order issued in this state remains in effect until an order is obtained from the other state within the period specified or the period expires.
  4. A court of this state which has been asked to make a child-custody determination under this section, upon being informed that a child-custody proceeding has been commenced in, or a child-custody determination has been made by, a court of a state having jurisdiction under §§ 36-6-216 — 36-6-218, shall immediately communicate with the other court. A court of this state which is exercising jurisdiction pursuant to §§ 36-6-216 — 36-6-218, upon being informed that a child custody proceeding has been commenced in, or a child-custody determination has been made by, a court of another state under a statute similar to this section shall immediately communicate with the court of that state to resolve the emergency, protect the safety of the parties and the child, and determine a period for the duration of the temporary order.

Acts 1999, ch. 389, § 20.

Compiler's Notes. Former part 2, §§ 36-6-20136-6-225 (Acts 1979, ch. 383, §§ 1-25; 1981, ch. 483, § 1; T.C.A., §§ 36-1301 — 36-1325), the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, was repealed and replaced by the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act by Acts 1999, ch. 389, § 1, effective June 14, 1999. For current provisions, see this part.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Construction.

T.C.A. § 36-6-219 can only be read to say the courts of this state may issue a temporary emergency order if the child is abandoned in this state or the child or a sibling or parent is subjected or threatened with abuse in this state. P.E.K. v. J.M., 52 S.W.3d 653, 2001 Tenn. App. LEXIS 232 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001).

Without some factual allegation of specific threats to the child's well-being, the court did not have any basis on which to issue a temporary emergency award. P.E.K. v. J.M., 52 S.W.3d 653, 2001 Tenn. App. LEXIS 232 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001).

Appellate court properly vacated the trial court's order that continued its temporary emergency jurisdiction indefinitely and for all purposes because T.C.A. § 36-6-219 only authorized emergency jurisdiction on a temporary basis; however, under T.C.A. § 36-6-221(c), Tennessee courts possessed jurisdiction to modify the Hawaii court's order that terminated the services of the child's therapist. Button v. Waite, 208 S.W.3d 366, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 1132 (Tenn. 2006).

Tennessee trial court correctly determined that a Kentucky order granting temporary custody of a child born in Tennessee to the child's relative and the relative's spouse in Kentucky was to be enforced and that further proceedings regarding custody of the child were properly addressed to the Kentucky court that made the initial custody determination. However, the trial court's order should have provided that the court's emergency jurisdiction ended following thirty days after its entry. In re Serenity W. M., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 588 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 23, 2015).

2. Jurisdiction.

Circuit court erred in finding a mother's children dependent and neglected and in remanding the case to the juvenile court for disposition or other further proceedings because it lost jurisdiction and its decision was null and void inasmuch as the state of Alabama had already assumed jurisdiction of the case and awarded the father temporary custody of the children. In re Ashton B., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 384 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 3, 2018).

Trial court did not assume temporary emergency custody over the child through its December 2016 order because it did not invoke such custody under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act in the order and it did not have the authority to do so because the child was not present Tennessee and not been present for several months. Hernandez v. Hernandez, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 371 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 30, 2019).

36-6-220. Notice and opportunity to be heard — Joinder and intervention.

  1. Before a child-custody determination is made under this part, notice and an opportunity to be heard in accordance with the standards of § 36-6-211 must be given to all persons entitled to notice under the law of this state as in child-custody proceedings between residents of this state, any parent whose parental rights have not been previously terminated, and any person having physical custody of the child.
  2. This part does not govern the enforceability of a child-custody determination made without notice or an opportunity to be heard.
  3. The obligation to join a party and the right to intervene as a party in a child-custody proceeding under this part are governed by the law of this state as in child-custody proceedings between residents of this state.

Acts 1999, ch. 389, § 21.

Compiler's Notes. Former part 2, §§ 36-6-20136-6-225 (Acts 1979, ch. 383, §§ 1-25; 1981, ch. 483, § 1; T.C.A., §§ 36-1301 — 36-1325), the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, was repealed and replaced by the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act by Acts 1999, ch. 389, § 1, effective June 14, 1999. For current provisions, see this part.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

This section generally continues the notice provisions of the UCCJA. However, it does not attempt to dictate who is entitled to notice. Local rules vary with regard to persons entitled to seek custody of a child. Therefore, this section simply indicates that persons entitled to seek custody should receive notice but leaves the rest of the determination to local law. Parents whose parental rights have not been previously terminated and persons having physical custody of the child are specifically mentioned as persons who must be given notice. The PKPA, § 1738A(e), requires that they be given notice in order for the custody determination to be entitled to full faith and credit under that act.

State laws also vary with regard to whether a court has the power to issue an enforceable temporary custody order without notice and hearing in a case without any interstate element. Such temporary orders may be enforceable, as against due process objections, for a short period of time if issued as a protective order or a temporary restraining order to protect a child from harm. Whether such orders are enforceable locally is beyond the scope of this act. Subsection (b) clearly provides that the validity of such orders and the enforceability of such orders is governed by the law which authorizes them and not by this act. An order is entitled to interstate enforcement and nonmodification under this act only if there has been notice and an opportunity to be heard. The PKPA, § 1738A(e), also requires that a custody determination is entitled to full faith and credit only if there has been notice and an opportunity to be heard. Rules requiring joinder of people with an interest in the custody of and visitation with a child also vary widely throughout the country. The UCCJA has a separate section on joinder of parties which has been eliminated. The issue of who is entitled to intervene and who must be joined in a custody proceeding is to be determined by local state law.

A sentence of the UCCJA § 4 which indicated that persons outside the state were to be given notice and an opportunity to be heard in accordance with the provision of that act has been eliminated as redundant.

36-6-221. Proceedings already commenced in another state.

  1. Except as otherwise provided in § 36-6-219, a court of this state may not exercise its jurisdiction under this part if, at the time of the commencement of the proceeding, a proceeding concerning the custody of the child has been commenced in a court of another state having jurisdiction substantially in conformity with this part, unless the proceeding has been terminated or is stayed by the court of the other state because a court of this state is a more convenient forum under § 36-6-222.
  2. Except as otherwise provided in § 36-6-219, a court of this state, before hearing a child custody proceeding, shall examine the court documents and other information supplied by the parties pursuant to § 36-6-224. If the court determines that a child custody proceeding has been commenced in a court in another state having jurisdiction substantially in accordance with this part, the court of this state shall stay its proceeding and communicate with the court of the other state. If the court of the state having jurisdiction substantially in accordance with this part does not determine that the court of this state is a more appropriate forum, the court of this state shall dismiss the proceeding.
  3. In a proceeding to modify a child custody determination, a court of this state shall determine whether a proceeding to enforce the determination has been commenced in another state. If a proceeding to enforce a child custody determination has been commenced in another state, the court may:
    1. Stay the proceeding for modification pending the entry of an order of a court of the other state enforcing, staying, denying, or dismissing the proceeding for enforcement;
    2. Enjoin the parties from continuing with the proceeding for enforcement; or
    3. Proceed with the modification under conditions it considers appropriate.

Acts 1999, ch. 389, § 22.

Compiler's Notes. Former part 2, §§ 36-6-20136-6-225 (Acts 1979, ch. 383, §§ 1-25; 1981, ch. 483, § 1; T.C.A., §§ 36-1301 — 36-1325), the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, was repealed and replaced by the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act by Acts 1999, ch. 389, § 1, effective June 14, 1999. For current provisions, see this part.

Law Reviews.

Best Interest on the Move: Standards for Custodial Removal of Children from Tennessee (A. Darby Dickerson, W. David Stalnaker), 18 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 399 (1988).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Jurisdiction To Modify.

Appellate court properly vacated the trial court's order that continued its temporary emergency jurisdiction indefinitely and for all purposes because T.C.A. § 36-6-219 only authorized emergency jurisdiction on a temporary basis; however, under T.C.A. § 36-6-221(c), Tennessee courts possessed jurisdiction to modify the Hawaii court's order that terminated the services of the child's therapist. Button v. Waite, 208 S.W.3d 366, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 1132 (Tenn. 2006).

2. Modification Court Authority.

After determining that it had jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), T.C.A. §§ 36-6-20136-6-243, the Tennessee trial court had discretion to press ahead with the Tennessee modification proceeding in spite of the ongoing enforcement proceeding in Florida because the Tennessee court communicated with the Florida court and understood that the Florida court planned to take no further action on the enforcement issue. Further, the UCCJEA expressly empowers the modification court to enjoin the parties from continuing with the enforcement proceeding under T.C.A. § 36-6-221(c)(2), but T.C.A. § 36-6-231 conveys no similar authority on the enforcement court to enjoin the parties from continuing with the modification proceeding. Staats v. McKinnon, 206 S.W.3d 532, 2006 Tenn. App. LEXIS 292 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006).

3. Proceedings in Another State.

Although T.C.A.§ 36-6-221(a) prohibits a court from exercising its jurisdiction to modify another state's child custody determination if a child custody proceeding has already been commenced in another state and has not been stayed or terminated, § 36-6-221(a) does not apply if the previously commenced proceeding is an enforcement proceeding because enforcement proceedings are expressly excluded from the statutory definition of a child custody proceeding in T.C.A. § 36-6-205(4). Staats v. McKinnon, 206 S.W.3d 532, 2006 Tenn. App. LEXIS 292 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006).

After being notified of the custody proceeding in Georgia, the Tennessee court stayed the instant proceeding and conducted a conference call with the judge in the Georgia proceeding; based on that judge's determination that the custody case was ongoing, that Georgia was the more convenient forum, and that it should retain jurisdiction, the Tennessee court did not err in dismissing the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Oni v. Oni, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 522 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 4, 2018).

4. Child Custody.

Trial court did not have jurisdiction over the custody proceedings a father initiated because a proceeding concerning the custody of the child had been commenced in the courts of Scotland, and until the court in Scotland ceded jurisdiction, it had exclusive jurisdiction of the custody matters; two custody proceedings were being litigated at the same time, contrary to the purpose and construction of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Enforcement Act. Hagans v. Hagans, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 178 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 5, 2018).

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

This section represents the remnants of the simultaneous proceedings provision of the UCCJA § 6. The problem of simultaneous proceedings is no longer a significant issue. Most of the problems have been resolved by the prioritization of home state jurisdiction under section 17 [§ 36-6-216]; the exclusive, continuing jurisdiction provisions of section 18 [§ 36-6-217]; and the prohibitions on modification of section 19 [§ 36-6-218]. If there is a home state, there can be no exercise of significant connection jurisdiction in an initial child custody determination and, therefore, no simultaneous proceedings. If there is a state of exclusive, continuing jurisdiction, there cannot be another state with concurrent jurisdiction and, therefore, no simultaneous proceedings. Of course, the home state, as well as the state with exclusive, continuing jurisdiction, could defer to another state under section 23 [§ 36-6-222]. However, that decision is left entirely to the home state or the state with exclusive, continuing jurisdiction.

Under this act, the simultaneous proceedings problem will arise only when there is no home state, no state with exclusive, continuing jurisdiction and more than one significant connection state. For those cases, this section retains the “first in time” rule of the UCCJA. Subsection (b) retains the UCCJA's policy favoring judicial communication. Communication between courts is required when it is determined that a proceeding has been commenced in another state.

Subsection (c) concerns the problem of simultaneous proceedings in the state with modification jurisdiction and enforcement proceedings. This section authorizes the court with exclusive, continuing jurisdiction to stay the modification proceeding pending the outcome of the enforcement proceeding, to enjoin the parties from continuing with the enforcement proceeding, or to continue the modification proceeding under such conditions as it determines are appropriate.

The court may wish to communicate with the enforcement court. However, communication is not mandatory. Although the enforcement state is required by the PKPA to enforce according to its terms a custody determination made consistently with the PKPA, that duty is subject to the decree being modified by a state with the power to do so under the PKPA. An order to enjoin the parties from enforcing the decree is the equivalent of a temporary modification by a state with the authority to do so. The concomitant provision addressed to the enforcement court is section 22 [§ 36-6-221]. That section requires the enforcement court to communicate with the modification court in order to determine what action the modification court wishes the enforcement court to take.

The term “pending” that was utilized in the UCCJA section on simultaneous proceeding has been replaced. It has caused considerable confusion in the case law. It has been replaced with the term “commencement of the proceeding” as more accurately reflecting the policy behind this section. The latter term is defined in section 6(5) [§ 36-6-205(5)].

36-6-222. Declining jurisdiction — Inconvenient forum.

  1. A court of this state which has jurisdiction under this part to make a child-custody determination may decline to exercise its jurisdiction at any time if it determines that it is an inconvenient forum under the circumstances and that a court of another state is a more appropriate forum. The issue of inconvenient forum may be raised upon motion of a party, the court's own motion, or request of another court.
  2. Before determining whether it is an inconvenient forum, a court of this state shall consider whether it is appropriate for a court of another state to exercise jurisdiction. For this purpose, the court shall allow the parties to submit information and shall consider all relevant factors, including:
    1. The length of time the child has resided outside this state;
    2. The distance between the court in this state and the court in the state that would assume jurisdiction;
    3. The relative financial circumstances of the parties;
    4. Any agreement of the parties as to which state should assume jurisdiction;
    5. The nature and location of the evidence required to resolve the pending litigation, including testimony of the child;
    6. The ability of the court of each state to decide the issue expeditiously and the procedures necessary to present the evidence;
    7. Whether domestic violence has occurred and is likely to continue in the future and which state could best protect the parties and the child; and
    8. The familiarity of the court of each state with the facts and issues in the pending litigation.
  3. If a court of this state determines that it is an inconvenient forum and that a court of another state is a more appropriate forum, it shall stay the proceedings upon condition that a child-custody proceeding be promptly commenced in another designated state and may impose any other condition the court considers just and proper.
  4. A court of this state may decline to exercise its jurisdiction under this part if a child-custody determination is incidental to an action for divorce or another proceeding while still retaining jurisdiction over the divorce or other proceeding.

Acts 1999, ch. 389, § 23.

Compiler's Notes. Former part 2, §§ 36-6-20136-6-225 (Acts 1979, ch. 383, §§ 1-25; 1981, ch. 483, § 1; T.C.A., §§ 36-1301 — 36-1325), the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, was repealed and replaced by the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act by Acts 1999, ch. 389, § 1, effective June 14, 1999. For current provisions, see this part.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Stay of Proceedings.

Trial court erred in dismissing a father's petition for modification of the parties'  permanent parenting plan and criminal contempt against the mother because, while the court properly determined that Tennessee was an inconvenient forum; the mother and child resided in Florida and the father resided in Alaska; the trial court should have stayed the father's petition and directed the parties to file the action in Florida, which the court determined was a more convenient forum. Kapustka v. Kapustka, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 390 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 3, 2016).

Vacating of a Tennessee juvenile court's decision to decline to exercise jurisdiction and remand of the case for further proceedings was appropriate because the court abused its discretion in declining to exercise jurisdiction on the basis that Alabama was the more convenient forum without allowing the parties an opportunity to present evidence. Furthermore, from the record, the appellate court could not determine whether the Tennessee court considered the requisite statutory factors in reaching its decision. In re Arabella L., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 764 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 28, 2017).

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

This section retains the focus of Section 7 of the UCCJA. It authorizes courts to decide that another state is in a better position to make the custody determination, taking into consideration the relative circumstances of the parties. If so, the court may defer to the other state.

The list of factors that the court may consider has been updated from the UCCJA. The list is not meant to be exclusive. Several provisions require comment. Subparagraph (1) is concerned specifically with domestic violence and other matters affecting the health and safety of the parties. For this purpose, the court should determine whether the parties are located in different states because one party is a victim of domestic violence or child abuse. If domestic violence or child abuse has occurred, this factor authorizes the court to consider which state can best protect the victim from further violence or abuse.

In applying subparagraph (3), courts should realize that distance concerns can be alleviated by applying the communication and cooperation provisions of sections 31 and 32 [§§ 36-6-230 and 36-6-231].

In applying subsection (7) on expeditious resolution of the controversy, the court could consider the different procedural and evidentiary laws of the two states, as well as the flexibility of the court dockets. It also should consider the ability of a court to arrive at a solution to all the legal issues surrounding the family. If one state has jurisdiction to decide both the custody and support issues, it would be desirable to determine that state to be the most convenient forum. The same is true when children of the same family live in different states. It would be inappropriate to require parents to have custody proceedings in several states when one state could resolve the custody of all the children.

Before determining whether to decline or retain jurisdiction, the court of this state may communicate, in accordance with section 32 [§ 36-6-231], with a court of another state and exchange information pertinent to the assumption of jurisdiction by either court.

There are two departures from Section 7 of the UCCJA. First, the court may not simply dismiss the action. To do so would leave the case in limbo. Rather the court shall stay the case and direct the parties to file in the state that has been found to be the more convenient forum. The court is also authorized to impose any other conditions it considers appropriate. This might include the issuance of temporary custody orders during the time necessary to commence a proceeding in the designated state, dismissing the case if the custody proceeding is not commenced in the other state or resuming jurisdiction if a court of the other state refuses to take the case.

Second, UCCJA § 7(g) which allowed the court to assess fees and costs if it was a clearly inappropriate court, has been eliminated. If a court has jurisdiction under this act, it could not be a clearly inappropriate court.

36-6-223. Unjustifiable conduct of a party.

  1. Except as otherwise provided in § 36-6-219, or by other law of this state, if a court of this state has jurisdiction under this part because a person seeking to invoke its jurisdiction has engaged in unjustifiable conduct, the court shall decline to exercise its jurisdiction unless:
    1. The parents and all persons acting as parents have acquiesced in the exercise of jurisdiction;
    2. A court of the state otherwise having jurisdiction under §§ 36-6-216 — 36-6-218 determines that this state is a more appropriate forum under § 36-6-222; or
    3. No court of any other state would have jurisdiction under the criteria specified in §§ 36-6-216 — 36-6-218.
  2. If a court of this state declines to exercise its jurisdiction pursuant to subsection (a), it may fashion an appropriate remedy to ensure the safety of the child and prevent a repetition of the unjustifiable conduct, including staying the proceeding until a child custody proceeding is commenced in a court having jurisdiction under §§ 36-6-216 — 36-6-218.
  3. If a court dismisses a petition or stays a proceeding because it declines to exercise its jurisdiction pursuant to subsection (a), it shall assess against the party seeking to invoke its jurisdiction necessary and reasonable expenses including costs, communication expenses, attorney's fees, investigative fees, expenses for witnesses, travel expenses, and child care during the course of the proceedings, unless the party from whom fees are sought establishes that the assessment would be clearly inappropriate.

Acts 1999, ch. 389, § 24.

Compiler's Notes. Former part 2, §§ 36-6-20136-6-225 (Acts 1979, ch. 383, §§ 1-25; 1981, ch. 483, § 1; T.C.A., §§ 36-1301 — 36-1325), the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, was repealed and replaced by the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act by Acts 1999, ch. 389, § 1, effective June 14, 1999. For current provisions, see this part.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Purpose.

T.C.A. 36-6-223(a) was intended to address cases where parents, or their surrogates, act in a reprehensible manner, such as removing, secreting, retaining, or restraining the child. Staats v. McKinnon, 206 S.W.3d 532, 2006 Tenn. App. LEXIS 292 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006).

2. Unjustifiable Conduct.

Trial court properly did not decline to exercise jurisdiction on the basis that the father exercised unjustifiable conduct under T.C.A. § 36-6-223(a) by not returning the child to the mother immediately upon the Florida court's reversal of granting primary residential custody to the father because there was nothing in the record to suggest that in the ten days that followed the order, the mother attempted to make arrangements for the child to be brought to Massachusetts. Staats v. McKinnon, 206 S.W.3d 532, 2006 Tenn. App. LEXIS 292 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006).

No evidence was presented in this action to indicate that the mother was avoiding the jurisdiction of Tennessee courts by relocating from Tennessee to Alabama because her testimony supported a determination that she was providing a timeline rather than a rationale for her relocation. The record demonstrated that the mother appeared in Tennessee for purposes of defending her criminal court charges, as well as answering the father's petitions in the instant matter. Hernandez v. Hernandez, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 371 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 30, 2019).

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

The “clean hands” section of the UCCJA has been truncated in this act. Since there is no longer a multiplicity of jurisdictions which could take cognizance of a child-custody proceeding, there is less of a concern that one parent will take the child to another jurisdiction in an attempt to find a more favorable forum. Most of the jurisdictional problems generated by abducting parents should be solved by the prioritization of home state in section 17 [§ 36-6-216]; the exclusive, continuing jurisdiction provisions of section 18 [§ 36-6-217]; and the ban on modification in section 19 [§ 36-6-218]. For example, if a parent takes the child from the home state and seeks an original custody determination elsewhere, the stay-at-home parent has six (6) months to file a custody petition under the extended home state jurisdictional provision of section 17 [§ 36-6-216], which will ensure that the case is retained in the home state. If a petitioner for a modification determination takes the child from the state that issued the original custody determination, another state cannot assume jurisdiction as long as the first state exercises exclusive, continuing jurisdiction.

Nonetheless, there are still a number of cases where parents, or their surrogates, act in a reprehensible manner, such as removing, secreting, retaining, or restraining the child. This section ensures that abducting parents will not receive an advantage for their unjustifiable conduct. If the conduct that creates the jurisdiction is unjustified, courts must decline to exercise jurisdiction that is inappropriately invoked by one of the parties. For example, if one parent abducts the child pre-decree and establishes a new home state, that jurisdiction will decline to hear the case. There are exceptions. If the other party has acquiesced in the court's jurisdiction, the court may hear the case. Such acquiescence may occur by filing a pleading submitting to the jurisdiction, or by not filing in the court that would otherwise have jurisdiction under this act. Similarly, if the court that would have jurisdiction finds that the court of this state is a more appropriate forum, the court may hear the case.

This section applies to those situations where jurisdiction exists because of the unjustified conduct of the person seeking to invoke it. If, for example, a parent in the state with exclusive, continuing jurisdiction under section 18 [§ 36-6-217] has either restrained the child from visiting with the other parent, or has retained the child after visitation, and seeks to modify the decree, this section in inapplicable. The conduct of restraining or retaining the child did not create jurisdiction. Jurisdiction existed under this act without regard to the parent's conduct. Whether a court should decline to hear the parent's request to modify is a matter of local law.

The focus in this section is on the unjustified conduct of the person who invokes the jurisdiction of the court. A technical illegality or wrong is insufficient to trigger the applicability of this section. This is particularly important in cases involving domestic violence and child abuse.

Domestic violence victims should not be charged with unjustifiable conduct for conduct that occurred in the process of fleeing domestic violence, even if their conduct is technically illegal. Thus, if a parent flees with a child to escape domestic violence and in the process violates a joint custody decree, the case should not be automatically dismissed under this section. An inquiry must be made into whether the flight was justified under the circumstances of the case. However, an abusive parent who seizes the child and flees to another state to establish jurisdiction has engaged in unjustifiable conduct and the new state must decline to exercise jurisdiction under this section.

Subsection (b) authorizes the court to fashion an appropriate remedy for the safety of the child and to prevent a repetition of the unjustified conduct. Thus, it would be appropriate for the court to notify the other parent and to provide for foster care for the child until the child is returned to the other parent. The court could also stay the proceeding and require that a custody proceeding be instituted in another state that would have jurisdiction under this act. It should be noted that the court is not making a forum non conveniens analysis in this section. If the conduct is unjustifiable, it must decline jurisdiction. It may, however, retain jurisdiction until a custody proceeding is commenced in the appropriate tribunal if such retention is necessary to prevent a repetition of the wrongful conduct or to ensure the safety of the child.

The attorney's fee standard for this section is patterned after the International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 42 U.S.C. § I 1607(b)(3). The assessed costs and fees are to be paid to the respondent who established that jurisdiction was based on unjustifiable conduct.

36-6-224. Information in first pleading or affidavit — Stay — Continuing duty to inform court — Sealing records.

  1. Subject to § 36-4-106(b), in a child-custody proceeding, each party, in its first pleading or in an attached affidavit, shall give information, if reasonably ascertainable, under oath, as to the child's present address or whereabouts, the places where the child has lived during the last five (5) years, and the names and present addresses of the persons with whom the child has lived during that period. The pleading or affidavit must state whether the party:
    1. Has participated, as a party or witness or in any other capacity, in any other proceeding concerning the custody of or visitation with the child and, if so, identify the court, the case number, and the date of the child-custody determination, if any;
    2. Knows of any proceeding that could affect the current proceeding, including proceedings for enforcement and proceedings relating to domestic violence, protective orders, termination of parental rights, and adoptions and, if so, identify the court, the case number, and the nature of the proceeding; and
    3. Knows the names and addresses of any person not a party to the proceeding who has physical custody of the child or claims rights of legal custody or physical custody of, or visitation with, the child and, if so, the names and addresses of those persons.
  2. If the information required by subdivisions (a)(1)-(3) is not furnished, the court, upon motion of a party or its own motion, may stay the proceeding until the information is furnished.
  3. If the declaration as to any of the items described in subdivisions (a)(1)-(3) is in the affirmative, the declarant shall give additional information under oath as required by the court. The court may examine the parties under oath as to details of the information furnished and other matters pertinent to the court's jurisdiction and the disposition of the case.
  4. Each party has a continuing duty to inform the court of any proceeding in this or any other state that could affect the current proceeding.
  5. If a party alleges in an affidavit or a pleading under oath that the health, safety, or liberty of a party or child would be jeopardized by disclosure of identifying information, the information must be sealed and may not be disclosed to the other party or the public unless the court orders the disclosure to be made after a hearing in which the court takes into consideration the health, safety, or liberty of the party or child and determines that the disclosure is in the interest of justice. Nothing in this subsection (e) shall be construed to require sealing of any information or records maintained by the state or a local government except identifying information in a custody or visitation action brought under this part.

Acts 1999, ch. 389, § 25.

Compiler's Notes. Former part 2, §§ 36-6-20136-6-225 (Acts 1979, ch. 383, §§ 1-25; 1981, ch. 483, § 1; T.C.A., §§ 36-1301 — 36-1325), the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, was repealed and replaced by the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act by Acts 1999, ch. 389, § 1, effective June 14, 1999. For current provisions, see this part.

Cross-References. Confidentiality of public records, § 10-7-504.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

The pleading requirements from Section 9 of the UCCJA are generally carried over into this act. However, the information is made subject to local law on the protection of names and other identifying information in certain cases. A number of states have enacted laws relating to the protection of victims in domestic violence and child abuse cases which provide for the confidentiality of victims names, addresses, and other information. These procedures must be followed if the child-custody proceeding of the state requires their applicability. See, e.g., California Family Law Code § 3409(a). If a state does not have local law that provides for protecting names and addresses, then subsection (e) or a similar provision should be adopted. Subsection (e) is based on the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges' Model Code on Domestic and Family Violence § 304(c). There are other models to choose from, in particular UIFSA § 312.

In subsection (a)(2), the term “proceedings” should be read broadly to include more than custody proceedings. Thus, if one parent was being criminally prosecuted for child abuse or custodial interference, those proceedings should be disclosed. If the child is subject to the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children, facts relating to compliance with the Compact should be disclosed in the pleading or affidavit.

Subsection (b) has been added. It authorizes the court to stay the proceeding until the information required in subsection (a) has been disclosed, although failure to provide the information does not deprive the court of jurisdiction to hear the case. This follows the majority of jurisdictions which held that failure to comply with the pleading requirements of the UCCJA did not deprive the court of jurisdiction to make a custody determination.

36-6-225. Order to appear before court — Orders to ensure safety — Payment of expenses.

  1. In a child-custody proceeding in this state, the court may order a party to the proceeding who is in this state to appear before the court in person with or without the child. The court may order any person who is in this state and who has physical custody or control of the child to appear in person with the child.
  2. If a party to a child-custody proceeding whose presence is desired by the court is outside this state, the court may order that a notice given pursuant to § 36-6-220 include a statement directing the party to appear in person with or without the child and informing the party that failure to appear may result in a decision adverse to the party.
  3. The court may enter any orders necessary to ensure the safety of the child and of any person ordered to appear under this section.
  4. If a party to a child custody proceeding who is outside this state is directed to appear under subsection (b) or desires to appear personally before the court with or without the child, the court may require another party to pay reasonable and necessary travel and other expenses of the party so appearing and of the child.

Acts 1999, ch. 389, § 26.

Compiler's Notes. Former part 2, §§ 36-6-20136-6-225 (Acts 1979, ch. 383, §§ 1-25; 1981, ch. 483, § 1; T.C.A., §§ 36-1301 — 36-1325), the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, was repealed and replaced by the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act by Acts 1999, ch. 389, § 1, effective June 14, 1999. For current provisions, see this part.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

No major changes have been made to this section which was Section 11 of the UCCJA. Language was added to subsection (a) to authorize the court to require a non-party who has physical custody of the child to produce the child.

Subsection (c) authorizes the court to enter orders providing for the safety of the child and the person ordered to appear with the child. If safety is a major concern, the court, as an alternative to ordering a party to appear with the child, could order and arrange for the party's testimony to be taken in another state under section 15 [§ 36-6-214]. This alternative might be important when there are safety concerns regarding requiring victims of domestic violence or child abuse to travel to the jurisdiction where the abuser resides.

36-6-226. Enforcement of international orders under the Hague Convention.

A court of this state may enforce an order for the return of the child made under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction as if it were a child-custody determination.

Acts 1999, ch. 389, § 27.

Compiler's Notes. The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of Child Abduction (CTIA No. 8303.000), referred to in this section, was completed October 25, 1990, entered into force December 1, 1983, and was signed by the United States July 1, 1998.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

This section applies the enforcement remedies to orders requiring the return of a child issued under the authority of the International Child Abduction Remedies Act (ICARA), 42 U.S.C. § 11601 et seq., implementing the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. Specific mention of ICARA proceedings is necessary because they often occur prior to any formal custody determination. However, the need for a speedy enforcement remedy for an order to return the child is just as necessary.

