tncode

Chapter 1
Qualifications and Exemptions

22-1-101. Obligation to serve — Qualifications.

It is policy of this state that all qualified citizens have an obligation to serve on petit juries or grand juries when summoned by the courts of this state, unless excused. Every person eighteen (18) years of age, being a citizen of the United States, and a resident of this state, and of the county in which the person may be summoned for jury service for a period of twelve (12) months next preceding the date of the summons, is legally qualified to act as a grand or petit juror, if not otherwise incompetent under the express provisions of this title.

Acts 2008, ch. 1159, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Former chapter 1, §§ 22-1-101 — 22-1-107 (Code 1858, §§ 4002 (deriv. Acts 1809 (Sept.), ch. 119, § 2; 1835-1836, ch. 6, § 8), 4004, 4003 (deriv. Acts 1835-1836, ch. 68, § 1), 4005 (deriv. Acts 1805, ch. 20, §§ 1, 2; 1831, ch. 103, § 10), 4006 (deriv. Acts 1809 (Sept.), ch. 107, § 1), 4007, 4008 (deriv. Acts 1779 (Oct.), ch. 6, § 11); impl. am. Acts 1867-1868, ch. 31, § 1; Acts 1877, ch. 52, § 1; 1887, ch. 211, § 1; 1897, ch. 112, § 5; 1903, ch. 38, § 1; 1909, ch. 400, § 125; Shan., §§ 5813-5819; Acts 1919, ch. 79, § 1; Code 1932, §§ 10006, 10007, 10009-10012, 10014; Acts 1951, ch. 71, § 4; 1973, ch. 76, § 1; Acts 1977, ch. 197, § 1; 1979, ch. 416, § 1, 3; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), §§ 22-101 — 22-107; Code 1932, § 10007; Acts 1987, ch. 37, §§ 1-4; 1989, ch. 591, § 119; 1991, ch. 215, § 1; 1993, ch. 309, §§ 2-4; Acts 1994, ch. 785, § 1; 1996, ch. 690, § 1), concerning qualifications and exemptions, was repealed by Acts 2008, ch. 1159, § 1, effective January 1, 2009.

Effective Dates. Acts 2008, ch. 1159, § 9. January 1, 2009.

Law Reviews.

Criminal Procedure—Juror Misconduct and Bias—Assessing the Prejudicial Effect of Extra-Judicial Communications by Jurors in a Technologically Advanced Society, 82 Tenn. L. Rev. 253 (2014).

What Jurors Want to Know: Motivating Juror Cognition to Increase Legal Knowledge & Improve Decisionmaking, 81 Tenn. L. Rev. 752 (2014).

Attorney General Opinions. Qualifying jurors and assigning jury-service dates online, OAG 14-64, 2014 Tenn. AG Lexis 67 (6/25/14)

Textbooks. Tennessee Criminal Practice and Procedure (Raybin), §§ 9.13, 16.28, 25.45.

Tennessee Forms (Robinson, Ramsey and Harwell), No. 3-6-6.

Tennessee Jurisprudence, 1 Tenn. Juris., Aliens, §§ 3, 9; 14 Tenn. Juris., Grand Jury, §§ 3, 5; 17 Tenn. Juris., Jury, §§ 2, 13.

Law Reviews.

Picking a Jury: Who Are You Talking To? 67 Tenn. L. Rev. 517 (2000).

Symposium, Communicating with Juries, 67 Tenn. L. Rev. 517 (2000).

The Tennessee Court Systems — The Jury System, 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 489.

Theology in the Jury Room: Religious Discussion as “Extra Material” in the Course of Capital Punishment Deliberations, 55 Vand. L. Rev. 127 (2002).

Attorney General Opinions. A juvenile may not serve on a jury in Tennessee, OAG 04-146 (9/02/04).

There is no conflict in the same person acting as both the grand jury foreperson and the security officer for the general sessions court in the same count, OAG 05-162 (10/20/05).

Comparative Legislation. Qualifications and exemptions of jurors:

Ala. Code § 12-16-1 et seq.; § 12-16-55 et seq.

Ark. Code § 16-31-101 et seq.

Ga. O.C.G.A. § 15-12-20 et seq.

Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 29A.010 et seq.

Miss. Code Ann. §§ 13-5-1, 13-5-23, 13-5-25.

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 494.400.

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 9-1 et seq.

Va. Code § 8.01-337 et seq.

Cited: State v. Hester, 324 S.W.3d 1, 2010 Tenn. LEXIS 897 (Tenn. Oct. 5, 2010).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Citizenship — Necessity.

Second defendant's convictions for facilitation of first-degree murder and aggravated child abuse were appropriate because T.C.A. § 22-1-101's requirement that jurors be United States citizens does not violate the Tennessee Constitution. State v. Gomez, — S.W.3d —, 2010 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 752 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 10, 2010), rev'd, 367 S.W.3d 237, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 291 (Tenn. Apr. 24, 2012).

Decisions Under Prior Law

1. In General.

The fair-cross-section principle must have much leeway in its application. The states remain free to prescribe relevant qualifications for their jurors and to provide reasonable exemption so long as it may be fairly stated that the jury list or panels are representative of the community. State v. Bell, 745 S.W.2d 858, 1988 Tenn. LEXIS 24 (Tenn. 1988).

2. Time for Objection to Juror.

Objection for want of qualification of a juror propter defectum, must be made before the swearing of the jury. Ward v. State, 20 Tenn. 253, 1839 Tenn. LEXIS 44 (1839); Calhoun v. State, 23 Tenn. 477, 1844 Tenn. LEXIS 143 (1844); Goodal v. Thurman, 38 Tenn. 209, 1858 Tenn. LEXIS 156 (1858); Draper v. State, 63 Tenn. 246, 1874 Tenn. LEXIS 239 (1874); Cartwright v. State, 80 Tenn. 620, 1883 Tenn. LEXIS 214 (1883); Hamilton v. State, 101 Tenn. 417, 47 S.W. 695, 1898 Tenn. LEXIS 83 (1898); Givens v. State, 103 Tenn. 648, 55 S.W. 1107, 1899 Tenn. LEXIS 143 (1899); Goad v. State, 106 Tenn. 175, 61 S.W. 79, 1900 Tenn. LEXIS 146 (1900); Walker v. State, 118 Tenn. 375, 99 S.W. 366, 1906 Tenn. LEXIS 104 (1906); Williams v. United States, 3 F.2d 933, 1925 U.S. App. LEXIS 3838 (6th Cir. 1925).

3. Citizenship — Necessity.

A juror must be a citizen, and a person of foreign birth who has not been naturalized is not a competent juror. Norfleet v. State, 36 Tenn. 340, 1857 Tenn. LEXIS 7 (1857).

4. Effect on Private Acts.

This section affects citizens in their private capacity rather than the county in its governmental capacity so that Private Acts 1911, ch. 115 permitting only men to serve on the grand jury in Chester County was repealed by necessary implication in absence of good reason why women should not be permitted to serve in that county. Pierce v. State, 204 Tenn. 14, 315 S.W.2d 271, 1958 Tenn. LEXIS 240 (1958).

5. Exclusion of Qualified Persons.

Where nothing had occurred to necessitate refilling of the jury box, there was no systematic exclusion of otherwise qualified voters from defendant's grand jury. Shadden v. State, 488 S.W.2d 54, 1972 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 313 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1972), cert. denied, Shadden v. Tennessee, 411 U.S. 909, 93 S. Ct. 1538, 36 L. Ed. 2d 199, 1973 U.S. LEXIS 2958 (1973).

6. Number of Women Required.

A fair representation of women on the jury in a criminal case is all that is required by the federal constitution. State v. Strouth, 620 S.W.2d 467, 1981 Tenn. LEXIS 473 (Tenn. 1981), cert. denied, Strouth v. Tennessee, 455 U.S. 983, 102 S. Ct. 1491, 71 L. Ed. 2d 692, 1982 U.S. LEXIS 1099 (1982).

7. Prejudice Must Be Shown.

The failure of an applicant for habeas corpus relief to raise before trial his challenges to the respective make-ups of the grand jury which indicted him and the trial jury which convicted him constituted a waiver of his objections thereto, where the applicant claimed no actual prejudice caused him by either of those make-ups. Cagle v. Davis, 520 F. Supp. 297, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16804 (E.D. Tenn. 1980), aff'd without opinion, 663 F.2d 1070, 1981 U.S. App. LEXIS 11414 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1981).

Collateral References. 47 Am. Jur. 2d Jury §§ 27, 28, 128-135, 189, 190, 194.

50 C.J.S. Juries §§ 134-154.

Deafness of juror as ground for impeaching verdict. 38 A.L.R.4th 1170.

Former jeopardy where jury discharged because of nonresidence. 38 A.L.R. 716.

Intelligence or character, test of qualifications of juror. 126 A.L.R. 507.

Validity of enactment requiring juror to be an elector or voter or have qualifications thereof. 78 A.L.R.3d 1147.

Prejudical effect of juror's inability to comprehend English. 117 A.L.R.5th 1.

Validity of requirement or practice of selecting prospective jurors exclusively from list of registered voters. 80 A.L.R.3d 869.

Women as jurors. 157 A.L.R. 461.

Jury 38.

22-1-102. Incompetent persons.

The following persons are incompetent to act as jurors:

Persons convicted of a felony or any other infamous offense in a court of competent jurisdiction; or
Persons convicted of perjury or subornation of perjury.

Acts 2008, ch. 1159, § 1.

Effective Dates. Acts 2008, ch. 1159, § 9. January 1, 2009.

Cross-References. Disqualifications of conspirators, § 40-12-102.

Textbooks. Tennessee Criminal Practice and Procedure (Raybin), §§ 25.45, 25.59.

Tennessee Jurisprudence, 17 Tenn. Juris., Jury, § 32.

Law Reviews.

Tennessee Civil Disabilities: A Systemic Approach (Neil P. Cohen), 41 Tenn. L. Rev. 253.

The Tennessee Court Systems — The Jury System, 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 489.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

2. Convicted Felons.

Because the eligibility of the grand jury foreman was not a jurisdictional element necessary for a constitutionally valid indictment, the fact that the foreman had a prior felony conviction was not a cognizable ground for relief under post-conviction Johnson v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 724 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 24, 2014), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 978 (Tenn. Nov. 19, 2014).

Decisions Under Prior Law

1. Representation of Distinct Groups to Be Preserved.

Once a cross-sectionally fair master list is compiled, the jury commissioners are free to delete the names of those persons who are known to be disqualified to serve under this section or unqualified under former § 22-2-302(a), as long as such deletions do not result in the exclusion of a “distinct” group in the community. State v. Nelson, 603 S.W.2d 158, 1980 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 284 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1980).

2. Convicted Felons.

Former § 22-2-302 required that the board of jury commissioners shall select the names of persons to serve as jurors from a list of names of upright and intelligent persons known for their integrity, fair character and sound judgment who are otherwise legally qualified to serve as jurors. The state has elected to exclude convicted felons from that category. State v. Bell, 745 S.W.2d 858, 1988 Tenn. LEXIS 24 (Tenn. 1988).

Collateral References. 47 Am. Jur. 2d Jury §§ 189, 194.

50 C.J.S. Juries §§ 135, 142, 153.

Criminal charge or conviction as disqualifying juror. 126 A.L.R. 518.

Disqualification or exemption of juror for conviction of, or prosecution for, criminal offense. 75 A.L.R.5th 295.

Governing law as to existence or character of offense for which one has been convicted in a federal court or court of another state, as bearing upon disqualification to sit on jury. 175 A.L.R. 805.

Prejudical effect of juror's inability to comprehend English. 117 A.L.R.5th 1.

Removal by executive of disqualification resulting from conviction of crime as applicable in case of conviction in federal court or court of another state. 135 A.L.R. 1493.

22-1-103. Excuse from service — Undue or extreme physical or financial hardship — Documentation — Permanent excuse.

Any person may be excused from serving as a juror if the prospective juror has a mental or physical condition that causes that person to be incapable of performing jury service. The juror, or the juror's personal representative, must provide the court with documentation from a physician licensed to practice medicine, verifying that a mental or physical condition renders the person unfit for jury service.
Any person, when summoned to jury duty, may be excused upon a showing that the person's service will constitute an undue or extreme physical or financial hardship to the prospective juror or a person under the prospective juror's care or supervision.
1. A judge of the court for which the prospective juror was called to jury service shall make undue or extreme physical or financial hardship determinations unless a judge of that court delegates this authority to the jury coordinator. In the event this authority is not delegated to the jury coordinator, a judge of the court may authorize the jury coordinator to make initial inquiries and recommendations concerning such requests.
2. A person asking to be excused based on a finding of undue or extreme physical or financial hardship shall take all actions necessary to have obtained a ruling on that request by no later than the date on which the person is scheduled to appear for jury duty.
3. Undue or extreme physical or financial hardship does not exist solely based on the fact that a prospective juror will be required to be absent from that prospective juror's place of employment.
4. A person requesting an excuse based on undue or extreme physical or financial hardship shall be required to provide the judge with income tax returns, medical statements from licensed physicians, proof of dependency or guardianship, an affidavit stating that the person is unable to obtain an appropriate substitute caregiver during the period of participation in the jury pool or on the jury, or similar documentation that the judge finds to clearly support the request to be excused. Failure to provide satisfactory documentation may result in a denial of the request to be excused.
5. As used in this section, “undue or extreme physical or financial hardship” is limited to circumstances in which a prospective juror would:
  1. Be required to abandon a person under the juror's personal care or supervision due to the impossibility of obtaining an appropriate substitute caregiver during the period of participation in the jury pool or on the jury;
  2. Incur costs that would have a substantial adverse impact on the payment of the juror's necessary daily living expenses or on those for whom the juror provides the principal means of support;
  3. Suffer physical hardship that would result in illness or disease; or
  4. Be deprived of compensation due to the fact that the prospective juror works out-of-state and the out-of-state employer is unwilling to compensate the juror pursuant to § 22-4-106 or that the prospective juror is employed by an employer who is not required to compensate jurors pursuant to § 22-4-106 and declines to do so voluntarily.
Documents submitted pursuant to this section shall be maintained by the jury coordinator during the jury service term, but may be destroyed thereafter. These documents are not public records and shall not be disclosed, except pursuant to a court order; however, the jury coordinator shall maintain a list of members of the jury pool who were excused pursuant to this section, and that information shall be made available upon request.
A person excused from jury service pursuant to this section becomes eligible for qualification as a juror following the period ordered by the court, which shall not exceed twenty-four (24) months. A person is excused from jury service permanently only when the deciding judge determines that the underlying grounds for being excused are of a permanent nature.

Acts 2008, ch. 1159, § 1.

Effective Dates. Acts 2008, ch. 1159, § 9. January 1, 2009.

Cross-References. Confidentiality of public records, § 10-7-504.

Textbooks. Tennessee Criminal Practice and Procedure (Raybin), § 25.43.

Tennessee Jurisprudence, 14 Tenn. Juris., Grand Jury, §§ 3, 5; 17 Tenn. Juris., Jury, § 14.

Law Reviews.

Jury Duty (Donald F. Paine), 44 No. 12 Tenn. B.J. 32 (2008).

Jury Reform in Tennessee, 34 U. Mem. L. Rev. 1 (2003).

The Tennessee Court Systems — The Jury System, 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 489.

Attorney General Opinions. Blind or deaf persons serving on juries, OAG 87-86 (5/13/87).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

Statutory exemptions did not infringe on petitioner's right to a jury composed of a fair cross section of the community because the United States Supreme Court has authorized States to exempt citizens from jury service. Van Tran v. Bell, — F. Supp. 2d —, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146189 (W.D. Tenn. Sept. 30, 2010).

Decisions Under Prior Law

1. Constitutionality.

Since the federal employees cannot necessarily be equated with federal office holders and since defendant failed to demonstrate the exclusion of cognizable groups, this section does not create an unrepresentative jury for the purposes of U.S. Const., amends. 6, 14. Honeycutt v. State, 544 S.W.2d 912, 1976 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 339 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1976).

