Chapter 1
General Provisions

Part 1
In General

16-1-101. Vesting of judicial power.

The judicial power of the state is vested in judges of the courts of general sessions, recorders of certain towns and cities, circuit courts, criminal courts, common law and chancery courts, chancery courts, courts of appeals, and the supreme court, and other courts created by law.

Code 1858, §§ 4094, 4095 (deriv. Const. 1834, art. 6, § 1); Shan., § 5907; mod. Code 1932, § 10107; modified; impl. am. Acts 1979, ch. 68, §§ 2, 3; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-101.

Cross-References. Constitutional vesting of power, power of general assembly to create courts, Tenn. Const., art. VI, § 1.

Law Reviews.

Drug Treatment Courts and Emergent Experimentalist Government, 53 Vand. L. Rev. 831 (2000).

Inferiority Complex: Should State Courts Follow Lower Federal Court Precedent on the Meaning of Federal Law?, 68 Vand. L. Rev. 53  (2015).

Justiciability in Tennessee, Part Three: Timing (Barbara Kritchevsky), 16 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 177 (1986).

Original Meaning and the Precedent Fallback, 68 Vand. L. Rev. 105 (2015).

Attorney General Opinions. General authority of judges of general sessions to administer oaths is not limited by T.C.A. §§ 8-18-107, 8-18-109(b) or 17-1-105, OAG 03-043 (4/15/03).

Comparative Legislation. General provisions:

Ala.  Code § 12-1-1 et seq.

Ark.  Code § 16-10-101 et seq.

Ga. O.C.G.A. § 15-1-1 et seq.

Miss.  Code Ann. § 9-1-5 et seq.

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 476.010 et seq.

Va. Code § 17-1 et seq.

Cited: Elizabethton v. Carter County, 204 Tenn. 452, 321 S.W.2d 822, 1958 Tenn. LEXIS 276 (1958); Cage v. Sexton, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 495 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 10, 2012).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Municipal Courts.

Municipal courts may be created by the general assembly, under the authority of this section and under Tenn. Const., art. VI, § 1. Deming v. Nichols, 135 Tenn. 295, 186 S.W. 113, 1916 Tenn. LEXIS 27 (1916).

While ordinarily the jurisdiction of municipal courts is limited to cases involving violations of municipal ordinances, it may be extended by the legislature to cases arising under state law. Moore v. State, 159 Tenn. 468, 19 S.W.2d 233, 1928 Tenn. LEXIS 109 (1929).

2. Jurisdiction.

Because the offense occurred in Lawrence County, Tenneesee the Lawrence County Circuit Court had subject matter jurisdiction over defendant's misdemeanor charges; defendant, a resident of the State by his own admission, drove a motor vehicle on a public highway in Lawrence County and then personally appeared in the Lawrence County Circuit Court to stand trial, thus vesting that court with personal jurisdiction. State v. Hirsch, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 887 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 28, 2017).

Collateral References. Courts 1 et seq.

16-1-102. Powers of court.

Every court has the power to:

  1. Enforce order in its immediate presence, or as near thereto as is necessary to prevent interruption, disturbance, or hindrance to its proceedings;
  2. Enforce order before a person or body acting under its authority;
  3. Compel obedience to its judgments, orders, and process, and to the order of a judge out of court, in an action or proceeding in court;
  4. Control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of its officers, and all other persons connected with a judicial proceeding before it, in every matter pertaining to the proceeding;
  5. Administer oaths whenever it may be necessary in the exercise of its powers and duties; and
  6. Control its process and orders.

Code 1858, § 4099; Shan., § 5911; mod. Code 1932, § 10110; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-102.

Textbooks. Gibson's Suits in Chancery (7th ed., Inman), § 306.

Tennessee Criminal Practice and Procedure (Raybin), § 24.14.

Law Reviews.

Clashes with Judges Can't Always be Attributed to “Robitis” (Hon. R. Vann Owens) 28 No. 5 Tenn. B.J. 39 (1992).

Attorney General Opinions. General authority of judges of general sessions to administer oaths is not limited by T.C.A. §§ 8-18-107, 8-18-109(b) or 17-1-105, OAG 03-043 (4/15/03).

Sheriff's disregard of chancery court order.  OAG 10-120, 2010 Tenn. AG LEXIS 126 (12/30/10).

Cited: In re Throneberry, 754 S.W.2d 633, 1988 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 138 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Appellate Court — Enforcement of Judgments and Decrees.

The supreme court of Tennessee has inherent power, as a constituent part, to enforce its final judgments, and to protect them from interference, and such power is guaranteed by subdivisions (3), (4) and (6) of this section, and by § 16-3-202, authorizing the supreme court to issue all writs and process necessary to enforce its jurisdiction. State ex rel. Conner v. Herbert, 127 Tenn. 220, 154 S.W. 957, 1912 Tenn. LEXIS 24 (1912); Chaffin v. Robinson, 187 Tenn. 125, 213 S.W.2d 32, 1948 Tenn. LEXIS 418 (1948).

Where trial court and supreme court had previously sustained validity of annexation ordinance and annexation procedure and same complainants filed suit in chancery court seeking to enjoin collection of taxes in the annexed area and complaint in chancery suit contained basically the same averments as those in the previous proceedings, supreme court issued supersedeas and permanent injunction superseding any action taken or which might be taken in the chancery proceeding and enjoining and restraining complainants from interfering directly or indirectly with previous judgment of the supreme court. State ex rel. Stall v. Knoxville, 211 Tenn. 428, 365 S.W.2d 433, 1963 Tenn. LEXIS 363 (1963).

Supreme court has power and authority to take such action as it deems proper and appropriate to enforce its decrees and orders and to issue all necessary process to prevent interference therewith. State ex rel. Stall v. Knoxville, 211 Tenn. 428, 365 S.W.2d 433, 1963 Tenn. LEXIS 363 (1963).

2. Enforcement of Judgments and Decrees Generally.

The power to enforce final judgments is inherent in all courts as a constituent part and is recognized and guaranteed by statute. State ex rel. Stall v. Knoxville, 211 Tenn. 428, 365 S.W.2d 433, 1963 Tenn. LEXIS 363 (1963).

3. Substitute Service of Process.

Upon motion, supported by affidavit, trial judges may, in the exercise of sound discretion, order in lieu of publication, that the clerk mail a copy of the complaint and summons by return receipt registered mail to defendant's last known address and post a copy of the summons at three public places in the county; that the clerk make an entry on the rule docket so showing, and note thereon and file with the record the document returned, and such a method of substitute service will satisfy both federal and state due process requirements. Dungan v. Dungan, 579 S.W.2d 183, 1979 Tenn. LEXIS 424 (Tenn. 1979).

4. Jurisdiction to Try Attorney.

Trial judge had jurisdiction to try appellant attorney for contempt under the interchange provisions; because the appellant's charges of contempt implicated two judges in the first judicial district as witnesses, all the judges of the first judicial district recused themselves from hearing the case, and accordingly, the presiding judge of the first judicial district requested a judge from the second judicial district to hear the contempt proceedings. Wilson v. Wilson (In re Cowan), 877 S.W.2d 271, 1993 Tenn. App. LEXIS 814 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993).

5. Enforcing Order.

Juvenile defendant acted in a contentious and disruptive manner before the court, in violation of T.C.A. § 16-1-102(1), failed to follow the court's order to sit in the area benches, and resisted arrest when the court ordered that defendant be taken to a holding cell; because the court had the right and the responsibility to punish that conduct, there was no need to address defendant's constitutional concerns regarding T.C.A. § 39-16-602(b), and the jury's decision to find defendant guilty of assault and resisting arrest was proper. State v. Roberts, 106 S.W.3d 658, 2002 Tenn. App. LEXIS 579 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2002 Tenn. LEXIS 685 (Tenn. Dec. 16, 2002).

Trial court did not err in granting a judgment to a former wife on alimony arrears, even though the trial court did not hold the former husband in contempt because the trial court had the power and discretion to enforce its orders in the way it deemed best, T.C.A. § 16-1-102, and a finding of contempt was not a mandatory requirement for the award of arrears; the mere fact the trial court relieved the husband of a contempt finding did not, ipso facto, relieve him of the judgment made by the court for the purpose of enforcing its order. Wilkinson v. Wilkinson, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. App. LEXIS 107 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 19, 2013).

Because a father willfully refused to pay his share of his children's medical expenses despite his ability to do so, the trial court did not err in holding the father in contempt based on his failure to pay the medical expenses. Brunetz v. Brunetz, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 119 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 8, 2019).

6. Due Process

Judgment authorizing a city to demolish property owners'  house was reversed, where the procedure used by the city to demolish the house did not comply with due process. Hearing at which the trial court gave the city authority to demolish the house was a hearing on a contempt motion, but the owners of the house had no notice that the hearing would involve a request for permission to demolish the house. City of Franklin v. Hunter, — S.W.3d —, 2009 Tenn. App. LEXIS 177 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 6, 2009).

Collateral References. 20 Am. Jur. 2d Courts §§ 78, 79.

16-1-103. Contempt.

For the effectual exercise of its powers, every court is vested with the power to punish for contempt, as provided for in this code.

Code 1858, § 4100; Shan., § 5912; Code 1932, § 10111; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-103.

Cross-References. Punishment for contempt, title 29, ch. 9.

Textbooks. Tennessee Criminal Practice and Procedure (Raybin), § 24.14.

Attorney General Opinions. Authority of city court to punish an individual for contempt of court when the person fails to appear in court for an appointed court date.  OAG 11-17, 2011 Tenn. AG LEXIS 19 (2/15/11).

A court has authority to enter a default judgment of contempt in a proceeding for civil contempt if the alleged contemnor fails to respond or appear, as long as the alleged contemnor has been provided with proper notice and the opportunity to respond. OAG 15-36, 2015 Tenn. AG LEXIS 36  (4/21/15).

Cited: In re Throneberry, 754 S.W.2d 633, 1988 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 138 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988); State ex rel. Comm'r DOT v. Cox, 840 S.W.2d 357, 1991 Tenn. App. LEXIS 1006 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991); In re Drake L., — S.W.3d —, 2010 Tenn. App. LEXIS 445 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 13, 2010); Sloan v. Poff, — S.W.3d —, 2011 Tenn. App. LEXIS 153 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 29, 2011); Furlong v. Furlong, 370 S.W.3d 329, 2011 Tenn. App. LEXIS 559 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 14, 2011); State v. Beeler, 387 S.W.3d 511, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 810 (Tenn. May 9, 2012).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Powers.

The power to punish for contempt is inherent in the courts of justice. Thigpen v. Thigpen, 874 S.W.2d 51, 1993 Tenn. App. LEXIS 716 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993).

Trial court had power to impose an order of contempt on three members of a compensation self-insured group trust in liquidation where the members continued to violate court orders to make periodic payments. State ex rel. Flowers v. Tenn. Trucking Ass'n Self Ins. Group Trust, 209 S.W.3d 602, 2006 Tenn. App. LEXIS 251 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006), appeal denied, State ex rel. Flowers v. Tenn. Trucking Ass'n Self Ins. Group Trust & Trucking Servs., — S.W.3d —, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 1010 (Tenn. 2006).

Juvenile court had authority under T.C.A. § 29-9-104 to hold its court clerk in contempt of court and to incarcerate him to compel compliance with its lawful orders to produce court files to court referees. The finding that his noncompliance was willful under T.C.A. § 29-9-102(3) was supported by the evidence. In re Lineweaver, 343 S.W.3d 401, 2010 Tenn. App. LEXIS 75 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 28, 2010), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2010 Tenn. LEXIS 769 (Tenn. Aug. 25, 2010).

2. Limitation of Powers.

The power of the courts to punish for contempt is limited to the cases laid down in § 29-9-102. Scott v. State, 109 Tenn. 390, 71 S.W. 824, 1902 Tenn. LEXIS 82 (1902).

3. Jurisdiction to Try Attorney.

Trial judge had jurisdiction to try appellant attorney for contempt under the interchange provisions; because the appellant's charges of contempt implicated two judges in the first judicial district as witnesses, all the judges of the first judicial district recused themselves from hearing the case, and accordingly, the presiding judge of the first judicial district requested a judge from the second judicial district to hear the contempt proceedings. Wilson v. Wilson (In re Cowan), 877 S.W.2d 271, 1993 Tenn. App. LEXIS 814 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993).

4. No Contempt.

From a doctor's suit against a public hospital regarding his staff privileges being revoked, the doctor's lawyers should not have been held in civil contempt after they sought public records from the hospital while the doctor's interlocutory appeal regarding a discovery dispute was pending because the plain language of the order staying “all proceedings below” was not broad enough to apply to separate actions under T.C.A. § 10-7-505(a) seeking access to public records; the appellate court's stay order could reasonably have been interpreted to apply only to the pending legal and administrative proceedings between the doctor and the hospital. Konvalinka v. Chattanooga-Hamilton County Hosp. Auth., 249 S.W.3d 346, 2008 Tenn. LEXIS 103 (Tenn. Feb. 13, 2008).

5. Contempt.

Dismissal of a third count of contempt against the husband was inappropriate because he was given sufficient notice since the wife's contempt petition satisfied all three requirements of Tenn. R. Crim. P. 42(b)(1). In part, the wife's petition for contempt clearly and accurately referenced the prior orders that prohibited the husband from contacting the wife or coming around her for any reason. Fox v. Fox, — S.W.3d —, 2010 Tenn. App. LEXIS 663 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 26, 2010).

Trial court did not err in fining a mother $ 50 for failing to attend all the counseling sessions ordered in a decree of child support and child custody and in proceeding to decide the mother's motion for modification of a parenting plan and modification of child support despite her failure to comply with the counseling order. There was no harm shown to the children by the mother's failure to attend all the counseling sessions as ordered. Schreur v. Garner, — S.W.3d —, 2011 Tenn. App. LEXIS 331 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 20, 2011).

In a property dispute wherein a trial court ruled a right-of-way “should remain open and unobstructed,” the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding defendant in civil contempt for erecting a gate over the right-of-way because the fact that the order did not contain language explicitly prohibiting a “gate” did not make the order ambiguous or unsupported; the erection of a gate clearly constituted an “obstruction.” Gilreath v. Peters, — S.W.3d —, 2011 Tenn. App. LEXIS 665 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 13, 2011).

Although a trial court did not err in holding a husband in willful contempt, pursuant to T.C.A. §§ 16-1-103 and 29-9-102, for violating a statutorily-mandated temporary injunction, the trial court did err in banning all contact between the husband and the parties'  child as punishment for the contemptuous behavior because the total suspension of the husband's visitation was not the least drastic measure available and was therefore unjustified. Slagle v. Slagle, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 281 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2012).

In a divorce matter, a trial court did not err in holding a husband in willful contempt, pursuant to T.C.A. §§ 16-1-103 and 29-9-102, for violating the statutorily-mandated temporary injunction in T.C.A. § 36-4-106(d)(1)-(7) because the husband withdrew, transferred, and used, hundreds of thousands of dollars in marital assets to finance the “start-up costs” of a new business venture after the parties'  divorce was filed. Slagle v. Slagle, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 281 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2012).

Mother willfully violated the parenting plan by asking the child to repeat to her that his father and stepmother touched his privates, had the ability to comply with the plan, and her conduct constituted civil, not criminal, contempt. Cremeens v. Cremeens, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 599 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 24, 2015).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the father in civil contempt for failing to pay child support, as the evidence showed that the father had the ability to work and was able to meet other obligations. Cisneros v. Cisneros, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 938 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 25, 2015), appeal dismissed, Cisneros v. Miller, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 6, 2017).

Collateral References. Contempt 32-36.

16-1-104. Conflicts in use of courtroom.

In case of conflict among the courts, the use of the courtroom may be regulated by consent, in which case the court yielding the room may hold its session in any other room within the limits of the county seat. If no agreement is made, the circuit court shall be preferred to the chancery court. If excluded from the courtroom on Monday, the circuit court shall try no jury causes on that day, except by consent of parties.

Code 1858, § 4097 (deriv. Acts 1835-1836, ch. 18, § 12); Shan., § 5909; Code 1932, § 10109; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-104.

Textbooks. Tennessee Criminal Practice and Procedure (Raybin), § 24.16.

Attorney General Opinions. Distribution of court space by presiding judge, OAG 99-049 (3/2/99).

Cited: State v. Parton, 817 S.W.2d 28, 1991 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 406 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991).

Collateral References. Courts 72.

16-1-105. Holding court outside of courthouse or in courthouse or room outside county seat.

    1. If for any cause, in the opinion of the court deemed sufficient, it is impracticable or inconvenient for any court to hold its session at the courthouse, or place designated by law, it shall be lawful for the court to hold its session, or any part of its session, at any other room within the limits of the county seat, or at any other room open to the public within an institution of the department of correction or the department of children's services if the court deems it necessary, and all its proceedings at such place, whether in civil or criminal cases, are as valid as if done at the courthouse.
      1. It is lawful for the court to temporarily hold its session, or any part of its session, in a courthouse or other room located outside the county seat if:
        1. The courthouse in the county seat is rendered temporarily unusable by reason of a natural disaster;
        2. Trials and other judicial proceedings are scheduled to be held in the courthouse during the time the courthouse is temporarily unusable;
        3. Another room located within the county seat with sufficient security and otherwise suitable for conducting court proceedings is not available; and
        4. The presiding judge of the district determines that extraordinary circumstances exist such that temporarily moving the judicial proceedings outside the county seat is in the best interests of justice.
      2. If the presiding judge of the judicial district determines the requirements of subdivision (a)(2)(A) have been met, the presiding judge will consult with the person who schedules events and proceedings at the location outside the county seat to determine dates when the courthouse or room outside the county seat is available for use.
      3. When the courthouse, or place designated by law, within the county seat is ready for use, judicial proceedings must be returned to the courthouse of the county seat, unless a trial is in progress at the time the courthouse within the county seat is ready for use and all parties involved agree to keep the matter in the courthouse or room outside the county seat until the conclusion of the case.
      4. All proceedings held pursuant to this subdivision (a)(2) in a courthouse or other room located outside the county seat, whether civil or criminal cases, are as valid as if done at the courthouse within the county seat.
      5. Nothing in this subdivision (a)(2) allows:
        1. The direct or indirect relocation of the county seat; or
        2. A court to lawfully hold its session at a courthouse or other room located outside the county seat for a period of time longer than is necessary to relocate or reconstruct a courthouse or other room within the limits of the county seat, except as provided in subdivision (a)(2)(C).
      6. As used in this subdivision (a)(2), “natural disaster” has the same meaning as defined in § 4-31-803.
  1. Nothing in this section shall be construed as preventing or prohibiting a county that has constructed a criminal justice building or facility, or that uses a building or facility, that is not located within the limits of the county seat, from holding criminal court in that building or facility; provided, that it is located within the limits of the county. If the building or facility is used to hold criminal court, a defendant may be indicted, prosecuted, tried and convicted in that building or facility as if done at the courthouse.

Code 1858, § 4096 (deriv. Acts 1835-1836, ch. 6, § 7; 1835-1836, ch. 18, § 13); Shan., § 5908; Code 1932, § 10108; modified; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-105; Acts 1985 (1st E.S.), ch. 12, § 1; 1989, ch. 278, § 28; 1996, ch. 1079, § 30; 2006, ch. 630, § 2; 2020, ch. 805, § 1.

Amendments. The 2020 amendment added (a)(2).

Effective Dates. Acts 2020, ch. 805, § 2. July 15, 2020.

Textbooks. Tennessee Criminal Practice and Procedure (Raybin), § 24.16.

Tennessee Jurisprudence, 17 Tenn. Juris., Justices of Peace and General Sessions Courts, § 2.

Attorney General Opinions. Distribution of court space by presiding judge, OAG 99-049 (3/2/99).

Unless expressly authorized by T.C.A. §§ 16-2-106 through 16-2-402 or a private act, neither a general sessions nor a circuit court may regularly hold its sessions outside the city limits of the county seat, OAG 05-122 (8/8/05).

Cited: State v. Upchurch, 620 S.W.2d 540, 1981 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 366 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1980); State v. Parton, 817 S.W.2d 28, 1991 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 406 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991); State v. Carruthers, 35 S.W.3d 516, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 683 (Tenn. 2000); State v. Rimmer, — S.W.3d —, 2006 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 986 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 15, 2006).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Perjury Committed in Building Other Than Courthouse.

Circuit court had jurisdiction to try defendant for perjury committed while court was sitting in federal custom house during period in which courthouse was undergoing repairs, since this section of the Code authorized court to occupy rooms away from courthouse under such circumstances. Exum v. State, 90 Tenn. 501, 17 S.W. 107, 1891 Tenn. LEXIS 32, 25 Am. St. Rep. 700, 15 L.R.A. 381 (1891).

Collateral References. 20 Am. Jur. 2d Courts § 36.

21 C.J.S. Courts §§ 164, 166.

16-1-106. Minutes.

  1. The minutes of the court for each day's work shall be signed by the judge. The minute book shall provide a place for the judge's signature after the minute entries each day; however, where the orders of the court are photocopied so that an accurate facsimile of the entire order and judge's signature appears, it shall be sufficient for the judge to sign at the end of the minute book approving all the minutes in the book.
  2. When any judge or chancellor fails to sign the minutes of the judge's or chancellor's court because of death, vacancy in office or disability, or for any other reason, the judge's or chancellor's successor shall examine all the unsigned minutes, and if the successor finds that the unsigned minutes satisfactorily represent the true and complete proceedings of the court, the successor shall so certify. The judge's or chancellor's successor shall examine any decree or order that has been signed by the deceased or disabled predecessor but that has not been spread upon the minutes of the court, and if the successor finds that the decree or order is a true and complete decree or order, the successor shall direct that the decree or order be spread upon the minutes of the court and certify the minutes. Any minutes certified by a judge or chancellor pursuant to this subsection (b) have the same force and effect as minutes entered pursuant to subsection (a).

Code 1858, § 4101 (deriv. Acts 1809 (Sept.), ch. 49, § 20); Shan., § 5913; Code 1932, § 10112; Acts 1967, ch. 81, § 1; 1972, ch. 803, § 1; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-106; Acts 1984, ch. 756, § 1.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 16 Tenn. Juris., Judgments and Decrees, § 25.

Law Reviews.

The Procedural Details of the Proposed Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, IV. The Record on Appeal (John L. Sobieski, Jr.), 46 Tenn. L. Rev. 35.

Cited: Hull v. Vaughn, 171 Tenn. 642, 107 S.W.2d 219, 1937 Tenn. LEXIS 146 (1937); State v. Hodge, — S.W.3d —, 2009 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 763 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 16, 2009); State v. Houston, 328 S.W.3d 867, 2010 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 197 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 3, 2010).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Purpose.

The failure to read and sign the minutes each morning in open court, and the signing of the same at chambers, or in another town or place, after the court has adjourned, is severely reprehended and deprecated, as likely to result in surreptitious entries and evil practices. Bass v. State, 65 Tenn. 579, 1872 Tenn. LEXIS 457 (1873).

Minutes are indigenous to courts of record, and when signed by a trial judge they become the highest evidence of what has been done in the court. Ray v. State, 577 S.W.2d 681, 1978 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 280 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978).

2. Nature of Statute.

The requirement of this section that the minutes of the court shall be signed by the judge is directory only. Jackson v. Jackson, 3 Shan. 18 (1878); State ex rel. Pierce v. Hardin, 163 Tenn. 471, 43 S.W.2d 924, 1931 Tenn. LEXIS 137 (1931); Duboise v. State, 200 Tenn. 93, 290 S.W.2d 646, 1956 Tenn. LEXIS 380 (1956).

The provisions of this section are merely directory and not mandatory. Duboise v. State, 200 Tenn. 93, 290 S.W.2d 646, 1956 Tenn. LEXIS 380 (1956).

While this section has repeatedly been construed as being directory rather than mandatory, it is nevertheless right and proper that such directions not be ignored. Howard v. State, 217 Tenn. 556, 399 S.W.2d 738, 1966 Tenn. LEXIS 609 (1966).

3. Minutes.

The minutes, signed as required by this statute, and thus authenticated, are made the highest evidence of what was done in court; and, so far as they are records of judicial proceedings, they import absolute verity, and are conclusive unless attacked for fraud. Moore v. State, 50 Tenn. 493, 1872 Tenn. LEXIS 23 (1871); Conway v. Brown, 52 Tenn. 237, 1871 Tenn. LEXIS 255 (1871); Dyer v. State, 79 Tenn. 509, 1883 Tenn. LEXIS 96 (1883); Chrisman v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 178 Tenn. 321, 157 S.W.2d 831, 1941 Tenn. LEXIS 62 (1942).

Contention of the defendant that the minutes of the court were not properly signed because trial judge only signed the minute book at the close of all the entries for the day was without merit as no more was required. Fuller v. State, 504 S.W.2d 385, 1973 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 220 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1973).

4. —Failure to Enter Judgment on Day Pronounced — Effect.

Although this section contemplates that a judgment be entered on the day it is pronounced, the statute is directory only; however, the failure to comply with it delays execution of the judgment. Welch v. State, 553 S.W.2d 917, 1977 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 282 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1977).

5. —Failure to Sign — Effect.

The failure of a judge, through inadvertence or accident, to sign the minutes of the court for the day on which a judgment was recovered, does not invalidate the judgment, the provisions of the statute on this subject being directory. Jackson v. Jackson, 3 Shan. 18 (1878).

The minutes of records of courts are generally required to be authenticated by the signature of the judge, but failure of the judge to sign the record as directed by statute does not make the judgment a nullity; it is at most irregular and erroneous, but not void. Crum v. Fillers, 6 Tenn. App. 547, — S.W. —, 1926 Tenn. App. LEXIS 149 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1926).

Failure of trial judge to sign minutes which contained order convicting defendants or minutes overruling motion for new trial did not invalidate judgment of conviction. Duboise v. State, 200 Tenn. 93, 290 S.W.2d 646, 1956 Tenn. LEXIS 380 (1956).

Decree was not invalid because chancellor failed to sign minutes containing such decree. Cobb v. Brown, 42 Tenn. App. 595, 305 S.W.2d 241, 1956 Tenn. App. LEXIS 145 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1956).

6. —Presumption as to Signing.

It will be presumed that the chancellor performed his duty and signed the minutes. Hull v. Vaughn, 171 Tenn. 642, 107 S.W.2d 219, 1937 Tenn. LEXIS 146 (1937).

7. Bill of Exceptions — Death of Judge without Signing.

Unsigned bill of exceptions, if agreed to by counsel, may be considered by the supreme court, where the judge died pending a motion for a new trial, before the adjournment of the court and before the expiration of the time for signing the bill of exceptions. Sims v. State, 72 Tenn. 357, 1880 Tenn. LEXIS 27 (1880).

8. General Sessions Court — Nature of Dockets.

Where the dockets provided for by Private Acts 1937, ch. 12 creating a court of general sessions for Davidson County were no more than those formerly kept by the justices of the peace whose judicial powers and functions the court took over and where there was no provision that such dockets should be read aloud each morning and verified by signature of the judge, such records did not approach the dignity and verity of the authenticated minutes of a court of record and such court was not a court of record. Chrisman v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 178 Tenn. 321, 157 S.W.2d 831, 1941 Tenn. LEXIS 62 (1942).

Collateral References. 20 Am. Jur. 2d Courts §§ 51, 53, 54, 56-59, 61, 62.

Courts 113.

16-1-107. Power to sell land.

In all suits, instituted according to law, to sell the real estate of decedents for the payment of debts, or to sell lands for partition, a court of record may decree a sale of lands lying in any part of the state.

Code 1858, § 4102 (deriv. Acts 1847-1848, ch. 170); Shan., § 5914; mod. Code 1932, § 10113; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-107.

Law Reviews.

Abolishing Local Action Rules: A First Step toward Modernizing Jurisdiction and Venue in Tennessee, 34 U. Mem. L. Rev. 251 (2004).

Cited: French v. Buffatt, 161 Tenn. 500, 33 S.W.2d 92, 1930 Tenn. LEXIS 35 (1930).

Collateral References. Judicial Sales 7.

16-1-108. Vesting title by decree or clerk's deed.

Courts having jurisdiction to sell lands, instead of ordering parties to convey, may divest and vest title directly by decree, or empower the clerk to make title.

Code 1858, § 4103 (deriv. Acts 1801, ch. 6, § 48; 1837-1838, ch. 176, § 1); Shan., § 5915; Code 1932, § 10114; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-108.

Cross-References. Judgment for specific acts; vesting title, Tenn. R. Civ. P. 70.

Textbooks. Gibson's Suits in Chancery (7th ed., Inman), §§ 301, 303, 306.

Tennessee Jurisprudence, 16 Tenn. Juris., Judicial Sales, §§ 12, 38.

Law Reviews.

Quiet Title Actions in Tennessee, 15 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 263 (1985).

Cited: Davis v. Solari, 132 Tenn. 225, 177 S.W. 939, 1915 Tenn. LEXIS 16 (1915); Searight v. White Sewing Mach. Co., 140 Tenn. 50, 203 S.W. 330, 1918 Tenn. LEXIS 18 (1918); Roberts v. Roberts, — S.W.3d —, 2011 Tenn. App. LEXIS 197 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 19, 2011).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Transfer of Title.

A bid at a master's sale continues as a mere offer until the court rejects it or accepts it. But the purchaser does not become the owner of the legal title, unless the decree divests and vests title, or unless a deed is made by the master pursuant to a decree ordering him so to do, or unless, on being so ordered, the master fails to make the deed within a reasonable time, in which latter event, the title will vest in the purchaser by the mere lapse of such reasonable time. Camp v. Riddle, 128 Tenn. 294, 160 S.W. 844, 1913 Tenn. LEXIS 49 (1913).

2. Confirmation.

Confirmation of report of sale constitutes and completes the contract in court sales of land. Eakin & Co. v. Herbert, 44 Tenn. 116, 1867 Tenn. LEXIS 19 (1867); Myers v. Lindsay, 73 Tenn. 331, 1880 Tenn. LEXIS 132 (1880).

Sale of personal property was complete without a confirmation by decree. Saunders & Aycock v. Stallings, 52 Tenn. 65, 1871 Tenn. LEXIS 234 (1871).

In case of real property confirmation completes the sale without formal divestiture and investiture in purchaser in whom there is all the beneficial interest regardless of the naked legal title being outstanding. Williams v. Clark, 51 S.W. 130, 1898 Tenn. Ch. App. LEXIS 135 (1898); Killough v. Warren, 58 S.W. 898, 1899 Tenn. Ch. App. LEXIS 182 (Tenn. Ch. App. 1899).

3. Failure of Master to Make Deed.

Decree directing reformation of deed and conveyance of property to complainant by clerk and master operated to invest title in complainant from the date of the decree even though clerk and master did not execute the deed. Behrn v. White, 108 Tenn. 392, 67 S.W. 810, 1901 Tenn. LEXIS 39 (1902).

A sufficient time did not, as a matter of law, elapse between December, 1876, when a decree directed the master to make a deed for land purchased at judicial sale, and February, 1877, to vest the legal title in the purchaser without a deed, by lapse of time. Camp v. Riddle, 128 Tenn. 294, 160 S.W. 844, 1913 Tenn. LEXIS 49 (1913).

4. Transfer of Interest before Receiving Sheriff's Deed.

A purchaser of land at a court sale may before he takes the sheriff's deed transfer in good faith such interest as he acquired under the purchase and no registration of such transfer is required. Spicer v. Kimes, 25 Tenn. App. 247, 156 S.W.2d 334, 1941 Tenn. App. LEXIS 102 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1941).

Where decree of court vested title in purchaser but before the deeds were executed by the clerk, the purchaser asked the court to make an order directing the clerk to execute the deeds to him and his wife, which order was entered on the minutes and the deeds were so executed, such procedure vested title in the purchaser and his wife as tenants by the entireties. Spicer v. Kimes, 25 Tenn. App. 247, 156 S.W.2d 334, 1941 Tenn. App. LEXIS 102 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1941).

5. Decree as Evidence.

Such a decree when proper and registered may be introduced as evidence, without production of other parts of the record. Whitmore v. Johnson's Heirs, 29 Tenn. 610, 1850 Tenn. LEXIS 41 (1850).

16-1-109. Registration of decree or clerk's deed.

The decree or deed of the clerk, as the case may be, has the same force and effect as a conveyance by the party, and shall be registered.

Code 1858, § 4104 (deriv. Acts 1801, ch. 6, § 48; 1837-1838, ch. 176); Shan., § 5916; Code 1932, § 10115; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-109.

Cross-References. Judgment for specific acts; vesting title, Tenn R. Civ. P. 70.

Textbooks. Gibson's Suits in Chancery (7th ed., Inman), § 303.

Law Reviews.

The Tennessee Recording System (Toxey H. Sewell), 50 Tenn. L. Rev. 1 (1982).

Cited: Roberts v. Roberts, — S.W.3d —, 2011 Tenn. App. LEXIS 197 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 19, 2011).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Effect of Decree or Deed.

The decree or deed has the effect of a deed duly executed and acknowledged by the parties in interest. White v. O'Bryan, 148 Tenn. 18, 251 S.W. 785, 1922 Tenn. LEXIS 77 (1922).

2. Final Divorce Decree.

Trial court did not err by failing to order a wife to file a quit claim on the marital residence awarded to the husband because the final divorce decree, pursuant to which the husband was awarded the marital residence, had the same force and effect as a conveyance by the party and had to be registered. Gentry v. Gentry, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 838 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2017).

16-1-110. Implied covenants in sales of land.

In cases where the sale is made at the voluntary instance of parties, the decree or deed of the clerk shall imply a covenant of seisin and warranty of title by the parties whose interest is sold, their heirs and representatives, unless otherwise provided in the face of the decree.

Code 1858, § 4105; Shan., § 5917; Code 1932, § 10116; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-110.

Textbooks. Gibson's Suits in Chancery (7th ed., Inman), § 303.

Tennessee Jurisprudence, 16 Tenn. Juris., Judicial Sales, § 12; 20 Tenn. Juris., Partition, § 22.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. In General.

Implied warranty of title and against encumbrances, where the court sale is made at the instance of the parties for the conversion of their interests into the money, or for like purposes. Staunton v. Harris, 56 Tenn. 579, 1872 Tenn. LEXIS 178 (1872).

Where land is sold in constraint of law, in invitum, for the benefit of creditors, either under execution or under the decrees or orders of any competent court, the purchaser obtains no warranty of title or covenants against encumbrances, and can have no recourse on the creditor for any encumbrances, deficiency, or for failure of title, though he may recover for some encumbrances of the party as whose property the land was sold. Staunton v. Harris, 56 Tenn. 579, 1872 Tenn. LEXIS 178 (1872); Childress v. Vance, 60 Tenn. 406, 1872 Tenn. LEXIS 522 (1873); Hously v. Lindsay, 57 Tenn. 651, 1873 Tenn. LEXIS 281 (1873); Foster v. Bradford, 1 Tenn. Ch. 400 (1873); Myers v. Lindsay, 73 Tenn. 331, 1880 Tenn. LEXIS 132 (1880); Chandler v. Jobe, 73 Tenn. 591, 1880 Tenn. LEXIS 189 (1880); Williams v. Whitmore, 77 Tenn. 262, 1882 Tenn. LEXIS 49 (1882); Mayor of Nashville v. Cowan, 78 Tenn. 209, 1882 Tenn. LEXIS 165 (1882); Irby v. Irby, 79 Tenn. 165, 1883 Tenn. LEXIS 34 (1883); State v. Hill, 87 Tenn. 638, 11 S.W. 610, 1889 Tenn. LEXIS 15 (1889); Hunt v. Memphis Gaslight Co., 95 Tenn. 136, 31 S.W. 1006, 1895 Tenn. LEXIS 72 (1895); Brown v. Timmons, 110 Tenn. 148, 72 S.W. 958, 1902 Tenn. LEXIS 48 (1903).

2. Sales for Partition.

3. —Decisions not Based on This Section.

In sales for petition authorized by statute where the buyer obtains a defective title and discovers the fact before the conveyance is executed he may recover his purchase money. Deaderick v. Smith, 25 Tenn. 138, 1845 Tenn. LEXIS 46 (1845); Read v. Fite, 27 Tenn. 328, 1847 Tenn. LEXIS 81 (1847); Foster v. Bradford, 1 Tenn. Ch. 400 (1873).

4. Warranties Binding on Parties.

Where the sale of land for a partition was made on the theory that the interests of the remaindermen were vested, whereas in fact they were contingent, the purchasers are not entitled to be relieved from their purchase on their contention that they were thereby deprived of the implied warranty of title, given by this section, where a sale for partition was made at the voluntary instance of the parties. Jordan v. Jordan, 145 Tenn. 378, 239 S.W. 423, 1921 Tenn. LEXIS 86 (1922).

Collateral References. Judicial Sales 50(1).

16-1-111. Use of papers filed in federal courts.

In all cases that have been removed from the courts of the state to the federal courts, and that have been afterward remanded to the state courts, the pleadings, depositions and proofs that have been filed in the federal court during its pendency there shall be used as if the pleadings, depositions and proofs had been originally filed in the state court. In cases where the original depositions, pleadings and proofs cannot be obtained from the federal court for use in the state court, then certified copies of the original depositions, pleadings and proofs may be obtained from the federal court, for use in the state court, instead of the originals.

Acts 1903, ch. 17, §§ 1, 2; Shan., §§ 5917a1, 5917a2; mod. Code 1932, §§ 10117, 10118; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-111.

Textbooks. Gibson's Suits in Chancery (7th ed., Inman), § 317.

16-1-112. Justice of the peace — Name change throughout code.

Tennessee Code Annotated is amended in each of its provisions providing the judicial powers, duties, functions or jurisdiction of the justice of the peace to delete references to “justice of the peace” or any variation of those words and to substitute instead references to the “court of general sessions” or “judge of the court of general sessions” or a variation of those words. The Tennessee code commission is granted the authority to reword the provisions to conform to the appropriate reference and sentence structure and to make grammatical changes necessary to effect those word changes without any change of substantive law.

Acts 1979, ch. 68, § 3; T.C.A., § 19-102.

Textbooks. Tennessee Criminal Practice and Procedure (Raybin), § 7.1.

Tennessee Jurisprudence, 2 Tenn. Juris., Appeal and Error, § 251; 17 Tenn. Juris., Justices of Peace and General Sessions Courts, §§ 1, 2.

Collateral References. Justices of the peace 3.

16-1-113. Court business and filings — Facsimile transmissions.

  1. It is the intent of the general assembly, in recognition of the common practice and use of facsimile transmissions (faxes) in business and government, to:
    1. Promote a more efficient means of filing documents and overcome expenses and delays entailed in long distance communication; and
    2. Enable courts in this state to implement procedures for the filing of documents by fax.
  2. Courts in this state may implement procedures for the transmission of documents by fax machines in accordance with this section and § 16-3-408 and the Tennessee supreme court rules.

Acts 1991, ch. 146, §§ 1, 2.

Cited: Cruse v. City of Columbia, 922 S.W.2d 492, 1996 Tenn. LEXIS 305 (Tenn. 1996).

16-1-114. Immunity for judges sitting specially or by interchange.

Any judge or lawyer sitting specially under § 16-15-209 or § 17-2-208 or by interchange shall have the same immunity as the judge for whom the judge or lawyer is sitting, and the state or county that would provide the defense for the judge for whom the lawyer or judge is sitting shall be required to provide the defense for the substitute judge.

Acts 1997, ch. 473, § 1.

16-1-115. Electronic signatures.

Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, courts in this state may implement procedures for the use of electronic signatures in the signing of pleadings, court orders, judgment orders, affidavits of complaint, arrest warrants, a mittimus or other court documents. An electronic signature may be used to sign a document and shall have the same force and effect as a written signature.

Acts 1997, ch. 505, § 1.