36-6-227. Recognition and enforcement of foreign decrees.

  1. A court of this state shall recognize and enforce a child-custody determination of a court of another state if the latter court exercised jurisdiction in substantial conformity with this part, or the determination was made under factual circumstances meeting the jurisdictional standards of this part and the determination has not been modified in accordance with this part.
  2. A court of this state may utilize any remedy available under other law of this state to enforce a child-custody determination made by a court of another state. The remedies provided in this part are cumulative and do not affect the availability of other remedies to enforce a child-custody determination.

Acts 1999, ch. 389, § 28.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Foreign Order.

Tennessee trial court correctly determined that a Kentucky order granting temporary custody of a child born in Tennessee to the child's relative and the relative's spouse in Kentucky was to be enforced and that further proceedings regarding custody of the child were properly addressed to the Kentucky court that made the initial custody determination. However, the trial court's order should have provided that the court's emergency jurisdiction ended following thirty days after its entry. In re Serenity W. M., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 588 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 23, 2015).

2. Available Remedies.

Because the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) did not limit other available remedies, the father could seek to enroll the Texas divorce decree under the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act or register the decree under the UCCJEA; the chancery court had subject matter jurisdiction over the father's petition, and the deficiency in the petition, missing one page of the decree, was not a jurisdictional deficiency. New v. Dumitrache, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 174 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 12, 2019).

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

This section is based on Section 13 of the UCCJA which contained the basic duty to enforce. The language of the original section has been retained and the duty to enforce is generally the same.

Enforcement of custody determinations of issuing states is also required by federal law in the PKPA, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(a). The changes now make a state's duty to enforce and not modify a child custody determination of another state consistent with the enforcement and non-modification provisions of the PKPA. Therefore, custody determinations made by a state pursuant to the UCCJA that would be enforceable under the PKPA will generally be enforced under this act. However, if a state custody determination made pursuant to the UCCJA would not be enforceable under the PKPA, it will also not be enforceable under this act. Thus a custody determination made by a “significant connection” jurisdiction when there is a home state is not enforceable under the PKPA regardless of whether a proceeding was ever commenced in the home state. Even though such a determination would be enforceable under the UCCJA with its four (4) concurrent bases of jurisdiction, it would not be enforceable under this act. This carries out the policy of the PKPA of strongly discouraging a state from exercising its concurrent “significant connection jurisdiction under the UCCJA when another state could exercise home state” jurisdiction.

This section also incorporates the concept of Section 15 of the UCCJA to the effect that a custody determination of another state will be enforced in the same manner as a custody determination made by a court of this state. Whatever remedies are available to enforce a local determination can be utilized to enforce a custody determination of another state. However, it remains a custody determination of the state that issued it. A child-custody determination of another state is not subject to modification unless the state would have jurisdiction to modify the determination.

The remedies provided by this part for the enforcement of a custody determination will normally be used. This part does not detract from other remedies available under other local law. There is often a need for a number of remedies to ensure that a child-custody determination is obeyed. If other remedies would easily facilitate enforcement, they are still available. The petitioner, for example, can still cite the respondent for contempt of court or file a tort claim for intentional interference with custodial relations if those remedies are available under local law.

36-6-228. Temporary order of enforcement.

  1. A court of this state which does not have jurisdiction to modify a child-custody determination may issue a temporary order enforcing:
    1. A visitation schedule made by a court of another state; or
    2. The visitation provisions of a child-custody determination of another state that does not provide for a specific visitation schedule.
  2. If a court of this state makes an order under subdivision (a)(2), it shall specify in the order a period that it considers adequate to allow the petitioner to obtain an order from a court having jurisdiction under the criteria specified in this part. The order remains in effect until an order is obtained from the other court or the period expires.

Acts 1999, ch. 389, § 29.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Specification of Period.

Trial court had authority to enforce visitation, but remand was required because the court failed to specify the period it considered adequate to allow the father to obtain an order modifying the parenting plan or Montana court to determine it no longer had exclusive, continuing jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, T.C.A. §§ 36-6-201 to 36-6-243. Stack v. Stack, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 561 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 4, 2016).

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

This section authorizes a court to issue a temporary order if it is necessary to enforce visitation rights without violating the rules on nonmodification contained in Section 3 [§ 36-6-202] of this part. Therefore, if there is a visitation schedule provided in the custody determination that was made in accordance with this act, a court can issue an order under this section implementing the schedule. An implementing order may include make-up or substitute visitation.

A court may also issue a temporary order providing for visitation if visitation was authorized in the custody determination, but no specific schedule was included in the custody determination. Such an order could include a substitution of a specific visitation schedule for reasonable and seasonable.

However, a court may not, under subsection (a)(2) provide for a permanent change in visitation. Therefore, requests for a permanent change in the visitation schedule must be addressed to the court with exclusive, continuing jurisdiction under section 17 [§ 36-6-216] or modification jurisdiction under section 19 [§ 36-6-218]; As under section 20 [§ 36-6-219], subsection (b) of this section requires that the temporary visitation order stay in effect only long enough to allow the person who obtained the order to obtain a permanent modification in the state with appropriate jurisdiction.

36-6-229. Registration of foreign decrees — Duties of registering court — Contesting validity of registered decree.

  1. A child-custody determination issued by a court of another state may be registered in this state, with or without a simultaneous request for enforcement, by sending to the appropriate court in this state:
    1. A letter or other document requesting registration;
    2. Two (2) copies, including one (1) certified copy, of the determination sought to be registered, and a statement under penalty of perjury that to the best of the knowledge and belief of the person seeking registration the order has not been modified; and
    3. Except as otherwise provided in § 36-6-224, the name and address of the person seeking registration and any parent or person acting as a parent who has been awarded custody or visitation in the child-custody determination sought to be registered.
  2. On receipt of the documents required by subsection (a), the registering court shall:
    1. Cause the determination to be filed as a foreign judgment, together with one (1) copy of any accompanying documents and information, regardless of their form; and
    2. Serve notice upon the persons named pursuant to subdivision (a)(3) and provide them with an opportunity to contest the registration in accordance with this section.
  3. The notice required by subdivision (b)(2) must state that:
    1. A registered determination is enforceable as of the date of the registration in the same manner as a determination issued by a court of this state;
    2. A hearing to contest the validity of the registered determination must be requested within twenty (20) days after service of notice; and
    3. Failure to contest the registration will result in confirmation of the child-custody determination and preclude further contest of that determination with respect to any matter that could have been asserted.
  4. A person seeking to contest the validity of a registered order must request a hearing within twenty (20) days after service of the notice. At that hearing, the court shall confirm the registered order unless the person contesting registration establishes that:
    1. The issuing court did not have jurisdiction under this part;
    2. The child-custody determination sought to be registered has been vacated, stayed, or modified by a court having jurisdiction to do so under this part; or
    3. The person contesting registration was entitled to notice, but notice was not given in accordance with the standards of § 36-6-211, in the proceedings before the court that issued the order for which registration is sought.
  5. If a timely request for a hearing to contest the validity of the registration is not made, the registration is confirmed as a matter of law and the person requesting registration and all persons served must be notified of the confirmation.
  6. Confirmation of a registered order, whether by operation of law or after notice and hearing, precludes further contest of the order with respect to any matter that could have been asserted at the time of registration.

Acts 1999, ch. 389, § 30.

Cross-References. Perjury, title 39, ch. 16, part 7.

Attorney General Opinions. Enforcement of out-of-state and ex parte orders of protection. OAG 14-101, 2014 Tenn. AG LEXIS 104 (11/26/14).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Applicability.

Court of Appeals of Tennessee concludes that the Legislature intended to require grandparents seeking visitation rights in Tennessee to utilize the Grandparent Visitation Statute rather than the Tennessee Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, T.C.A. § 36-6-201 et seq., registration provision. Moorcroft v. Stuart, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 52 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 30, 2015).

Trial court erred in finding the parents in contempt of a Kentucky grandparent visitation order because the trial court employed an “unlawful mode of procedure” in enrolling the Kentucky order, which made the order void ab initio and such an order could not serve as the basis for a finding of contempt. Moorcroft v. Stuart, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 527 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 6, 2015).

2. Subject Matter Jurisdiction.

In a child custody case where the parties were divorced in Ohio and the mother moved to Tennessee with the parties'  child, although the trial court erred by modifying the father's co-parenting time as the father had remained a resident of Ohio at all times relevant to the action and the Ohio court had not relinquished its jurisdiction to Tennessee, registration of the Ohio decree was proper as T.C.A. § 36-6-229 allowed the trial court to register the Ohio decree regarding child custody. Kelso v. Decker, 262 S.W.3d 307, 2008 Tenn. App. LEXIS 3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 7, 2008), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2008 Tenn. LEXIS 486 (Tenn. June 23, 2008).

T.C.A. § 36-6-229(d)(1), the Tennessee Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, T.C.A. § 36-6-201 et seq., provision dealing with registration of foreign custody orders, permits the Court of Appeals of Tennessee to examine whether a foreign court issuing a custody order had jurisdiction to do so prior to registration. Moorcroft v. Stuart, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 52 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 30, 2015).

Because the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) did not limit other available remedies, the father could seek to enroll the Texas divorce decree under the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act or register the decree under the UCCJEA; the chancery court had subject matter jurisdiction over the father's petition, and the deficiency in the petition, missing one page of the decree, was not a jurisdictional deficiency. New v. Dumitrache, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 174 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 12, 2019).

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

This section authorizes a simple registration procedure that can be used to predetermine the enforceability of a custody determination. It parallels the process in UIFSA for the registration of child support orders. It should be as much of an aid to pro se litigants as the registration procedure of UIFSA.

A custody determination can be registered without any accompanying request for enforcement. This may be of significant assistance in international cases. For example, the custodial parent under a foreign custody order can receive an advance determination of whether that order would be recognized and enforced before sending the child to the United States for visitation. Part 26 of the 1996 Hague Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition and Cooperation in Respect of Parental Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of Children, 35 I.L.M. 1391(1996), requires those states which accede to the Convention to provide such a procedure.

36-6-230. Enforcement and modification of registered decrees.

  1. A court of this state may grant any relief normally available under the law of this state to enforce a registered child-custody determination made by a court of another state.
  2. A court of this state shall recognize and enforce, but may not modify, except in accordance with this part, a registered child-custody determination of a court of another state.

Acts 1999, ch. 389, § 31.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

A registered child-custody determination can be enforced as if it was a child-custody determination of this state. However, it remains a custody determination of the state that issued it. A registered custody order is not subject to modification unless the state would have jurisdiction to modify the order.

36-6-231. Proceeding for enforcement of registered decree when modification procedures are pending in another state.

If a proceeding for enforcement under this part is commenced in a court of this state and the court determines that a proceeding to modify the determination is pending in a court of another state having jurisdiction to modify the determination under this part, the enforcing court shall immediately communicate with the modifying court. The proceeding for enforcement continues unless the enforcing court, after consultation with the modifying court, stays or dismisses the proceeding.

Acts 1999, ch. 389, § 32.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Enforcement Court Authority.

After determining that it had jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), T.C.A. § 36-6-20136-6-243, the Tennessee trial court had discretion to press ahead with the Tennessee modification proceeding in spite of the ongoing enforcement proceeding in Florida because the Tennessee court communicated with the Florida court and understood that the Florida court planned to take no further action on the enforcement issue. Further, the UCCJEA expressly empowers the modification court to enjoin the parties from continuing with the enforcement proceeding under T.C.A. § 36-6-221(c)(2), but T.C.A. § 36-6-231 conveys no similar authority on the enforcement court to enjoin the parties from continuing with the modification proceeding. Staats v. McKinnon, 206 S.W.3d 532, 2006 Tenn. App. LEXIS 292 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006).

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

The pleading rules of section 25 [§ 36-6-224] require the parties to disclose any pending proceedings. Normally, an enforcement proceeding will take precedence over a modification action since the PKPA requires enforcement of child custody determinations made in accordance with its terms. However, the enforcement court must communicate with the modification court in order to avoid duplicative litigation. The courts might decide that the court with jurisdiction shall continue with the modification action and stay the enforcement proceeding. Or they might decide that the enforcement proceeding shall go forward. The ultimate decision rests with the court having exclusive, continuing jurisdiction under section 19 [§ 36-6-218], or if there is no state with exclusive, continuing jurisdiction, then the decision rests with the state that would have jurisdiction to modify under section 20 [§ 36-6-219]. Therefore, if that court determines that the enforcement proceeding should be stayed or dismissed, the enforcement court should stay or dismiss the proceeding. If the enforcement court does not do so, the court with exclusive, continuing jurisdiction under section 19 [§ 36-6-218], or with modification jurisdiction under section 20 [§ 36-6-219], could enjoin the parties from continuing with the enforcement proceeding.

36-6-232. Verification and contents of petition for enforcement — Order for respondent to appear.

  1. A petition under this part must be verified. Certified copies of all orders sought to be enforced and of any order confirming registration must be attached to the petition. A copy of a certified copy of an order may be attached instead of the original.
  2. A petition for enforcement of a child-custody determination must state:
    1. Whether the court that issued the determination identified the jurisdictional basis it relied upon in exercising jurisdiction and, if so, what the basis was;
    2. Whether the determination for which enforcement is sought has been vacated, stayed, or modified by a court whose decision must be enforced under this part and, if so, identify the court, the case number, and the nature of the proceeding;
    3. Whether any proceeding has been commenced that could affect the current proceeding, including proceedings relating to domestic violence, protective orders, termination of parental rights, and adoptions and, if so, identify the court, the case number, and the nature of the proceeding;
    4. The present physical address of the child and the respondent, if known;
    5. Whether relief in addition to the immediate physical custody of the child and attorney's fees is sought, including a request for assistance from law enforcement officials and, if so, the relief sought; and
    6. If the child custody determination has been registered and confirmed under § 36-6-229, the date and place of registration.
  3. Upon the filing of a petition, the court shall issue an order directing the respondent to appear in person with or without the child at a hearing and may enter any order necessary to ensure the safety of the parties and the child. The hearing must be held on the next judicial day after service of the order unless that date is impossible. In that event, the court shall hold the hearing on the first judicial day possible. The court may extend the date of hearing at the request of the petitioner.
  4. An order issued under subsection (c) must state the time and place of the hearing and advise the respondent that at the hearing the court will order that the petitioner may take immediate physical custody of the child and the payment of fees, costs, and expenses under § 36-6-236, and may schedule a hearing to determine whether further relief is appropriate, unless the respondent appears and establishes that:
    1. The child-custody determination has not been registered and confirmed under § 36-6-229 and that:
      1. The issuing court did not have jurisdiction under this part;
      2. The child-custody determination for which enforcement is sought has been vacated, stayed, or modified by a court having jurisdiction to do so under this part;
      3. The respondent was entitled to notice, but notice was not given in accordance with the standards of § 36-6-211, in the proceedings before the court that issued the order for which enforcement is sought; or
    2. The child-custody determination for which enforcement is sought was registered and confirmed under § 36-6-229, but has been vacated, stayed, or modified by a court of a state having jurisdiction to do so under this part.

Acts 1999, ch. 389, § 33.

Attorney General Opinions. Enforcement of out-of-state and ex parte orders of protection. OAG 14-101, 2014 Tenn. AG LEXIS 104 (11/26/14).

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

This section provides the normal remedy that will be used in interstate cases: the production of the child in a summary, remedial process based on habeas corpus.

The petition is intended to provide the court with as much information as possible. Attaching certified copies of all orders sought to be enforced allows the court to have the necessary information. Most of the information relates to the permissible scope of the court's inquiry. The petitioner has the responsibility to inform the court of all proceedings that would affect the current enforcement action. Specific mention is made of certain proceedings to ensure that they are disclosed. A procedure relating to domestic violence includes not only protective order proceedings but also criminal prosecutions for child abuse or domestic violence.

The order requires the respondent to appear at a hearing on the next judicial day. The term “next judicial day” in this section means the next day when a judge is at the courthouse. At the hearing, the court will order the child to be delivered to the petitioner unless the respondent is prepared to assert that the issuing state lacked jurisdiction, that notice was not given in accordance with section 12 [§ 36-6-211], or that the order sought to be enforced has been vacated, modified, or stayed by a court with jurisdiction to do so. The court is also to order payment of the fees and expenses set out in section 37 [§ 36-6-236]. The court may set another hearing to determine whether additional relief available under this state's law should be granted.

If the order has been registered and confirmed in accordance with section 30 [§ 36-6-229], the only defense to enforcement is that the order has been vacated, stayed or modified since the registration proceeding by a court with jurisdiction to do so.

36-6-233. Service of petition and order.

Except as otherwise provided in § 36-6-235, the petition and order must be served, by any method authorized by the law of this state, upon the respondent and any person who has physical custody of the child.

Acts 1999, ch. 389, § 34.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

In keeping with other sections of this act, the question of how the petition and order should be served is left to local law.

36-6-234. Order for immediate physical custody — Fees, costs and expenses — Party refusal to testify — Husband and wife communications as evidence.

  1. Unless the court issues a temporary emergency order pursuant to § 36-6-219, upon a finding that a petitioner is entitled to immediate physical custody of the child, the court shall order that the petitioner may take immediate physical custody of the child unless the respondent establishes that:
    1. The child-custody determination has not been registered and confirmed under § 36-6-229 and that:
      1. The issuing court did not have jurisdiction under this part;
      2. The child-custody determination for which enforcement is sought has been vacated, stayed, or modified by a court of a state having jurisdiction to do so under this part; or
      3. The respondent was entitled to notice, but notice was not given in accordance with the standards of § 36-6-211, in the proceedings before the court that issued the order for which enforcement is sought; or
    2. The child-custody determination for which enforcement is sought was registered and confirmed under § 36-6-229 but has been vacated, stayed, or modified by a court of a state having jurisdiction to do so under this part.
  2. The court shall award the fees, costs, and expenses authorized under § 36-6-236 and may grant additional relief, including a request for the assistance of law enforcement officials, and set a further hearing to determine whether additional relief is appropriate.
  3. If a party called to testify refuses to answer on the ground that the testimony may be self-incriminating, the court may draw an adverse inference from the refusal.
  4. A privilege against disclosure of communications between spouses and a defense of immunity based on the relationship of husband and wife or parent and child may not be invoked in a proceeding under this part.

Acts 1999, ch. 389, § 35.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

The scope of inquiry for the enforcing court is quite limited. Federal law requires the court to enforce the custody determination if the issuing state's decree was rendered in compliance with the PKPA. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(a). This act requires enforcement of custody determinations that are made in conformity with the act's jurisdictional rules.

The certified copy, or a copy of the certified copy, of the custody determination entitling the petitioner to the child is prima facie evidence of the issuing court's jurisdiction to enter the order. If the order is one that is entitled to be enforced and if it has been violated, the burden shifts to the respondent to show that the custody determination is not entitled to enforcement.

It is a defense to enforcement that another jurisdiction has issued a custody determination that is required to be enforced. An example is when one court has based its original custody determination on the UCCJA § 3(a)(2) (significant connections) and another jurisdiction has rendered an original custody determination based on the UCCJA § 3(a)(1) (home state). When this occurs, this act as well as the PKPA, mandate that the home state determination be enforced in all other states, including the state that rendered the significant connections determination.

Lack of notice in accordance with section 12 [§ 36-6-211] by a person entitled to notice and opportunity to be heard at the original custody determination is a defense to enforcement of the custody determination. The scope of the defense under this act is the same as the defense would be under the law of the state that issued the notice. Thus, if the defense of lack of notice would not be available under local law if the respondent purposely hid from the petitioner, took deliberate steps to avoid service of process or elected not to participate in the initial proceedings, the defense would also not be available under this act.

There are no other defenses to an enforcement action. If the child would be endangered by the enforcement of a custody or visitation order, there may be a basis for the assumption of emergency jurisdiction under section 20 [§ 36-6-219]. Upon the finding of an emergency, the court issues a temporary order and directs the parties to proceed either in the court that is exercising continuing jurisdiction over the custody proceeding under section 18 [§ 36-6-217], or the court that would have jurisdiction to modify the custody determination under section 19 [§ 36-6-218].

The court shall determine at the hearing whether fees should be awarded under section 37 [§ 36-6-236]. If so, it should order them paid. The court may determine if additional relief is appropriate, including requesting law enforcement officers to assist the petitioner in the enforcement of the order. The court may set a hearing to determine whether further relief should be granted.

The remainder of this section is derived from UIFSA § 316 with regard to the privilege of self-incrimination, spousal privileges, and immunities. It is included to keep parallel the procedures for child support and child custody proceedings to the extent possible.

36-6-235. Warrant for physical custody — Conditional placement.

  1. Upon the filing of a petition seeking enforcement of a child-custody determination, the petitioner may file a verified application for the issuance of a warrant to take physical custody of the child if the child is immediately likely to suffer serious physical harm or be removed from this state.
  2. If the court, upon the testimony of the petitioner or other witness, finds that the child is imminently likely to suffer serious physical harm or be removed from this state, it may issue a warrant to take physical custody of the child. The petition must be heard on the next judicial day after the warrant is executed unless that date is impossible. In that event, the court shall hold the hearing on the first judicial day possible. The application for the warrant must include the statements required by § 36-6-232(b).
  3. A warrant to take physical custody of a child must:
    1. Recite the facts upon which a conclusion of imminent serious physical harm or removal from the jurisdiction is based;
    2. Direct law enforcement officers to take physical custody of the child immediately; and
    3. Provide for the placement of the child pending final relief.
  4. The respondent must be served with the petition, warrant, and order immediately after the child is taken into physical custody.
  5. A warrant to take physical custody of a child is enforceable throughout this state. If the court finds on the basis of the testimony of the petitioner or other witness that a less intrusive remedy is not effective, it may authorize law enforcement officers to enter private property to take physical custody of the child. If required by exigent circumstances of the case, the court may authorize law enforcement officers to make a forcible entry at any hour.
  6. The court may impose conditions upon placement of a child to ensure the appearance of the child and the child's custodian.

Acts 1999, ch. 389, § 36.

Law Reviews.

Best Interest on the Move: Standards for Custodial Removal of Children from Tennessee (A. Darby Dickerson, W. David Stalnaker), 18 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 399 (1988).

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

The section provides a remedy for emergency situations where there is a reason to believe that the child will suffer imminent, serious physical harm or be removed from the jurisdiction once the respondent learns that the petitioner has filed an enforcement proceeding. If the court finds such harm exists, it should temporarily waive the notice requirements and issue a warrant to take physical custody of the child. Immediately after the warrant is executed, the respondent is to receive notice of the proceedings.

The term “harm” cannot be totally defined and as in the issuance of temporary restraining orders, the appropriate issuance of a warrant is left to the circumstances of the case. Those circumstances include cases where the respondent is the subject of a criminal proceeding as well as situations where the respondent is secreting the child in violation of a court order, abusing the child, a flight risk and other circumstances that the court concludes make the issuance of notice a danger to the child. The court must hear the testimony of the petitioner or another witness prior to issuing the warrant. The testimony may be heard in person, via telephone, or by any other means acceptable under local law. The court must state the reasons for the issuance of the warrant. The warrant can be enforced by law enforcement officers wherever the child is found in the state. The warrant may authorize entry upon private property to pick up the child if no less intrusive means are possible. In extraordinary cases, the warrant may authorize law enforcement to make a forcible entry at any hour.

The warrant must provide for the placement of the child pending the determination of the enforcement proceeding. Since the issuance of the warrant would not occur absent a risk of serious harm to the child, placement cannot be with the respondent. Normally, the child would be placed with the petitioner. However, if placement with the petitioner is not indicated, the court can order any other appropriate placement authorized under the laws of the court's state. Placement with the petitioner may not be indicated if there is a likelihood that the petitioner also will flee the jurisdiction. Placement with the petitioner may not be practical if the petitioner is proceeding through an attorney and is not present before the court.

This section authorizes the court to utilize whatever means are available under local law to ensure the appearance of the petitioner and child at the enforcement hearing. Such means might include cash bonds, a surrender of a passport, or whatever the court determines is necessary.

Attorney General Opinions. A court has the authority to impose conditions, such as a child custody bond to be forfeited if the child is not produced, in an enforcement hearing regarding a child custody determination for the purpose of ensuring the appearance of the child and the child's custodian, OAG 00-176, 2000 Tenn. AG LEXIS 179 (11/20/00).

36-6-236. Award of prevailing party fees, costs and expenses.

The court may award the prevailing party, including a state, necessary and reasonable expenses incurred by or on behalf of the party, including costs, communication expenses, attorney's fees, investigative fees, expenses for witnesses, travel expenses, and child care during the course of the proceedings. The court may assess fees, costs, or expenses against a state pursuant to this part.

Acts 1999, ch. 389, § 37.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Not Awarded.

In a divorce proceeding, a wife was not entitled to attorney fees under T.C.A. § 36-6-236 because this was a purely intrastate custody dispute; however, the issue of whether fees should have been awarded under T.C.A. § 36-5-103(c) was not decided since the case was being remanded for reconsideration of alimony and the marital property award to the wife. Keyt v. Keyt, 244 S.W.3d 321, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 1082 (Tenn. Dec. 19, 2007).

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

This section is derived from the International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 42 U.S.C. § 11607(b)(3). Normally the court will award fees and costs against the non-prevailing party. Included as expenses are the amount of investigation fees incurred by private persons or by public officials as well as the cost of child placement during the proceedings.

This section implements the policies of Section 8(c) of Pub.L. 96-611 (part of the PKPA). The term prevailing party is not given a special definition for this act. Each state will apply its own standard.

36-6-237. Full faith and credit for foreign orders.

A court of this state shall accord full faith and credit to an order issued by another state and consistent with this part which enforces a child-custody determination by a court of another state unless the order has been vacated, stayed, or modified by a court having jurisdiction to do so under this part.

Acts 1999, ch. 389, § 38.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

The enforcement order, to be effective, must also be enforced by other states. This section requires courts of this state to enforce and not modify enforcement orders issued by other states when made consistently with the provisions of this act.

36-6-238. Appeals.

An appeal may be taken from a final order in a proceeding under this part in accordance with the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure and may be accelerated under Tennessee Rules of the Court of Appeals, Rule 13. Unless the court enters a temporary emergency order under § 36-6-219, the enforcing court may not stay an order enforcing a child-custody determination pending appeal.

Acts 1999, ch. 389, § 39.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

The order may be appealed as an expedited civil matter. An enforcement order should not be stayed by the court. Provisions for a stay would defeat the purpose of having a quick enforcement procedure. If there is a risk of serious mistreatment or abuse to the child, a petition to assume emergency jurisdiction must be filed under section 20 [§ 36-6-219]. This section leaves intact the possibility of obtaining an extraordinary remedy such as mandamus or prohibition from an appellate court to stay the court's enforcement action. In many states, it is not possible to limit the constitutional authority of appellate courts to issue a stay. However, unless the information before the appellate panel indicates that emergency jurisdiction would be assumed under Section 20 [§ 36-6-219], there is no reason to stay the enforcement of the order pending appeal.

36-6-239. Powers of prosecutors or public officials.

  1. In a case arising under this part or involving the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, the prosecutor or other appropriate public official may take any lawful action, including resort to a proceeding under this part or any other available civil proceeding to locate a child, obtain the return of a child, or enforce a child-custody determination if there is:
    1. An existing child-custody determination;
    2. A request to do so from a court in a pending child-custody proceeding;
    3. A reasonable belief that a criminal statute has been violated; or
    4. A reasonable belief that the child has been wrongfully removed or retained in violation of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction.
  2. A prosecutor or appropriate public official acting under this section acts on behalf of the court and may not represent any party.

Acts 1999, ch. 389, § 40.

Compiler's Notes. The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of Child Abduction (CTIA No. 8303.000), referred to in this section, was completed October 25, 1990, entered into force December 1, 1983, and was signed by the United States July 1, 1998.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

Sections 40-42 [§§ 36-6-23936-6-241] are derived from the recommendations of the Obstacles Study that urge a role for public authorities in civil enforcement of custody and visitation determinations. One of the basic policies behind this approach is that, as is the case with child support, the involvement of public authorities will encourage the parties to abide by the terms of the court order. The prosecutor usually would be the most appropriate public official to exercise authority under this section. However, states may locate the authority described in the section in the most appropriate public office for their governmental structure. The authority could be, for example, the Attorney General. If the parties know that prosecutors and law enforcement officers are available to help secure the return of a child, the parties may be deterred from interfering with the exercise of rights established by court order.

The use of public authorities should provide a more effective method of remedying violations of the custody determination. Most parties do not have the resources to enforce a custody determination in another jurisdiction. The availability of the prosecutor or other government official as an enforcement agency will help ensure that remedies of this act can be made available regardless of income level. In addition, the prosecutor may have resources to draw on that are unavailable to the average litigant.

The role of the public authorities should generally not begin until there is a custody determination that is sought to be enforced. The act does not authorize the public authorities to be involved in the action leading up to the making of the custody determination, except when requested by the court, when there is a violation the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, or when the person holding the child has violated a criminal statute.

This act does not mandate that the public authorities be involved in all cases referred to it. There is only so much time and money available for enforcement proceedings. Therefore, the public authorities eventually will develop guidelines to determine which cases will receive priority.

The use of civil procedures instead of, or in addition to, filing and prosecuting criminal charges enlarges the prosecutor's options and may provide a more economical and less disruptive means of solving problems of criminal abduction and retention. With the use of criminal proceedings alone, the procedure may be inadequate to ensure the return of the child. The civil options would permit the prosecutor to resolve that recurring and often frustrating problem.