Capital defendant failed to establish a prima facie violation of U.S. Const. amend. VI, on the basis of the potential exclusion of large numbers of college-educated individuals from juries under this section. State v. Heck Van Tran, 864 S.W.2d 465, 1993 Tenn. LEXIS 343 (Tenn. 1993), rehearing denied, 1993 Tenn. LEXIS 383 (Tenn. 1993), cert. denied, Heck Van Tran v. Tennessee, 511 U.S. 1046, 114 S. Ct. 1577, 128 L. Ed. 2d 220, 1994 U.S. LEXIS 3111 (1994).

2. Strict Construction of Exemption.

Statutes exonerating individuals from the common burdens imposed on citizens generally must be strictly construed. Shoregere v. White, 1 Shan. 90 (1858).

It was error for county commissioners to systematically exclude from the jury pool candidates that met the exemption requirements of former T.C.A. § 22-1-103, because the exemptions were personal and needed to be claimed by the prospective juror; however, the error did not translate into an error of constitutional magnitude in defendant's case. State v. Daniel, — S.W.3d —, 2006 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 834 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 30, 2006), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 291 (Tenn. 2007).

3. Charter Exemptions — Invalidity.

Where a charter of a corporation attempts to exempt its officers and employees, it is an unconstitutional provision. Neely v. State, 72 Tenn. 316, 1880 Tenn. LEXIS 19 (1880).

4. Licensed Attorney Not Practicing.

A person who was licensed as an attorney, but who does not follow the profession of law as his vocation, is not exempt from serving. Wheatley v. State, 79 Tenn. 262, 1883 Tenn. LEXIS 53 (1883).

5. Person Entitled to Claim Exemption.

Conviction will not be overruled on ground that one of the indicting grand jurors was a minister and therefore exempt from jury service under this section since the exemption is personal to the individual, to be claimed or waived by him alone. East v. State, 197 Tenn. 644, 277 S.W.2d 361, 1955 Tenn. LEXIS 330 (1955).

The exemptions in this section are personal to the individual, to be claimed or waived by such person alone, so that jury commission was incorrect in removing on its own initiative the names of both black and white teachers and ministers, although that technicality did not amount to the systematic exclusion of blacks from the jury list. Smith v. State, 566 S.W.2d 553, 1978 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 298 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978).

The exemptions provided by statute, such as this section, are personal, to be claimed by or waived by the prospective jurors who are entitled to them; thus, the jury commission was wrong in removing occupationally exempt persons on its own initiative. Cooper v. State, 847 S.W.2d 521, 1992 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 484 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992).

6. Persons Over 65.

The exemption of jurors over 65 years of age does not result in a significant underrepresentation of an identifiable segment of society. State v. Blunt, 708 S.W.2d 415, 1985 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 3275 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1985).

Trial court did not err in applying the statutory disability exemption to excuse prospective jurors from jury service to a prospective juror who had recently undergone cataract surgery. The court further did not err in excusing prospective jurors who were over the age of 65, including a 79-year-old prospective juror who had no transportation but was willing to walk to the courthouse each day. State v. Hester, — S.W.3d —, 2009 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 363 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 5, 2009), aff'd, 324 S.W.3d 1, 2010 Tenn. LEXIS 897 (Tenn. Oct. 5, 2010).

7. Court's Motion to Exclude Jurors.

There was no constitutional error in the court's exclusion of certain occupationally exempt jurors on its own motion; thus, the petitioner did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel for counsel's failure to raise this issue. Cooper v. State, 847 S.W.2d 521, 1992 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 484 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992).

8. Local Acts.

Although defendant's contention that Hamilton County had exceeded the population range set forth in a local act was correct, the act remained applicable to Hamilton County, exempting it from general jury law under this chapter. State v. Boyd, 867 S.W.2d 330, 1992 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 92 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992).

Collateral References. 47 Am. Jur. 2d Jury §§ 81, 82.

50 C.J.S. Juries § 153.

Jury 55, 56.

22-1-104. Disqualification by interest or relationship.

No person may act as a juror in any case in which the person is interested, or in which either of the parties is connected with the person by affinity or consanguinity, within the sixth degree, as computed by the civil law, except by consent of all parties.

Acts 2008, ch. 1159, § 1.

Effective Dates. Acts 2008, ch. 1159, § 9. January 1, 2009.

Textbooks. Tennessee Criminal Practice and Procedure (Raybin), §§ 25.45, 25.55.

Tennessee Forms (Robinson, Ramsey and Harwell), Nos. 3-6-3, 3-6-4, 3-6-6.

Tennessee Jurisprudence, 14 Tenn. Juris., Grand Jury, § 5; 17 Tenn. Juris., Jury, §§ 14, 23, 32.

Law Reviews.

Criminal Law and Procedure (William D. Warren), 6 Vand. L. Rev. 1179.

Selecting A Trial Jury In Tennessee, 22 Tenn. L. Rev. 220.

The Tennessee Court Systems — The Jury System, 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 489.

Theology in the Jury Room: Religious Discussion as “Extra Material” in the Course of Capital Punishment Deliberations, 55 Vand. L. Rev. 127 (2002).

Trial — Intimating that Defendant Has Liability Insurance, 15 Tenn. L. Rev. 831.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Decisions Under Prior Law

1. Jurors Covered.

The section is applicable to both grand and petit jurors. State v. Chairs, 68 Tenn. 196, 1877 Tenn. LEXIS 16 (1877).

The impartial jury guaranteed by constitutional provisions is one which is of impartial frame of mind at the beginning of trial, is influenced only by legal and competent evidence produced during trial, and bases its verdict upon evidence connecting defendant with the commission of the crime charged. State v. Lawson, 794 S.W.2d 363, 1990 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 299 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990), appeal denied, — S.W.2d —, 1990 Tenn. LEXIS 259 (Tenn. July 2, 1990).

2. Affinity.

3. —Affinity Lacking — Example.

The fact that the sons of the juror's present wife, by a former marriage, were second cousins of the deceased, does not disqualify the juror on a trial for murder. Moses v. State, 30 Tenn. 232, 1850 Tenn. LEXIS 101 (1850).

A juror is not disqualified by the fact that he is related to one of the counsel in the case. Partin v. Henderson, 686 S.W.2d 587, 1984 Tenn. App. LEXIS 3380 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984) (related within sixth degree).

4. —Dissolution of Affinity.

Relationship by affinity is dissolved by dissolution of the marriage by which the relationship was created. A juror whose wife is dead is competent, although by his marriage he was related to one of the parties to the suit within the prohibited degree. Goodal v. Thurman, 38 Tenn. 209, 1858 Tenn. LEXIS 156 (1858); Wilson v. State, 100 Tenn. 596, 46 S.W. 451, 1898 Tenn. LEXIS 21, 66 Am. St. Rep. 789 (1898).

5. —Related Juror — Passing to Accused as Error.

If a juror is related within the prohibited degree to the defendant, as where the juror is a second cousin to the wife of the defendant, it is error to pass him to the accused for election or challenge. Parrish v. State, 80 Tenn. 655, 1883 Tenn. LEXIS 222 (1883); Hamilton v. State, 101 Tenn. 417, 47 S.W. 695, 1898 Tenn. LEXIS 83 (1898).

6. —Unknown to Juror — Effect.

Disqualification due to relationship does not annul verdict, if the relationship is unknown to the parties. Nashville, C. & S. L. Ry. v. Williams, 164 Tenn. 144, 46 S.W.2d 815, 1931 Tenn. LEXIS 21 (1932).

Bias of a juror ignorant of the relationship to one of the parties cannot be presumed. Nashville, C. & S. L. Ry. v. Williams, 164 Tenn. 144, 46 S.W.2d 815, 1931 Tenn. LEXIS 21 (1932).

Where neither plaintiff nor juror was aware of relationship within sixth degree it was not reversible error for court to sustain judgment for plaintiff. Sutherland v. Keen, 29 Tenn. App. 303, 203 S.W.2d 917, 1947 Tenn. App. LEXIS 72 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1947).

Where there was a fifth degree relationship by affinity between one of the jurors and the prosecuting witness, and where the juror had no knowledge of her relationship to such witness at the time she was seated and did not learn of the relationship until after the trial was completed, no prejudice to the defendant could be shown and defendant's motion for a new trial was denied. Murphy v. State, 560 S.W.2d 414, 1977 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 310 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1977).

7. —Sixth Degree.

Where plaintiff and juror were descendants of common great grandparents they were related within degree prohibited by this section. Sutherland v. Keen, 29 Tenn. App. 303, 203 S.W.2d 917, 1947 Tenn. App. LEXIS 72 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1947).

8. Interest.

The fact that a rape victim was a student at Middle Tennessee University and was abducted from its campus did not, by itself, disqualify from jury service a teacher at the university or one of the jurors whose wife worked there. Smith v. State, 566 S.W.2d 553, 1978 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 298 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978).

Juror bias must be shown, not just suspected. State v. Lawson, 794 S.W.2d 363, 1990 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 299 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990), appeal denied, — S.W.2d —, 1990 Tenn. LEXIS 259 (Tenn. July 2, 1990).

Refusal to strike a prospective juror, a deputy sheriff, constituted reversible error, because: (1) The juror was a subordinate employee of a captain, whose deposition was read into evidence; (2) The nature of the case involved an assault upon a law enforcement officer; (3) The juror was personally acquainted with the officer; and (4) The juror served on the jury as its foreman while in full uniform and with sidearm. State v. Pamplin, 138 S.W.3d 283, 2003 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1077 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003).

9. —Members of Disputing Churches.

In actions between trustees of different religious denominations, involving the right of the possession of lands, the members of each denomination are, by reason of interest, incompetent. Cleage v. Hyden, 53 Tenn. 73, 1871 Tenn. LEXIS 319 (1871).

10. —Disqualification Propter Affectum.

Tennessee Constitution guarantees every defendant a trial by a jury free of a “disqualification propter affectum” which is a bias or partiality toward one side. Toombs v. State, 197 Tenn. 229, 270 S.W.2d 649, 1954 Tenn. LEXIS 475 (1954).

Where friendly relations existed between prosecutor and juror and juror was first cousin of prosecutor's wife and defendants did not learn of this relationship until after return of verdict, juror's disqualification was “disqualification propter affectum” rather than “disqualification propter defectum,” and defendants were entitled to a new trial. Toombs v. State, 197 Tenn. 229, 270 S.W.2d 649, 1954 Tenn. LEXIS 475 (1954).

11. Concealment by Juror.

Incompetency of a juror is ground for new trial when discovered after verdict, where he denied or concealed ground of his incompetency on voir dire provided accused was misled or prejudiced by such denial or concealment. Toombs v. State, 197 Tenn. 229, 270 S.W.2d 649, 1954 Tenn. LEXIS 475 (1954).

12. Waiver.

The disqualification of a juror due to a prohibitive relationship between the juror and the prosecuting witness was deemed waived since no objection was entered prior to the swearing of the jury, despite the fact that the defendant had no knowledge of the defect at the time of the jury's selection. Murphy v. State, 560 S.W.2d 414, 1977 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 310 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1977).

A disqualification propter defectum is deemed waived if no objection is entered prior to the swearing in of the jury. State v. Elrod, 721 S.W.2d 820, 1986 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 2729 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1986).

Defendant waived any objection to a juror based on relationship of the juror to the victim where the defendant failed to object during the jury selection process. State v. Brock, 940 S.W.2d 577, 1996 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 169 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996).

13. Excuse of Juror Proper.

Trial court did not err in excusing prospective jurors based upon information that they provided to the trial court either in writing or in person, including information that they had previously scheduled vacation or work-related trips, that a prospective juror's physician deemed him unable to serve because he had recently been released from an extended hospital stay following surgery for pancreatic cancer, and that a prospective juror was hard of hearing, took medication on a daily basis, and was a friend of the murder victim. State v. Hester, — S.W.3d —, 2009 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 363 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 5, 2009), aff'd, 324 S.W.3d 1, 2010 Tenn. LEXIS 897 (Tenn. Oct. 5, 2010).

Trial court did not err in excusing prospective jurors based upon a finding that jury service would constitute a personal hardship in view of their respective employment situations where one prospective juror was primarily responsible for his dairy farming operations and only had one dairyman to assist him in milking 200 cows, a second prospective juror was responsible for 300 head of cattle with only his wife to help him, a third was his company's only sales representative in the area, was paid on commission, and made about 18 sales calls a day, a fourth was the only employee in the dental laboratory where he worked, a fifth had recently obtained a job that required him to work out-of-town five days a week, and a sixth was self-employed as a backhoe operator and had work scheduled. State v. Hester, — S.W.3d —, 2009 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 363 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 5, 2009), aff'd, 324 S.W.3d 1, 2010 Tenn. LEXIS 897 (Tenn. Oct. 5, 2010).

Trial court acted within its discretion in excusing prospective jurors from jury service based upon medical conditions including anxiety, depression, behavioral health issues, bipolar disorder, and memory problems. The court further did not err in excusing three community college students who advised the court that jury duty could conflict with their ability to attend classes, take examinations, or keep up with their assignments. State v. Hester, — S.W.3d —, 2009 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 363 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 5, 2009), aff'd, 324 S.W.3d 1, 2010 Tenn. LEXIS 897 (Tenn. Oct. 5, 2010).

Collateral References. 47 Am. Jur. 2d Jury §§ 192, 193, 195-197, 200-208, 212.

50 C.J.S. Juries §§ 208, 217, 218.

Competency of juror as affected by his membership in cooperative association interested in the case. 69 A.L.R.3d 1296.

Disqualification, as jurors, of residents or taxpayers of litigating political subdivision, in absence of specific controlling statute. 81 A.L.R.2d 708.

Dissolution of marriage as affecting disqualifying relationship by affinity in case of juror. 117 A.L.R. 800.

Former jeopardy where jury discharged because of relationship of juror. 38 A.L.R. 711.

Implied bias or interest because of relationship to one who would be subject to challenge for that reason, challenge of proposed juror for. 86 A.L.R. 118.

Juror's voir dire denial or nondisclosure of acquaintance or relationship with attorney in case, or with partner or associate of such attorney, as ground for new trial or mistrial. 64 A.L.R.3d 126.

Prosecutor or witness for prosecution, relationship to, as disqualifying juror in criminal case. 18 A.L.R. 375.

Relationship to one financially affected by offense charged as disqualifying juror. 63 A.L.R. 183.

Similarity of occupation between proposed juror and alleged victim of crime as affecting juror's competency. 71 A.L.R.3d 974.

Jury 90, 91.

22-1-105. Discharge of unqualified jurors — Reasonable or proper cause.

A court may discharge from service a grand or petit juror who does not possess the requisite qualifications, or who is disqualified from such service, or for any other reasonable or proper cause, to be judged by the court. That a state of mind exists on the juror's part that will prevent the juror from acting impartially shall constitute such cause.

Acts 2008, ch. 1159, § 1.

Effective Dates. Acts 2008, ch. 1159, § 9. January 1, 2009.

Textbooks. Tennessee Criminal Practice and Procedure (Raybin), §§ 25.20, 25.43, 25.56.

Tennessee Forms (Robinson, Ramsey and Harwell), No. 3-6-6.

Tennessee Jurisprudence, 17 Tenn. Juris., Jury, §§ 19, 22, 25, 30.

Law Reviews.

Selecting A Trial Jury In Tennessee, 22 Tenn. L. Rev. 220.

Tennessee Civil Disabilities: A Systemic Approach (Neil P. Cohen), 41 Tenn. L. Rev. 253.

The Tennessee Court Systems — The Jury System, 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 489.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Accepted Juror.

Trial court did not err by refusing to dismiss a juror for cause based upon the juror's position as a civilian employee of the police department, familiarity with the case, and the fact that the juror made financial contributions to a fund established to cover the victim's medical bills because the juror stated that neither the job nor the financial contribution to the recovery fund would prevent the juror from deciding the case on the evidence presented at trial. State v. Soller, — S.W.3d —, 2010 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 472 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 9, 2010), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2011 Tenn. LEXIS 68 (Tenn. Jan. 13, 2011).