Law Reviews.

The E-Sign Act: A Move in the Right Direction and a Boost for E-Commerce (Daniel W. Van Horn), 37 No. 2 Tenn. B.J. 14 (2001).

Attorney General Opinions. In allowing an officer to use an electronic signature, a detailed proposal for the issuance of an arrest warrant conformed with the statutory provision giving electronic signatures the same force and effect as written signatures in affidavits of complaint and arrest warrants; therefore, the resulting one-page arrest warrant with the electronic signature of the affiant and two original signatures of the judicial commissioner constituted a valid charging instrument, OAG 00-124 (8/7/00).

If an affiant personally appears before a judicial commissioner to swear to the allegations of the arrest warrant and signs the warrant using an electronic signature pad, the resulting arrest warrant bearing the electronic signature constitutes a valid charging instrument, OAG 00-124 (8/7/00).

16-1-116. Transfer of actions or appeals.

Notwithstanding any other provision of law or rule of court to the contrary, when an original civil action, an appeal from the judgment of a court of general sessions, or a petition for review of a final decision in a contested case under the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, compiled in title 4, chapter 5, is filed in a state or county court of record or a general sessions court and such court determines that it lacks jurisdiction, the court shall, if it is in the interest of justice, transfer the action or appeal to any other such court in which the action or appeal could have been brought at the time it was originally filed. Upon such a transfer, the action or appeal shall proceed as if it had been originally filed in the court to which it is transferred on the date upon which it was actually filed in the court from which it was transferred.

Acts 2000, ch. 794, § 1.

Cited: Hawkins v. Tenn. Dep't of Corr., 127 S.W.3d 749, 2002 Tenn. App. LEXIS 536 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002); Benson v. Herbst, 240 S.W.3d 235, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 317 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 18, 2007); Ward v. Nat'l Healthcare Corp., — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 695 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 15, 2007); Williams v. City of Milan, — S.W.3d —, 2011 Tenn. App. LEXIS 67 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 16, 2011); Burkhart v. City of Clarksville, — S.W.3d —, 2011 Tenn. App. LEXIS 161 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 1, 2011); Suggs v. Gallaway Health Care Ctr., — S.W.3d —, 2011 Tenn. App. LEXIS 185 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 18, 2011); Carbone v. Blaeser, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 780 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 14, 2012).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Applicability.

While T.C.A. § 16-1-116 applied generally to cases incorrectly filed in one court which may be transferred to another court, T.C.A. § 9-8-307 applied specifically to the transfer of claims from a court to the Tennessee Claims Commission; therefore, the more general statute, T.C.A. § 16-1-116, was inapplicable. Turner v. State, 184 S.W.3d 701, 2005 Tenn. App. LEXIS 380 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005).

In a prison inmate's suit against the department of corrections challenging a disciplinary decision against him, dismissal of the inmate's suit was proper as T.C.A. § 41-21-803 expressly provided that the inmate's action be brought in the county in which the correctional facility was located, and he failed to do so; furthermore, the chancellor applied the correct legal standard, and her discretionary determination for not transferring the case to the proper venue was based upon and a consequence of the inmate's previous acts and omissions. Jones v. Tenn. Dep't of Corr., — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 273 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 27, 2007), overruled, Womack v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 448 S.W.3d 362, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 659 (Tenn. Sept. 22, 2014).

Prison inmate's certiorari petition seeking judicial review of a disciplinary proceeding, which petition was filed in a county other than that of the prison, was properly dismissed because the venue requirement of T.C.A. § 41-21-803 was jurisdictional, and the petition also had several procedural defects under T.C.A. § 27-8-104(a) and T.C.A. § 27-8-106, so that neither the interests of justice nor the principles of judicial economy would be served by transferring the case to the proper county. Clark v. S. Cent. Corr. Facility, — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 442 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 17, 2007), overruled, Womack v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 448 S.W.3d 362, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 659 (Tenn. Sept. 22, 2014).

Prisoner's challenge to the actions of an administrative disciplinary board and prison officials at a privately operated prison was properly dismissed for improper venue as the more specific venue statute, T.C.A. § 41-21-803, controlled; the county where the prison was located was the only county in whose courts the suit could be filed. Rice v. Turner, — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 701 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 15, 2007).

Appellate court denied defendant's request that his habeas corpus petition be treated as one for postconviction relief and that the appellate court order the Davidson county court to transfer the matter to the Maury county criminal court to proceed as if the petition was for postconviction relief, because without express authority, it would not order a transfer; the appellate court was not persuaded that T.C.A. § 16-1-116 applied, as postconviction proceedings were governed specifically by T.C.A. § 40-30-101 et seq., and habeas corpus actions were governed specifically by T.C.A. § 29-21-119. Carter v. Bell, — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 745 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 21, 2007), aff'd, 279 S.W.3d 560, 2009 Tenn. LEXIS 307 (Tenn. 2009).

In a family's medical malpractice suit against a doctor, his employer, and a hospital, as the family and the employer were in the same county (the hospital was not), and the cause of action arose out of medical treatment provided in that county, transfer of venue to that county under T.C.A. § 20-4-101(b) was proper; since the entire case could have been brought in that county initially, transfer there pursuant to T.C.A. § 16-1-116 was permissible. Pack v. Ross, 288 S.W.3d 870, 2008 Tenn. App. LEXIS 223 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 9, 2008).

In a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 case in which a pro se state inmate filed his complaint in the incorrect venue pursuant to T.C.A. § 41-21-803, the trial court did not err in dismissing the petition. While the inmate had filed an affidavit to proceed in forma pauperis, as required by T.C.A. § 41-21-805, he failed to list any prior lawsuits or claims filed by him. Hayes v. State, 341 S.W.3d 293, 2009 Tenn. App. LEXIS 681 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 8, 2009), appeal dismissed, Hayes v. Turner, — S.W.3d —, 2010 Tenn. LEXIS 95 (Tenn. Feb. 16, 2010).

In a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 case in which a pro se state inmate filed his complaint in the incorrect venue pursuant to T.C.A. § 41-21-803, the trial court did not err in dismissing the petition since the inmate had not exhausted his administrative remedies as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e, and exhaustion was a prerequisite to filing an action. Hayes v. State, 341 S.W.3d 293, 2009 Tenn. App. LEXIS 681 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 8, 2009), appeal dismissed, Hayes v. Turner, — S.W.3d —, 2010 Tenn. LEXIS 95 (Tenn. Feb. 16, 2010).

Chancery court erred in granting summary judgment and dismissing an employee's retaliatory discharge case rather than granting the public employer's motion to transfer because the employer raised a jurisdictional objection and, therefore, transfer was mandated. Young v. Davis, — S.W.3d —, 2009 Tenn. App. LEXIS 728 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 30, 2009), overruled in part, Sneed v. City of Red Bank, 459 S.W.3d 17, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 962 (Tenn. Dec. 2, 2014), overruled, Young v. City of Lafollette, 479 S.W.3d 785, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 695 (Tenn. Aug. 26, 2015).

In a case in which, under T.C.A. § 40-30-104, a habeas court lacked jurisdiction over a pro se inmate's petition as a petition for post-conviction relief because it was filed in the wrong court for post-conviction review, since the habeas court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the post-conviction case, it could not direct a transfer to the appropriate court in the absence of statutory authority, and, T.C.A. § 16-1-116, did not authorize the transfer of habeas petitions. Jeffries v. Dotson, — S.W.3d —, 2009 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1019 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 14, 2009).

Court of appeals considered the applicability of the Transfer Statute, T.C.A. § 16-1-116, in plaintiff's appeal of an order dismissing his claim under the Government Tort Liability Act as time barred pursuant to T.C.A. § 29-20-305(b) because the questions before the court of appeals, whether the general sessions court had authority to transfer plaintiff's case to the circuit court and whether plaintiff's claim was time barred, were the central issues before the circuit court; the Transfer Statute was not discussed in the circuit court, but the questions, the issues of subject matter jurisdiction and whether the claim was time barred, were raised. Haynes v. Rutherford County, 359 S.W.3d 585, 2011 Tenn. App. LEXIS 350 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 27, 2011), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2011 Tenn. LEXIS 915 (Tenn. Sept. 21, 2011).

Transfer Statute, T.C.A. § 16-1-116, is applicable to Government Tort Liability Act, T.C.A. § 29-20-101 et seq., claims; the Transfer Statute does not create a new substantive right or a new cause of action that could be asserted against the state or its political subdivisions, but the Transfer Statute merely authorizes the transfer of such a claim to a court empowered to hear the merits of the claim. Haynes v. Rutherford County, 359 S.W.3d 585, 2011 Tenn. App. LEXIS 350 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 27, 2011), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2011 Tenn. LEXIS 915 (Tenn. Sept. 21, 2011).

Trial court erred in dismissing plaintiff's claim under the Government Tort Liability Act as time barred pursuant to T.C.A. § 29-20-305(b) because the case was properly transferred under the Transfer Statute, T.C.A. § 16-1-116; at the time plaintiff filed in general sessions court, his claim could have been brought in the circuit court, and because the case was properly transferred to a court with jurisdiction, the filing of the action in the sessions court on tolled the running of the statute of limitations before the expiration of the limitations period, and the date of transfer related back to the date plaintiff's claim was originally filed. Haynes v. Rutherford County, 359 S.W.3d 585, 2011 Tenn. App. LEXIS 350 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 27, 2011), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2011 Tenn. LEXIS 915 (Tenn. Sept. 21, 2011).

Trial court properly transferred an inmate's action against a private correctional facility in accordance with T.C.A. § 16-1-116 because T.C.A. § 41-21-803 effectively localized actions brought by prisoners and the proper venue in the matter was in the county where the facility was located. Womack v. Corr. Corp. of Am., — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 893 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 20, 2012), rev'd, 448 S.W.3d 362, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 659 (Tenn. Sept. 22, 2014).

Trial court properly acted within its discretion in transferring a probate action to another county based on a skilled nursing facility's contention that the decedent resided in that county at the time of his death; the statute has been utilized to transfer actions to the proper court with jurisdiction rather than dismissing the action when the original court has been determined to lack jurisdiction because venue was localized. In re Estate of Salmons, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 130 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 14, 2018).

Order granting administration of an estate to an administratrix was not void but was voidable because the Campbell County Chancery Court had the statutory authority to enter such an order, and the voidable nature of the order was only demonstrated with the presentment of proof that the decedent was purportedly a resident of a different county at the time of his death; because the order was not void, administration of the estate could be validly transferred pursuant to the statute. In re Estate of Salmons, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 130 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 14, 2018).

2. Transfer Not In the Interest of Justice.

Because an inmate's petition for writ of certiorari from the denial of parole was filed well beyond the 60-day time limit of T.C.A. § 27-9-102, the interest of justice would not have been served by transferring his petition from Davidson County Circuit Court to Davidson County Chancery Court pursuant to T.C.A. § 16-1-116; the petition would have been treated as if it had been filed when it was filed in Circuit Court. Seagroves v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2010 Tenn. App. LEXIS 502 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 4, 2010).

Trial court properly refused to transfer a dissolution proceeding regarding a nonprofit corporation to Davidson County since the trial court did not lack jurisdiction over the dissolution proceeding and pending receivership, and it was not necessary to consider T.C.A. § 16-1-116. Pee Wee Wisdom Child Dev. Ctr. v. Cooper, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 99 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 14, 2012).

3. Civil Action.

Language of the statute does not carve out an exception for probate actions; thus, the statute is unambiguous in its application to any “civil action.” In re Estate of Salmons, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 130 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 14, 2018).

4. Transfer.

Chancery Court for Cumberland County, Tennessee, erred in attempting to invalidate a DeKalb County, Tennessee, lien because to the extent a limited liability company (LLC) sought to quiet title to land in DeKalb County, Cumberland County was not the proper venue; the chancery court was directed on remand to transfer the case to an appropriate court in DeKalb County to address the LLC's action to quiet title to land in that county. Little Hurricane Props., LLC v. Cafaro, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 489 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 22, 2018).

Appointment of an administrator ad litem for the decedent did not constitute a suit in equity for transfer purposes under T.C.A. § 16-10-111, and for purposes of T.C.A. § 16-1-116, the case could not be transferred to chancery court because the circuit court had jurisdiction to award the damages requested. Owens v. Muenzel, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 752 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 21, 2018).

Both conditions of the Transfer Statute were met; at the time that plaintiff originally filed this action, it could have been brought in the Campbell County Circuit Court, plus it was in the interest of justice for this action to be transferred to the court with subject matter jurisdiction. Bruce v. Jackson, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 234 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 17, 2019).

16-1-117. Reporting case statistics — Automated court information system.

  1. It is the duty of the administrative office of the courts to collect, develop, and maintain uniform statistical information relative to court caseloads in Tennessee. To assist the administrative office of the courts in this duty, the clerks of each court shall report case data as set forth below:
    1. Each criminal case shall be assigned a unique docket number. A criminal case shall be defined and reported as a single charge or set of charges arising out of a single incident concerning a single defendant in one (1) court proceeding. An incident shall be all criminal activity occurring on the same date. A court proceeding refers to a single level of court, such as general sessions or circuit. An appeal, probation revocation, or other post-judgment proceeding shall be considered a separate case. This definition shall not alter the practice in the Tennessee rules of criminal procedure dealing with joinder and severance of criminal cases. In addition, in courts of record, multiple incidents shall be counted as a single case when the charges are of a related nature and it is the district attorney general's intention that all of the charges be handled in the same court proceeding pursuant to a single indictment. If a case has more than one (1) charge or count, then the administrative office of the courts shall count the case according to the highest class of charge or count for the weighted caseload study based on the formula set out in § 16-2-513(a). Nothing in this subdivision (a)(1) shall operate to deprive court clerks of any fees to which they were entitled prior to July 1, 2014;
    2. A civil case shall be defined as all motions, petitions, claims, counterclaims or proceedings between the parties resulting from the initial filing until the case is disposed. A unique docket number will be assigned to a civil case upon filing. Until the case is disposed, all subsequent motions, petitions, claims, counterclaims or proceedings between the parties resulting from the initial filing will be handled under the assigned docket number and will not be assigned a new docket number. Once a civil case has been disposed and further actions occur on the case, the original case will be reopened using the same docket number under which it was originally filed and is subject to additional court costs. All subsequent motions, petitions, claims, counterclaims or proceedings relating to the reopened case will be handled under the one reopened case docket number until disposed. Any subsequent re-openings will still use the original docket number, but will be counted by the administrative office of the courts as a new case for case-reporting purposes and are subject to additional court costs. Civil cases in courts of record shall be counted and reported to the administrative office of the courts according to this subdivision (a)(2);
    3. All general sessions courts and municipal courts with general sessions jurisdiction shall collect and provide court data to the administrative office of the courts based on the definitions for criminal and civil cases as provided in subdivisions (a)(1) and (2);
    4. All courts of record, except for juvenile courts, and all general sessions courts and municipal courts with general sessions jurisdiction shall report caseload data to the administrative office of the courts not less than one (1) time each month, so that all cases filed and disposed in one (1) month have been received by the administrative office of the courts by the fifteenth day of the following month in which the case is filed or disposed. The administrative office of the courts shall create forms to be used by each court in reporting the caseload data;
    5. The administrative office of the courts will provide written notification to any responsible party found not to be in compliance with the reporting requirements. Written notification will detail the type of noncompliance and recommend the corrective action to be taken. If compliance is not achieved during the subsequent reporting period following notification, the administrative office of the courts will no longer accept data from the office not in compliance until such time as the errors are corrected. Notification of this action will be sent to all judges, district attorneys general, district public defenders and court clerks within the district where the noncomplying office is located. Notification will also be sent to the district attorneys general conference, the district public defender conference, the administrative office of the courts and the county officials association of Tennessee. Any periods of noncompliance will also be reported in the annual report to the chairs of the judiciary committee of the house of representatives and the judiciary committee of the senate;
      1. The clerks of those courts wherein commitments to a mental institution, as defined in § 16-10-213, are ordered or persons are adjudicated as a mental defective, as defined in § 16-10-213, shall report information described in § 16-10-213(c) regarding individuals who have been adjudicated as a mental defective or judicially committed to a mental institution. Included in the report pursuant to this subdivision (a)(6)(A) shall be the date in which such information was also reported to the federal bureau of investigation-NICS index;
      2. The clerks of courts, pursuant to the reporting requirements of §§ 16-10-213, 16-11-206, 16-15-303 and 16-16-120, shall provide sufficient information to the administrative office of the courts who shall make such reports on behalf of those clerks as soon as practicable, but no later than the third business day following the date of receipt of signed order;
      3. The information reported pursuant to subdivision (a)(6)(A) shall be maintained as confidential and not subject to public inspection, except for such use as may be necessary in the conduct of any proceedings pursuant to §§ 39-17-1316, 39-17-1353 and 39-17-1354;
      4. The administrative office of the courts shall provide written notification to any responsible party found not to be in compliance with the reporting requirements of this subdivision (a)(6) or with the reporting requirements of §§ 16-10-213, 16-11-206, 16-15-303 and 16-16-120. If compliance is not achieved during the subsequent reporting period following notification, the administrative office of the courts will no longer accept data from the office not in compliance. Notification of this action will be sent to all judges, district attorneys general, district public defenders and court clerks within the district where the noncomplying office is located. Notification will also be sent to the district attorneys general conference, the district public defenders conference, the administrative office of the courts and the county officials association of Tennessee. Any periods of noncompliance will also be reported in the annual report to the chair of the judiciary committee of the senate and the chair of the judiciary committee of the house of representatives.
  2. Any automated court information system being used or developed on or after July 1, 2003, including, but not limited to, the Tennessee court information system (TnCIS) being designed pursuant to § 16-3-803(h), shall ensure comparable data will be reported to the administrative office of the courts with respect to courts of record, and criminal cases in general sessions courts and municipal courts with general sessions jurisdiction, using the definitions and standards set forth in subsection (a). Each system shall use the Tennessee code citation on each criminal charge, and have the capability of using this information to classify the type and class of each charge.

Acts 2001, ch. 408, § 4; 2002, ch. 791, §§ 2-4, 6; 2013, ch. 236, § 37; 2013, ch. 300, § 1; 2014, ch. 673, § 1; 2018, ch. 799, § 6; 2019, ch. 345, § 19; 2019, ch. 420, § 6.

Amendments. The 2013 amendment by ch. 236  substituted “the chairs of the civil justice committee of the house of representatives and the judiciary committee of the senate” for “the chairs of the judiciary committees of the house of representatives and the senate” in the last sentence of (a)(5).

The 2013 amendment by ch. 300 added (a)(6).

The 2014 amendment rewrote (a)(1) which read: “Each criminal case shall be assigned a unique docket number. A criminal case in a court of record, except juvenile court, shall be defined and reported as a single charge or set of charges arising out of a single incident involving the same victim or victims concerning a defendant in one (1) court proceeding. An incident shall be all criminal activity occurring within a twenty-four-hour period. A court proceeding refers to a single level of court, such as general sessions, circuit, appeals or supreme court. An appeal, probation revocation, or other post-judgment proceeding shall be considered a separate case. This definition shall not alter the practice in the Tennessee rules of criminal procedure dealing with joinder and severance of criminal cases. Charges of a related nature shall be defined as charges against a single defendant that may have more than one (1) victim and that are similar, such as, but not limited to, burglaries, drug offenses or serial rape. Worthless check cases shall be defined and reported as all worthless checks filed by the same affiant against the same defendant within a twenty-four-hour period with each check counted as a separate charge. District attorneys general shall treat multiple incidents as a single incident for purposes of this subdivision (a)(1) when the charges are of a related nature and it is the district attorney general's intention that all of the charges be handled in the same court proceeding. If a case has more than one (1) charge or count, then the administrative office of the courts shall count the case according to the highest class of charge or count at the time of filing or disposition for the weighted caseload study based on the formula set out in § 16-2-513(a);”.

The 2018 amendment substituted “The clerks of courts,” for “The clerks of those courts unable to make direct reports to the federal bureau of investigation-NICS index” in (a)(6)(B).

The 2019 amendment by ch. 345 substituted “judiciary” for “civil justice” preceding “committee of the house” in (a)(5) and (a)(6)(D).

The 2019 amendment by ch. 420 deleted “to the judicial council and” following “Any periods of noncompliance will also be reported in the annual report” in (a)(5).

Effective Dates. Acts 2013, ch. 236, § 94. April 19, 2013.

Acts 2013, ch. 300, § 11. July 1, 2013.

Acts 2014, ch. 673, § 2. July 1, 2014.

Acts 2018, ch. 799, § 7. July 1, 2018.

Acts 2019, ch. 345, § 148. May 10, 2019.

Acts 2019, ch. 420, § 27. May 21, 2019.

Cross-References. Confidentiality of public records, § 10-7-504.

Rule Reference. This section is referred to in Rule 11, § II of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Tennessee.

Cited: State v. Webb, — S.W.3d —, 2011 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 101 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 11, 2011).

16-1-118. Utilization of electronic court filing system provider authorized by the administrative office of the courts.

Unless otherwise provided by law, all courts in this state that implement an electronic court filing system pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 46 and Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 5B shall utilize only a system provider authorized by the administrative office of the courts. The administrative office of the courts shall establish technical standards with the goals of ensuring integrity of filings, assuring an environment that promotes uniformity and ease of filing, and providing the framework for future compatibility among e-filing solutions implemented by local and state courts. Nothing in this section shall require the administrative office of the courts to begin implementing a statewide e-filing system.

Acts 2013, ch. 279, § 1.

Effective Dates. Acts 2013, ch. 279, § 2. July 1, 2013.

16-1-119. Advisory task force to review composition of judicial districts.

      1. By no later than September 1, 2018, the speaker of the senate and the speaker of the house of representatives shall establish an advisory task force to review the composition of Tennessee's current judicial districts codified at § 16-2-506.
      2. The task force shall be composed of eleven (11) members, as follows:
        1. Three (3) current trial court judges, one (1) representing each grand division, appointed by joint action of the speaker of the senate and speaker of the house of representatives;
        2. Three (3) current district attorneys general, one (1) representing each grand division, appointed by joint action of the speaker of the senate and speaker of the house of representatives;
        3. Three (3) current district public defenders, one (1) representing each grand division, appointed by the joint action of the speaker of the senate and speaker of the house of representatives; and
        4. Two (2) citizen members, one (1) appointed by each speaker. The citizen members must reside in different grand divisions.
      3. The speakers shall jointly designate one (1) of the members to serve as chair of the task force.
      1. By no later than December 1, 2019, the task force shall complete its findings and recommend and publish a proposed statewide judicial redistricting plan. The plan shall provide reasonable and timely access to Tennessee's circuit, chancery, and criminal courts and shall promote the efficient utilization of publicly funded resources allocated for the courts.
      2. Prior to completing its findings and recommending this plan, the task force shall conduct at least one (1) public hearing within each of the three (3) grand divisions and shall receive oral and written testimony from interested organizations and citizens of this state. In addition, the task force shall establish a publicly accessible judicial redistricting task force page on the website of the administrative office of the courts for redistricting-related information, including meeting notices and redistricting plans.
    1. The task force shall deliver a report of its findings, as well as its proposed judicial redistricting plan, to the governor, the speakers of the senate and house of representatives, the judiciary committee of the senate, the judiciary committee of the house of representatives, and the administrative office of the courts at least one (1) week prior to publication of the proposed judicial redistricting plan.
    1. The administrative office of the courts shall provide support services to the task force created under this section.
    2. The members of the task force shall serve without compensation but shall be entitled to reimbursement of any travel expenses incurred. All reimbursement for travel expenses shall be in conformity with the comprehensive state travel regulations as promulgated by the commissioner of finance and administration and approved by the attorney general and reporter.
    3. The task force shall cease to exist upon completion of the task force's report and recommendations.

Acts 2018, ch. 974, § 4; 2019, ch. 345, § 20.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment substituted “judiciary” for “civil justice” following “senate, the” in (a)(3).

Effective Dates. Acts 2018, ch. 974, § 5. May 21, 2018.

Acts 2019, ch. 345, § 148. May 10, 2019.

Cross-References. Grand divisions, title 4, ch. 1, part 2.

16-1-120. Processing passport applications — Photographs for passports.

If a court clerk chooses to process passport applications, the court clerk may take photographs for the passports and charge a reasonable fee for such service.

Acts 2019, ch. 344, § 1.

Effective Dates. Acts 2019, ch. 344, § 2. May 10, 2019.

Part 2
Defense of Unclean Hands [Repealed]

16-1-201. [Repealed.]

Acts 2010, ch. 908, § 1; repealed by Acts 2012, ch. 518, § 1, effective February 23, 2012.

Compiler's Notes. Former part 2, §§ 16-1-20116-1-206 concerned the defense of unclean hands.

Acts 2012, ch. 518, § 2 provided that it is the legislative intent of the act to repeal the statutory codification of the equitable defense of unclean hands, codified in title 16, chapter 1, part 2. It is the further legislative intent, consistent with the original enactment's intent, that the common law equitable doctrine shall remain in full force and effect, unchanged and unadulterated, by the original enactment or this repeal.

Acts 2012, ch. 518, § 3 provided that any person affected by the repeal of the statutory codification of the equitable defense of unclean hands having a claim arising out of any act or omission resulting from such codification shall bring suit in chancery or circuit court alleging such claim, counterclaim, or defense to a claim not later than one year after February 23, 2012, or forever be barred from asserting such claim under title 16, chapter 1, part 2, as a claim, counterclaim, or defense to a claim. The limitation of this section shall not affect any claim or defense or application of any other equitable doctrine arising under the common law.

16-1-202. [Repealed.]

Acts 2010, ch. 908, § 1; repealed by Acts 2012, ch. 518, § 1, effective February 23, 2012.

Compiler's Notes. Former part 2, §§ 16-1-20116-1-206 concerned the defense of unclean hands.

Acts 2012, ch. 518, § 2 provided that it is the legislative intent of the act to repeal the statutory codification of the equitable defense of unclean hands, codified in title 16, chapter 1, part 2. It is the further legislative intent, consistent with the original enactment's intent, that the common law equitable doctrine shall remain in full force and effect, unchanged and unadulterated, by the original enactment or this repeal.

Acts 2012, ch. 518, § 3 provided that any person affected by the repeal of the statutory codification of the equitable defense of unclean hands having a claim arising out of any act or omission resulting from such codification shall bring suit in chancery or circuit court alleging such claim, counterclaim, or defense to a claim not later than one year after February 23, 2012, or forever be barred from asserting such claim under title 16, chapter 1, part 2, as a claim, counterclaim, or defense to a claim. The limitation of this section shall not affect any claim or defense or application of any other equitable doctrine arising under the common law.

16-1-203. [Repealed.]

Acts 2010, ch. 908, § 1; repealed by Acts 2012, ch. 518, § 1, effective February 23, 2012.

Compiler's Notes. Former part 2, §§ 16-1-20116-1-206 concerned the defense of unclean hands.

Acts 2012, ch. 518, § 2 provided that it is the legislative intent of the act to repeal the statutory codification of the equitable defense of unclean hands, codified in title 16, chapter 1, part 2. It is the further legislative intent, consistent with the original enactment's intent, that the common law equitable doctrine shall remain in full force and effect, unchanged and unadulterated, by the original enactment or this repeal.

Acts 2012, ch. 518, § 3 provided that any person affected by the repeal of the statutory codification of the equitable defense of unclean hands having a claim arising out of any act or omission resulting from such codification shall bring suit in chancery or circuit court alleging such claim, counterclaim, or defense to a claim not later than one year after February 23, 2012, or forever be barred from asserting such claim under title 16, chapter 1, part 2, as a claim, counterclaim, or defense to a claim. The limitation of this section shall not affect any claim or defense or application of any other equitable doctrine arising under the common law.

16-1-204. [Repealed.]

Acts 2010, ch. 908, § 1; repealed by Acts 2012, ch. 518, § 1, effective February 23, 2012.

Compiler's Notes. Former part 2, §§ 16-1-20116-1-206 concerned the defense of unclean hands.

Acts 2012, ch. 518, § 2 provided that it is the legislative intent of the act to repeal the statutory codification of the equitable defense of unclean hands, codified in title 16, chapter 1, part 2. It is the further legislative intent, consistent with the original enactment's intent, that the common law equitable doctrine shall remain in full force and effect, unchanged and unadulterated, by the original enactment or this repeal.

Acts 2012, ch. 518, § 3 provided that any person affected by the repeal of the statutory codification of the equitable defense of unclean hands having a claim arising out of any act or omission resulting from such codification shall bring suit in chancery or circuit court alleging such claim, counterclaim, or defense to a claim not later than one year after February 23, 2012, or forever be barred from asserting such claim under title 16, chapter 1, part 2, as a claim, counterclaim, or defense to a claim. The limitation of this section shall not affect any claim or defense or application of any other equitable doctrine arising under the common law.

16-1-205. [Repealed.]

Acts 2010, ch. 908, § 1; repealed by Acts 2012, ch. 518, § 1, effective February 23, 2012.

Compiler's Notes. Former part 2, §§ 16-1-20116-1-206 concerned the defense of unclean hands.

Acts 2012, ch. 518, § 2 provided that it is the legislative intent of the act to repeal the statutory codification of the equitable defense of unclean hands, codified in title 16, chapter 1, part 2. It is the further legislative intent, consistent with the original enactment's intent, that the common law equitable doctrine shall remain in full force and effect, unchanged and unadulterated, by the original enactment or this repeal.

Acts 2012, ch. 518, § 3 provided that any person affected by the repeal of the statutory codification of the equitable defense of unclean hands having a claim arising out of any act or omission resulting from such codification shall bring suit in chancery or circuit court alleging such claim, counterclaim, or defense to a claim not later than one year after February 23, 2012, or forever be barred from asserting such claim under title 16, chapter 1, part 2, as a claim, counterclaim, or defense to a claim. The limitation of this section shall not affect any claim or defense or application of any other equitable doctrine arising under the common law.

16-1-206. [Repealed.]

Acts 2010, ch. 908, § 1; repealed by Acts 2012, ch. 518, § 1, effective February 23, 2012.

Compiler's Notes. Former part 2, §§ 16-1-20116-1-206 concerned the defense of unclean hands.

Acts 2012, ch. 518, § 2 provided that it is the legislative intent of the act to repeal the statutory codification of the equitable defense of unclean hands, codified in title 16, chapter 1, part 2. It is the further legislative intent, consistent with the original enactment's intent, that the common law equitable doctrine shall remain in full force and effect, unchanged and unadulterated, by the original enactment or this repeal.

Acts 2012, ch. 518, § 3 provided that any person affected by the repeal of the statutory codification of the equitable defense of unclean hands having a claim arising out of any act or omission resulting from such codification shall bring suit in chancery or circuit court alleging such claim, counterclaim, or defense to a claim not later than one year after February 23, 2012, or forever be barred from asserting such claim under title 16, chapter 1, part 2, as a claim, counterclaim, or defense to a claim. The limitation of this section shall not affect any claim or defense or application of any other equitable doctrine arising under the common law.

Chapter 2
Judicial Divisions and Districts

Part 1
Appellate Courts

16-2-101. Grand divisions — Appeals from Marion County.

  1. For the administration of justice in the supreme court, the court of appeals and the court of criminal appeals, the state is divided into the three (3) grand divisions described in §§ 4-1-201 — 4-1-204.
  2. All appeals, writs of error and appeals in the nature of a writ of error from the chancery and circuit courts of Marion County shall be granted to and heard by the supreme court, the court of appeals and the court of criminal appeals, within their respective jurisdictions, sitting at Nashville.

Code 1858, § 100 (deriv. Acts 1835-1836, ch. 3, § 8); Shan., § 129; Acts 1923, ch. 70; Code 1932, § 147; Acts 1941, ch. 17, § 1; C. Supp. 1950, §§ 147, 148; impl. am. Acts 1967, ch. 226, § 1; modified; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-201.

Law Reviews.

Tennessee Criminal Law: An Overview of the Courts and a Compendium of Tennessee Criminal Procedure, 5 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 90.

The Tennessee Court System (Frederic S. Le Clercq), 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 189.

Comparative Legislation. Judicial divisions:

Ala.  Code § 12-11-2.

Ga. O.C.G.A. § 15-6-1 et seq.

Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 21A.010 et seq.

Miss.  Code Ann. § 9-5-3 et seq.; § 9-7-3 et seq.

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 478.073 et seq.

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-1 et seq.

Va. Code § 17-119.1:1 et seq.

Collateral References. Courts 50, 74, 75.

16-2-102. Places where supreme court sessions held.

The supreme court for the eastern division is held at Knoxville; for the middle division, at Nashville; and for the western division, at Jackson. In addition to the places where the supreme court is required to be held by the Constitution of Tennessee, it may be held in other places that the chief justice may from time to time designate.

Code 1858, § 104; Acts 1867-1868, ch. 76, § 1; 1869-1870, ch. 18, § 1; 1870, ch. 24, § 3; Shan., § 133; Code 1932, § 151; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-202; Acts 1984, ch. 713, § 1.

Cross-References. Grand divisions, title 4, ch. 1, part 2.

Places where supreme court to hold court, Tenn. Const., art. VI, § 2.

Textbooks. Tennessee Criminal Practice and Procedure (Raybin), § 24.10.

Law Reviews.

Tennessee Criminal Law: An Overview of the Courts and a Compendium of Tennessee Criminal Procedure (Michael R. Tilley), 5 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 90.

Collateral References. Courts 74.

16-2-103. Times of supreme court sessions.

The court shall hold one (1) session each year, as follows: at Knoxville on the second Monday in September; at Nashville on the first Monday in December; and at Jackson on the first Monday in April of each year.

Code 1858, § 105; Acts 1877, ch. 4, § 1; Shan., § 134; Code 1932, § 152; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-203.

Cross-References. Places where supreme court to hold court, Tenn. Const., art. VI, § 2.

Law Reviews.

The Tennessee Court System — Supreme Court (Frederic S. Le Clercq), 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 191.

16-2-104. Transfer of supreme court cases between divisions.

The supreme court is empowered to direct the hearing of all of the cases coming to the supreme court from any county, in any division of the state, in any other division of the state; provided, that all appeals, appeals in error, writs of error, petitions for certiorari and all other proceedings for the correction of error arising in the respective divisions shall be taken to Knoxville, Nashville and Jackson, transcripts there filed, and all decrees, orders and judgments shall be entered at Knoxville, Nashville and Jackson; provided, however, that nothing in this section shall be construed to interfere with or dispense with the regular sittings of the supreme court at Knoxville, Nashville and Jackson, for the trial and disposition of the causes in the respective grand divisions of the state, but that this section shall only apply to emergency causes, to causes wherein the general public welfare demands a speedy hearing, to causes involving the title to any public office, or to causes where the parties agree thereto, arising in any grand division, either during vacation or when the court is sitting in some other grand division, or to the consideration and decision of causes which the court, sitting in any grand division, has not had time to decide before adjourning.

Acts 1915, ch. 95, § 1; Shan., § 135a1; Code 1932, § 154; Acts 1939, ch. 17, § 1; C. Supp. 1950, § 154; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-204.

Cross-References. Grand divisions, title 4, ch. 1, part 2.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 2 Tenn. Juris., Appeal and Error, § 218.

Law Reviews.

Appellate Practice — Advancing Case for Hearing Out of Regular Order, 12 Tenn. L. Rev. 130.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Transfer by Court.

The supreme court had authority to transfer a case from one division of the state to another, in order to obtain an earlier hearing, when the court was not able to consider and decide the case before completing its sitting in the division from which the case was transferred, even though the parties did not consent thereto. Provident Life & Acci. Ins. Co. v. Prieto, 168 Tenn. 126, 76 S.W.2d 314, 1934 Tenn. LEXIS 27 (1934).

2. Emergency Causes.

There is no emergency warranting transfer of hearing on application of parties wishing to force sale of realty during financial distress of the community where the appellees are protected by injunction bond and the property is held by a receiver appointed by the court. Foster v. Harle, 165 Tenn. 616, 57 S.W.2d 452, 1932 Tenn. LEXIS 94 (1933).

The exercise of the authority conferred by this section should be confined to “emergency causes,” or those where great or irreparable injury or wrong might result from a delay. State v. Meux, 166 Tenn. 286, 61 S.W.2d 974, 1933 Tenn. LEXIS 93 (1933).

A quo warranto proceeding by a new road commission, created under a law impliedly repealing the former law, against the commission created under the former law to determine which of the two was entitled to administer the road law is not an “emergency cause” within the meaning of this section. State v. Meux, 166 Tenn. 286, 61 S.W.2d 974, 1933 Tenn. LEXIS 93 (1933).

16-2-105. Transfer of supreme court cases by consent of parties.

The hearing and determination of any case, other than those involving emergency or general public welfare referred to in § 16-2-104, may, upon written application, presented in person by counsel representing all parties, and with the unanimous approval of the court, be transferred from any one (1) grand division to the court sitting in any other grand division of the state, this provision being intended to expedite the hearing of important cases, the speedy determination of which is advisable.

Acts 1923, ch. 70, § 2; Shan. Supp., § 135a6; mod. Code 1932, § 158; modified; Acts 1963, ch. 111, § 1; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-205.

Cross-References. Grand divisions, title 4, ch. 1, part 2.

Law Reviews.

The Tennessee Court System — Supreme Court (Frederic S. Le Clercq), 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 191.

16-2-106. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former § 16-2-106 (Acts 1931 (2nd E.S.), ch. 38, § 1; C. Supp. 1950, § 159; 1973, ch. 356, § 1; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-206), concerning judicial circuits and chancery divisions, was repealed by Acts 1984, ch. 931, § 15, which repealed this section except insofar as this section divided existing circuit, criminal or chancery courts into parts or divisions. It was the intent of the general assembly to create new judicial districts in accordance with § 16-2-506, but to retain and continue the existing parts or divisions of the courts as they are set out. For present provisions relating to judicial districts, see part 5 of this chapter.

Attorney General Opinions. Unless expressly authorized by T.C.A. §§ 16-2-106 through 16-2-402 or a private act, neither a general sessions nor a circuit court may regularly hold its sessions outside the city limits of the county seat, OAG 05-122 (8/8/05).

16-2-107. Transfer of cause of action.

In judicial districts that have a separate circuit and chancery court or in districts that have more than one (1) division of circuit or chancery court, if a civil cause of action is filed in the improper court or the improper division of court within the judicial district, upon the motion of either party, or upon the court's own motion, the civil cause of action may be transferred to the proper court or proper division within such district.

Acts 1991, ch. 265, § 1.

Law Reviews.

Civil Procedure — Flowers v. Dyer County: The Death of the Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction, 23 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 409 (1993).

Cited: Spann v. Abraham, 36 S.W.3d 452, 1999 Tenn. App. LEXIS 746 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Transfer Not Required.

Because an inmate's petition for writ of certiorari from the denial of parole was filed well beyond the 60-day time limit of T.C.A. § 27-9-102, the interest of justice would not have been served by transferring his petition from Davidson County Circuit Court to Davidson County Chancery Court pursuant to T.C.A. § 16-1-116; the petition would have been treated as if it had been filed when it was filed in Circuit Court. Seagroves v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2010 Tenn. App. LEXIS 502 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 4, 2010).

When a wife sought to enforce an Illinois judgment ordering the sale of a Tennessee marital home and child support, a circuit court was not required to transfer the case to chancery court, where a husband had prosecuted a divorce action against the wife, because (1) the wife's action was not a case previously filed and dismissed and then refiled, under Tenn. R. 11 Dist. Ch. Cir. Ct. 7.01, and (2) transfer was discretionary. Claborn v. Claborn, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 791 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 29, 2015).