A concern was expressed about whether allowing the prosecutor to use civil means as a method of settling a child abduction violated either DR 7-105(A) of the Code of Professional Responsibility or Model Rule of Professional Responsibility 4.4. Both provisions either explicitly or implicitly disapprove of a lawyer threatening criminal action to gain an advantage in a civil case. However, the prohibition relates to threats that are solely to gain an advantage in a civil case. If the prosecutor has a good faith reason for pursuing the criminal action, there is no ethical violation. See Committee on Legal Ethics v. Printz, 416 S.E. 2d 720 (W.Va. 1992) (Lawyer can threaten to press criminal charges against a client's former employee unless employee made restitution).

It must be emphasized that the public authorities do not become involved in the merits of the case. They are authorized only to locate the child and enforce the custody determination. The public authority is authorized by this section to utilize any civil proceeding to secure the enforcement of the custody determination. In most jurisdictions, that would be a proceeding under this act. If the prosecutor proceeds pursuant to this act, the prosecutor is subject to its provisions. There is nothing in this act that would prevent a state from authorizing the prosecutor or other public official to use additional remedies beyond those provided in this act.

The public authority does not represent any party to the custody determination. It acts as a “friend of the court.” Its role is to ensure that the custody determination is enforced.

Sections 40-42 [§§ 36-6-23936-6-241] are limited to cases covered by this act, i.e. interstate cases. However, states may, if they wish, extend this part of the act to intrastate cases.

It should also be noted that the provisions of this section relate to the civil enforcement of child custody determinations. Nothing in this section is meant to detract from the ability of the prosecutor to use criminal provisions in child abduction cases.

36-6-240. Law enforcement officer powers.

At the request of a prosecutor or other appropriate public official acting under § 36-6-239, a law enforcement officer may take any lawful action reasonably necessary to locate a child or a party and assist a prosecutor or appropriate public official with responsibilities under § 36-6-239.

Acts 1999, ch. 389, § 41.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

This section authorizes law enforcement officials to assist in locating a child and enforcing a custody determination when requested to do so by the public authorities. It is to be read as an enabling provision. Whether law enforcement officials have discretion in responding to a request by the prosecutor or other public official is a matter of local law.

36-6-241. Respondent liability for costs and expenses incurred by prosecutors, public officials and law enforcement officers.

If the respondent is not the prevailing party, the court may assess against the respondent all direct expenses and costs incurred by the prosecutor or other appropriate public official and law enforcement officers under §§ 36-6-239 or 36-6-240.

Acts 1999, ch. 389, § 42.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

One of the major problems of utilizing public officials to locate children and enforce custody and visitation determinations is cost. This section authorizes the prosecutor and law enforcement to recover costs against the non-prevailing party. The use of the term “direct” indicates that overhead is not a recoverable cost. This section cannot be used to recover the value of the time spent by the public authorities' attorneys.

36-6-242. Uniformity of construction among states.

In applying and construing this uniform act, consideration must be given to the need to promote uniformity of the law with respect to its subject matter among states that enact it.

Acts 1999, ch. 389, § 43.

36-6-243. Actions commenced before June 14, 1999.

A motion or other request for relief made in a child-custody proceeding or to enforce a child-custody determination which was commenced before June 14, 1999, is governed by the law in effect at the time the motion or other request was made.

Acts 1999, ch. 389, § 45.

COMMENTS TO OFFICIAL TEXT

A child custody proceeding will last throughout the minority of the child. The commencement of a child custody proceeding prior to this act does not mean that jurisdiction will continue to be governed by prior law. The provisions of this act apply if a motion to modify an existing determination is filed after the enactment of this act. A motion that is filed prior to enactment may be completed under the rules in effect at the time the motion is filed.

Part 3
Visitation

36-6-301. Visitation.

After making an award of custody, the court shall, upon request of the noncustodial parent, grant such rights of visitation as will enable the child and the noncustodial parent to maintain a parent-child relationship unless the court finds, after a hearing, that visitation is likely to endanger the child's physical or emotional health. In granting any such rights of visitation, the court shall designate in which parent's home each minor child shall reside on given days of the year, including provisions for holidays, birthdays of family members, vacations and other special occasions. If the court finds that the noncustodial parent has physically or emotionally abused the child, the court may require that visitation be supervised or prohibited until such abuse has ceased or until there is no reasonable likelihood that such abuse will recur. The court may not order the department of children's services to provide supervision of visitation pursuant to this section except in cases where the department is the petitioner or intervening petitioner in a case in which the custody or guardianship of a child is at issue.

Acts 1995, ch. 428, § 3; 1996, ch. 1079, § 71; 1998, ch. 1050, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Former § 36-6-301 was transferred to § 36-6-302 by Acts 1995, ch. 428, § 3.

Law Reviews.

Adoption and Custody: Current Trends in Tennessee Family Law: Bridge Over Troubled Water: Changing the Custody Laws in Tennessee, 27 U. Mem. L. Rev. 769 (1997).

Constitutional Law — Campbell v. Sundquist: Tennessee's Homosexual Practices Act Violates the Right to Privacy, 28 U. Mem. L. Rev. 311 (1997).

For the Children's Sake: How the New Parenting Plan Will Work (Hon. Don R. Ash), 36 No. 9 Tenn. B.J. 12 (2000).

When One Parent Goes and the Other Parent Stays: The Inconsistency and Inequality of Guaranteeing Absent Parents Permanent Parental Rights (Wendee M. Hilderbrand), 56 Vand. L. Rev. 1907 (2003).

“Where Have You Been Fran?” The Right of Siblings to Seek Court Access To Override Parental Denial of Visitation, 66 Tenn. L. Rev. 977 (1999).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

Provision of divorce decree that husband was entitled to visitation only upon petition by the guardian ad litem and after an opportunity for the wife to be heard by the court violated the open courts provision of the state constitution. Whitaker v. Whitaker, 957 S.W.2d 834, 1997 Tenn. App. LEXIS 266 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1028, 118 S. Ct. 1316, 140 L. Ed. 2d 480, 1998 U.S. LEXIS 1960 (1998).

2. Provisions for Prevention of Physical or Emotional Abuse.

Provision of visitation decree requiring husband to enroll in programs of anger management and parenting skills and a program with a psychiatrist, subject to the approval of a guardian ad litem, was unduly restrictive. Whitaker v. Whitaker, 957 S.W.2d 834, 1997 Tenn. App. LEXIS 266 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1028, 118 S. Ct. 1316, 140 L. Ed. 2d 480, 1998 U.S. LEXIS 1960 (1998).

Finding that the child had a genuine fear of his father was being emotionally scarred by enforcement of visitation provided a basis for limiting parenting time to therapeutic supervised visitation, but a remand was necessary because the order did not refer to T.C.A. § 36-6-301 or discuss T.C.A. § 36-6-106(a) factors. In re Jaxon W., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 87 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 15, 2019).

3. Child's State of Mind.

The child's state of mind cannot be the only factor to consider in deciding visitation privileges. Wilson v. Wilson, 987 S.W.2d 555, 1998 Tenn. App. LEXIS 612 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998), rehearing denied, 987 S.W.2d 555, 1998 Tenn. App. LEXIS 630 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998), rev'd, 984 S.W.2d 898, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 744 (Tenn. 1998).

4. Third-Party Visitation.

Juvenile court erred in ruling that in the event the father was unable to exercise personal visitation in any month, the paternal grandparents were entitled to exercise his shared parenting time; that conditional order established the grandparents'  visitation fully and completely and was therefore governed by T.C.A. § 36-6-306, which allowed visitation rights to grandparents but did not grant jurisdiction to decide grandparental visitation rights. Smallwood v. Mann, 205 S.W.3d 358, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 994 (Tenn. 2006).

There was simply no statutory authority for allowing a non-custodial parent to transfer or assign his or her visitation rights to the grandparents. Smallwood v. Mann, 205 S.W.3d 358, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 994 (Tenn. 2006).

Non-biological parent was not a biological parent, legal parent, or step parent, and she did not seek to adopt the child; thus, she did not fit within any of these statutory definitions of a parent, rendering her without standing to pursue a parentage action or visitation with the child. Pippin v. Pippin, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 220 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 14, 2020).

5. Judicial Discretion.

While the details of visitation arrangements are generally left to the discretion of the trial court, this discretion is not unbounded, and it must be based on proof and appropriate legal principles. Hogue v. Hogue, 147 S.W.3d 245, 2004 Tenn. App. LEXIS 182 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004), review or rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 804 (Tenn. Sept. 13, 2004).

6. Non-custodial Parents.

Right of the non-custodial parent to reasonable visitation is clearly favored. Hogue v. Hogue, 147 S.W.3d 245, 2004 Tenn. App. LEXIS 182 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004), review or rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 804 (Tenn. Sept. 13, 2004).

Judgment denying the father's visitation with the parties'  minor children was reversed because there simply was no evidence that the father had inflicted harm on his children sufficiently severe to justify the practical severing of the parent-child relationship. Melvin v. Melvin, 415 S.W.3d 847, 2011 Tenn. App. LEXIS 407 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 26, 2011), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2011 Tenn. LEXIS 1082 (Tenn. Nov. 16, 2011).

7. Homosexual Parents.

Temporary restraining order imposed on a father following a divorce that enjoined him from exposing his child to his “gay lifestyle” was unenforceable due to vagueness; the trial court erred by holding him in contempt of court for telling his child that he was gay and allowing his child to meet his gay lover. Hogue v. Hogue, 147 S.W.3d 245, 2004 Tenn. App. LEXIS 182 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004), review or rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 804 (Tenn. Sept. 13, 2004).

Courts should follow the same principles for placing restrictions on gay parents that they use on any parents; those principles provide that after making an award of custody, the trial courts are to grant such rights of visitation as will enable the child and the non-custodial parent to maintain a parent-child relationship, unless the court finds that visitation is likely to endanger the child's physical or emotional health. Hogue v. Hogue, 147 S.W.3d 245, 2004 Tenn. App. LEXIS 182 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004), review or rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 804 (Tenn. Sept. 13, 2004).

Neither gay parents nor heterosexual parents have special rights; they are subject to the same laws, the same restrictions. Hogue v. Hogue, 147 S.W.3d 245, 2004 Tenn. App. LEXIS 182 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004), review or rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 804 (Tenn. Sept. 13, 2004).

Chancery court erred in unilaterally imposing substantive and material restrictions on a father's activities during his parenting time without affording him an evidentiary hearing because some of the restrictions placed on the father were too vague to be enforceable, the statement of the evidence did not provide a factual basis for the restrictions placed on the father, and such restraints should be well defined and must involve conduct that competent evidence shows could cause harm to the child. Brantley v. Brantley, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 617 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 15, 2017).

8. Visitation Proper.

Trial court did not err by granting a mother unsupervised, regular visitation with her child because grandparents presented no evidence of any physical or emotional abuse by the mother or that she was likely to endanger the child's health; the trial court did not conclude that the mother presented a substantial risk of harm to the child if she were granted visitation. In re Kane H., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 359 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 20, 2015).

36-6-302. Grandparents' visitation rights upon child's removal or placement in home or facility.

      1. If a child is removed from the custody of the child's parents, guardian or legal custodian; and
      2. If a child is placed in a licensed foster home, a facility operated by a licensed child care agency, or other home or facility designated or operated by the court, whether such placement is by court order, voluntary placement agreement, surrender of parental rights, or otherwise;
    1. Then, the grandparents of such child may be granted reasonable visitation rights to the child during such child's minority by the court of competent jurisdiction upon a finding that:
      1. Such visitation rights would be in the best interest of the minor child;
      2. The grandparents would adequately protect the child from further abuse or intimidation by the perpetrator or any other family member;
      3. The grandparents were not implicated in the commission of any alleged act against such child or of their own children that under the law in effect prior to November 1, 1989, would constitute the criminal offense of:
        1. Aggravated rape under § 39-2-603 [repealed];
        2. Rape under § 39-2-604 [repealed];
        3. Aggravated sexual battery under § 39-2-606 [repealed];
        4. Sexual battery under § 39-2-607 [repealed];
        5. Assault with intent to commit rape or attempt to commit rape or sexual battery under § 39-2-608 [repealed];
        6. Crimes against nature under § 39-2-612 [repealed];
        7. Incest under § 39-4-306 [repealed];
        8. Begetting child on wife's sister under § 39-4-307 [repealed];
        9. Use of minor of obscene purposes under § 39-6-1137 [repealed]; or
        10. Promotion of performance including sexual conduct by minor under § 39-6-1138 [repealed]; and
      4. The grandparents are not implicated in the commission of any alleged act against such child or of their own children that under the law in effect on or after November 1, 1989, would constitute the criminal offense of:
        1. Aggravated rape under § 39-13-502;
        2. Rape under § 39-13-503;
        3. Aggravated sexual battery under § 39-13-504;
        4. Sexual battery under § 39-13-505;
        5. Criminal attempt for any of the offenses in subdivisions (a)(2)(D)(i)-(a)(2)(D)(iv) as provided in § 39-12-101;
        6. Incest under § 39-15-302;
        7. Sexual exploitation of a minor under § 39-17-1003;
        8. Aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor under § 39-17-1004; or
        9. Especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor under § 39-17-1005.
  1. This section shall not apply in any case in which the child has been adopted by any person other than a stepparent or other relative of the child.

Acts 1971, ch. 74, §§ 1, 2; 1975, ch. 330, § 1; T.C.A., §§ 36-1101, 36-1102; Acts 1985, ch. 341, § 1; 1985, ch. 478, § 22; 1995, ch. 428, § 3; T.C.A. § 36-6-301; Acts 1997, ch. 503, § 1; 2000, ch. 981, § 51.

Compiler's Notes. Former § 36-6-302, concerning visitation rights of stepparents, was transferred to § 36-6-303 in 1995.

The sections of title 39, chs. 1-6, referred to in this section, were repealed by Acts 1989, ch. 591.

Acts 1997, ch. 503, § 4 provides that the 1997 amendment shall apply to any petition for visitation rights filed on or after June 1, 1997.

Law Reviews.

A Summary of the 1999 — 2000 U.S. Supreme Court Civil Decisions (Perry A. Craft and Arshad (Paku) Khan), 36 No. 10 Tenn. B.J. 18 (2000).

Adoption and Custody: Current Trends in Tennessee Family Law: Bridge Over Troubled Water: Changing the Custody Laws in Tennessee, 27 U. Mem. L. Rev. 769 (1997).

Family Law — Hawk v. Hawk: Grandparent Visitation Rights — Court Protects Parental Privacy Rights Over “Child's Best Interests” (Alicia C. Klyman), 24 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 413 (1994).

“Where Have You Been Fran?” The Right of Siblings to Seek Court Access To Override Parental Denial of Visitation, 66 Tenn. L. Rev. 977 (1999).

Attorney General Opinions. Constitutionality of the grandparents' visitation rights statute, OAG 91-21, 1991 Tenn. AG LEXIS 23 (3/7/91).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

When applied to married parents who have maintained continuous custody of their children and have acted as fit parents, court interference pursuant to this section constitutes an unconstitutional invasion of privacy rights under the Tennessee Constitution. Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573, 1993 Tenn. LEXIS 202 (Tenn. 1993).

The language of this statute, allowing grandparents reasonable visitation rights upon a finding of the best interests of the minor child, constitutes an unconstitutional invasion of the privacy rights of the parents under the Tennessee Constitution. Ellison v. Ellison, 994 S.W.2d 623, 1998 Tenn. App. LEXIS 746 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998).

2. Burden of Proof.

Under this section, the burden of proof is on the petitioning natural or legal grandparents to prove that visitation rights are in the best interest of the child. Clark v. Evans, 778 S.W.2d 446, 1989 Tenn. App. LEXIS 198 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989).

3. Jurisdiction.

Court that entered decree providing for custody and grandparents' visitation was “court of competent jurisdiction” referred to in this section. In re Tate, 797 S.W.2d 618, 1990 Tenn. App. LEXIS 316 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990).

4. Parental Rights.

In a contempt action by paternal grandparents against mother for refusing to allow visitation with grandchild, where the natural father's parental rights had been terminated and the child adopted by the mother's husband, under their constitutionally protected parental rights, and because there was no evidence that the child was in danger of substantial harm, the mother and adoptive father had the right to refuse visitation. Simmons v. Simmons, 900 S.W.2d 682, 1995 Tenn. LEXIS 271 (Tenn. 1995).

5. Applicability.

When children are adopted by people who are not relatives or step-parents, the standards of the statute do not apply; because the person who opposed visitation and who adopted the children was the paternal grandmother, the case would not fall into the exemption, and the statute could work as correctly applied by the trial court. Seibers v. Latimer, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 290 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 25, 2018).

When considered together, the specificity of T.C.A. § 36-6-302, which applies only in cases of removal, would override the language of T.C.A. § 36-6-306 that applies any time grandparent visitation is opposed by a parent or custodian of a child under various conditions; when applied together, § 36-6-302 is the proper law to consider when a petition for grandparent visitation is filed after a child has been removed from his or her parent, guardian, or custodian. Seibers v. Latimer, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 290 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 25, 2018).

Trial court did not err in granting maternal grandparents visitation because it was correct in applying the statute in its analysis; although the children had been adopted by the paternal grandmother, they were not adopted by a person outside of the family, which would prevent application of the statute. Seibers v. Latimer, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 290 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 25, 2018).

While the trial court erred in saying that T.C.A. § 36-6-306 did not apply to a paternal grandmother, that error was harmless because it would not affect the application of T.C.A. § 36-6-302. Seibers v. Latimer, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 290 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 25, 2018).

36-6-303. Visitation rights of stepparents.

  1. In extraordinary cases, the court is authorized to order stepparent visitation under the following circumstances:
    1. If a stepparent or former stepparent presents a petition, or a motion in a pending case to which the stepparent is a party, for visitation with the stepparent's stepchild or former stepchild to the circuit court, chancery court, general sessions court with domestic relations jurisdiction, or juvenile court of the county in which the stepchild or former stepchild resides, the court shall set the matter for hearing if such visitation is opposed by a parent or custodian or if the petitioner's visitation has been severely reduced by the parent or custodian and any of the following circumstances exist:
      1. The parent of the child to whom the petitioner was married is deceased;
      2. The child's parent and the petitioner are divorced or are in the process of seeking a divorce;
      3. The whereabouts of the child's parent to whom the petitioner is married are unknown;
      4. The court of another state has ordered the visitation between the child and the petitioner;
      5. The child and petitioner maintained a significant relationship for a substantial period of time preceding severance or severe reduction of contact and the contact was severed or severely reduced by the parent or custodian for reasons other than abuse or presence of danger of substantial mental, emotional, or physical harm to the child, and severance or severe reduction of this contact is likely to cause substantial mental, emotional, or physical harm to the child; or
      6. There has been an unreasonable denial of visitation by a parent or custodian and the denial has caused the child severe mental, emotional, or physical harm.
    2. For purposes of this section, “petitioner” includes a movant, unless the context otherwise requires.
    1. In considering a petition or motion for stepparent visitation, the court shall first determine the presence of a danger of substantial mental, emotional, or physical harm to the child if the requested visitation is not permitted by the court. Such finding of substantial harm may be based upon cessation or severe reduction of the contact between a minor child and the petitioner only if the court determines by a preponderance of the evidence that the child had a significant existing relationship with the petitioner, and that loss of or severe reduction in contact is likely to occasion severe mental, emotional, or physical harm to the child or presents the danger of other direct and substantial harm to the child.
    2. A petitioner is not required to present the testimony of an expert witness in order to establish a significant existing relationship with a child or that the loss or severe reduction of the contact is likely to cause substantial mental, emotional, or physical harm to the child.
  2. There is a rebuttable presumption that a fit parent's or custodian's actions and decisions regarding the petitioner's requested visitation are not harmful to the child's mental, emotional, or physical health. The burden is on the petitioner to prove that a parent's or custodian's actions and decisions regarding visitation will cause substantial harm to the child's mental, emotional, or physical health.
  3. Upon an initial finding of the presence of a danger of substantial mental, emotional, or physical harm to the child, the court shall then determine whether the petitioner's visitation would be in the best interest of the child based upon the factors in subsection (e). The best interest finding will only occur in extraordinary cases. Upon a determination that visitation would be in the best interest of the child, reasonable visitation may be ordered.
  4. In determining the best interests of the child under this section, the court shall consider all pertinent matters, including, but not limited to, the following:
    1. The length and quality of the prior relationship between the child and the petitioner and the role performed by the petitioner;
    2. The existing emotional ties of the child to the petitioner;
    3. The preference of the child if the child is determined to be of sufficient maturity to express a preference;
    4. The effect of hostility between the petitioner and the parent or custodian of the child manifested before the child, and the willingness of the petitioner, except in case of abuse, to encourage a close relationship between the child and the parent or custodian of the child;
    5. The good faith of the petitioner in filing the petition or motion;
    6. If one (1) parent or custodian is deceased or missing, the fact that the petitioner requesting visitation is or was the spouse of the deceased or missing parent or custodian;
    7. Any unreasonable deprivation of the petitioner's opportunity to visit with the child by the child's parent or custodian;
    8. Whether the petitioner is seeking to maintain a significant existing relationship with the child;
    9. Whether awarding the petitioner visitation would interfere with the parent-child relationship or the custodian-child relationship;
    10. The child's interactions and interrelationships with siblings, half-siblings, other relatives, and step-relatives;
    11. Any court finding that the child's parent or custodian is unfit; and
    12. Any other factors the court deems relevant.

Acts 1981, ch. 243, § 1; T.C.A., § 36-837; § 36-6-302; Acts 1995, ch. 428, § 3; 2019, ch. 431, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2019, ch. 431, § 2 provided that the act, which amended this section, shall apply to petitions and motions filed on or after July 1, 2019.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment rewrote this section, which read: “(a) In a suit for annulment, divorce or separate maintenance where one (1) party is a stepparent to a minor child born to the other party, such stepparent may be granted reasonable visitation rights to such child during the child's minority by the court of competent jurisdiction upon a finding that such visitation rights would be in the best interests of the minor child and that such stepparent is actually providing or contributing towards the support of such child.“(b) Such decree shall remain within the control of the court and be subject to such changes or modification as the exigencies of the case require.”

Effective Dates. Acts 2019, ch. 431, § 2. July 1, 2019.

Law Reviews.

Defining the Family in the Millennium: The Troxel Follies (John DeWitt Gregory), 32 U. Mem. L. Rev. 687 (2002).

36-6-304. Exposure of child to nudist colony prohibited.

No person who has been granted visitation rights to a child shall, during the child's minority, expose the child to any facility organized or operated as a nudist colony without the consent of the custodial parent. Any court of competent jurisdiction shall have the ability to enforce these provisions and enjoin violations of this section through the full extent of the court's civil and criminal contempt powers.

Acts 1996, ch. 900, § 1.

Cross-References. Contempt of court, title 29, ch. 9.

Criminal contempt, Tenn. R. Crim. P. 42.

36-6-305. Mediation in cases involving domestic abuse.

In any proceeding concerning the visitation of a child, if an order of protection issued in or recognized by this state is in effect or if there is a court finding of domestic abuse or any criminal conviction involving domestic abuse within the marriage that is the subject of the proceeding for divorce or separate support and maintenance, the court may order mediation or refer either party to mediation only if:

  1. Mediation is agreed to by the victim of the alleged domestic or family violence;
  2. Mediation is provided by a certified mediator who is trained in domestic and family violence in a specialized manner that protects the safety of the victim; and
  3. The victim is permitted to have in attendance at mediation a supporting person of the victim's choice, including, but not limited to, an attorney or advocate. No victim may provide monetary compensation to a nonattorney advocate for attendance at mediation.

Acts 1997, ch. 350, § 3.

36-6-306. Grandparents' visitation rights.

  1. Any of the following circumstances, when presented in a petition for grandparent visitation to the circuit, chancery, general sessions courts with domestic relations jurisdiction, other courts with domestic relations jurisdiction or juvenile court in matters involving children born out of wedlock of the county in which the petitioned child currently resides, necessitates a hearing if such grandparent visitation is opposed by the custodial parent or parents or custodian or if the grandparent visitation has been severely reduced by the custodial parent or parents or custodian:
    1. The father or mother of an unmarried minor child is deceased;
    2. The child's father or mother are divorced, legally separated, or were never married to each other;
    3. The child's father or mother has been missing for not less than six (6) months;
    4. The court of another state has ordered grandparent visitation;
    5. The child resided in the home of the grandparent for a period of twelve (12) months or more and was subsequently removed from the home by the parent, parents, or custodian (this grandparent-grandchild relationship establishes a rebuttable presumption that denial of visitation may result in irreparable harm to the child); or
    6. The child and the grandparent maintained a significant existing relationship for a period of twelve (12) months or more immediately preceding severance or severe reduction of the relationship, this relationship was severed or severely reduced by the parent, parents, or custodian for reasons other than abuse or presence of a danger of substantial harm to the child, and severance or severe reduction of this relationship is likely to occasion substantial emotional harm to the child.
    1. In considering a petition for grandparent visitation, the court shall first determine the presence of a danger of substantial harm to the child. Such finding of substantial harm may be based upon cessation or severe reduction of the relationship between an unmarried minor child and the child's grandparent if the court determines, upon proper proof, that:
      1. The child had such a significant existing relationship with the grandparent that loss or severe reduction of the relationship is likely to occasion severe emotional harm to the child;
      2. The grandparent functioned as a primary caregiver such that cessation or severe reduction of the relationship could interrupt provision of the daily needs of the child and thus occasion physical or emotional harm; or
      3. The child had a significant existing relationship with the grandparent and loss or severe reduction of the relationship presents the danger of other direct and substantial harm to the child.
    2. For purposes of this section, a grandparent shall be deemed to have a significant existing relationship with a grandchild if:
      1. The child resided with the grandparent for at least six (6) consecutive months;
      2. The grandparent was a full-time caretaker of the child for a period of not less than six (6) consecutive months; or
      3. The grandparent had frequent visitation with the child who is the subject of the suit for a period of not less than one (1) year.
    3. A grandparent is not required to present the testimony or affidavit of an expert witness in order to establish a significant existing relationship with a grandchild or that the loss or severe reduction of the relationship is likely to occasion severe emotional harm to the child. Instead, the court shall consider whether the facts of the particular case would lead a reasonable person to believe that there is a significant existing relationship between the grandparent and grandchild or that the loss or severe reduction of the relationship is likely to occasion severe emotional harm to the child.
    4. For the purposes of this section, if the child's parent is deceased and the grandparent seeking visitation is the parent of that deceased parent, there shall be a rebuttable presumption of substantial harm to the child based upon the cessation or severe reduction of the relationship between the child and grandparent.
  2. Upon an initial finding of danger of substantial harm to the child, the court shall then determine whether grandparent visitation would be in the best interests of the child based upon the factors in § 36-6-307. Upon such determination, reasonable visitation may be ordered.
    1. Notwithstanding § 36-1-121, if a relative or stepparent adopts a child, this section applies.
    2. If a person other than a relative or a stepparent adopts a child, any visitation rights granted pursuant to this section before the adoption of the child shall automatically end upon such adoption.
  3. Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, as used in this part, with regard to the petitioned child, the word “grandparent” includes, but is not limited to:
    1. A biological grandparent;
    2. The spouse of a biological grandparent;
    3. A parent of an adoptive parent; or
    4. A biological or adoptive great-grandparent or the spouse thereof.
  4. For purposes of this section, “severe reduction” or “severely reduced” means reduction to no contact or token visitation as defined in § 36-1-102.

Acts 1997, ch. 503, § 2; 2000, ch. 891, § 1; 2001, ch. 440, § 1; 2003, ch. 79, § 1; 2004, ch. 452, § 1; 2004, ch. 691, § 1; 2004, ch. 874, § 1; 2007, ch. 22, § 1; 2010, ch. 957, § 1; 2015, ch. 247, §§ 1, 2; 2016, ch. 1076, §§ 1-4; 2018, ch. 734, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 1997, ch. 503, § 4 provides that this section shall apply to any petition for visitation rights filed on or after July 23, 1997.

Amendments. The 2018 amendment inserted “, other courts with domestic relations jurisdiction” in the introductory language of (a).

Effective Dates. Acts 2018, ch. 734, § 2. April 18, 2018.

Attorney General Opinions. Constitutionality of grandparent visitation provisions, OAG 99-006, 1999 Tenn. AG LEXIS 8 (1/25/99).

Grandparents who are the parents of single or never-been-married parents of grandchildren are eligible to petition the court for visitation, OAG 00-127, 2000 Tenn. AG LEXIS 128 (8/9/00).

Constitutionality of 2010 amendment to grandparent visitation statute.  OAG 10-62, 2010 Tenn. AG LEXIS 67 (5/5/10).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Applicability.

In using the term “including, but not limited to” in the grandparent visitation statute, T.C.A. § 36-6-306, the Tennessee Legislature intended “grandparent” to be defined expansively, and, at any rate, did not intend to limit that definition solely to the three enumerated examples of grandparent. Lovlace v. Copley, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 74 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 3, 2012), rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 136 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 22, 2012), rev'd, 418 S.W.3d 1, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 718 (Tenn. Sept. 6, 2013).

Pursuant to T.C.A. § 36-6-306(d)(1), in spite of the adoption statute, T.C.A. § 36-1-121, if a relative or stepparent adopts the child, then the grandparent visitation statute, T.C.A. § 36-6-306, as opposed to the adoption statute, is the controlling statute. Lovlace v. Copley, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 74 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 3, 2012), rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 136 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 22, 2012), rev'd, 418 S.W.3d 1, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 718 (Tenn. Sept. 6, 2013).