Trial court did not err in refusing to excuse a juror for cause; despite initially stating that he was inclined to believe the defendant was guilty based on what the lawyers said during voir dire, the juror stated in answer to the trial court's questions that he understood that what the lawyers said was not evidence and that he could decide the case solely on the evidence. State v. Goode, — S.W.3d —, 2010 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 970 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 17, 2010), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2011 Tenn. LEXIS 397 (Tenn. Apr. 13, 2011).

Court did not err by dismissing a potential juror for cause and failing to dismiss another juror for cause because the first juror stated that she might have trouble sitting in judgment of defendant, and it was within the trial court's discretion to disqualify her from the panel. Regarding the other juror, although his answers during voir dire demonstrated that he was frustrated by the repeated burglaries of his home and that he did not believe the police were going to help him, he never said he believed people arrested for burglaries in general were probably guilty. State v. Graves, — S.W.3d —, 2011 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 91 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 8, 2011), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2011 Tenn. LEXIS 508 (Tenn. May 27, 2011).

Defendant failed to establish a prima facie case of juror bias because defendant, who was accused of tampering with the evidence by deleting photos from the cell phone of adult's adult child, did not clearly establish that a juror, who was friends on Facebook with the child, a fellow musician, and had heard people talk about the child's case, actually knew and recognized defendant's child, let alone that the juror had any prejudice against defendant. State v. Christie, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 960 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 30, 2016).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a change in venue under T.C.A. § 22-1-105; the jurors who heard about his case were extensively questioned about their knowledge of the case and their ability to impartially consider the proof, and defendant failed to establish that any of the jurors who rendered a verdict in his case were prejudiced by the publicity surrounding his case. State v. Pearman, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 372 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 11, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 615 (Tenn. Sept. 21, 2017).

2. Discharge for Cause Proper.

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in discharging a juror for cause under T.C.A. § 22-1-105 as the juror had informed the trial court, immediately after the trial court dismissed the remaining jury pool but before swearing in and empaneling the fourteen prospective jurors, that she and her husband had been involved in an incident with the police department that undermined her confidence in some police officers and expressed her concern that this incident would affect her judgment as a juror, in that she would not be able to accept a police officer's testimony. State v. Hill, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 115 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 11, 2013).

3. No Prejudice Shown.

Record did not establish any actual prejudice on the part of an alternate juror, as it was not clearly established that she actually knew defendant, plus defendant did not question her about it when given the chance, she said she could be impartial, she did not sit on the jury that convicted defendant, and he did not present any proof that the jury was not fair and impartial. State v. Burrows, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 21 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 12, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 364 (Tenn. May 6, 2016).

4. Presumption of Partiality.

Record did not clearly establish that one juror actually knew and recognized defendant, and no proof existed of the actual existence of such an opinion in the mind of the juror as will have raised the presumption of partiality, and thus defendant was not entitled to relief in this regard. State v. Seiber, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 137 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 23, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 421 (Tenn. June 23, 2016).

Decisions Under Prior Law

1. Discharge of Juror Before Sworn.

2. —Discretion.

Pending the selection of the jury, and before the jurors had been charged with the trial of the prisoner, two of them were discharged by the court, one for intoxication and the other for sudden severe illness of his wife, both with the consent of the district attorney and the prisoner. In this there was no error. Nolen v. State, 39 Tenn. 520, 1859 Tenn. LEXIS 266 (1859).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion when it removed a prospective juror who expressed his concern that his close relationship with his co-worker, whose son was on trial for murder, might affect his judgment in defendant's case and who indicated that serving as a juror would make him uncomfortable at his place of employment. State v. Schmeiderer, — S.W.3d —, 2009 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 282 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 9, 2009), aff'd, 319 S.W.3d 607, 2010 Tenn. LEXIS 865 (Tenn. 2010).

3. —Juror Excluded Without Cause.

Trial court committed reversible error in discharging juror who was qualified where state had exhausted its peremptory challenges. Vines v. State, 190 Tenn. 644, 231 S.W.2d 332, 1950 Tenn. LEXIS 531 (1950).

That juror expressed disagreement with the law is not sufficient cause for dismissal; rather, it should be determined that the juror cannot or will not follow the law before he or she is disqualified. Brazelton v. State, 550 S.W.2d 7, 1974 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 244 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1974).

4. —Accepted Juror.

Where, after the juror has been selected, he informs the court that he is a minor, or where it appears that he is otherwise incompetent, as where he is guilty of improper conduct after his selection, the court may discharge such juror, even in a criminal case, before the jury has been sworn. Hines v. State, 27 Tenn. 597, 1848 Tenn. LEXIS 3 (1848), overruled, State v. McKay, 680 S.W.2d 447, 1984 Tenn. LEXIS 942 (Tenn. 1984), overruled in part, State v. McKay, 680 S.W.2d 447, 1984 Tenn. LEXIS 951 (Tenn. 1984); Lewis v. State, 40 Tenn. 127, 1859 Tenn. LEXIS 38 (1859); Griffee v. State, 69 Tenn. 41, 1878 Tenn. LEXIS 38 (1878); Taylor v. State, 79 Tenn. 708, 1883 Tenn. LEXIS 130 (1883); Boyd v. State, 82 Tenn. 161, 1884 Tenn. LEXIS 117 (1884).

Court did not err by failing to excuse a juror when it was discovered that her brother was formerly married to one of the witnesses for the plaintiff because the appellant failed to establish by convincing evidence that the court's action was erroneous; the juror stated she could be fair to both sides and the fact that she knew a witness would not cause her to favor one side or the other. Thompson v. City of Lavergne, — S.W.3d —, 2005 Tenn. App. LEXIS 718 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 16, 2005), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 360 (Tenn. Apr. 24, 2006).

In defendant's felony murder case, the trial court did not err by denying defendant's challenges for cause to three jurors because the trial court was satisfied with the jurors' answers when questioned, and allowing the jurors to remain on the jury was within the trial court's discretion. State v. Tallant, — S.W.3d —, 2008 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 21 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 14, 2008), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2008 Tenn. LEXIS 449 (Tenn. June 30, 2008).

5. —Reexamination of Others.

Proper practice where incompetent jurors are discharged before the jury is sworn is to refuse to discharge the other jurors who, upon reexamination, are found to be uncontaminated by their association with the discharged jurors. Ellis v. State, 92 Tenn. 85, 20 S.W. 500, 1892 Tenn. LEXIS 54 (1892).

6. —Evidence of Disqualification.

The court's discharge of an accepted juror, before the jury had been sworn, upon the charge that he was a “whitecap,” is justified by proof of a general rumor that the juror was a “whitecap,” which he did not offer to contradict or disprove. Such testimony was properly heard under § 40-12-102, and a discharge was properly made under this section. Jenkins v. State, 99 Tenn. 569, 42 S.W. 263, 1897 Tenn. LEXIS 67 (1897).

7. —Recall of Unsworn Juror.

A juror may be discharged for his persistently refusing to be sworn, but such discharged juror cannot be recalled and forced on the accused. Isaac v. State, 39 Tenn. 458, 1859 Tenn. LEXIS 250 (1859).

8. Discharge of Juror After Sworn.

The court may in discretion supply the place of a sick juror and proceed to try the case de novo, or discharge the jury and continue the case. Snowden v. State, 66 Tenn. 482, 1874 Tenn. LEXIS 168 (1874).

9. —Challenge by State — Effect.

The challenge of jurors propter defectum must be made before the jury is sworn; and such a discharge on challenge of the district attorney thereafter operates to discharge the accused. Hamilton v. State, 101 Tenn. 417, 47 S.W. 695, 1898 Tenn. LEXIS 83 (1898); Tomasson v. State, 112 Tenn. 596, 79 S.W. 802, 1903 Tenn. LEXIS 128 (1903).

10. —Proper Cause.

Where a juror, after being sworn, stated that he did not believe that a Christian should have anything to do with punishing people, and that he would not convict the accused, but would let God punish him, it was entirely impossible to secure a verdict of conviction, and the court properly discharged the juror and had another one selected. Green v. State, 147 Tenn. 299, 247 S.W. 84, 1922 Tenn. LEXIS 42, 28 A.L.R. 842 (1923).

11. Objections.

12. —After Verdict.

It is too late to object, after verdict, to the juror's incompetency. McClure v. State, 9 Tenn. 206, 1829 Tenn. LEXIS 43 (1829); Gillespie v. State, 16 Tenn. 507, 1835 Tenn. LEXIS 115 (1835); King v. State, 91 Tenn. 617, 20 S.W. 169, 1892 Tenn. LEXIS 33 (1892).

The deliberate withholding of information asked for on voir dire amounted to false swearing and raised the presumption of bias and partiality, and an objection on this ground could be made after the verdict. Tennessee Farmers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Greer, 682 S.W.2d 920, 1984 Tenn. App. LEXIS 2923 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984).

There are two broad classes of causes for challenge of a juror: (1) Propter defectum (on account of some defect) from personal objections as alienage, infancy, lack of statutory requirements, etc.; and (2) Propter affectum (on account of partiality) from some bias or partiality either actually shown to exist or presumed to exist from circumstances. Generally, objections to a juror based upon causes propter defectum cannot be made after verdict. However, objections to a juror based upon causes propter affectum may be made after verdict. Tennessee Farmers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Greer, 682 S.W.2d 920, 1984 Tenn. App. LEXIS 2923 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984).

13. —Clear and Satisfactory Proof Necessary.

After the juror has been selected and sworn, the burden is on the objecting party to show his incompetency; and to impeach a juror after verdict, the evidence must be clear and satisfactory, both as to its source and matter. Mann v. State, 40 Tenn. 373, 1859 Tenn. LEXIS 104 (1859); Rader v. State, 73 Tenn. 610, 1880 Tenn. LEXIS 193 (1880); Cartwright v. State, 80 Tenn. 620, 1883 Tenn. LEXIS 214 (1883); Spence v. State, 83 Tenn. 539, 1885 Tenn. LEXIS 79 (1885); King v. State, 91 Tenn. 617, 20 S.W. 169, 1892 Tenn. LEXIS 33 (1892); Ellis v. State, 92 Tenn. 85, 20 S.W. 500, 1892 Tenn. LEXIS 54 (1892); Thomas v. State, 109 Tenn. 684, 75 S.W. 1025, 1902 Tenn. LEXIS 99 (1902).

14. Voir Dire Questioning.

15. —By Court.

A rule of practice requiring counsel to submit to the court questions as to the juror's formation and expression of opinion, to be asked by the court, will not be interfered with by the supreme court, because the court cannot see that any prejudice could result to the defendant from the enforcement of such rule. Foute v. State, 83 Tenn. 712, 1885 Tenn. LEXIS 100 (1885).

16. —After Jury Empaneled.

In a personal injury action arising out of an automobile collision, where, after the jury was empaneled, a juror was involved in an accident similar to that suffered by the plaintiff, it was reversible error for the trial court not to inquire into whether the juror could weigh the evidence impartially. Ricketts v. Carter, 918 S.W.2d 419, 1996 Tenn. LEXIS 190 (Tenn. 1996).

17. —Right of Litigant.

It is reversible error to compel a litigant to pass upon a juror without permitting his examination upon oath touching his qualifications. The litigant has the right to subject to a rigid examination every man presented to him as a juror, upon his oath on his voir dire, and to sift his conscience, with a view of ascertaining whether any legal reason exists why such party should not be permitted to sit on the trial of the cause. Paducah, T. & A. R. Co. v. Muzzell, 95 Tenn. 200, 31 S.W. 999, 1895 Tenn. LEXIS 77 (1895), approving Williams v. Godfrey, 48 Tenn. 299, 1870 Tenn. LEXIS 51 (1870).

18. New Trial.

19. —Explanation by Juror.

A juror is a competent witness to exculpate himself when charged with having formed or expressed an opinion as a basis for a new trial. Rader v. State, 73 Tenn. 610, 1880 Tenn. LEXIS 193 (1880); Cartwright v. State, 80 Tenn. 620, 1883 Tenn. LEXIS 214 (1883); Spence v. State, 83 Tenn. 539, 1885 Tenn. LEXIS 79 (1885); King v. State, 91 Tenn. 617, 20 S.W. 169, 1892 Tenn. LEXIS 33 (1892); Ellis v. State, 92 Tenn. 85, 20 S.W. 500, 1892 Tenn. LEXIS 54 (1892). See Johnson v. State, 79 Tenn. 47, 1883 Tenn. LEXIS 11 (1883).

20. —Good Character of Juror.

Evidence of the good character of the juror is admissible where he is charged with forming an opinion as basis for new trial. Rader v. State, 73 Tenn. 610, 1880 Tenn. LEXIS 193 (1880); King v. State, 91 Tenn. 617, 20 S.W. 169, 1892 Tenn. LEXIS 33 (1892).

21. —Discharge Propter Affectum.

A new trial will be granted for a juror's disqualification propter affectum, as where he had prejudged the case. Brakefield v. State, 33 Tenn. 215, 1853 Tenn. LEXIS 32 (1853); Norfleet v. State, 36 Tenn. 340, 1857 Tenn. LEXIS 7 (1857); Mann v. State, 40 Tenn. 373, 1859 Tenn. LEXIS 104 (1859); Magness v. Stewart, 42 Tenn. 309, 1865 Tenn. LEXIS 64 (1865); Riddle v. State, 50 Tenn. 401, 1872 Tenn. LEXIS 6 (1872); Draper v. State, 63 Tenn. 246, 1874 Tenn. LEXIS 239 (1874); Johnson v. State, 79 Tenn. 47, 1883 Tenn. LEXIS 11 (1883); Cartwright v. State, 80 Tenn. 620, 1883 Tenn. LEXIS 214 (1883); Parrish v. State, 80 Tenn. 655, 1883 Tenn. LEXIS 222 (1883); Hoard v. State, 83 Tenn. 318, 1885 Tenn. LEXIS 54 (1885); Spence v. State, 83 Tenn. 539, 1885 Tenn. LEXIS 79 (1885); Hamilton v. State, 101 Tenn. 417, 47 S.W. 695, 1898 Tenn. LEXIS 83 (1898).

In prosecution for the sale of intoxicating liquor outside a city within four miles of a school, a venireman who stated that he was in favor of enforcing the law outside of the city, but thought saloons should be permitted to run in the city, was not qualified as a “good and lawful man” to sit upon the jury since be believes in partiality in the enforcement of the laws. Turner v. State, 128 Tenn. 27, 157 S.W. 67, 1913 Tenn. LEXIS 21 (1913).

22. —Qualification of Juror — State's Burden.

The state must make good the affirmative proposition that the juror is qualified. Riddle v. State, 50 Tenn. 401, 1872 Tenn. LEXIS 6 (1872).

23. Discharge of Jury as Whole.

24. —Causes.

The classes of cases of necessity authorizing discharge of a jury in a criminal case are where: (1) The court is compelled by law to be adjourned before the jury can agree upon a verdict; (2) The prisoner, by his own misconduct, places it out of the power of the jury to investigate his case correctly, or is, by the visitation of providence, prevented from being able to attend his trial; or (3) There is no possibility for the jury to agree upon and return a verdict. Mahala v. State, 18 Tenn. 532, 1837 Tenn. LEXIS 81 (1837), overruled in part, State v. Pool, 72 Tenn. 363, 1880 Tenn. LEXIS 28 (1880).

25. —Failure to Agree.

The discharge of the jury in a criminal case, after their failure to agree, by consent of the defendant, does not operate as an acquittal. Mahala v. State, 18 Tenn. 532, 1837 Tenn. LEXIS 81 (1837), overruled in part, State v. Pool, 72 Tenn. 363, 1880 Tenn. LEXIS 28 (1880); Elijah v. State, 20 Tenn. 102, 1839 Tenn. LEXIS 25 (1839). See Moore v. State, 50 Tenn. 493, 1872 Tenn. LEXIS 23 (1871).