Part 2
Circuit and Criminal Divisions Enumerated

16-2-201 — 16-2-231. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former part 2, §§ 16-2-20116-2-231 (Acts 1931 (2nd E.S.), ch. 38, § 1; 1935, ch. 125, § 1; 1935 Private, ch. 332, § 1; 1937, ch. 59, § 1; 1937, ch. 98, § 1; 1937, ch. 204, § 1; 1937, ch. 205, § 1; 1939, ch. 61, § 1; 1939, ch. 119, § 1; 1943, ch. 28, § 1; 1943, ch. 94, § 1; 1947, ch. 138, §§ 1-3; C. Supp. 1950, § 159; Acts 1951, ch. 12, § 1; 1951, ch. 17, § 1; 1951, ch. 28, § 1; 1951, ch. 73, § 12 (Williams, § 159); Acts 1953, ch. 2, § 1; 1953, ch. 18, § 1; 1953, ch. 206, § 1; 1955, ch. 19, §§ 1, 2; 1955, ch. 104, § 1; 1955, ch. 107, § 1; 1955, ch. 222, § 1; 1957, ch. 2, § 1; 1957, ch. 47, § 1; 1957, ch. 54, § 12; 1957, ch. 95, §§ 1, 2; 1957, ch. 205, § 1; 1957, ch. 226, § 1; 1957, ch. 249, § 1; 1957, ch. 280, §§ 1, 2; 1957, ch. 342, § 1; 1959, ch. 99, §§ 1, 2; 1959, ch. 208, §§ 1, 2; 1961, ch. 87, § 1; 1961, ch. 161, §§ 7, 8; 1961, ch. 257, § 1; 1961, ch. 315, § 1; 1963, ch. 262, §§ 1, 2; 1963, ch. 306, § 1; 1963, ch. 344, § 1; 1965, ch. 17, § 1; 1965, ch. 75, § 1; 1965, ch. 188, §§ 1-3; 1965, ch. 204, §§ 1-5; 1965, ch. 274, §§ 2, 3, 9; 1967, ch. 5, § 1; 1967, ch. 7, § 1; 1967, ch. 10, §§ 1-3; 1967, ch. 47, § 1; 1967, ch. 162, § 1; 1967, ch. 228, §§ 1-3, 13; 1967, ch. 247, § 1; 1967, ch. 248, §§ 1, 2, 8; 1968, ch. 433, §§ 1, 2; 1968, ch. 457, §§ 1, 2; 1968, ch. 467, § 1; 1968, ch. 496, § 1; 1968, ch. 616, § 1; 1969, ch. 265, § 1; 1969, ch. 276, §§ 1, 2; 1970, ch. 513, § 1; 1970, ch. 542, § 1; 1971, ch. 239, § 1; 1971, ch. 347, § 1; 1972, ch. 442, §§ 3, 4; 1972, ch. 462, §§ 2, 8; 1972, ch. 515, §§ 1, 2; 1972, ch. 520, § 10; 1972, ch. 593, § 1; 1972, ch. 863, § 8; 1973, ch. 390, § 1; 1974, ch. 526, § 9; 1974, ch. 686, §§ 1, 2; 1974, ch. 711, §§ 1, 2; 1974, ch. 718, §§ 1-3; 1974, ch. 783, §§ 1, 3-5, 8, 9; 1975, ch. 8, § 1; 1975, ch. 14, § 1; 1975, ch. 15, §§ 1, 2; 1975, ch. 94, § 1; 1975, ch. 304, § 1; 1976, ch. 478, § 1; 1976, ch. 518, § 3(b); 1976, ch. 544, § 1; 1977 Private Acts, ch. 51, § 1; 1977, ch. 199, §§ 1, 2; 1977, ch. 216, § 1; 1977, ch. 418, §§ 2, 3, 10-12; 1977, ch. 444, §§ 2, 3; 1978, ch. 707, §§ 1, 2; 1978, ch. 798, §§ 1, 2; 1978, ch. 848, §§ 1, 10; 1979, ch. 150, § 1; 1979, ch. 238, § 1; 1979, ch. 427, §§ 1, 2; 1980, ch. 557, §§ 1, 2; 1980, ch. 803, § 1; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), §§ 16-207 — 16-236), concerning the enumeration of circuit and criminal divisions, was repealed by Acts 1984, ch. 931, § 15, which repealed this part except insofar as this part divided existing circuit, criminal or chancery courts into parts or divisions. It was the intent of the general assembly to create new judicial districts in accordance with § 16-2-506, but to retain and continue the existing parts or divisions of the courts as they are set out.

Attorney General Opinions. Laws applicable to the circuit and chancery courts of the 1st Judicial District are T.C.A. Ann. §§ 16-2-201 and 16-2-301 to the extent those statutes divided the courts into parts and divisions; and T.C.A. §§ 16-2-501et seq., OAG 05-072 (5/3/05).

Disclosing terms of consulting contracts for services rendered outside the state, OAG 05-073 (5/4/05).

Part 3
Chancery Divisions Enumerated

16-2-301 — 16-2-317. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former part 3, §§ 16-2-30116-2-317 (Acts 1931, ch. 80, §§ 3, 4; 1931 (2nd E.S.), ch. 38, § 1; 1935, ch. 148, § 1; 1935, ch. 153, §§ 1, 2; 1941, ch. 12, § 1; 1941, ch. 27, §§ 1, 2; 1941, ch. 160; 1945, ch. 12, § 1; C. Supp. 1950, §§ 159, 159.1 (Williams, § 159 and note); Acts 1951, ch. 199, § 1; 1951, ch. 269, § 1; 1953, ch. 140, § 1; 1955, ch. 217, § 1; 1955, ch. 224, § 1; 1955, ch. 255, § 1; 1957, ch. 2, § 2; 1957, ch. 294, § 1; 1957, ch. 377, § 1; 1961, ch. 85, § 1; 1961, ch. 161, §§ 1, 2; 1961, ch. 275, § 1; 1963, ch. 371, §§ 1, 2; 1965, ch. 74, § 1; 1965, ch. 274, §§ 2, 3, 9; 1967, ch. 22, § 1; 1967, ch. 27, § 1; 1967, ch. 54, § 1; 1967, ch. 248, §§ 1, 2, 8; 1967, ch. 295, § 1; 1967, ch. 320, §§ 1, 2, 5; 1968, ch. 429, § 1; 1968, ch. 457, § 2; 1968, ch. 505, § 1; 1968, ch. 561, § 1; 1969, ch. 198, §§ 1-3; 1972, ch. 462, §§ 2, 8; 1972, ch. 863, § 8; 1973, ch. 356, §§ 2, 3; 1974, ch. 547, § 6; 1974, ch. 718, §§ 11, 12; 1974, ch. 783, § 2; 1975, ch. 14, § 1; 1975, ch. 207, § 1; 1975, ch. 295, § 1; 1976, ch. 577, § 2; 1977, ch. 418, §§ 2, 7; 1978, ch. 919, § 1; 1979, ch. 342, §§ 1, 2; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), §§ 16-237 — 16-250, 16-252 — 16-254), concerning the enumeration of chancery divisions, was repealed by Acts 1984, ch. 931, § 15, which repealed this part except insofar as this part divided existing circuit, criminal or chancery courts into parts or divisions. It was the intent of the general assembly to create new judicial districts in accordance with § 16-2-506, but to retain and continue the existing parts or divisions of the courts as they are set out.

Part 4
Special Chancery Divisions Enumerated

16-2-401, 16-2-402. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former part 4, §§ 16-2-401 and 16-2-402 (Acts 1931 (2nd E.S.), ch. 38, § 1; 1949, ch. 230, § 1; C. Supp. 1950, § 159; Acts 1957, ch. 197, § 1; 1968, ch. 561, §§ 2, 4, 5; 1974, ch. 711, §§ 3, 4; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), §§ 16-251, 16-255), concerning the enumeration of chancery divisions, was repealed by Acts 1984, ch. 931, § 15, which repealed this part except insofar as this part divided existing circuit, criminal or chancery courts into parts or divisions. It was the intent of the general assembly to create new judicial districts in accordance with § 16-2-506, but to retain and continue the existing parts or divisions of the courts as they are set out.

Part 5
Trial Courts

16-2-501. Legislative purpose — Existing courts.

  1. The general assembly expressly declares that its purpose in enacting this part is to reorganize the existing trial court system of this state in such a way that its growth occurs in a logical and orderly manner. It does not have as its purpose the abolition of any court or judicial office.
  2. Nothing in this part shall be construed as altering, diminishing or abolishing chancery court or the constitutional and historical distinctions between chancery court and circuit court.

Acts 1984, ch. 931, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 1984, ch. 931, § 26, provided that all other laws or parts of law in conflict with the provisions of ch. 931 were repealed.

Cross-References. Power of general assembly to create courts, Tenn. Const., art. VI, § 1.

Textbooks. Gibson's Suits in Chancery (7th ed., Inman), § 9.

Tennessee Criminal Practice and Procedure (Raybin), §§ 24.10, 24.17.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Legislative Intent.

The general assembly did not intend, by the enactment of this part, to give the chancery court of Dyer County unbridled discretion to hear cases involving unliquidated damages, so as to confer upon it an authority beyond that of every other chancery court in the state. Flowers v. Dyer County, 830 S.W.2d 51, 1992 Tenn. LEXIS 491 (Tenn. 1992), rehearing denied, — S.W.2d —, 1992 Tenn. LEXIS 368 (Tenn. May 4, 1992).

The Tennessee Legislature specifically provided that the reorganization of the trial court system did not have as its purpose the abolition of any court or judicial office. Therefore, the long-standing process for trying an offender in the county in which a crime was committed by a jury that was selected from that county was not abolished by the creation of judicial districts. Kenner v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 440 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 5, 2015), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 875 (Tenn. Oct. 15, 2015).

16-2-502. Titles of judges — Jurisdiction.

Each trial court judge shall continue to be officially known and designated as either a chancellor, circuit court judge, criminal court judge, or law and equity court judge, depending upon the position to which the chancellor or judge was elected or appointed prior to June 1, 1984. Any judge or chancellor may exercise by interchange, appointment, or designation the jurisdiction of any trial court other than that to which the judge or chancellor was elected or appointed.

Acts 1984, ch. 931, § 2.

Textbooks. Tennessee Criminal Practice and Procedure (Raybin), § 24.10.

Cited: Dupuis v. Hand, 814 S.W.2d 340, 1991 Tenn. LEXIS 168 (Tenn. 1991).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Jurisdiction to Try Attorney.

Trial judge had jurisdiction to try appellant attorney for contempt under the interchange provisions; because the appellant's charges of contempt implicated two judges in the first judicial district as witnesses, all the judges of the first judicial district recused themselves from hearing the case, and accordingly, the presiding judge of the first judicial district requested a judge from the second judicial district to hear the contempt proceedings. Wilson v. Wilson (In re Cowan), 877 S.W.2d 271, 1993 Tenn. App. LEXIS 814 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993).

2. Magistrate.

Magistrate did not have authority to issue search warrants for defendants'  homes because the magistrate issued the warrants for property located outside his judicial district; the magistrate was not sitting by interchange when he issued the search warrants, no evidence was introduced to establish that he was sitting by appointment or designation when he issued the warrants, and the State did not allege any other lawful ground authorizing him to exercise his duties in another district. State v. Frazier, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 861 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 25, 2017), aff'd, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 537 (Tenn. Sept. 26, 2018).

3. Search Warrant.

Trial court properly granted defendants'  motion to suppress drugs and drug paraphernalia seized from their homes pursuant to search warrants because the warrants were invalid under the Fourth Amendment, as the district circuit court judge who issued the search warrants lacked jurisdiction to issue search warrants for defendants'  residences that were located in a different judicial district. Nothing in the record established that the issuing judge obtained jurisdiction to issue the search warrants by interchange, designation, appointment, or other lawful means. State v. Frazier, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 537 (Tenn. Sept. 26, 2018).

16-2-503. Filing and processing of actions.

Suits shall be filed in the same court and processed by the same clerk as they were filed and processed prior to September 1, 1984.

Acts 1984, ch. 931, § 3.

16-2-504. Selection of clerk and master — Trial court judge as chancellor.

In those judicial districts in which this part has left a particular district without a chancellor, all trial court judges within that district shall be designated as chancellors for the purpose of selecting the clerk and master. The trial court judges shall also sit as chancellors for the purpose of disposing of those cases filed in chancery court. In judicial districts in which one (1) or more chancellors remain, the clerk and master shall continue to be selected as provided by law.

Acts 1984, ch. 931, § 4.

Textbooks. Gibson's Suits in Chancery (7th ed., Inman), § 615.

16-2-505. Election of additional judges — Secretary — Courtroom security — Judicial candidates.

  1. In any judicial district in which § 16-2-506 requires the election of an additional judge, the election shall occur in August of that year. The qualified voters of the judicial district in which the election is required shall elect a person to the office of judge for that district. That person shall possess the same qualifications, powers and duties and shall receive the same compensation, payable in the same manner, benefits, emoluments and dignity of office as is required or provided by law for other judges.
    1. If the election occurs in 1984, 1986, or 1988, the person elected shall hold office until September 1, 1990, and until that person's successor is elected and qualified. Thereafter, a judge shall be elected for an eight-year term. At the regular August election in 1990, the qualified voters of all judicial districts required by § 16-2-506 to elect an additional judge in such year shall elect a person to such office for a full eight-year term. The person elected in 1990 as an additional judge for each such district shall possess the same qualifications, powers and duties and shall receive the same compensation, payable in the same manner, benefits, emoluments and dignity of office as is required or provided by law for other circuit court judges.
    2. If the election occurs in 1992, 1994, or 1996, the person elected shall hold office until September 1, 1998, and until the person's successor is elected and qualified. Thereafter, a judge shall be elected for an eight-year term. At the regular August election in 1998, the qualified voters of all judicial districts required by § 16-2-506 to elect an additional judge in 1992, 1994, 1996 or 1998 shall elect a person to such office for a full eight-year term. The person elected in 1998 shall possess the same qualifications, powers and duties and shall receive the same compensation, payable in the same manner, benefits, emoluments and dignity of office as is required or provided by law for other circuit court judges or chancellors.
    3. If the election occurs in 2000, 2002, or 2004, the person elected shall hold office until September 1, 2006, and until the person's successor is elected and qualified. Thereafter, a judge shall be elected for an eight-year term. At the regular August election in 2006, the qualified voters of all judicial districts required by § 16-2-506 to elect an additional judge in 2000, 2002, 2004 or 2006 shall elect a person to such office for a full eight-year term. The person elected in 2006 shall possess the same qualifications, powers and duties and shall receive the same compensation, payable in the same manner, benefits, emoluments and dignity of office as is required or provided by law for other circuit court judges or chancellors.
    4. Any vacancy occurring in the office of one (1) of the circuit court judges elected pursuant to § 16-2-506 shall be filled as provided by law.
  2. Upon the election of a judge pursuant to § 16-2-506, there is created the position of secretary for that judge. The judge shall select a suitable person to fill the position of secretary and that person shall receive the same compensation, payable in the same manner, as is provided by law for the secretary of the other judges in the district. The secretary shall perform the duties assigned by the judge.
    1. It is the responsibility of the counties comprising the judicial district to provide a judge elected pursuant to § 16-2-506 with sufficient space and facilities in which to conduct the business and duties of the court.
    2. Each county shall establish a court security committee composed of the county mayor, sheriff, district attorney general, the presiding judge of the judicial district and a court clerk from the county to be designated by the presiding judge, for the purpose of examining the space and facilities to determine the security needs of the courtrooms in the county in order to provide safe and secure facilities.
    3. Upon completion of the examination of security needs, the following procedure shall be followed:
      1. The administrative office of the courts shall distribute to each court security committee a copy of the minimum security standards as adopted by the Tennessee judicial conference, and each committee shall review and consider these standards in determining court security needs.
      2. No later than May 15 each year, the court security committee shall report its findings to the county legislative body and the administrative office of the courts.
      3. The county legislative body shall review and consider the recommendations of the court security committee in the preparation of each fiscal year budget.
      4. No later than December 1 each year, the county legislative body shall report to the administrative office of the courts any action taken to meet the security needs.
      5. No later than January 15 each year, the administrative office of the courts shall report to the general assembly on the compliance by each county government with the security needs established by the court security committee.
    4. Any recommendation by the court security committee requiring county expenditures shall be subject to approval of the county legislative body.
  3. Any person who seeks election to the office of circuit court judge, criminal court judge, law and equity court judge or chancellor, whether the judgeship is created by this part or was in existence on April 1, 1984, shall qualify as provided by law with the various election commissions in the counties comprising the judicial district in which the person seeks election. At the time of qualification, the person shall designate to each such commission the court and part of the court, if any, to which that person seeks election. If properly qualified, the names of all of the judicial candidates shall appear on the official ballot by the court and part of court, if any, previously designated and the candidate who shall receive the highest number of votes cast for judge of each part of each court shall be declared elected.

Acts 1984, ch. 931, § 5; 1993, ch. 506, §§ 1, 2; 1995, ch. 225, § 1; 2001, ch. 268, § 1; 2003, ch. 90, § 2.

Compiler's Notes. The Courtroom Security Act of 1995 is codified as subdivisions (d)(2)-(4).

Acts 2003, ch. 90, § 2, directed the code commission to change all references from “county executive” to “county mayor” and to include all such changes in supplements and replacement volumes for the Tennessee Code Annotated.

Attorney General Opinions. Funding for local court security committee, OAG 96-085 (7/2/96).

County legislative bodies' responsibility to provide court facilities, OAG 99-049 (3/2/99).

Even though T.C.A. § 16-2-505(d) does not expressly mention general sessions courts, the statute applies by necessary implication to general sessions courts to the extent that security in those facilities affects security in facilities provided circuit and chancery court judges, for example, when general sessions court is conducted in the same building as the circuit and chancery courts, OAG 02-052 (4/24/02).

Although T.C.A. § 16-2-505(d)(2) does not expressly authorize the court security committee to adopt any measures with regard to courthouse security, it is reasonable to infer that the committee may put into effect security measures affecting the security of space and facilities provided to state trial judges, so long as these measures do not require county expenditures; these measures may affect general sessions courtrooms and personnel, as well as the personnel of other offices located in the courthouse, if the measures are reasonably related to ensuring security of space and facilities provided to state trial judges, OAG 02-052 (4/24/02).

The court security committee has no authority to impose a monetary or other penalty for failure to comply with valid court security measures; however, subject to the direction of the county commission, the sheriff may exclude individuals from the courthouse who refuse to comply with reasonable security procedures, OAG 02-052 (4/24/02).

T.C.A. § 16-2-505(d)(2) is constitutional, OAG 02-052 (4/24/02).

Carrying of firearms into rooms where judicial proceedings are in progress; establishment of security committee for determining security needs of courtrooms; security training of court officers.  OAG 12-32, 2012 Tenn. AG LEXIS 32 (3/9/12).

County courthouse security and dress rules.  OAG 12-107, 2012 Tenn. AG LEXIS 111 (11/26/12).

16-2-506. Establishment of judicial districts — Assistant district attorneys general — Criminal investigators — Equity and law courts — Chancery courts.

The state is divided into thirty-two (32) judicial districts composed as follows:

    1. The first judicial district consists of the counties of Carter, Johnson, Unicoi and Washington. The four (4) incumbent trial court judges and the district attorney general currently residing in those counties shall continue to serve the first judicial district in their respective capacities. In 1988, the qualified voters of the first judicial district shall elect an additional judge or chancellor in accordance with § 16-2-505 to serve the court and part of court designated pursuant to § 16-2-512;
    2. The district attorney general of the first judicial district is entitled to nine (9) assistant district attorney general positions and one (1) criminal investigator position;
    1. The second judicial district consists of the county of Sullivan. The three (3) incumbent trial court judges and the district attorney general currently residing in such county shall continue to serve the second judicial district in their respective capacities. Effective September 1, 1984, the law and equity court currently located in Sullivan County shall become a chancery court for the second judicial district and the current law and equity judge shall become a chancellor who on such date shall possess the same jurisdiction, powers and duties and shall receive the same compensation, benefits, emoluments and dignity of office as is required or provided by law for chancellors. In 1984, the qualified voters of the second judicial district shall elect an additional judge in accordance with § 16-2-505 to serve part II of the circuit court of such district;
    2. The district attorney general of the second judicial district is entitled to eight (8) assistant district attorney general positions and two (2) criminal investigator positions;
    1. The third judicial district consists of the counties of Greene, Hamblen, Hancock and Hawkins. The three (3) incumbent trial court judges and the district attorney general currently residing in such counties shall continue to serve the third judicial district in their respective capacities. In 1986, the qualified voters of the third judicial district shall elect an additional judge or chancellor in accordance with § 16-2-505 to serve the court and part of court designated pursuant to § 16-2-512. In 1990, the qualified voters of the third judicial district shall elect an additional circuit court judge in accordance with § 16-2-505 to serve part III of the circuit court of such district;
    2. The district attorney general of the third judicial district is entitled to nine (9) full-time assistant district attorney general positions and three (3) criminal investigator positions;
    1. The fourth judicial district consists of the counties of Cocke, Grainger, Jefferson and Sevier. The three (3) incumbent trial court judges and the district attorney general currently residing in such counties shall continue to serve the fourth judicial district in their respective capacities. Notwithstanding any other provision of law or this part to the contrary, the chancellor currently serving in the fourth judicial district shall also serve the fifth judicial district. As long as the chancellor for the fourth judicial district also serves the fifth judicial district, such chancellor shall be elected by the qualified voters of both such districts and may reside in either district. In 1990, the qualified voters of the fourth judicial district shall elect an additional circuit court judge in accordance with § 16-2-505 to serve part III of the circuit court of such district. Effective September 1, 1998, there is created an additional circuit court in the fourth judicial district. At the August 1998 general election, the qualified voters of the fourth judicial district shall elect a person in accordance with § 16-2-505, to serve as judge of the circuit court created by this section for an eight-year term;
    2. The district attorney general of the fourth judicial district is entitled to seven (7) assistant district attorney general positions and two (2) criminal investigator positions;
    1. The fifth judicial district consists of the county of Blount. The two (2) incumbent trial court judges and the district attorney general currently residing in such county shall continue to serve the fifth judicial district in their respective capacities;
    2. The district attorney general of the fifth judicial district is entitled to five (5) assistant district attorney general positions and one (1) criminal investigator position;
    1. The sixth judicial district shall consist of the county of Knox. The nine (9) incumbent trial court judges and the district attorney general currently residing in such county shall continue to serve the sixth judicial district in their respective capacities. In 1986, the qualified voters of the sixth judicial district shall elect an additional chancellor in accordance with § 16-2-505 to serve part III of the chancery court of such district;
    2. The district attorney general of the sixth judicial district is entitled to sixteen (16) assistant district attorney general positions and two (2) criminal investigator positions;
    1. The seventh judicial district consists of the county of Anderson. The two (2) incumbent trial court judges and the district attorney general currently residing in such county shall continue to serve the seventh judicial district;
    2. The district attorney general of the seventh judicial district is entitled to three (3) assistant district attorney general positions and one (1) criminal investigator position;
    1. The eighth judicial district consists of the counties of Campbell, Claiborne, Fentress, Scott and Union. The three (3) incumbent trial court judges and the district attorney general currently residing in such counties shall continue to serve the eighth judicial district in their respective capacities;
    2. The district attorney general of the eighth judicial district is entitled to six (6) assistant district attorney general positions and two (2) criminal investigator positions;
    1. The ninth judicial district consists of the counties of Loudon, Meigs, Morgan and Roane. The two (2) incumbent trial court judges and the district attorney general currently residing in such counties shall continue to serve the ninth judicial district in their respective capacities. In 1984, the qualified voters of the ninth judicial district shall elect a chancellor in accordance with § 16-2-505 to serve part I of the chancery court of such district;
    2. The district attorney general of the ninth judicial district is entitled to five (5) assistant district attorney general positions and two (2) criminal investigator positions;
    1. The tenth judicial district consists of the counties of Bradley, McMinn, Monroe and Polk. The four (4) incumbent trial court judges and the district attorney general currently residing in such counties shall continue to serve the tenth judicial district in their respective capacities. In 1986, the qualified voters of the tenth judicial district shall elect an additional judge or chancellor in accordance with § 16-2-505 to serve the court and part of court designated pursuant to § 16-2-512;
    2. The district attorney general of the tenth judicial district is entitled to ten (10) assistant district attorney general positions and two (2) criminal investigator positions;
    1. The eleventh judicial district consists of the county of Hamilton. The nine (9) incumbent trial court judges and the district attorney general currently residing in such county shall continue to serve the eleventh judicial district in their respective capacities;
    2. The district attorney general of the eleventh judicial district is entitled to seventeen (17) assistant district attorney general positions and four (4) criminal investigator positions;
      1. The twelfth judicial district consists of the counties of Bledsoe, Franklin, Grundy, Marion, Rhea and Sequatchie. The three (3) incumbent trial court judges and the district attorney general currently residing in such counties shall continue to serve the twelfth judicial district in their respective capacities. In 1986, the qualified voters of the twelfth judicial district shall elect an additional judge in accordance with § 16-2-505, to serve part III of the circuit court of such district;
      2. Notwithstanding any other provision of this part to the contrary, from September 1, 1984 until September 1, 1990, the chancellor currently residing in the twelfth judicial district shall also serve as chancellor for Coffee and Warren counties in the fourteenth and thirty-first judicial districts, respectively;
    1. The district attorney general of the twelfth judicial district is entitled to eight (8) assistant district attorney general positions and two (2) criminal investigator positions;
    1. The thirteenth judicial district consists of the counties of Clay, Cumberland, DeKalb, Overton, Pickett, Putnam and White. The three (3) incumbent trial court judges and the district attorney general currently residing in such counties shall continue to serve the thirteenth judicial district in their respective capacities. In 1984, the qualified voters of the thirteenth judicial district shall elect an additional judge in accordance with § 16-2-505 to serve part II of the circuit court of such district. Effective September 1, 1998, there is created a criminal court in the thirteenth judicial district. At the August 1998 general election, the qualified voters of the thirteenth judicial district shall elect a person in accordance with § 16-2-505, to serve as judge of the criminal court created by this section for an eight-year term;
    2. The district attorney general of the thirteenth judicial district is entitled to eight (8) assistant district attorney general positions and two (2) criminal investigator positions;
    1. The fourteenth judicial district consists of the county of Coffee. The incumbent trial court judge and district attorney general currently residing in such county shall continue to serve the fourteenth judicial district in their respective capacities. In 1990, the qualified voters of the fourteenth judicial district shall elect an additional judge or chancellor in accordance with § 16-2-505, to serve the court and part of court designated pursuant to § 16-2-512. The additional judge elected in 1990 shall serve the fourteenth judicial district exclusively and the judge currently residing in such district shall also have the responsibility and duty to assist the judge of the thirty-first judicial district with the judge's docket by interchange;
    2. The district attorney general of the fourteenth judicial district is entitled to three (3) assistant district attorney general positions and one (1) criminal investigator positions;
    1. The fifteenth judicial district consists of the counties of Jackson, Macon, Smith, Trousdale and Wilson. The three (3) incumbent trial court judges and the district attorney general currently residing in such counties shall continue to serve the fifteenth judicial district. The present criminal court judge shall continue to serve as judge of the criminal court; the present chancellor shall continue to serve as judge of the chancery court; and the present circuit judge shall continue to serve as judge of the circuit court. Effective September 1, 1998, there is created an additional circuit court in the fifteenth judicial district. At the August 1998 general election, the qualified voters of the fifteenth judicial district shall elect a person in accordance with § 16-2-505, to serve as judge of the circuit court created by this section for an eight-year term;
    2. The district attorney general of the fifteenth judicial district is entitled to seven (7) assistant district attorney general positions and two (2) criminal investigator positions;
      1. The sixteenth judicial district consists of the counties of Cannon and Rutherford. The two (2) incumbent trial court judges and the district attorney general currently residing in such counties shall continue to serve the sixteenth judicial district in their respective capacities. In 1984, the qualified voters of the sixteenth judicial district shall elect an additional judge in accordance with § 16-2-505 to serve part II of the circuit court of such district;
      2. On May 31, 1993, there is created an additional court in the sixteenth judicial district with the type of such court, type of judge to preside over such court and part of court being designated as provided in § 16-2-512. The position of judge or chancellor for such court is also created on such date and such position shall be filled by appointment as provided by law. The person so appointed shall serve until September 1, 1994, or until such person's successor is elected and qualified. At the August 1994 general election, the qualified voters of the sixteenth judicial district shall elect a judge or chancellor in accordance with § 16-2-505 to serve the court and part of court created by subdivision (16)(A)(ii);
      3. Effective September 1, 1998, there is created an additional circuit court in the sixteenth judicial district. At the August 1998 general election, the qualified voters of the sixteenth judicial district shall elect a person in accordance with § 16-2-505, to serve as judge of the circuit court created by this section for an eight-year term;
      4. Effective September 1, 2018, there is created an additional trial court in the sixteenth judicial district. The type of court, type of judge to preside over the court, and part of court shall be designated as provided in § 16-2-512. The governor shall appoint a person to serve as an additional judge or chancellor, and the person so appointed shall serve in that capacity until September 1, 2020, or until the person's successor is elected and qualified. At the August 2020 general election, the qualified voters of the sixteenth judicial district shall elect an additional judge or chancellor to serve until September 1, 2022, or until the person's successor is elected and qualified. At the August 2022 general election, and every eight (8) years thereafter, the qualified voters of the sixteenth judicial district shall elect an additional judge or chancellor for a full eight-year term;
    1. The district attorney general of the sixteenth judicial district is entitled to ten (10) assistant district attorney general positions and one (1) criminal investigator position;
    1. The seventeenth judicial district consists of the counties of Bedford, Lincoln, Marshall and Moore. The two (2) incumbent trial court judges and the district attorney general currently residing in such counties shall continue to serve the seventeenth judicial district in their respective capacities. Effective September 1, 1989, there is created the position of circuit court judge to serve part II of the circuit court of the seventeenth judicial district. Such position shall be filled by appointment of the governor as provided by law and the person so appointed shall serve until September 1, 1990, or until such person's successor is elected and qualified. In 1990, the qualified voters of the seventeenth judicial district shall elect a circuit court judge in accordance with § 16-2-505, to serve part II of the circuit court of such district. The judge of part II of such circuit court may be a resident of any county within the seventeenth judicial district and shall serve the entire district;
    2. The district attorney general of the seventeenth judicial district is entitled to five (5) assistant district attorney general positions and one (1) criminal investigator position;
      1. The eighteenth judicial district consists of the county of Sumner. The two (2) incumbent trial court judges and the district attorney general currently residing in such county shall continue to serve the eighteenth judicial district in their respective capacities. In 1986, the qualified voters of the eighteenth judicial district shall elect an additional judge or chancellor in accordance with § 16-2-505 to serve the court and part of court designated pursuant to § 16-2-512;
      2. Notwithstanding any other provision of this part to the contrary, from September 1, 1984 until September 1, 1990, the circuit court judge currently residing in the eighteenth judicial district shall also serve the nineteenth judicial district;
    1. The district attorney general of the eighteenth judicial district is entitled to seven (7) assistant district attorney general positions and two (2) criminal investigator positions;
      1. The nineteenth judicial district consists of the counties of Montgomery and Robertson. The two (2) incumbent trial court judges and the district attorney general currently residing in such counties shall continue to serve the nineteenth judicial district in their respective capacities. In 1984, the qualified voters of the nineteenth judicial district shall elect an additional judge in accordance with § 16-2-505 to serve part I of the circuit court of such district;
      2. Notwithstanding any other provision of this part to the contrary, from September 1, 1984 until September 1, 1988, the chancellor currently residing in the nineteenth judicial district shall also serve as chancellor for Stewart County in the twenty-third judicial district;
      3. The circuit court judge elected in 1984 to serve part I of the circuit court of the nineteenth judicial district shall be a resident of Robertson County but shall serve the entire district. In any subsequent election for part I of such circuit court, the judge may be a resident of any county within the district. Notwithstanding any other provision of this part to the contrary, from September 1, 1984 until September 1, 1986, the circuit judge for the nineteenth judicial district is authorized to sit by interchange in the eighteenth judicial district when requested to do so by the judges of the eighteenth judicial district. During such two-year period, nothing other than the agreement of the judges involved is necessary to effectuate such an interchange;
      4. Effective September 1, 1984, the law and equity court currently located in Montgomery County shall become part II of the circuit court of the nineteenth judicial district and the current law and equity judge shall become judge of part II of such circuit court. On such date, such law and equity judge shall possess the same jurisdiction, powers and duties and shall receive the same compensation, benefits, emoluments and dignity of office as is required or provided by law for circuit court judges;
      5. In 1990, the qualified voters of the nineteenth judicial district shall elect an additional circuit court judge in accordance with § 16-2-505 to serve part III of the circuit court of such district;
      6. Effective September 1, 2015, there is created in the nineteenth judicial district one (1) additional circuit court to be designated as division IV. The governor shall appoint a person to serve as judge of division IV of the circuit court. The person so appointed shall serve in such capacity until September 1, 2016, or until the person's successor is elected and qualified. At the August 2016 general election, the qualified voters of the nineteenth judicial district shall elect, in accordance with § 16-2-505, one (1) person to serve as judge of division IV of the circuit court. The person so elected at the August 2016 general election shall hold office until September 1, 2022, or until the person's successor is elected and qualified. Thereafter, the judge of division IV of the circuit court shall be elected for a full eight-year term;
      7. Effective September 1, 2018, there is created an additional trial court in the nineteenth judicial district. The type of court, type of judge to preside over the court, and part of court shall be designated as provided in § 16-2-512. The governor shall appoint a person to serve as an additional judge or chancellor, and the person so appointed shall serve in that capacity until September 1, 2020, or until the person's successor is elected and qualified. At the August 2020 general election, the qualified voters of the nineteenth judicial district shall elect an additional judge or chancellor to serve until September 1, 2022, or until the person's successor is elected and qualified. At the August 2022 general election, and every eight (8) years thereafter, the qualified voters of the nineteenth judicial district shall elect an additional judge or chancellor for a full eight-year term;
    1. The district attorney general of the nineteenth judicial district is entitled to ten (10) assistant district attorney general positions and one (1) criminal investigator position;
      1. The twentieth judicial district consists of the county of Davidson. The twelve (12) incumbent trial court judges and the district attorney general currently residing in such county shall continue to serve the twentieth judicial district in their respective capacities. In 1990, the qualified voters of the twentieth judicial district shall elect an additional judge or chancellor in accordance with § 16-2-505 to serve the court and part of court designated pursuant to § 16-2-512. In 1998, the qualified voters of the twentieth judicial district shall elect an additional circuit court judge in accordance with § 16-2-505 to serve as judge of division VII of the circuit court of such district. In addition to the jurisdiction of a circuit court judge, the judge of division VII shall have concurrent chancery court jurisdiction and exclusive jurisdiction over the probate of wills and the administration of estates, including the estates of decedents and of wards under guardianships and conservatorships. Effective September 1, 1998, there is created an additional circuit court in the twentieth judicial district. At the August 1998 general election, the qualified voters of the twentieth judicial district shall elect a person in accordance with § 16-2-505, to serve as judge of the circuit court created by this section for an eight-year term;
      2. Effective September 1, 2003, there is created in the twentieth judicial district one (1) additional chancery court to be designated as division IV and two (2) additional criminal courts to be designated as division V and division VI. The governor shall appoint a person to serve as chancellor of division IV of the chancery court, a person to serve as judge of division V of the criminal court and a person to serve as judge of division VI of the criminal court. The persons so appointed shall serve in such capacity until September 1, 2004, or until their successors are elected and qualified. At the August 2004 general election, the qualified voters of the twentieth judicial district shall elect, in accordance with § 16-2-505, one (1) person to serve as chancellor of division IV of the chancery court, one (1) person to serve as judge of division V of the criminal court and one (1) person to serve as judge of division VI of the criminal court. The persons so elected at the August 2004 election shall hold office until September 1, 2006, and until their successors are elected and qualified. Thereafter, the chancellor and judges shall be elected for full eight-year terms;
    1. The district attorney general of the twentieth judicial district is entitled to thirty (30) assistant district attorney general positions and five (5) criminal investigator positions;
      1. Until September 1, 2022, the twenty-first judicial district consists of the counties of Hickman, Lewis, Perry and Williamson. The two (2) incumbent trial court judges and the district attorney general currently residing in such counties shall continue to serve the twenty-first judicial district in their respective capacities. In 1986, the qualified voters of the twenty-first judicial district shall elect an additional judge or chancellor in accordance with § 16-2-505 to serve the court and part of court designated pursuant to § 16-2-512. Effective January 1, 1998, there is created an additional circuit court in the twenty-first judicial district. At the August 1998 general election, the qualified voters of the twenty-first district shall elect a person in accordance with § 16-2-505, to serve as judge of the circuit court created by this section for an eight-year term;
      2. Effective September 1, 2018, there is created an additional trial court in the twenty-first judicial district. The type of court, type of judge to preside over the court, and part of court shall be designated as provided in § 16-2-512. The governor shall appoint a person to serve as an additional judge or chancellor, and the person so appointed shall serve in that capacity until September 1, 2020, or until the person's successor is elected and qualified. At the August 2020 general election, the qualified voters of the twenty-first judicial district shall elect an additional judge or chancellor to serve until September 1, 2022, at which time the additional trial court shall be transferred to the newly created thirty-second judicial district and presided over by a trial court judge elected by voters of the thirty-second judicial district at the August 2022 general election;
      3. It is the intent of the general assembly by adding an additional trial court in the twenty-first judicial district that the interests of public access to the courts and economy of judicial travel are best served by the presiding judge designating the new trial court created by subdivision (21)(A)(ii) to serve Hickman, Lewis, and Perry counties prior to being transferred to the thirty-second judicial district. Unless otherwise designated by the presiding judge to effectuate the duties enumerated in § 16-2-509(b), the remaining judges shall serve Williamson County;
      1. Effective September 1, 2022, the twenty-first judicial district consists of the county of Williamson. Except as provided in subdivision (21)(A)(iii), the incumbent trial court judges and the district attorney general currently residing in the county shall continue to serve the twenty-first judicial district in their respective capacities until September 1, 2022. At the August 2022 general election, and every eight (8) years thereafter, the qualified voters of Williamson County shall elect four (4) trial court judges to fill the positions created by subdivision (21)(A)(i) for a full eight-year term;
      2. Effective September 1, 2022, the additional trial court created by subdivision (21)(A)(ii) shall be transferred to the thirty-second judicial district;
    1. The district attorney general of the twenty-first judicial district is entitled to seven (7) assistant district attorney general positions, one (1) criminal investigator position, and one (1) additional assistant district attorney general position; provided, that the funding for such additional assistant district attorney general position is provided exclusively by the municipal and county governments that comprise the twenty-first judicial district;
    1. The twenty-second judicial district consists of the counties of Giles, Lawrence, Maury and Wayne. The three (3) incumbent trial court judges and the district attorney general currently residing in such counties shall continue to serve the twenty-second judicial district in their respective capacities. Effective September 1, 1998, there is created an additional circuit court in the twenty-second judicial district. At the August 1998 general election, the qualified voters of the twenty-second judicial district shall elect a person in accordance with § 16-2-505, to serve as judge of the circuit court created by this section for an eight-year term;
    2. The district attorney general of the twenty-second judicial district is entitled to eight (8) assistant district attorney general positions and two (2) criminal investigator positions;
    1. The twenty-third judicial district consists of the counties of Cheatham, Dickson, Houston, Humphreys and Stewart. The two (2) incumbent trial court judges and the district attorney general currently residing in such counties shall continue to serve the twenty-third judicial district in their respective capacities. In 1988, the qualified voters of the twenty-third judicial district shall elect an additional judge or chancellor in accordance with § 16-2-505 to serve the court and part of court designated pursuant to § 16-2-512;
    2. The district attorney general of the twenty-third judicial district is entitled to seven (7) assistant district attorney general positions and two (2) criminal investigator positions. The fifth assistant district attorney general position shall not be filled unless full funding for the position is secured from local, federal or other funding sources apart from state appropriations;
    1. The twenty-fourth judicial district consists of the counties of Benton, Carroll, Decatur, Hardin and Henry. The two (2) incumbent trial court judges and the district attorney general currently residing in such counties shall continue to serve the twenty-fourth judicial district in their respective capacities. In 1984, the qualified voters of the twenty-fourth judicial district shall elect an additional judge in accordance with § 16-2-505 to serve part II of the circuit court of such district;
    2. The district attorney general of the twenty-fourth judicial district is entitled to five (5) assistant district attorney general positions and one (1) criminal investigator position;
    1. The twenty-fifth judicial district consists of the counties of Fayette, Hardeman, Lauderdale, McNairy and Tipton. The three (3) incumbent trial court judges and the district attorney general currently residing in such counties shall continue to serve the twenty-fifth judicial district in their respective capacities. In 1990, the qualified voters of the twenty-fifth judicial district shall elect an additional judge or chancellor in accordance with § 16-2-505 to serve the court and part of court designated pursuant to § 16-2-512;
    2. The district attorney general of the twenty-fifth judicial district is entitled to nine (9) assistant district attorney general positions and one (1) criminal investigator position;
    1. The twenty-sixth judicial district consists of the counties of Chester, Henderson and Madison. The three (3) incumbent trial court judges and the district attorney general currently residing in such counties shall continue to serve the twenty-sixth judicial district in their respective capacities. Effective September 1, 1998, there is created an additional circuit court in the twenty-sixth judicial district. At the August 1998 general election, the qualified voters of the twenty-sixth judicial district shall elect a person in accordance with § 16-2-505, to serve as judge of the circuit court created by this section for an eight-year term;
    2. The district attorney general of the twenty-sixth judicial district is entitled to seven (7) assistant district attorney general positions and one (1) criminal investigator position;
    1. The twenty-seventh judicial district consists of the counties of Obion and Weakley. The two (2) incumbent trial court judges and the district attorney general currently residing in such counties shall continue to serve the twenty-seventh judicial district in their respective capacities;
    2. The district attorney general of the twenty-seventh judicial district is entitled to three (3) assistant district attorney general positions and one (1) criminal investigator position;
      1. The twenty-eighth judicial district consists of the counties of Crockett, Gibson and Haywood. The two (2) incumbent trial court judges and the district attorney general currently residing in such counties shall continue to serve the twenty-eighth judicial district in their respective capacities;
      2. Effective September 1, 1984, the law and equity court currently located in Gibson County shall become a chancery court for the twenty-eighth judicial district and the current law and equity judge shall become a chancellor who on such date shall possess the same jurisdiction, powers and duties and shall receive the same compensation, benefits, emoluments and dignity of office as is required or provided by law for chancellors;
    1. The district attorney general of the twenty-eighth judicial district is entitled to five (5) assistant district attorney general positions and one (1) criminal investigator position;
      1. The twenty-ninth judicial district consists of the counties of Dyer and Lake. The two (2) incumbent trial court judges and the district attorney general currently residing in such counties shall continue to serve the twenty-ninth judicial district in their respective capacities. Juvenile jurisdiction in Dyer County shall be in the court of general sessions as provided in §§ 37-1-102 and 37-1-203, unless such jurisdiction is vested in another court by law or private act;
      2. Effective April 15, 1986, part II of the circuit court of the twenty-ninth judicial district shall become part I of the chancery court of such district and the current judge of part II of such circuit court shall become chancellor of part I of the chancery court of such district. On such date, such chancellor shall possess the same jurisdiction, powers and duties and shall receive the same compensation, benefits, emoluments and dignity of office as is required or provided by law for chancellors. This chancellor shall have concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit court of this district;
    1. The district attorney general of the twenty-ninth judicial district is entitled to three (3) assistant district attorney general positions and one (1) criminal investigator position;
    2. Effective September 1, 1984, there is created the position of secretary for the chancellor of part I of the chancery court of the twenty-ninth judicial district and such chancellor is authorized to employ a person to fill such position in accordance with § 16-2-505(c);
    1. The thirtieth judicial district is composed of the county of Shelby. The nineteen (19) incumbent trial court judges and the district attorney general currently residing in such county shall continue to serve the thirtieth judicial district in their respective capacities. In 1984, the qualified voters of the thirtieth judicial district shall elect an additional judge in accordance with § 16-2-505 to serve part IX of the circuit court of such district. In 1990, the qualified voters of the thirtieth judicial district shall elect one (1) additional criminal court judge in accordance with § 16-2-505 to serve part IX of the criminal court of such district. The board of commissioners of Shelby County shall furnish all books other than those provided by the administrative director of the courts and other necessary supplies for the judge to be elected in 1990. On June 6, 1995, there is created an additional criminal court in the thirtieth judicial district. The court shall be Part X of the criminal court of such district. The position shall be filled by appointment as provided by law. The person so appointed shall serve until September 1, 1996, or until such person's successor is elected and qualified. At the August 1996 general election, the qualified voters of the thirtieth judicial district shall elect a criminal court judge in accordance with § 16-2-505 to serve Part X of the court;
    2. The district attorney general of the thirtieth judicial district is entitled to forty-four (44) assistant district attorney general positions and thirteen (13) criminal investigator positions; and
    1. The thirty-first judicial district consists of the counties of Van Buren and Warren. The incumbent trial court judge currently residing in such counties shall continue to serve the thirty-first judicial district. The judge residing in the thirty-first judicial district shall also have the responsibility and duty to assist the judge of the fourteenth judicial district by interchange with such judge's docket;
      1. Effective September 1, 1990, there is created the position of district attorney general for the thirty-first judicial district. At the regular August election in 1990, the qualified voters of the thirty-first judicial district shall elect a person to the position of district attorney general for a full eight-year term. The person elected to such position shall possess the same qualifications, powers and duties and shall receive the same compensation, payable in the same manner, benefits, emoluments and dignity of office as is required or provided by law for other district attorneys general;
      2. Effective July 1, 1989, there are created two (2) secretarial positions for the district attorney general of the thirty-first judicial district. Such district attorney general shall select a suitable person to fill one (1) position and such person shall receive the same compensation, payable in the same manner, as is provided by law for the secretary of other district attorneys general. The secretary shall perform such duties as may be assigned by such district attorney general. Such district attorney general shall transfer all authority and funding concerning the other secretarial position to the district attorney general for the fourth judicial district who shall select a suitable person to fill the other position, and such person shall receive the same compensation, payable in the same manner, as is provided by law for the secretary of other district attorneys general. The secretary shall perform such duties as may be assigned by the district attorney general for the fourth judicial district;
      3. The district attorney general of the thirty-first judicial district is entitled to three (3) assistant district attorney general positions and one (1) criminal investigator position;
      4. On September 1, 1990, the office space and all state-owned furniture, equipment, supplies, books and other such office property located in the Warren County courthouse and currently being used by the district attorney general of the fourteenth judicial district, or by one (1) of the district attorney general's assistants or investigators, shall be transferred for the use of the district attorney of the thirty-first judicial district. On and after such date, all such office space and other office property located in the Warren County courthouse shall become the space for and property of the office of district attorney general for the thirty-first judicial district. Nothing contained herein shall be construed as prohibiting such district attorney general from also establishing an office in the other county comprising the thirty-first judicial district;
      5. By September 1, 1990, all records, files, papers and other official documents pertaining to any pending or completed case arising out of any of the counties comprising the thirty-first judicial district shall be transferred to and become the property of the office of district attorney general for the thirty-first judicial district;
      6. Notwithstanding any other law or this subdivision (31) to the contrary, if a vacancy occurs in the office of the district attorney general currently serving the thirty-first judicial district, the governor shall appoint a suitable person to serve as district attorney general for such district. The person so appointed shall possess all of the qualifications required by law for district attorneys general and shall serve until September 1, 1990, or until the district attorney general to be elected by the voters of the thirty-first judicial district pursuant to this subdivision (31)(B) is elected and qualified; and
    1. Effective September 1, 2022, the thirty-second judicial district consists of the counties of Hickman, Lewis, and Perry. The incumbent trial court judge elected pursuant to subdivision (21)(A)(ii) shall continue to serve the twenty-first judicial district until September 1, 2022, at which time the additional trial court created by subdivision (21)(A)(ii) shall be transferred to the thirty-second judicial district and presided over by a trial court judge to be elected by voters of the thirty-second judicial district at the August 2022 general election. Every eight (8) years thereafter, the qualified voters of the thirty-second judicial district shall elect a judge or chancellor for a full eight-year term;
      1. Effective September 1, 2022, there is created the position of district attorney general for the thirty-second judicial district. At the regular August election in 2022, the qualified voters of the thirty-second judicial district shall elect a person to the position of district attorney general for a full eight-year term. The person elected to such position shall possess the same qualifications, powers, and duties and shall receive the same compensation, payable in the same manner, benefits, emoluments, and dignity of office as is required or provided by law for other district attorneys general;
      2. The district attorney general of the thirty-second judicial district is entitled to three (3) assistant district attorney general positions, one (1) administrative assistant position, two (2) secretary positions, one (1) criminal investigator position, and two (2) victim-witness coordinator positions;
      3. On September 1, 2022, the office space and all state-owned furniture, equipment, supplies, books, and other such office property located in the Centerville or Hohenwald offices of the district attorney general of the twenty-first district and currently being used by the district attorney general of the twenty-first judicial district, or by one (1) of the district attorney general's assistants or investigators, shall be transferred for the use of the district attorney of the thirty-second judicial district. On and after such date, all such office space and other office property located in the Centerville and Hohenwald offices shall become the space for and property of the office of district attorney general for the thirty-second judicial district. Nothing in this subdivision (32)(B)(iii) prohibits the district attorney general from also establishing another office in the thirty-second judicial district; and
      4. By September 1, 2022, all records, files, papers, and other official documents pertaining to any pending or completed case arising out of any of the counties comprising the thirty-second judicial district shall be transferred to and become the property of the office of district attorney general for the thirty-second judicial district.