Because an adoptive parent enjoys the same legal standing as a biological parent, there is no reason to distinguish between the two for purposes of grandparent visitation. Therefore, an adoptive grandparent would come within the statutory definition of “grandparent” under the grandparent visitation statute, T.C.A. § 36-6-306(e). Following this logic, the husband of an adoptive grandparent, by virtue of his marriage, has the same standing under § 36-6-306(e)(2) to petition the court for grandparent visitation as the spouse of a biological grandparent. Lovlace v. Copley, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 74 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 3, 2012), rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 136 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 22, 2012), rev'd, 418 S.W.3d 1, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 718 (Tenn. Sept. 6, 2013).

Circuit court erred in utilizing the Tennessee Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, T.C.A. § 36-6-201 et seq., to register and enforce a Kentucky grandparent visitation order where the legislature intended to require grandparents seeking visitation rights in Tennessee to utilize the Grandparent Visitation Statute. Moorcroft v. Stuart, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 52 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 30, 2015).

Court of Appeals of Tennessee concludes that the Legislature intended to require grandparents seeking visitation rights in Tennessee to utilize the Grandparent Visitation Statute rather than the Tennessee Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, T.C.A. § 36-6-201 et seq., registration provision. Moorcroft v. Stuart, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 52 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 30, 2015).

While the trial court erred in saying that the statute did not apply to a paternal grandmother, that error was harmless because it would not affect the application of T.C.A. § 36-6-302. Seibers v. Latimer, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 290 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 25, 2018).

When considered together, the specificity of T.C.A. § 36-6-302, which applies only in cases of removal, would override the language of T.C.A. § 36-6-306 that applies any time grandparent visitation is opposed by a parent or custodian of a child under various conditions; when applied together, § 36-6-302 is the proper law to consider when a petition for grandparent visitation is filed after a child has been removed from his or her parent, guardian, or custodian. Seibers v. Latimer, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 290 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 25, 2018).

Trial court properly construed the grandparents'  pleadings to include a claim for grandparent visitation rights; they had custody of the child for a majority of his life, they continued to seek custody after the father filed a petition to establish a parenting plan, and the trial court found that a significant relationship existed between the grandparents and the child. In re Christian S., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 619 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 24, 2018).

Trial court properly dismissed for lack of standing a petition filed by the paternal great uncle and great aunt of a minor child under the grandparent visitation statute because the great uncle and great aunt did not qualify as grandparents under the statute. In re Claire C., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 66 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 14, 2020).

2. —Great-Grandparents.

Tennessee General Assembly did not intend to enact the type of grandparent visitation statute that would grant standing to only four grandparents, and the Legislature's wording of the statute indicates an intent to provide standing to lineal ancestors, or grandparents who are biologically related to the child; in this case, the great-grandparents were lineal ancestors of the children and biologically related to them, and, therefore, they were within the same group of people contemplated in the statute, such that they had standing to seek visitation, and the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction. In re Dayton R., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 229 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 21, 2015).

3. Construction with Former Statute.

Allowing a grandparent to procure visitation without first requiring a showing of harm to the child if such visitation is denied violate earlier provisions of T.C.A. § 36-6-306(b)(1) which specifically required such a showing. Smallwood v. Mann, 205 S.W.3d 358, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 994 (Tenn. 2006).

4. Requirements.

In order for T.C.A. § 36-6-306 to be implicated, visitation by grandparents must be opposed by the custodial parent or parents; because trial court found no such opposition, the statute was not implicated and trial court erred by failing to dismiss grandmother's action against parents seeking visitation of her grandchildren. Rogers v. Turner, — S.W.3d —, 2008 Tenn. App. LEXIS 608 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 13, 2008).

In a modification of grandparent visitation case where the non-parents were the movants, the burden was on the non-parents, under T.C.A. § 36-6-306, to show by a preponderance of the evidence that there had been a material change in circumstance that would have presented a substantial risk of harm to the child if modification was denied. The trial court, however, incorrectly applied the best interest of the child standard. Lovlace v. Copley, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 74 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 3, 2012), rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 136 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 22, 2012), rev'd, 418 S.W.3d 1, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 718 (Tenn. Sept. 6, 2013).

Adoption Statute, T.C.A. § 36-1-121(f), and the Grandparent Visitation Statute, T.C.A. § 36-6-306(d), do not conflict as the Grandparent Visitation Statute is more specific and clearly and unambiguously carves out a narrow, limited exception, in the case of grandparent visitation and stepparent adoption, to the more general rule stated in the Adoption Statute. Lovlace v. Copley, 418 S.W.3d 1, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 718 (Tenn. Sept. 6, 2013).

For purposes of grandparent visitation, hypothetical evidence of a child's reaction to the cessation of a relationship with a grandparent fails to meet the standard that a substantial harm must be specific to the relationship of the child at issue with his grandparent. McGarity v. Jerrolds, 429 S.W.3d 562, 2013 Tenn. App. LEXIS 552 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 27, 2013), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 160 (Tenn. Feb. 24, 2014).

Even with the stipulation that there was a significant existing relationship between the grandparents and the child, for visitation purposes, the grandparents were required to show that the child was likely to suffer severe emotional harm due to the termination of that relationship by not permitting visitation with the grandparents. McGarity v. Jerrolds, 429 S.W.3d 562, 2013 Tenn. App. LEXIS 552 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 27, 2013), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 160 (Tenn. Feb. 24, 2014).

Visitation by grandparents must be opposed before the court is empowered to act. In re Destin R., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 210 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 8, 2015).

There was no finding of fact upon which the trial court based its determination that the mother terminated the grandparents'  visitation, and the briefs were also deficient in showing that the mother opposed the grandparents'  visitation, which was the threshold finding to invoke the trial court's intervention; the evidence preponderated against a finding that the mother opposed the grandfather's visitation and showed that the mother restricted, but did not oppose, the grandmother's visitation, and it was necessary for the trial court to make specific findings relative to the mother's opposition to both grandparents, and an independent review was inappropriate. In re Destin R., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 210 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 8, 2015).

Provisions of the statute for grandparent visitation are only triggered when there is parental opposition to grandparent visitation; the statute requires evidence that the custodial parent opposes grandparent visitation, which means opposition existing when the petition is filed, not opposition likely to occur in the future. Coleman v. Olson, 551 S.W.3d 686, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 315 (Tenn. June 15, 2018).

Legislature's use of the words, “is opposed by,” means actual existing opposition, not likely future opposition; based on the plain meaning of subsection (a), a petitioning grandparent must establish that the custodial parent opposes grandparent visitation, and unless there is evidence of parental opposition to visitation, a trial court cannot consider whether the child is at substantial risk of harm or whether visitation would be in the child's best interest. Coleman v. Olson, 551 S.W.3d 686, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 315 (Tenn. June 15, 2018).

Trial court erred by awarding a maternal grandmother grandparent visitation because she failed to allege the threshold requirement of parental opposition to visitation; the grandmother's allegations focused on her close relationship with her grandchild and the death of the mother and omitted any allegation that the father denied her visitation. Coleman v. Olson, 551 S.W.3d 686, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 315 (Tenn. June 15, 2018).

Grandparent visitation statutes must be narrowly construed to protect the fundamental parental liberty interest at stake, and the supreme court has expressly rejected the examination of the extent or quality of a petitioner's relationship with the child when determining whether he or she qualifies as a grandparent under the statute; thus, subsection (e) does not authorize a court to determine that a petitioner qualifies as a de facto grandparent based upon his or her relationship with a child. In re Claire C., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 66 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 14, 2020).

5. Visitation Granted.

Once grandparents have obtained court-ordered visitation, the presumption of superior parental rights does not apply in proceedings to modify or terminate grandparent visitation. Lovlace v. Copley, 418 S.W.3d 1, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 718 (Tenn. Sept. 6, 2013).

Appellate court erred by reversing a judgment granting a set of grandparents visitation because they had standing to bring suit as they met the definition of a grandparent under T.C.A. § 36-6-306(e) and the adoption of the child did not extinguish their previously granted visitation rights. Lovlace v. Copley, 418 S.W.3d 1, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 718 (Tenn. Sept. 6, 2013).

Definition of grandparent under T.C.A. § 36-6-306(e) includes two categories that do not require proof of a biological relationship with the child. Lovlace v. Copley, 418 S.W.3d 1, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 718 (Tenn. Sept. 6, 2013).

6. Amount of Visitation.

Trial court did not abuse its discretion by only awarding the grandparents'  visitation consisting of eight house on the second Sunday of each month, December 26, and four hours on each child's birthday because it sufficiently recognized the importance of both parents'  fundamental interests to their children and the children's busy schedules. The parents had stated that more visitation would conflict with the children's activities and their own parenting time and a physician testified that multiple overnight visits with the grandparents may have a negative effect on the children's ability to fully integrate into their parents'  homes. In re Dayton R., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 246 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 7, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 610 (Tenn. Aug. 18, 2016).

Trial court's visitation schedule for the grandmother, which allowed her overnight visitation with the child the third weekend of every month, every Christmas break, every other Thanksgiving break, and every summer break, and required the mother to facilitate two phone calls per week, was not reasonable because it impermissibly interfered with the mother's rights and it was not narrowly tailored, as the child was only 16 months old, the grandmother never acted as a caregiver or parent, and yet to establish a significant relationship with the child, having only visited her twice. In re Diawn B., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 422 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 23, 2018).

7. Visitation Reversed.

Juvenile court erred in ruling that in the event the father was unable to exercise personal visitation in any month, the paternal grandparents were entitled to exercise his shared parenting time; that conditional order established the grandparents'  visitation fully and completely and was therefore governed by T.C.A. § 36-6-306, which allowed visitation rights to grandparents but did not grant jurisdiction to decide grandparental visitation rights. Smallwood v. Mann, 205 S.W.3d 358, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 994 (Tenn. 2006).

Because the evidence showed only that the child became excited at the mention of his paternal grandparents, not that he became inconsolable, or otherwise upset, due to the loss of connection with them, and there was no evidence in the record to support a finding that the child would likely feel inadequate, abandoned, rejected, that he would lose connection with his heritage, or that he would suffer economically if grandparent visitation was not granted, the trial court erred in allowing grandparent visitation. McGarity v. Jerrolds, 429 S.W.3d 562, 2013 Tenn. App. LEXIS 552 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 27, 2013), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 160 (Tenn. Feb. 24, 2014).

Award of grandparent visitation was vacated because (1) the court did not sufficiently find a mother opposed visitation, as required to implicate the grandparent visitation statute, as finding there had been “some deprivation” of visitation was insufficient, since the mother could reasonably limit such visitation, and (2) the disputed issue of whether the mother offered visitation with reasonable limits was unresolved. Manning v. Manning, 474 S.W.3d 252, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 114 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 10, 2015).

When an award of grandparent visitation was vacated, the case had to be remanded because the trial court's failure to make specific findings was fatal to appellate review, since whether the mother offered the grandparents any visitation, and whether the grandparents refused such offer, was significantly disputed, requiring resolution based on the parties'  relative credibility, which the trial court had to find. Manning v. Manning, 474 S.W.3d 252, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 114 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 10, 2015).

8. Visitation Mooted.

Court rejected grandparents'  argument that the trial court erred in dismissing sua sponte their counter-petition for grandparent visitation where the mother, who lived with the grandparents, had been granted visitation and when the mother had visitation with the children in the grandparents'  home, the grandparents would have unrestricted visitation with the children; therefore, the grandparents'  relationship with the children was not severed and their claim for grandparent visitation had been rendered moot. Keisling v. Keisling, 196 S.W.3d 703, 2005 Tenn. App. LEXIS 747 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 474 (Tenn. 2006).

9. Jurisdiction.

Earlier provisions of T.C.A. § 36-6-306 provided that a grandparent's visitation petition may be presented to a court of competent jurisdiction, but that phrase was not defined; the 2003 amendments provide that unless the child has been removed from the parents'  custody by the court, a petition for grandparents'  visitation is to be presented to the circuit or chancery court of the county in which the petitioned child currently resides. Smallwood v. Mann, 205 S.W.3d 358, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 994 (Tenn. 2006).

Because the amendment to T.C.A. § 36-6-306 appeared to clarify a legislative intent that circuit and chancery courts have sole jurisdiction over grandparents'  visitation petitions, the supreme court of Tennessee was constrained to conclude that the juvenile court did not have jurisdiction to grant grandparents'  visitation pursuant to T.C.A. § 37-1-104(f). Smallwood v. Mann, 205 S.W.3d 358, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 994 (Tenn. 2006).

Whether the legislature intended for all grandparent visitation petitions, including those pertaining to children whose parents were never married, to be filed in circuit or chancery court is unclear. Smallwood v. Mann, 205 S.W.3d 358, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 994 (Tenn. 2006).

10. Transfer of Visitation.

There was simply no statutory authority for allowing a non-custodial parent to transfer or assign his or her visitation rights to the grandparents. Smallwood v. Mann, 205 S.W.3d 358, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 994 (Tenn. 2006).

11. Res Judicata.

Grandmother's second petition for visitation, filed after her prior petition was denied, was barred by res judicata, as she did not allege new facts, and the intervening change in the burden of persuasion in the grandparent visitation statute, T.C.A. § 36-6-306, did not provide an exception to the operation of res judicata that entitled her to relitigate the same dispute. Jackson v. Smith, 387 S.W.3d 486, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 812 (Tenn. Nov. 16, 2012).

12. Visitation Not Opposed.

Trial court erred in awarding grandparent visitation, because there was no evidence of the father's opposition to visitation prior to the filing of the grandparent visitation petition. Coleman v. Olson, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 782 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 20, 2016).

Grandmother's claim that the juvenile court violated her rights by not granting her visitation with the child lacked merit, as she failed to prove that the mother denied her visitation; the grandmother admitted that the mother had allowed her to visit with the child in Chattanooga, but what she really wanted was more visitation and for the visitation to occur in Utah. However, the statute could not be used by grandparents who thought they were entitled to more or different visitation in the absence of a finding that the parent opposed visitation. In re Cassi J., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 258 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 2, 2020).

13. Significant Existing Relationship Found.

It was not error to find a child's loss of a significant relationship with the child's grandmother would severely harm the child because the child lived with the grandmother for over six consecutive months, the grandmother frequently visited the child for at least one year, and such a presumption was not rebutted. Chamberlain v. Brown, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 965 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 19, 2016).

14. Review.

Trial court's judgment ordering grandparent visitation was insufficient for appellate review where it did not state whether subsection (5) or (6) of this section applied, its findings regarding substantial harm or severe emotional harm to the child were too generalized, and it contained no analysis as to the child's best interest as required by this section. Hadjopoulos v. Sponcia, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 292 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 28, 2016).

Trial court did not err by determining the maternal grandmother was not entitled to grandparent visitation because there was ample evidence that the grandmother was a negative influence on the child and caused the child to feel torn between her two grandmothers. This, in turn, affected the child's behavior at home and school, and the grandmother's actions evinced a hostility towards the paternal grandparents and an unwillingness to foster a close relationship between them and the Child. In re Alexis S., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 526 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 29, 2019).

15. Presumption Not Rebutted.

It was not error to find a presumption that denying grandparent visitation might harm a child was not rebutted, because a grandmother proved the child lived in the grandmother's home for over 12 months and was removed by the child's parents, who also lived in the home, and the grandmother did not have to then be the child's primary or only caretaker. Chamberlain v. Brown, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 965 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 19, 2016).

16. Relationship Severed.

It was not error to find a child's relationship with the child's grandmother was severed because the child's mother did not respond to the parties'  normal method of arranging visitation between the child and the grandmother, effectively denying the grandmother visitation. Chamberlain v. Brown, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 965 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 19, 2016).

17. Severe Reduction In Visitation.

Evidence preponderated against a finding that the grandparents'  visitation with the children was severely reduced according to the applicable statutory definition, as the trial court incorrectly interpreted “severe reduction” to include insubstantial contact compared to the previous relationship rather than a reduction to “token” visitation, as defined in T.C.A. § 36-1-102. Clark v. Johnson, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 300 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 29, 2018).

36-6-307. Determination of best interests of child for grandparent visitations.

In determining the best interests of the child under § 36-6-306, the court shall consider all pertinent matters, including, but not necessarily limited to, the following:

  1. The length and quality of the prior relationship between the child and the grandparent and the role performed by the grandparent;
  2. The existing emotional ties of the child to the grandparent;
  3. The preference of the child if the child is determined to be of sufficient maturity to express a preference;
  4. The effect of hostility between the grandparent and the parent of the child manifested before the child, and the willingness of the grandparent, except in case of abuse, to encourage a close relationship between the child and the parent or parents, or guardian or guardians of the child;
  5. The good faith of the grandparent in filing the petition;
  6. If the parents are divorced or separated, the time-sharing arrangement that exists between the parents with respect to the child;
  7. If one (1) parent is deceased or missing, the fact that the grandparents requesting visitation are the parents of the deceased or missing person;
  8. Any unreasonable deprivation of the grandparent's opportunity to visit with the child by the child's parents or guardian, including denying visitation of the minor child to the grandparent for a period exceeding ninety (90) days;
  9. Whether the grandparent is seeking to maintain a significant existing relationship with the child;
  10. Whether awarding grandparent visitation would interfere with the parent-child relationship; and
  11. Any court finding that the child's parent or guardian is unfit.

Acts 1997, ch. 503, § 2; 2000, ch. 891, § 2; 2011, ch. 500, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 1997, ch. 503, § 4 provides that this section shall apply to any petition for visitation rights filed on or after July 23, 1997.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Visitation.

Trial court properly considered the factors pursuant to T.C.A. § 36-6-307 in determining that it was in a child's best interest to allow visitation with her maternal grandparents after the paternal grandparents'  adoption petition was granted, as the child had a close bond with the maternal grandparents, she had resided with them for a lengthy period, and a cessation of that relationship would pose a detrimental effect upon her. In re Sidney J., 313 S.W.3d 772, 2010 Tenn. LEXIS 433 (Tenn. May 10, 2010).

Definition of grandparent under T.C.A. § 36-6-306(e) includes two categories that do not require proof of a biological relationship with the child. Lovlace v. Copley, 418 S.W.3d 1, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 718 (Tenn. Sept. 6, 2013).

Appellate court erred by reversing a judgment granting a set of grandparents visitation because they had standing to bring suit as they met the definition of a grandparent under T.C.A. § 36-6-306(e) and the adoption of the child did not extinguish their previously granted visitation rights. Lovlace v. Copley, 418 S.W.3d 1, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 718 (Tenn. Sept. 6, 2013).

Adoption Statute, T.C.A. § 36-1-121(f), and the Grandparent Visitation Statute, T.C.A. § 36-6-306(d), do not conflict as the Grandparent Visitation Statute is more specific and clearly and unambiguously carves out a narrow, limited exception, in the case of grandparent visitation and stepparent adoption, to the more general rule stated in the Adoption Statute. Lovlace v. Copley, 418 S.W.3d 1, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 718 (Tenn. Sept. 6, 2013).

Once grandparents have obtained court-ordered visitation, the presumption of superior parental rights does not apply in proceedings to modify or terminate grandparent visitation. Lovlace v. Copley, 418 S.W.3d 1, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 718 (Tenn. Sept. 6, 2013).

Trial court properly construed the grandparents'  pleadings to include a claim for grandparent visitation rights; they had custody of the child for a majority of his life, they continued to seek custody after the father filed a petition to establish a parenting plan, and the trial court found that a significant relationship existed between the grandparents and the child. In re Christian S., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 619 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 24, 2018).

2. Best Interests Analysis.

As the determination of the best interests of the children in a parental termination proceeding required consideration of a different set of factors than those that were considered in a prior custody and grandparent visitation proceeding, the doctrine of collateral estoppel was inapplicable because the issues in the two cases were not identical. In re B. W., 397 S.W.3d 105, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 199 (Tenn. Feb. 21, 2013).

Trial court's judgment ordering grandparent visitation was insufficient for appellate review where it did not state whether T.C.A. § 36-6-306(a)(5) or (6) applied, its findings regarding substantial harm or severe emotional harm to the child were too generalized, and it contained no analysis as to the child's best interest as required by § 36-6-306(c). Hadjopoulos v. Sponcia, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 292 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 28, 2016).

It was no error for a court to find it was in a child's best interest to have visitation with the child's grandmother because the court examined all relevant statutory factors. Chamberlain v. Brown, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 965 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 19, 2016).

Part 4
Parenting Plans

36-6-401. Findings.

  1. Parents have the responsibility to make decisions and perform other parental duties necessary for the care and growth of their minor children. In any proceeding between parents under this chapter, the best interests of the child shall be the standard by which the court determines and allocates the parties' parental responsibilities. The general assembly recognizes the detrimental effect of divorce on many children and that divorce, by its nature, means that neither parent will have the same access to the child as would have been possible had they been able to maintain an intact family. The general assembly finds the need for stability and consistency in children's lives. The general assembly also has an interest in educating parents concerning the impact of divorce on children. The general assembly recognizes the fundamental importance of the parent-child relationship to the welfare of the child, and the relationship between the child and each parent should be fostered unless inconsistent with the child's best interests. The best interests of the child are served by a parenting arrangement that best maintains a child's emotional growth, health and stability, and physical care.
  2. The general assembly finds that mothers and fathers in families are the backbone of this state and this nation. They teach children right from wrong, respect for others, and the value of working hard to make a good life for themselves and for their future families. Most children do best when they receive the emotional and financial support of both parents. The general assembly finds that a different approach to dispute resolution in child custody and visitation matters is useful.

Acts 1997, ch. 557, § 1; 1998, ch. 1098, §§ 71, 74; 2000, ch. 889, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 1997, ch. 557, § 3 further provided that this part shall apply to each action or petition for modification filed on or after July 1, 1997.

Law Reviews.

For the Children's Sake: How the New Parenting Plan Will Work (Hon. Don R. Ash), 36 No. 9 Tenn. B.J. 12 (2000).

Solomon's New Sword: Tennessee's Parenting Plan, The Roles of Attorneys, and the Care Perspective (Wesley Mack Bryant), 70 Tenn. L. Rev. 221 (2002).

Attorney General Opinions. The Parenting Plan Act, § 36-6-401 et seq., does not apply to any matter subject to the concurrent jurisdiction of the juvenile court, OAG 01-028, 2001 Tenn. AG LEXIS 28 (2/27/01).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Factors.

Court did not err in awarding primary custodial care to a father where he admitted his shortcomings and had been actively seeking outside assistance to improve his parenting skills, the separation of two siblings was in their best interests as one sibling exhibited aggressive behavior towards the other, and the parenting plan allowed for the children to spend every weekend together and granted both parents liberal visitation rights. Shofner v. Shofner, 181 S.W.3d 703, 2004 Tenn. App. LEXIS 865 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004), rehearing denied, 181 S.W.3d 703, 2005 Tenn. App. LEXIS 854 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005), appeal denied, Shofner v. Kalisz, — S.W.3d —, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 943 (Tenn. Oct. 24, 2005).

Trial court erred in adopting a mother's proposed permanent parenting plan because the trial court focused almost entirely on the father's alleged need for the companionship of the child, rather than the issue of whether the child's best interests were furthered by enrolling her in preschool, T.C.A. §§ 36-6-401 and 36-6-404(b); there was no basis for the trial court to restrict the father's parenting time so as to accommodate preschool. Rountree v. Rountree, 369 S.W.3d 122, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 69 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 1, 2012), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 355 (Tenn. May 16, 2012).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in devising a residential parenting schedule that allowed both parties to enjoy the maximum participation possible in the life of the child because the evidence did not preponderate against its findings that the mother's living situation was temporary and that she would seek separate housing when possible; the trial court considered the mother's move to as it related to the child's need for stability. Woolbright v. Woolbright, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 90 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 16, 2018).

2. Best Interests Analysis.

Record supported the trial court's setting of the residential schedule because the wife was uniquely situated to provide the specialized care that the parties'  daughter needed, and questions remained as to whether the husband had the capacity to provide the constant supervision necessary to care for the daughter on a regular basis; the testimony reflected that the husband left the daughter unsupervised, thereby exposing her to harm as a result of her special needs. Kibbe v. Kibbe, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 262 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 28, 2015).

Modification of a child's parenting time schedule was in the child's best interests because it was reasonable to infer the child's mother had purposely inconvenienced the father's exercise of parenting time. Leonardo v. Leonardo, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 486 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 18, 2015), modified, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 943 (Tenn. Nov. 24, 2015).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding equal parenting time because five of the best interest factors weighed equally in favor of both a mother and a father and one weighed slightly more against the father; the trial court found that both parents had a strong relationship with the child, each developed emotional closeness with the child, both demonstrated a disposition to provide the child with necessaries, and both had contributed significantly to care giving responsibilities. Woolbright v. Woolbright, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 90 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 16, 2018).

It was in the children's best interests for the father to be the primary residential parent because the mother was livid with the father for notifying the police about the maternal grandfather's sexual abuse of the daughter; the daughter was receiving the necessary counseling while in the father's care; the mother did not initially report the sexual abuse after the daughter made the disclosure, and she waited some time before considering counseling for the daughter; and the mother had shown an unwillingness or inability to encourage a continuing relationship between the children and the father, but the father ensured that the children had telephone contact with the mother. Gillam v. Ballew, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 229 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 21, 2020).

3. Permanent Parenting Plan.

Trial court erred by including provisions in a permanent parenting plan because there was no evidence that a parent's unsupervised visitation would be harmful to the parties'  child. The provisions were modified to delete requiring supervision of the parent's visitation, disallowing the parent's paramour from spending overnight during visitation, ruling that the parent was to have no additional co-parenting time for holidays or otherwise without agreement, and granting the other parent sole authority to make major decisions regarding the child. Mashburn v. Mashburn, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 445 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 30, 2016).

36-6-402. Part definitions.

As used in this part, unless the context requires otherwise:

  1. “Dispute resolution” means the mediation process or alternative dispute resolution process in accordance with Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 31 unless the parties agree otherwise. For the purposes of this part, such process may include: mediation, the neutral party to be chosen by the parties or the court; arbitration, the neutral party to be chosen by the parties or the court; or a mandatory settlement conference presided over by the court or a special master;
  2. “Parenting responsibilities” means those aspects of the parent-child relationship in which the parent makes decisions and performs duties necessary for the care and growth of the child. “Parenting responsibilities,” the establishment of which is the objective of a permanent parenting plan, include:
    1. Providing for the child's emotional care and stability, including maintaining a loving, stable, consistent, and nurturing relationship with the child and supervising the child to encourage and protect emotional, intellectual, moral, and spiritual development;
    2. Providing for the child's physical care, including attending to the daily needs of the child, such as feeding, clothing, physical care, and grooming, supervision, health care, and day care, and engaging in other activities that are appropriate to the developmental level of the child and that are within the social and economic circumstances of the particular family;
    3. Providing encouragement and protection of the child's intellectual and moral development, including attending to adequate education for the child, including remedial or other education essential to the best interests of the child;
    4. Assisting the child in developing and maintaining appropriate interpersonal relationships;
    5. Exercising appropriate judgment regarding the child's welfare, consistent with the child's developmental level and the family's social and economic circumstances; and
    6. Providing any financial security and support of the child in addition to child support obligations;
  3. “Permanent parenting plan” means a written plan for the parenting and best interests of the child, including the allocation of parenting responsibilities and the establishment of a residential schedule, as well as an award of child support consistent with chapter 5 of this title;
  4. “Primary residential parent” means the parent with whom the child resides more than fifty percent (50%) of the time;
  5. “Residential schedule” is the schedule of when the child is in each parent's physical care, and the residential schedule must designate a primary residential parent when the child is scheduled to reside with one (1) parent more than fifty percent (50%) of the time; in addition, the residential schedule must designate in which parent's home each minor child shall reside on given days of the year, including provisions for holidays, birthdays of family members, vacations, and other special occasions, consistent with the criteria of this part; provided, that nothing contained herein modifies any provision of § 36-6-108; and
  6. “Temporary parenting plan” means a plan for the temporary parenting and the best interests of the child, including the establishment of a temporary residential schedule, and the establishment of temporary financial support designed to maintain the financial status quo to the extent possible, consistent with chapter 5 of this title, and the guidelines thereunder.

Acts 1997, ch. 557, § 1; 2000, ch. 889, § 1; 2019, ch. 83, § 1.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment, in the definition of “residential schedule”,  substituted “the residential schedule must designate a” for “it shall designate the”, inserted “when the child is scheduled to reside with one (1) parent more than fifty percent (50%) of the time;” substituted “schedule must designate” for “schedule shall designate”, and substituted “modifies” for “shall be construed to modify”.

Effective Dates. Acts 2019, ch. 83, § 4. July 1, 2019.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Construction.

Tennessee's statutes require both a residential schedule, T.C.A. § 36-6-404(b), and the designation of a primary residential parent, T.C.A. § 36-6-402(5). The Tennessee child support guidelines contemplate that child support may be awarded only to the primary residential parent; thus, the court of appeals erred where it divided child custody between the parties equally, and ordered the father to pay child support, but did not designate a primary residential parent. Hopkins v. Hopkins, 152 S.W.3d 447, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 830 (Tenn. 2004), rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 1065 (Tenn. Dec. 2, 2004).

2. Primary Residential Parent.

Tennessee's statutes require both a residential schedule, T.C.A. § 36-6-404(b), and the designation of a primary residential parent, T.C.A. § 36-6-402(5). The Tennessee child support guidelines contemplate that child support may be awarded only to the primary residential parent; thus, the court of appeals erred where it divided child custody between the parties equally, and ordered the father to pay child support, but did not designate a primary residential parent. Hopkins v. Hopkins, 152 S.W.3d 447, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 830 (Tenn. 2004), rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 1065 (Tenn. Dec. 2, 2004).

It was error not to designate a primary residential parent in a custody award because, even though each parent was awarded an equal amount of parenting time, such a designation was required for state and federal statutory purposes and insurance policies. Henegar v. Henegar, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 450 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 29, 2016).