Discharge of jury in a criminal case, without consent of defendant, because they cannot agree, may, in a proper case, operate as an acquittal. Mahala v. State, 18 Tenn. 532, 1837 Tenn. LEXIS 81 (1837), overruled in part, State v. Pool, 72 Tenn. 363, 1880 Tenn. LEXIS 28 (1880); Ward v. State, 20 Tenn. 253, 1839 Tenn. LEXIS 44 (1839); State v. Brooks, 22 Tenn. 70, 1842 Tenn. LEXIS 27 (1842); Morgan v. State, 35 Tenn. 475, 1856 Tenn. LEXIS 12 (1856); State v. Connor, 45 Tenn. 311, 1868 Tenn. LEXIS 13 (1868); State v. Pool, 72 Tenn. 363, 1880 Tenn. LEXIS 28 (1880); Tomasson v. State, 112 Tenn. 596, 79 S.W. 802, 1903 Tenn. LEXIS 128 (1903).

Where there was no physical impossibility for the jury to agree, and they were discharged by the court, at least 24 hours before the court adjourned, without the prisoner's consent, the facts show no case of necessity justifying the discharge, and the discharge operated as an acquittal of the prisoner charged with murder upon his motion to be discharged made before the adjournment of the court. Mahala v. State, 18 Tenn. 532, 1837 Tenn. LEXIS 81 (1837), overruled in part, State v. Pool, 72 Tenn. 363, 1880 Tenn. LEXIS 28 (1880); cited in Morgan v. State, 35 Tenn. 475, 1856 Tenn. LEXIS 12 (1856).

26. —Necessary Discharge of Jury in Criminal Case.

Discharge of jury in a criminal case, upon grounds of necessity, does not operate as an acquittal. Mahala v. State, 18 Tenn. 532, 1837 Tenn. LEXIS 81 (1837), overruled in part, State v. Pool, 72 Tenn. 363, 1880 Tenn. LEXIS 28 (1880); State v. Brooks, 22 Tenn. 70, 1842 Tenn. LEXIS 27 (1842); State v. Curtis, 24 Tenn. 601, 1845 Tenn. LEXIS 144 (1845); Coleman v. Tennessee, 97 U.S. 509, 24 L. Ed. 1118, 1878 U.S. LEXIS 1480 (1879)in dissenting opinionState v. Pool, 72 Tenn. 363, 1880 Tenn. LEXIS 28 (1880); Deberry v. State, 99 Tenn. 207, 42 S.W. 31, 1897 Tenn. LEXIS 26 (1897); Tomasson v. State, 112 Tenn. 596, 79 S.W. 802, 1903 Tenn. LEXIS 128 (1903). See Walton v. State, 35 Tenn. 687, 1856 Tenn. LEXIS 44 (1856); Moore v. State, 50 Tenn. 493, 1872 Tenn. LEXIS 23 (1871). See § 40-18-109.

27. —Waiver of Irregularity in Discharge.

Where a jury in a felony case was discharged for inability to agree without objection of the prisoner whereupon the case was continued by consent, and at a subsequent term, the prisoner was convicted without exception to the discharge, he cannot take advantage of any irregularity in the discharge upon appeal to the supreme court, but must be held to have waived it. Morgan v. State, 35 Tenn. 475, 1856 Tenn. LEXIS 12 (1856).

28. Scheduled Travel And Medical Conditions.

Collateral References. 50 C.J.S. Juries § 249.

Juror's relationship to witness, in civil case, as ground of disqualification or for reversal or new trial. 85 A.L.R.2d 851.

Membership in racially biased or prejudiced organization as proper subject of voir dire injury or ground for challenge. 63 A.L.R.3d 1052.

Prior service on grand jury which considered indictment against accused as disqualification for service on petit jury. 24 A.L.R.3d 1236.

Jury 56.

22-1-106. Exemption from process.

Service of process on any juror while that juror is attending or traveling to or from the court to which the juror is summoned is voidable and subject to challenge.

Acts 2008, ch. 1159, § 1.

Effective Dates. Acts 2008, ch. 1159, § 9. January 1, 2009.

Cross-References. Exemption of witnesses, § 24-2-105.

Textbooks. Tennessee Criminal Practice and Procedure (Raybin), § 25.20.

Tennessee Jurisprudence, 17 Tenn. Juris., Jury, § 13.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Decisions Under Prior Law

1. Object of Statute.

The object of this provision was the obtaining of jurors who should be constant and punctual in attendance and the prevention of delay in the conduct of public business. Grove & Jenkins v. Campbell, 17 Tenn. 7, 1836 Tenn. LEXIS 2 (1836).

2. —Discretion.

Collateral References. 62 Am. Jur. 2d Process § 133.

72 C.J.S. Process § 86.

Prior service on grand jury which considered indictment against accused as disqualification for service on petit jury. 24 A.L.R.3d 1236.

Process 121.

Chapter 2
Selection and Attendance of Jurors

Part 1
General Provisions

22-2-101. Application of chapter.

This chapter applies to all grand and petit juries in all circuit and criminal courts of this state. This chapter also applies to any law court in any of the counties.
Except as provided in § 22-4-101, every private act enacted in this state touching in any way upon the subject of juries, jurors or jury commissioners is repealed in its entirety.
1. [Deleted by 2011 amendment.]
2. [Deleted by 2011 amendment.]
The jury selection methods in the chancery courts of this state shall not be affected in any way by this chapter, except as provided in § 22-2-312.

Acts 2008, ch. 1159, § 1; 2011, ch. 209, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Former chapter 2, §§ 22-2-101 — 22-2-315 (Acts 1959, ch. 8, §§ 1-16, 18, 19, 21; 1961, ch. 124, § 1; 1961, ch. 206, § 1; 1967, ch. 182, §§ 1, 2; 1972, ch. 498, § 1; 1972, ch. 826, § 1; 1974, ch. 548, § 1; 1975, ch. 254, §§ 1, 2; 1980, ch. 714, §§ 1-4; 1980, ch. 903, §§ 1-8, 10, 11; 1981, ch. 317, § 1; T.C.A., § 22-223 — 22-236, 22-238 — 22-242, 22-244; Acts 1981, ch. 82, §§ 1-3; 1983, ch. 108, §§ 1-3; 1984, ch. 649, § 1; 1984, ch. 650, § 1; 1984, ch. 716, § 1; 1985, ch. 343, §§ 1, 2; 1988, ch. 736, § 1; 1989, ch. 449, § 1; 1989, ch. 591, §§ 1, 6; 1993, ch. 291, § 1; 1993, ch. 309, § 1; 1994, ch. 642, § 1; 2000, ch. 733, § 1; 2005, ch. 254, § 1; 2005, ch. 429, § 3), concerning selection and attendance of jurors, was repealed by Acts 2008, ch. 1159, § 1, effective January 1, 2009, except in certain counties. See this version of chapter 2 for provisions effective January 1, 2009, except in counties having a population of not less than 19,500, nor more than 19,775 and in counties having a population of not less than 28,350, nor more than 28,450, according to the 2000 federal census or any subsequent federal census. See chapter 5 of this title for provisions effective in counties having a population of not less than 19,500, nor more than 19,775 and in counties having a population of not less than 28,350, nor more than 28,450, according to the 2000 federal census or any subsequent federal census.

Acts 2011, ch. 209, § 1 deleted § 22-2-101(b)(1) and (2), effective July 1, 2011. Since § 22-2-101(b)(1) and (2) have been deleted, this chapter is no longer only effective in certain counties, and jurors and jury panels for the counties formerly referenced in § 22-2-101(b)(1) shall no longer be selected in accordance with this chapter as it existed prior to January 1, 2009, which was formerly compiled in title 22, ch. 5, which has been deleted.

Amendments. The 2011 amendment deleted former (b)(1) and (2) which read: “(1) This chapter shall not apply in counties having a population, according to the 2000 federal census or any subsequent federal census, of:not less than nor more than 19,500 19,77528,350 28,450“(2) Jurors and jury panels for the courts in the counties referenced in subdivision (b)(1) shall continue to be selected in accordance with this chapter as it existed immediately prior to January 1, 2009, which has been compiled in chapter 5 of this title; provided, however, that each member of the board of jury commissioners shall be paid the sum of one hundred dollars ($100) for each day or fraction of each day spent in the discharge of the duties of the board, which shall be paid by the county from its general fund.”.

Effective Dates. Acts 2011, ch. 209, § 2. July 1, 2011.

Law Reviews.

What Jurors Want to Know: Motivating Juror Cognition to Increase Legal Knowledge & Improve Decisionmaking, 81 Tenn. L. Rev. 752 (2014).

22-2-102. Unlawful acts — Penalties.

It is contempt of court punishable by the court wherein such violation may be under investigation, upon its own motion or upon the petition or motion of the attorney general and reporter, for any person to alter any automated jury database or jury list, to open any jury box except as provided in this chapter, to destroy, deface, or remove without authority such automated jury database, jury list, jury box or the tickets or cards in the jury box, or jury book or any portion of the jury book, to assist in or connive any such acts, or for any custodian of an automated juror database, jury box or jury list to knowingly permit any such acts to be done.
It is a Class A misdemeanor punishable by fine only for any person to request or to have another request that the person's name be placed in the jury database, upon the jury list or in the jury box for the purpose of violating this title.

Acts 2008, ch. 1159, § 1.

Code Commission Notes.

The version of this chapter 2 that is applicable in counties having a population of not less than 19,500, nor more than 19,775 and in counties having a population of not less than 28,350, nor more than 28,450, according to the 2000 federal census or any subsequent federal census, was transferred to chapter 5 of this title by the code commission in 2008.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class A misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

Law Reviews.

Tennessee Civil Disabilities: A Systemic Approach (Neil P. Cohen), 41 Tenn. L. Rev. 253.

Part 2
Jury Coordinator

22-2-201. Determination of jury coordinator — Oath — Illness or absence of coordinator — Compensation.

1. The clerk of the circuit court of the county shall be the jury coordinator unless the judge or judges who hold circuit or criminal court in such county appoint someone other than the clerk to serve as the jury coordinator. The jury coordinator, whether it be the clerk or a person appointed by the judges, shall perform all the duties required of the jury coordinator by this title. However, the judges may, in their discretion, distribute the jury coordinator's duties between the circuit court clerk and an appointed jury coordinator.
2. Before entering upon the duties as jury coordinator, the clerk of the circuit court, or the person filling any separate jury coordinator position, shall take and subscribe, before an officer authorized to administer oaths, the following oath:
  “I, , do solemnly swear or affirm that I will faithfully and impartially discharge the duties imposed upon me as jury coordinator for County to the best of my knowledge and ability; that I will never place the name of any person on the jury list or in the jury box whom I know to be unqualified to serve as a juror, or who has to my knowledge solicited or had others to solicit that the person's own name be placed on the jury list or in the jury box, so help me God.”
3. If the circuit court clerk serving as jury coordinator becomes ill or is absent for any cause when the jury coordinator's services are required, the clerk's deputy may take the oath prescribed for the jury coordinator and thereafter perform the jury coordinator duties in the clerk's absence. If the jury coordinator is a person other than the circuit court clerk, the circuit court clerk may serve as jury coordinator in the jury coordinator's absence after taking the required oath.
If the judges appoint a person other than the circuit court clerk to serve as jury coordinator, compensation for the jury coordinator shall be set by the legislative body of the county or the legislative body of the metropolitan government of any county having a metropolitan form of government.

Acts 2008, ch. 1159, § 1.

Code Commission Notes.

Attorney General Opinions. Authority of jury coordinator to select prospective jurors to serve on jury panels. OAG 10-125, 2010 Tenn. AG LEXIS 131 (12/30/10).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Prejudice.

Defendant's convictions for first-degree murder, attempted first-degree murder, and aggravated arson were proper because, removing from a jury venire the names of persons who had died, who no longer lived in the county, or who were physically or mentally disabled so as to prevent jury service, was legally permissible. In the absence of any evidence that the jury commissioners removed persons from the jury venire for improper purposes or that defendant was prejudiced by the removal of the persons, the service of the jury commissioners, even if they were not qualified to serve, did not provide sufficient grounds to reverse and vacate defendant's convictions. State v. Hester, 324 S.W.3d 1, 2010 Tenn. LEXIS 897 (Tenn. Oct. 5, 2010), cert. denied, Hester v. Tennessee, 179 L. Ed. 2d 896, 563 U.S. 939, 131 S. Ct. 2096, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 3140 (U.S. 2011), superseded by statute as stated in, State v. Wilson, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 126 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 13, 2013).

Part 3
Jury Selection and Attendance

22-2-301. Automated selection of names for jury list.

The jury coordinator in each county shall select names of prospective jurors to serve in the courts of that county by random automated means, without opportunity for the intervention of any human agency to select a particular name and in a manner that causes no prejudice to any person. The names, which shall constitute the jury list, shall be compiled from licensed driver records or lists, tax records or other available and reliable sources that are so tabulated and arranged that names can be selected by automated means. The jury coordinator may utilize a single source or any combination of sources. The jury coordinator is prohibited from using the permanent voter registration records as a source to compile the jury list.
The jury coordinator shall repeat this procedure as often as reasonably necessary, but in no event may a list be retained for more than two (2) years. Prior to repeating this procedure and compiling a new jury list, no person may add to or take from the existing list, except as provided in this part.
Notwithstanding the provisions of title 2, chapter 2, part 1 to the contrary, any voter registration form created on or after January 1, 2009, by the state coordinator of elections shall clearly state on the registration form the following: “Names of persons selected for jury service in state court are not chosen from permanent voter registration records.”

Acts 2008, ch. 1159, § 1.

Code Commission Notes.

Textbooks. Tennessee Forms (Robinson, Ramsey and Harwell), No. 3-6-6.

Tennessee Jurisprudence, 17 Tenn. Juris., Jury, § 15.

Attorney General Opinions. Authority of jury coordinator to select prospective jurors to serve on jury panels. OAG 10-125, 2010 Tenn. AG LEXIS 131 (12/30/10).

Cited: State v. Blair, — S.W.3d —, 2009 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1032 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 17, 2009); State v. Hester, 324 S.W.3d 1, 2010 Tenn. LEXIS 897 (Tenn. Oct. 5, 2010).

22-2-302. Alternate non-automated jury selection method.

In the event that any county of this state cannot obtain and select names for jury selection by automated means pursuant to § 22-2-301, the county may utilize the alternate jury selection method set out in this section.

The jury box, a suitable and well-bound book in which to record the jury list and any necessary stationery shall be purchased by the jury coordinator and paid for by the county, and the jury coordinator shall be the custodian of these items. Neither the book nor the box shall be opened except as provided in this part.
1. The jury coordinator and the circuit court clerk, or the clerk's deputy if the circuit court clerk serves as the jury coordinator, referred to as “witness” in this part, shall meet in the circuit court clerk's office at a time fixed by the presiding judge of the judicial district to select the names of prospective jurors to serve in the courts of the county. The names, which shall constitute the jury list, shall be selected randomly from licensed driver records or lists, tax records, or other available and reliable sources. The jury coordinator may utilize a single source or any combination of sources. The jury coordinator is prohibited from using the permanent voter registration records as a source to compile the jury list.
2. The number of names to be placed on the jury list shall be determined by the presiding judge of the judicial district.
3. The jury coordinator and the circuit court clerk, or the clerk's deputy if the circuit court clerk serves as the jury coordinator, shall repeat this procedure as often as reasonably necessary, but in no event may a list be retained for more than two (2) years. Prior to repeating this procedure and compiling a new jury list, no person may add to or take from the existing list, except as provided in this part.
1. At the top of each page of the well-bound book shall be written or printed the words, “Jury list for County.” Following these words and preceding the list of names shall be written these words, “Jury List Selected by , Jury Coordinator for County, on the day of , .”
2. Immediately following this heading shall be recorded the list of jurors selected, placing one (1) name on each line, arranging the names in alphabetical order and numbering them consecutively, beginning with No. 1.
3. At the end of the list shall be written and signed by the jury coordinator and the witness the following: “I, , Jury Coordinator for County, and , (witness) certify that the foregoing is the jury list selected by us for the next year(s)/month(s)/days for the county. This the day of , .”
1. The names on the list, preceded by the original number thereof, shall be written by the jury coordinator on tickets or cards of paper uniform in size, and placed in the jury box in the presence of the witness, the box to be kept securely locked and under seal, and it shall not be unlocked or the seal broken except by the order of and in the presence of the jury coordinator and a witness, and then only for the purpose of refilling the box or drawing from the box the names of jurors for jury service, or by order of a judge holding court as provided in this part.
2. The jury book shall be kept in secret by the jury coordinator under lock and key and no one shall be allowed to inspect the jury book except the presiding judge of the judicial district or the jury coordinator.