Acts 1984, ch. 931, § 6; 1985, ch. 474, § 1; 1986, ch. 746, §§ 1, 2; 1986, ch. 813, § 1; 1988, ch. 725, § 1; 1988, ch. 773, § 1; 1988, ch. 804, § 1; 1989, ch. 118, § 1; 1989, ch. 144, § 1; 1989, ch. 148, § 1; 1989, ch. 529, § 1; 1989, ch. 530, §§ 1, 2; 1989, ch. 586, §§ 1, 2; 1990, ch. 687, § 1; 1990, ch. 842, § 1; 1990, ch. 914, § 1; 1990, ch. 998, § 1; 1990, ch. 1013, § 1; 1990, ch. 1058, §§ 1, 2; 1990, ch. 1064, § 1; 1991, ch. 287, § 1; 1991, ch. 435, § 1; 1991, ch. 474, § 1; 1992, ch. 593, § 1; 1992, ch. 961, § 1; 1993, ch. 66, § 15; 1993, ch. 330, § 1; 1993, ch. 506, § 3; 1994, ch. 540, § 1; 1994, ch. 804, §§ 1, 2; 1994, ch. 937, §§ 2-31; 1994, ch. 949, § 1; Priv. Acts 1995, ch. 62, § 1; Acts 1995, ch. 398, § 1; 1997, ch. 120, § 1; 1997, ch. 450, § 1-8; 1998, ch. 771, §§ 1-25; 1999, ch. 179, § 1; 2001, ch. 361, § 1; 2003, ch. 216, § 1; 2005, ch. 31, §§ 1-23; 2015, ch. 437, § 1; 2018, ch. 974, §§ 1-3; 2020, ch. 530, §§ 1-3.

Code Commission Notes.

Article II, § 24 of the Constitution of Tennessee provides, in part, that:

Any law requiring the expenditure of state funds shall be null and void unless, during the session in which the act receives final passage, an appropriation is made for the estimated first year's funding.

The Tennessee code commission has been advised by the commissioner of finance and administration that the necessary first year's funding was not appropriated during the 1991 regular session for the following public acts which would have amended this section: Acts 1991, ch. 286, § 1; ch. 375, § 1; ch. 387, § 1; ch. 404, § 1; ch. 408, § 1; ch. 409, § 1; ch. 437, § 1; and ch. 478, § 1.

The code commission was directed by Acts 1991, ch. 509, § 54 to not codify acts which did not receive first year's funding. Accordingly, Acts 1991, ch. 286, § 1; ch. 375, § 1; ch. 387, § 1; ch. 404, § 1; ch. 408, § 1; ch. 409, § 1; ch. 437, § 1; and ch. 478, § 1, which would have amended this section, have not been codified. If the foregoing chapters had been codified, this section would have been amended as follows:

Chapter 286, § 1 would have substituted the following for the present text of (1)(B): “The district attorney general of the first judicial district shall be entitled to seven (7) assistant district attorney general positions and one (1) criminal investigator position.” This amendment would have taken effect July 1, 1991.

Chapter 375, § 1 would have added the following in (8)(B): “Effective July 1, 1991, the district attorney general of the eighth judicial district shall be entitled to an additional criminal investigator position. The district attorney general for such district shall appoint a suitable person to such position to serve at the pleasure of such district attorney general. The criminal investigator so appointed shall have the same power and authority as deputies of the county sheriff, and shall perform such duties and functions as the district attorney general may require. The criminal investigator shall be compensated as provided by law.”

Chapter 387, § 1 would have substituted the following for the present text of (3)(B): “The district attorney general of the third judicial district shall be entitled to seven (7) assistant district attorney general positions and three (3) criminal investigator positions. One (1) of the assistant district attorney general positions shall be a part-time position, and shall be filled only if funding for the position is available through the District Attorneys General Fiscal Affairs Act.” This amendment would have taken effect July 1, 1991.

Chapter 404, § 1 would have added the following in (13)(B): “Effective July 1, 1991, the district attorney general of the thirteenth judicial district shall be entitled to an additional assistant district attorney general position to be appointed and who shall have the same qualifications and duties as is provided in Tennessee Code Annotated, Section 16-2-508.”

Chapter 408, § 1 would have added the following in (15)(B): “On July 1, 1991, the district attorney general of the fifteenth judicial district shall be entitled to one (1) additional assistant district attorney general position.”

Chapter 409, § 1 would have added the following as (31)(B)(x): “On July 1, 1991, the district attorney general of the thirty-first (31st) judicial district shall be entitled to an additional assistant district attorney general position.”

Chapter 437, § 1 would have added the following in (18)(B): “On July 1, 1991, the district attorney general of the eighteenth judicial district shall be entitled to an additional assistant district attorney general position.”

Chapter 478, § 1 would have added the following in (10)(B): “On July 1, 1991, the district attorney general of the 10th judicial district shall be entitled to one (1) additional criminal investigator.”

Compiler's Notes. Acts 1988, ch. 773, §§ 2, 3 provided that the additional criminal investigator for the tenth judicial district, provided for by the 1988 amendment to this section, shall have the same power and authority as deputies of the county sheriffs, shall perform such duties and functions as the district attorney general may require, and shall be compensated as provided for by the general law of this state.

Acts 1989, ch. 586, § 2 provided that authority and funding concerning a secretarial position created for the 31st judicial district shall be transferred to the district attorney general for the 4th judicial district, who shall select the person to fill such secretarial position.

Acts 1989, ch. 586, § 4 provided that for the purpose of qualifying and seeking election to the position of district attorney general for the thirty-first judicial district created by that act and for the purpose of transferring documents pertaining to such district, the amendment by that act took effect June 13, 1989. For all other purposes, § 4 provided that the amendment by ch. 586 take effect September 1, 1990.

Acts 1990, ch. 998, § 2 provided that the amendment by that act shall not be construed to be an appropriation of funds and no funds shall be obligated or expended pursuant to the second sentence in subdivision (20)(B) unless such funds are specifically appropriated by the general appropriations act.

Acts 1990, ch. 1013, § 2 provided that no state funds in excess of one hundred eighty-five thousand dollars ($185,000) shall be obligated or expended to implement the provisions of ch. 1013.

Acts 1990, ch. 1064, § 2 provided that no state funds in excess of one hundred eighty-five thousand dollars ($185,000) shall be obligated or expended to implement the provisions of ch. 1064.

Acts 1991, ch. 27 created five additional assistant district attorneys general, two criminal investigators and two secretaries to the staff of the district attorney general for the sixth judicial district, and provided for their appointment, compensation and duties.

Acts 1994, ch. 937, § 32 provided that the provisions of that act, which amended this section and enacted § 16-2-519, shall take effect only to the extent funding is provided specifically for its implementation in the General Appropriations Act. To the extent such funding is insufficient to fully implement the provisions of the act, the district attorneys general conference and the commissioner of finance and administration shall determine which provisions of the act shall be implemented. Section 32 further directed the code commission to codify only those provisions of the act deemed to be funded by the district attorneys general conference as provided above.

Acts 2003, ch. 216, § 2 provided that the provisions of the act shall have no effect, and no appointments shall be made pursuant to § 3 of the act, unless funds are appropriated in the 2003-2004 appropriations act to fund the estimated first year's costs of any positions, and associated costs, authorized by this act. Funding was provided by Acts 2003, ch. 356, § 12, item 7.

Acts 2003, ch. 216, § 3 provided that for the purpose of the governor appointing persons to serve as chancellor and judge of the three (3) judicial positions created by the amendment by the act, the act shall take effect June 2, 2003.

Acts 2020, ch. 530, § 5 provided: that the act, which amended this section,  shall not be construed to limit, terminate, or otherwise affect the term or future terms of office of any circuit court clerk, criminal court clerk, or clerk and master, subject to the residence requirement found in § 18-1-102. All such incumbents shall continue in office until the expiration of their respective terms of office and shall be eligible for reelection or reappointment. Nothing in this act shall be construed to require, permit, or authorize the consolidation of the offices of clerk and master, circuit court clerk, or criminal court clerk or to place any clerk in a position of dominance over any other clerk.

Acts 2020, ch. 530, § 6 provided:

“(a)  All process issued after September 1, 2022, shall be returnable at the times and places fixed by local court rules promulgated in accordance with this act. All bonds and undertakings executed after September 1, 2022, shall be governed by local court rules, insofar as to appearance dates and other conditions relating to time and place.

“(b)  All cases, both civil and criminal except those that have previously been heard and taken under advisement, pending in any court in the twenty-first judicial district prior to September 1, 2022, shall as of that date be heard and determined in the appropriate court by the appropriate judge.

“(c)  Notwithstanding Tennessee Code Annotated, Title 16, Chapter 2, to the contrary, nothing in this act shall be construed to repeal, amend, or affect in any manner any jurisdiction granted to any local court by any public or private law.”

Amendments. The 2015 amendment added (19)(A)(vi).

The 2018 amendment added (16)(A)(iv), (19)(A)(vii), (21)(A)(ii) and (21)(A)(iii).

The 2020 amendment substituted “thirty-two (32)” for “thirty-one (31)” in the introductory language;  substituted “Until September 1, 2022, the” for “The” in (21)(A)(i); in the last sentence of (21)(A)(ii), substituted “at which time the additional trial court shall be transferred to the newly created thirty-second judicial district and presided over by a trial court judge elected by voters of the thirty-second judicial district at the August 2022” for “or until the person’s successor is elected and qualified. At the August 2022”, and deleted “and every eight (8) years thereafter, the qualified voters of the thirty-first judicial district shall elect an additional judge or chancellor for a full eight-year term;” following “general election”; at the end of the first sentence of (21)(A)(iii), added “, prior to being transferred to the thirty-second judicial district”; redesignated former (21)(B) as (21)(C); added (21)(B)(i) and (21)(B)(ii); and added (32).

Effective Dates. Acts 2015, ch. 437, § 2. May 18, 2015.

Acts 2018, ch. 974, § 5. May 21, 2018.

Acts 2020, ch. 530, § 7. March 10, 2020.

Cross-References. Criminal investigators and assistant district attorneys general, compensation, title 8, ch. 7, part 2.

District attorneys general, title 8, ch. 7, part 1.

Textbooks. Tennessee Criminal Practice and Procedure (Raybin), § 24.10.

Law Reviews.

Civil Procedure — Flowers v. Dyer County: The Death of the Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction, 23 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 409 (1993).

What Price is Justice? Adequate funding for judicial system needs to be top priority of upcoming General Assembly (W. Andy Hardin), 37 No. 2 Tenn. B.J. 23 (2001).

Attorney General Opinions. Constitutionality, judges and district attorneys for certain judicial districts, OAG 87-163 (10/23/87).

County legislative bodies' responsibility to provide court facilities, OAG 99-049 (3/2/99).

Cited: Minor v. Williams, 640 F. Supp. 360, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15368 (M.D. Tenn. 1985); Flowers v. Dyer County, 830 S.W.2d 51, 1992 Tenn. LEXIS 491 (Tenn. 1992); Woods v. MTC Mgmt., 967 S.W.2d 800, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 213 (Tenn. 1998); Cousin v. Sundquist, 145 F.3d 818, 1998 FED App. 171P, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 10796 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1138, 119 S. Ct. 1026, 143 L. Ed. 2d 37, 1999 U.S. LEXIS 1020 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1999); Williams v. City of Milan, — S.W.3d —, 2011 Tenn. App. LEXIS 67 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 16, 2011).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. In General.

Where defendant alleged that plaintiffs did not prove the existence of the chancery court in which the action was brought, the court of appeals took judicial notice of the constitutional provision creating chancery courts and the pertinent statute designating the county as a judicial district. Industrial Dev. Bd. v. Hancock, 901 S.W.2d 382, 1995 Tenn. App. LEXIS 92 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995).

Where the executor represented to decedent's husband, his counsel, and to probate court that he agreed to extend the statute of limitations for decedent's husband to file his petition for elective share, probate court did not err by allowing the husband to go forward with his petition for elective share; pursuant to T.C.A. § 16-2-506(20)(A), probate court had jurisdiction over the matter. In re Estate of Grass, — S.W.3d —, 2008 Tenn. App. LEXIS 343 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 4, 2008), overruled in part, In re Estate of Fletcher, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 743 (Tenn. Dec. 6, 2017).

Trial court erred in holding that intermediate appellate judges were subject to retention only by the qualified voters of the grand division in which the judge resided because the General Assembly intend to create one court of appeals and not three. Hooker v. Haslam, 382 S.W.3d 358, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 511 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 27, 2012).

The Tennessee Legislature specifically provided that the reorganization of the trial court system did not have as its purpose the abolition of any court or judicial office. Therefore, the long-standing process for trying an offender in the county in which a crime was committed by a jury that was selected from that county was not abolished by the creation of judicial districts. Kenner v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 440 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 5, 2015), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 875 (Tenn. Oct. 15, 2015).

Magistrate did not have authority to issue search warrants for defendants'  homes because the magistrate issued the warrants for property located outside his judicial district; because the magistrate, who was a circuit court judge, did not have the authority to issue the search warrants for defendants'  homes located outside of his district, the search warrants were void ab initio, and the searches of defendants'  homes were unconstitutional. State v. Frazier, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 861 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 25, 2017), aff'd, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 537 (Tenn. Sept. 26, 2018).

Because the offense occurred in Lawrence County, Tenneesee the Lawrence County Circuit Court had subject matter jurisdiction over defendant's misdemeanor charges; defendant, a resident of the State by his own admission, drove a motor vehicle on a public highway in Lawrence County and then personally appeared in the Lawrence County Circuit Court to stand trial, thus vesting that court with personal jurisdiction. State v. Hirsch, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 887 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 28, 2017).

16-2-507. Incumbent judges — Cooperation between judges.

  1. All incumbent trial court judges shall hold office in and serve the judicial district of which they have been designated by § 16-2-506.
  2. It is the affirmative duty of every trial court judge to fully cooperate with the presiding judge and the other judges in the district.

Acts 1984, ch. 931, § 7.

Attorney General Opinions. Distribution of court space by presiding judge, OAG 99-049 (3/2/99).

16-2-508. District attorneys general — Powers and duties — Assistant district attorneys general — Criminal investigators — Other positions.

  1. All incumbent district attorneys general shall hold office in and serve the judicial district to which they are assigned by § 16-2-506. The district attorneys general shall exercise and possess the jurisdiction, powers and duties within the judicial districts created by this part as are conferred by law upon district attorneys general. This part shall not be construed to make any reduction in the staff of any district attorney general, and any legislative act that creates assistant district attorney general, criminal investigator or other positions, or that otherwise affects or involves the office of district attorney general in a particular judicial district or attorney's district as it is presently numbered or identified is made applicable to the judicial district to which the present district attorney general is assigned by this part. Nothing in this part shall be construed as affecting a county's authority to provide staff and other resources to the district attorney general of the district in which the county is located.
  2. Except in the judicial districts comprised of the urban counties of Shelby, Davidson, Knox, Hamilton and Sullivan, the district attorney general of each judicial district shall be entitled to at least one (1) assistant district attorney general position for each trial court judge in the judicial district to which the district attorney general is assigned, as well as either one (1) additional assistant district attorney general position if the judicial district is comprised of four (4) or more counties, or two (2) additional assistant district attorney general positions if the judicial district is comprised of more than six (6) counties. If an additional trial court judge is added to a judicial district, and that district does not already have sufficient assistant district attorney general positions to satisfy the formula set out in this subsection (b), an additional assistant district attorney general position shall be created for that district upon the effective date of the creation of the new judicial position.
  3. [Deleted by 2013 amendment, effective March 20, 2013.]
  4. The district attorney general of any judicial district in which an assistant district attorney general position is created by this part shall appoint a suitable person to serve as assistant district attorney general. The person so appointed shall serve at the pleasure of the district attorney general, and shall perform the duties the district attorney general requires. Each person so appointed shall be compensated as provided for by general law.
  5. Except for the assistant district attorney general position created annually by former subsection (c) and those created when, pursuant to § 16-2-506, an additional trial court judge is elected in 1986, 1988 or 1990, the number of such assistant positions set out in § 16-2-506 shall be the total number of positions to which the corresponding district attorney general is entitled, and nothing in this section shall be construed as creating any assistant positions in excess of such number.
    1. The district attorneys general shall appoint suitable individuals to the position of criminal investigator. The individuals so appointed shall perform such duties as the district attorney general may direct, and shall serve at the pleasure of the district attorney general.
    2. In carrying out the duties of the criminal investigator's office, each of the criminal investigators shall possess the same power and authority as deputies of the county sheriffs or if the judicial district includes a metropolitan form of government then their power and authority shall include all police powers of law enforcement officers in that area metropolitan government. The compensation of such investigators shall be as provided by general law.

Acts 1984, ch. 931, § 8; 1986, ch. 813, §§ 2, 3; 1989, ch. 144, § 2; 1996, ch. 996, § 2; 2013, ch. 21, § 2; 2013, ch. 68, § 3.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 1986, ch. 813 created criminal investigator positions in the 1st, 5th, 15th, 17th, 19th, 23rd, 24th, 25th and 26th judicial districts.

Acts 1996, ch. 996, §  2 provided that the name “executive director of the district attorneys general conference” be substituted for “executive secretary to the district attorneys general conference”.

Subsection (e) refers to former subsection (c), which was deleted by Acts 2013, ch. 21, § 2, effective March 20, 2013, and which read: “(c)  The district attorneys general of the judicial districts comprising the urban counties of Shelby, Davidson, Knox, Hamilton and Sullivan shall retain their present number of assistant district attorneys general, except that on September 1, 1985, and on each successive September 1 through 1990, one (1) additional assistant district attorney general position shall be created, and assigned to the urban district then having the highest ratio of population to assistant district attorneys general. On August 1, 1985, through August 1, 1990, the office of local government of the office of the comptroller of the treasury shall determine which of the five (5) urban judicial districts listed above has the highest ratio of population to assistant district attorney general positions. The office of local government shall notify the executive director of the district attorneys general conference who shall notify the district attorney general of the district with the highest ratio that effective September 1, of that year the district attorney general is entitled to employ one (1) additional assistant district attorney general.”

Amendments. The 2013 amendment by ch. 21 deleted (c) which read: “The district attorneys general of the judicial districts comprising the urban counties of Shelby, Davidson, Knox, Hamilton and Sullivan shall retain their present number of assistant district attorneys general, except that on September 1, 1985, and on each successive September 1 through 1990, one (1) additional assistant district attorney general position shall be created, and assigned to the urban district then having the highest ratio of population to assistant district attorneys general. On August 1, 1985, through August 1, 1990, the office of local government of the office of the comptroller of the treasury shall determine which of the five (5) urban judicial districts listed above has the highest ratio of population to assistant district attorney general positions. The office of local government shall notify the executive director of the district attorneys general conference who shall notify the district attorney general of the district with the highest ratio that effective September 1, of that year the district attorney general is entitled to employ one (1) additional assistant district attorney general.”

The 2013 amendment by ch. 68 rewrote (f) which read: “(f)(1) The district attorney general for the first, fifth, fifteenth, seventeenth, nineteenth, twenty-third, twenty-fourth, twenty-fifth and twenty-sixth districts shall appoint a suitable person to the position of criminal investigator. The person so appointed shall perform the duties that the district attorney general directs, and shall serve at the pleasure of the district attorney general.“(2) In carrying out the duties of the criminal investigator's office, each of the criminal investigators created by Acts 1986, ch. 813, shall possess the same power and authority as deputies of the county sheriffs. The compensation of the investigators shall be as provided by general law.”

Effective Dates. Acts 2013, ch. 21, § 4. March 20, 2013.

Acts 2013, ch. 68, § 4. July 1, 2013.

Cross-References. Criminal investigators and assistant district attorneys general, compensation, title 8, ch. 7, part 2.

District attorneys general, title 8, ch. 7, part 1.

16-2-509. Presiding judges.

  1. The judges in each judicial district shall assemble for the purpose of selecting a presiding judge of the district. In August of each year, the judges within each district shall assemble at the call of the presiding judge and select a successor to such presiding judge who shall serve until September 1 of the following year. If upon any selection date the judges in any district fail to choose or are unable to agree upon the selection of a presiding judge, the chief justice of the supreme court shall designate one (1) of their number to serve.
  2. It is the duty of the presiding judge to:
    1. Reduce docket delays and hold congestion to a minimum;
    2. Seek and maintain an equitable distribution of the workload and an equal sharing of the bench and chambers time necessary to dispose of the business of the district;
    3. Promote the orderly and efficient administration of justice within the district; and
    4. Take immediate and affirmative action to correct or alleviate any caseload imbalance, or any condition adversely affecting the administration of justice within the district over which the judge presides.
  3. To effectuate the duties enumerated in subsection (b), the presiding judge may assign cases to judges and chancellors within the district over which the judge presides. In assigning cases, the presiding judge shall, whenever possible and not detrimental to the orderly and efficient administration of justice, give due regard to the court upon which the judge or chancellor serves, the judge's or chancellor's particular background, experience and preference and economy of judicial travel time.
  4. If a presiding judge is unable to correct a caseload imbalance or reduce docket delays utilizing the available judges within the district over which the judge presides, it is the affirmative duty of the presiding judge to contact other presiding judges and request assistance or contact the supreme court and request assistance pursuant to § 16-3-502.
  5. This part shall not be construed as altering or modifying any law concerning interchange by agreement.

Acts 1984, ch. 931, § 9; 2005, ch. 26, § 1.

Cross-References. Interchange of judges, § 17-2-202.

Rule Reference. This section is referred to in Rule 11, §§ III, VII of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Tennessee; and in Rule 2, Davidson County Local Rules of Practice, Courts of Record, Twentieth Judicial District of Tennessee.

Attorney General Opinions. Distribution of court space by presiding judge, OAG 99-049 (3/2/99).

Although T.C.A. § 16-2-505(d)(2) does not expressly authorize the court security committee to adopt any measures with regard to courthouse security, it is reasonable to infer that the committee may put into effect security measures affecting the security of space and facilities provided to state trial judges, so long as these measures do not require county expenditures; these measures may affect general sessions courtrooms and personnel, as well as the personnel of other offices located in the courthouse, if the measures are reasonably related to ensuring security of space and facilities provided to state trial judges, OAG 02-052 (4/24/02).

Cited: State Dep't of Children's Servs. v. A.M.H., 198 S.W.3d 757, 2006 Tenn. App. LEXIS 156 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Appointment of Special Judge.

A trial judge should appoint a clerk and master to act as a special/substitute judge in the trial judge's absence only if the trial judge determines it is not possible either to interchange pursuant to § 17-2-202, or to obtain assistance from another presiding judge or from the Tennessee supreme court pursuant to T.C.A. § 16-2-509(e). Ferrell v. Cigna Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 33 S.W.3d 731, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 686 (Tenn. 2000).

In a tax case, a clerk and master lacked authority to enter summary judgment in favor of the Tennessee commissioner of revenue under T.C.A. § 17-2-118(a), (f)(2) (now (f)(1)(B)) because the clerk and master was not appointed or ordered to sit as a judge on the date at issue, and the requirement for exploring interchange was not satisfied where a chancellor was out of town; procedures for appointing a substitute judge were mandatory, and to hold otherwise would have rendered Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10, Canon 3A and Ferrell v. Cigna Property & Cas. Ins. Co., 33 S.W.3d 731, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 686 (Tenn. 2000), meaningless. Maxwell Med., Inc. v. Chumley, 282 S.W.3d 893, 2008 Tenn. App. LEXIS 542 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 22, 2008).

16-2-510. Holding of court — Terms abolished — Grand juries.

  1. Court shall be held within each judicial district at such times and on such dates as the judges of each judicial district fix by rule. Court shall be held in each county within the district as often as is necessary to dispose of the business of the court. Not less than thirty (30) days prior to the rule taking effect, the rule shall be published and circulated to the practicing bar, and filed with the administrative director of the courts.
  2. Terms of court are abolished and the minutes of all courts shall remain open continuously. Any reference in Tennessee Code Annotated to the beginning of a term of court shall be deemed to be a reference to the appropriate date fixed by rule as provided by this section.
  3. New grand juries shall be impaneled at least twice a year at times selected by the presiding judge of the district. The presiding judge within each district shall be responsible for designating the foreperson and for impaneling, charging and receiving the report of the grand jury, but may designate another judge to perform these responsibilities. In those districts in which there is a criminal court judge or judges, the criminal court judge or judges shall perform the duties pertaining to the grand jury assigned to the presiding judge by this subsection (c).

Acts 1984, ch. 931, § 10; 1993, ch. 66, § 16.

Textbooks. Tennessee Criminal Practice and Procedure (Raybin), §§ 24.10, 24.18, 24.80, 25.14, 25.20, 25.22, 25.54.

Law Reviews.

A Noble Ideal Whose Time Has Come (Penny J. White), 18 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 223 (1989).

Cited: State v. Osborne, 712 S.W.2d 488, 1986 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 2604 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1986).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Grand Juries.

This section was enacted for the benefit of the public at large, not a particular accused, and in the absence of corruption, fraud, bias, disqualification or other illegality infecting the grand jury, an irregularity in its selection does not invalidate its acts. State v. Thompson, 768 S.W.2d 239, 1989 Tenn. LEXIS 47 (Tenn. 1989), rehearing denied, — S.W.2d —, 1989 Tenn. LEXIS 194 (Tenn. Mar. 27, 1989), cert. denied, Thompson v. Tennessee, 497 U.S. 1031, 110 S. Ct. 3288, 111 L. Ed. 2d 796, 1990 U.S. LEXIS 3596 (1990); State v. Bates, 804 S.W.2d 868, 1991 Tenn. LEXIS 44 (Tenn. 1991), rehearing denied, — S.W.2d —, 1991 Tenn. LEXIS 82 (Tenn. Feb. 25, 1991), cert. denied, Bates v. Tennessee, 502 U.S. 841, 112 S. Ct. 131, 116 L. Ed. 2d 98, 1991 U.S. LEXIS 4994 (1991).

16-2-511. Uniform rules of practice — Designation of court by certain types of cases.

Uniform rules of practice may be promulgated in each district by the judges of the district. The rules shall be consistent with the statutory law, the rules of the supreme court and the rules of criminal and civil procedure. The judges within a district may, by rule, designate courts or parts of a court that will be primarily responsible for hearing certain types of cases or cases dealing with certain areas of the law. Not less than thirty (30) days prior to the rules taking effect, copies of the rules shall be published and circulated to the practicing bar and filed with the administrative director of the courts.

Acts 1984, ch. 931, § 11; 1993, ch. 66, § 17.

Textbooks. Tennessee Criminal Practice and Procedure (Raybin), § 24.18.

Law Reviews.

Judicial Notice in Tennessee (Robert Banks, Jr. and Elizabeth T. Collins), 21 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 431 (1991).

Cited: Hessmer v. Hessmer, 138 S.W.3d 901, 2003 Tenn. App. LEXIS 346 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003); Tigg v. Pirelli Tire Corp., 232 S.W.3d 28, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 641 (Tenn. Aug. 16, 2007); Metropolitan Gov't of Nashville v. Cuozzo, — S.W.3d —, 2008 Tenn. App. LEXIS 498 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 25, 2008).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Conflicting Local Rule.

Sullivan County, Tenn., Cir. & Chancery Ct. R. 16, requiring the filing of a temporary parenting plan in all divorce cases involving children, impermissibly conflicted with T.C.A. § 36-6-403(1) because the statute did not require the filing of such a plan in cases in which the parties agreed to such a plan. Smalling v. Smalling, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. App. LEXIS 26 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 24, 2014).

16-2-512. Recommendations classifying elected additional judges.

  1. Where § 16-2-506 requires the election of an additional judge in a judicial district, the presiding judge of the district shall notify the trial court vacancy commission in writing of the judge's recommendation as to whether the additional judge will be a circuit court judge, criminal court judge, or chancellor and of the part of court the judge or chancellor will serve. The recommendation must be made by January 1 of the year in which the additional judge is to be elected and must be made only after consultation with all other trial level judges in the district, all local bar associations in the district, and any other person or group with an interest in the recommendation.
  2. The trial court vacancy commission has thirty (30) days from receipt of the written recommendation provided for in subsection (a) to approve or reject it; provided, that the recommendation stands approved unless rejected by a two-thirds (2/3) vote of the entire commission. No recommendation shall be rejected except following a public hearing of the commission held upon ten (10) days' advance notice to the presiding judge who made the recommendation and to the public. At the hearing, interested parties may present evidence on the issue. If the recommendation is not approved or rejected within thirty (30) days, the recommendation is considered approved.
  3. Upon the trial court vacancy commission's approval of a recommendation pursuant to this section, it shall notify the governor of its decision. Upon receiving this recommendation, the governor shall send notice that a vacancy has occurred to the commission and shall fill the vacancy in accordance with title 17, chapter 4, part 3.
  4. The administrative director of the courts shall notify the presiding judge of the affected district of the commission's action and shall notify the election commission of each county in the affected district of the type of judge and part of court of the judge to be elected. Upon receiving such information, each election commission shall prepare the ballot to be used in such judicial election accordingly.

Acts 1984, ch. 931, § 12; 1993, ch. 66, § 18; 1993, ch. 506, § 4; 2001, ch. 268, § 2; 2019, ch. 420, § 7.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment, in the first sentence, in (a), substituted “trial court vacancy commission” for “judicial council”, and in the second sentence substituted “must be made” for “shall be made” in two places; rewrote (b), which read: “The judicial council shall have thirty (30) days from receipt of the written recommendation provided for in subsection (a) to approve or reject it; provided, that the recommendation shall stand approved unless rejected by a two-thirds (2/3) vote of the entire council. No recommendation shall be rejected except following a public hearing of the council held upon ten (10) days' advance notice to the presiding judge who made the recommendation and to the public. At the hearing, interested parties may present evidence on the issue. If the recommendation is not approved or rejected within thirty (30) days, the recommendation shall be considered approved.”; and substituted “commission’s action” for “council’s action” in (d).