In a case in which the trial court entered an order naming the father the primary residential parent, the appellate court concluded that the mother's appeal was not a final judgment because the trial court did not delineate a residential schedule or set child support. Consequently, the appellate court did not have jurisdiction to hear the appeal, which was subject to dismissal. Jones v. Jones, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 519 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 22, 2016).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion by designating the mother as the primary residential parent for the parties'  daughter because it applied the factors in T.C.A. § 36-6-106(a) and the testimony supported the trial court's finding that the mother acted as the primary caregiver, had formed a stronger emotional bond with her daughter, had provided her daughter with a stable environment, and appeared willing to foster a continuing, close relationship between her daughter and the father. Engh v. Engh, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 12 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 10, 2017).

In a petition for modification of visitation time, the trial court did not err in naming the father as the primary residential parent and awarding him increased visitation time with the children because and it was in the children's best interest as the father testified about the mother's and the children's excessive emphasis on rock climbing while under the mother's care to the exclusion of other activities, including their education, and the mother's own testimony reinforced that conclusion; and the trial court was concerned with the mother's financial dependence upon a close friend, while the father was independent and relatively stable. Bell v. Bell, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 335 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 18, 2017).

Trial court did not err in naming a mother as the primary residential parent because no matters were ignored or overlooked by the trial court; consideration of the father's relocation was not a “relitigation” of matters resolved in the divorce, and the evidence did not preponderate against the trial court's holding that the mother's criminal record did not make her a bad mother. Norman v. Norman, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 768 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 28, 2017).

Trial court, in a divorce case, erred by designating the father as the primary residential parent of the parties'  child because the appellate court concluded that the court-ordered permanent parenting plan was not in the best interest of the child as the appellate court, pursuant to the statutory best interest of the child factors, concluded that the mother was to be the primary residential parent. Therefore, on remand the trial court was to establish a new permanent parenting plan that included the mother as the primary residential parent. Brown v. Brown, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 513 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 30, 2018).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in formulating a parenting plan where it conducted a thorough and unbiased assessment of the evidence, its findings were supported by the evidence, and it weighed the appropriate factors in concluding that the children should be with the wife during the school year. Sullivan v. Sullivan, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 492 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 4, 2019).

Juvenile court erred in designating a father as the primary residential parent and in adopting his proposed parenting plan because, although the court was concerned with the child's injuries while in the mother's care, it failed to consider her performance of the majority of the parenting responsibilities, her status as the primary caregiver, the importance of continuity in the child's life, and the length of time in which he had lived in a stable, satisfactory environment where the mother sought medical treatment when necessary, expressed remorse, and the parties had shared co-parenting time since the child's birth without major incident. Deaton v. Williams, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 73 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 21, 2020).

It was in the children's best interests for the father to be the primary residential parent because the mother was livid with the father for notifying the police about the maternal grandfather's sexual abuse of the daughter; the daughter was receiving the necessary counseling while in the father's care; the mother did not initially report the sexual abuse after the daughter made the disclosure, and she waited some time before considering counseling for the daughter; and the mother had shown an unwillingness or inability to encourage a continuing relationship between the children and the father, but the father ensured that the children had telephone contact with the mother. Gillam v. Ballew, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 229 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 21, 2020).

Ex-wife was properly designated the primary residential parent, despite the fact that the children would have to change schools, because, for most of the marriage, the ex-husband spent only 30-40% of each year at home as he toured heavily with his band and for his songwriting career; the wife had been the primary caregiver for the children since they were born; she took them to almost all of their medical appointments; she took them to and from their extracurricular activities and procured the necessary equipment for those activities; she participated at the children's school; and, although the husband began spending more time at home, he still spent about 50% of the year traveling, and his travel schedule often changed with little notice. Griffin v. Griffin, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 371 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 19, 2020).

3. Split Custody.

Court erred by awarding joint child custody because it was undisputed that the husband's psychological problems negatively impacted the child, the husband sometimes physically hit the wife in the presence of the child, the court's opinion failed to follow the statutory imperative to prioritize the best interest of the child ahead of the parents'  interests, and it effectively rejected, without adequate evidentiary support for doing so, the duly submitted report of the court's own expert; there was considerable evidence of a stronger relationship between the wife and the child than between the husband and the child. Burden v. Burden, 250 S.W.3d 899, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 611 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 26, 2007), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2008 Tenn. LEXIS 133 (Tenn. Feb. 25, 2008).

Evidence supported award to a father of most of the visitation time with the parties'  daughter because the daughter's relationship with the father was stronger than the daughter's volatile relationship with the mother, the father had become the primary caregiver, and the daughter preferred living with the father. The evidence supported the award to both parties of 50/50 visitation with the parties'  son, with the father to make the major decisions for the son except religion, because the father appeared to be a comparatively more stable parent. Carter v. Carter, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 452 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 7, 2018).

4. Modification.

After the parties'  divorce, the mother was named primary residential custodian and she was spending a greater amount of time with the child; the court allowed her to relocate to California with the child, and the relocation had a reasonable purpose and would not result in specific and serious harm to the child. Kawatra v. Kawatra, 182 S.W.3d 800, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 1052 (Tenn. 2005).

5. Best Interests Analysis.

Residential parenting plan was affirmed as there was no error of law in the trial court's application of the best interest factors; while the father challenged the trial court's weighing of the factors relative to the fact that he did not learn he was the father of the child until she was 18 months old and his efforts to see the child had been frustrated by the mother, the record showed the father's concerns were considered and given substantial weight. In re Khrystchan D., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 297 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 26, 2020).

36-6-403. Temporary parenting plan.

Except as may be specifically provided otherwise herein, a temporary parenting plan shall be incorporated in any temporary order of the court in actions for absolute divorce, legal separation, annulment, or separate maintenance involving a minor child. A temporary parenting plan shall comply with those provisions for a permanent parenting plan under § 36-6-404(a) that are applicable for the time frame and shall include a residential schedule as described in § 36-6-404(b). The court shall approve a temporary parenting plan as follows:

  1. If the parties can agree to a temporary parenting plan, no written temporary parenting plan is required to be entered; or
  2. If the parties cannot agree to a temporary parenting plan, either or both parties may request the court to order dispute resolution. The court may immediately order the parties to participate in dispute resolution to establish a temporary parenting plan unless one (1) of the restrictions in § 36-6-406(a) exists. If dispute resolution is not available, either party may request and the court may order an expedited hearing to establish a temporary parenting plan. In either mediation or in a hearing before the court each party shall submit a proposed temporary parenting plan and a verified statement of income as defined by chapter 5 of this title, and a verified statement that the plan is proposed in good faith and is in the best interest of the child. If only one (1) party files a proposed temporary parenting plan in compliance with this section, that party may petition the court for an order adopting that party's plan by default, upon a finding by the court that the plan is in the child's best interest. In determining whether the proposed temporary parenting plan serves the best interests of the child, the court shall be governed by the allocation of residential time and support obligations contained in the child support guidelines and related provisions in chapter 5 of this title.

Acts 1997, ch. 557, § 1; T.C.A., § 36-6-407; Acts 2000, ch. 889, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2000, ch. 889, § 1, effective January 1, 2001, renumbered former § 36-6-403 as present § 36-6-411 and former § 36-6-407 as this section.

Attorney General Opinions. A court may not order dispute resolution pursuant to T.C.A. § 36-6-403(a)(2) unless the circumstances allow the court to waive the education seminar requirement, OAG 00-178, 2000 Tenn. AG LEXIS 181 (11/20/00).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Construction.

Construing T.C.A. § 36-6-403 and 36-6-404(a) in tandem, it is clear that a trial court cannot enter a temporary parenting plan concomitant with a final decree of divorce. Rigsby v. Rigsby, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 929 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 25, 2015).

2. Permanent Parenting Plan.

Trial court erred in designating a second parenting plan as the permanent parenting plan because it lacked authority to enter a “temporary” parenting plan concomitant with the parties'  final decree of divorce; therefore, the temporary parenting plan entered in concomitant with the final decree had to constitute the permanent parenting plan. Rigsby v. Rigsby, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 929 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 25, 2015).

36-6-404. Permanent parenting plan.

  1. Any final decree or decree of modification in an action for absolute divorce, legal separation, annulment, or separate maintenance involving a minor child shall incorporate a permanent parenting plan; provided, however, that this part shall be inapplicable to parties who were divorced prior to July 1, 1997, and thereafter return to court to enter an agreed order modifying terms of the previous court order. A permanent parenting plan shall:
    1. Provide for the child's changing needs as the child grows and matures, in a way that minimizes the need for further modifications to the permanent parenting plan;
    2. Establish the authority and responsibilities of each parent with respect to the child, consistent with the criteria in this part;
    3. Minimize the child's exposure to harmful parental conflict;
    4. Provide for a process for dispute resolution, before court action, unless precluded or limited by § 36-6-406; provided, that state agency cases are excluded from the requirement of dispute resolution as to any child support issue involved. In the process for dispute resolution:
      1. Preference shall be given to carrying out the parenting plan;
      2. The parents shall use the designated process to resolve disputes relating to the implementation of the plan;
      3. A written record shall be prepared of any agreement reached in mediation, arbitration, or settlement conference and shall be provided to each party to be drafted into a consent order of modification;
      4. If the court finds that a parent willfully failed to appear at a scheduled dispute resolution process without good reason, the court may, upon motion, award attorney fees and financial sanctions to the prevailing parent;
      5. This subsection (a) shall be set forth in the decree; and
      6. Nothing in this part shall preclude court action, if required to protect the welfare of the child or a party;
    5. Allocate decision-making authority to one (1) or both parties regarding the child's education, health care, extracurricular activities, and religious upbringing. The parties may incorporate an agreement related to the care and growth of the child in these specified areas, or in other areas, into their plan, consistent with the criteria in this part. Regardless of the allocation of decision making in the parenting plan, the parties may agree that either parent may make emergency decisions affecting the health or safety of the child;
    6. Provide that each parent may make the day-to-day decisions regarding the care of the child while the child is residing with that parent;
    7. Provide that when mutual decision making is designated but cannot be achieved, the parties shall make a good-faith effort to resolve the issue through the appropriate dispute resolution process, subject to the exception set forth in subdivision (a)(4)(F);
    8. Require the obligor to report annually on a date certain to the obligee, and the department of human services or its contractor in Title IV-D cases, on a form provided by the court, the obligor's income as defined by the child support guidelines and related provisions contained in chapter 5 of this title; and
    9. Specify that if the driver license of a parent is currently expired, canceled, suspended or revoked or if the parent does not possess a valid driver license for any other reason, the parent shall make acceptable transportation arrangements as may be necessary to protect and ensure the health, safety and welfare of the child when such child is in the custody of such parent.
  2. Any permanent parenting plan shall include a residential schedule as defined in § 36-6-402. The court shall make residential provisions for each child, consistent with the child's developmental level and the family's social and economic circumstances, which encourage each parent to maintain a loving, stable, and nurturing relationship with the child. The child's residential schedule shall be consistent with this part. If the limitations of § 36-6-406 are not dispositive of the child's residential schedule, the court shall consider the factors found in § 36-6-106(a)(1)–(15).
  3. The court shall approve a permanent parenting plan as follows:
    1. Upon agreement of the parties:
      1. With the entry of a final decree or judgment; or
      2. With a consent order to modify a final decree or judgment involving a minor child;
    2. If the parties cannot reach agreement on a permanent parenting plan, upon the motion of either party, or upon its own motion, the court may order appropriate dispute resolution proceedings pursuant to Tennessee Rules of the Supreme Court, Rule 31, to determine a permanent parenting plan; or
    3. If the parties have not reached agreement on a permanent parenting plan on or before forty-five (45) days before the date set for trial, each party shall file and serve a proposed permanent parenting plan, even though the parties may continue to mediate or negotiate. Failure to comply by a party may result in the court's adoption of the plan filed by the opposing party if the court finds such plan to be in the best interests of the child. In determining whether the proposed plan is in the best interests of the child, the court may consider the allocation of residential time and support obligations contained in the child support guidelines and related provisions contained in chapter 5 of this title. Each parent submitting a proposed permanent parenting plan shall attach a verified statement of income pursuant to the child support guidelines and related provisions contained in chapter 5 of this title, and a verified statement that the plan is proposed in good faith and is in the best interest of the child.
  4. The administrative office of the courts shall develop a “parenting plan” form that shall be used consistently by each court within the state that approves parenting plans pursuant to § 36-6-403 or this section on and after July 1, 2005. The administrative office of the courts shall be responsible for distributing such form for the use of those courts no later than June 1, 2005. The administrative office of the courts shall be responsible for updating such form as it deems necessary, in consultation with the Tennessee family law commission, the domestic relations committee of the Tennessee judicial conference, and other knowledgeable persons.

Acts 1997, ch. 557, § 1; T.C.A., § 36-6-410; Acts 2000, ch. 889, § 1; 2002, ch. 677, § 1; 2003, ch. 243, § 1; 2004, ch. 864, § 1; 2005, ch. 127, § 1; 2014, ch. 617, § 7.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2000, ch. 889, § 1, effective January 1, 2001, renumbered former § 36-6-404 as present § 36-6-412 and former § 36-6-410 as this section.

Acts 2004, ch. 864, § 2 provided for the repeal of former subsection (d) effective June 30, 2005.

Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, referred to in this section, is compiled in 42 U.S.C. § 651 et seq.

For the Preamble to the act concerning domestic relations, please refer to Acts 2014, ch. 617.

Law Reviews.

Family Matters: Modification of Permanent Parenting Plans In Tennessee, 49 Tenn. B.J. 27 (2013).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Factors.

Court did not err in awarding primary custodial care to a father where he admitted his shortcomings and had been actively seeking outside assistance to improve his parenting skills, the separation of two siblings was in their best interests as one sibling exhibited aggressive behavior towards the other, and the parenting plan allowed for the children to spend every weekend together and granted both parents liberal visitation rights. Shofner v. Shofner, 181 S.W.3d 703, 2004 Tenn. App. LEXIS 865 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004), rehearing denied, 181 S.W.3d 703, 2005 Tenn. App. LEXIS 854 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005), appeal denied, Shofner v. Kalisz, — S.W.3d —, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 943 (Tenn. Oct. 24, 2005).

Court erred by awarding joint child custody because it was undisputed that the husband's psychological problems negatively impacted the child, the husband sometimes physically hit the wife in the presence of the child, the court's opinion failed to follow the statutory imperative to prioritize the best interest of the child ahead of the parents'  interests, and it effectively rejected, without adequate evidentiary support for doing so, the duly submitted report of the court's own expert; there was considerable evidence of a stronger relationship between the wife and the child than between the husband and the child. Burden v. Burden, 250 S.W.3d 899, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 611 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 26, 2007), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2008 Tenn. LEXIS 133 (Tenn. Feb. 25, 2008).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion by determining that a permanent parenting plan, which did not award a father any parenting time and conditioned any future parenting time on recommendations by the children's therapists, was in the children's best interests because there was sufficient evidence of the father's pattern of emotional abuse of the children, T.C.A. §§ 36-6-106(a), 36-6-404, 36-6-406(a)(2); the father had a history of becoming verbally and physically aggressive with the children. Beyer v. Beyer, 428 S.W.3d 59, 2013 Tenn. App. LEXIS 229 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 5, 2013), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 827 (Tenn. Oct. 16, 2013).

Evidence clearly preponderated against the trial court's best interest finding as to the custody of the parties' son as the 15-year-old son unequivocally testified that he wished to remain with his father, the evidence showed that the son and the husband had a positive bond and relationship, and there was a need for the son to have stability following years of movement and the turbulence created by his parents' marital discord. Kelly v. Kelly, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. App. LEXIS 514 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 6, 2013), modified, 445 S.W.3d 685, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 664 (Tenn. Sept. 10, 2014).

Preponderance of the evidence supported the trial court's findings regarding the husband's alleged abuse because it weighed the facts before finding that there was no abuse by the husband; the wife committed against the husband actions similar to ones that she asserted were abuse when committed by the husband. Potts v. Potts, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 69 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 8, 2018).

Evidence supported award to a father of most of the visitation time with the parties'  daughter because the daughter's relationship with the father was stronger than the daughter's volatile relationship with the mother, the father had become the primary caregiver, and the daughter preferred living with the father. The evidence supported the award to both parties of 50/50 visitation with the parties'  son, with the father to make the major decisions for the son except religion, because the father appeared to be a comparatively more stable parent. Carter v. Carter, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 452 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 7, 2018).

2. Modification.

Trial court properly found that modification of the residential parenting schedule to increase the father's time with the children from 85 days to 143 days was in the children's best interest. The trial court preserved, to the extent possible, the original residential parenting schedule, and it also structured the schedule so that it reflected the way the father and the mother had already been cooperating with each other to afford the father additional time. Armbrister v. Armbrister, 414 S.W.3d 685, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 782 (Tenn. Oct. 21, 2013).

Although a parenting plan removed days from one parent's parenting time, it did not amount to an abuse of discretion because the record did not reflect that the trial court applied an incorrect legal standard, reached an illogical conclusion, based its decision on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence, or employed reasoning that caused an injustice to the parent. Solima v. Solima, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 116 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 11, 2015).

Material change of circumstance occurred, for purposes of modifying residential parenting time, because (1) the parenting plan was over 11 years old, (2) the child's needs had changed significantly, and (3) the father and mother added people to their respective households, requiring consideration of whether it was in the child's best interest to grant the father more parenting time. In re Jacob B., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 514 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 26, 2015).

Material change in circumstances warranting a change in the parties'  residential schedule occurred because the significant change in one parent's work schedule, the parties'  admitted failure to adhere strictly to the parenting plan, and the parent's remarriage, when taken together, constituted a material change affecting the child's best interest. Remand of the case to the trial court was necessary for the court to determine whether a modification of the residential schedule was in the child's best interest. Cook v. Cook, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 960 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 20, 2015), substituted opinion, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 961 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 9, 2015).

Although a father was required to submit a new proposed parenting plan, his petition to modify the plan was sufficient to invoke the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction because all of the trial court's orders were final judgments; after the entry of each final judgment, the trial court lost the ability to exercise its authority over the case until the father “invoked” its jurisdiction, and he attempted to invoke its jurisdiction by filing a motion to modify the parenting plan. Freeman v. Freeman, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 721 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 14, 2018).

Denial of a father's petition to modify a permanent parenting plan was appropriate because the only change alleged by the father was that the father's attitude toward the mother had not affected the parties'  child as originally suspected by the trial court. The record belied any such assertion as evidenced by the father's repeated filings and general contempt toward the mother and as reflected by the child's exhibition of signs of distress resulting from the parents'  inability to work together. Barmmer v. Staininger, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 400 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 19, 2019).

3. Primary Residential Parent.

Tennessee's statutes require both a residential schedule, T.C.A. § 36-6-404(b), and the designation of a primary residential parent, T.C.A. § 36-6-402(5). The Tennessee child support guidelines contemplate that child support may be awarded only to the primary residential parent; thus, the court of appeals erred where it divided child custody between the parties equally, and ordered the father to pay child support, but did not designate a primary residential parent. Hopkins v. Hopkins, 152 S.W.3d 447, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 830 (Tenn. 2004), rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 1065 (Tenn. Dec. 2, 2004).

Trial court abused its discretion in making a husband the primary residential parent with final decision-making authority and in setting the parenting schedule on a 50/50 alternating week schedule. In considering the factors in T.C.A. § 36-6-404(b)(6) (see now T.C.A. § 36-6-106(a)), the trial court erred in not assigning significant weight to the wife's role as primary caregiver to the children throughout the course of the parties'  marriage, in not considering the fact that the award of primary residential status to the husband had the undesirable effect of making the grandfather a de facto parent for several hours every other week when the wife was available to care for the children, and in not considering the husband's wrongdoing and his continued denial of wrongdoing. K.B.J. v. T.J., 359 S.W.3d 608, 2011 Tenn. App. LEXIS 474 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 26, 2011), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2011 Tenn. LEXIS 1166 (Tenn. Dec. 14, 2011).

Designation of the wife as the primary residential parent of the parties'  two minor children was proper because of the husband's prolonged abuse of the wife and because the daughter alleged abuse against her and there was also evidence that the husband failed to ensure that the son received his medication for a life-threatening medical condition. Mayfield v. Mayfield, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 40 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 17, 2012), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 395 S.W.3d 108, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 876 (Tenn. Dec. 3, 2012).

Trial court properly formulated a parenting plan because, while most of the statutory factors weighed in favor of both parents equally, several factors favored the mother, and no factors favored the father, the trial court's decision to deviate from the agreed permanent parenting plan was reasonable, the version that was finally approved by the trial court was consistent with the father's proposal, requiring parents who precipitated custody or support proceeding to underwrite the costs if their claims were ultimately found to be unwarranted was appropriate as a matter of policy, and the mother was entitled to recover the reasonable and necessary attorney's fees she incurred on appeal. Kincade v. Kincade, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 173 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 4, 2018).

Trial court, in a divorce case, erred by designating the father as the primary residential parent of the parties'  child because the appellate court concluded that the court-ordered permanent parenting plan was not in the best interest of the child as the appellate court, pursuant to the statutory best interest of the child factors, concluded that the mother was to be the primary residential parent. Therefore, on remand the trial court was to establish a new permanent parenting plan that included the mother as the primary residential parent. Brown v. Brown, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 513 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 30, 2018).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in formulating a parenting plan where it conducted a thorough and unbiased assessment of the evidence, its findings were supported by the evidence, and it weighed the appropriate factors in concluding that the children should be with the wife during the school year. Sullivan v. Sullivan, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 492 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 4, 2019).

Ex-wife was properly designated the primary residential parent, despite the fact that the children would have to change schools, because, for most of the marriage, the ex-husband spent only 30-40% of each year at home as he toured heavily with his band and for his songwriting career; the wife had been the primary caregiver for the children since they were born; she took them to almost all of their medical appointments; she took them to and from their extracurricular activities and procured the necessary equipment for those activities; she participated at the children's school; and, although the husband began spending more time at home, he still spent about 50% of the year traveling, and his travel schedule often changed with little notice. Griffin v. Griffin, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 371 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 19, 2020).

4. Permanent Parenting Plan.

Trial court erred in adopting a mother's proposed permanent parenting plan because the trial court focused almost entirely on the father's alleged need for the companionship of the child, rather than the issue of whether the child's best interests were furthered by enrolling her in preschool, T.C.A. §§ 36-6-401 and 36-6-404(b); there was no basis for the trial court to restrict the father's parenting time so as to accommodate preschool. Rountree v. Rountree, 369 S.W.3d 122, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 69 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 1, 2012), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 355 (Tenn. May 16, 2012).

Trial court erred in designating a second parenting plan as the permanent parenting plan because it lacked authority to enter a “temporary” parenting plan concomitant with the parties'  final decree of divorce; therefore, the temporary parenting plan entered in concomitant with the final decree had to constitute the permanent parenting plan. Rigsby v. Rigsby, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 929 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 25, 2015).

Construing T.C.A. § 36-6-403 and 36-6-404(a) in tandem, it is clear that a trial court cannot enter a temporary parenting plan concomitant with a final decree of divorce. Rigsby v. Rigsby, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 929 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 25, 2015).

Trial court erred by including provisions in a permanent parenting plan because there was no evidence that a parent's unsupervised visitation would be harmful to the parties'  child. The provisions were modified to delete requiring supervision of the parent's visitation, disallowing the parent's paramour from spending overnight during visitation, ruling that the parent was to have no additional co-parenting time for holidays or otherwise without agreement, and granting the other parent sole authority to make major decisions regarding the child. Mashburn v. Mashburn, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 445 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 30, 2016).

Juvenile court's adoption of a permanent parenting plan was vacated because (1) the court made no specific findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding adopting a mother's proposed plan and did not find the plan was in the child's best interest, and (2) the lack of conclusions and credibility assessments precluded independent appellate review of the record. In re Briley R., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 721 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 31, 2017).

5. Best Interest of the Child.

Change in custody was in the child's best interests because the trial court found an instability in the mother's family, the mother had emotional ill health, the mother emotionally abused the child, the mother's boyfriend had a bad character and erratic behavior, and the father had a greater potential for future performance of parenting responsibilities. Muhonen v. Muhonen, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 78 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 20, 2015).

Trial court set forth clear parameters for the co-parenting residential schedule, and while the trial court did not in its final judgment set forth a factor-by-factor analysis of its consideration of the child's best interest in formulating the modification to the co-parenting residential schedule, the trial court properly addressed the continuity of care each parent could provide, the approximately equal difficulty each parent had experienced financially in maintaining a stable home, and the presence of others in each home, and trial court carefully considered the applicable factors to modify the schedule. In re Jesslyn C., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 173 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2015).

Trial court erred by failing to find a material change in circumstances warranting a change in a residential parenting schedule based on a significant change in a father's work schedule, a failure to adhere strictly to the parenting plan, and the father's remarriage. A remand was necessary because the trial court did not engage in an analysis of the child's best interests. Cook v. Cook, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 961 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 9, 2015).

Given that the parents agreed at mediation that a material change of circumstance had occurred, they both testified that the parenting plan was no longer workable, and there had been additions to both parents' families and the father was no longer eligible to deploy with the Army, these changes were material, and the trial court should have considered whether a change in parenting time was in the children's best interests. Wilkerson v. Wilkerson, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 349 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 19, 2016).

In a case involving a modification of an agreed parenting plan, the juvenile court did not err by naming the father the primary residential parent and by granting the father sole decision-making authority as the parties had stipulated that there had been a material change of circumstance, and it was in the child's best interests because the mother was unwilling to cooperate with the father in making educational decisions; the mother continued to share inappropriate information with the child concerning the parents'  relationship and the details of the custody dispute; the mother admitted to having physical and mental health issues; and the mother made a habit of sending the father inappropriate and occasionally threatening emails. Gider v. Hubbell, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 211 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 29, 2017).

Trial court's finding of a material change did not predetermine the outcome of the best interest analysis because after consideration of the statutory factors, it determined that naming the father the primary residential parent was in the child's best interest Skelton v. Skelton, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 318 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 16, 2017).

Trial court erred in that it failed to determine whether modification of the residential parenting schedule was in the children's best interest, having applied an incorrect legal issue to the issue. Irvin v. Irvin, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 8, 2018).

It was in the children's best interests for the father to be the primary residential parent because the mother was livid with the father for notifying the police about the maternal grandfather's sexual abuse of the daughter; the daughter was receiving the necessary counseling while in the father's care; the mother did not initially report the sexual abuse after the daughter made the disclosure, and she waited some time before considering counseling for the daughter; and the mother had shown an unwillingness or inability to encourage a continuing relationship between the children and the father, but the father ensured that the children had telephone contact with the mother. Gillam v. Ballew, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 229 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 21, 2020).

6. Illustrative Cases.

Evidence preponderated against the parenting schedule ordered by the trial court because it did not maximize the father's participation in the child's life, the court did not make specific findings of fact or state the statutory factors upon which it relied, there was no justification for limiting the father's continuous parenting time during the summer months in the manner ordered, and the statutes favored a parenting schedule that gave each parent the maximum amount of time in accordance with the child's best interests. In re Blaklyn M., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 87 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 24, 2015).

Trial court did its best to balance the mother's interest that she and the child be permitted to relocate with the father's concerns about future abuse from a stepbrother, and the restriction on the time the child and stepbrother could be together in the mother's home was not arbitrary or an abuse of discretion; the trial court found a doctor to be credible, and he testified there was a low risk that the stepbrother would reoffend, plus the boys would spend time together only so long as appropriate safeguards were in place. Dahl v. Young, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 88 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 24, 2015).

Trial court did not err in changing the designation of the primary residential parent for a teenage child because (1) a material change in circumstance occurred based on the child's recent athletic development and its impact on the child's social development; (2) the court properly considered the relevant factors, including the importance of continuity, when it made its determination of the child's best interests; and (3) the court did not err in its consideration of the child's expressed preference. Robinson v. Robinson, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 121 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 16, 2015).

Trial court did not err in regard to determining a father's parenting time because there were no serious concerns about the parenting ability of either parent, both parents had strong relationships with the children and loved the children dearly, both parents had suitable homes, both parents were able to take the children to school and to their extracurricular activities, and both parents were able to provide the children with food, clothing, medical care, and other necessities. Watts v. Watts, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 461 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 11, 2017).

Parents had strong disagreements about the children's medical care, and to minimize conflict, the trial court allocated decision-making authority for non-emergency medical care to the father; in making its determination, the trial court relied on a number of factors in determining the best interests of the children, and as there was no transcript or statement of the evidence, it was presumed that there was sufficient evidence before the trial court to support its decision. King v. Daily, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 699 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2018).

Trial court had not based its decision to designate the father as the primary residential parent solely on the fact that the mother engaged in an extramarital affair where her decision to expose the child to her relationship with another man while she was still married to the father, coupled with her dishonesty throughout the litigation, tipped the scales against her, and the evidence showed that the father was loving, devoted, and encouraged the child's relationship with the mother. Stokes v. Stokes, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 118 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 7, 2019).

Partial default judgment was not “a final judgment” because it did not resolve all the issues in the case; because the partial default judgment did not include a permanent parenting plan, it was a temporary or interlocutory order that the trial court could modify, and as a consequence, the partial default judgment that was entered 16 days before the 90-day period expired did not violate subsection (b). Pack v. Pack, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 206 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2019).

7. Arbitration.

Trial court did not err in ordering the parties to attend mediation to resolve disagreements regarding a parenting plan as the court was required to include a provision for some type of dispute resolution and could not allow the parties to go directly to court without some extenuating circumstances, such as abuse, which were not at play in the matter. In re Grace N., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 331 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 14, 2015).