Acts 2008, ch. 1159, § 1.

Code Commission Notes.

Textbooks. Tennessee Criminal Practice and Procedure (Raybin), §§ 9.13, 25.20.

Tennessee Forms (Robinson, Ramsey and Harwell), No. 3-6-6.

Law Reviews.

Criminal Law in Tennessee in 1980 — A Critical Survey, IV. Procedure (Joseph G. Cook), 48 Tenn. L. Rev. 563.

Cross-Sectionalism in Jury-Selection Procedures After Taylor v. Louisiana (Martha Craig Daughtrey), 43 Tenn. L. Rev. 1.

Jury Reform in Tennessee, 34 U. Mem. L. Rev. 1 (2003).

Special Project: Criminal Procedure as Defined by the Tennessee Supreme Court (Julian L. Bibb and Walter Sillers Weems), 30 Vand. L. Rev. (4) 691.

The Tennessee Court Systems — The Jury System, 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 489.

Cited: State v. Hester, — S.W.3d —, 2009 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 363 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 5, 2009); State v. Hester, 324 S.W.3d 1, 2010 Tenn. LEXIS 897 (Tenn. Oct. 5, 2010).

22-2-303. Counties having courts in two places — Separate records.

In those counties of the state where the circuit or criminal courts, or both, sit in two (2) places, the jury coordinators for those counties shall be required to select jurors from the territorial jurisdiction of each of the two (2) courts and will maintain two (2) sets of records, one (1) for each of the courts as is provided in this part, the same as if both courts were in separate counties.

Acts 2008, ch. 1159, § 1.

Code Commission Notes.

Collateral References. Jury 63.

22-2-304. Automated selection of names for jury pool.

In any county in this state where the names of prospective jurors are obtained by automated means pursuant to § 22-2-301, the selection of names of prospective jurors to be summoned shall likewise be made by automated means in such a manner as to assure proportionate distribution of names selected without opportunity for the intervention of any human agency to select a particular name and in a manner that causes no prejudice to any person. It is the duty of the presiding judge of the judicial district to notify the jury coordinator of the number of names to be selected from the jury list, and these names shall constitute the jury pool.
When the required number of names have been selected for the jury pool, the jury coordinator shall place a list of those names in an envelope, and with the list shall be enclosed a report prepared and signed by the jury coordinator. A copy of the list and report shall be retained by the jury coordinator for use under the provisions of this chapter, and the report shall provide substantially as follows:
To the Honorable , Presiding Judge of the Judicial District, at County:

I, , the jury coordinator for such county, report that the enclosed names, which have been drawn according to law, constitute the jury pool for the upcoming jury service term:

This the day of , .

Jury Coordinator

Acts 2008, ch. 1159, § 1.

Code Commission Notes.

Cross-References. Dentists exempt from jury service, § 63-5-123.

Textbooks. Tennessee Criminal Practice and Procedure (Raybin), § 25.20.

Tennessee Forms (Robinson, Ramsey and Harwell), No. 3-6-6.

Tennessee Jurisprudence, 14 Tenn. Juris., Grand Jury, § 6; 17 Tenn. Juris., Jury, § 15.

Law Reviews.

The Tennessee Court System — Criminal Court (Frederic S. Le Clercq), 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 319.

The Tennessee Court Systems — The Jury System, 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 489.

Attorney General Opinions. Authority of jury coordinator to select prospective jurors to serve on jury panels. OAG 10-125, 2010 Tenn. AG LEXIS 131 (12/30/10).

Cited: State v. Hester, — S.W.3d —, 2009 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 363 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 5, 2009).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Burden of Proof.

Defendant's convictions for first-degree murder, attempted first-degree murder, and aggravated arson were proper because the burden was upon defendant to demonstrate any prejudice that he suffered as a result of the deviation from T.C.A. § 22-2-304(e)'s requirement that the methodology employed utilize a procedure that assures a proportionate distribution of names selected. He failed to carry that burden. State v. Hester, 324 S.W.3d 1, 2010 Tenn. LEXIS 897 (Tenn. Oct. 5, 2010), cert. denied, Hester v. Tennessee, 179 L. Ed. 2d 896, 563 U.S. 939, 131 S. Ct. 2096, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 3140 (U.S. 2011), superseded by statute as stated in, State v. Wilson, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 126 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 13, 2013).

Collateral References. Jury 66(5).

22-2-305. Selection of names for jury pool by alternate manual means.

In the event that any county of this state cannot obtain and select names for the jury pool by automated means pursuant to § 22-2-304, the county may utilize the alternate jury selection method set out in this section.

On Monday, two (2) weeks before each jury service term, the jury coordinator shall unlock the jury box and break the seal of the jury box, and after well shaking the jury box, cause to be drawn from the jury box, in the presence of the witness, that number of names that the presiding judge of the judicial district has directed to be drawn, to constitute the jury pool for the jury service term. If the Monday two (2) weeks before the jury service term begins is a legal holiday, the jury coordinator may perform this function on the following business day.
In the event the name is drawn of a person known by the jury coordinator to no longer be qualified or competent to serve pursuant to § 22-1-101 or § 22-1-102, the name shall be put aside and not used, and another name shall be drawn instead. Should the jury coordinator, when drawing names from the jury box, overlook the names of persons who are incompetent or unqualified to serve, the presiding judge of the judicial district and the judge presiding over a trial in which those persons serve as jury panel members each shall have the authority to excuse those persons from jury service and direct that their names be withdrawn from the jury pool.
1. Not more than five (5) days before the jury service term and not later than the first day of the jury service term, the jury coordinator and witness shall certify that the names drawn constitute the jury pool for the term by following the procedures in subdivision (3)(B).
2. When the required number of names have been drawn for the jury pool, the original tickets or cards on which they have been written shall be placed in an envelope and with the the original tickets or cards shall be enclosed a report prepared and signed by the jury coordinator and witness, a copy of which shall be retained by the jury coordinator for use under the provisions of this chapter, substantially as follows:
  To the Honorable , Presiding Judge of the Judicial District, at County:
  
  I, , the jury coordinator for such county, and , who witnessed the selection of names, respectfully report the following names, which have been drawn according to law, arranged alphabetically and numbered, as shown on the original tickets or cards enclosed with this report, as the jury pool for the upcoming jury service term:
  
  Names
  
  No.
  
  No.
  
  No.
  
  We further report that in addition to the above list there were drawn from the jury box at the same time the following names of persons known to the jury coordinator to be unqualified or incompetent to serve (copying such names and numbers), and we enclose such original tickets or cards with this report separate from the other tickets or cards.
  
  This the day of , .
  
  Jury Coordinator
  
  Witness
3. The jury coordinator shall then seal the envelope containing the coordinator's report and the original tickets or cards, address the envelope to the presiding judge of the judicial district, write the judge's name across the sealing of the envelope, and deliver the envelope to the judge at the opening of the jury service term.

Acts 2008, ch. 1159, § 1.

Code Commission Notes.

Textbooks. Tennessee Criminal Practice and Procedure (Raybin), §§ 25.20, 24.32.

Tennessee Forms (Robinson, Ramsey and Harwell), No. 3-6-6.

Tennessee Jurisprudence, 17 Tenn. Juris., Jury, § 18.

Law Reviews.

The Tennessee Court Systems — The Jury System, 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 489.

Cited: State v. Hester, 324 S.W.3d 1, 2010 Tenn. LEXIS 897 (Tenn. Oct. 5, 2010).

Collateral References.

Indoctrination by court of persons summoned for jury service. 89 A.L.R.2d 197.

Jury 67.

22-2-306. Juror Summons — Contents.

Each juror summons shall include the following:
1. Name of the juror;
2. Address of the juror;
3. Date, time and place juror is required to appear in response to the summons or, in the alternative, date and method by which the juror is required to contact the jury coordinator or otherwise respond to the court regarding the juror's service;
4. Penalty for juror's failure to appear or otherwise respond to the summons in the prescribed manner;
5. Juror qualifications listed in §§ 22-1-101 and 22-1-102;
6. Process by which the juror may attempt to be excused due to a hardship pursuant to § 22-1-103, including the juror's obligation to submit documentation in support of the juror's request; and
7. Process by which the juror may request a postponement of jury service pursuant to § 22-2-315.
The administrative office of the courts shall prepare a form juror summons that may be used by the jury coordinator in any county.

Acts 2008, ch. 1159, § 1.

Code Commission Notes.

Attorney General Opinions. Qualifying jurors and assigning jury-service dates online, OAG 14-64, 2014 Tenn. AG Lexis 67 (6/25/14)

Cited: State v. Flamini, — S.W.3d —, 2009 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 380 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 26, 2009).

22-2-307. Summoning jurors.

The sheriff shall summon jurors by first class mail sent to the regular address of each member of the jury pool, giving notice of such person's selection for jury duty. The summons shall be mailed to the regular address at least ten (10) days prior to the date fixed for such person's appearance for jury service.
Notwithstanding subsection (a), the sheriff may summon jurors by personal service.
The jury coordinator shall provide sufficient information regarding the members of the jury pool to enable the sheriff to summon the jurors pursuant to this section.
Notwithstanding subsections (a)-(c), the jury coordinator may, at the coordinator's discretion, summon the jurors by first class mail without the assistance of the sheriff.

Acts 2008, ch. 1159, § 1.

Code Commission Notes.

22-2-308. Publication of jury list — Copies.

Immediately after the jury pool has been summoned in accordance with § 22-2-307, the jury coordinator shall create a list of the members of the jury pool, and a copy of the list of the members of the jury pool shall be posted in the clerk's office for public inspection. In addition, the jury coordinator shall cause to be made a sufficient number of copies of the list of the members of the jury pool, which shall be placed in the clerk's office and available for general distribution to the members of the bar and to all other interested persons.

Acts 2008, ch. 1159, § 1.

Code Commission Notes.

Textbooks. Tennessee Criminal Practice and Procedure (Raybin), § 25.22.

Tennessee Forms (Robinson, Ramsey and Harwell), No. 3-6-6.

Tennessee Jurisprudence, 17 Tenn. Juris., Jury, § 16.

Cited: State v. Flamini, — S.W.3d —, 2009 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 380 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 26, 2009); Young v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2011 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 638 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 18, 2011); State v. Marsh, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 728 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 17, 2012).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Decisions Under Prior Law

1. Failure to Publish List.

Where the clerk, not the judge, opened the jury box, drew the names and resealed the box in the clerk's office, not in open court before the judge as required by § 22-2-308(a)(2), and where the clerk failed to publish the names of the special panel as required by subsection (b), such deviations constituted prejudice to the administration of justice and defendant's conviction could not stand. State v. Lynn, 924 S.W.2d 892, 1996 Tenn. LEXIS 379 (Tenn. 1996).

In defendant's first degree murder case, the circuit court's deviations from statutorily mandated procedure in selecting the names for jury service did not result in prejudice to defendant because the circuit court properly found that the clerk was in substantial compliance with the requirements of forming the venire and gathering the names, and if there were errors, they were not material errors. State v. Stephens, 264 S.W.3d 719, 2007 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 748 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 21, 2007), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2008 Tenn. LEXIS 300 (Tenn. Apr. 14, 2008), overruled in part, State v. Beaty, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 842 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 8, 2016).

Collateral References. Jury 69, 72(8).

22-2-309. Attendance of jurors — Excuse upon showing of sufficient cause.

All persons summoned as members of the jury pool shall attend at the time and place designated in the summons, or otherwise respond as specified in the summons, unless excused pursuant to § 22-1-103, granted a postponement pursuant to § 22-2-315, or otherwise discharged in a manner authorized by this title or other binding legal authority.
If a person who has been summoned but not excused or discharged pursuant to subsection (a) fails to appear for service or otherwise respond as directed, a show cause order shall issue and be served upon the person, requiring the person to appear at a date certain and show cause why the person should not be held in civil contempt of court for the person's failure to appear.
Upon the appearance of any person served with a show cause order, the person may make the person's excuse known. If the person was summoned and if the excuse is sufficient in the opinion of a judge of the court for which the individual was called to jury service, the person shall be excused; but the person shall pay the cost incident to issuance and service of the show cause order, unless waived by the judge. If the excuse is insufficient, the person shall be adjudged in civil contempt of court and shall be assessed a civil penalty of not more than five hundred dollars ($500) and the costs of the show cause order. The court shall suspend payment of that portion of the civil penalty in excess of fifty dollars ($50.00) upon the condition that the person complete the jury service term for which the person was summoned. The civil penalty authorized by this subsection (c) is remedial in nature.

Acts 2008, ch. 1159, § 1.

Code Commission Notes.

Textbooks. Tennessee Forms (Robinson, Ramsey and Harwell), No. 3-6-6.

Tennessee Jurisprudence, 17 Tenn. Juris., Jury, § 18.

Law Reviews.

The Tennessee Court Systems — The Jury System, 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 489.

What Jurors Want to Know: Motivating Juror Cognition to Increase Legal Knowledge & Improve Decisionmaking, 81 Tenn. L. Rev. 752 (2014).

Attorney General Opinions. Qualifying jurors and assigning jury-service dates online. OAG 14-64, 2014 Tenn. AG Lexis 67 (6/25/14).

Collateral References. Jury 57-82.

22-2-310. Impaneling jurors — Additional jurors.

The members of the grand and petit juries shall be made up as provided by law from the jury pool. In the event the original jury pool does not include a sufficient number of jurors, courts shall follow the procedures in subsection (b) for securing additional jurors. These additional names shall supplement, not replace, the original jury pool. These procedures shall be repeated, as necessary, until the grand and petit juries are completed.
1. Regardless of whether a county utilizes the automated or manual method of jury selection, additional names shall be selected for the special jury pool in the same manner this part provides for the selection of the original jury pool. Likewise, these members of the special jury pool shall be summoned in the manner specified in § 22-2-307.
2. In the event the presiding judge of the judicial district is unavailable for good cause, any judge of the court for which the jury pool is being selected may perform the duties required of the presiding judge.
1. If a judge presiding over a trial discovers that the number of jurors constituting the panel, or venire, assigned to the trial is not adequate to secure a petit jury and that the jury pool has been exhausted or contains an insufficient number of jurors, the judge shall direct the jury coordinator to comply with subsection (b) unless the trial is pending in a county that utilizes the manual method of jury selection. In that event, the judge shall direct the jury coordinator to produce the jury box in open court, the judge shall open the box, and there shall be drawn from the box, as directed by the judge, the number of names deemed by the judge to be sufficient to secure a petit jury for that trial. These prospective jurors shall be summoned by personal service pursuant to § 22-2-307(b) if time constraints preclude compliance with the notice requirement in § 22-2-307(a).
2. If a judge causes the jury box to be unlocked pursuant to subdivision (c)(1), the judge shall cause it to be relocked and sealed by the jury coordinator, and the judge shall write the judge's own name across the seal. The box then shall be returned by the jury coordinator to its place of keeping.
In the event the names of jurors are selected pursuant to subsection (c) for service in a particular trial, the jury coordinator shall make a list of such names, but the names shall not be removed from the jury list and, in counties utilizing the manual method of jury selection, shall be returned to the jury box. Service on a jury pursuant to subsection (c) does not constitute jury service for purposes of § 22-2-314, and shall not disqualify or excuse any person from service on the regular juries if the person's name is regularly drawn.
Jurors selected pursuant to this section may be excused for good cause.

Acts 2008, ch. 1159, § 1.

Code Commission Notes.

Attorney General Opinions. Authority of jury coordinator to select prospective jurors to serve on jury panels. OAG 10-125, 2010 Tenn. AG LEXIS 131 (12/30/10).