Effective Dates. Acts 2019, ch. 420, § 27. May 21, 2019.

Attorney General Opinions. Because the General Assembly has not repealed title 16, chapter 21 of the Tennessee Code, and has specifically referred to it and identified it as providing the appropriate procedure for filling the three new judgeships created by S.B. 5/H.B. 10, 110th Gen. Assem. (2018), the Commission should comply with T.C.A. § 16-2-512 to the extent possible, even though the Judicial Council established by title 16, chapter 21, no longer exists. OAG 18-21, 2018 Tenn. AG LEXIS 20 (5/24/2018).

16-2-513. Formula for determining need for additional judges — Annual report.

  1. The comptroller of the treasury shall devise and maintain a weighted caseload formula for the purpose of determining the need for creation or reallocation of judicial positions using case weights derived from the most recent weighted caseload study. The comptroller of the treasury shall update the formula at least annually. The comptroller of the treasury may adjust the formula as necessary to reflect the impact of any legislative enactment that is material to judicial caseloads.
  2. Each district attorney general and each public defender, separately or through the appropriate conference, the council of juvenile and family court judges and the administrative office of the courts shall provide to the comptroller of the treasury information that the comptroller of the treasury determines is necessary to accomplish the purposes of this section. This information shall include caseload totals by appropriate case type for each study and total number of judicial, child support magistrates, district attorney and public defender resources for each district, noting how many are funded by the federal, state or local government. This data is to be provided to the comptroller in electronic and hard copy form on or before October 15 of each year.
  3. Using such formula, information and adjustments, the comptroller of the treasury shall annually publish a weighted caseload report analyzing the current distribution of judicial positions throughout the state as well as the current need, if any, for creation of or reallocation of such positions.
  4. The processing of case data by the administrative office of the courts for the purpose of providing the comptroller of the treasury with the information necessary to complete the weighted caseload study shall be subject to audit by the comptroller of the treasury. The audit shall ensure that the validation, verification and compilation of case data are performed in accordance with § 16-1-117(a).

Acts 1984, ch. 931, § 13; 1989, ch. 240, §§ 1-4; 2001, ch. 408, § 5; 2002, ch. 791, § 5; 2009, ch. 235, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2009, ch. 235, § 1 directed the code commission to change all references from “child support referee” to “child support magistrate” and to include all such changes in supplements and replacement volumes for the Tennessee Code Annotated.

Amendments. The 2009 amendment substituted “child support magistrates” for “child support referees” in (b).

Effective Dates. Acts 2009, ch. 235, § 2. May 20, 2009.

Attorney General Opinions. Legislature’s authority to eliminate specific judicial positions. OAG 14-54, 2014 Tenn. AG LEXIS 56 (5/12/14)

16-2-514. Incumbent clerks and masters.

  1. Nothing in this part shall be construed to limit, terminate or otherwise affect the term or future terms of office of any circuit court clerk, criminal court clerk or clerk and master. All such incumbents shall continue in office until the expiration of their respective terms of office and shall be eligible for reelection and reappointment.
  2. Nothing in this part shall be construed to require, permit or authorize the consolidation of the offices of clerk and master, circuit court clerk or criminal court clerk or to place any clerk in a position of dominance over any other clerk.

Acts 1984, ch. 931, § 14.

16-2-515. References to judicial circuits or divisions deemed to judicial districts.

All references in Tennessee Code Annotated to “judicial circuits” or “chancery divisions” shall be deemed references to the judicial districts created by this part.

Acts 1984, ch. 931, § 25.

16-2-516. Pending cases — Process — Surety bonds — Applicability of local rules.

All process issued after September 1, 1984, shall be returnable at the times and places fixed by local court rules promulgated in accordance with this part. All bonds and undertakings executed after September 1, 1984, shall be governed by local court rules, insofar as to appearance dates and other conditions relating to time and place.

Acts 1984, ch. 931, § 27.

Code Commission Notes.

Former provisions in this section regarding cases pending prior to September 1, 1984, were deleted as obsolete by the code commission in 2009.

16-2-517. Jurisdictions unaffected.

Notwithstanding any provision of this part to the contrary, nothing in this part shall be construed to repeal, amend or affect in any manner any jurisdiction granted to any local court by any public or private law.

Acts 1984, ch. 931, § 28.

16-2-518. Increase in positions or funding to office of public defender.

Any increase in local funding for positions or office expense for the district attorney general shall be accompanied by an increase in funding of seventy-five percent (75%) of the increase in funding to the office of the public defender in such district for the purpose of indigent criminal defense.

Acts 1992, ch. 965, § 7; 1994, ch. 1005, § 4.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 1994, ch. 937, § 33 provided that, to the extent passage of that act, which enacted § 16-2-519 and amended § 16-2-506, creates additional staffing requirements for public defenders under the provisions of § 16-2-518, as it existed on January 1, 1994, it is the legislative intent to implement such increased staffing requirements only to the extent funds for such purpose are specifically provided in the General Appropriations Act. To the extent such funds are insufficient to fully implement such staffing requirements, the district public defenders conference and the commissioner of finance and administration shall determine the allocation of any such funds as may be available under the General Appropriations Acts to the various public defender districts.

Law Reviews.

What Price is Justice? Adequate funding for judicial system needs to be top priority of upcoming General Assembly (W. Andy Hardin), 37 No. 2 Tenn. B.J. 23 (2001).

Attorney General Opinions. State ownership of equipment purchased for public defender's office, OAG 99-033 (2/18/99).

The term “office expense” in T.C.A. § 16-2-518 includes the authorized costs of all items, including capital assets, that are incurred for the district attorney general’s office to perform its duties and responsibilities. OAG 18-40, 2018 Tenn. AG LEXIS 39 (8/29/2018).

16-2-519. Creation of assistant district attorney positions.

  1. It is the declared policy of the general assembly to create assistant district attorney general (ADA) positions based upon the number of the ADA positions to population ratios being the primary consideration with secondary consideration being caseload when uniformly reported caseload statistics become available. The Tennessee district attorneys general conference is directed to make recommendations on this basis with the immediate objective being to achieve the following ratio:

    Urban and rural districts—One (1) ADA per twenty thousand (20,000) population, according to the 1990 federal census or any subsequent federal census.

  2. As used in this section, “urban districts” means the second, sixth, eleventh, twentieth and thirtieth judicial districts and “rural districts” means all other judicial districts.
  3. For the sole purpose of computing the one (1) assistant district attorney per twenty thousand (20,000) population, the district attorney general in any one (1) county judicial district having a population of less than fifty thousand (50,000) shall be counted as one-half (½) of an assistant district attorney.
  4. Until the various judicial districts have attained approximate equality in ADA to population ratios, other factors are assigned a lower priority than ADA to population ratios. When the ratio set out in this section has been achieved, other factors, including uniform caseload statistics, local funding and geographic conditions that create logistical problems in covering the judicial district, shall be considered in support of additional position requests.

Acts 1994, ch. 937, § 1; 2019, ch. 420, § 8.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 1994, ch. 937, § 32 provided that the provisions of that act, which enacted this section and amended § 16-2-506, shall take effect only to the extent funding is provided specifically for its implementation in the General Appropriations Act. To the extent such funding is insufficient to fully implement the provisions of the act, the district attorneys general conference and the commissioner of finance and administration shall determine which provisions of the act shall be implemented. Section 32 further directed the code commission to codify only those provisions of the act deemed to be funded by the district attorneys general conference as provided above.

For table of U.S.decennial populations of Tennessee counties, see Volume 13 and its supplement.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment substituted “is” for  “and the Tennessee judicial council are” in the second sentence of (a).

Effective Dates. Acts 2019, ch. 420, § 27. May 21, 2019.

16-2-520. Additional assistant district attorney general positions.

  1. Effective July 1, 2004, there are created thirty (30) additional assistant district attorney general positions to be designated in judicial districts as provided in this section.
    1. The executive director of the district attorneys general conference and the administrative director of the courts shall meet and prepare a report that contains the recommendations of such officials as to the specific judicial districts in which the additional assistant district attorney general positions created pursuant to subsection (a) should be designated. The report shall be prepared in consultation with the comptroller of the treasury.
    2. By October 1, 2004, the executive director of the district attorneys general conference shall file the report prepared pursuant to subdivision (b)(1) with the speakers of the senate and house of representatives and chairs of the judiciary committees of the senate and house of representatives. Upon the filing of the report, the district attorneys general recommended by the report to receive additional assistant positions shall be authorized to interview and employ persons to fill such positions.
  2. As early as is practicable during the first session of the 104th General Assembly, the general assembly shall consider and enact legislation that specifically designates the judicial district in which the persons employed in the additional assistant district attorney general positions created pursuant to subsection (a) will serve.
  3. The number of assistant district attorney general positions created by this section or to which the district attorney general of each judicial district is entitled pursuant to § 16-2-506 or any other provision of law shall be the minimum number of positions authorized in each district. Nothing in this section or any other provision of law shall be construed to prohibit or prevent the employment of additional assistant district attorneys general in a particular judicial district, regardless of whether the positions are funded by a state or non-state source, or whether they are specifically enumerated in this section, § 16-2-506 or any other provision of law.

Acts 2004, ch. 916, § 1; 2006, ch. 815, § 2.

16-2-521. Number of criminal investigator positions to which district attorney general entitled pursuant to § 16-2-506.

The number of criminal investigator positions to which the district attorney general of each judicial district is entitled pursuant to § 16-2-506 or any other law shall be the minimum number of positions authorized in each judicial district. No law shall be construed to prohibit the employment of additional criminal investigators in a judicial district as established by § 16-2-506, regardless of whether the positions are funded by a state or non-state source, or whether they are specifically enumerated in any other law.

Acts 2013, ch. 68, § 1.

Effective Dates. Acts 2013, ch. 68, § 4. July 1, 2013.

Chapter 3
Supreme Court

Part 1
Membership

16-3-101. Composition — Election of judges — Qualifications — Concurrence necessary for decisions.

  1. The supreme court shall consist of five (5) judges, one (1) of whom shall reside in each grand division, and no more than two (2) in the same grand division.
  2. A judge must have been a resident of the grand division from which the judge is appointed for at least one (1) year immediately preceding appointment. For purposes of this subsection (b), “resident” has the same meaning as defined in § 2-1-104.
  3. Each judge shall be at least thirty-five (35) years of age at the time of appointment, shall have been a resident of the state for at least five (5) consecutive years immediately preceding appointment, and shall be licensed to practice law in this state. For purposes of this subsection (c), “resident” has the same meaning as defined in § 2-1-104.
  4. A judge's term of office shall be eight (8) years.
  5. The concurrence of three (3) of the judges is necessary to a decision in every case.

Code 1858, § 4495 (deriv. Acts 1835-1836, ch. 3, § 1); Acts 1870, ch. 24, §§ 1, 6, 9, 10 (as mod. by Const., art. 6, §§ 2, 3); Shan., §§ 375, 6328; Code 1932, §§ 632, 10630; modified; Acts 1974, ch. 708, § 1; T.C.A., §§ 2-308, 2-3-202; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-301; Acts 2016, ch. 528, §§ 2, 3.

Compiler's Notes. For the Preamble to the act concerning an orderly procedure for the appointment, confirmation, and retention of appellate court judges as required by Tennessee Constitution, Article VI, Section 3, please refer to Acts 2016, ch. 528.

Amendments. The 2016 amendment rewrote (b) which read: “Judges of the supreme court shall be elected as follows: one (1) of the supreme court judges shall be elected from each of the three (3) grand divisions and two (2) of the supreme court judges shall be elected from the state at large. Each candidate shall reside in the grand division for which the candidate is elected and the two (2) candidates elected for the state at large shall not reside in the same grand division.”; and rewrote (c) which read: “Each judge shall be thirty-five (35) years of age and shall, before election, have been a resident of the state for five (5) years.”

Effective Dates. Acts 2016, ch. 528, § 23. January 28, 2016.

Cross-References. Composition of supreme court, Tenn. Const., art. VI, § 2.

Concurrence of supreme court judges needed for decision, Tenn. Const., art. VI, § 2.

Election of judges, §§ 2-3-202, 17-1-103.

Grand divisions, title 4, ch.1, part 2.

Qualifications of supreme court judges, election, and term, Tenn. Const., art. VI, § 3.

Law Reviews.

The Tennessee Court System — Supreme Court (Frederic S. Le Clercq), 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 191.

Attorney General Opinions. Residency requirements for the appellate courts, OAG 94-141 (11/28/94).

Factors used to determine residency status, OAG 95-019 (3/27/95).

Comparative Legislation. Supreme Court:

Ala.  Code § 12-2-1 et seq.

Ark.  Code § 16-11-101 et seq.

Ga. O.C.G.A. § 15-2-1 et seq.

Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 21A.010 et seq.

Miss.  Code Ann. § 9-3-1 et seq.

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 477.010 et seq.

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-10 et seq.; § 7A-25 et seq.

Va. Code § 17-93 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Concurrence.

Less than three judges cannot reach a decision but such decision may be announced by only one member. Cowan v. Murch, 97 Tenn. 590, 37 S.W. 393, 1896 Tenn. LEXIS 186, 34 L.R.A. 538, (1896).

16-3-102. Chief justice.

After their election and qualification, the judges shall designate one (1) of their number who shall preside as chief justice.

Acts 1870, ch. 24, § 11; Shan., § 376; Code 1932, § 633; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-302.

Cross-References. Selection of chief justice, Tenn. Const., art. VI, § 2.

16-3-103. Expenses.

The expenses of the supreme court shall be paid out of the state treasury, upon the warrant of the commissioner of finance and administration.

Code 1858, § 106 (deriv. Acts. 1857-1858, ch. 79, § 4); Shan., § 135; mod. Code 1932, § 153; impl. am. Acts 1937, ch. 33, § 24; impl. am. Acts 1939, ch. 11, § 12; C. Supp. 1950, § 153; modified; impl. am. Acts 1959, ch. 9, § 3; impl. am. Acts 1961, ch. 97, § 3; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-303.

Part 2
Powers and Duties

16-3-201. Jurisdiction.

  1. The jurisdiction of the court is appellate only, under restrictions and regulations that from time to time are prescribed by law; but it may possess other jurisdiction that is now conferred by law upon the present supreme court.
  2. The court has no original jurisdiction, but appeals and writs of error, or other proceedings for the correction of errors, lie from the inferior courts and court of appeals, within each division, to the supreme court as provided by this code.
  3. The court also has jurisdiction over all interlocutory appeals arising out of matters over which the court has exclusive jurisdiction.
    1. The supreme court may, upon the motion of any party, assume jurisdiction over an undecided case in which a notice of appeal or an application for interlocutory or extraordinary appeal is filed before any intermediate state appellate court.
    2. Subdivision (d)(1) applies only to cases of unusual public importance in which there is a special need for expedited decision and that involve:
      1. State taxes;
      2. The right to hold or retain public office; or
      3. Issues of constitutional law.
    3. The supreme court may, upon its own motion, when there is a compelling public interest, assume jurisdiction over an undecided case in which a notice of appeal or an application for interlocutory or extraordinary appeal is filed with an intermediate state appellate court.
    4. The supreme court may by order take actions necessary or appropriate to the exercise of the authority vested by this section.
  4. Appeals of actions under title 2, chapter 17 relative to election contests shall be to the court of appeals in accordance with the Tennessee rules of appellate procedure.

Code 1858, § 4496 (deriv. Acts 1822, ch. 13, § 4); Acts 1870, ch. 24, § 8; Shan., §§ 377, 6329; mod. Code 1932, §§ 634, 10631; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-304; Acts 1989, ch. 40, § 2; 1992, ch. 952, §§ 11, 12; 1994, ch. 573, § 1; 2001, ch. 256, § 1; 2016, ch. 755, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 1989, ch. 40, § 4 provided that any action pending on July 1, 1989, shall be maintained under law prior to the 1989 amendment by that act until its final disposition.

Acts 1992, ch. 952, § 15 provided that the amendments by that act apply to all matters as to which a notice of appeal is filed from and after May 1, 1992.

Amendments. The 2016 amendment inserted “or an application for interlocutory or extraordinary appeal” in (d)(3).

Effective Dates. Acts 2016, ch. 755, § 2. April 12, 2016.

Cross-References. Constitutional jurisdiction and jurisdiction of supreme court, Tenn. Const., art. VI, § 2.

Textbooks. Gibson's Suits in Chancery (7th ed., Inman), § 705.

Tennessee Jurisprudence, 2 Tenn. Juris., Appeal and Error, §§ 16, 51, 138, 210, 222; 17 Tenn. Juris., Jurisdiction, § 18.

Law Reviews.

Regulation of the Bar in Tennessee (Walter P. Armstrong, Jr.), 53 Tenn. L. Rev. 723 (1986).

“Seeking Justice on Appeal,” 27 No. 4 Tenn. B.J. 28 (1991).

Cited: Ashe v. Leech, 653 S.W.2d 398, 1983 Tenn. LEXIS 676 (Tenn. 1983); Stewart Title Guar. Co. v. McReynolds, 886 S.W.2d 233, 1994 Tenn. App. LEXIS 296 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994); State v. Shepherd, 902 S.W.2d 895, 1995 Tenn. LEXIS 269 (Tenn. 1995); Ballard v. Herzke, 924 S.W.2d 652, 1996 Tenn. LEXIS 378 (Tenn. 1996); Holder v. Tennessee Judicial Selection Comm'n, 937 S.W.2d 877, 1996 Tenn. LEXIS 688 (Tenn. 1996); State v. Booher, 978 S.W.2d 953, 1997 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 799 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997); In re Askew, 993 S.W.2d 1, 1999 Tenn. LEXIS 258 (Tenn. 1999); State v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 18 S.W.3d 186, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 194 (Tenn. 2000); Workman v. State, 22 S.W.3d 807, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 655 (Tenn. 2000); Haley v. Univ. of Tennessee-Knoxville, 188 S.W.3d 518, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 192 (Tenn. 2006); Bailey v. County of Shelby, 188 S.W.3d 539, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 208 (Tenn. 2006); ACLU v. Darnell, 195 S.W.3d 612, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 610 (Tenn. 2006); Mills v. Shelby County Election Comm'n, 218 S.W.3d 33, 2006 Tenn. App. LEXIS 589 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006); Jordan v. Knox County, 213 S.W.3d 751, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 26 (Tenn. 2007); Bredesen v. Tenn. Judicial Selection Comm'n, 214 S.W.3d 419, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 121 (Tenn. 2007); Hooker v. Haslam, 393 S.W.3d 156, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 719 (Tenn. July 27, 2012).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Nature of Jurisdiction.

The jurisdiction is appellate only, with such powers as, though not appellate, are absolutely necessary in carrying out and completing the jurisdiction given, such as forfeited recognizances, failure of officers to return process, or false returns, motions against them, etc. Miller v. Conlee, 37 Tenn. 432, 1858 Tenn. LEXIS 30 (1858); Memphis v. Halsey, 59 Tenn. 210, 1873 Tenn. LEXIS 44 (1873); State ex rel. Kain v. Hall, 65 Tenn. 3, 1873 Tenn. LEXIS 290 (1873); State v. Wilson, 70 Tenn. 204, 1879 Tenn. LEXIS 157 (1879); Dodds v. Duncan, 80 Tenn. 731, 1884 Tenn. LEXIS 157 (1884); State use of Fletcher v. Gannaway, 84 Tenn. 124, 1885 Tenn. LEXIS 122 (1885).

This last clause, “but it may possess such other jurisdiction as is now conferred by law upon the present supreme court,” confers power to adopt such proceedings, issue such process, and try such facts as might become necessary to carry out and perfect its own judgments and decrees in cases before it by appeal, or writ of error, such as the issuance of scire facias and capias upon forfeited bonds or recognizances, motions against sheriffs for nonreturn of process. Jurisdiction of this character is all that was intended to be conferred by that provision. State v. Bank of East Tennessee, 37 Tenn. 573, 1858 Tenn. LEXIS 64 (1858); Ward v. Thomas, 42 Tenn. 565, 1865 Tenn. LEXIS 103 (1865); Motion Against Curry, 59 Tenn. 51, 1873 Tenn. LEXIS 26 (1873). See also Bank of Tennessee v. Cannon, 49 Tenn. 428, 1871 Tenn. LEXIS 28 (1871).

The jurisdiction of the supreme court is appellate only. Memphis S. R. Co. v. Byrne, 119 Tenn. 278, 104 S.W. 460, 1907 Tenn. LEXIS 8 (1907).

The power of the supreme court exists in every case that reaches the court through the exercise of its appellate power, as, for example, by the writ of certiorari, as well as by writ of error or appeal, or appeal in the nature of a writ of error; also to proceedings originating in the court in aid and enforcement of its appellate power at every stage, from their inception in any given controversy to their completion in the full execution of its final judgments and decrees. State ex rel. Conner v. Herbert, 127 Tenn. 220, 154 S.W. 957, 1912 Tenn. LEXIS 24 (1912).

Supreme court is a court of appellate jurisdiction only and without jurisdiction to hear proof on petition to set aside decrees and orders of chancery court and Court of Appeals. Pierce v. Tharp, 224 Tenn. 328, 455 S.W.2d 145, 1970 Tenn. LEXIS 330 (1970), rehearing denied, 224 Tenn. 339, 457 S.W.2d 529 (1970), cert. denied, McKown v. Pierce, 402 U.S. 929, 91 S. Ct. 1527, 28 L. Ed. 2d 863, 1971 U.S. LEXIS 2286 (1971).

Although the Tennessee Supreme Court's jurisdiction was appellate only, it could raise the issue of a contract's validity under public policy grounds sua sponte. Baugh v. Novak, — S.W.3d —, 2011 Tenn. LEXIS 453 (Tenn. May 20, 2011).

2. Power of General Assembly to Regulate Jurisdiction.

The jurisdiction is appellate only, and the general assembly cannot confer any original jurisdiction upon it. State v. Bank of East Tennessee, 37 Tenn. 573, 1858 Tenn. LEXIS 64 (1858); Ward v. Thomas, 42 Tenn. 565, 1865 Tenn. LEXIS 103 (1865); State ex rel. Kain v. Hall, 65 Tenn. 3, 1873 Tenn. LEXIS 290 (1873); State use of Fletcher v. Gannaway, 84 Tenn. 124, 1885 Tenn. LEXIS 122 (1885).

The general assembly may, by establishing an intermediate appellate court or other appropriate legislation, restrict the right of litigants to resort to the supreme court and regulate the mode of doing so, but may not interfere unreasonably or embarrass its ultimate supervisory power. Memphis S. R. Co. v. Byrne, 119 Tenn. 278, 104 S.W. 460, 1907 Tenn. LEXIS 8 (1907).

3. Advisory Opinions.

The supreme court will not give advisory opinions where it is without jurisdiction. Crane Enamelware Co. v. Smith, 168 Tenn. 203, 76 S.W.2d 644, 1934 Tenn. LEXIS 39 (1934); De Saussure v. Hall, 201 Tenn. 164, 297 S.W.2d 90, 1956 Tenn. LEXIS 479 (1956).

4. Cases De Novo.

The supreme court, being exclusively an appellate tribunal, has no jurisdiction to try cases de novo. Simm v. Dougherty, 186 Tenn. 356, 210 S.W.2d 486, 1948 Tenn. LEXIS 557 (1948).

5. Security on Process Sued Out in Lower Court.

The supreme court cannot make a rule to justify or give new security on process sued out in the court below. Stewart v. Wilcox, 69 Tenn. 81, 1878 Tenn. LEXIS 47 (1878); Scoggins v. Cowden, 69 Tenn. 134, 1878 Tenn. LEXIS 63 (1878).

6. Receivers — Effect of Action of Lower Court.

An application for a receiver, based upon the same facts on which the chancellor had refused a similar application, cannot be entertained. Allen v. Harris, 72 Tenn. 190, 1879 Tenn. LEXIS 17 (1879); State use of Fletcher v. Gannaway, 84 Tenn. 124, 1885 Tenn. LEXIS 122 (1885).

The supreme court cannot revise the action of the inferior court as to the appointment of a receiver separately, for there cannot be separate hearings of different parts of the same case. Christian v. Clark, 78 Tenn. 291, 1882 Tenn. LEXIS 178 (1882).

7. Judgments in Favor of Sureties.

The supreme court has no jurisdiction of a motion of one cosurety for judgment against another, nor of the sureties against the principal. Waters v. Lewis, 17 Tenn. 15, 1836 Tenn. LEXIS 4 (1836); Evans v. Vanbibber, 1 Shan. 38 (1850); Ward v. Thomas, 42 Tenn. 565, 1865 Tenn. LEXIS 103 (1865).

8. Decrees of court of appeals.

Interlocutory decrees of court of appeals are not reviewed by the supreme court. First Nat'l Bank v. Planters' Nat'l Bank, 158 Tenn. 50, 12 S.W.2d 528, 1928 Tenn. LEXIS 122 (1929).

9. Power as to Lower Court.

The supreme court can by mandamus compel a lower court to set aside an illegal act. State ex rel. Richards v. Sneed, 105 Tenn. 711, 58 S.W. 1070, 1900 Tenn. LEXIS 125 (1900), overruled, Shelton v. Wade, 139 Tenn. 685, 203 S.W. 253, 1917 Tenn. LEXIS 138 (1918).

The supreme court has jurisdiction to enjoin a proceeding in a lower court which is an interference with its decree. Caldwell v. Spicer & McEvoy, 159 Tenn. 465, 19 S.W.2d 238, 1928 Tenn. LEXIS 108 (1929).

State supreme court assumed jurisdiction of an appeal from an intermediate state appellate court to decide if the state failed to comply with the supreme court's directive in Small Schools II to equalize teachers' salaries according to the basic education plan (BEP) formula for funding public education. Tenn. Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 91 S.W.3d 232, 2002 Tenn. LEXIS 425, 110 A.L.R.5th 707 (Tenn. 2002).

10. Restraining Usurpation of Jurisdiction by Lower Court.

The supreme court has no jurisdiction to award a writ of prohibition to restrain an inferior tribunal from a usurpation of jurisdiction. Memphis v. Halsey, 59 Tenn. 210, 1873 Tenn. LEXIS 44 (1873).

11. —Determinations as to Bail.

The supreme court had no jurisdiction to compel an inferior court to hear and determine whether prisoners are entitled to bail. State v. Elmore, 46 Tenn. 528, 1869 Tenn. LEXIS 92 (1869).

12. —Exclusion of Attorney by Lower Court.

If an inferior judge improperly excludes an attorney from practice, and will not permit anything to be entered of record from which an appeal may be taken, and refuses to sign a proper bill of exceptions, the supreme court has jurisdiction, by mandamus, to compel him to do so, and he will be liable for costs. Ingersoll v. Howard, 48 Tenn. 247, 1870 Tenn. LEXIS 45 (1870).

13. —Trial of Cause in Lower Court.

The court has no jurisdiction to award a mandamus to compel an inferior judge to proceed to the trial of a cause. State ex rel. Kain v. Hall, 65 Tenn. 3, 1873 Tenn. LEXIS 290 (1873).

14. —Bill of Exceptions.

Under its appellate powers, the supreme court has jurisdiction to award the writ of mandamus to the end that an inferior judge may be compelled to sign a proper bill of exceptions. State ex rel. Sneed v. Hall, 43 Tenn. 255, 1866 Tenn. LEXIS 49 (1866); In re Vanvaver, 88 Tenn. 334, 12 S.W. 786, 1889 Tenn. LEXIS 55 (1890)

Writ of mandamus compelling the signing of bill of exceptions will only be granted when there has been a clear case of abuse of discretion by the judge. Alexander v. State, 82 Tenn. 88, 1884 Tenn. LEXIS 109 (1884); State v. Brockwell, 84 Tenn. 683, 1886 Tenn. LEXIS 156 (1886).

The inferior judge will not be compelled to sign a particular bill of exceptions, when he asserts upon his oath its incorrectness, and its correctness is doubtful; but if the particular bill is clearly correct, he would be compelled to sign it. In re Vanvaver, 88 Tenn. 334, 12 S.W. 786, 1889 Tenn. LEXIS 55 (1890).

15. —Certiorari.

The supreme court, with appellate and supervisory jurisdiction over proceedings and judgments of all inferior courts, has the inherent power to grant writs of certiorari, whenever necessary in the exercise and enforcement of its jurisdiction. Tennessee C. R. Co. v. Campbell, 109 Tenn. 640, 75 S.W. 1012, 1902 Tenn. LEXIS 96 (1903); Tennessee C. R. Co. v. Campbell, 109 Tenn. 655, 73 S.W. 112, 1902 Tenn. LEXIS 97 (1903).

The appellate courts have, in their spheres, jurisdiction to award the writ of certiorari to correct errors of lower courts. Cockrill v. Peoples Sav. Bank, 155 Tenn. 342, 293 S.W. 996, 1926 Tenn. LEXIS 53 (1927).

16. —Appeal Bond.

The supreme court had jurisdiction to issue mandamus to compel a lower court to accept a proper bond required to perfect an appeal. Ing v. Davey, 70 Tenn. 276, 1879 Tenn. LEXIS 175 (1879).

17. —Review of Juvenile Court Proceedings.

The juvenile court is neither a court of law nor of equity within the meaning of this section. Review of its proceedings is by way of certiorari to the circuit court. State v. Bockman, 139 Tenn. 422, 201 S.W. 741, 1917 Tenn. LEXIS 118 (1917).

18. Judgment of Supreme Court — Correction of Errors.

The supreme court may correct mistakes apparent on the face of the record, such as clerical errors, at any term after final judgment; but mistake of facts or errors in judgment in point of law, existing in the decree, are, after the expiration of the term, beyond the reach of the court. Elliot v. Cochran, 41 Tenn. 389, 1860 Tenn. LEXIS 80 (1860); Russell v. Colyar, 51 Tenn. 154, 1871 Tenn. LEXIS 147 (1871).

19. —Bill of Review.

The supreme court had no jurisdiction to entertain a bill of review to review its own decrees. Cox v. Breedlove, 10 Tenn. 499, 1831 Tenn. LEXIS 7 (1831); Murphy v. Johnson, 107 Tenn. 552, 64 S.W. 894, 1901 Tenn. LEXIS 107 (1901).

20. —Writ of Error Coram Nobis.

The supreme court has no jurisdiction to entertain a writ of error coram nobis; and a person whose name is forged to an appeal bond as surety, and against whom a judgment is rendered, is entitled to no relief by such writ. Lamb v. Sneed, 63 Tenn. 349, 1874 Tenn. LEXIS 260 (1874); Wills v. Wills, 104 Tenn. 382, 58 S.W. 301, 1900 Tenn. LEXIS 5 (1900), overruled, Moore v. Moore, 222 Tenn. 1, 431 S.W.2d 754, 1968 Tenn. LEXIS 405 (1968).

21. —Chancery Proceedings.

An accommodation endorser of a note, against whom and the makers judgment was rendered, from which the makers appealed for themselves and the endorser, without his authority and consent, on the affirmance of the judgment in the supreme court, is entitled, upon bill filed in chancery court establishing these facts, to have the surety on appeal bond held liable before him. Coles v. Anderson & Griswell, 27 Tenn. 489, 1847 Tenn. LEXIS 111 (1847).

Where judgment was rendered without notice in supreme court on sheriff's bond for nonreturn of execution in an amount greater than due, chancery court could grant relief in form of an injunction. Smith v. Van Bebber, 31 Tenn. 110, 1851 Tenn. LEXIS 28 (1851).

A judgment rendered in the supreme court, on motion, without notice, upon a sheriff's official bond, for the nonreturn of an execution, where his term of office expired before the return day, is void, and, it being regular upon its face, the remedy is by bill in chancery court to have it declared void. Kinzer v. Helm, 54 Tenn. 672, 1872 Tenn. LEXIS 103 (1872).

Where the satisfaction of a judgment of the supreme court is set aside by it on the ex parte application of the judgment debtor suppressing a material fact, the disclosure of which would have defeated the application, the chancery court has jurisdiction to enjoin the execution of the judgment, and the ex parte action of supreme court is not res judicata. Wilburn v. McCollom, 54 Tenn. 267, 1872 Tenn. LEXIS 45 (1872).

The supreme court's decree cannot be reviewed by a bill of review in the chancery court from which the cause was appealed. Hurt v. Long, 90 Tenn. 445, 16 S.W. 968, 1891 Tenn. LEXIS 29 (1891); Murphy v. Johnson, 107 Tenn. 552, 64 S.W. 894, 1901 Tenn. LEXIS 107 (1901).

22. Judgment of Supreme Court — Revival.

The supreme court has jurisdiction to issue scire facias to revive its own judgments as in similar cases in the inferior courts. McIntosh v. Paul, 74 Tenn. 45, 1880 Tenn. LEXIS 209 (1880).

23. Unusual Public Importance.

A case involving the requirements of the constitutional provision as to the placement of a proposed amendment to the constitution on the general election ballot presented an issue of unusual public importance with a special need for an expedited decision. State ex rel. Cohen v. Darnell, 885 S.W.2d 61, 1994 Tenn. LEXIS 275 (Tenn. 1994).

Collateral References. 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appeal and Error §§ 1, 4, 6-14, 20, 1007, 1008.

21 C.J.S. Courts § 457.

Courts 23.

16-3-202. Process, receivers, and references.

The court may appoint receivers, order references and issue all writs and process necessary for the exercise and enforcement of its jurisdiction.

Code 1858, § 4503; Shan., § 6336; mod. Code 1932, § 10637; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-305.

Textbooks. Gibson's Suits in Chancery (7th ed., Inman), § 679.

Tennessee Jurisprudence, 3 Tenn. Juris., Attachment and Garnishment, § 152.

Law Reviews.

The Tennessee Court System — Supreme Court (Frederic S. Le Clercq), 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 191.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Writs and Process Enforcing Jurisdiction.

The supreme court has jurisdiction by adequate writs to make effective appeals to it from lower courts. Ward v. Thomas, 42 Tenn. 565, 1865 Tenn. LEXIS 103 (1865); State ex rel. Shaw v. Cooper, 107 Tenn. 202, 64 S.W. 50, 1901 Tenn. LEXIS 72 (1901); State ex rel. Conner v. Herbert, 127 Tenn. 220, 154 S.W. 957, 1912 Tenn. LEXIS 24 (1912). See Newman v. Justices of Scott County, 48 Tenn. 787, 1870 Tenn. LEXIS 149 (1870).

The supreme court has authority to issue all writs and process necessary for the exercise and enforcement of its jurisdiction and to protect its jurisdiction. To prevent such jurisdiction from being trifled with or rendered ineffectual, it may consider matters transpiring after a cause is heard in the lower court. Cockrill v. Peoples Sav. Bank, 155 Tenn. 342, 293 S.W. 996, 1926 Tenn. LEXIS 53 (1927).

The supreme court has power and authority to take such action as it deems proper and appropriate to enforce its decrees and orders and to issue all necessary process to prevent interference therewith. State ex rel. Stall v. Knoxville, 211 Tenn. 428, 365 S.W.2d 433, 1963 Tenn. LEXIS 363 (1963).

Where trial court and supreme court had previously sustained validity of annexation ordinance and annexation procedure and same complainants filed suit in chancery court seeking to enjoin collection of taxes in the annexed area and complaint in chancery suit contained basically the same averments as those in the previous proceedings, supreme court issued supersedeas and permanent injunction superseding any action taken or which might be taken in the chancery proceeding and enjoining and restraining complainants from interfering directly or indirectly with previous judgment of the supreme court. State ex rel. Stall v. Knoxville, 211 Tenn. 428, 365 S.W.2d 433, 1963 Tenn. LEXIS 363 (1963).

2. Receivers.

The supreme court has power to appoint a receiver in a cause pending in it by appeal. West v. Weaver, 50 Tenn. 589, 1871 Tenn. LEXIS 118 (1871); Kerr v. White, 66 Tenn. 394, 1874 Tenn. LEXIS 151 (1874); Bidwell v. Paul, 64 Tenn. 693, 1875 Tenn. LEXIS 160 (1875); Allen v. Harris, 72 Tenn. 190, 1879 Tenn. LEXIS 17 (1879).

Application for receiver, made in advance of hearing on appeal, will not be entertained. Allen v. Harris, 72 Tenn. 190, 1879 Tenn. LEXIS 17 (1879).

The supreme court is without power to appoint a receiver in a cause pending in it by appeal, after an inferior court has refused the application. Allen v. Harris, 72 Tenn. 190, 1879 Tenn. LEXIS 17 (1879); Darusmont v. Patton, 72 Tenn. 597, 1880 Tenn. LEXIS 67 (1880).

3. Writ of Restitution.

The supreme court may issue a writ of restitution. Caruthers v. Caruthers, 70 Tenn. 71, 1878 Tenn. LEXIS 189 (1878).

The supreme court may issue a writ of restitution only after a hearing on the merits. Terry v. Clark, 72 Tenn. 186, 1879 Tenn. LEXIS 16 (1879).

4. Examination of Garnishees.

The court has jurisdiction to examine a garnishee in aid of its final process. Wyler, Ackerland & Co. v. Blevins, 113 Tenn. 528, 82 S.W. 829, 1904 Tenn. LEXIS 45 (1904).

5. Interference with Process — Prevention.

The court is empowered to prevent interference with process in any division, wherever it may be sitting. State ex rel. Conner v. Herbert, 127 Tenn. 220, 154 S.W. 957, 1912 Tenn. LEXIS 24 (1912).

6. Staying Proceeding under Procedendo.

The supreme court, having concluded that it properly should have taken jurisdiction of a cause and granted a petition for certiorari, and the time in which it might grant the writ to review a decree of the court of appeals not being limited, acted within its power in granting the writ upon becoming satisfied of a mistake in its former refusal. Having taken jurisdiction of the cause, the court had full authority, under this section, by way of exercising and enforcing its own jurisdiction to stay proceedings under a procedendo irregularly issued from the court of appeals. McArthur v. Faw, 183 Tenn. 504, 193 S.W.2d 763, 1946 Tenn. LEXIS 230 (1946).

7. Executor De Bonis Propriis — Judgment Against.

The supreme court cannot render judgment against an executor de bonis propriis upon the return of an execution nulla bona against him de bonis testatoris. Chestnut v. McBride, 65 Tenn. 95, 1873 Tenn. LEXIS 310 (1873).

8. Execution of Judgment.

The execution of the supreme court judgment may be effected by an order to the marshal of the court, to the sheriff of any county having the prisoner in charge, or to an official of the penitentiary, to take possession of the prisoner, and transport him to the penitentiary. Vowell v. State, 132 Tenn. 349, 178 S.W. 768, 1915 Tenn. LEXIS 28 (1915).

16-3-203. Powers over criminal defendants.

The court may recommit offenders in state cases, when it may appear necessary, and remand them to the inferior court from which their cases were brought to the supreme court, taking recognizances from the defendants, when the offense charged is bailable, with the security that the court judges proper.

Code 1858, § 4498 (deriv. Acts 1817, ch. 17, § 3); Shan., § 6331; Code 1932, § 10632; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-306.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 4 Tenn. Juris., Bail and Recognizance, § 4; 8 Tenn. Juris., Criminal Procedure, § 28; 17 Tenn. Juris., Jurisdiction, § 18.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Presence of Accused in Court.

In a felony case there is no requirement that the accused confined in the penitentiary, pending his appeal, or at large on bond be present in the supreme court when his case is heard or decided, because Tenn. Const., art. I, § 9, requiring his presence “in all criminal prosecutions,” applies only to a trial prosecuted by the state in the trial court, which does not include a review on appeal or writ of error, which is a proceeding brought by the accused himself. Vowell v. State, 132 Tenn. 349, 178 S.W. 768, 1915 Tenn. LEXIS 28 (1915).