8. Findings.

Appellate court's ability to review a trial court's designation of a primary residential parent and adoption of a parenting plan was limited because the findings of fact and conclusions of law entered by the trial court did not include a discussion of the impact on the finding by the trial court of domestic violence. Accordingly, the decision had to be vacated, and the case remanded for the court to make appropriate findings in that regard. Carr v. Carr, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 117 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 1, 2018).

Because the trial court, in naming the husband the primary residential parent, only considered the stable environment offered by the husband in the marital home, and it did not enumerate or discuss the statutory factors of this section or the best interests of the children, and it made virtually no findings of fact regarding the abuse allegations against the husband as required, the court remanded to the trial court to make appropriate findings. Mangum v. Mangum, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 192 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 24, 2019).

Trial court failed to elaborate the basis for its deviating from the parties'  agreed parenting plan before concluding that the parents could not jointly parent, and, more egregiously, was silent concerning the child's best interest. Thus, the vacating of the trial court's permanent parenting plan and remand for further findings were necessary because the trial court's findings were not sufficient either to support its refusal to enter the parties'  proposed parenting plan, or to support the parenting plan arrived at by the trial court. Wright v. Wright, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 99 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 6, 2020).

36-6-405. Modification of permanent parenting plans.

  1. In a proceeding for a modification of a permanent parenting plan, a proposed parenting plan shall be filed and served with the petition for modification and with the response to the petition for modification. Such plan is not required if the modification pertains only to child support. The obligor parent's proposed parenting plan shall be accompanied by a verified statement of that party's income pursuant to the child support guidelines and related provisions contained in chapter 5 of this title. If the parties cannot agree to a modification of a permanent parenting plan, the process established by § 36-6-404(b) shall be used to establish an amended permanent parenting plan or final decree or judgment.
  2. In a proceeding for a modification of a permanent parenting plan, the existing residential schedule shall not be modified prior to a final hearing unless the parents agree to the modification or the court finds that the child will be subject to a likelihood of substantial harm absent the temporary modification. If a temporary modification of the existing residential schedule is granted ex parte, the respondent shall be entitled to an expedited hearing within fifteen (15) days of the entry of the temporary modification order.
  3. Title IV-D child support cases involving the department of human services or any of its public or private contractors shall be bifurcated from the remaining parental responsibility issues. Separate orders shall be issued concerning Title IV-D issues, which shall not be contained in, or part of, temporary, permanent or modified parenting plans. The department and its public or private contractors shall not be required to participate in mediation or dispute resolution pursuant to this part.
  4. If the parties agree to a modification of an existing permanent parenting plan, and the parties announce to the court and place on the record an agreement specifying the terms of modification, or if the parties execute a permanent parenting plan which modifies a prior order of the court with respect to either custody or residential parenting schedule which is approved through entry of an agreed order, then the court is not required to inquire further and make an independent determination as to whether the modification is in the best interest of the child. An order of the court approving the agreement and stating that the modification is made by agreement of the parties satisfies the requirements of Rule 52.01 of the Tennessee rules of civil procedure. The court is not required to accept an agreement of the parties modifying a permanent parenting plan, and this subsection (d) does not diminish the authority of the court to make inquiry and ensure that the modification of the permanent parenting plan is in the best interest of the child, is entered into freely and voluntarily by both parents, and is not the product of duress, coercion, or undue influence.

Acts 1997, ch. 557, § 1; T.C.A., § 36-6-409; Acts 2000, ch. 889, § 1; 2010, ch. 956, § 1; 2020, ch. 520, §§ 3, 4.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2000, ch. 889, § 1, effective January 1, 2001, renumbered former § 36-6-405 as present § 36-6-408 and former § 36-6-409 as this section.

Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, referred to in this section, is compiled in 42 U.S.C. § 651 et seq.

Amendments. The 2020 amendment substituted “If the parties cannot agree to a modification of a permanent parenting plan, the process” for “The process” in the last sentence of (a) and added (d).

Effective Dates. Acts 2020, ch. 520, § 6. March 6, 2020.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Changed Circumstances.

Where there was a material change in circumstances relating to a residential parenting plan due to a mother's permissible relocation under T.C.A. § 36-6-108, a trial court erred by re-examining the comparative fitness of the parents under T.C.A. § 36-6-101(a)(2)(B), (C) since there was no material change on that issue, and the mother could not have been penalized for her relocation or for her sexual orientation; moreover, since the father failed to submit a proposed parenting plan, and the mother's proposal addressed the concerns that gave rise to the need for a modification, it was adopted. Massey-Holt v. Holt, 255 S.W.3d 603, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 668 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 31, 2007), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2008 Tenn. LEXIS 309 (Tenn. Apr. 14, 2008).

Material change of circumstance occurred, for purposes of modifying residential parenting time, because (1) the parenting plan was over 11 years old, (2) the child's needs had changed significantly, and (3) the father and mother added people to their respective households, requiring consideration of whether it was in the child's best interest to grant the father more parenting time. In re Jacob B., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 514 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 26, 2015).

Concerning the lack of a finding pertaining to a material change of circumstance, the absence of such did not invalidate the trial court's modification order, given the consent of the parties to modify; although the threshold inquiry is whether a material change in circumstance has occurred, such an inquiry is not required when parties agree to modify a parenting plan, and the language in the statute is not controlling, but this does not negate the importance of proving a material change of circumstance in contested cases. Stricklin v. Stricklin, 490 S.W.3d 8, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 754 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 21, 2015).

Because a finding of a material change of circumstance must be supported by competent proof, it cannot be made unless parties formally present that proof before the trial court, and there is no reason why parents who have agreed to modify a parenting arrangement must be forced to spend time and fees in an attempt to prove a material change; when parties have agreed that a change to the existing parenting arrangement is necessary, trial courts should not be required to spend judicial resources in addressing the question. Stricklin v. Stricklin, 490 S.W.3d 8, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 754 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 21, 2015).

Material change in circumstances warranting a change in the parties'  residential schedule occurred because the significant change in one parent's work schedule, the parties'  admitted failure to adhere strictly to the parenting plan, and the parent's remarriage, when taken together, constituted a material change affecting the child's best interest. Remand of the case to the trial court was necessary for the court to determine whether a modification of the residential schedule was in the child's best interest. Cook v. Cook, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 960 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 20, 2015), substituted opinion, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 961 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 9, 2015).

Father did not meet his burden of proving a material change in circumstances justifying a change in the primary residential parent; the child's absences and tardiness did not rise to the level of a material change in circumstances because they did not affect the child's school work, the mother's failure to comply with a parenting plan did not amount to a material change in circumstances since a “right of first refusal” provision left plenty of room for interpretation, and there was no proof that the child was lacking necessities or had otherwise been adversely impacted by the mother's income reduction. Although the lower standard for modifying a residential parenting schedule was met, the best interests of the child were not addressed. Gentile v. Gentile, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 962 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 9, 2015).

Proof established a material change that met the lower standard required for modification of the residential parenting schedule; given the distance between the parents'  homes, the need to enroll the child in school, and the failure of the parents to reach an agreement, the alternating weekly residential schedule in the current plan was unworkable, and on remand, the trial court was to consider the statutory best interest factors. Williamson v. Lamm, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 744 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2016).

2. Procedure.

Simple fact that the mother styled her pleading as a motion instead of a petition was not of ultimate consequence, and the erroneous styling of the pleading, by itself, did not prevent the trial court from assuming jurisdiction over the modification proceeding. Stricklin v. Stricklin, 490 S.W.3d 8, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 754 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 21, 2015).

In light of the nature of modification proceedings, the commencement of proceedings under that section should be treated as the filing of an independent action. Stricklin v. Stricklin, 490 S.W.3d 8, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 754 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 21, 2015).

Although the father suggested that the modification order ran afoul of the statute by failing to find that the parties'  agreement was knowing and voluntary, the parties'  consent to the terms of the parenting arrangement was readily established at a hearing, and the arrangement was incorporated in the order. Stricklin v. Stricklin, 490 S.W.3d 8, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 754 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 21, 2015).

Although the petition referred to the statute should be treated as a complaint for the purposes of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, the father did not argue that he was denied any procedural rights or that he was denied service of process, and his issues in this regard were waived. Stricklin v. Stricklin, 490 S.W.3d 8, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 754 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 21, 2015).

Record did not support a finding that the mother ever actually requested an increase in her parenting time prior to the trial on this cause; she never submitted a permanent parenting plan, which violated the statute. Hart v. Hart, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 131 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 23, 2017).

Mother's petition to move to California with the child was filed pursuant to T.C.A. § 36-6-405(a), and thus, did not require a proposed parenting plan be filed with the petition. Allen v. Allen, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 567 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 28, 2018).

3. Agreement Between Parties.

Father consented to the terms of the agreement that were announced in open court, and even assuming he had repudiated it before the terms were memorialized in the modification order, the agreement could still be enforced by the trial court's approval of it; the father's attempt to repudiate the agreement post-judgment did not invalidate the consent that was previously established before the trial court. Stricklin v. Stricklin, 490 S.W.3d 8, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 754 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 21, 2015).

4. Best Interests.

Court does not intend to suggest that the trial court should have no involvement when parties reach an agreement as to parenting issues; although parties may certainly reach an agreement to modify an existing parenting arrangement, they cannot bind courts to approve agreements affecting a child's best interests, and the order in this case failed to include appropriate findings regarding the child's best interests, and the case was remanded. Stricklin v. Stricklin, 490 S.W.3d 8, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 754 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 21, 2015).

Although parties may agree to a given parenting arrangement, such an agreement does not obviate the trial court's duty to ensure that it is in the children's best interests; in this case, the trial court's statement could be construed as expressing his satisfaction that the parties had been able to reach a resolution on the best interest issue, but the delegation of such an issue is not permissible. Stricklin v. Stricklin, 490 S.W.3d 8, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 754 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 21, 2015).

Given that the parents agreed at mediation that a material change of circumstance had occurred, they both testified that the parenting plan was no longer workable, and there had been additions to both parents' families and the father was no longer eligible to deploy with the Army, these changes were material, and the trial court should have considered whether a change in parenting time was in the children's best interests. Wilkerson v. Wilkerson, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 349 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 19, 2016).

In a case involving a modification of an agreed parenting plan, the juvenile court did not err by naming the father the primary residential parent and by granting the father sole decision-making authority as the parties had stipulated that there had been a material change of circumstance, and it was in the child's best interests because the mother was unwilling to cooperate with the father in making educational decisions; the mother continued to share inappropriate information with the child concerning the parents'  relationship and the details of the custody dispute; the mother admitted to having physical and mental health issues; and the mother made a habit of sending the father inappropriate and occasionally threatening emails. Gider v. Hubbell, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 211 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 29, 2017).

Trial court's finding of a material change did not predetermine the outcome of the best interest analysis because after consideration of the statutory factors, it determined that naming the father the primary residential parent was in the child's best interest Skelton v. Skelton, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 318 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 16, 2017).

Trial court erred in that it failed to determine whether modification of the residential parenting schedule was in the children's best interest, having applied an incorrect legal issue to the issue. Irvin v. Irvin, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 8, 2018).

5. Proposed Parenting Plan.

Father also failed to file a proposed parenting plan concurrently with his modification petition, but filed a proposed parenting plan two days before trial; in contrast, the mother had not provided any explanation with respect to her continued failure to submit a proposed parenting plan either before or during trial. Hart v. Hart, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 131 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 23, 2017).

Declining to adopt the father's proposed parenting plan was not error where although the mother had not filed a proposed plan as required by T.C.A. § 36-6-405, the court determined that the existing parenting plan and schedule was working well for the child. Ballard v. Cayabas, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 683 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 12, 2017).

6. Jurisdiction.

Parent's partial noncompliance with subsection (a), by failing to attach a proposed parenting plan to a petition to modify custody, does not nullify the parent's attempt to invoke the trial court's jurisdiction. Freeman v. Freeman, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 721 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 14, 2018).

Although a father was required to submit a new proposed parenting plan, his petition to modify the plan was sufficient to invoke the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction because all of the trial court's orders were final judgments; after the entry of each final judgment, the trial court lost the ability to exercise its authority over the case until the father “invoked” its jurisdiction, and he attempted to invoke its jurisdiction by filing a motion to modify the parenting plan. Freeman v. Freeman, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 721 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 14, 2018).

36-6-406. Restrictions in temporary or permanent parenting plans.

  1. The permanent parenting plan and the mechanism for approval of the permanent parenting plan shall not utilize dispute resolution, and a parent's residential time as provided in the permanent parenting plan or temporary parenting plan shall be limited if the limitation is found to be in the best interest of the minor child and if the court determines, based upon a prior order or other reliable evidence, that a parent has engaged in any of the following conduct:
    1. Willful abandonment that continues for an extended period of time or substantial refusal to perform parenting responsibilities; or
    2. Physical or sexual abuse or a pattern of emotional abuse of the parent, child or of another person living with that child as defined in § 36-3-601.
  2. The parent's residential time with the child shall be limited if it is determined by the court, based upon a prior order or other reliable evidence, that the parent resides with a person who has engaged in physical or sexual abuse or a pattern of emotional abuse of the parent, child or of another person living with that child as defined in § 36-3-601.
  3. If a parent has been convicted as an adult of a sexual offense under § 39-15-302, title 39, chapter 17, part 10, or §§ 39-13-501 — 39-13-511, or has been found to be a sexual offender under title 39, chapter 13, part 7, the court shall restrain the parent from contact with a child that would otherwise be allowed under this part. If a parent resides with an adult who has been convicted, or with a juvenile who has been adjudicated guilty of a sexual offense under § 39-15-302, title 39, chapter 17, part 10, or §§ 39-13-501 — 39-13-511, or who has been found to be a sexual offender under title 39, chapter 13, part 7, the court shall restrain that parent from contact with the child unless the contact occurs outside the adult's or juvenile's presence and sufficient provisions are established to protect the child.
  4. A parent's involvement or conduct may have an adverse effect on the child's best interest, and the court may preclude or limit any provisions of a parenting plan, if any of the following limiting factors are found to exist after a hearing:
    1. A parent's neglect or substantial nonperformance of parenting responsibilities;
    2. An emotional or physical impairment that interferes with the parent's performance of parenting responsibilities as defined in § 36-6-402;
    3. An impairment resulting from drug, alcohol, or other substance abuse that interferes with the performance of parenting responsibilities;
    4. The absence or substantial impairment of emotional ties between the parent and the child;
    5. The abusive use of conflict by the parent that creates the danger of damage to the child's psychological development;
    6. A parent has withheld from the other parent access to the child for a protracted period without good cause;
    7. A parent's criminal convictions as they relate to such parent's ability to parent or to the welfare of the child; or
    8. Such other factors or conduct as the court expressly finds adverse to the best interests of the child.
  5. In entering a permanent parenting plan, the court shall not draw any presumptions from the temporary parenting plan.
    1. In all Title IV-D child or spousal support cases in which payment of support is to be made by income assignment, or otherwise, and in all cases where payments made by income assignment based upon support orders entered on or after January 1, 1994, that are not Title IV-D support cases but must be made to the central collection and disbursement unit as provided by § 36-5-116, and, except as may otherwise be allowed by § 36-5-501(a)(2)(B), the court shall only approve a temporary or permanent parenting plan involving the payment of support that complies with the requirements for central collection and disbursement as required by § 36-5-116. Prior to approval of a parenting plan in which payments are to be made directly to the spouse or the court clerk or to some other person or entity, there shall be filed with the plan presented to the court a written certification, under oath if filed by a party, or signed by the party's counsel, stating whether the case for which the plan is to be approved is a Title IV-D support case subject to enforcement by the department of human services or is otherwise subject to collection through the department's central collection and disbursement unit established by § 36-5-116.
    2. Any provision of any parenting plan, agreement or court order providing for any other payment procedure contrary to the requirements of § 36-5-116, except as may otherwise be allowed by § 36-5-501(a)(2)(B), whether or not approved by the court, shall be void and of no effect. No credit for support payments shall be given by the court, the court clerk or the department of human services for child or spousal support payments required by the support order that are made in contravention of such requirements; provided, however, the department may make any necessary adjustments to the balances owed to account for changes in the Title IV-D or central collection and disbursement status of the support case.
  6. Forms used by parties as parenting plans or adopted by the court for their use shall conform to all substantive language requirements established by the administrative office of the courts at such time as parenting plan forms are promulgated and approved by that office.

Acts 1997, ch. 557, § 1; T.C.A., § 36-6-412; Acts 2000, ch. 889, § 1; 2001, ch. 447, § 18; 2020, ch. 693, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. In the span of §§  39-13-50139-13-511, referred to in this section, §  39-13-507 is repealed, and §  39-13-510 has been removed from the Tennessee Code Annotated as unconstitutional.

Former § 36-6-406 (Acts 1997, ch. 557, § 1), concerning failure to comply with decree, temporary injunction, temporary or permanent parenting plan and obligation to make support or maintenance payments or permit contact with children not suspended, was repealed by Acts 2000, ch. 889, § 1.

Acts 2000, ch. 889, § 1, effective January 1, 2001, renumbered former § 36-6-412 as this section.

Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, referred to in this section, is compiled in 42 U.S.C. § 651 et seq.

Amendments. The 2020 amendment, in the introductory language of (a), substituted “if the limitation is found to be in the best interest of the minor child and if the court determines” for “if it is determined by the court”.

Effective Dates. Acts 2020, ch. 693, § 2. June 11, 2020.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Factors.

Court did not err in awarding primary custodial care to a father where he admitted his shortcomings and had been actively seeking outside assistance to improve his parenting skills, the separation of two siblings was in their best interests as one sibling exhibited aggressive behavior towards the other, and the parenting plan allowed for the children to spend every weekend together and granted both parents liberal visitation rights. Shofner v. Shofner, 181 S.W.3d 703, 2004 Tenn. App. LEXIS 865 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004), rehearing denied, 181 S.W.3d 703, 2005 Tenn. App. LEXIS 854 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005), appeal denied, Shofner v. Kalisz, — S.W.3d —, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 943 (Tenn. Oct. 24, 2005).

Court erred by awarding joint child custody, because it was undisputed that the husband's psychological problems negatively impacted the child, the husband sometimes physically hit the wife in the presence of the child, the court's opinion failed to follow the statutory imperative to prioritize the best interest of the child ahead of the parents'  interests, and it effectively rejected, without adequate evidentiary support for doing so, the duly submitted report of the court's own expert; there was considerable evidence of a stronger relationship between the wife and the child than between the husband and the child. Burden v. Burden, 250 S.W.3d 899, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 611 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 26, 2007), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2008 Tenn. LEXIS 133 (Tenn. Feb. 25, 2008).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion by determining that a permanent parenting plan, which did not award a father any parenting time and conditioned any future parenting time on recommendations by the children's therapists, was in the children's best interests because there was sufficient evidence of the father's pattern of emotional abuse of the children, T.C.A. §§ 36-6-106(a), 36-6-406(a)(2), and 36-6-404(b); the father had a history of becoming verbally and physically aggressive with the children. Beyer v. Beyer, 428 S.W.3d 59, 2013 Tenn. App. LEXIS 229 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 5, 2013), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 827 (Tenn. Oct. 16, 2013).

Because the determination of whether the father was an active addict or in recovery was a factor that might be taken into consideration in determining an appropriate residential parenting schedule, although res judicata barred reconsideration of whether the father was a drug addict at the time of the divorce, it did not bar evidence showing that the father was a recovering addict in the decision to modify the parenting plan, and the father should have been permitted to offer his doctor's testimony as evidence that he was not an active addict; however, the error was harmless as the error did not affect a substantial right because the trial court relied on other factors in limiting the father's parenting time with the children. Duke v. Duke, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. App. LEXIS 627 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 3, 2014), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 165 (Tenn. Feb. 13, 2015).

Change in custody was in the child's best interests because the trial court found an instability in the mother's family, the mother had emotional ill health, the mother emotionally abused the child, the mother's boyfriend had a bad character and erratic behavior, and the father had a greater potential for future performance of parenting responsibilities. Muhonen v. Muhonen, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 78 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 20, 2015).

Trial court did not err in allocating sole decision-making authority to one parent with respect to a child's educational, non-emergency medical, and extra-curricular activities as the parents had communications issues and that parent historically had been the primary decision-maker and caregiver. In re Grace N., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 331 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 14, 2015).

Restriction on the father's visitation was proper, as the father's inappropriate statement and conduct concerning the child's genitalia preponderated in favor of the finding that his conduct was directly adverse to the best interest of the child, and the father neglected the child when, inter alia, he left the child alone in a car while he went into a convenience store to purchase tobacco. Thompson v. Thompson, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 1000 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 30, 2015).

Trial court properly determined that, while a mother established that a material change of circumstances had occurred, modification of the parenting schedule was not in the child's best interest because the court fully considered the father's conduct and whether it would have an adverse effect on the child's best interest and, although the order did not include specific findings of fact relative to the statutory factors the mother and the father spent effectively the same amount of time and engaged in the same activities with the child between the time she came home from school and the time she went to bed. Wheeler v. Wheeler, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 373 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 24, 2016).

Trial court had properly considered the T.C.A. § 36-6-406(d) limiting factors on residential co-parenting time where it carefully weighed factors 5 and 6 in finding severe parental alienation to be a basis for limiting the father's co-parenting time and found that leaving the situation as it was would have resulted in the mother's effective exclusion from the children's lives. McClain v. McClain, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 634 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 21, 2017).

Trial court erred in expanding the father's parenting time after making its findings of domestic abuse; the trial court's judgment was vacated so as to delete the father's co-parenting time of one weekend per month in September, October, November, January, February, April, and May. Purvis v. Purvis, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 280 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 22, 2018).

Evidence supported award to a father of most of the visitation time with the parties'  daughter because the daughter's relationship with the father was stronger than the daughter's volatile relationship with the mother, the father had become the primary caregiver, and the daughter preferred living with the father. The evidence supported the award to both parties of 50/50 visitation with the parties'  son, with the father to make the major decisions for the son except religion, because the father appeared to be a comparatively more stable parent. Carter v. Carter, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 452 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 7, 2018).

Trial court did not err by limiting the father's residential parenting time because it found that he engaged in conduct constituting abusive use of conflict and the record showed that his conduct adversely affected the children. Burchfield v. Burchfield, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 248 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 21, 2019).

Preponderance of the evidence supported the trial court's decision to limit the father's residential parenting time because the record showed that the father had punched the mother's vehicle, stalked her, vindictively swore out a criminal summons against her, and secretly recorded conversations with her. Burchfield v. Burchfield, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 248 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 21, 2019).

2. Permanent Parenting Plan.

Trial court erred by including provisions in a permanent parenting plan because there was no evidence that a parent's unsupervised visitation would be harmful to the parties'  child. The provisions were modified to delete requiring supervision of the parent's visitation, disallowing the parent's paramour from spending overnight during visitation, ruling that the parent was to have no additional co-parenting time for holidays or otherwise without agreement, and granting the other parent sole authority to make major decisions regarding the child. Mashburn v. Mashburn, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 445 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 30, 2016).

3. Findings.

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in adopting a parenting schedule that permitted the mother unsupervised overnight weekend visits with the child twice per month and on alternating holidays; it was not necessary for the court to make a finding with respect to the statute because the modification to the parenting schedule did not severely and inappropriately limit the mother's parenting time. In re Emily M., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 906 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2016).

Trial court did not err when fashioning a permanent parenting plan because the evidence did not preponderate against the trial court's finding against the father's allegations of abuse by the mother against the father. Roberts v. Roberts, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 758 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 22, 2017).

Appellate court's ability to review a trial court's designation of a primary residential parent and adoption of a parenting plan was limited because the findings of fact and conclusions of law entered by the trial court did not include a discussion of the impact on the finding by the trial court of domestic violence. Accordingly, the decision had to be vacated, and the case remanded for the court to make appropriate findings in that regard. Carr v. Carr, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 117 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 1, 2018).

Because the trial court's custody order failed to make sufficient findings and conclusions, the order was vacated and the case was remanded; the trial court stated that it considered the factors regarding custody, but did not weigh the facts against the factors, the trial court did not specifically conclude that one parent was more emotionally fit to care for the child, and it was unclear whether the trial court followed the mandate of T.C.A. § 36-6-406 in deciding to designate the father as the primary residential parent. Williams v. Williams, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 415 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 23, 2018).

Because the trial court, in naming the husband the primary residential parent, only considered the stable environment offered by the husband in the marital home, and it did not enumerate or discuss the statutory factors of T.C.A. §§ 36-6-106, 36-6-404 or the best interests of the children, and it made virtually no findings of fact regarding the abuse allegations against the husband as required by this section, the court remanded to the trial court to make appropriate findings. Mangum v. Mangum, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 192 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 24, 2019).

Trial court failed to elaborate the basis for its deviating from the parties'  agreed parenting plan before concluding that the parents could not jointly parent, and, more egregiously, was silent concerning the child's best interest. Thus, the vacating of the trial court's permanent parenting plan and remand for further findings were necessary because the trial court's findings were not sufficient either to support its refusal to enter the parties'  proposed parenting plan, or to support the parenting plan arrived at by the trial court. Wright v. Wright, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 99 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 6, 2020).

4. Supervised Visitation.

Record, which included the father's claim that the mother did not supervise the child's internet usage or tell the father about the child's “suicide note,” did not support the decision to impose supervised visitation. Allen v. Allen, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 157 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 7, 2017).

5. Applicability.

In a divorce case, the trial court did not err in not applying the statute restricting the parenting of an abusive parent based on the wife's allegations that the husband physically abused her because whether the husband was actually responsible for the wife's injuries to her leg was a hotly debated issue throughout the trial; and the trial court ultimately concluded that there was simply not enough evidence to support an intentional injury caused by the husband as the wife never told anyone about the alleged abuse, the husband had no history of physical abuse, the wife allowed the husband to move back into the marital home, and the record was devoid of any evidence that the wife was frightened of the husband. Williams v. Williams, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 563 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 17, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 883 (Tenn. Dec. 8, 2017).

36-6-407. Allocation of parenting responsibilities.

  1. The court shall approve agreements of the parties allocating parenting responsibilities, or specifying rules, if it finds that:
    1. The agreement is consistent with any limitations on a parent's decision-making authority mandated by § 36-6-406;
    2. The agreement is knowing and voluntary; and
    3. The agreement is in the best interest of the child.
  2. The court may consider a parent's refusal, without just cause, to attend a court-ordered parental educational seminar in making an award of sole decision-making authority to the other parent. The court shall order sole decision making to one (1) parent when it finds that:
    1. A limitation on the other parent's decision-making authority is mandated by § 36-6-406;
    2. Both parents are opposed to mutual decision making; or
    3. One (1) parent is opposed to mutual decision making, and such opposition is reasonable in light of the parties' inability to satisfy the criteria for mutual decision-making authority.
  3. Except as provided in subsections (a) and (b), the court shall consider the following criteria in allocating decision-making authority:
    1. The existence of a limitation under § 36-6-406;
    2. The history of participation of each parent in decision making in each of the following areas: physical care, emotional stability, intellectual and moral development, health, education, extracurricular activities, and religion; and whether each parent attended a court-ordered parent education seminar;
    3. Whether the parents have demonstrated the ability and desire to cooperate with one another in decision making regarding the child in each of the following areas: physical care, emotional stability, intellectual and moral development, health, education, extracurricular activities, and religion; and
    4. The parents' geographic proximity to one another, to the extent that it affects their ability to make timely mutual decisions.
  4. When determining whether an agreement allocating parenting responsibilities is in the best interest of the child pursuant to subdivision (a)(3), the court may consider any evidence submitted by a guardian ad litem appointed for the child, if one has been appointed by the court, subject to the Tennessee Rules of the Supreme Court relative to guidelines for guardians ad litem appointed for minor children in divorce proceedings and the Tennessee Rules of Evidence.
  5. Notwithstanding any provision to the contrary, the requirements of subsection (a) and Rule 52.01 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure are conclusively satisfied upon the court's approval of the parties' agreement allocating parenting responsibilities, or specifying rules, and written findings of fact and conclusions of law by the court are not required.

Acts 1997, ch. 557, § 1; 1998, ch. 1098, § 71; T.C.A., § 36-6-411; Acts 2000, ch. 889, § 1; 2009, ch. 563, §§ 1, 2; 2020, ch. 520, § 5.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2000, ch. 889, § 1, effective January 1, 2001, renumbered former § 36-6-407 as present § 36-6-403 and former § 36-6-411 as this section.

Acts 2009, ch. 563, § 3 provided that the act, which amended § 36-6-407(a)(3) and added § 36-6-407(d), shall apply to parenting plans approved by the court on or after July 1, 2009.

Amendments. The 2020 amendment added (e).

Effective Dates. Acts 2020, ch. 520, § 6. March 6, 2020.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Final Decision-Making Authority.

Trial court did not err in allocating sole decision-making authority to one parent with respect to a child's educational, non-emergency medical, and extra-curricular activities as the parents had communications issues and that parent historically had been the primary decision-maker and caregiver. In re Grace N., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 331 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 14, 2015).

Case was remanded to the trial court to modify the permanent parenting plan to change the decision making authority for the child's non-emergency healthcare and education from “joint” to “mother” because the mother was the most suitable person to exercise that important function. Madden v. Madden, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 546 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 28, 2016).

Trial court's decision to allocate decision-making authority to the father was supported by evidence that the parties had not cooperated with respect to the children, fostering an unhealthy atmosphere. Lanier v. Lanier, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 943 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 9, 2016).