Textbooks. Tennessee Criminal Practice and Procedure (Raybin), §§ 25.21, 25.43.

Tennessee Forms (Robinson, Ramsey and Harwell), No. 3-6-6.

Tennessee Jurisprudence, 17 Tenn. Juris., Jury, §§ 16, 18.

Law Reviews.

Six-Member Juries: Does Size Really Matter? 67 Tenn. L. Rev. 743 (2000).

The Tennessee Court Systems — The Jury System, 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 489.

Collateral References. Jury 143-150.

22-2-311. Jury coordinator’s report in first day’s minutes — Investigation of irregularities.

At the beginning of the jury service term, the presiding judge of a judicial district that utilizes the manual method of jury selection shall compare the jury coordinator's report with the original tickets or cards contained in the sealed envelope. If they correspond, they shall constitute the jury pool for the jury service term, and the report shall be spread on record in the caption of the first day's minutes. Absent any identifiable irregularities in the jury selection process, the presiding judge of a judicial district that utilizes the automated method of jury selection likewise shall spread the jury coordinator's report on the first day's minutes, and the names listed in the report shall constitute the jury pool for the jury service term. Nothing in this subsection (a) is intended to prevent a judge or jury coordinator from subsequently excusing, disqualifying, postponing the service of or otherwise discharging a member of the jury pool in a manner consistent with this title.
If the presiding judge of the judicial district at any time believes that the jury list has not been prepared or renewed as required by law, the jury box has been tampered with or any other provisions of this title have been violated, the judge shall have broad authority to investigate. Should the judge conclude that any provisions of this title have been violated, the judge shall correct any irregularities necessary to ensure that this title is duly enforced.

Acts 2008, ch. 1159, § 1.

Code Commission Notes.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 17 Tenn. Juris., Jury, § 15.

Collateral References. Jury 82(1).

22-2-312. Selection and summons when no jury pool provided.

If for any reason a jury pool is not furnished at any jury service term as provided by this part, then the presiding judge of the judicial district shall have the right to select a jury pool as may be needed during the jury service term.
In all counties of this state, regardless of population, jurors required to try issues of fact in the chancery or other court, not supplied with regular jurors, may be summoned instanter, by order of the court, as in subsection (a).

Acts 2008, ch. 1159, § 1.

Code Commission Notes.

Textbooks. Tennessee Forms (Robinson, Ramsey and Harwell), No. 3-6-6.

Cited: State v. Haynes, — S.W.3d —, 2010 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 504 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 17, 2010).

Collateral References.

Excusing, on account of public, charitable, or educational employment, one qualified and not specifically exempted as juror in state criminal case, as ground of complaint by accused. 99 A.L.R.3d 1261.

Jury 72, 82(4).

22-2-313. Objection required to affect validity of selection.

In the absence of fraud, no irregularity with respect to this title or the procedure under this title shall affect the validity of the selection of any grand jury or the validity of any verdict rendered by a petit jury unless the irregularity has been objected to before the jury is sworn.

Acts 2008, ch. 1159, § 1.

Code Commission Notes.

Textbooks. Tennessee Criminal Practice and Procedure (Raybin), §§ 16.26, 25.23.

Law Reviews.

The Tennessee Court Systems — The Jury System, 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 489.

Cited: State v. Hester, 324 S.W.3d 1, 2010 Tenn. LEXIS 897 (Tenn. Oct. 5, 2010).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Waiver.

Defendant's conviction for first-degree premeditated murder was appropriate because he waived any objection to the procedure used for selecting the venire by failing to object before the jury was sworn. State v. Blair, — S.W.3d —, 2009 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1032 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 17, 2009), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2010 Tenn. LEXIS 628 (Tenn. June 30, 2010).

Decisions Under Prior Law

1. Necessity for Objection.

Either the pointing out of the alleged irregularity and taking exception thereto before the jury is sworn or the presence of fraud is indispensable for irregularities in selection of the jury to affect the jury's actions. Rutherford v. State, 219 Tenn. 331, 409 S.W.2d 535, 1966 Tenn. LEXIS 532 (1966).

2. Waiver.

Where provisions of former§ 22-2-304 (now § 22-5-304) relative to withdrawal of jurors' names from jury box by child under 10 years of age were not complied with and jury commissioners exceeded their authority by excluding certain classes from jury without statutory authority but no objection was made thereto before jury was sworn and absence of fraud was admitted, proceedings were not invalidated. Rutherford v. State, 219 Tenn. 331, 409 S.W.2d 535, 1966 Tenn. LEXIS 532 (1966).

3. Objection Properly Made.

Defense counsel properly objected to the deviations prior to the time the jury was sworn, where the trial court substantially, flagrantly, and unnecessarily deviated from the statutory procedures. State v. Bondurant, 4 S.W.3d 662, 1999 Tenn. LEXIS 420 (Tenn. 1999).

Collateral References. Appeal and error 199.

22-2-314. Limitation on jury service.

A juror who has completed a jury service term shall not be summoned to serve another jury service term in any court of this state for a period of twenty-four (24) months following the last day of such service; however, the county legislative body of any county, may, by majority vote, extend the twenty-four-month period.

Acts 2008, ch. 1159, § 1.

Code Commission Notes.

22-2-315. Postponement of jury service.

Notwithstanding any of the foregoing provisions, individuals scheduled to appear for jury service may request a postponement of the date of their initial appearance for jury service. When requested, postponements shall be granted by the jury coordinator; provided, that:
1. The juror has not previously been granted a postponement;
2. The prospective juror appears in person or contacts the jury coordinator by telephone, electronic mail, facsimile, or in writing to request a postponement; and
3. Prior to the grant of a postponement and with the concurrence of the jury coordinator, the prospective juror fixes a date certain on which the juror will appear for jury service within twelve (12) months after the date on which the prospective juror originally was called to serve and on which date the court will be in session.
Notwithstanding subsection (a), if a judge holding court in the county finds good cause to postpone the jury service term for a juror, the judge shall notify the juror and the jury coordinator in writing designating an alternate date to which the juror's service is postponed.
A subsequent request to postpone jury service may be approved by a judge only on the basis of an extraordinary event, such as a death in the prospective juror's family, sudden grave illness or a natural disaster or national emergency in which the prospective juror is personally involved, that could not have been anticipated at the time the initial postponement was granted. Prior to the grant of a second postponement, the prospective juror must fix a date certain on which the juror will appear for jury service within twelve (12) months of the postponement and on which date the court will be in session.
A juror who is granted a postponement pursuant to this section shall remain under summons to appear on the alternate date without the necessity of the issuance of a new summons; however, the jury coordinator may, at the coordinator's discretion, issue a new summons.
The jury coordinator shall maintain a list of members of the jury pool whose service was postponed pursuant to this section, and that information shall be made available upon request.

Acts 2008, ch. 1159, § 1.

Code Commission Notes.

Cited: State v. Marsh, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 728 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 17, 2012).

22-2-316. Delegation of judge’s duties.

The presiding judge may delegate any or all of the duties imposed upon the judge by this part to another chancellor or judge authorized to conduct jury trials.

Acts 2008, ch. 1159, § 1.

Code Commission Notes.

Cited: State v. Blair, — S.W.3d —, 2009 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1032 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 17, 2009).

22-2-317. List of disqualified or potentially disqualified prospective jurors.

The jury coordinator shall prepare or cause to be prepared a list of all persons disqualified or potentially disqualified as a prospective juror from jury service due to being a non-United States citizen, convicted of a felony, deceased, not a resident of this state, or not a resident of the county. The list must be prepared and sent to the administrator of elections according to the jury summons cycle used by the court clerk. Nothing in this section prevents the list from being sent more frequently. The list may be provided by mail, facsimile transmission, or email.
The jury coordinator shall provide the administrator of elections with the following information about the disqualified juror:
1. The full name of the disqualified juror;
2. Current and prior addresses, if any;
3. Telephone number, if available;
4. Date of birth; and
5. The reason the prospective juror was disqualified.
After verifying that the person is a registered voter, the administrator of elections shall follow the procedures listed in § 2-2-106 or § 2-2-141.
In addition to the list of names, if the jury coordinator has documentation showing the person's disqualification under subsection (a), the documentation may be forwarded to the administrator of elections.

Acts 2018, ch. 837, § 1.

Effective Dates. Acts 2018, ch. 837, § 2. April 27, 2018.

Chapter 3
Examination and Challenge of Jurors

22-3-101. Absolute right of parties to examine.

Parties in civil and criminal cases or their attorneys shall have an absolute right to examine prospective jurors in such cases, notwithstanding any rule of procedure or practice of court to the contrary.

Acts 2008, ch. 1159, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Former chapter 3, §§ 22-3-101 — 22-3-105 (Code 1858, §§ 4009 (deriv. Const. 1834, art. 1, §§ 6, 9), 4010 (deriv. Acts 1805, ch. 60, § 1; 1843-1844, ch. 134, § 3), 4012 (deriv. Acts 1805, ch. 60, § 1); Acts 1879, ch. 108; impl. am. Acts 1883, ch. 198, § 1; Shan., §§ 5820–5822, 5824; Code 1932, §§ 10015-10017, 10019; Acts 1955, ch. 281, § 1; 1965, ch. 31, §§ 1, 2; 1968, ch. 608, § 1; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), §§ 22-301 — 22-304; Acts 1977, ch. 100, § 1; T.C.A., § 22-501), concerning examination and challenge of furors, was repealed by Acts 2008, ch. 1159, § 1, effective January 1, 2009.

Textbooks. Tennessee Criminal Practice and Procedure (Raybin), § 25.47.

Tennessee Forms (Robinson, Ramsey and Harwell), No. 1-47.01-1.

Tennessee Jurisprudence, 17 Tenn. Juris., Jury, §§ 2, 21, 30.

Law Reviews.

A Survey of Civil Procedure in Tennessee — 1977, V. Trial Procedure (John L. Sobieski, Jr.), 46 Tenn. L. Rev. 347.

What Jurors Want to Know: Motivating Juror Cognition to Increase Legal Knowledge & Improve Decisionmaking, 81 Tenn. L. Rev. 752 (2014).

Comparative Legislation. Examination of jurors:

Ala. R.C.P. 47(a).

Ark. Code § 16-33-101 et seq; § 16-33-201 et seq.

Ga. O.C.G.A. § 15-12-131 et seq.

Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 29A.290.

Miss. Code Ann. § 13-5-69.

Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 494.465 — 494.480.

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 9-15.

Va. Code § 8.01-358.

Cited: State v. Odom, — S.W.3d —, 2010 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 223 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 4, 2010); State v. Graves, — S.W.3d —, 2011 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 91 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 8, 2011); Cole v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2011 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 186 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 8, 2011); State v. Climer, — S.W.3d —, 2011 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 914 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 14, 2011).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutional Right to Trial by Jury.

Defendant's convictions for first-degree murder were proper because the record did not support a conclusion that the jurors impaneled were incompetent and that he did not received his guaranteed right to trial by an impartial jury. The record failed to also reveal the allocation of the peremptory challenges; each side had 15 peremptory challenges, and only 22 peremptory challenges were exercised at the time the final jury was empaneled. State v. Sexton, — S.W.3d —, 2010 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1035 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 7, 2010), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 368 S.W.3d 371, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 377 (Tenn. May 29, 2012).

2. Discretion of Judge.

Even if a juror was excused improperly based on a peremptory strike rather than for cause pursuant to T.C.A. § 22-3-104, which was untimely under T.C.A. § 22-3-101 and Tenn. R. Civ. P. 47.03, such error was harmless under T.R.A.P. 36(b) where there was no indication that there was any error that affected the judgment in the medical malpractice action; the matter was still tried before a panel of competent, impartial jurors after the juror was excused, and there was nothing that affected the constitutional right to a trial by jury under Tenn. Const art. I, § 6. McDonald v. Shea, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 103 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 16, 2012).

Decisions Under Prior Law

1. Constitutional Right to Trial by Jury.

In a capital murder case, the trial court did not err by refusing to excuse two jurors for cause because the challenged jurors either stated during voir dire that they could be impartial or were rehabilitated, and that the trial court did not err by refusing to excuse them; although one juror initially was skeptical that he could impose a sentence, he changed his position after being advised that a life sentence meant that defendant would serve at least 51 years, and although the other juror initially stated that death was the only proper sentence in a first degree murder case, he later admitted that his view was based on his lack of knowledge about the capital sentencing law. State v. Kiser, — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 890 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 29, 2007), aff'd, 284 S.W.3d 227, 2009 Tenn. LEXIS 303 (Tenn. 2009).

Court rejected defendant's argument that a juror was incompetent to serve because, of all of the prospective jurors, she was the juror whose individual voir dire was the most restricted by the trial court; the fact that defendant knew little about a juror was insufficient to establish her incompetence. State v. Schmeiderer, — S.W.3d —, 2009 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 282 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 9, 2009), aff'd, 319 S.W.3d 607, 2010 Tenn. LEXIS 865 (Tenn. 2010).

Collateral References.

Examination and challenge of state case jurors on basis of attitudes toward homosexuality. 80 A.L.R.5th 469.

Propriety of inquiry on voir dire as to juror's attitude toward, or acquaintance with literature dealing with, amount of damage awards. 63 A.L.R.5th 285.

Use of peremptory challenges to exclude Caucasian persons, as a racial group, from criminal jury—post-Batson state cases. 47 A.L.R.5th 259.

Jury 131(9).

22-3-102. Challenge for general causes of incompetency.

Either party to an action may challenge for cause any person presented as a petit juror, in either a civil or criminal proceeding, who is incompetent to act as a juror under chapter 1 of this title or who has completed a jury service term in any court of this state within the previous twenty-four (24) months.

Acts 2008, ch. 1159, § 1.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 17 Tenn. Juris., Jury, §§ 20-23, 32.

Law Reviews.

The Tennessee Court System (Frederic S. Le Clercq), 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 189.

Rethinking Independence: The Lack of an Effective Remedy for Improper For-Cause Removals (Tracey A. Hardin), 50 Vand. L. Rev. 197 (1997).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Decisions Under Prior Law

1. Constitutional Right to Trial by Jury.

Constitutional provision that jury trial shall remain inviolate protects the right as it existed at common law. Manning v. State, 155 Tenn. 266, 292 S.W. 451, 1926 Tenn. LEXIS 45 (1927), superseded by statute as stated in, State v. Johnson, 692 S.W.2d 412, 1985 Tenn. LEXIS 602 (Tenn. 1985).

The constitutional right to a trial by jury applies to common law actions, and not to equitable actions. Hunt v. Hunt, 169 Tenn. 1, 80 S.W.2d 666, 1934 Tenn. LEXIS 102 (1935).

2. Purpose of Section.

The purpose was to procure integrity and intelligence in the exercise of the functions of jurors and to guard against extraneous influences calculated to affect impartiality. Riley v. Bussell, 48 Tenn. 294, 1870 Tenn. LEXIS 50 (1870).

3. Officer Disqualified.

Where defendant objected only to certain members of jury summoned by officers who were disqualified to summon them by reason of their interest in the result of the case, he was entitled to challenge such jurors for cause without challenge to the array or motion to quash panel in writing. A challenge to the array is not necessary, nor is a written motion to quash the panel. Oliphant v. State, 153 Tenn. 130, 282 S.W. 206, 1925 Tenn. LEXIS 11 (1926).

4. Procedure.

5. —Submission of Question to Court.

Where a person challenges a juror for cause, he must submit the question to the decision of the court, otherwise it will be held to be a peremptory challenge. Crider v. Lifsey, 57 Tenn. 456, 1873 Tenn. LEXIS 236 (1873).

6. —Challenge to the Array.

Challenges to the array or motion to quash the panel must be made in the court below in writing and point out in particularity the grounds relied upon for setting the panel aside. Mahon v. State, 127 Tenn. 535, 156 S.W. 458, 1913 Tenn. LEXIS 1 (1912).

7. —Objection When Made.

The objection that one of the jury was not of lawful age and was not a freeholder or householder, made after verdict, comes too late. Brewer v. Jacobs, 22 F. 217, 1884 U.S. App. LEXIS 2512 (C.C.D. Tenn. 1884).