The accused appealing from a conviction of a felony who is bonded to appear in court must be present in cases where judgment is affirmed on appeal, either at the time or later, in order that actual custody may be taken of him, and that he may be transported to the penitentiary; and in case of reversal and remandment for new trial, he must attend to give bond or recognizance, unless permitted by order of the court to surrender to the sheriff of the trial court and give bond there, and only under very special circumstances will the court reverse a judgment in a felony case where the accused is under bond without requiring his presence in court. Vowell v. State, 132 Tenn. 349, 178 S.W. 768, 1915 Tenn. LEXIS 28 (1915).

16-3-204. Bonds and recognizances.

  1. The court may give judgment upon any and all bonds or recognizances, whether in civil or criminal cases, executed in the progress of the cause, under the general provisions of law, or by lawful order of the court, either in the inferior or supreme court, and enforce the same by execution or otherwise, as in the case of other judgments and decrees of the court.
  2. Process of scire facias may, in all such cases, be issued as is proper in similar cases in the inferior courts, and, upon appearance of the defendant, and issue of fact made thereon, the court may order a jury to be summoned forthwith to determine the issue, and may give judgment thereon as the inferior courts of law might do in similar cases.

Code 1858, §§ 4499, 4500 (deriv. Acts 1817, ch. 199, § 3); Shan., §§ 6332, 6333; Code 1932, §§ 10633, 10634; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-307.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 2 Tenn. Juris., Appeal and Error, § 265; 8 Tenn. Juris., Criminal Procedure, § 28; 17 Tenn. Juris., Jurisdiction, § 18.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Surety on Appeal Bond — Liability Ahead of Party Not Appealing.

An accommodation endorser of a note, against whom and the makers judgment was rendered, from which the makers appealed for themselves and the endorser, without his authority and consent, on the affirmance of the judgment in the supreme court, is entitled, upon bill filed in the chancery court establishing these facts, to have a surety on appeal bond held liable before himself. Coles v. Anderson & Griswell, 27 Tenn. 489, 1847 Tenn. LEXIS 111 (1847); Murray v. Winham, 3 Cooper's Tenn. Ch. 336 (1877); Winham v. Crutcher, 78 Tenn. 610, 1882 Tenn. LEXIS 230 (1882); Briggs v. Hinton, 82 Tenn. 233, 1884 Tenn. LEXIS 123 (1884).

2. Jury.

The appellate court may order a jury, to be summoned forthwith, to determine an issue of fact upon the return of a scire facias issuing out of such court. Newman v. Justices of Scott County, 48 Tenn. 787, 1870 Tenn. LEXIS 149 (1870); Lamb v. Sneed, 63 Tenn. 349, 1874 Tenn. LEXIS 260 (1874); Dodds v. Duncan, 80 Tenn. 731, 1884 Tenn. LEXIS 157 (1884).

3. Presence of Defendant Required.

In a felony case there is no requirement that the accused confined in the penitentiary, pending his appeal, or at large on bond be present in the supreme court when his case is heard or decided, because Tenn. Const., art. I, § 9, requiring his presence “in all criminal prosecutions,” applies only to a trial prosecuted by the state in the trial court, which does not include a review on appeal or writ of error, which is a proceeding brought by the accused himself. Vowell v. State, 132 Tenn. 349, 178 S.W. 768, 1915 Tenn. LEXIS 28 (1915).

The accused appealing from a conviction of a felony who is bonded to appear in court must be present in cases where judgment is affirmed on appeal, either at the time or later, in order that actual custody may be taken of him, and that he may be transported to the penitentiary; and in case of reversal and remandment for new trial, he must attend to give bond or recognizance, unless permitted by order of the court to surrender to the sheriff of the trial court and give bond there, and only under very special circumstances will the court reverse a judgment in a felony case where the accused is under bond without requiring his presence in court. Vowell v. State, 132 Tenn. 349, 178 S.W. 768, 1915 Tenn. LEXIS 28 (1915).

Collateral References. 76 C.J.S. Recognizances §§ 31, 32.

16-3-205. Supersedeas by judges.

The judges of the supreme court, or any one of them, on a proper case being made out, shall have the authority to grant the process of supersedeas to an execution, returnable to their own court, in the same manner the supreme court, while it is in session, can grant such process, also grant supersedeas to the execution of an interlocutory decree of an inferior court, in the cases provided for in § 27-1-103 [repealed].

Code 1858, §§ 4512, 4513 (deriv. Acts 1835-1836, ch. 3, § 15; 1851-1852, ch. 181, § 4); Shan., §§ 6347, 6348; Code 1932, §§ 10649, 10650; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-308.

Compiler's Notes. Section 27-1-103, referred to in this section, was repealed by Acts 1981, ch. 449, § 1(8). For present provisions, see T.R.A.P. 3, 7, 10, 13, 24, 36.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 2 Tenn. Juris., Appeal and Error, § 265; 16 Tenn. Juris., Judges, § 15.

Cited: Clements v. Roberts, 144 Tenn. 129, 230 S.W. 30, 1920 Tenn. LEXIS 66 (1921).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. In General.

The supreme court may in term time, or either of the judges in vacation, grant writs of supersedeas to the execution of such interlocutory orders or decrees of inferior courts as are to be carried out or executed by some further act of such inferior courts, but cannot supersede negative or prohibitory orders, or orders simply and only removing the inhibition of an injunction, and if the chancellor's order is nothing more than the removal of the injunction, which leaves the defendant free to prosecute his remedy at law, it cannot be superseded, but if the order dissolving an injunction gives a judgment on the injunction bond for the debt enjoined, the writ of supersedeas may be granted to supersede its execution. Watkins v. First Nat'l Bank, 3 Shan. 564 (1875).

Where term of office of clerk and master of chancery court had not expired when his successor was appointed, and the latter procured a warrant directing the seizure of official books and papers, on application for a writ of error from the judgment on which the warrant issued, a supersedeas would issue, though the warrant has been fully executed, with a direction to restore the books and papers, that being the only method for preserving the rights of the parties as they were before the making of the order. Stafford v. Williams, 3 Shan. 311, 13 S.W. 793, 1889 Tenn. LEXIS 84 (Tenn. 1889).

2. Temporary Injunction.

Supersedeas is not a suitable remedy to vacate a temporary injunction. Howell v. Thompson, 130 Tenn. 311, 170 S.W. 253, 1914 Tenn. LEXIS 30 (1914).

3. Transcript of Record — Necessity.

A writ of supersedeas to an interlocutory order or decree of the chancery court cannot be granted by one of the judges of the supreme court, unless the petition therefor is accompanied by a transcript of the whole record, or so much of it as is essential to enable the judge to pass upon the alleged error, and both must be filed. Richardson v. Wm. Richardson & Co., 3 Shan. 401 (1875); Roberson v. Roberson, 71 Tenn. 50, 1879 Tenn. LEXIS 29 (1879).

A motion will lie to discharge a writ of supersedeas to an interlocutory order or decree of chancery, where it was granted by one of the supreme judges, and where no transcript of the record was filed with the petition therefor in the supreme court. In this case, the motion was postponed to give the party in whose favor the writ was issued an opportunity to file a transcript of the record. Richardson v. Wm. Richardson & Co., 3 Shan. 401 (1875).

4. Reversal of Supreme Court's Judgments at Subsequent Term.

This section does not confer power on the supreme court to reverse its decrees or judgments at a term subsequent to that at which they were rendered. Lamb v. Sneed, 63 Tenn. 349, 1874 Tenn. LEXIS 260 (1874).

Collateral References. Prohibition 16.

16-3-206. Vacating judgment.

In all cases in which the supreme court may give judgment or decree through inadvertence and oversight, when upon the face of the record no cause of action existed against the party, the court may, upon its own motion, vacate the judgment or decree.

Code 1858, § 4501 (deriv. Acts 1845-1846, ch. 135); Shan., § 6334; mod. Code 1932, § 10635; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-309.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 2 Tenn. Juris., Appeal and Error, § 265; 16 Tenn. Juris., Judgments and Decrees, § 47; 19 Tenn. Juris., Motions and Summary Proceedings, § 9.

Cited: Fort v. Dixie Oil Co., 171 Tenn. 199, 101 S.W.2d 692, 1936 Tenn. LEXIS 80 (1937).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Purpose of Statute.

The purpose of the statute was that in cases where, from inadvertence, that is, the mind of the court not being turned to the fact, or by an oversight, not having observed it, a wrong judgment was rendered, and if it should appear from the records of the court that such was the case, a correction might be made. Russell v. Colyar, 51 Tenn. 154, 1871 Tenn. LEXIS 147 (1871); Riggs v. White, 51 Tenn. 503, 1871 Tenn. LEXIS 194 (1871). See also Polk v. Pledge, 52 Tenn. 371, 1871 Tenn. LEXIS 270 (1871); Bond v. Greenwald, 66 Tenn. 466, 1874 Tenn. LEXIS 166 (1874); Pettit v. Cooper, 77 Tenn. 21, 1882 Tenn. LEXIS 9 (1882).

2. Time for Vacating Judgment.

A judgment given through “inadvertence and oversight” may be vacated at a subsequent term. Russell v. Colyar, 51 Tenn. 154, 1871 Tenn. LEXIS 147 (1871); Polk v. Pledge, 52 Tenn. 371, 1871 Tenn. LEXIS 270 (1871). See Easley v. Tarkington, 64 Tenn. 592, 1875 Tenn. LEXIS 133 (1875).

3. Surprise of Defendant.

The supreme court will not set aside its own judgment, valid on its face, to allow a plea of bankruptcy, upon the ground that the judgment was taken by surprise to the defendant, and before the cause was reached on the docket. Riggs v. White, 51 Tenn. 503, 1871 Tenn. LEXIS 194 (1871).

4. Attorneys Consenting to Setting Aside.

The court cannot, even by consent of attorneys for parties, set aside its judgment rendered at former term, except where by a clerical mistake or inadvertence an erroneous judgment has been entered. Thompson v. Anderson, 2 Shan. 161 (1876); Hethcoat v. State, 213 Tenn. 563, 376 S.W.2d 478, 1964 Tenn. LEXIS 422 (1964); Pierce v. Tharp, 224 Tenn. 328, 455 S.W.2d 145, 1970 Tenn. LEXIS 330 (1970), rehearing denied, 224 Tenn. 339, 457 S.W.2d 529 (1970), cert. denied, McKown v. Pierce, 402 U.S. 929, 91 S. Ct. 1527, 28 L. Ed. 2d 863, 1971 U.S. LEXIS 2286 (1971).

Collateral References. 21 C.J.S. Courts § 501.

16-3-207. Correction of apparent mistakes.

The court may, at any time after final judgment, correct mistakes apparent on the face of the record, as provided in § 20-11-106 [repealed].

Code 1858, § 4502 (deriv. Acts 1855-1856, ch. 70, § 2); Shan., § 6335; Code 1932, § 10636; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-310.

Compiler's Notes. Section 20-11-106, referred to in this section, was repealed by Acts 1989, ch. 106, § 1. Section Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.01 was intended to supersede § 20-11-106. The Committee Comment to that rule reads: “60.01: This Rule supersedes the provisions of Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 20-1508 [repealed], 20-11-106 and 20-11-107, although it is generally consistent with the purpose of those statutes. The provisions of the Rule are somewhat more flexible than the statutory procedures.”

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 2 Tenn. Juris., Appeal and Error, § 265; 16 Tenn. Juris., Judgments and Decrees, § 46; 19 Tenn. Juris., Motions and Summary Proceedings, § 9.

Law Reviews.

Criminal Law and Procedure — 1954 Tennessee Survey, 7 Vand. L. Rev. 825.

Cited: Fort v. Dixie Oil Co., 171 Tenn. 199, 101 S.W.2d 692, 1936 Tenn. LEXIS 80 (1937).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Court Changing Its Opinion.

Judgments will not be changed because the court has changed its opinion. Though erroneous in point of law or in conclusions of fact, they are final in the particular cases, and cannot be vacated at a subsequent term. Overton v. Bigelow's Adm'r, 18 Tenn. 48, 1836 Tenn. LEXIS 100 (1836); Allen v. Barksdale, 38 Tenn. 238, 1858 Tenn. LEXIS 162 (Tenn. Dec. 1858); Saunders v. Gregory's Heirs, 50 Tenn. 567, 1871 Tenn. LEXIS 115 (1871); Rafalshy v. M. Kraus & Co., 57 Tenn. 558, 1873 Tenn. LEXIS 260 (1873); Lamb v. Sneed, 63 Tenn. 349, 1874 Tenn. LEXIS 260 (1874); Markham v. Townsend, 2 Cooper's Tenn. Ch. 713 (1877).

2. Matters Available at Time of Order — Urging at Subsequent Term.

A decretal order will not be modified at a subsequent term of the supreme court, upon grounds which might and should have been urged when the order was made. Myers v. James, 72 Tenn. 370, 1880 Tenn. LEXIS 29 (1880).

3. Judgment Correct on Face.

Where the judgment is correct on its face, though erroneous, it cannot be vacated or corrected under §§ 16-3-206, 16-3-207. Kinzer v. Helm, 54 Tenn. 672, 1872 Tenn. LEXIS 103 (1872).

4. Names Omitted from Appeal Bond.

Omission of names from appeal bond cannot be corrected, after final disposition in the supreme court, upon a bill filed in the chancery court for that purpose, although such omission was the mistake of the clerk of the inferior court. The supreme court might, in the original cause, before its final determination, have granted permission to amend the defective bond, but such mistake cannot be made the object of a new bill. Duval v. Brady, 72 Tenn. 528, 1880 Tenn. LEXIS 57 (1880).

5. Execution Barring Right to Modification.

A decretal order will not be modified at all after it has been executed unless, indeed, in a very extraordinary case. Myers v. James, 72 Tenn. 370, 1880 Tenn. LEXIS 29 (1880).

16-3-208. Appeals taken before term.

All appeals, and appeals in the nature of a writ of error, taken from the final judgment or decree of an inferior court, at any time before the sitting of the supreme court, shall stand for hearing at the first term, without notice to the opposite party.

Code 1858, § 4514 (deriv. Acts 1835-1836, ch. 3, § 19); Shan., § 6349; Code 1932, § 10651; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-312.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 2 Tenn. Juris., Appeal and Error, §§ 51, 58, 218.

Cited: Harmon v. Hart, 53 S.W. 310, 1899 Tenn. Ch. App. LEXIS 74 (1899).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Application to Court of Appeals.

Although this section and § 16-3-209 deal with jurisdiction and practice in the supreme court, they also apply to ordinary appeals to the court of appeals. Savely v. Phillips, 25 Tenn. App. 654, 166 S.W.2d 780, 1940 Tenn. App. LEXIS 95 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1940); Lacy v. Rymer, 28 Tenn. App. 180, 187 S.W.2d 653, 1944 Tenn. App. LEXIS 74 (1945).

2. Construction With Other Sections.

When this section and § 16-3-209 are read together their meaning is unquestionably this: That appeals should generally be taken to the next term succeeding the time at which an appeal is granted, and that they shall stand for hearing at that succeeding term; but that an appellant has the option to appeal to the present or current term of the court and may have a hearing at that term upon giving five days' notice of that desire to his adversary. Savely v. Phillips, 25 Tenn. App. 654, 166 S.W.2d 780, 1940 Tenn. App. LEXIS 95 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1940).

3. Term of Appeal.

Although appeals should generally be taken to the next term succeeding the time at which an appeal is granted, and they shall stand for hearing at that succeeding term, but an appellant has the option to appeal to the present or current term of the court and may have a hearing at that term upon giving five days' notice of that desire to his adversary. Savely v. Phillips, 25 Tenn. App. 654, 166 S.W.2d 780, 1940 Tenn. App. LEXIS 95 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1940).

This section impliedly requires or at least suggests that appeals to the supreme court should be to the succeeding term. Savely v. Phillips, 25 Tenn. App. 654, 166 S.W.2d 780, 1940 Tenn. App. LEXIS 95 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1940).

This section and § 16-3-209 mean that appeal should generally be taken to the next term succeeding the time at which the appeal is granted and shall stand for hearing at that succeeding term, but an appellant has the option to appeal to the present or current term of the court and may have a hearing at that term upon giving the five days' notice. Grissom v. H. K. Ferguson Co., 205 Tenn. 580, 329 S.W.2d 816, 1959 Tenn. LEXIS 396 (1959).

4. Dismissal.

5. —Motion to Dismiss.

Where a decree is rendered against the complainant, and he appeals to the supreme court, he will not be permitted in that court to dismiss his bill upon motion. The appeal only may be dismissed. Stone v. Huggins, 1 Shan. 564 (1876).

6. —Delay.

Appeal was dismissed for delay in filing assignments of error and brief where appellant did not file same until three days before hearing date though notified by clerk of hearing date 53 days prior thereto. State ex rel. Pennington v. Bailey, 196 Tenn. 285, 265 S.W.2d 882, 1954 Tenn. LEXIS 376 (1954).

If after the record is filed the clerk sets the case for hearing at the current term instead of the succeeding term and counsel fails to object to the hearing at that time, after proper notice is given by the clerk, counsel will be considered as having waived the right to object to the setting at the current term and will be required to comply with the rules of court concerning filing of assignments of error. Grissom v. H. K. Ferguson Co., 205 Tenn. 580, 329 S.W.2d 816, 1959 Tenn. LEXIS 396 (1959).

If appeal was filed and case was set for hearing in the same term but assignments of error were not filed within the time required by supreme court rule, fact that after motion of adversary to dismiss for failure to properly file the appellant filed the record for a writ of error and executed and filed bond with the clerk and re-filed the assignments of error did not cure the failure to file within the required time in the first instance. Grissom v. H. K. Ferguson Co., 205 Tenn. 580, 329 S.W.2d 816, 1959 Tenn. LEXIS 396 (1959).

16-3-209. Appeal during term.

An appeal, appeal in the nature of a writ of error, or writ of error may be prosecuted from any final judgment or decree, rendered in an inferior court during the term of the supreme court, the record being filed in the court, and the opposite party, or the opposite party's counsel, notified five (5) days before the hearing.

Code 1858, § 4515 (deriv. Acts 1835-1836, ch. 3, § 19); Shan., § 6350; Code 1932, § 10652; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-313.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 2 Tenn. Juris., Appeal and Error, §§ 51-58, 218.

Cited: Tipton v. Tipton, 118 Tenn. 691, 104 S.W. 237, 1907 Tenn. LEXIS 71 (1907).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. “Hearing” — Meaning.

The word “hearing” means the regular hearing and does not apply to the application for a writ of error. A. J. White & Co. v. Bettis & Capps, 52 Tenn. 374, 1871 Tenn. LEXIS 271 (1871).

2. Time for Notice.

The notice is intended to be given five days or more before the regular hearing of the cause and not the hearing of the application for writ of error. A. J. White & Co. v. Bettis & Capps, 52 Tenn. 374, 1871 Tenn. LEXIS 271 (1871).

3. Appeal to Next Term — Dismissal at Pending Term.

An appeal prayed, granted, and perfected to the next term of the supreme court, when the court is in session in that division of the state where granted, may be dismissed for good cause shown, at the term of the supreme court then being held. Pond v. Trigg, 52 Tenn. 532, 1871 Tenn. LEXIS 285 (1871).

16-3-210. Scheduling of districts.

The court may class the judicial districts to set the causes from each district for trial on certain weeks of the term, and make publication of the classes before the beginning of the term.

Code 1858, § 4505; Shan., § 6338; mod. Code 1932, § 10640; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-314.

16-3-211. Order of counties in districts.

The supreme court, except as otherwise provided, shall take up and try the cases from the different counties in a judicial district in the order in which the counties are named in the section of chapter 2 of this title that prescribes the times of holding court in the judicial district; and when the business of a county is taken up, it shall be argued before passing to the business of another county, unless postponed for satisfactory reasons to the court.

Acts 1868-1869, ch. 28, § 4; Shan., § 6339; mod. Code 1932, § 10641; modified; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-315.

16-3-212. Special personnel for expedition of post-conviction proceedings in capital cases.

The supreme court is authorized to employ, reassign or contract with individuals utilizing special funds appropriated solely for the purpose of providing prompt and fair adjudication of post-conviction proceedings in capital sentence cases, including authority to assign the additional personnel the duties of personnel reassigned to the post-conviction cases. In no event shall the employment, contract or expenditures under this authority extend beyond a two-year period.

Acts 1993, ch. 472, § 4.

Cross-References. Appropriation of funds, § 16-3-806.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Review of Order of Special Assignment.

The court of criminal appeals did not have jurisdiction to review the propriety of an order of the supreme court specially designating a judge to hear a post-conviction case. Thompson v. State, 958 S.W.2d 156, 1997 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 522 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997).

Part 3
Terms

16-3-301. Duration of terms.

It is the duty of the judges of the supreme court to hold its terms at the different places as designated by law, until all the causes are determined or otherwise disposed of, or until it becomes necessary to adjourn to hold court at another point.

Code 1858, § 4510 (deriv. Acts 1835-1836, ch. 3, § 6); Shan., § 6344; Code 1932, § 10646; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-316.

Cross-References. Places where supreme court to hold court, Tenn. Const., art. VI, § 2.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 2 Tenn. Juris., Appeal and Error, § 51.

16-3-302. Adjourned terms.

The court may sit upon its own adjournment, and hold its term at any time, for the purpose of hearing and deciding unfinished business.

Code 1858, § 4511 (deriv. Acts 1835-1836, ch. 3, § 6); Shan., § 6345; Code 1932, § 10647; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-317.

16-3-303. Adjournment from day to day.

  1. Any judge in attendance at any time may adjourn court, in the absence of the other judges, from day to day, until they are able to attend.
  2. The clerk or sheriff may also adjourn the court from day to day, for one (1) week at the first of the term, if no judge attends.

Code 1858, §§ 4506, 4507 (deriv. Acts 1817, ch. 199, § 4); Shan., §§ 6340, 6341; Code 1932, §§ 10642, 10643; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-318.

16-3-304. Adjournment to court in course.

  1. The clerk, at the expiration of the week  specified in § 16-3-303, or the single judge in attendance in the case mentioned in § 16-3-303(a), if satisfied that a quorum cannot be had, may adjourn to the court in course.
  2. Adjournment works no discontinuance in any case, but the business stands over until the next term, and may then be disposed of, and all process, recognizances, or other obligations enforced as if no continuance had been made.

Code 1858, §§ 4508, 4509; Shan., §§ 6342, 6343; Code 1932, §§ 10644, 10645; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-319.

16-3-305. Orders opening and closing terms.

The court has the power, by an order signed by three (3) of its members and forwarded to the clerk at any of the places where its sessions are required to be held, to open any term of the court at such place, without the attendance of the judges of the court, and likewise an order of adjournment or any other order, judgment or decree, signed by three (3) of the judges, may be entered in the absence of the members of the court. The signed orders shall be entered by the clerk on the minutes of the court, and shall have the effect of signed minute orders from the time received and filed by the clerk. The signed orders shall be filed and preserved by the clerk receiving them, until compared with the minutes by the court, and the minutes shall be examined and signed by the court at least once every thirty (30) days.

Acts 1915, ch. 95, § 2; Shan., § 135a2; Code 1932, § 155; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-320.

Law Reviews.

Tennessee Criminal Law: An Overview of the Courts and a Compendium of Tennessee Criminal Procedure (Michael R. Tilley), 5 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 90.

16-3-306. Continuation of terms — Concurrent terms.

Every term of the court when opened shall remain open until an order of adjournment is entered, and it shall be lawful for the terms of court in all the grand divisions to be open and running concurrently.

Acts 1915, ch. 95, § 3; Shan., § 135a3; Code 1932, § 156; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-321.

Cross-References. Grand divisions, title 4, ch. 1, part 2.

16-3-307. Rules for terms and transfers.

The court is empowered to make all necessary rules to carry out the purposes of §§ 16-2-104, 16-3-305, and 16-3-306, and to expedite the hearing of cases.

Acts 1915, ch. 95, § 4; Shan., § 135a4; Code 1932, § 157; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-322.

16-3-308. Special term.

The judges of the supreme court have the power to appoint and hold a special term, upon giving twenty (20) days' notice of the time in some newspaper in the division in which the court is held, for the trial of causes that they deem essential to the public interest.

Acts 1868-1869, ch. 28, § 2; Shan., § 6346; Code 1932, § 10648; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-323.

Cited: Grissom v. H. K. Ferguson Co., 205 Tenn. 580, 329 S.W.2d 816, 1959 Tenn. LEXIS 396 (1959).

Part 4
Rule Making

16-3-401. Supreme court rules of practice.

The supreme court may make rules of practice for the better disposal of business before it.

Code 1858, § 4504 (deriv. Acts 1835-1836, ch. 3, § 19); Shan., § 6337; Code 1932, § 10638; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-311.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 2 Tenn. Juris., Appeal and Error, § 101.

Law Reviews.

Discovery - Thomas v. Oldfield: Protecting the Necessary Boundaries of Discovery While Recognizing the Realities of Modern Litigation (Jason G. McCuistion), 40 U. Mem. L. Rev. 485 (2009).

Cross-References. Delinquency in student loan repayment, § 23-3-111.

Law Reviews.

The Theoretical Foundations of the Proposed Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, I. Introduction (John L. Sobieski, Jr.), 45 Tenn. L. Rev. 162.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Nature and Scope of Power of Court.

The supreme court has the power to adopt all rules and orders necessary and proper to make effective its appellate jurisdiction and to enforce its judgments, and it has the power to make and establish a rule, when a case arises to which there is no rule then in use that applies. Foster v. Burem, 48 Tenn. 783, 1870 Tenn. LEXIS 148 (1870); Newman v. Justices of Scott County, 48 Tenn. 787, 1870 Tenn. LEXIS 149 (1870); Lynn v. Polk, 76 Tenn. 328, 1881 Tenn. LEXIS 17 (1881); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Ordway, Gordon & McGuire, 76 Tenn. 558, 1881 Tenn. LEXIS 45 (1881); Memphis S. R. Co. v. Johnson, 114 Tenn. 632, 88 S.W. 169, 1905 Tenn. LEXIS 31 (1905).

The supreme court has both the inherent power and statutory authority to make and enforce reasonable rules of practice. Denton v. Woods, 86 Tenn. 37, 5 S.W. 489, 1887 Tenn. LEXIS 21 (1887); Wood v. Frazier, 86 Tenn. 500, 8 S.W. 148, 1888 Tenn. LEXIS 2 (1888); Cheatham v. Pearce, 89 Tenn. 668, 15 S.W. 1080, 1890 Tenn. LEXIS 90 (1891); Memphis S. R. Co. v. Johnson, 114 Tenn. 632, 88 S.W. 169, 1905 Tenn. LEXIS 31 (1905).

The court has the power to adopt rules for carrying out and enforcing its judgments and orders, but which cannot be exercised in contravention of any constitutional provision or statute restricting or regulating its jurisdiction. Chaffin v. Robinson, 187 Tenn. 125, 213 S.W.2d 32, 1948 Tenn. LEXIS 418 (1948).

It is clearly implicit in this part that no court other than the supreme court can make rules governing the procedure in other courts. State v. Best, 614 S.W.2d 791, 1981 Tenn. LEXIS 437 (Tenn. 1981).

2. Right to Require Assignment of Errors.

Rule of the supreme court requiring of appellants assignments of error (85 Tenn. 757, appendix) was held to be a reasonable rule of practice. Denton v. Woods, 86 Tenn. 37, 5 S.W. 489, 1887 Tenn. LEXIS 21 (1887); Wood v. Frazier, 86 Tenn. 500, 8 S.W. 148, 1888 Tenn. LEXIS 2 (1888); Cheatham v. Pearce, 89 Tenn. 668, 15 S.W. 1080, 1890 Tenn. LEXIS 90 (1891); Memphis S. R. Co. v. Johnson, 114 Tenn. 632, 88 S.W. 169, 1905 Tenn. LEXIS 31 (1905).

The supreme court, by rule, may provide that the errors assignable upon the action of the trial judge in refusing a new trial in the circuit or law court, shall be limited to such grounds for a new trial as were set out in the motion for that purpose in the trial court, regardless of the rules of that court. Memphis S. R. Co. v. Johnson, 114 Tenn. 632, 88 S.W. 169, 1905 Tenn. LEXIS 31 (1905); Jacks v. Williams-Robinson Lumber Co., 125 Tenn. 123, 140 S.W. 1066, 1911 Tenn. LEXIS 12 (Tenn. Sep. 1911).

3. Advisory Commissions.

The statutory scheme of rule making contemplates that the supreme court will make appropriate use of the advisory commissions authorized by § 16-3-601. State v. Best, 614 S.W.2d 791, 1981 Tenn. LEXIS 437 (Tenn. 1981).

Collateral References. 20 Am. Jur. 2d Courts §§ 82-86.

21 C.J.S. Courts §§ 170, 457.

Courts 80(1).

16-3-402. Other courts — General rules of practice.

The supreme court has the power to prescribe by general rules the forms of process, writs, pleadings and motions, and the practice and procedure in all of the courts of this state in all civil and criminal suits, actions and proceedings.

Acts 1965, ch. 227, § 1; 1975, ch. 376, § 1; T.C.A., § 16-112.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 22 Tenn. Juris., Rules of Court, § 2.

Law Reviews.

Discovery - Thomas v. Oldfield: Protecting the Necessary Boundaries of Discovery While Recognizing the Realities of Modern Litigation (Jason G. McCuistion), 40 U. Mem. L. Rev. 485 (2009).

Judicial Notice in Tennessee (Robert Banks, Jr. and Elizabeth T. Collins), 21 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 431 (1991).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Exclusive Authority of Court.

It is clearly implicit in this part that no court other than the supreme court can make rules governing the procedure in other courts. State v. Best, 614 S.W.2d 791, 1981 Tenn. LEXIS 437 (Tenn. 1981).

Trial court did not err in granting a city summary judgment because process was never served on the city's chief executive officer or city attorney; even assuming the city charter authorized the city clerk to act as the mayor's agent, to allow the charter to “supersede” subsection (8) would clearly conflict with T.C.A. § 16-3-406. Middleton v. City of Millington, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 713 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 11, 2018).

2. Separation of Powers.

Pre-lawsuit notice requirement in T.C.A. § 29-26-121(a) and (b) did not contravene the separation of powers clause of Tenn. Const. art. II, § 2, as it did not redefine the commencement of an action and accordingly, was construed harmoniously with Tenn. R. Civ. P. 3 and did not impede T.C.A. §§ 16-3-402 and 16-3-406. Williams v. SMZ Specialists, P.C., — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. App. LEXIS 267 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 19, 2013), appeal denied, Williams v. SMZ Specialists, P.C., — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 1018 (Tenn. Dec. 10, 2013).

3. Subject Matter Jurisdiction.

Chancery court erred in exercising subject matter jurisdiction over a bail bond company's action for injunctive relief and declaratory judgment declaring proposed Local Rules of Practice and Procedure for Bail Bond Companies unenforceable, unconstitutional, and in violation of the law because it did not have subject matter jurisdiction to entertain an action for declaratory or injunctive relief regarding the validity of local rules of the criminal court. Memphis Bonding Co. v. Crim. Court of Tenn. 30th Dist., 490 S.W.3d 458, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 930 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 25, 2015), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 247 (Tenn. Mar. 22, 2016).

Because a bail bond company's underlying claim for injunctive relief regarding Local Rules of Practice and Procedure for Bail Bond Companies could not be brought in chancery court, the chancery court could not exercise subject matter jurisdiction over the declaratory judgment aspect of the case either; the courts should not assume that subject matter jurisdiction existed based on the fact that the issue was not addressed. Memphis Bonding Co. v. Crim. Court of Tenn. 30th Dist., 490 S.W.3d 458, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 930 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 25, 2015), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 247 (Tenn. Mar. 22, 2016).

To allow the chancery court to review the validity or enjoin the enforcement of the local rules of the criminal court would interfere with the inherent power of the criminal court to administer its affairs and impose reasonable regulations regarding the making of bonds; the statutes and rules do not authorize chancery court review of the local rules of the criminal court. Memphis Bonding Co. v. Crim. Court of Tenn. 30th Dist., 490 S.W.3d 458, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 930 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 25, 2015), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 247 (Tenn. Mar. 22, 2016).

Collateral References. Courts 80(1).

16-3-403. Rules not to affect substantive rights — Consistency with constitutions.

The rules prescribed by the supreme court pursuant to § 16-3-402 shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right, and shall be consistent with the constitutions of the United States and Tennessee.

Acts 1965, ch. 227, § 2; T.C.A., § 16-113.

Law Reviews.

Champerty as We Know It (R. D. Cox), 13 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 139 (1983).

Cited: State v. Ellis, 598 S.W.2d 826, 1980 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 311 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1980); State v. Pettus, 986 S.W.2d 540, 1999 Tenn. LEXIS 44 (Tenn. 1999); Corum v. Holston Health & Rehab. Ctr., 104 S.W.3d 451, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 338 (Tenn. 2003).

16-3-404. Effective date of rules — Approval of rules by general assembly.

The supreme court shall fix the effective date of all its rules; provided, that the rules shall not take effect until they have been reported to the general assembly by the chief justice at or after the beginning of a regular session of the general assembly, but not later than February 1 during the session, and until they have been approved by resolutions of both the house of representatives and the senate.

Acts 1965, ch. 227, § 3; T.C.A., § 16-114; Acts 1985, ch. 24, § 1.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 22 Tenn. Juris., Rules of Court, § 2.

Law Reviews.

The Theoretical Foundations of the Proposed Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, I. Introduction (John L. Sobieski, Jr.), 45 Tenn. L. Rev. 162.

Cited: State v. Ellis, 598 S.W.2d 826, 1980 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 311 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1980); Malone v. State, 707 S.W.2d 541, 1985 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 3258 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1985); Lock v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 809 S.W.2d 483, 1991 Tenn. LEXIS 154 (Tenn. 1991); Alley v. State, 958 S.W.2d 138, 1997 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 428 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997); State v. Brewer, 989 S.W.2d 349, 1997 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 989 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997); Memphis Planned Parenthood, Inc. v. Sundquist, 175 F.3d 456, 1999 FED App. 162P, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 8481 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1999).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Exclusive Authority of Court.

It is clearly implicit in this part that no court other than the supreme court can make rules governing the procedure in other courts. State v. Best, 614 S.W.2d 791, 1981 Tenn. LEXIS 437 (Tenn. 1981).

2. Attorney Discipline.

Trial court properly determined that the Tennessee Open Meetings Act did not apply to the Board of Professional Responsibility because the Board was not created by legislative action, and thus, it could not be a public body and could not be a governing body; the supreme court has never considered rules governing the disciplining of attorneys to be covered by this statute. Moncier v. Bd. of Prof'l Responsibility of the Supreme Court of Tenn., — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. App. LEXIS 380 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 6, 2013), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 915 (Tenn. Nov. 13, 2013).

3. Applicability.

Tennessee Supreme Court does not consider rules governing the disciplining of attorneys to be covered by T.C.A. § 16-3-404. Moncier v. Hearing Panel of the Bd. of Prof'l Responsibility, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. App. LEXIS 469 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 19, 2013), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 895 (Tenn. Nov. 13, 2013).

16-3-405. Publication of rules.

All rules adopted by the supreme court shall be published in the Tennessee Code Annotated and may be publicized both before and after becoming effective in a manner that the supreme court deems appropriate.

Acts 1965, ch. 227, § 4; T.C.A., § 16-115.

Compiler's Notes. The Supreme Court Rules are published in the Tennessee Court Rules Annotated, which is updated by replacement volumes in July of each year and are updated by supplementation once each year.

Cross-References. Publication of Tennessee Code Annotated, § 1-1-105.

16-3-406. Laws in conflict with rules nullified.

After the rules have become effective, all laws in conflict with the rules shall be of no further force or effect.

Acts 1965, ch. 227, § 5; T.C.A., § 16-116.

Rule Reference. This section is referred to in the Advisory Commission Comments under T.R.A.P. 13.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 2 Tenn. Juris., Appeal and Error, § 63; 22 Tenn. Juris., Rules of Court, § 2.

Tennessee Law of Evidence (2nd ed., Cohen, Paine and Sheppeard), §§ 605.1, 610.1.

Law Reviews.

The Procedural Details of the Proposed Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, II. Initiation of An Appeal (John L. Sobieski, Jr.), 46 Tenn. L. Rev. 4.

Cited: State v. Ellis, 598 S.W.2d 826, 1980 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 311 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1980); Haynes v. McKenzie Memorial Hospital, 667 S.W.2d 497, 1984 Tenn. App. LEXIS 3274 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984); Lock v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 809 S.W.2d 483, 1991 Tenn. LEXIS 154 (Tenn. 1991); Arnold v. City of Chattanooga, 19 S.W.3d 779, 1999 Tenn. App. LEXIS 765 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999); State v. West, 19 S.W.3d 753, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 244 (Tenn. 2000); Fields v. State, 40 S.W.3d 450, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 110 (Tenn. 2001); State v. Mallard, 40 S.W.3d 473, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 235 (Tenn. 2001); Corum v. Holston Health & Rehab. Ctr., 104 S.W.3d 451, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 338 (Tenn. 2003); The Tennessean v. Tenn. Dep't of Pers., — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 267 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 27, 2007); Rajvongs v. Wright, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 393 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 18, 2012); Webb v. Roberson, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. App. LEXIS 261 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 17, 2013).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. In General.

Conflicts between provisions of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure and provisions of the Tennessee Code Annotated which cannot be harmoniously construed will be resolved in favor of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. Mid-South Pavers, Inc. v. Arnco Constr., Inc., 771 S.W.2d 420, 1989 Tenn. App. LEXIS 12 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989).

Pre-lawsuit notice requirement in T.C.A. § 29-26-121(a) and (b) did not contravene the separation of powers clause of Tenn. Const. art. II, § 2, as it did not redefine the commencement of an action and accordingly, was construed harmoniously with Tenn. R. Civ. P. 3 and did not impede T.C.A. §§ 16-3-402 and 16-3-406. Williams v. SMZ Specialists, P.C., — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. App. LEXIS 267 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 19, 2013), appeal denied, Williams v. SMZ Specialists, P.C., — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 1018 (Tenn. Dec. 10, 2013).

Trial court did not err in granting a city summary judgment because process was never served on the city's chief executive officer or city attorney; even assuming the city charter authorized the city clerk to act as the mayor's agent, to allow the charter to “supersede” subsection (8) would clearly conflict with T.C.A. § 16-3-406. Middleton v. City of Millington, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 713 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 11, 2018).

Dismissal of a parent's untimely appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when the parent failed to file an appeal within ten days of the general sessions court's order of protection, as required by statute, was appropriate because the writ of error which the parent filed after the expiration of the time limit was no longer a viable method of appeal in the State of Tennessee. Furthermore, statutes providing for a period of more than ten days to file an appeal were not applicable to the matter. New v. Dumitrache, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. LEXIS 264 (Tenn. June 29, 2020).

2. Section Applied.

This section was applied in: Bush v. Bradshaw, 615 S.W.2d 157, 1981 Tenn. LEXIS 431 (Tenn. 1981).

16-3-407. Additional or supplementary rules of other courts.

Each of the other courts of this state may adopt additional or supplementary rules of practice and procedure not inconsistent with or in conflict with the rules prescribed by the supreme court.

Acts 1965, ch. 227, § 6; T.C.A., § 16-117.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 22 Tenn. Juris., Rules of Court, § 2.

Law Reviews.

The Tennessee Court System — Chancery Court (Frederic S. Le Clercq), 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 281.

The Tennessee Court System — Court of Appeals (Frederic S. Le Clercq), 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 219.

The Tennessee Court System — General Sessions Court (Frederic S. Le Clercq), 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 375.