In a case involving a modification of an agreed parenting plan, the juvenile court did not err by naming the father the primary residential parent and by granting the father sole decision-making authority as the parties had stipulated that there had been a material change of circumstance, and it was in the child's best interests because the mother was unwilling to cooperate with the father in making educational decisions; the mother continued to share inappropriate information with the child concerning the parents'  relationship and the details of the custody dispute; the mother admitted to having physical and mental health issues; and the mother made a habit of sending the father inappropriate and occasionally threatening emails. Gider v. Hubbell, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 211 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 29, 2017).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in designating the mother as the sole decision maker for the child because the father made the unilateral decision to move to Virginia, which was more than eight hours away from the child; and the parents geographic proximity to one another, to the extent that it affected their ability to make timely mutual decisions, was a proper factor for consideration. Sansom v. Sansom, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 298 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 10, 2017).

Because the evidence showed that the parents were unable to exercise joint decision-making regarding the son's education and the mother filed a petition to modify their decision-making authority, the trial court was required to determine whether the decision-making authority in the parenting plan should be modified. However, the trial court failed to designate a primary decision-maker for the son's education or make any findings on the issue, and therefore its order was vacated. Cantey v. Cantey, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 342 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 9, 2019).

2. Voluntariness.

Although the father suggested that the modification order ran afoul of the statute by failing to find that the parties'  agreement was knowing and voluntary, the parties'  consent to the terms of the parenting arrangement was readily established at a hearing, and the arrangement was incorporated in the order. Stricklin v. Stricklin, 490 S.W.3d 8, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 754 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 21, 2015).

36-6-408. Parent educational seminar.

  1. In an action where a permanent parenting plan is or will be entered, each parent shall attend a parent educational seminar as soon as possible after the filing of the complaint. The seminar may be divided into sessions, which in the aggregate must not be less than four (4) hours in duration, and the minor children must be excluded from attending the seminar. The seminar must be educational in nature and not designed for individual therapy. The seminar must educate parents concerning how to protect and enhance the child's emotional development and inform the parents regarding the legal process. The seminar must include:
    1. At least one (1) thirty-minute video on adverse childhood experiences created:
      1. By the department of children's services in conjunction with the Tennessee commission on children and youth; or
      2. As part of the Building Strong Brains Tennessee public awareness campaign; and
    2. A discussion of alternative dispute resolution, marriage counseling, the judicial process, and common perpetrator attitudes and conduct involving domestic violence.
  2. The fees or costs of the educational sessions under this section, which shall be reasonable, shall be borne by the parties and may be assessed by the court as it deems equitable. Such fees may be waived for indigent persons.
  3. No court shall deny the granting of a divorce from the bonds of matrimony for failure of a party or both parties to attend the educational session.
  4. The requirement of attendance by parents at the parent educational seminar may be waived upon motion by either party and the agreement of the court upon the showing of good cause.

Acts 1997, ch. 557, § 1; T.C.A., § 36-6-405; Acts 2000, ch. 889, § 1; 2020, ch. 710, §§ 1, 2.

Compiler's Notes. Former § 36-6-408 (Acts 1997, ch. 557, § 1), concerning procedure for determining permanent parenting plan, was repealed by Acts 2000, ch. 889, § 1.

Acts 2000, ch. 889, § 1, effective January 1, 2001, renumbered former § 36-6-405 as this section.

Amendments. The 2020 amendment rewrote (a) which read: “(a) In an action where a permanent parenting plan is or will be entered, each parent shall attend a parent educational seminar as soon as possible after the filing of the complaint. The seminar shall educate parents concerning how to protect and enhance the child's emotional development and informing the parents regarding the legal process. The seminar shall also include a discussion of alternative dispute resolution, marriage counseling, the judicial process, and common perpetrator attitudes and conduct involving domestic violence. The program may be divided into sessions, which in the aggregate shall not be less than four (4) hours in duration. The seminar shall be educational in nature and not designed for individual therapy. The minor children shall be excluded from attending these sessions. The requirement of attendance at such a seminar may be waived upon motion by either party and the agreement of the court upon the showing of good cause for such relief.”; and added (d).

Effective Dates. Acts 2020, ch. 710, § 3. June 22, 2020.

Attorney General Opinions. A court has the power to order the parents to attend a parent education seminar, to compel obedience with such an order, and to punish for contempt the willful disobedience of a party to the court's order; further, although a court may not refuse to grant a divorce based on the failure of the parent(s) to attend an educational seminar, the court may consider this factor in determining the child's residential schedule and in allocating decision-making authority between the parents, OAG 00-178, 2000 Tenn. AG LEXIS 181 (11/20/00).

Responsibility for establishing the parent education seminar required by the statute lies within the discretion of the circuit and chancery courts, OAG 00-178, 2000 Tenn. AG LEXIS 181 (11/20/00).

36-6-409. Procedures and restrictions applicable to dispute resolution.

The following procedures and restrictions are applicable to the use of the dispute resolution process under this part:

  1. Each neutral party, the court, or the special master shall apply or, in the case of mediation, assist the parties to uphold as a standard for making decisions in mediation, the criteria in this part. Nothing in this part shall be construed to prevent a party from having the party's attorney present at a mediation or other dispute resolution procedure;
  2. The Tennessee Rules of Evidence do not apply in any mediation or alternative dispute resolution process; the neutral party may rely upon evidence submitted that reasonably prudent persons would rely upon in the conduct of their affairs;
  3. When dispute resolution is utilized in this chapter, it shall be preceded by a pretrial conference and the attendance by parents at the parent educational seminar set forth in § 36-6-408;
  4. The court shall not order a dispute resolution process, except court action, if the court:
    1. Finds that any limiting factor under § 36-6-406 applies;
    2. Finds that either parent is unable to afford the cost of the proposed dispute resolution process, unless such cost is waived or subsidized by the state;
    3. Enters a default judgment against the defendant; or
    4. Preempts such process upon motion of either party for just cause;
  5. If an order of protection issued in or recognized by this state is in effect or if there is a court finding of domestic abuse or criminal conviction involving domestic abuse within the marriage that is the subject of the proceeding for divorce or separate support and maintenance, the court may order mediation or refer the parties to mediation only if:
    1. Mediation is agreed to by the victim of the alleged domestic or family violence;
    2. Mediation is provided by a certified mediator who is trained in domestic and family violence in a specialized manner that protects the safety of the victim; and
    3. The victim is permitted to have in attendance at mediation a supporting person of the victim's choice, including, but not limited to, an attorney or advocate. No victim may provide monetary compensation to a nonattorney advocate for attendance at mediation. The other party may also have in attendance at mediation a supporting person of such party's choice, including, but not limited to, an attorney or advocate;
  6. If a dispute resolution process is not precluded or limited, then in designating such a process the court shall consider all relevant factors, including:
    1. Differences between the parents that would substantially inhibit their effective participation in any designated process;
    2. The parents' wishes or agreements and, if the parents have entered into agreements, whether the agreements were made knowingly and voluntarily; and
    3. The financial circumstances of the parties to pay for alternative dispute resolution processes where court sanctioned alternative dispute resolution programs are unavailable.

Acts 2000, ch. 889, § 1; 2002, ch. 651, § 7.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2000, ch. 889, § 1, effective January 1, 2001, renumbered former § 36-6-409 as present § 36-6-405.

36-6-410. Designation of custody for the purpose of other state and federal statutes.

  1. Solely for the purpose of all other state and federal statutes and any applicable policies of insurance that require a designation or determination of custody, a parenting plan must designate the parent with whom the child is scheduled to reside a majority of the time as the primary residential parent of the child; provided, that this designation shall not affect either parent's rights and responsibilities under the parenting plan. In the absence of such a designation, the parent with whom the child is scheduled to reside a majority of the time is deemed to be the primary residential parent for the purposes of such federal and state statutes.
  2. Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, when the child is scheduled to reside an equal amount of time with both parents, the parents may agree to a designation as joint primary residential parents or to waive the designation of a primary residential parent. In the absence of an agreement between the parties, a single primary residential parent must be designated; provided, that this designation shall not affect either parent's rights and responsibilities under the parenting plan.

Acts 1997, ch. 557, § 1; T.C.A., § 36-6-413; Acts 2000, ch. 889, § 1; 2019, ch. 83, § 2.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2000, ch. 889, § 1, effective January 1, 2001, renumbered former § 36-6-410 as present § 36-6-404 and former § 36-6-413 as this section.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment added (b); and, in present (a),   substituted “primary residential parent” for “custodian” in the first and second sentences, substituted “must designate” for “shall designate” in the first sentence, and substituted “is deemed” for “shall be deemed” in the second sentence.

Effective Dates. Acts 2019, ch. 83, § 4. July 1, 2019.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Primary Residential Parent.

Trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of an operator and sponsor of a club for boys and girls (the defendants) for lack of standing because a father was statutorily barred from bringing any claim to recover medical expenses or loss of his child's service resulting from an injury where he was not a primary residential parent and the father failed to present evidence or assert that he had paid or was responsible for the child's medical expenses. Neale v. United Way of Greater Kingsport, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 607 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 28, 2015).

36-6-411. Juvenile court jurisdiction.

  1. Nothing in this part shall be construed to alter, modify or restrict the exclusive jurisdiction of the juvenile court pursuant to § 37-1-103.
  2. The juvenile court may incorporate any part of the parenting plan process in any matter that the court deems appropriate.
  3. Nothing in this part shall require the department of children's services, acting in any capacity, to:
    1. Be bound in any manner by a permanent parenting plan;
    2. Participate in mediation or dispute resolution in relation to any permanent parenting plan; or
    3. Facilitate the development, modification, or presentation of any permanent or temporary parenting plan to a court.

Acts 1997, ch. 557, § 1; T.C.A., § 36-6-403; Acts 2000, ch. 889, § 1; 2006, ch. 947, §§ 1, 4.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2000, ch. 889, § 1, effective January 1, 2001, renumbered former § 36-6-411 as present § 36-6-407 and former § 36-6-403 as this section.

Law Reviews.

Family Mediation in Tennessee (Judge Marietta Shipley), 26 U. Mem. L. Rev. 1085 (1996).

Attorney General Opinions. The juvenile court is not subject to the Parenting Plan Act, § 36-6-401 et seq., in any matter before the juvenile court pursuant to its exclusive original jurisdiction, OAG 01-028, 2001 Tenn. AG LEXIS 28 (2/27/01).

36-6-412. Gender.

It is the legislative intent that the gender of the party seeking to be the primary residential parent shall not give rise to a presumption of parental fitness or cause a presumption in favor of or against such party.

Acts 1997, ch. 557, § 1; T.C.A., § 36-6-404; Acts 2000, ch. 889, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2000, ch. 889, § 1, effective January 1, 2001, renumbered former § 36-6-412 as present § 36-6-406 and former § 36-6-404 as this section.

36-6-413. Funding.

  1. The costs of the mediation required by this part may be assessed as discretionary costs of the action.
    1. The court may direct that all or part of the cost of court-ordered mediation, education and any related services to resolve family conflict in divorce and post-divorce matters shall be paid from all available federal, state, and local funds. Eligibility for receipt of such funds will be based on a sliding scale based on a person's ability to pay.
    2. There is hereby imposed an additional fee of sixty-two dollars and fifty cents ($62.50) on the issuance of a marriage license; provided, however, that, in any county having a municipality defined as a premier type tourist resort pursuant to § 67-6-103(a)(3)(B) when both applicants provide the county clerk with an affidavit or valid driver license establishing that they are not Tennessee residents, or when both applicants provide the county clerk with a valid and timely certificate of completion of a premarital preparation course as provided in subdivision (b)(3), the applicants shall be exempt from payment of sixty dollars ($60.00) of this fee. The county clerk shall pay the sixty dollar ($60.00) fee to the state treasurer, which fee shall be allocated as follows:
      1. Seven dollars ($7.00) to the administrative office of the courts for the specific purpose of funding the parenting plan requirements pursuant to this part, through the divorcing parent education and mediation fund, which funding includes the costs of court-ordered mediation, parenting education programs and any related services to resolve family conflict in divorce and post-divorce matters;
      2. Fifteen dollars ($15.00) to the department of children's services for child abuse prevention services;
      3. Seven dollars and fifty cents ($7.50) to the office of criminal justice programs for domestic violence services, which shall be in addition to the privilege tax on marriage licenses under § 67-4-505;
      4. Twenty dollars and fifty cents ($20.50) to the Tennessee Disability Coalition to build the capacity of the statewide disability community to offer services to families and children with disabilities;
      5. Three dollars ($3.00) to the Tennessee Court Appointed Special Advocates Association (CASA);
      6. Four dollars ($4.00) to the department of education for the sole purpose of making grants to Tennessee Alliance of Boys and Girls Clubs in each grand division as selected by the commissioner of education for the purpose of defraying the expenses of such clubs implementing the “Project Learn” after-school program in the areas served by each club; and
      7. Three dollars ($3.00) to the Tennessee chapter of the National Association of Social Workers for education, information, publications and capacity building efforts focused on strengthening services and referral networks to families and children.
    3. Funds in the divorcing parent education and mediation fund shall be used to fund the parenting plan requirements of this part, including the creation of a grant process to serve local courts utilizing any part of the parenting plan process, costs of court-ordered mediation, parenting educational programs and any related services to resolve family conflict in divorce, post-divorce, and other child custody matters.
    4. The clerks of court with divorce jurisdiction, or two (2) or more clerks within a county or judicial district acting jointly, may apply to the administrative office of the courts for funding to serve such court or courts.
      1. A man and a woman who, together or separately, complete a premarital preparation course in compliance with this section shall be exempt from the sixty dollar ($60.00) fee otherwise imposed by this section. Such course shall be not less than four (4) hours each, and shall be completed no more than one (1) year prior to the date of application for a marriage license. Each individual shall verify completion of the course by filing with the application a valid certificate of completion from the course provider, on a form developed by the administrative office of the courts, which certificate shall comply with the requirements of this subdivision (b)(5).
      2. The premarital preparation course may include instruction regarding:
        1. Conflict management;
        2. Communication skills;
        3. Financial responsibilities;
        4. Children and parenting responsibilities; and
        5. Data compiled from available information relating to problems reported by married couples that seek marital or individual counseling.
      3. All individuals who participate in a premarital preparation course shall choose from the following list of qualified instructors:
        1. A psychologist as defined under § 63-11-203;
        2. A clinical social worker as defined in title 63, chapter 23;
        3. A licensed marital and family therapist as defined in § 63-22-115;
        4. A clinical pastoral therapist as defined in title 63, chapter 22, part 2;
        5. A professional counselor as defined in § 63-22-104;
        6. A psychological examiner as defined in § 63-11-202;
        7. An official representative of a religious institution that is recognized under § 63-22-204; or
        8. Any other instructor who meets the qualifying guidelines that may be established by the judicial district for the county in which the marriage license is issued.
      4. The administrative office of the courts shall develop a certificate of completion form to be completed by providers, which shall include:
        1. An attestation of the provider's compliance with the premarital preparation course requirements as set forth in this section;
        2. The course instructor's name, address, qualifications, and license number, if any, or, if an official representative of a religious institution, a statement as to relevant training;
        3. The name of the participant or participants; and
        4. The hours completed and the date of completion.
      5. Each premarital preparation course provider shall furnish each participant who completes the course with a certificate of completion as required by this subdivision (b)(5).
    5. Any moneys collected under this section during the pilot program and not expended shall remain in the divorcing parent and mediation fund established by the state treasurer within the general fund for use by the administrative office of the courts, consistent with subdivision (b)(2)(A). No moneys collected under this section shall revert to the general fund of the state, but shall remain available exclusively as specified in this section.
    6. In addition to other fees authorized by this section, court clerks shall be entitled to normal copying fees, not to exceed fifty cents (50¢) per page, for providing copies of documents necessary for parenting plans.

Acts 1997, ch. 557, § 1; T.C.A., § 36-6-414; Acts 2000, ch. 889, § 1; 2002, ch. 854, § 1; 2003, ch. 203, § 1; 2004, ch. 951, §§ 1-3; 2006, ch. 947, §§ 2, 3; 2008, ch. 924, § 16.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2000, ch. 889, § 1, effective January 1, 2001, renumbered former § 36-6-413 as present § 36-6-410 and former § 36-6-414 as this section.

Acts 2002, ch. 854, § 2 provided that the administrative office of the courts shall not be obligated to make grants to judicial districts except with funds specifically appropriated for such purpose.

Acts 2002, ch. 854, § 3 provided that the provisions of that act shall not be construed to be an appropriation of funds and no funds shall be obligated or expended pursuant to that act unless such funds are specifically appropriated by the general appropriations act.

Cross-References. Grand divisions, title 4, ch. 1, part 2.

Rule Reference. This section is referred to in Rule 38 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Tennessee.

Attorney General Opinions. Responsibility for determining what the “sliding scale” is, who is “indigent,” and enforcement or regulation of these determinations lies within the discretion of the courts, OAG 00-178, 2000 Tenn. AG LEXIS 181 (11/20/00).

The courts are responsible for applying for any federal, state, and local funds to pay for dispute resolution and parent education seminars, and parents are also responsible for applying for any funds available to assist them to pay for dispute resolution and parent education seminars, OAG 00-178, 2000 Tenn. AG LEXIS 181 (11/20/00).

36-6-414. Evaluation.

The parenting plan processes established by this part shall be evaluated by the administrative office of the courts after the program has been in effect for three (3) years.

Acts 2000, ch. 889, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2000, ch. 889, § 1 renumbered former § 36-6-414 as present § 36-6-413.

36-6-415. Address for purposes of determining school zoning.

When the child is scheduled to reside an equal amount of time with both parents, the address of either parent may be used to determine school zoning.

Acts 2019, ch. 83, § 3.

Effective Dates. Acts 2019, ch. 83, § 4. July 1, 2019.

Part 5
Parent Visitation

36-6-501. Part definitions.

As used in this part, unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “License” means a license, certification, registration, permit, approval or other similar document issued to an individual evidencing admission to or granting authority to engage in a profession, trade, occupation, business, or industry, or to hunt or fish, but does not include a license to practice law unless the supreme court establishes guidelines pursuant to § 36-6-511 making this part applicable to such license; “license” does not include a license to operate any motor vehicle or other conveyance;
  2. “Licensee” means any individual holding a license, certification, registration, permit, approval, or other similar document evidencing admission to or granting authority to engage in a profession, trade, occupation, business, or industry, or to hunt or fish. “Licensee” does not include an attorney only with respect to the attorney's license to practice law unless the supreme court establishes guidelines pursuant to § 36-6-511 making this part applicable to such license;
  3. “Licensing authority” means the board, commission, or agency, excluding the department of safety, that has been established by statute or state regulation to oversee the issuance and regulation of any license. Excluded from this definition is the supreme court, unless the supreme court acts in accordance with § 36-6-511, and any licensing authority established solely by the action and authority of a county or municipal government;
  4. “Not in compliance with an order of visitation” means that one parent has intentionally interfered with implementation of a schedule of court-ordered visitation on two (2) or more occasions in any six-month period; and
  5. “Order of visitation” means any order granting a noncustodial parent the right to visit with such parent's child on days and times determined by the court.

Acts 2000, ch. 971, § 2.

Cross-References. Enforcement of child support orders through license denial and revocation, title 36, ch. 5, part 7.

36-6-502. Compliance with visitation orders — Enforcement

  1. In all cases where visitation is ordered, both parents shall comply with such order of visitation by turning over custody of the child on the days and at the times so ordered by the court and by picking up the child and returning the child on the days and at the times so ordered by the court.
  2. An order of visitation may be enforced by using the license revocation, denial or suspension procedures provided in this part and any other sanctions deemed appropriate by the court.
  3. Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, if the driver license of a parent is currently canceled, suspended or revoked pursuant to title 55, chapter 10, part 4, or title 55, chapter 50, part 5, and, if such parent personally drives a motor vehicle to the location where the parent is scheduled to take custody of a child pursuant to a valid order of visitation or parenting plan, then the parent or other person having custody of the child may refuse to turn over custody of the child under the circumstances and such refusal shall not constitute a violation of subsection (a).

Acts 2000, ch. 971, § 3; 2003, ch. 243, § 2.

36-6-503. Petition regarding intentional violation of visitation order — Notice.

  1. A parent, who has been victimized by the other parent's intentional violation of § 36-6-502(a) on two (2) or more occasions within any six-month period, may petition the court having jurisdiction over the order of visitation for a finding that the other parent is not in compliance with an order of visitation; provided, prior to the most recent violation, the victimized parent must have notified the other parent, by certified mail, return receipt requested, that subsequent violations of the court-ordered visitation shall be subject to sanctions authorized by this part and a copy of such notification must have been filed with the court. The petitioner shall include with the petition any information concerning a license held by the other parent and covered by § 36-6-511. A notice shall be served on the other parent together with the petition. Such notice shall state that:
    1. The parent may request a hearing to contest the issue of compliance;
    2. A request for a hearing must be made in writing and must be received by the court within twenty (20) days of service;
    3. If such parent requests a hearing within twenty (20) days of service, the court shall stay the proceedings to certify such parent to any appropriate licensing authority for noncompliance with an order of visitation pending a decision after the hearing;
    4. If the court finds that such parent is not in compliance with an order of visitation or such parent does not request a hearing within twenty (20) days of service, the court may certify such parent to any appropriate licensing authority for noncompliance with a court order of visitation; and
    5. If the court certifies such parent to a licensing authority for noncompliance with an order of visitation, the licensing authority, notwithstanding any law to the contrary, must deny a renewal request, revoke such parent's license or refuse to issue or reinstate a license, as the case may be, until such parent provides the licensing authority with a release from the court pursuant to § 36-6-508 that states such parent is in compliance with the order of visitation.
  2. The notice sent pursuant to this section shall also include a statement informing such parent of the need to obtain a release from the court in order to allow such parent's license to be issued, renewed or reinstated. The notice shall be served by certified mail, return receipt requested, or by personal service with an affidavit of service completed by an authorized process server.

Acts 2000, ch. 971, § 4.

Law Reviews.

One Fell Through the Cracks: Why Tennessee Needs an Initial Outpatient Commitment Statute (Lori R. Holyfield), 42 U. Mem. L. Rev. 221 (2011).

36-6-504. Hearing to contest court's intention to issue finding of noncompliance — Consent order.

  1. If a parent requests a hearing pursuant to this part to contest the court's intention to issue a finding of noncompliance to a licensing authority, the court shall conduct the hearing only to determine:
    1. Whether the licensee is a parent subject to an order of visitation;
    2. Whether the licensee is not in compliance with an order of visitation; and
    3. Whether good cause exists to impose the licensing sanctions provided for in this part.
  2. The parties may enter into a consent order wherein the parent in violation agrees to henceforth comply with the order of visitation. Upon entry of such an order the proceedings for licensing sanctions shall be further stayed unless there is noncompliance with the consent order. In the event of noncompliance with the consent order, the stay shall cease and the court shall certify to each affected licensing authority that such parent is not in compliance with an order of visitation. Entry of such consent order shall constitute a waiver of such parent's right to any hearing on the issue of noncompliance with an order of visitation based upon the notice of noncompliance for which the consent order has been entered.
  3. The cost of this action and reasonable attorney's fees shall be taxed to the parent who is not in compliance with an order of visitation. The cost of this action and reasonable attorney's fees shall be assessed against any parent who, in bad faith, petitions the court for imposition of sanctions pursuant to this part.

Acts 2000, ch. 971, § 5.

36-6-505. Requesting hearing for noncompliance.

  1. If a parent timely requests a hearing to contest the issue of compliance, the court shall stay the action and may not certify the name of such parent to any licensing authority for noncompliance with an order of visitation until the court issues a written decision after a hearing that finds such parent is not in compliance with an order of visitation; provided, that after a decision by the court has been made in the form of a final order as provided in § 4-5-315, there will be no further stay unless a reviewing court issues a stay, which stay shall be automatic upon the filing of a notice of appeal.
  2. The court shall issue its decision after hearing without undue delay. The order must inform both parents that either party may file an appeal of the decision within thirty (30) days of the date of the decision. A certification concerning the status of a license shall be automatically stayed pending disposition of an appeal.
  3. Upon a finding of noncompliance, the court may also allocate additional time with the child to the nonoffending parent.
  4. Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, the court shall assess costs of an unsuccessful appeal of notice of noncompliance to the parent in non-compliance.

Acts 2000, ch. 971, § 6.

36-6-506. Determining noncompliance of visitation.

The court may certify in writing or by electronic data exchange to each licensing authority that the offending parent is not in compliance with an order of visitation if:

  1. Such parent does not timely request a hearing upon service of notice issued under § 36-6-503;
  2. Such parent has not entered into a consent order as provided for in § 36-6-504, or having entered into such an order, has failed to comply with such an order;
  3. The court issues a decision after a hearing pursuant to this part that finds such parent is not in compliance with an order of visitation; or
  4. In any proceeding to enforce any provision of an order of visitation, the court finds a parent to be not in compliance with the order of visitation and the other parent specifically prayed for relief in the form of license revocation, denial or suspension.

Acts 2000, ch. 971, § 7.

36-6-507. Denial, suspension or revocation of a license.

  1. Notwithstanding any other law, rule or regulation to the contrary, the certification from the court under § 36-6-506 shall be a basis for the denial, suspension or revocation of a license, or for refusal to issue, renew, or reinstate a license by a licensing authority.
  2. The licensing authority shall notify, without undue delay, by regular mail, a parent certified from the court under § 36-6-506, that the parent's application for the issuance, renewal or reinstatement of a license has been denied or that the parent's current license has been suspended or revoked because the parent's name has been certified by the court as a parent who is not in compliance with an order of visitation.
  3. A notice of suspension shall specify the reason and statutory grounds for the suspension and the effective date of the suspension and may include any other notices prescribed by the licensing authority. The notice shall also inform the individual that in order to apply for issuance, renewal or reinstatement of the license, the individual shall obtain a release from the court in accordance with § 36-6-508.
  4. If a licensing authority fails to deny, suspend or revoke a license when so ordered by a court pursuant to this part, the other parent may petition the court to compel the authority's compliance.
  5. A notice to the individual by the licensing authority to revoke, deny, suspend, or refuse to renew or reinstate a license after receipt of the court certification under this section shall not be appealable under the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, compiled in title 4, chapter 5, part 3.

Acts 2000, ch. 971, § 8.

36-6-508. Compliance with order — Release from the court.

  1. When a parent who is served notice under § 36-6-503, or whose license was otherwise revoked, denied or suspended by order of the court, complies with the order of visitation, the court shall provide the licensing authority with written or electronic data exchange confirmation that the parent is in compliance with the order and issue a release to the parent. For purposes of lifting the licensing sanctions pursuant to this section, a parent will be considered in compliance with an order of visitation upon fully complying with such order for the next four (4) consecutive scheduled visitation periods after the finding by the court of noncompliance.
    1. Upon receipt of the release from the court, the licensing authority shall issue or extend the parent's license, or withdraw any denial, revocation or suspension of the parent's license; provided, that all other applicable licensing requirements are met by the parent. If all other applicable licensing requirements are met by the parent, the parent shall not, however, be required to be retested or recertified for a license that was valid and that was held in good standing by the parent, or for which the parent had been determined otherwise eligible by the licensing authority to receive, prior to the revocation or suspension or denial of such license pursuant to this part, and which license was revoked, suspended or denied solely pursuant to this part.
    2. If, after the revocation, suspension or denial of the license, and before the date on which the next periodic licensing would be due, the license is restored or issued by the licensing authority due to a release, the parent shall not be required to pay a new periodic license fee for the period remaining before the next periodic licensing fee would be due; provided, the licensing authority may impose a reasonable reinstatement fee not to exceed five dollars ($5.00) for processing of the restoration or issuance of the license at any time.

Acts 2000, ch. 971, § 9.

36-6-509. Authorities cooperating with the court.

The various licensing authorities shall cooperate with the court in any manner necessary to effectuate this part, and the court and the various licensing authorities shall enter into any necessary agreements to carry out the purposes of this part.

Acts 2000, ch. 971, § 10.

36-6-510. Filing of motions.

Nothing in this part prohibits a custodial or noncustodial parent from filing a motion with the court to modify an order of visitation or a custody order.

Acts 2000, ch. 971, § 11.

36-6-511. Qualifications for licensure or registration — Eligibility.

  1. In addition to other qualifications for licensure or registration and conditions for continuing eligibility to hold a license as prescribed by law, rule or regulation issued under the provisions of titles 43, 44, 45, 56, 62, 63, 68, 70 or 71, for an individual to engage in a profession, trade, occupation, business, or industry, or to hunt or fish, applicants for licensure, certification or registration, and licensees renewing their licenses, and existing licensees, must not then be subject to a certification that the licensee is not in compliance with an order of visitation.
  2. The supreme court is encouraged to establish guidelines to suspend the license of an attorney who fails to comply with an order of visitation.

Acts 2000, ch. 971, § 12.

Part 6
Uniform Child Abduction Prevention Act

36-6-601. Short title.

This part shall be known and may be cited as the “Uniform Child Abduction Prevention Act.”

Acts 2010, ch. 832, § 1.

36-6-602. Part definitions.

In this part:

  1. “Abduction” means the wrongful removal or wrongful retention of a child;
  2. “Child” means an unemancipated individual who is less than eighteen (18) years of age;
  3. “Child-custody determination” means a judgment, decree, or other order of a court providing for the legal custody, physical custody, or visitation with respect to a child. The term includes a permanent, temporary, initial, and modification order;
  4. “Child-custody proceeding” means a proceeding in which legal custody, physical custody, or visitation with respect to a child is at issue. “Child-custody proceeding” includes a proceeding for divorce, dissolution of marriage, separation, neglect, abuse, dependency, guardianship, paternity, termination of parental rights, or protection from domestic violence;
  5. “Court” means an entity authorized under the law of a state to establish, enforce, or modify a child-custody determination;
  6. “Petition” includes a motion or its equivalent;
  7. “Record” means information that is inscribed on a tangible medium or that is stored in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable in perceivable form;
  8. “State” means a state of the United States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the United States Virgin Islands, or any territory or insular possession subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. “State” includes a federally recognized Indian tribe or nation;
  9. “Travel document” means records relating to a travel itinerary, including travel tickets, passes, reservations for transportation, or accommodations. “Travel document” does not include a passport or visa;
  10. “Wrongful removal” means the taking of a child that breaches rights of custody or visitation given or recognized under the law of this state; and
  11. “Wrongful retention” means the keeping or concealing of a child that breaches rights of custody or visitation given or recognized under the law of this state.