Collateral References. 50 C.J.S. Juries §§ 267-269.

Former law enforcement officers as qualified jurors in criminal cases. 72 A.L.R.3d 958.

Law enforcement officers as qualified jurors in criminal cases. 72 A.L.R.3d 895.

Membership in racially biased or prejudiced organization as proper subject for voir dire inquiry or ground for challenge. 63 A.L.R.3d 1052.

Religious belief, affiliation or prejudice of prospective juror as proper subject of inquiry or ground for challenge on voir dire. 95 A.L.R.3d 172.

Use of peremptory challenges to exclude Caucasian persons, as a racial group, from criminal jury—post-Batson state cases. 47 A.L.R.5th 259.

Jury 124-133.

22-3-103. Challenge for adverse interest.

Either party to an action may challenge for cause any person who has an adverse interest in a similar suit involving like questions of facts or involving the same parties.

Acts 2008, ch. 1159, § 1.

Textbooks. Tennessee Criminal Practice and Procedure (Raybin), §§ 25.45, 25.54.

Tennessee Jurisprudence, 17 Tenn. Juris., Jury, §§ 22-24, 32.

Law Reviews.

Selecting A Trial Jury In Tennessee, 22 Tenn. L. Rev. 220.

The Tennessee Court Systems — The Jury System, 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 489.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Decisions Under Prior Law

1. Recent Prior Service.

Service within two years is made a ground of challenge for cause, by this section. Crider v. Lifsey, 57 Tenn. 456, 1873 Tenn. LEXIS 236 (1873).

A juror is not competent to serve in the criminal court of the county, if he has, within two years, served as a juror in the circuit court of that county. Smith v. State, 102 Tenn. 721, 52 S.W. 182, 1899 Tenn. LEXIS 80 (1899).

2. —False Statement on Voir Dire.

Fact that a juror falsely stated on his voir dire examination, that he had not served on the regular panel within the last two years, and thereby deceived counsel and prevented his challenge for cause, is a sufficient ground for setting aside a verdict and granting a new trial, especially where this fact is fortified by such conduct of the jury, on and after the trial, as indicated that they were not fair and impartial. Knights Of Pythias v. Steele, 107 Tenn. 1, 63 S.W. 1126, 1901 Tenn. LEXIS 53 (1901).

3. Juror in Case Involving Same Facts.

Where ten of the jurors had tried two other cases against the same defendant, and the proof in the third case consists, in part, of the same proof as in the other two cases, it was error to refuse a motion for a new panel. Apperson v. Logwood, 59 Tenn. 262, 1873 Tenn. LEXIS 54 (1873).

4. Pending Suit.

It is a good cause of challenge that the juror has a suit pending, whether for trial or not at that term, or that he has been tried and acquitted of a criminal charge at that term. Riley v. Bussell, 48 Tenn. 294, 1870 Tenn. LEXIS 50 (1870); Hunt v. State, 2 Shan. 395 (1877); Murphy v. State, 77 Tenn. 373, 1882 Tenn. LEXIS 68 (1882).

5. Disqualification Propter Affectum.

Defendant in rape case did not receive a fair trial by an impartial jury where a juror who was prosecutor on a rape case on the suspended docket on voir dire examination when questioned as to his experience in court did not reveal that he was a prosecutor in undisposed rape case, and challenge to juror after verdict should have been granted since it was within the “propter affectum” class. Durham v. State, 182 Tenn. 577, 188 S.W.2d 555, 1945 Tenn. LEXIS 256, 160 A.L.R. 746 (1945).

6. Other Causes.

It is, it seems, a cause for challenge that the juror has been summoned as a witness for the accused. State v. Underwood, 2 Tenn. 91, 2 Tenn. 92, 1806 Tenn. LEXIS 5 (1806).

It is a cause for challenge that a juror summoned is an alien. Norfleet v. State, 36 Tenn. 340, 1857 Tenn. LEXIS 7 (1857).

Collateral References. 47 Am. Jur. 2d Jury §§ 102-107.

50 C.J.S. Juries §§ 262, 269.

Bias, prejudice, or conduct of individual member or members of jury panel as ground for challenge to array or to entire panel. 76 A.L.R.2d 678.

Competency of juror as affected by his participation in a case of similar character, but not involving the party making the objection. 160 A.L.R. 753.

Defense, prejudice against certain type of, as ground of challenge for cause of juror in criminal case. 112 A.L.R. 531.

Effect of juror's false or erroneous answer on voir dire as to previous claims or actions against himself or his family. 66 A.L.R.4th 509.

Effect of juror's false or erroneous answer on voir dire in personal injury or death action as to previous claims or actions or damages by himself or his family. 38 A.L.R.4th 267.

Excusing qualified juror drawn in criminal case, defendant's right to complain of, as affected by existence or absence of right of peremptory challenge. 96 A.L.R. 514.

Extrinsic evidence in support of challenge to juror for cause, right to introduce, 65 A.L.R. 1056.

Failure of juror in criminal case to disclose his previous jury service within disqualifying period as ground for reversal. 13 A.L.R.2d 1482.

Former jeopardy where jury discharged because of prior service of member as juror. 38 A.L.R. 714.

Implied bias or interest because of relationship to one who would be subject to challenge for that reason, challenge of proposed juror for. 86 A.L.R. 118.

Insurance company, prospective juror's connection with, as ground for challenge for cause in action for personal injuries or damage to property. 103 A.L.R. 511.

Membership in racially biased or prejudiced organization as proper subject of voir dire inquiry or ground for challenge. 63 A.L.R.3d 1052.

Membership in secret order or organization for the suppression of crime as proper subject of examination, or ground of challenge, of juror. 31 A.L.R. 411, 158 A.L.R. 1361.

Personal injury or death action, questions to jury in, as to interest in, or connection with, indemnity insurance company. 56 A.L.R. 1454, 74 A.L.R. 849, 95 A.L.R. 388, 105 A.L.R. 1319, 4 A.L.R.2d 761, 40 A.L.R. Fed. 541.

Presumption of innocence or rule as to reasonable doubt, failure to understand or unwillingness to accept as rendering juror incompetent. 40 A.L.R. 612.

Professional or business relations between proposed juror and attorney as ground for challenge for cause. 52 A.L.R.4th 964.

Propriety and effect of asking prospective jurors hypothetical questions, on voir dire, as to how they would decide issues of case. 99 A.L.R.2d 7.

Propriety of inquiry on voir dire as to juror's attitude toward, or acquaintance with literature dealing with, amount of damage awards. 63 A.L.R.5th 285.

Right of defense in criminal prosecution to disclosure of prosecution information regarding prospective jurors. 86 A.L.R.3d 571.

Secret order or organization for suppression of crime, membership in, as ground of challenge of juror. 158 A.L.R. 1361.

Social or business relationship between proposed juror and nonparty witness as affecting former's qualification as juror. 11 A.L.R.3d 859.

Statutory grounds for challenge of jurors for cause as exclusive of common law grounds. 64 A.L.R. 645.

Unfamiliarity with English as affecting competency of juror. 34 A.L.R. 194.

Use of peremptory challenges to exclude Caucasian persons, as a racial group, from criminal jury—post-Batson state cases. 47 A.L.R.5th 259.

Jury 126.

22-3-104. Peremptory challenges — Effect of consolidation of cases.

Either party to a civil action may challenge four (4) jurors without assigning any cause.
In the event there is more than one (1) party plaintiff or more than one (1) party defendant in a civil action, four (4) additional challenges shall be allowed to such side or sides of the case; and the trial court shall, in its discretion, divide the aggregate number of challenges between the parties on the same side, which shall not exceed eight (8) challenges to the side, regardless of the number of parties. Even when two (2) or more cases are consolidated for trial purposes, the total challenges shall be eight (8), as provided in this subsection (b).
If a party is both a plaintiff and a defendant, that party is considered one (1) party for the purpose of this section.

Acts 2008, ch. 1159, § 1.

Cross-References. Civil actions, right of trial by jury, Tenn. R. Civ. P. 38.

Criminal actions, peremptory challenges, Tenn. R. Crim. P. 24.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 17 Tenn. Juris., Jury, § 35.

Law Reviews.

Cross-Sectionalism in Jury-Selection Procedures After Taylor v. Louisiana (Martha Craig Daughtrey), 43 Tenn. L. Rev. 1.

Jury Reform in Tennessee, 34 U. Mem. L. Rev. 1 (2003).

The All-New Civil Semi-Peremptory Jury Challenge (André Kahn Blumstein), 28 Tenn. B.J. 27 (1992).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

2. Multiple Parties.

Circuit court erred in denying the parents' request for additional peremptory challenges in their wrongful death action (of a child who died during birth) against a hospital, a treating physician, and a medical practice pursuant to the state supreme court's decision in Beard v. Branson, 528 S.W.3d 487, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 540 (Tenn. 2017), upon the child's death, the wrongful death action passed to the parents, who each asserted the wrongful death claim on his or her own behalf, they constituted two “party plaintiffs,” and the trial court's failure to allow them to exercise all eight of the peremptory challenges granted to them by statute constituted prejudice to the judicial process that necessitated a new trial. O'Dneal v. Baptist Mem. Hospital-Tipton, 556 S.W.3d 759, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 63 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 6, 2018), appeal denied, O'Dneal v. Baptist Mem. Hospital-Tipton, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 463 (Tenn. July 19, 2018).

7. Discretion of Judge.

Appellate court rejected defendants claim the trial court erred when it denied plaintiff's challenges for cause to exclude certain prospective jurors. There was nothing in the record to reflect that plaintiff's attorney exercised all of his peremptory challenges, and it was not clear whether any of the excused jurors were challenged peremptorily, much less whether they were challenged peremptorily by plaintiff. Muller v. Higgins, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 512 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 29, 2015).

Decisions Under Prior Law

1. “Party” defined.

“Either party” means the plaintiff or defendant, and each side, regardless of the number of parties thereon, is entitled to only two challenges. Blackburn v. Hays, 44 Tenn. 227, 1867 Tenn. LEXIS 35 (1867), superseded by statute as stated in, Walker v. Jackson, — S.W.2d —, 1992 Tenn. App. LEXIS 626 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 24, 1992), overruled in part, Hunter v. Ura, 163 S.W.3d 686, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 306 (Tenn. 2005); Bruce v. Beall, 100 Tenn. 573, 47 S.W. 204, 1898 Tenn. LEXIS 18 (1898). See Hill v. State, 10 Tenn. 246, 1829 Tenn. LEXIS 1 (1829); Wiggins v. State, 69 Tenn. 738, 1878 Tenn. LEXIS 171 (1878).

2. Multiple Parties.

When there are two plaintiffs in one lawsuit, T.C.A. § 22-3-105 (now § 22-3-104) requires that each be afforded four peremptory challenges; failure to allow the statutorily mandated number of challenges is reversible error. Tuggle v. Allright Parking Sys., 922 S.W.2d 105, 1996 Tenn. LEXIS 302 (Tenn. 1996).

3. Additional Jurors.

If peremptory challenges have been exhausted, the presentation of new proposed jurors will not extend or enlarge the right to such challenge. Bruce v. Beall, 100 Tenn. 573, 47 S.W. 204, 1898 Tenn. LEXIS 18 (1898).

4. Consolidated Cases.

Consolidation of several jury cases under an agreement to try them together does not deprive the respective parties of right to two peremptory challenges. Southern R.R. v. Edwards, 2 Tenn. Civ. App. (2 Higgins) 125 (1911).

Where there is an agreed consolidation of three separate and distinct lawsuits for trial by jury, the plaintiffs are entitled to a total of eight peremptory challenges to their side to be divided among them as the trial judge deems appropriate. Crawford v. Heaberg, 709 S.W.2d 611, 1986 Tenn. App. LEXIS 2729 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986).

5. Number of Challenges Prior to Amendment.

In civil cases each party to the suit whether consisting of one or more persons was entitled to but two peremptory challenges. Kunk v. Howell, 40 Tenn. App. 183, 289 S.W.2d 874, 1956 Tenn. App. LEXIS 133, 73 A.L.R.2d 1304 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1956). (Decision prior to 1955 amendment.)

6. Filling Vacancies Caused by Challenge.

Action of court in requiring defendant to accept the panel or exercise second peremptory challenge before filling vacancy caused by first challenge did not constitute reversible error where there was no showing that the action of the court resulted in the acceptance of an incompetent juror. Kunk v. Howell, 40 Tenn. App. 183, 289 S.W.2d 874, 1956 Tenn. App. LEXIS 133, 73 A.L.R.2d 1304 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1956).

7. Discretion of Judge.

Method of exercising peremptory challenges is generally left to discretion of trial judge. State v. Simon, 635 S.W.2d 498, 1982 Tenn. LEXIS 413 (Tenn. 1982), cert. denied, Simon v. Tennessee, 459 U.S. 1055, 103 S. Ct. 473, 74 L. Ed. 2d 621 (1982).

8. Number of challenges after amendment.

In a wrongful death case, although the trial court erred in granting plaintiff eight peremptory challenges, the error did not harm the administration of justice and did not result in actual harm to defendants because they did not object to the trial court's ruling on peremptory challenges and did not object to the competency of the jurors who were empaneled; like plaintiff, defendants received eight peremptory challenges, of which they exercised five. Hunter v. Ura, 163 S.W.3d 686, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 306 (Tenn. 2005), rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 373 (Tenn. Apr. 27, 2005).

Collateral References. 47 Am. Jur. 2d Jury §§ 287, 290, 293, 313.

50 C.J.S. Juries § 281.

Additional peremptory challenges because of multiple criminal charges. 5 A.L.R.4th 533.

Effect of allowing excessive number of peremptory challenges. 95 A.L.R.2d 957.

Jury: Number of peremptory challenges allowable in civil case where there are more than two parties involved. 32 A.L.R.3d 747.

Use of peremptory challenges to exclude Caucasian persons, as a racial group, from criminal jury—post-Batson state cases. 47 A.L.R.5th 259.

Use of peremptory challenge to exclude from jury persons belonging to race or class. 79 A.L.R.3d 14.

Use of peremptory challenges to exclude persons from criminal jury based on religious affiliation — Post-Batson state cases. 63 A.L.R.5th 375.

Waiver of peremptory challenge or challenges in civil case other than by acceptance of juror. 56 A.L.R.2d 742.

Jury 134-140.

Chapter 4
Compensation of Jurors

22-4-101. Per diem and travel allowance.

Every regular juror, including jurors on chancery court juries, is entitled to receive at least ten dollars ($10.00) for each day's attendance.
The legislative body of any county or the legislative body of the metropolitan government of any county having a metropolitan form of government may by vote increase this rate to an amount in excess of ten dollars ($10.00) for each day's attendance and to allow all tolls necessarily incurred in going to and returning from court and mileage at the rate of ten cents (10¢) per mile on the way from the home of the juror to the courthouse of the county where the juror is summoned and attends. In the alternative, the county may pay each juror a flat rate of eleven dollars ($11.00) per day, or any county with a metropolitan or home rule type of government may, at its option, set the compensation for each juror in its county by ordinance, to be paid out of the county treasury.
This section shall not be intended or considered as repealing or rescinding any special or private act now in effect.
The amount of fees or compensation of juries serving in all criminal actions shall be equal to that of juries serving in felony cases.
Notwithstanding this section, any juror who is sequestered is entitled to receive at least thirty dollars ($30.00) for each day's attendance.