The Tennessee Court System — The County Court, 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 419.

Attorney General Opinions. It is not unauthorized practice of law for a court to develop form petitions and orders and to direct non-attorney members of the clerk's office to make petitions available for use by pro se litigants seeking to have their driving privileges restored, OAG 04-071 (4/21/04).

Cited: State v. Huskins, 989 S.W.2d 735, 1998 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1020 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998); Metropolitan Gov't of Nashville v. Cuozzo, — S.W.3d —, 2008 Tenn. App. LEXIS 498 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 25, 2008).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. In General.

The trial courts of the state have authority to make reasonable rules of practice applicable to such courts including rules as to motions for new trials so long as such rules are not inconsistent with the law. Richie v. Liberty Cash Grocers, Inc., 63 Tenn. App. 311, 471 S.W.2d 559, 1971 Tenn. App. LEXIS 261 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1971).

When issues arise for which no procedure is otherwise specifically prescribed, trial courts have the inherent power to adopt appropriate rules of procedure to address the issues. State v. Reid, 981 S.W.2d 166, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 695 (Tenn. 1998).

Because a bail bond company's underlying claim for injunctive relief regarding Local Rules of Practice and Procedure for Bail Bond Companies could not be brought in chancery court, the chancery court could not exercise subject matter jurisdiction over the declaratory judgment aspect of the case either; the courts should not assume that subject matter jurisdiction existed based on the fact that the issue was not addressed. Memphis Bonding Co. v. Crim. Court of Tenn. 30th Dist., 490 S.W.3d 458, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 930 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 25, 2015), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 247 (Tenn. Mar. 22, 2016).

To allow the chancery court to review the validity or enjoin the enforcement of the local rules of the criminal court would interfere with the inherent power of the criminal court to administer its affairs and impose reasonable regulations regarding the making of bonds; the statutes and rules do not authorize chancery court review of the local rules of the criminal court. Memphis Bonding Co. v. Crim. Court of Tenn. 30th Dist., 490 S.W.3d 458, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 930 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 25, 2015), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 247 (Tenn. Mar. 22, 2016).

Chancery court erred in exercising subject matter jurisdiction over a bail bond company's action for injunctive relief and declaratory judgment declaring proposed Local Rules of Practice and Procedure for Bail Bond Companies unenforceable, unconstitutional, and in violation of the law because it did not have subject matter jurisdiction to entertain an action for declaratory or injunctive relief regarding the validity of local rules of the criminal court. Memphis Bonding Co. v. Crim. Court of Tenn. 30th Dist., 490 S.W.3d 458, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 930 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 25, 2015), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 247 (Tenn. Mar. 22, 2016).

2. Exclusive Authority of Court.

It is clearly implicit in this part that no court other than the supreme court can make rules governing the procedure in other courts. State v. Best, 614 S.W.2d 791, 1981 Tenn. LEXIS 437 (Tenn. 1981).

3. Modification of Rules.

Although the court of appeals had the power to modify its rules they must not conflict with the rules of the supreme court. Ford Motor Co. v. Moulton, 511 S.W.2d 690, 1974 Tenn. LEXIS 498 (Tenn. 1974).

4. Judicial Notice of Rules by Appellate Court.

Supreme court cannot judicially know rules of trial court. Shettles v. State, 209 Tenn. 157, 352 S.W.2d 1, 1961 Tenn. LEXIS 359 (1961).

The court of appeals cannot judicially know the rules established by the circuit courts and will not notice them until they are proved below and incorporated into the bill of exceptions. Talley v. Talley, 51 Tenn. App. 622, 371 S.W.2d 152, 1962 Tenn. App. LEXIS 126 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1962).

5. Specific Rules.

6. —Request for Jury.

Local rule requiring party wanting a jury to demand it in his pleading or on the first day of the term at which the cause set for trial is reasonable and proper. Hackman v. Harris, 225 Tenn. 645, 475 S.W.2d 175, 1972 Tenn. LEXIS 403 (1972).

7. —Substitute Service of Process.

Upon motion, supported by affidavit, trial judges may, in the exercise of sound discretion, order in lieu of publication, that the clerk mail a copy of the complaint and summons by return receipt registered mail to defendant's last known address and post a copy of the summons at three public places in the county; that the clerk make an entry on the rule docket so showing, and note thereon and file with the record the document returned, and such a method of substitute service will satisfy both federal and state due process requirements. Dungan v. Dungan, 579 S.W.2d 183, 1979 Tenn. LEXIS 424 (Tenn. 1979).

8. —Bail Bondsmen.

Suspension of a bonding company for violating a local rule of court requiring an agent of the bonding company to be present at court appearances of defendants for whom the bonding company served as surety was appropriate because the local rule did not conflict with any statute and was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. The Tennessee statute pertaining to bonding companies was supplemental to other laws providing for and regulating professional bail bondsmen and did not establish exclusive grounds for suspension. In re Cumberland Bail Bonding, 599 S.W.3d 17, 2020 Tenn. LEXIS 143 (Tenn. Apr. 6, 2020).

16-3-408. Courts — Facsimile transmission of documents — Rules and procedures.

The supreme court is urged to develop court rules and procedures to control the process of courts using fax transmissions of documents. The court rules and procedures should provide for the following:

  1. The type of document that may be faxed;
  2. The length of restriction, if any, of a document that may be faxed;
  3. The type of equipment and paper that must be used by clerks' offices;
  4. The amount, if any, of fees to be charged for the faxing of documents;
  5. The payment of regular filing fees of the court;
  6. The time of filing of a faxed document;
  7. Requirements, if any, for filing of original documents or original signatures;
  8. Requirements, if any, for maintenance of transmittal reports of faxed documents; and
  9. Any other rule or procedure the court deems appropriate.

Acts 1991, ch. 146, § 3.

Cross-References. Facsimile transmissions, court business and filings, § 16-1-113.

Part 5
Supervision of Inferior Courts

16-3-501. Inferior courts — Supervisory control.

In order to ensure the harmonious, efficient and uniform operation of the judicial system of the state, the supreme court is granted and clothed with general supervisory control over all the inferior courts of the state.

Acts 1970, ch. 422, § 1; T.C.A., § 16-330.

Rule Reference. This section is referred to in Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 11, § VII and Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 27, § 2.

Law Reviews.

The Tennessee Court System — Supreme Court (Frederic S. Le Clercq), 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 191.

Attorney General Opinions. The Tennessee supreme court has the authority to require general sessions courts to collect and report statistical and other data to the administrative office of the courts concerning filing and disposition of driving while intoxicated cases and to make such information available to the department of safety or to any other department or agency of state government, OAG 01-054 (4/9/01).

Because an airport authority has discretion to determine the fees applicable to businesses operating on its property when it enters into contracts or other agreements with those businesses, it may impose a fuel flowage fee as part of those agreements. An airport authority may enter into agreements that require non-profit entities to pay fuel flowage fees. OAG 18-32, 2018 Tenn. AG LEXIS 31 (7/20/2018).

The Tennessee Constitution gives the Legislature the exclusive authority to create inferior courts, including a business court.  The Tennessee Supreme Court may create a business docket in an inferior court within the limits established by the Tennessee Constitution.  The judges assigned to the business court or to the business docket must be elected in accordance with the Tennessee Constitution. OAG 18-33, 2018 Tenn. AG LEXIS 32 (7/30/2018).

Cited: Dungan v. Dungan, 579 S.W.2d 183, 1979 Tenn. LEXIS 424 (Tenn. 1979); State v. Brown, 644 S.W.2d 418, 1982 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 398 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1982); Housler v. State, 749 S.W.2d 758, 1988 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 216 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988); Evans v. Wilson, 776 S.W.2d 939, 1989 Tenn. LEXIS 394 (Tenn. 1989); Ferrell v. Cigna Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 33 S.W.3d 731, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 686 (Tenn. 2000); State v. Daniel, — S.W.3d —, 2006 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 834 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 30, 2006); In re Bell, 344 S.W.3d 304, 2011 Tenn. LEXIS 577 (Tenn. June 10, 2011).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Generally.

Trial court acted within its authority because the Supreme Court of Tennessee appointed a retired chancellor to hear a conservatorship proceeding. Arnold v. Kennedy, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. App. LEXIS 369 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 31, 2013).

Although the statute generally applies to all personnel in state service, it does not apply to the judicial branch of state government including, but not limited to, employees of the administrative office of the courts; thus, in this area, the supreme court retains exclusive supervisory authority to establish and interpret personnel policies applicable to Judicial Department employees, including the employment status of a trial judge's secretarial assistant. Moore-Pennoyer v. State, 515 S.W.3d 271, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 184 (Tenn. Mar. 28, 2017).

16-3-502. Supervisory procedures.

In addition to other constitutional, statutory and inherent power, but not restrictive thereof, the supreme court may:

  1. Designate the administrative director of the courts as the chief administrative officer of the courts of the state;
  2. Direct the administrative director of the courts to take all action or to perform duties that are necessary for the orderly administration of justice within the state, whether or not herein or elsewhere enumerated;
  3. Direct the administrative director of the courts to provide administrative support to all of the courts of the state through an administrative office of the courts in order to:
    1. Designate and assign temporarily any judge or chancellor to hold or sit as a member of any court, of comparable dignity or equal or higher level, for any good and sufficient reason;
    2. Maintain a roster of retired judges who are willing and able to undertake special duties from time to time and to designate or assign them appropriate judicial duties;
    3. Make a careful and continuing survey of the dockets of the circuit, criminal, chancery and other similar courts of record, and to report at periodic intervals to the court, and annually to the general assembly, information that is public record;
    4. Take affirmative and appropriate action to correct and alleviate any imbalance in caseloads among the various judicial districts of the state; and
    5. Take affirmative and appropriate action to correct or alleviate any condition or situation adversely affecting the administration of justice within the state;
  4. Adopt, upon the recommendation of the administrative director of the courts, an annual plan providing for the orientation of newly elected or appointed judges of trial or appellate courts of record and for the appropriate continuing legal education and training of the judges; and
  5. Establish and implement a policy concerning the prevention of sexual harassment. This policy shall include training workshops and the establishment of a hearing procedure.

Acts 1970, ch. 422, § 2; T.C.A., § 16-331; Acts 1984, ch. 931, § 23; 1993, ch. 65, § 1; 1993, ch. 307, § 3.

Cross-References. Department of personnel, sexual harassment workshops, § 4-3-1703.

Orientation and continuing training and education of trial and appellate judges, § 16-3-803.

Posting of sexual harassment policy by state entities, § 4-3-124.

Supervision of judicial system, Tenn. R. Sup. Ct. 11.

Rule Reference. This section is referred to in Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 11, §§ I and VII.

Textbooks. Tennessee Criminal Practice and Procedure (Raybin), § 24.12.

Tennessee Jurisprudence, 16 Tenn. Juris., Judges, § 7.

Law Reviews.

The Tennessee Court System — Supreme Court (Frederic S. Le Clercq), 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 191.

Attorney General Opinions. Constitutionality of legislation governing ethical standards for certain attorneys, OAG 87-51 (3/30/87).

Constitutionality of legislation relating to appointment of special judges, OAG 99-068 (3/18/99).

The Tennessee supreme court has the authority to require general sessions courts to collect and report statistical and other data to the administrative office of the courts concerning filing and disposition of driving while intoxicated cases and to make such information available to the department of safety or to any other department or agency of state government, OAG 01-054 (4/9/01).

Proposed legislation that gives the Tennessee Supreme Court the authority to appoint any former judge or justice who has at least one year of judicial service to serve as “a senior judge to hear complex commercial disputes” raises significant constitutional concerns. Unlike existing law, the proposed legislation would permit a former judge who has minimal judicial experience and who has never won a judicial election to serve in a judicial capacity. And the appointment would not be temporary but would be for a four-year term, renewable without limitation at the discretion of the Supreme Court. The election requirement of article VI, section 4 is not absolute, as demonstrated by the several provisions that allow unelected individuals to exercise judicial authority for a limited time or limited purpose, but the proposed legislation would undermine the election requirement to an extent not provided in existing law.  However, the proposed legislation that would allow the Supreme Court to transfer complex commercial cases from the assigned trial court judge to a senior business judge does itself not raise constitutional concerns. It constitutes a specific grant of authority to transfer cases in furtherance of the Supreme Court’s existing supervisory authority. OAG 18-14, 2018 Tenn. AG LEXIS 15 (3/23/2018).

Because an airport authority has discretion to determine the fees applicable to businesses operating on its property when it enters into contracts or other agreements with those businesses, it may impose a fuel flowage fee as part of those agreements. An airport authority may enter into agreements that require non-profit entities to pay fuel flowage fees. OAG 18-32, 2018 Tenn. AG LEXIS 31 (7/20/2018).

The Tennessee Constitution gives the Legislature the exclusive authority to create inferior courts, including a business court.  The Tennessee Supreme Court may create a business docket in an inferior court within the limits established by the Tennessee Constitution.  The judges assigned to the business court or to the business docket must be elected in accordance with the Tennessee Constitution. OAG 18-33, 2018 Tenn. AG LEXIS 32 (7/30/2018).

Cited: Cantor v. Brading, 494 S.W.2d 139, 1973 Tenn. App. LEXIS 250 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1973); Dungan v. Dungan, 579 S.W.2d 183, 1979 Tenn. LEXIS 424 (Tenn. 1979); State v. Brown, 644 S.W.2d 418, 1982 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 398 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1982); Johnson v. State, 797 S.W.2d 578, 1990 Tenn. LEXIS 314 (Tenn. 1990); State v. Bates, 804 S.W.2d 868, 1991 Tenn. LEXIS 44 (Tenn. 1991); Maxwell Med., Inc. v. Chumley, 282 S.W.3d 893, 2008 Tenn. App. LEXIS 542 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 22, 2008); In re Bell, 344 S.W.3d 304, 2011 Tenn. LEXIS 577 (Tenn. June 10, 2011).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Exercise of Power.

Supreme court under its supervisory jurisdiction will not permit an abuse of legal process for the purpose of harassment or delay and will not permit a litigant to deliberately harass public officials or delay the transaction of public business. Mitchell v. Carmichael, 522 S.W.2d 869, 1975 Tenn. LEXIS 727 (Tenn. 1975).

As the supreme court may require more of its officers than the legislature may prescribe in the exercise of its public power, former § 29-110, which provided that the license to practice law was not subject to membership in any organization, was an unconstitutional interference with the court's power, violating Tenn. Const., art. II, §§ 1, 2, and subdivisions (5) and (6) of this section. Petition of Tennessee Bar Asso., 532 S.W.2d 224, 1975 Tenn. LEXIS 609 (Tenn. 1975).

Trial court acted within its authority because the Supreme Court of Tennessee appointed a retired chancellor to hear a conservatorship proceeding. Arnold v. Kennedy, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. App. LEXIS 369 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 31, 2013).

2. Contract of Employment.

Inclusion of funds in the Tennessee Judicial Department's budget for the purpose of compensating trial judge secretarial assistants does not give rise to an implied annual contract of employment for any particular trial judge secretarial assistant; moreover, the role of the Administrative Office of the Courts (AOC) in performing human resources functions for the Judicial Department does not give rise to implied contracts between the AOC and Judicial Department employees. Moore-Pennoyer v. State, 515 S.W.3d 271, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 184 (Tenn. Mar. 28, 2017).

3. Administrative Office of the Courts.

Despite the many critically important functions it provides the Judicial Department, the Administrative Office of the Courts is not authorized to hire, supervise, or remove a trial judge's secretarial assistant; this authority resides in the trial judge. Moore-Pennoyer v. State, 515 S.W.3d 271, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 184 (Tenn. Mar. 28, 2017).

16-3-503. Inherent power of court.

The general assembly declares that this part is declaratory of the common law as it existed at the time of the adoption of the constitution of Tennessee and of the power inherent in a court of last resort.

Acts 1970, ch. 422, § 3; T.C.A., § 16-332.

Rule Reference. This section is referred to in Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 11, § VII.

Law Reviews.

The Tennessee Court System — Supreme Court (Frederic S. Le Clercq), 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 191.

Cited: Cantor v. Brading, 494 S.W.2d 139, 1973 Tenn. App. LEXIS 250 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1973); Dungan v. Dungan, 579 S.W.2d 183, 1979 Tenn. LEXIS 424 (Tenn. 1979); State v. Brown, 644 S.W.2d 418, 1982 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 398 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1982); In re Burson, 909 S.W.2d 768, 1995 Tenn. LEXIS 509 (Tenn. 1995).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Modification of Common Law Rules.

The court has not only the power, but the duty, to consider, adapt, and modify common law rules. Heck Van Tran v. State, 6 S.W.3d 257, 1999 Tenn. LEXIS 602 (Tenn. 1999), cert. denied, Heck Van Tran v. Tennessee, 529 U.S. 1091, 120 S. Ct. 1728, 146 L. Ed. 2d 648, 2000 U.S. LEXIS 2938 (2000).

2. Supreme Court.

Although the statute generally applies to all personnel in state service, it does not apply to the judicial branch of state government including, but not limited to, employees of the administrative office of the courts; thus, in this area, the supreme court retains exclusive supervisory authority to establish and interpret personnel policies applicable to Judicial Department employees, including the employment status of a trial judge's secretarial assistant. Moore-Pennoyer v. State, 515 S.W.3d 271, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 184 (Tenn. Mar. 28, 2017).

16-3-504. Plenary and discretionary powers.

This part shall constitute a broad conference of full, plenary and discretionary power upon the supreme court.

Acts 1970, ch. 422, § 4; T.C.A., § 16-333.

Rule Reference. This section is referred to in Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 11, § VII.

Law Reviews.

The Tennessee Court System — Supreme Court (Frederic S. Le Clercq), 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 191.

Cited: Dungan v. Dungan, 579 S.W.2d 183, 1979 Tenn. LEXIS 424 (Tenn. 1979); State v. Brown, 644 S.W.2d 418, 1982 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 398 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1982); In re Burson, 909 S.W.2d 768, 1995 Tenn. LEXIS 509 (Tenn. 1995); Heck Van Tran v. State, 6 S.W.3d 257, 1999 Tenn. LEXIS 602 (Tenn. 1999); State v. Daniel, — S.W.3d —, 2006 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 834 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 30, 2006).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Supreme Court.

Although the statute generally applies to all personnel in state service, it does not apply to the judicial branch of state government including, but not limited to, employees of the administrative office of the courts; thus, in this area, the supreme court retains exclusive supervisory authority to establish and interpret personnel policies applicable to Judicial Department employees, including the employment status of a trial judge's secretarial assistant. Moore-Pennoyer v. State, 515 S.W.3d 271, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 184 (Tenn. Mar. 28, 2017).

Part 6
Advisory Commission on Rules

16-3-601. Advisory commission on rules of practice and procedure.

  1. There shall be an advisory commission whose members shall be appointed by the supreme court and whose duty shall be to advise the supreme court from time to time respecting the rules of practice and procedure.
  2. Each member shall serve for a term of three (3) years and members shall be eligible for reappointment; provided, that members shall not be appointed for more than three (3) successive terms.
  3. No compensation shall be paid to any of the members; however, the expenses necessarily incurred by the members in the accomplishment of the purposes of the commission, as set out in this part, shall be reimbursable when statements of expenses are submitted pursuant to policies and guidelines promulgated by the supreme court.
  4. The advisory commission has the authority to employ, subject to the approval of the administrative director of the courts and commissioner of finance and administration, legal, clerical and other assistance that may be necessary to the efficient discharge of its duties.

Acts 1965, ch. 227, § 7; 1975, ch. 376, §§ 2, 4; T.C.A., § 16-118; Acts 1993, ch. 66, § 19; 1993, ch. 196, § 2; 2001, ch. 257, §§ 1-3.

Law Reviews.

The Tennessee Court System — Supreme Court (Frederic S. Le Clercq), 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 191.

Cited: Webb v. Nashville Area Habitat for Humanity, Inc., 346 S.W.3d 422, 2011 Tenn. LEXIS 623 (Tenn. July 21, 2011).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Appropriate Use Contemplated.

The statutory scheme of rule making contemplates that the supreme court will make appropriate use of the advisory commissions authorized by this section. State v. Best, 614 S.W.2d 791, 1981 Tenn. LEXIS 437 (Tenn. 1981).

Part 7
Court Buildings Commissions

16-3-701. Commission to control supreme court building at Nashville.

There is created a commission composed of the chief justice of the supreme court, who shall serve as chair, the presiding judge of the court of appeals or the presiding judge's designee, the presiding judge of the court of criminal appeals or presiding judge's designee, the administrative director of the courts, the clerk of the supreme court, and one (1) other member from the supreme court to be elected by the membership of the supreme court, which commission is vested with authority and jurisdiction to supervise and control the supreme court building at Nashville, to employ all necessary assistants and help for the building, and to make necessary contracts therefor.

Acts 1953, ch. 138, § 1 (Williams, § 1032.3); 1965, ch. 184, § 1; 1975, ch. 73, § 1; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-324; Acts 1984, ch. 833, § 1; 1993, ch. 66, § 20; 1994, ch. 897, § 3.

16-3-702. Commission to control court building at Knoxville.

There is created a commission composed of the chief justice of the supreme court, who shall serve as chair, the presiding judge of the court of appeals or the presiding judge's designee, the presiding judge of the court of criminal appeals or the presiding judge's designee, the administrative director of the courts, the clerk of the supreme court, and one (1) other member from the supreme court to be elected by the membership of the supreme court, which commission is vested with authority and jurisdiction to supervise and control the court and office building at Knoxville, and to employ all necessary assistants and help for the building, and make necessary contracts therefor.

Acts 1953, ch. 138, § 1 (Williams, § 1032.3); 1965, ch. 184, § 1; 1975, ch. 73, § 1; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-324; Acts 1984, ch. 833, § 2; 1993, ch. 66, § 21; 1994, ch. 897, § 4.

Law Reviews.

The Tennessee Court System — Supreme Court (Frederic S. Le Clercq), 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 191.

16-3-703. Commission to control court building at Jackson.

There is created a commission composed of the chief justice of the supreme court, who shall serve as chair, the presiding judge of the court of appeals or the presiding judge's designee, the presiding judge of the court of criminal appeals or the presiding judge's designee, the administrative director of the courts, the clerk of the supreme court, and one (1) other member from the supreme court to be elected by the membership of the supreme court, which commission is vested with the authority and jurisdiction to supervise and control the court and office building at Jackson, and to employ all necessary assistants and help for the building, and make necessary contracts therefor.

Acts 1984, ch. 833, § 3; 1993, ch. 66, § 22; 1994, ch. 897, § 5.

Part 8
Administrative Office of the Courts

16-3-801. Creation — Purpose.

There is created the administrative office of the courts. The purpose of this office is to assist in improving the administration of justice in the state by performing the duties and exercising the powers conferred in this part.

Acts 1993, ch. 65, § 2.

Compiler's Notes. Former part 8, §§ 16-3-80116-3-805 (Acts 1963, ch. 86, §§ 1-5; 1965, ch. 214, § 1; T.C.A. §§ 16-325 — 16-329; Acts 1984, ch. 931, § 24; 1992, ch. 651, § 1; 1992, ch. 896, § 1), concerning the executive secretary to the supreme court, was repealed by Acts 1993, ch. 65, § 2.

Acts 1993, ch. 66, § 74 provided that it was the intention of the general assembly to change the name of the executive secretary to the supreme court to the administrative director of the courts. In furtherance of that intention, the Tennessee Code Commission was directed to make any other language or stylistic changes in the text of the law which might be necessary to effectuate the change.

Law Reviews.

The Tennessee Court System — Supreme Court (Frederic S. Le Clercq), 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 191.

Three Quarters of a Century in Judicial Administration (Delmar Karlen), 32 Tenn. L. Rev. 412.

16-3-802. Administrative director — Appointment — Salary.

  1. The supreme court shall appoint the administrative director of the courts, who shall serve as the director of the administrative office of the courts. The administrative director shall serve at the pleasure of the supreme court.
  2. The supreme court shall fix the salary of the administrative director of the courts at an amount not to exceed the salary paid to judges of the court of appeals.

Acts 1993, ch. 65, § 2.

Compiler's Notes. Former part 8, §§ 16-3-80116-3-805 (Acts 1963, ch. 86, §§ 1-5; 1965, ch. 214, § 1; T.C.A. §§ 16-325 — 16-329; Acts 1984, ch. 931, § 24; 1992, ch. 651, § 1; 1992, ch. 896, § 1), concerning the executive secretary to the supreme court, was repealed by Acts 1993, ch. 65, § 2.

Law Reviews.

The Tennessee Court System — Supreme Court (Frederic S. Le Clercq), 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 191.

16-3-803. Administrative director — Powers and duties.

  1. The administrative director of the courts shall work under the supervision and direction of the chief justice and shall, as the chief administrative officer of the state court system, assist the chief justice in the administration of the state court system to the end that litigation may be expedited and the administration of justice improved.
  2. The administrative director of the courts shall attend to duties that may be assigned by the supreme court or chief justice of the supreme court.
    1. Acting in accordance with procedures established pursuant to § 9-6-103, the administrative director of the courts shall annually prepare, approve and submit a budget for the maintenance and operation of the state court system. When the budget for the maintenance and operation of the state court system is submitted to the department of finance and administration, the administrative director of the courts shall also submit copies of the budget to the speaker of the senate and the speaker of the house of representatives for referral and consideration by the appropriate standing committees of the general assembly.
    2. The administrative director of the courts shall administer the accounts of the state court system, including all accounts related to the state court system as may be designated by the comptroller of the treasury and the chief justice. The administrative director of the courts shall draw and approve all requisitions for the payment of public moneys appropriated for the maintenance and operation of the state court system, and shall audit claims and prepare vouchers for presentation to the department of finance and administration, including payroll warrants, expense warrants and warrants covering the necessary cost of supplies, materials and other obligations by the various offices with respect to which the administrative director of the courts shall exercise fiscal responsibility.
  3. The administrative director of the courts shall, within budgetary limitations, provide the judges of the trial courts of record with minimum law libraries, the nature and extent of which shall be determined in every instance by the administrative director on the basis of need. All books furnished shall remain the property of the state, and shall be returned to the custody of the administrative director by each judge upon the retirement or expiration of the official duties of the judge.
  4. All functions performed by the administrative director of the courts that involve expenditures of state funds shall be subject to the same auditing procedures by the commissioner of finance and administration and the comptroller of the treasury as required in connection with the expenditure of all other state funds.
    1. The administrative director of the courts shall, within the limit of appropriated funds, prepare for the supreme court's approval an annual judicial education plan providing for the orientation and continuing training and education of all elected or appointed judges of trial and appellate courts of record of this state.
    2. To the extent practicable, the annual judicial education plan shall provide that the orientation programs approved by the supreme court shall be made available to all newly elected or appointed judges of trial and appellate courts of record within one (1) year from the date of their initial appointment or election. The plan shall also provide, to the extent practicable, that all judges of trial and appellate courts of record whose terms exceed three (3) years shall, within two (2) years of the date of their initial election or appointment, be given the opportunity to attend judicial training programs approved by the supreme court.
    3. For the purpose of implementing the annual judicial education plan, the administrative director of the courts, with the approval of the chief justice, may apply for and expend grant funds from whatever source.
    4. The administrative director of the courts is authorized to recommend to the supreme court a plan whereby judges of trial and appellate courts of record who, on September 1, 1984, have not participated in training programs similar to those included in the annual judicial education plan, may be permitted to attend future orientation and training programs for judges made available through the annual plan.
    5. Nothing in this subsection (f) nor in any annual judicial education plan prepared by the administrative director of the courts and approved by the supreme court shall be construed to require judges whose salaries and other related expenses are not paid by state government to participate in any training or orientation program provided for in this subsection (f). With the agreement of appropriate units of local government to pay for the reasonable costs of the orientation and training programs, the administrative director of the courts may authorize judges whose salaries are paid by units of local government to participate in orientation or training programs made available in accordance with the approved annual plan.
  5. The administrative director of the courts shall continuously survey and study the operation of the state court system, the volume and condition of business in the courts of the state, whether of record or not, the procedures employed by those courts, and the quality and responsiveness of all of the courts with regard to the needs of civil litigants and the needs of the criminal justice system throughout the state.
  6. The administrative director of the courts shall establish criteria, develop procedures and implement a Tennessee court information system (TnCIS). The system shall provide an integrated case management and accounting software system addressing the statutory responsibilities of the clerks of the general sessions, chancery, circuit and juvenile courts. The system shall also provide state-wide reporting and data transfer capabilities for the administrative office of the courts (AOC), department of human services, Tennessee bureau of investigation, department of safety and other state agencies determined by the AOC or as statutorily mandated. To ensure comparable data from all courts, the system shall be designed to report cases according to a standard definition of a case as set forth in § 16-1-117.
  7. It is the duty of the administrative office of the courts to collect, develop and maintain uniform statistical information relative to court caseloads in Tennessee. For the purposes of monitoring the operation of the court system, reducing unnecessary delay and assessing the responsiveness of the court system to the needs of litigants, victims of crime and the citizens of the state, the administrative director of the courts shall have the responsibility for annually collecting, compiling, analyzing and publishing caseload statistics pertaining to the court system. It is the responsibility of the administrative director of the courts to develop, define, update and disseminate standard, uniform measures, definitions and criteria for collecting statistics pertaining to the court system. These standards and reporting requirements shall be used for uniform statistical data collection in all courts throughout the state, as established by statute or by the rules of the supreme court.
  8. The administrative director of the courts shall prepare and distribute an annual report reflecting the operation of the courts of the state and highlighting those changes, innovations, or recommendations made or introduced to enhance the effectiveness of the courts.
  9. The administrative director of the courts shall conduct ongoing internal review, analysis and planning for the future needs of the state court system. The analysis shall be designed to devise ways of simplifying court system procedure, expediting the transaction of court system business and correcting weaknesses in the administration of justice.
  10. The administrative director of the courts shall:
    1. File a copy of the supreme court's policies and guidelines governing the reimbursement of expenses for judicial officers with the judiciary committee of the house of representatives, the judiciary committee of the senate, and the finance, ways and means committees of the senate and the house of representatives, the fiscal review committee, the comptroller of the treasury and the commissioner of finance and administration; and
    2. Respond in a timely manner to any appropriate request by these committees or officials for information concerning reimbursements made pursuant to the policies and guidelines.
  11. The administrative director of the courts shall annually prepare and distribute to the judiciary committee of the senate and judiciary committee of the house of representatives:
    1. A report detailing the expenditure of moneys in the civil legal representation of indigents fund; and
    2. A copy of any rules and policies adopted by the supreme court governing the expenditure and application of funds in the civil legal representation of indigents fund.
  12. The administrative office of the courts shall collect, develop and maintain statistical information relative to sentencing in Tennessee. To assist the administrative office of the courts, the clerks of the circuit and criminal courts shall send a copy of each judgment document for a felony conviction to the administrative office of the courts. These copies shall be forwarded to the administrative office of the courts no less than one (1) time each month so that all judgments rendered in one (1) month have been received by the fifteenth day of the following month. When an electronic transfer system is operational and approved by the administrative office of the courts, the judgment document for all felony convictions shall be electronically transmitted to the administrative office of the courts in the same manner required by this subsection (n) for paper copies.
  13. The administrative director of the courts shall administer finances related to the office's control and supervision of the existing state law libraries, including the:
    1. Operation and maintenance of the libraries;
    2. Preparation of warrants for the payment of obligations related to the operation and maintenance of the libraries; and
    3. Recording of all transactions related to the administration of such finances in accordance with the laws and regulations governing state fiscal operations.

Acts 1993, ch. 65, § 2; 1993, ch. 196, § 10; 1994, ch. 1005, § 1; 1995, ch. 550, § 3; 1999, ch. 486, § 1; 2001, ch. 408, §§ 1-3; 2002, ch. 791, § 1; 2013, ch. 236, § 45; 2016, ch. 619, § 4; 2019, ch. 345, § 21; 2019, ch. 420, §§ 9, 10.

Compiler's Notes. Former part 8, §§ 16-3-80116-3-805 (Acts 1963, ch. 86, §§ 1-5; 1965, ch. 214, § 1; T.C.A. §§ 16-325 — 16-329; Acts 1984, ch. 931, § 24; 1992, ch. 651, § 1; 1992, ch. 896, § 1), concerning the executive secretary to the supreme court, was repealed by Acts 1993, ch. 65, § 2.

Amendments. The 2013 amendment substituted “the civil justice committee of the house of representatives, the judiciary committee of the senate, and” for “the judiciary committees and” in (l )(1); and substituted “the judiciary committee of the senate and civil justice committee of the house of representatives” for “the judiciary committees of the senate and the house of representatives” at the end of the introductory paragraph in (m).

The 2016 amendment added (o).

The 2019 amendment by ch. 345 substituted “judiciary” for “civil justice” preceding “committee of the house” in (l )(1) and (m).

The 2019 amendment by ch. 420, rewrote (b) which read: “The administrative director of the courts shall serve as secretary to the judicial council, shall perform those duties enumerated in § 16-3-502, and shall attend to other duties that may be assigned by the supreme court or chief justice of the supreme court. As secretary to the judicial council, the administrative director of the courts shall provide staff and secretarial support for all functions of the judicial council”; and rewrote (g) which read: “The administrative director of the courts shall continuously survey and study the operation of the state court system, the volume and condition of business in the courts of the state, whether of record or not, the procedures employed by those courts, and the quality and responsiveness of all of the courts with regard to the needs of civil litigants and the needs of the criminal justice system throughout the state. The administrative director of the courts shall also provide liaison and staff support to the judicial council with regard to the responsibilities of the judicial council in the areas described in this subsection (g).”

Effective Dates. Acts 2013, ch. 236, § 94. April 19, 2013.

Acts 2016, ch. 619, § 6. March 22, 2016.

Acts 2019, ch. 345, § 148. May 10, 2019.

Acts 2019, ch. 420, § 27. May 21, 2019.

Cross-References. Administration of annual educational seminar of Tennessee state court clerks' conference, § 18-1-506.

Orientation and continuing training and education of trial and appellate judges, § 16-3-502.

Rule Reference. This section is referred to in Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 11, § II.

Law Reviews.

The Tennessee Court System — Supreme Court (Frederic S. Le Clercq), 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 191.

Attorney General Opinions. The Tennessee supreme court has the authority to require general sessions courts to collect and report statistical and other data to the administrative office of the courts concerning filing and disposition of driving while intoxicated cases and to make such information available to the department of safety or to any other department or agency of state government, OAG 01-054 (4/9/01).

Cited: Cornelius v. McWilliams, 641 S.W.2d 508, 1982 Tenn. App. LEXIS 494 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982); Blackard v. Memphis Area Med. Ctr. for Women, Inc., 262 F.3d 568, 2001 FED App. 286P, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 19024 (6th Cir. Tenn. 2001).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Contract of Employment.

Inclusion of funds in the Tennessee Judicial Department's budget for the purpose of compensating trial judge secretarial assistants does not give rise to an implied annual contract of employment for any particular trial judge secretarial assistant; moreover, the role of the Administrative Office of the Courts (AOC) in performing human resources functions for the Judicial Department does not give rise to implied contracts between the AOC and Judicial Department employees. Moore-Pennoyer v. State, 515 S.W.3d 271, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 184 (Tenn. Mar. 28, 2017).

2. Court Personnel.

Despite the many critically important functions it provides the Judicial Department, the Administrative Office of the Courts is not authorized to hire, supervise, or remove a trial judge's secretarial assistant; this authority resides in the trial judge. Moore-Pennoyer v. State, 515 S.W.3d 271, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 184 (Tenn. Mar. 28, 2017).

16-3-804. Personnel — Law practice barred.

  1. The administrative director of the courts shall, subject to the approval of the supreme court, appoint and fix the compensation of assistants, clerical staff, or other employees that are necessary to enable the administrative director to perform the duties of the administrative office of the courts.
  2. Neither the administrative director of the courts nor any employee of the state court system shall, during the term of office or employment, directly or indirectly engage in the practice of law in any of the courts of this state. Nothing in this subsection (b) or any other law shall be construed to prohibit personnel described in this section from providing pro bono legal services through an organized program of pro bono legal services that receives funding pursuant to § 16-3-808 and that provides professional liability insurance for losses sustained by clients of lawyers participating in the program.
    1. Prior to a person's employment with the administrative office of the courts, the administrative director of the courts is authorized to obtain a criminal history background check to be conducted by the Tennessee bureau of investigation and the federal bureau of investigation. Background checks must include fingerprint checks against state and federal criminal records maintained by the Tennessee bureau of investigation and the federal bureau of investigation.
    2. The administrative director of the courts may establish the job titles or classifications to which the requirements of this subsection (c) apply. Nothing in this subsection (c) supersedes any mandatory fingerprint-based criminal history background requirements that may be applicable for any person who is seeking employment in a position subject to licensure, approval, or certification by any state program or agency.
    3. The administrative office of the courts shall pay the Tennessee bureau of investigation or the federal bureau of investigation, as appropriate, for any costs the bureaus incur when conducting the investigations of applicants.

Acts 1993, ch. 65, § 2; 2009, ch. 7, § 3; 2017, ch. 104, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Former part 8, §§ 16-3-80116-3-805 (Acts 1963, ch. 86, §§ 1-5; 1965, ch. 214, § 1; T.C.A. §§ 16-325 — 16-329; Acts 1984, ch. 931, § 24; 1992, ch. 651, § 1; 1992, ch. 896, § 1) concerning the executive secretary to the supreme court, was repealed by Acts 1993, ch. 65, § 2.

Amendments. The 2009 amendment added the last sentence of (b).

The 2017 amendment added (c).

Effective Dates. Acts 2009, ch. 7, § 4. July 1, 2009.

Acts 2017, ch. 104, § 2. April 7, 2017.

16-3-805. Office, equipment, and supplies.

The administrative director of the courts shall be provided with suitable office space and with all office equipment and supplies necessary to perform the duties and functions of the office.

Acts 1993, ch. 65, § 2.

Compiler's Notes. Former part 8, §§ 16-3-80116-3-805 (Acts 1963, ch. 86, §§ 1-5; 1965, ch. 214, § 1; T.C.A. §§ 16-325 — 16-329; Acts 1984, ch. 931, § 24; 1992, ch. 651, § 1; 1992, ch. 896, § 1) concerning the executive secretary to the supreme court, was repealed by Acts 1993, ch. 65, § 2.

16-3-806. Appropriation of funds for special personnel assigned to capital sentence costs.

All funds appropriated solely to employ, contract with or reassign personnel for the purpose of providing prompt and fair adjudication of post-conviction proceedings in capital sentence cases shall be appropriated to the administrative director of the courts to be allocated to, and pursuant to standards established by agreement of, the chief justice, the attorney general and reporter, the executive director of the conference of district attorneys general and the executive director of the conference of district public defenders. In addition, funds may be allocated and grants given to the offices of public defenders in Shelby and Davidson counties. Notice of intended allocations shall be given to the commissioner of finance and administration.

Acts 1993, ch. 472, § 5; 1996, ch. 610, § 4; 1996, ch. 996, § 2.

Cross-References. Attorney general and reporter, hiring of special personnel, § 8-6-111.

District attorney general, hiring of special personnel, § 8-7-111.

District public defender, hiring of special personnel, § 8-14-111.

Supreme court, hiring of special personnel, § 16-3-212.

16-3-807. Tennessee judicial information system fund.