Acts 2010, ch. 832, § 1.

36-6-603. Cooperation and communication among courts.

Sections 36-6-210, 36-6-211 and 36-6-212 apply to cooperation and communications among courts in proceedings under this part.

Acts 2010, ch. 832, § 1.

36-6-604. Actions for abduction prevention measures.

  1. A court on its own motion may order abduction prevention measures in a child-custody proceeding if the court finds that the evidence establishes a credible risk of abduction of the child.
  2. A party to a child-custody determination or another individual or entity having a right under the law of this state or any other state to seek a child-custody determination for the child may file a petition seeking abduction prevention measures to protect the child under this part.
  3. A prosecutor or public authority designated under § 36-6-239 may seek a warrant to take physical custody of a child under § 36-6-609 or other appropriate prevention measures.

Acts 2010, ch. 832, § 1.

36-6-605. Jurisdiction.

  1. A petition under this part may be filed only in a court that has jurisdiction to make a child-custody determination with respect to the child at issue under part 2 of this chapter.
  2. A court of this state has temporary emergency jurisdiction under § 36-6-219 if the court finds a credible risk of abduction.

Acts 2010, ch. 832, § 1.

36-6-606. Contents of petition.

  1. A petition under this part must be verified and include a copy of any existing child-custody determination, if available. The petition must specify the risk factors for abduction, including the relevant factors described in § 36-6-607.
  2. Subject to § 36-6-224(e), if reasonably ascertainable, the petition must contain:
    1. The name, date of birth, and gender of the child;
    2. The customary address and current physical location of the child;
    3. The identity, customary address, and current physical location of the respondent;
    4. A statement of whether a prior action to prevent abduction or domestic violence has been filed by a party or other individual or entity having custody of the child, and the date, location, and disposition of the action;
    5. A statement of whether a party to the proceeding has been arrested for a crime related to domestic violence, stalking, or child abuse or neglect, and the date, location, and disposition of the case; and
    6. Any other information required to be submitted to the court for a child-custody determination under § 36-6-224.

Acts 2010, ch. 832, § 1.

36-6-607. Factors to determine risk of abduction.

  1. In determining whether there is a credible risk of abduction of a child, the court shall consider any evidence that the petitioner or respondent:
    1. Has previously abducted or attempted to abduct the child;
    2. Has threatened to abduct the child;
    3. Has recently engaged in activities that may indicate a planned abduction, including:
      1. Abandoning employment;
      2. Selling a primary residence;
      3. Terminating a lease;
      4. Closing bank or other financial management accounts, liquidating assets, hiding or destroying financial documents, or conducting any unusual financial activities;
      5. Applying for a passport or visa or obtaining travel documents for the respondent, a family member, or the child; or
      6. Seeking to obtain the child's birth certificate or school or medical records;
    4. Has engaged in domestic violence, stalking, or child abuse or neglect;
    5. Has refused to follow a child-custody determination;
    6. Lacks strong familial, financial, emotional, or cultural ties to the state or the United States;
    7. Has strong familial, financial, emotional, or cultural ties to another state or country;
    8. Is likely to take the child to a country that:
      1. Is not a party to the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction and does not provide for the extradition of an abducting parent or for the return of an abducted child;
      2. Is a party to the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction but:
        1. The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction is not in force between the United States and that country;
        2. Is noncompliant according to the most recent compliance report issued by the United States department of state; or
        3. Lacks legal mechanisms for immediately and effectively enforcing a return order under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction;
      3. Poses a risk that the child's physical or emotional health or safety would be endangered in the country because of specific circumstances relating to the child or because of human rights violations committed against children;
      4. Has laws or practices that would:
        1. Enable the respondent, without due cause, to prevent the petitioner from contacting the child;
        2. Restrict the petitioner from freely traveling to or exiting from the country because of the petitioner's gender, nationality, marital status, or religion; or
        3. Restrict the child's ability legally to leave the country after the child reaches the age of majority because of a child's gender, nationality, or religion;
      5. Is included by the United States department of state on a current list of state sponsors of terrorism;
      6. Does not have an official United States diplomatic presence in the country; or
      7. Is engaged in active military action or war, including a civil war, to which the child may be exposed;
    9. Is undergoing a change in immigration or citizenship status that would adversely affect the respondent's ability to remain in the United States legally;
    10. Has had an application for United States citizenship denied;
    11. Has forged or presented misleading or false evidence on government forms or supporting documents to obtain or attempt to obtain a passport, a visa, travel documents, a social security card, a driver's license, or other government-issued identification card or has made a misrepresentation to the United States government;
    12. Has used multiple names to attempt to mislead or defraud; or
    13. Has engaged in any other conduct the court considers relevant to the risk of abduction.
  2. In the hearing on a petition under this part, the court shall consider any evidence that the respondent believed in good faith that the respondent's conduct was necessary to avoid imminent harm to the child or respondent and any other evidence that may be relevant to whether the respondent may be permitted to remove or retain the child.

Acts 2010, ch. 832, § 1.

36-6-608. Provisions and measures to prevent abduction.

  1. If a petition is filed under this part, the court may enter an order that must include:
    1. The basis for the court's exercise of jurisdiction;
    2. The manner in which notice and opportunity to be heard were given to the persons entitled to notice of the proceeding;
    3. A detailed description of each party's custody and visitation rights and residential arrangements for the child;
    4. A provision stating that a violation of the order may subject the party in violation to civil and criminal penalties; and
    5. Identification of the child's country of habitual residence at the time of the issuance of the order.
  2. If, at a hearing on a petition under this part or on the court's own motion, the court after reviewing the evidence finds a credible risk of abduction of the child, the court shall enter an abduction prevention order. The order must include the provisions required by subsection (a) and measures and conditions, including those in subsections (c), (d), and (e), that are reasonably calculated to prevent abduction of the child, giving due consideration to the custody and visitation rights of the parties. The court shall consider the age of the child, the potential harm to the child from an abduction, the legal and practical difficulties of returning the child to the jurisdiction if abducted, and the reasons for the potential abduction, including evidence of domestic violence, stalking, or child abuse or neglect.
  3. An abduction prevention order may include one (1) or more of the following:
    1. An imposition of travel restrictions that require that a party traveling with the child outside a designated geographical area provide the other party with the following:
      1. The travel itinerary of the child;
      2. A list of physical addresses and telephone numbers at which the child can be reached at specified times; and
      3. Copies of all travel documents;
    2. A prohibition of the respondent directly or indirectly:
      1. Removing the child from this state, the United States, or another geographic area without permission of the court or the petitioner's written consent;
      2. Removing or retaining the child in violation of a child-custody determination;
      3. Removing the child from school or a child-care or similar facility; or
      4. Approaching the child at any location other than a site designated for supervised visitation;
    3. A requirement that a party register the order in another state as a prerequisite to allowing the child to travel to that state;
    4. With regard to the child's passport:
      1. A direction that the petitioner place the child's name in the United States department of state's child passport issuance alert program;
      2. A requirement that the respondent surrender to the court or the petitioner's attorney any United States or foreign passport issued in the child's name, including a passport issued in the name of both the parent and the child; and
      3. A prohibition upon the respondent from applying on behalf of the child for a new or replacement passport or visa;
    5. As a prerequisite to exercising custody or visitation, a requirement that the respondent provide:
      1. To the United States department of state office of children's issues and the relevant foreign consulate or embassy, an authenticated copy of the order detailing passport and travel restrictions for the child;
      2. To the court:
        1. Proof that the respondent has provided the information in subdivision (c)(5)(A); and
        2. An acknowledgment in a record from the relevant foreign consulate or embassy that no passport application has been made or passport issued on behalf of the child;
      3. To the petitioner, proof of registration with the United States embassy or other United States diplomatic presence in the destination country and with the Central Authority for the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, if that Convention is in effect between the United States and the destination country, unless one of the parties objects; and
      4. A written waiver under the Privacy Act (5 U.S.C. § 552a), with respect to any document, application, or other information pertaining to the child authorizing its disclosure to the court and the petitioner; and
    6. Upon the petitioner's request, a requirement that the respondent obtain an order from the relevant foreign country containing terms identical to the child-custody determination issued in the United States.
  4. In an abduction prevention order, the court may impose conditions on the exercise of custody or visitation that:
    1. Limit visitation or require that visitation with the child by the respondent be supervised until the court finds that supervision is no longer necessary and order the respondent to pay the costs of supervision;
    2. Require the respondent to post a bond or provide other security in an amount sufficient to serve as a financial deterrent to abduction, the proceeds of which may be used to pay for the reasonable expenses of recovery of the child, including reasonable attorney's fees and costs if there is an abduction; and
    3. Require the respondent to obtain education on the potentially harmful effects to the child from abduction.
  5. To prevent imminent abduction of a child, a court may:
    1. Issue a warrant to take physical custody of the child under § 36-6-609 or the law of this state other than this part;
    2. Direct the use of law enforcement to take any action reasonably necessary to locate the child, obtain return of the child, or enforce a custody determination under this part or the law of this state other than this part; or
    3. Grant any other relief allowed under the law of this state other than this part.
  6. The remedies provided in this part are cumulative and do not affect the availability of other remedies to prevent abduction.

Acts 2010, ch. 832, § 1.

36-6-609. Warrant to take physical custody of child.

  1. If a petition under this part contains allegations, and the court finds that there is a credible risk that the child is imminently likely to be wrongfully removed, the court may issue an ex parte warrant to take physical custody of the child.
  2. The respondent on a petition under subsection (a) must be afforded an opportunity to be heard at the earliest possible time after the ex parte warrant is executed, but not later than the next judicial day unless a hearing on that date is impossible. In that event, the court shall hold the hearing on the first judicial day possible.
  3. An ex parte warrant under subsection (a) to take physical custody of a child must:
    1. Recite the facts upon which a determination of a credible risk of imminent wrongful removal of the child is based;
    2. Direct law enforcement officers to take physical custody of the child immediately;
    3. State the date and time for the hearing on the petition; and
    4. Provide for the safe interim placement of the child pending further order of the court.
  4. If feasible, before issuing a warrant and before determining the placement of the child after the warrant is executed, the court may order a search of the relevant databases of the national crime information center system and similar state databases to determine if either the petitioner or respondent has a history of domestic violence, stalking, or child abuse or neglect.
  5. The petition and warrant must be served on the respondent when or immediately after the child is taken into physical custody.
  6. A warrant to take physical custody of a child, issued by this state or another state, is enforceable throughout this state. If the court finds that a less intrusive remedy will not be effective, it may authorize law enforcement officers to enter private property to take physical custody of the child. If required by exigent circumstances, the court may authorize law enforcement officers to make a forcible entry at any hour.
  7. If the court finds after a hearing that a petitioner sought an ex parte warrant under subsection (a) for the purpose of harassment or in bad faith, the court may award the respondent reasonable attorney's fees, costs, and expenses.
  8. This part does not affect the availability of relief allowed under the law of this state other than this part.

Acts 2010, ch. 832, § 1.

36-6-610. Duration of abduction prevention order.

An abduction prevention order remains in effect until the earliest of:

  1. The time stated in the order;
  2. The emancipation of the child;
  3. The child's attaining eighteen (18) years of age; or
  4. The time the order is modified, revoked, vacated, or superseded by a court with jurisdiction under §§ 36-6-216 — 36-6-218 and other applicable law of this state.

Acts 2010, ch. 832, § 1.

36-6-611. Uniformity of application and construction.

In applying and construing this uniform act, consideration must be given to the need to promote uniformity of the law with respect to its subject matter among states that enact it.

Acts 2010, ch. 832, § 1.

Attorney General Opinions. Enforcement of out-of-state and ex parte orders of protection. OAG 14-101, 2014 Tenn. AG LEXIS 104 (11/26/14).

36-6-612. Relation to Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act.

This part modifies, limits, and supersedes the federal Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act (15 U.S.C. § 7001 et seq.), but does not modify, limit, or supersede § 101(c) of the act (15 U.S.C. § 7001(c)), or authorize electronic delivery of any of the notices described in § 103(b) of that act (15 U.S.C. § 7003(b)).

Acts 2010, ch. 832, § 1.

Chapter 7
Uniform Deployed Parents Custody and Visitation Act

Part 1
General Provisions

36-7-101. Short title.

This chapter shall be known and may be cited as the “Uniform Deployed Parents Custody and Visitation Act.”

Acts 2014, ch. 798, § 1.

36-7-102. Chapter definitions.

In this chapter:

  1. “Adult” means an individual who has attained eighteen (18) years of age or is an emancipated minor;
  2. “Caretaking authority” means the right to live with and care for a child on a day-to-day basis. “Caretaking authority” includes physical custody, parenting time, right to access, and visitation;
  3. “Child” means:
    1. An unemancipated individual who has not attained eighteen (18) years of age; or
    2. An adult son or daughter by birth or adoption, or under law of this state other than this chapter, who is the subject of a court order concerning custodial responsibility;
  4. “Court” means a tribunal, including an administrative agency, authorized under law of this state other than this chapter to make, enforce, or modify a decision regarding custodial responsibility;
  5. “Custodial responsibility” includes all powers and duties relating to caretaking authority and decision-making authority for a child. “Custodial responsibility” includes physical custody, legal custody, parenting time, right to access, visitation, and authority to grant limited contact with a child;
    1. “Decision-making authority” means the power to make important decisions regarding a child, including decisions regarding the child's education, religious training, health care, extracurricular activities, and travel;
    2. “Decision-making authority” does not include the power to make decisions that necessarily accompany a grant of caretaking authority;
  6. “Deploying parent” means a service member who is deployed or has been notified of impending deployment and is:
    1. A parent of a child under law of this state other than this chapter; or
    2. An individual who has custodial responsibility for a child under law of this state other than this chapter;
  7. “Deployment” means the movement or mobilization of a service member for more than thirty (30) days pursuant to uniformed service orders that:
    1. Are designated as unaccompanied;
    2. Do not authorize dependent travel; or
    3. Otherwise do not permit the movement of family members to the location to which the service member is deployed;
  8. “Family member” means a sibling, aunt, uncle, cousin, stepparent, or grandparent of a child or an individual recognized to be in a familial relationship with a child under law of this state other than this chapter;
  9. “Limited contact” means the authority of a nonparent to visit a child for a limited time. “Limited contact” includes authority to take the child to a place other than the residence of the child;
  10. “Nonparent” means an individual other than a deploying parent or other parent;
  11. “Other parent” means an individual who, in common with a deploying parent, is:
    1. A parent of a child under law of this state other than this chapter; or
    2. An individual who has custodial responsibility for a child under law of this state other than this chapter;
  12. “Record” means information that is inscribed on a tangible medium or that is stored in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable in perceivable form;
  13. “Return from deployment” means the conclusion of a service member's deployment as specified in uniformed service orders;
  14. “Service member” means a member of a uniformed service;
  15. “Sign” means with present intent to authenticate or adopt a record:
    1. To execute or adopt a tangible symbol; or
    2. To attach to or logically associate with the record an electronic symbol, sound, or process;
  16. “State” means a state of the United States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the United States Virgin Islands, or any territory or insular possession subject to the jurisdiction of the United States; and
  17. “Uniformed service” means:
    1. Active and reserve components of the army, navy, air force, marine corps, or coast guard of the United States;
    2. The United States merchant marine;
    3. The commissioned corps of the United States public health service;
    4. The commissioned corps of the national oceanic and atmospheric administration of the United States; or
    5. The national guard of a state.

Acts 2014, ch. 798, § 1.

36-7-103. Remedies for noncompliance.

In addition to other remedies under law of this state other than this chapter, if a court finds that a party to a proceeding under this chapter has acted in bad faith or intentionally failed to comply with this chapter or a court order issued under this chapter, the court may assess reasonable attorney's fees and costs against the party and order other appropriate relief.

Acts 2014, ch. 798, § 1.

36-7-104. Jurisdiction.

  1. A court may issue an order regarding custodial responsibility under this chapter only if the court has jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, compiled in chapter 6, part 2 of this title.
  2. If a court has issued a temporary order regarding custodial responsibility pursuant to part 3 of this chapter, the residence of the deploying parent is not changed by reason of the deployment for the purposes of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act during the deployment.
  3. If a court has issued a permanent order regarding custodial responsibility before notice of deployment and the parents have requested to modify that order temporarily by agreement pursuant to part 2 of this chapter, the residence of the deploying parent is not changed by reason of the deployment for the purposes of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act.
  4. If a court in another state has issued a temporary order regarding custodial responsibility as a result of impending or current deployment, the residence of the deploying parent is not changed by reason of the deployment for the purposes of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act.
  5. This section does not prevent a court from exercising temporary emergency jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act.

Acts 2014, ch. 798, § 1.

36-7-105. Notification of pending deployment — Proposed plan for custodial responsibility during deployment.

  1. Except as otherwise provided in subsection (d) and subject to subsection (c), a deploying parent shall notify in a record the other parent of a pending deployment not later than seven (7) days after receiving notice of deployment unless reasonably prevented from doing so by the circumstances of service. If the circumstances of service prevent giving notification within the seven (7) days, the deploying parent shall give the notification as soon as reasonably possible.
  2. Except as otherwise provided in subsection (d) and subject to subsection (c), each parent shall provide in a record the other parent with a proposed plan for fulfilling that parent's share of custodial responsibility during deployment. Each parent shall provide the plan as soon as reasonably possible after notification of deployment is given under subsection (a).
  3. If a court order currently in effect prohibits disclosure of the address or contact information of the other parent, notification of deployment under subsection (a), or notification of a plan for custodial responsibility during deployment under subsection (b), may be made only to the issuing court. If the address of the other parent is available to the issuing court, the court shall forward the notification to the other parent. The court shall keep confidential the address or contact information of the other parent.
  4. Notification in a record under subsection (a) or (b) is not required if the parents are living in the same residence and both parents have actual notice of the deployment or plan.
  5. In a proceeding regarding custodial responsibility, a court may consider the reasonableness of a parent's efforts to comply with this section.

Acts 2014, ch. 798, § 1.

Cross-References. Confidentiality of public records, § 10-7-504.

36-7-106. Duty to notify of change of address.

  1. Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b), an individual to whom custodial responsibility has been granted during deployment pursuant to part 2 or 3 of this chapter shall notify the deploying parent and any other person with custodial responsibility of a child of any change of the individual's mailing address or residence until the grant is terminated. The individual shall provide the notice to any court that has issued a custody or child support order concerning the child which is in effect.
  2. If a court order currently in effect prohibits disclosure of the address or contact information of an individual to whom custodial responsibility has been granted, a notification under subsection (a) may be made only to the court that issued the order. The court shall keep confidential the mailing address or residence of the individual to whom custodial responsibility has been granted.

Acts 2014, ch. 798, § 1.

Cross-References. Confidentiality of public records, § 10-7-504.

36-7-107. Effect of past or future deployment on best interest considerations.

In a proceeding for custodial responsibility of a child of a service member, a court may not consider a parent's past deployment or possible future deployment in itself in determining the best interest of the child but may consider any significant impact on the best interest of the child of the parent's past or possible future deployment.

Acts 2014, ch. 798, § 1.

Part 2
Temporary custody agreements

36-7-201. Form of temporary agreement during deployment.

  1. The parents of a child may enter into a temporary agreement under this part granting custodial responsibility during deployment.
  2. An agreement under subsection (a) must be:
    1. In writing; and
    2. Signed by both parents and any nonparent to whom custodial responsibility is granted.
  3. Subject to subsection (d), an agreement under subsection (a), if feasible, must:
    1. Identify the destination, duration, and conditions of the deployment that is the basis for the agreement;
    2. Specify the allocation of caretaking authority among the deploying parent, the other parent, and any nonparent;
    3. Specify any decision-making authority that accompanies a grant of caretaking authority;
    4. Specify any grant of limited contact to a nonparent;
    5. If under the agreement custodial responsibility is shared by the other parent and a nonparent, or by other nonparents, provide a process to resolve any dispute that may arise;
    6. Specify the frequency, duration, and means, including electronic means, by which the deploying parent will have contact with the child, any role to be played by the other parent in facilitating the contact, and the allocation of any costs of contact;
    7. Specify the contact between the deploying parent and child during the time the deploying parent is on leave or is otherwise available;
    8. Acknowledge that any party's child-support obligation cannot be modified by the agreement, and that changing the terms of the obligation during deployment requires modification in the appropriate court;
    9. Provide that the agreement will terminate according to the procedures under part 4 of this chapter after the deploying parent returns from deployment; and
    10. Specify which parent is required to file the agreement with a court of competent jurisdiction pursuant to § 36-7-205.
  4. The omission of any of the items specified in subsection (c) does not invalidate an agreement under this section.

Acts 2014, ch. 798, § 1.

36-7-202. Nature of authority created by agreement.

  1. An agreement under this part is temporary and terminates pursuant to part 4 of this chapter after the deploying parent returns from deployment, unless the agreement has been terminated before that time by court order or modification under § 36-7-203. The agreement does not create an independent, continuing right to caretaking authority, decision-making authority, or limited contact in an individual to whom custodial responsibility is given.
  2. A nonparent who has caretaking authority, decision-making authority, or limited contact by an agreement under this part has standing to enforce the agreement until it has been terminated by court order, by modification under § 36-7-203, or under part 4 of this chapter.

Acts 2014, ch. 798, § 1.

36-7-203. Modification of agreement.

  1. By mutual consent, the parents of a child may modify an agreement regarding custodial responsibility made pursuant to this part.
  2. If an agreement is modified under subsection (a) before deployment of a deploying parent, the modification must be in writing and signed by both parents and any nonparent who will exercise custodial responsibility under the modified agreement approved by the court.
  3. If an agreement is modified under subsection (a) during deployment of a deploying parent, the modification must be agreed to in a record by both parents and any nonparent who will exercise custodial responsibility under the modified agreement approved by the court.

Acts 2014, ch. 798, § 1.

36-7-204. Grant and revocation of power of attorney.

A deploying parent, by power of attorney, may delegate all or part of custodial responsibility to an adult nonparent for the period of deployment if no other parent possesses custodial responsibility under law of this state other than this part, or if a court order currently in effect prohibits contact between the child and the other parent. The deploying parent may revoke the power of attorney by signing a revocation of the power.

Acts 2014, ch. 798, § 1.

36-7-205. Filing of agreement or power of attorney with court.

An agreement or power of attorney under this part must be filed within a reasonable time with any court that has entered an order on custodial responsibility or child support that is in effect concerning the child who is the subject of the agreement or power of attorney and shall be binding upon the parties upon approval by the court. The case number and heading of the pending case concerning custodial responsibility or child support must be provided to the court with the agreement or power of attorney.

Acts 2014, ch. 798, § 1.

Part 3
Court proceedings to obtain temporary custody order

36-7-301. “Close and substantial relationship” defined.

In this part, “close and substantial relationship” means a relationship in which a significant bond exists between a child and a nonparent.

Acts 2014, ch. 798, § 1.

36-7-302. Proceeding for temporary custody order.

  1. After a deploying parent receives notice of deployment and until the deployment terminates, a court may issue a temporary order granting custodial responsibility unless prohibited by the Service Members Civil Relief Act (50 U.S.C. Appendix Sections 521 and 522), and may not issue a permanent order granting custodial responsibility without the consent of the deploying parent.
  2. At any time after a deploying parent receives notice of deployment, either parent may file an action regarding custodial responsibility of a child during deployment. A motion must be filed in a pending proceeding for custodial responsibility in a court with jurisdiction under § 36-7-104 or, if there is no pending proceeding in a court with jurisdiction under § 36-7-104, in a new complaint for granting custodial responsibility during deployment.

Acts 2014, ch. 798, § 1.

36-7-303. Expedited hearing.

If an action to grant custodial responsibility is filed under § 36-7-302(b) before a deploying parent deploys, the court shall conduct an expedited hearing.

Acts 2014, ch. 798, § 1.

36-7-304. Testimony by electronic means.

In a proceeding under this part, a party or witness who is not reasonably available to appear personally may appear, provide testimony, and present evidence by electronic means unless the court finds good cause to require a personal appearance.

Acts 2014, ch. 798, § 1.

36-7-305. Effect of prior judicial order or agreement.

In a proceeding for a grant of custodial responsibility pursuant to this part, the following rules apply:

  1. A prior judicial order designating custodial responsibility in the event of deployment is binding on the court unless the circumstances meet the requirements of law of this state other than this chapter for modifying a judicial order regarding custodial responsibility; and
  2. The court shall enforce a prior written agreement between the parents for designating custodial responsibility in the event of deployment, including an agreement or modification executed under part 2 of this chapter, unless the court finds that the agreement is contrary to the best interest of the child.

Acts 2014, ch. 798, § 1.

36-7-306. Grant of caretaking or decision-making authority to nonparent.

  1. On motion of a deploying parent and in accordance with law of this state other than this chapter, if it is in the best interest of the child, a court may grant caretaking authority to a nonparent who is an adult family member of the child.
  2. Unless a grant of caretaking authority to a nonparent under subsection (a) is agreed to by the other parent, the grant is limited to an amount of time not greater than:
    1. The amount of time granted to the deploying parent under a permanent custody order, but the court may add unusual travel time necessary to transport the child; or
    2. In the absence of a permanent custody order that is currently in effect, the amount of time that the deploying parent habitually cared for the child before being notified of deployment, but the court may add unusual travel time necessary to transport the child.
  3. A court may grant part of a deploying parent's decision-making authority, if the deploying parent and the other parent are both unable to exercise that authority, to a nonparent who is an adult family member of the child or an adult with whom the child has a close and substantial relationship. If a court grants the authority to a nonparent, the court shall specify the decision-making powers granted, including decisions regarding the child's education, religious training, health care, extracurricular activities, and travel.

Acts 2014, ch. 798, § 1.

36-7-307. Nature of authority created by temporary custody order.

  1. A grant of authority under this part is temporary and terminates under part 4 of this chapter after the return from deployment of the deploying parent, unless the grant has been terminated before that time by court order. The grant does not create an independent, continuing right to caretaking authority, decision-making authority, or limited contact in an individual to whom it is granted.
  2. A nonparent granted caretaking authority, decision-making authority, or limited contact under this part has standing to enforce the grant until it is terminated by court order or under part 4 of this chapter.

Acts 2014, ch. 798, § 1.

36-7-308. Content of temporary custody order.

  1. An order granting custodial responsibility under this part must:
    1. Designate the order as temporary; and
    2. Identify to the extent feasible the destination, duration, and conditions of the deployment.
  2. If applicable, an order for custodial responsibility under this part must:
    1. Specify the allocation of caretaking authority, decision-making authority, or limited contact among the deploying parent, the other parent, and any nonparent;
    2. If the order divides caretaking or decision-making authority between individuals, or grants caretaking authority to one individual and limited contact to another, provide a process to resolve any dispute that may arise;
    3. Provide for liberal communication between the deploying parent and the child during deployment, including through electronic means, unless contrary to the best interest of the child, and allocate any costs of communications;
    4. Provide for liberal contact between the deploying parent and the child during the time the deploying parent is on leave or otherwise available, unless contrary to the best interest of the child; and
    5. Provide that the order will terminate pursuant to part 4 of this chapter after the deploying parent returns from deployment.

Acts 2014, ch. 798, § 1.

36-7-309. Order for child support.

If a court has issued an order granting caretaking authority under this part, or an agreement granting caretaking authority has been executed under part 2 of this chapter, the court may enter a temporary order for child support consistent with law of this state other than this chapter if the court has jurisdiction under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, compiled in chapter 5, parts 21-29 of this title.

Acts 2014, ch. 798, § 1.

36-7-310. Modifying or terminating grant of custodial responsibility to nonparent.

  1. Except for an order under § 36-7-305, except as otherwise provided in subsection (b), and consistent with the Service Members Civil Relief Act (50 U.S.C. Appendix Sections 521 and 522), on motion of a deploying or other parent or any nonparent to whom caretaking authority, decision-making authority, or limited contact has been granted, the court may modify or terminate the grant if the modification or termination is consistent with this part and it is in the best interest of the child. A modification is temporary and terminates pursuant to part 4 of this chapter after the deploying parent returns from deployment, unless the grant has been terminated before that time by court order.
  2. On motion of a deploying parent, the court shall terminate a grant of limited contact.

Acts 2014, ch. 798, § 1.

Part 4
Termination of order

36-7-401. Termination of temporary order providing for modification of child custody decree.

A temporary order entered under this chapter providing for a modification of a child custody decree shall terminate at the end of the deployment and shall revert back to the previous custody order.

Acts 2014, ch. 798, § 1.

Part 5
Applicability and construction

36-7-501. Application and construction of uniform law.

In applying and construing this uniform law, consideration must be given to the need to promote uniformity of the law with respect to its subject matter among states that enact it.

Acts 2014, ch. 798, § 1.

36-7-502. Relation to Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act.

This chapter modifies, limits, or supersedes the Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act (15 U.S.C. Section 7001 et seq.), but does not modify, limit, or supersede Section 101(c) of that act (15 U.S.C. Section 7001(c)), or authorize electronic delivery of any of the notices described in Section 103(b) of that act (15 U.S.C. Section 7003(b)).

Acts 2014, ch. 798, § 1.

36-7-503. Applicability of chapter.

This chapter does not affect the validity of a temporary court order concerning custodial responsibility during deployment which was entered before July 1, 2014.

Acts 2014, ch. 798, § 1.