Acts 2008, ch. 1159, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Former chapter 4, §§ 22-4-101 — 22-4-109 (Code 1858, §§ 4031 (deriv. Acts 1829, ch. 4, § 1; 1835-1836, ch. 6, § 8), 4032, 4033 (deriv. Acts 1835-1836, ch. 6, § 8), 4035 (deriv. Acts 1829, ch. 4, § 1), 4036 (deriv. Acts 1827, ch. 49, § 18), 4037 (deriv. Acts 1835-1836, ch. 6, § 8; 1835-1836, ch. 18, § 3); Acts 1866-1867, ch. 3, § 1; 1867-1868, ch. 67, § 1; 1870-1871, ch. 120, § 1; 1875, ch. 42, § 1; 1875, ch. 91, §§ 1, 3; 1899, ch. 7; 1909, ch. 337, §§ 1, 3; 1915, ch. 70, § 1; Shan., §§ 5843-5845, 5847, 5848, 5848a1, 5849; Code 1932, §§ 10042, 10043, 10045-10049; Acts 1949, ch. 129, § 1; C. Supp. 1950, § 10042; Acts 1951, ch. 184, § 1; 1959, ch. 163, § 1; 1965, ch. 61, § 1; 1973, ch. 138, § 1; modified; Acts 1978, ch. 522, § 1; impl. am. Acts 1978, ch. 934, §§ 16, 22, 36; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), §§ 22-401 — 22-408; Acts 1982, ch. 784, § 1; 1985, ch. 43, § 1; 1986, ch. 583, § 1; 1986, ch. 702, § 1; 1986, ch. 760, § 1; 1988, ch. 596, §§ 1, 2; 1989, ch. 101, § 1; 1989, ch. 591, §§ 1, 6; 1992, ch. 894, § 1; 1998, ch. 959, § 1; 1999, ch. 39, § 1; 2004, ch. 523, § 1; 2006, ch. 519, § 1), concerning compensation of jurors, was repealed by Acts 2008, ch. 1159, § 1, effective January 1, 2009.

Cross-References. Liability of state or county, § 40-25-129.

Textbooks. Tennessee Criminal Practice and Procedure (Raybin), § 25.24.

Tennessee Jurisprudence, 17 Tenn. Juris., Jury, § 2.

Law Reviews.

Jury Reform in Tennessee, 34 U. Mem. L. Rev. 1 (2003).

The Tennessee Court System (Frederic S. Le Clercq), 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 189.

Comparative Legislation. Compensation of jurors:

Ala. Code § 12-16-8.

Ark. Code § 16-34-103.

Ga. O.C.G.A. §§ 15-12-7 — 15-12-9.

Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 29A.330.

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 494.455.

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-312.

Va. Code § 14.1-195.1 et seq.

Collateral References. 47 Am. Jur. 2d Jury §§ 84, 86, 87.

50 C.J.S. Juries § 207.

Jury 77.

22-4-102. Tales jurors.

Tales jurors shall be compensated in the same manner as regular jurors.

Acts 2008, ch. 1159, § 1.

22-4-103. Reimbursement of jurors.

To qualify for reimbursement, jurors must prove, under oath, during the jury service term in which they serve and before the jury coordinator, the tolls necessarily incurred in going to or returning from their place of residence to the courthouse.

Acts 2008, ch. 1159, § 1.

22-4-104. Certification of list to county official.

The jury coordinator shall, when the jury pool is discharged, make out and certify a list of the jurors, with the number of days they have respectively served, and the amount due to each, and deliver the list to the appropriate county official, who shall compensate jurors in the amount due to each of them in accordance with applicable financial procedures in the county.

Acts 2008, ch. 1159, § 1.

Cross-References. Evidence of jurors' claims, § 5-9-305.

Collateral References. Clerks of courts 22, 51.

22-4-105. Issuance of warrants.

It is the duty of the county to issue a warrant in payment of jury service every thirty (30) days, for the full amount due up to that time, to each member of a regular, grand or petit jury, when the jury service term extends beyond thirty (30) days in length.

Acts 2008, ch. 1159, § 1.

22-4-106. Absence from employment — Amount of compensation.

1. Upon receiving a summons to report for jury duty, any employee shall, on the next day the employee is engaged in the employee's employment, exhibit the summons to the employee's immediate superior, and the employer shall thereupon excuse the employee from employment for each day the employee's service as a juror in any court of the United States or this state exceeds three (3) hours.
2. If an employee summoned for jury duty is working a night shift or is working during hours preceding those in which court is normally held, the employee shall also be excused from employment as provided by this section for the shift immediately preceding the employee's first day of service. After the first day of service, when the person's responsibility for jury duty exceeds three (3) hours during a day, the person whose circumstances fall within the parameters of this subdivision (a)(2) shall be excused from the person's next scheduled work period occurring within twenty-four (24) hours of that day of jury service. Any question concerning the application of this subdivision (a)(2) to a particular work shift or shifts shall be conclusively resolved by the trial judge of the court to which the employee has been summoned.
Notwithstanding the excused absence as provided in subsection (a), the employee shall be entitled to the employee's usual compensation received from such employment; however, the employer has the discretion to deduct the amount of the fee or compensation the employee receives for serving as a juror. Moreover, no employer shall be required to compensate an employee for more time than was actually spent serving and traveling to and from jury duty. If an employer employs less than five (5) people on a regular basis or if the juror has been employed by an employer on a temporary basis for less than six (6) months, the employer is not required to compensate the juror during the period of jury service pursuant to this section.
It is the duty of all persons paying jurors their fee or compensation for jury service to issue to each juror a statement showing the daily fee or compensation and the total amount of fees or compensation received by the juror. The person also shall provide a juror with a statement showing the number of hours the juror spent serving each day if the juror or juror's employer requests such a statement prior to the service at issue.
1. No employer shall discharge or in any manner discriminate against an employee for serving on jury duty if the employee, prior to taking time off, gives the required notice pursuant to subsection (a).
2. 1. Any employee who is discharged, demoted or suspended because the employee has taken time off to serve on jury duty is entitled to reinstatement and reimbursement for lost wages and work benefits caused by such acts of the employer.
  2. Any employer who willfully refuses to rehire or otherwise restore an employee or former employee commits a Class A misdemeanor.
Any employer who violates this section commits a Class A misdemeanor.
For the purposes of this section, “employer” includes, but is not limited to, the state of Tennessee or any local government.

Acts 2008, ch. 1159, § 1.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class A misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

Textbooks. Pritchard on Wills and Administration of Estates (4th ed., Phillips and Robinson), § 845.

Tennessee Criminal Practice and Procedure (Raybin), § 25.24.

Law Reviews.

Torts — Hodges v. S.C. Toof & Co.: New Substantive and Procedural Changes in the Awarding of Punitive Damages in Tennessee, 23 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 239 (1992).

Tennessee Attempts to Tighten the Purse Strings on Punitive Damages: Hodges v. S.C. Toof & Co. (P. Steven Hacker), 60 Tenn. L. Rev. 983 (1993).

Workers' Compensation — Anderson v. Standard Register Co.: Tennessee Supreme Court Specifies Elements Required to Establish a Cause of Action for Retaliatory Discharge in Workers' Compensation Cases, 24 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 825 (1994).

Revisiting the Tennessee Employment-At-Will Doctrine — What Is the Exception and What Is the Rule? (Frederick J. Lewis, Jeffery A. Jarratt), 19 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 171 (1989).

Attorney General Opinions. Contractor not required to pay temporary craftsmen during jury service, OAG 00-104 (1/27/99).

Jury duty travel compensation. OAG 11-72, 2011 Tenn. AG LEXIS 74 (10/10/11).

Cited: Admiral Webster v. Psychemedics Corporation, — S.W.3d —, 2011 Tenn. App. LEXIS 335 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 24, 2011).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Decisions Under Prior Law

1. Remedies.

The statutory remedy of reinstatement and reimbursement for lost wages and work benefits was not the sole and exclusive relief available to an employee who had been discharged or discriminated against for performing jury duty, and the employee was free to pursue a common law remedy in damages. Hodges v. S. C. Toof & Co., 833 S.W.2d 896, 1992 Tenn. LEXIS 312 (Tenn. 1992), rehearing denied, — S.W.2d —, 1992 Tenn. LEXIS 362 (Tenn. May 26, 1992).

Where a common law right exists, and a statutory remedy is subsequently created, the statutory remedy is cumulative unless expressly stated otherwise. Hodges v. S. C. Toof & Co., 833 S.W.2d 896, 1992 Tenn. LEXIS 312 (Tenn. 1992), rehearing denied, — S.W.2d —, 1992 Tenn. LEXIS 362 (Tenn. May 26, 1992).

2. Punitive Damages.

In Tennessee, a court may henceforth award punitive damages only if it finds a defendant has acted either: (1) Intentionally; (2) Fraudulently; (3) Maliciously; or (4) Recklessly. Hodges v. S. C. Toof & Co., 833 S.W.2d 896, 1992 Tenn. LEXIS 312 (Tenn. 1992), rehearing denied, — S.W.2d —, 1992 Tenn. LEXIS 362 (Tenn. May 26, 1992).

Because punitive damages are to be awarded only in the most egregious of cases, a plaintiff must prove the defendant's intentional, fraudulent, malicious, or reckless conduct by clear and convincing evidence. Hodges v. S. C. Toof & Co., 833 S.W.2d 896, 1992 Tenn. LEXIS 312 (Tenn. 1992), rehearing denied, — S.W.2d —, 1992 Tenn. LEXIS 362 (Tenn. May 26, 1992).

3. Retaliation.

Employer was entitled to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) dismissal of an employee's common law claim for retaliation in violation of Tennessee public policy, because the employee had not been discharged, a necessary element of the claim; the employee, however, stated a claim under T.C.A. § 22-4-108 (now § 22-4-106), because the prohibition against discriminating in any manner encompassed a wider range of possible behaviors than discharge, suspension, and demotion. Turner v. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 488 F. Supp. 2d 672, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36367 (M.D. Tenn. May 16, 2007).

Collateral References.

Wrongful discharge based on public policy derived from professional ethics codes. 52 A.L.R.5th 405.

22-4-107. Donation of juror reimbursement to criminal injuries compensation fund.

Each prospective juror reporting for jury service shall be provided a form letter that, when signed by the prospective juror, directs the county treasurer to donate all of the prospective juror's reimbursement for jury service to the criminal injuries compensation fund provided for in title 29, chapter 13.
The county treasurer shall send all donations made under subsection (a) to the state department of the treasury for deposit to the credit of the criminal injuries compensation fund.

Acts 2008, ch. 1159, § 1.

Chapter 5
Selection and Attendance of Jurors [Repealed]

Part 1
General Provisions [Repealed]

22-5-101. [Repealed.]

Code Commission Notes.

Former ch. 5 (Acts 1959, ch. 8, §§ 1-10, 12-16, 18, 21; 1961, ch. 206, § 1; 1961, ch. 124, § 1; 1967, ch. 182, § 1; 1972, ch. 498, § 1; 1972, ch. 826, § 1; 1974, ch. 548, § 1; 1975, ch. 254, §§ 1, 2; 1980, ch. 714, §§ 1-4; 1980, ch. 903, §§ 1-5, 7- 11; Acts 1981, ch. 82, §§ 1-3; 1981, ch. 317, § 1; 1983, ch. 108, §§ 1, 2; Acts 1984, ch. 649, § 1; 1984, ch. 650, § 1; 1985, ch. 343, §§ 1, 2; 1988, ch. 736, § 1; 1989, ch. 449, § 1; 1989, ch. 591, §§ 1, 6; 1993, ch. 291, § 1; 993, ch. 309, § 1; 1994, ch. 642, § 1; T.C.A., §§ 22-223 — 22-236, 22-238 — 22-244; 2000, ch. 733, § 1; 2005, ch. 254, § 1; 2005, ch. 429, § 3; T.C.A. §§ 22-2-101, 22-2-102; 22-2-201 — 22-2-204; 22-2-301 — 22-2-315) was impliedly deleted by Acts 2011, ch. 209, § 1, effective July 1, 2011. Chapter 209, § 1 deleted § 22-2-101(b)(1) and (2). Since § 22-2-101(b)(1) and (2) have been deleted, title 22, ch. 2 is no longer only effective in certain counties, and jurors and jury panels for the counties formerly referenced in § 22-2-101(b)(1) shall no longer be selected in accordance with title 22, ch. 2 as it existed prior to January 1, 2009, which was formerly compiled in title 22, ch. 5. Title 22, ch. 5 was deleted by the code commission as obsolete.

22-5-102. [Repealed.]

Code Commission Notes.

Part 2
Board of Jury Commissioners [Repealed]

22-5-201. [Repealed.]

Code Commission Notes.

22-5-202. [Repealed.]

Code Commission Notes.

22-5-203. [Repealed.]

Code Commission Notes.

22-5-204. [Repealed.]

Code Commission Notes.

Part 3
Jury Selection and Attendance [Repealed]

22-5-301. [Repealed.]

Code Commission Notes.

22-5-302. [Repealed.]

Code Commission Notes.

22-5-303. [Repealed.]

Code Commission Notes.

22-5-304. [Repealed.]

Code Commission Notes.

22-5-305. [Repealed.]

Code Commission Notes.

22-5-306. [Repealed.]

Code Commission Notes.

22-5-307. [Repealed.]

Code Commission Notes.

22-5-308. [Repealed.]

Code Commission Notes.

22-5-309. [Repealed.]

Code Commission Notes.

22-5-310. [Repealed.]

Code Commission Notes.

22-5-311. [Repealed.]

Code Commission Notes.

22-5-312. [Repealed.]

Code Commission Notes.

22-5-313. [Repealed.]

Code Commission Notes.

22-5-314. [Repealed.]

Code Commission Notes.

22-5-315. [Repealed.]

Code Commission Notes.

Chapter 1 Qualifications and Exemptions

22-1-101. Obligation to serve — Qualifications.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Citizenship — Necessity.

Decisions Under Prior Law

1. In General.

2. Time for Objection to Juror.

3. Citizenship — Necessity.

4. Effect on Private Acts.

5. Exclusion of Qualified Persons.

6. Number of Women Required.

7. Prejudice Must Be Shown.

22-1-102. Incompetent persons.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

2. Convicted Felons.

Decisions Under Prior Law

1. Representation of Distinct Groups to Be Preserved.

2. Convicted Felons.

22-1-103. Excuse from service — Undue or extreme physical or financial hardship — Documentation — Permanent excuse.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

Decisions Under Prior Law

1. Constitutionality.

2. Strict Construction of Exemption.

3. Charter Exemptions — Invalidity.

4. Licensed Attorney Not Practicing.

5. Person Entitled to Claim Exemption.

6. Persons Over 65.

7. Court's Motion to Exclude Jurors.

8. Local Acts.

22-1-104. Disqualification by interest or relationship.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Decisions Under Prior Law

1. Jurors Covered.

2. Affinity.

3. —Affinity Lacking — Example.

4. —Dissolution of Affinity.

5. —Related Juror — Passing to Accused as Error.

6. —Unknown to Juror — Effect.

7. —Sixth Degree.

8. Interest.

9. —Members of Disputing Churches.

10. —Disqualification Propter Affectum.

11. Concealment by Juror.

12. Waiver.

13. Excuse of Juror Proper.

22-1-105. Discharge of unqualified jurors — Reasonable or proper cause.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Accepted Juror.

2. Discharge for Cause Proper.

3. No Prejudice Shown.

4. Presumption of Partiality.

Decisions Under Prior Law

1. Discharge of Juror Before Sworn.

2. —Discretion.

3. —Juror Excluded Without Cause.

4. —Accepted Juror.

5. —Reexamination of Others.

6. —Evidence of Disqualification.

7. —Recall of Unsworn Juror.

8. Discharge of Juror After Sworn.

9. —Challenge by State — Effect.

10. —Proper Cause.

11. Objections.

12. —After Verdict.

13. —Clear and Satisfactory Proof Necessary.

14. Voir Dire Questioning.

15. —By Court.

16. —After Jury Empaneled.

17. —Right of Litigant.

18. New Trial.

19. —Explanation by Juror.

20. —Good Character of Juror.

21. —Discharge Propter Affectum.

22. —Qualification of Juror — State's Burden.

23. Discharge of Jury as Whole.

24. —Causes.

25. —Failure to Agree.

26. —Necessary Discharge of Jury in Criminal Case.

27. —Waiver of Irregularity in Discharge.

Chapter 1
Qualifications and Exemptions

Chapter 2
Selection and Attendance of Jurors

Part 1
General Provisions

Part 2
Jury Coordinator

Part 3
Jury Selection and Attendance

Chapter 3
Examination and Challenge of Jurors