  1. The state treasurer is authorized and directed to establish within the general fund the Tennessee judicial information system fund, as a restricted revolving account in the state treasury.
  2. The source of funding for this account shall be judicial branch appropriations made in the general appropriations act and unexpended funds carried forward in accordance with subsection (d).
  3. The funds for the Tennessee judicial information system established by this section may be invested by the state treasurer pursuant to policy guidelines, established by resolution of the funding board, created by § 9-9-101. The funding board shall establish the policy guidelines for the investment of the Tennessee judicial information system fund in a manner that is lawful for investment of state funds. All interest or other earnings shall be added to the corpus of the fund and shall remain a part of the fund.
  4. Any unencumbered or unexpended balance of this account at the end of the fiscal year shall not revert to the general fund but shall be carried forward until expended in accordance with this section.
  5. The balance of the fund shall be used for the acquisition of equipment, software, supplies, personnel, services and other costs incidental to the acquisition, development, operation and administration of information services, telecommunications, systems, software, supplies and equipment, including the payment of principal and interest on items paid in installments.

Acts 1994, ch. 1005, § 5.

16-3-808. Funds for civil legal representation of indigents.

  1. The state treasurer is authorized and directed to establish within the general fund a fund known as the civil legal representation of indigents fund.
  2. The source of funding for this fund shall be the revenue derived from the litigation tax levied pursuant to § 67-4-602(g). The revenue shall be collected in accordance with § 67-4-603, deposited to the civil legal representation of indigents fund as provided by law, and invested for the benefit of the fund pursuant to § 9-4-603. Moneys in the fund shall not revert to the general fund of the state, but shall remain available and are appropriated exclusively for providing legal representation of poor persons in civil matters.
  3. Moneys in the civil legal representation of indigents fund shall be annually allocated and expended to provide legal representation to poor persons in the state in civil matters in the manner determined by the supreme court, including in accordance with any rules and policies adopted by the supreme court for such purpose; provided, that no moneys allocated from this fund shall be expended for class-action lawsuits. The supreme court may designate not-for-profit organizations that ordinarily render or finance legal services to poor persons in civil matters to receive or administer the distribution of allocated funds. The supreme court shall make a conscious effort in the allocation of funds and in the adoption of any implementing rules and policies to cause the moneys in the civil legal representation of indigents fund to be expended for the benefit of indigent clients in all ninety-five (95) counties of the state on a poverty population basis.
  4. The administrative office of the courts shall appoint a five-member advisory panel to facilitate communication and joint activities among grantees of the civil legal representation of indigents fund. The administrative office of the courts shall appoint panel members as follows:
    1. One (1) member shall be appointed from lists of nominees submitted by bar associations whose membership primarily consists of minority attorneys;
    2. One (1) member shall be appointed from a list of nominees submitted by the Tennessee Bar Association;
    3. One (1) member shall be appointed from a list of nominees submitted by the Tennessee Trial Lawyers Association;
    4. One (1) member shall be appointed from a list of nominees submitted by the Tennessee conference on social welfare; and
    5. One (1) member shall be appointed from a list of nominees submitted by the state court clerks conference.

Acts 1995, ch. 550, § 2; 1999, ch. 502, § 3.

Cross-References. Tennessee voluntary fund for indigent civil representation, § 16-3-821.

16-3-809. State law libraries — Control and supervision — Powers — Expenditures.

  1. The administrative office of the courts shall have control and supervision of the existing state law libraries at Nashville, Knoxville, and Jackson. The office's powers include, but are not limited to, the following:
    1. The power to employ necessary personnel, either full or part time, and to fix their compensation;
    2. The power to purchase or otherwise acquire books, furniture, supplies, and all other necessary equipment, including the power to dispose of by sale, exchange, gift or otherwise, books and equipment, whenever in the judgment of the office it is deemed advisable;
    3. The power to make and enforce all necessary rules for the management and operation of the libraries; and
    4. The power to exchange the Tennessee Reports, the Tennessee Appeals Reports, Acts, and codes for the reports, acts, and codes of other jurisdictions, and the Tennessee Reports, the Tennessee Appeals Reports, Acts, and codes available for exchange under present and future laws shall be at the disposal of the office for such purpose.
  2. All expenditures made by the office pursuant to this section shall be within the limits of the amounts appropriated by the general assembly; provided, that the office has the authority to allocate amounts necessary for the operation and maintenance of each library among the libraries as it deems to be in the best interest of each library, but within the limits of the entire appropriation.

Acts 2016, ch. 619, § 3.

Compiler's Notes. Former § 16-3-809 (Acts 1998, ch. 686, § 1; 2012, ch. 578, § 2; terminated by Acts 2014, ch. 499, § 2, effective February 28, 2014) concerned the judicial information system advisory committee.

Effective Dates. Acts 2016, ch. 619, § 6. March 22, 2016.

16-3-810. Dismissal of defendant upon completion of diversion program—Creation of form.

The administrative office of the courts, in consultation with the Tennessee bureau of investigation and the Tennessee court clerks association, shall devise a standard form, or revise the existing uniform judgment document promulgated pursuant to Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 17, for use by judges when ordering the dismissal of charges against a defendant following the successful completion of a diversion program under title 40, chapter 15 or § 40-35-313, or the expunction of a defendant's public records following the dismissal of charges against the defendant. The suggested order shall include a place for all information the courts are required to send to the Tennessee bureau of investigation pursuant to §§ 40-15-105(e), 40-32-101(d) and 40-35-313(c) for entry into the bureau's expunged criminal offender and pretrial diversion database. Upon completion of the design of the form or revised uniform judgment document, the administrative office of the courts shall recommend to the supreme court that it promulgate a rule requiring the use of the form or revised uniform judgment document for the purposes provided in this section.

Acts 1998, ch. 1099, § 12.

16-3-811. [Repealed.]

Acts 1999, ch. 486, § 2; 2013, ch. 236, § 32; repealed by Acts 2014, ch. 501, § 2, effective February 28, 2014.

Compiler's Notes. Former § 16-3-811 concerned the Tennessee court information system steering committee.

Acts 2014, ch. 501, § 3 provided that notwithstanding § 4-29-112 or any other law to the contrary, the Tennessee court information system steering committee, created by § 16-3-811, shall terminate and shall cease to exist upon February 28, 2014.

16-3-812. Providing information regarding case disposition, compliance with reporting information and reports made by AOC regarding auditing compliance and accuracy of required reports.

  1. The administrative office of the courts (AOC) shall be responsible for making available to the Tennessee bureau of investigation in a mutually agreeable form all information the AOC receives from the various courts regarding disposition of cases.
  2. The AOC shall be responsible for making available, upon request, to the Tennessee bureau of investigation in a mutually agreeable form all information the AOC receives from the various courts regarding compliance with the reporting requirements of §§ 16-10-213, 16-11-206, 16-15-303, 16-16-120 and reports made by the AOC pursuant to § 16-1-117(a)(6)(B) for purposes of auditing compliance and accuracy of the required reports.

Acts 1999, ch. 495, § 1; 2013, ch. 300, § 2.

Amendments. The 2013 amendment added (b).

Effective Dates. Acts 2013, ch. 300, § 11. July 1, 2013.

16-3-813. Credentialed court interpreter.

  1. Any person seeking to become a credentialed court interpreter for spoken foreign languages pursuant to any rules that may be promulgated by the supreme court shall be required to supply a fingerprint sample and submit to a criminal history records check conducted by the Tennessee bureau of investigation pursuant to § 38-6-109, the federal bureau of investigation, other law enforcement agency or any other legally authorized entity. In addition to the fee required by § 38-6-109, the sheriff or any other law enforcement agency may assess a fee of up to ten dollars ($10.00) for costs incurred in complying with this section. Any fees assessed in the criminal background records check process are the responsibility of the person seeking to be credentialed as a court interpreter of spoken foreign languages.
  2. The administrative office of the courts (AOC) shall create and maintain a registry of those persons credentialed as court interpreters of spoken foreign languages and shall post the registry on the web site maintained by the AOC.

Acts 2002, ch. 494, § 1; 2004, ch. 755, § 1.

16-3-814. Integrated Criminal Justice Act of 2006.

Sections 16-3-814 — 16-3-820 shall be known and may be cited as the “Integrated Criminal Justice Act of 2006.”

Acts 2006, ch. 917, § 1.

16-3-815. Creation of the integrated criminal justice steering committee — Purpose.

There is created an integrated criminal justice steering committee, which shall be administratively attached to the administrative office of the courts. The purpose of the integrated criminal justice steering committee is to provide the governmental and technical information systems infrastructure necessary for accomplishing state and local government public safety and justice functions in the most effective manner, by appropriately and efficiently sharing criminal justice and juvenile justice information among law enforcement agencies, judicial agencies, corrections agencies, executive agencies and political subdivisions.

Acts 2006, ch. 917, § 1; 2013, ch. 97, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. The integrated criminal justice steering committee, created by this section, terminates June 30, 2026. See §§ 4-29-112, 4-29-247.

Amendments. The 2013 amendment deleted “of the state” from the end of the last sentence.

Effective Dates. Acts 2013, ch. 97, § 2. April 8, 2013.

16-3-816. Duties of the committee.

It is the duty of the integrated criminal justice steering committee to facilitate the development of cost-effective, integrated justice information systems that maximize standardization of information and communications technology across the state's justice and justice-affiliated agencies. It is further the duty of the committee to provide the leadership, strategy, mission, vision, goals, decision-making structure and accountability processes for the integrated criminal justice system.

Acts 2006, ch. 917, § 1.

16-3-817. Goals of the integrated criminal justice system.

Any integrated criminal justice system developed through the facilitation of the committee shall:

  1. Increase public safety and improve national security;
  2. Minimize the threat and risk of injury to specific individuals;
  3. Minimize the threat and risk of injury to law enforcement and other first responder personnel;
  4. Minimize the threat and risk of damage to real or personal property;
  5. Protect individual civil rights, civil liberties, privacy rights and other protected interests;
  6. Protect the integrity of the criminal investigatory, criminal intelligence and justice system processes and information;
  7. Minimize reluctance of individuals or groups to use or cooperate with the justice system;
  8. Support the role of the justice system in society;
  9. Promote governmental legitimacy and accountability;
  10. Not unduly burden the ongoing business of the justice system; and
  11. Make the most effective use of public resources allocated to justice agencies.

Acts 2006, ch. 917, § 1.

16-3-818. Membership of steering committee — Advisory committee appointments — Policies and procedures.

  1. The membership of the steering committee shall consist of:
    1. Director of the office of criminal justice programs or a designee;
    2. President of the Tennessee sheriffs association or a designee;
    3. President of the Tennessee association of chiefs of police or a designee;
    4. Executive director of the Tennessee district attorneys general conference or a designee;
    5. Executive director of the Tennessee district public defenders conference or a designee;
    6. Commissioner of correction or a designee;
    7. Chair of the board of parole or a designee;
    8. President of the Tennessee court clerks association or a designee;
    9. One (1) member of each body of the general assembly to be appointed by the respective speakers of the house of representatives and the senate;
    10. Attorney general and reporter or a designee;
    11. Tennessee chief information officer or a designee;
    12. Director of the Tennessee bureau of investigation or a designee;
    13. Commissioner of safety or a designee;
    14. Director of the Tennessee office of homeland security or a designee;
    15. Director of the administrative office of the courts or a designee;
    16. Chief justice of the Tennessee supreme court or a designee;
    17. Deputy commissioner of the juvenile justice division of the department of children’s services or a designee;
    18. Director of the Tennessee emergency management agency or a designee; and
    19. Director of the governor’s highway safety office or a designee.
  2. The steering committee may appoint advisory council members from time to time. Advisory members may represent entities, including, but not limited to:
    1. Municipal judges conference;
    2. Tennessee bar association;
    3. Tennessee county services association;
    4. Governor’s office and lay members appointed by the governor;
    5. Commission on children and youth;
    6. Council of juvenile and family court judges;
    7. Tennessee emergency communications division;
    8. Department of revenue;
    9. Department of commerce and insurance;
    10. Tennessee fireman’s association; and
    11. Alcoholic beverage commission.
  3. The steering committee may establish policies and procedures relative to membership and operations of the steering committee on issues, including, but not limited to, election and terms of officers, voting privileges, establishment of subcommittees, cessation of membership on the steering committee and other operational issues as may be necessary to the efficient and effective operation of the steering committee.

Acts 2006, ch. 917, § 1.

16-3-819. Compensation.

The members of the steering committee, advisory council and subcommittees shall serve without compensation, but shall be eligible for  reimbursement for travel expenses in accordance with the provisions of the comprehensive travel regulations as promulgated by the department of finance and administration and approved by the attorney general and reporter.

Acts 2006, ch. 917, § 1.

16-3-820. Hiring of personnel to manage integrated criminal justice projects.

The administrative office of the courts (AOC) shall be empowered to hire personnel to manage integrated criminal justice projects and to be responsible for day-to-day operations. In making the personnel decisions, the director of the AOC shall consult with the steering committee.

Acts 2006, ch. 917, § 1.

16-3-821. Tennessee voluntary fund for indigent civil representation.

  1. This section shall be known and may be cited as the “Tennessee voluntary fund for indigent civil representation.”
    1. There is established in the state treasury a separate account known as the Tennessee voluntary fund for indigent civil representation. It is the intent of the general assembly that this fund be used to provide supplemental funding for the provision of civil legal representation for indigents. Distribution of the fund as provided in this section shall be administered by the administrative office of the courts (AOC).
    2. Contributions to the Tennessee voluntary fund for indigent civil representation are voluntary and this section shall not be construed to require an appropriation from the general fund to establish, maintain, operate, or disburse money from the fund, if done in accordance with this section.
  2. The Tennessee voluntary fund for indigent civil representation is authorized to receive contributions from the following sources:
    1. The unpaid residuals from settlements or awards in class action litigation in both state and federal courts; provided, that the litigation has been certified as a class action under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 23 or Rule 23 of the federal rules of civil procedure;
    2. Awards from other actions in a state or federal court, when specifically designated by the judges in those actions;
    3. Monetary settlements, whether through mediation, arbitration or otherwise, when so designated by a party authorized to do so;
    4. Gifts, contributions, bequests, donations, devises and grants from any legal and appropriate source to effectuate the purpose of the fund. If these contributions to the fund are not in the form of money or other negotiable instrument, any income, rents or proceeds generated from the items contributed shall be deposited into the fund; and
    5. Any other legitimate funding source that is now available or may in the future become available.
  3. Amounts remaining in the fund at the end of the fiscal year shall not revert to the general fund, but shall remain available for use as provided in this section. Moneys in the fund shall be invested by the state treasurer pursuant to title 9, chapter 4, part 6, for the sole benefit of the fund.
  4. Any cost associated with the Tennessee voluntary fund for indigent civil representation shall be paid for by the proceeds of this fund.
  5. When the corpus of the Tennessee voluntary fund for indigent civil representation reaches or exceeds one million dollars ($1,000,000), the interest on the corpus shall be distributed in accordance with § 67-4-806(2).
    1. The AOC and the Tennessee Alliance for Legal Services may make the judiciary and legal profession aware of and promote the existence and purpose of this fund.
    2. The Tennessee Alliance for Legal Services may also make any materials explaining and promoting the fund available to charitable or philanthropic foundations and other groups or persons who might be interested in contributing to the fund.
  6. Nothing in this section shall be construed to repeal or affect the operation of the civil legal representation of indigents fund created in § 16-3-808. It is the intent of the general assembly that the two (2) funds remain distinct and separate methods to achieve the same goal of providing quality legal representation to indigents in civil actions.

Acts 2006, ch. 589, § 1.

Part 9
Private Probation Services Council

16-3-901. Creation.

There is created the private probation services council.

Acts 1998, ch. 1067, § 2.

Compiler's Notes. The private probation services council, created by this section, terminates June 30, 2021. See §§ 4-29-112, 4-29-242.

16-3-902. Purpose.

The purpose of the council is to ensure that uniform professional and contract standards are practiced and maintained by private corporations, enterprises and entities engaged in rendering general misdemeanor probation supervision, counseling and collection services to the courts.

Acts 1998, ch. 1067, § 3.

16-3-903. Part definitions.

As used in this part, unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “Council” means the private probation services council;
  2. “Governing authority” means the elected body of any county, municipality or metropolitan government with statutory power to enter into written contracts with corporations, enterprises or entities to provide public services; and
  3. “Private entity” means a privately owned and operated corporation, enterprise or entity that contracts to provide general probation supervision, counseling or collection services for persons convicted of a misdemeanor and placed on probation.

Acts 1998, ch. 1067, § 4.

16-3-904. Attachment to appropriate state entity.

The commissioner of finance and administration shall attach the council to the appropriate state entity for administrative purposes.

Acts 1998, ch. 1067, § 5.

16-3-905. Membership.

  1. The council shall consist of the following seven (7) voting members:
    1. Four (4) members who shall be appointed to serve for four-year terms as follows:
      1. One (1) criminal court judge who shall be appointed by the president of the Tennessee judicial conference, representing a judicial district within which one (1) or more private entities provide probation services; and
      2. Three (3) general sessions court judges who shall be appointed by the president of the Tennessee general sessions judges conference, representing counties within which one (1) or more private entities provide probation services; and
    2. Three (3) members who shall be appointed by the governor to serve four-year terms as follows:
      1. One (1) publicly employed probation officer;
      2. One (1) private probation officer or individual with expertise in private probation service by virtue of training or employment; and
      3. One (1) county commissioner.
  2. Subsequent vacancies on the council shall be filled in the same manner as initially filled.

Acts 1998, ch. 1067, § 6; 2007, ch. 149, § 1.

16-3-906. Officers.

The council shall annually elect from its membership a chair, vice chair and other officers as deemed expedient.

Acts 1998, ch. 1067, § 7.

16-3-907. Staff.

The state entity to which the council is attached for administrative purposes shall provide staff services for the council.

Acts 1998, ch. 1067, § 8.

16-3-908. Meetings.

The council shall meet at such times and places as necessary and convenient.

Acts 1998, ch. 1067, § 9; 2012, ch. 986, § 11.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2012, ch. 986, § 48 provided that all rules, regulations, orders, and decisions heretofore issued or promulgated by any of the boards or commissions, which the act terminates or merges into another board or commission, shall remain in full force and effect. In the case of the boards or commissions that are merged with another board or commission by the act, all final rules, regulations, orders, and decisions together with any matters that are pending on October 1, 2012, shall hereafter be administered, enforced, modified, or rescinded in accordance with the law applicable to the continuing board or commission.

Amendments. The 2012 amendment deleted “at least once each quarter and” following “shall meet”.

Effective Dates. Acts 2012, ch. 986, § 49. October 1, 2012.

16-3-909. Duties of council — Fingerprint sample and criminal history records check — Reinstatement of license — Promulgation of rules and regulations.

  1. The purpose of the council is to ensure that uniform professional and contract standards are practiced and maintained by private corporations, enterprises and entities rendering general misdemeanor probation supervision, counseling and collection services to the courts. To such end, the council shall:
    1. Provide oversight of private entities;
    2. Promulgate uniform professional standards and uniform contract standards for private entities;
    3. Establish forty (40) hours of orientation for new private probation officers and eight (8) hours of annual continuing education;
    4. Promulgate rules and regulations regarding noncompliance with the uniform professional standards and uniform contract standards;
    5. Promulgate rules and regulations requiring periodic registration of all private entities; and
    6. Publish an annual summary report.
    7. [Deleted by 2019 amendment.]
  2. The council:
    1. May reinstate a license upon the payment of a renewal fee, as set by the council; and
    2. Shall establish a late renewal fee, to be equal to twenty-five percent (25%) of the registration fee.
  3. All rules and regulations promulgated pursuant to subsection (a) shall be promulgated in accordance with the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, compiled in title 4, chapter 5.
    1. All private probation officers to be employed by entities providing private probation services pursuant to this part shall:
      1. Be required to supply a fingerprint sample and submit to a criminal history records check to be conducted by the Tennessee bureau of investigation (TBI) and the federal bureau of investigation (FBI) or other vendor contracted for the same purposes prior to being employed with such entities; and
      2. Agree that the TBI may send to the council information indicating the results of the criminal history records check. The results will indicate whether the applicant has a criminal conviction that would result in a private probation officer being denied employment by such entities.
    2. The applicant shall pay any reasonable costs incurred by the TBI or FBI, or both, in conducting an investigation of an applicant for employment as a private probation officer. In lieu of additional criminal history records checks for subsequent applications for employment, the applicant may submit copies of the applicant's initial criminal history records check documentation and shall not be required to pay any additional costs.

Acts 1998, ch. 1067, § 10; 2019, ch. 369, §§ 3-5.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment substituted “eight (8) hours” for “twenty (20) hours” in (a)(3); deleted former (a)(7), which read: “Promulgate rules and regulations requiring criminal records checks of all private probation officers.”; and added (b) and (d).

Effective Dates. Acts 2019, ch. 369, § 6. May 10, 2019.

16-3-910. Powers of the council.

The council has the power:

  1. To establish fees sufficient to pay the annual expenses of the council; and
  2. In a lawful proceeding under the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, compiled in title 4, chapter 5, assess civil penalties, in accordance with rules adopted pursuant to the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, for violations of statutes, rules or orders enforceable by the council.

Acts 2004, ch. 665, § 1.

16-3-911. Probation contracts with private entities.

No public officer or employee of a governing authority who is involved in making or administering a contract with a private entity that is governed by the council and that provides probation services may derive any direct benefit from the contract.

Acts 2014, ch. 827, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2014, ch. 827, § 2 provided that the act, which enacted this section, shall apply to all contracts entered into or renewed on or after April 28, 2014.

Pursuant to Article III, Section 18 of the Constitution of Tennessee, Acts 2014, ch. 827 took effect on April 28, 2014.

Effective Dates. Acts 2014, ch. 827, § 2. April 28, 2014. [See the Compiler’s Notes.]

Part 10
Automated Court System Hardware Replacement Loan Fund

16-3-1001. Establishment of special revolving loan fund — Purpose — Rules and regulations — Funding.

    1. There is established within the general fund a special revolving loan fund to be known as the automated court system hardware replacement loan fund, referred to in this part as the “fund”. The fund is established for the purpose of providing interest-free funding for the replacement of computer hardware associated with automated court systems that have been implemented by courts of the state.
    2. The department of finance and administration shall administer the fund and shall adopt rules and regulations for the administration.
    3. All interest and earnings of the fund shall remain a part of the fund.
    4. No part of the fund shall revert to the general fund at the end of any fiscal year, but shall remain a part of the fund available for expenditure in accordance with this part.
    5. The department shall deposit into the fund all receipts from the repayment of loans made pursuant to this part.
    6. Nothing in this part shall be construed to exclude or prevent future appropriations to the fund.
  1. All counties in which any court has implemented the Tennessee court information system (TnCIS), or a court automation system determined by the administrative office of the courts (AOC) to be functionally equivalent, are eligible to receive loans from the fund to purchase necessary computer hardware components in accordance with a hardware replacement schedule approved and monitored by the administrative office of the courts. No interest expense shall be passed on to the county unless the state issues bonds to capitalize all or a portion of the fund. In such case, a reasonable cost of issuance may be passed on to the loan recipients.
  2. When a county requests the department to have the state finance the acquisition of replacement hardware for an automated court system, the affected clerk, the governing body of the county, and the department shall enter into an agreement to be known as the automated court system hardware replacement loan agreement, referred to in this part as the “agreement.” The comptroller of the treasury must approve any deviations from the requirements outlined in the agreement. The agreement is subject to the following requirements:
    1. The original term of the loan shall be for a period of four (4) years. Annual installment payments to the fund shall begin the same year as funds are borrowed. The department shall establish an annual payment due date of June 1. Notice of the loan agreement, including the annual payment schedule, shall be sent to the comptroller of the treasury;
    2. All computer hardware purchased by a county under the agreement shall be acquired from current state contracts;
    3. The agreement may contain any other reasonable provisions deemed necessary and desirable by the department, the AOC, the comptroller of the treasury, the clerk for whom the replacement hardware is being purchased or the governing body of the county;
    4. If a county fails or neglects to pay any of the annual payments prescribed, the commissioner of finance and administration shall retain the sum necessary for the payment out of any state funds distributable to the county in which the state court resides. No statutory requirement that any distributable, state collected, locally shared funds shall be used exclusively for a designated purpose shall be construed as preventing the commissioner from withholding the funds; and
    5. The state will maintain a lien on any computer hardware purchased with moneys borrowed from the fund until the terms and conditions of the agreement have been satisfied.

Acts 2001, ch. 451, § 2.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2001, ch. 451, § 3 provided that, notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, all of the first year's funding of the act shall be from non-state sources and may be from non-state sources, in whole or in part, in subsequent years.

Chapter 4
Court of Appeals

16-4-101. Establishment.

There shall be an appellate court composed of twelve (12) judges, styled the court of appeals.

Acts 1925, ch. 100, § 1; Shan. Supp., § 6325a1; mod. Code 1932, § 10606; Acts 1978, ch. 836, § 1; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-401.

Cross-References. Power of general assembly to create courts, Tenn. Const., art. VI, § 1.

Law Reviews.

A Simplified System of Appellate Procedure, 17 Tenn. L. Rev. 651.

Appellate Court Voting Rights, 49 Vand. L. Rev. 997 (1996).

Justiciability in Tennessee, Part Three: Timing (Barbara Kritchevsky), 16 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 177 (1986).

The Tennessee Court of Appeals: How Often It Corrects the Trial Courts — and Why, 68 Tenn. L. Rev. 557 (2001).

Attorney General Opinions. Court of appeals precedent, OAG 07-098 (7/3/07).

Comparative Legislation. Appeals courts:

Ala.  Code § 12-3-1 et seq.

Ark.  Code § 16-12-101 et seq.

Ga. O.C.G.A. § 15-3-1 et seq.

Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 22A.010 et seq.

Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 477.040, 477.160 et seq.

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-16 et seq.; § 7A-26 et seq.

Va. Code § 17-116.01 et seq.

Cited: In re Scalf's Adoption, 176 Tenn. 581, 144 S.W.2d 772, 1940 Tenn. LEXIS 104 (1940); In re T.B.H., — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 239 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 20, 2007).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Purpose of Creation of Court.

The purpose of the creation of an intermediate appellate court was to lighten the labors of the supreme court by giving to the latter the benefit of a finding of facts, in a proper case, by the court of appeals on all material issues in equity cases. This purpose is demonstrated by the legislative history throughout 30 years. Hibbett v. Pruitt, 162 Tenn. 285, 36 S.W.2d 897, 1930 Tenn. LEXIS 89 (1931).

Trial court erred in holding that intermediate appellate judges were subject to retention only by the qualified voters of the grand division in which the judge resided because the General Assembly intend to create one court of appeals and not three. Hooker v. Haslam, 382 S.W.3d 358, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 511 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 27, 2012).

2. Panels of the Court.

Fact that plaintiff's appeal was decided by a tribunal comprised of members of the court from the middle section was not unusual nor improper as the Court of Appeals of Tennessee was one court, a single court, not three courts; the court sat in sections concurrently as ordered by the presiding judge for the purpose of hearing and determining cases before it and for such length of time as may, in the judgment of the court, be required for the dispatch of the business before the court. Further, members of the court routinely heard cases from grand divisions other than their own and the panels (the three judges assigned to hear the cases) may have been comprised of members from more than one grand division, and panels comprised solely from one section often heard cases arising from another section of the court. Houston v. Scott, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 33 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 17, 2012), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 386 (Tenn. May 23, 2012).

Collateral References. 21 C.J.S. Courts § 458.

Courts 42.

16-4-102. Election and qualifications of judges — Oaths.

  1. The court of appeals shall be composed of twelve (12) judges, of whom no more than four (4) shall be residents of the same grand division of the state. Immediately preceding appointment, each judge shall be at least thirty (30) years of age, shall have been a resident of the state for at least five (5) consecutive years, shall have been a resident of the grand division from which the judge is appointed for at least one (1) year, and shall be licensed to practice law in this state. For purposes of this subsection (a), “resident” has the same meaning as defined in § 2-1-104.
  2. The oaths of office of the judges of the court of appeals shall be filed and entered on the minutes of the court in the particular grand division from which the judge has been appointed and confirmed or subsequently elected. The oath shall likewise be filed and entered on the records in the office of the secretary of state at Nashville.
  3. The judges of the court of appeals shall be elected by the qualified voters of the state in a statewide retention election conducted in accordance with title 17, chapter 4, part 1. Vacancies on the court of appeals shall be filled by the governor in accordance with title 17, chapter 4, part 1.

Acts 1925, ch. 100, § 3; Shan. Supp., § 6325a3; mod. Code 1932, § 10607; Acts 1978, ch. 836, § 2; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-402; Acts 2016, ch. 528, § 4.

Compiler's Notes. For the Preamble to the act concerning an orderly procedure for the appointment, confirmation, and retention of appellate court judges as required by Tennessee Constitution, Article VI, Section 3, please refer to Acts 2016, ch. 528.

Amendments. The 2016 amendment rewrote the section which read: “At the regular judicial election held every eight (8) years, there shall be elected twelve (12) judges of the court of appeals, of whom not more than four (4) shall reside in one (1) grand division of the state, and each of whom shall be not less than thirty (30) years of age, and shall have been a resident of the state five (5) years before qualification; and be learned in the law.”

Effective Dates. Acts 2016, ch. 528, § 23. January 28, 2016.

Cross-References. Filling of vacancy in office, § 8-48-109.

Grand divisions, title 4, ch. 1, part 2.

Impeachment of judges or chancellors, title 8, ch. 46.

Vacancies in office, § 17-1-301.

Law Reviews.

The Tennessee Court System — Court of Appeals (Frederic S. Le Clercq), 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 219.

Attorney General Opinions. Factors used to determine residency status, OAG 95-019 (3/27/95).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Residency Requirements.

Statutes creating the intermediate courts of appeal distinguish between a residency requirement for a candidate for office and residence of voters for purposes of voting in exactly the same way as does the Constitution in establishing the Supreme Court; in both instances, a judicial candidate can be required to live in a certain geographic area as a qualification for office, but still be elected statewide without regard to geographic area in which the qualified voters reside. Hooker v. Haslam, 437 S.W.3d 409, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 934 (Tenn. Apr. 23, 2014).

Since judges of intermediate appellate courts are not assigned to any district or circuit, voting by district or circuit is not required, and this is in no way changed by the requirement that no more than four of the 12 judges on each intermediate appellate court may reside in any one of three grand divisions of Tennessee; a district is a political subdivision, and while a district usually connotes a subunit of a county and may be subject to reconfiguration, a grand division refers to one of three permanently defined, large umbrella units, each composed of many counties and districts, and a grand division is not a district within the meaning of the Constitution. Hooker v. Haslam, 437 S.W.3d 409, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 934 (Tenn. Apr. 23, 2014).

Even if a grand division were deemed to be a district, the statutory limitation on residence by grand division would still be irrelevant, since the judges of the intermediate appellate courts are not assigned to any grand division; the statutory residence requirement by grand division is merely a limiting qualification for the office of intermediate appellate judge, and it is not a limitation on voting. Hooker v. Haslam, 437 S.W.3d 409, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 934 (Tenn. Apr. 23, 2014).

Collateral References. Judges 3, 4.

16-4-103. Tenure and compensation of judges.

The tenure of office is eight (8) years, and the judges shall receive compensation as fixed in § 8-23-103.

Acts 1925, ch. 100, § 3; Shan. Supp., § 6325a3; mod. Code 1932, § 10608; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-403.

16-4-104. Organizational meetings — Rules.

At the first meeting of the court after the regular judicial election, the members of the court shall choose the presiding judge of the court of appeals and adopt rules of practice; and the presiding judge shall, on the request of a majority of the members, call meetings thereafter for the purpose of reconsidering or revising the rules.

Acts 1925, ch. 100, § 7; Shan. Supp., § 6325a7; Code 1932, § 10615; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-404.

Rule Reference. This section is referred to in the Internal Operating Procedures of the Tennessee Court of Appeals.

16-4-105. Presiding judges.

The entire court shall have one (1) presiding judge, chosen by the members of the court, and, when sitting in sections, each section shall at all times have a presiding judge to be chosen by its members.

Acts 1925, ch. 100, § 6; Shan. Supp., § 6325a6; Code 1932, § 10614; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-405.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Retention.

Trial court erred in holding that intermediate appellate judges were subject to retention only by the qualified voters of the grand division in which the judge resided because the General Assembly intend to create one court of appeals and not three. Hooker v. Haslam, 382 S.W.3d 358, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 511 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 27, 2012).

16-4-106. Clerks and marshals.

The clerks and marshals of the supreme court shall also be the clerks and marshals of the court of appeals, and shall perform the same duties and be subject to the same liabilities and receive the same compensation as are prescribed by law.

Acts 1925, ch. 100, § 15; Shan. Supp., § 6325a15; Code 1932, § 10628; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-406.

Cross-References. Law clerks, § 8-23-109.

Supreme court clerks, title 18, ch. 3.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 6 Tenn. Juris., Clerks of Court, § 12.

16-4-107. Expenses.

The expenses of the court of appeals shall be paid out of the state treasury, upon the warrant of the commissioner of finance and administration.

Acts 1925, ch. 100, § 15; Shan. Supp., § 6325a15; mod. Code 1932, §§ 153, 10628; mod. C. Supp. 1950, § 153; modified; impl. am. Acts 1959, ch. 9, § 3; impl. am. Acts 1961, ch. 97, § 3; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-407.

16-4-108. Jurisdiction — Venue.

    1. The jurisdiction of the court of appeals is appellate only, and extends to all civil cases except workers' compensation cases and appeals pursuant to § 37-10-304(g).
    2. All cases within the jurisdiction conferred on the court of appeals shall, for purposes of review, be taken directly to the court of appeals in the division within which the case arose, the eastern division to include Hamilton County and the western division to include Shelby County. As to all other cases, the exclusive right of removal and review is in the supreme court. Any case removed by mistake to the wrong court shall by that court be transferred to the court having jurisdiction of the case, direct.
  1. The court of appeals also has appellate jurisdiction over civil or criminal contempt arising out of a civil matter.

Acts 1925, ch. 100, § 10; Shan. Supp., § 6325a10; Code 1932, § 10618; Acts 1951, ch. 9, § 1; 1951, ch. 66, § 1; 1977, ch. 390, § 1; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-408; Acts 1989, ch. 40, § 3; 1989, ch. 147, § 2; 1992, ch. 952, § 2.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 1989, ch. 40, § 4 provided that any action pending on July 1, 1989, shall be maintained under law prior to the 1989 amendment by that act until its final disposition.

Acts 1989, ch. 147, § 12 provided that any and all matters filed or pending as of July 1, 1989, shall be disposed of under prior law.

Acts 1992, ch. 952, § 15 provided that the amendments by that act apply to all matters as to which a notice of appeal is filed from and after May 1, 1992.

Cross-References. Appeals from Marion County courts, § 16-2-101.

Attorney disciplinary proceedings, appeal from circuit or chancery court direct to Supreme Court, Tenn. R. Sup. Ct. 9, § 1.3.

Rule Reference. This section is referred to in Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9, § 1.3.

Textbooks. Gibson's Suits in Chancery (7th ed., Inman), §§ 664, 699.

Pritchard on Wills and Administration of Estates (4th ed., Phillips and Robinson), §§ 778, 845.

Tennessee Jurisprudence, 2 Tenn. Juris., Appeal and Error, §§ 15-17, 28, 30, 82, 116; 3 Tenn. Juris., Attorney and Client, § 25; 10 Tenn. Juris., Ejectment, § 30; 17 Tenn. Juris., Jurisdiction, §§ 19, 20; 18 Tenn. Juris., Mandamus, § 21.

Law Reviews.

A Survey of Civil Procedure in Tennessee— 1977, VII. Appellate Review of the Disposition (John L. Sobieski, Jr.), 46 Tenn. L. Rev. 366.

Attorney General Opinions. Appeals from grant or denial of order of protection, OAG 98-043 (2/17/98).

Cited: Ford Motor Co. v. Pace, 206 Tenn. 559, 335 S.W.2d 360, 1960 Tenn. LEXIS 394, 1960 Tenn. LEXIS 395 (1960); Paris v. Paris-Henry County Public Utility Dist., 207 Tenn. 388, 340 S.W.2d 885, 1960 Tenn. LEXIS 469 (1960); In re Estate of Deskins, 214 Tenn. 608, 381 S.W.2d 921, 1964 Tenn. LEXIS 512 (1964); Dickson v. Houston, 221 Tenn. 138, 425 S.W.2d 586, 1968 Tenn. LEXIS 453 (1968); Greer v. American Sec. Ins. Co., 223 Tenn. 390, 445 S.W.2d 904, 1969 Tenn. LEXIS 424 (1969); State ex rel. Pemberton v. Wilson, 481 S.W.2d 760, 1972 Tenn. LEXIS 348 (Tenn. 1972); Ohio Casualty Ins. Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 493 S.W.2d 465, 1973 Tenn. LEXIS 504 (Tenn. 1973); Pidgeon-Thomas Iron Co. v. Garner, 495 S.W.2d 826, 1973 Tenn. LEXIS 496 (Tenn. 1973); Rhodes v. Pioneer Parking Lot, Inc., 501 S.W.2d 569, 1973 Tenn. LEXIS 535 (Tenn. 1973); State v. Jackson, 503 S.W.2d 185, 1973 Tenn. LEXIS 440 (Tenn. 1973); Jackson v. Chambers, 510 S.W.2d 74, 1974 Tenn. LEXIS 501 (Tenn. 1974); State ex rel. Wood v. Memphis, 510 S.W.2d 889, 1974 Tenn. LEXIS 510 (Tenn. 1974); State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 511 S.W.2d 464, 1974 Tenn. LEXIS 495 (Tenn. 1974); Gentry v. Davis, 512 S.W.2d 4, 1974 Tenn. LEXIS 475 (Tenn. 1974); Metropolitan Government of Nashville & Davidson County v. Reynolds, 512 S.W.2d 6, 1974 Tenn. LEXIS 476 (Tenn. 1974); Moore v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 512 S.W.2d 564, 1974 Tenn. LEXIS 489 (Tenn. 1974); Great American Ins. Co. v. Hartford Acci. & Indem. Co., 519 S.W.2d 579, 1975 Tenn. LEXIS 706 (Tenn. 1975); Davis v. Hinton, 519 S.W.2d 776, 1975 Tenn. LEXIS 711 (Tenn. 1975); Martin v. State, 519 S.W.2d 793, 1975 Tenn. LEXIS 715 (Tenn. 1975); Norman v. Tennessee State Board of Claims, 533 S.W.2d 719, 1975 Tenn. LEXIS 547 (Tenn. 1975); White v. Roden Electrical Supply Co., 536 S.W.2d 346, 1976 Tenn. LEXIS 630 (Tenn. 1976); Ezell v. Buhler, 557 S.W.2d 62, 1977 Tenn. LEXIS 668 (Tenn. 1977); Frye v. Crowell, 563 S.W.2d 788, 1978 Tenn. LEXIS 534 (Tenn. 1978); Metropolitan Development & Housing Agency v. Leech, 591 S.W.2d 427, 1979 Tenn. LEXIS 524 (Tenn. 1979); Union Planters Nat'l Bank v. Inman, 588 S.W.2d 757, 1979 Tenn. App. LEXIS 351 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1979); Mitchell v. Mitchell, 594 S.W.2d 699, 1980 Tenn. LEXIS 421 (Tenn. 1980); Doochin v. Rackley, 610 S.W.2d 715, 1981 Tenn. LEXIS 397 (Tenn. 1981); State v. Lawyer, 619 S.W.2d 153, 1981 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 357 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1981); State ex rel. Lockert v. Crowell, 631 S.W.2d 702, 1982 Tenn. LEXIS 398 (Tenn. 1982); Pickett v. Brown, 638 S.W.2d 369, 1982 Tenn. LEXIS 430 (Tenn. 1982); Ashe v. Leech, 653 S.W.2d 398, 1983 Tenn. LEXIS 676 (Tenn. 1983); Carter v. Olsen, 660 S.W.2d 483, 1983 Tenn. LEXIS 732 (Tenn. 1983); Farmer v. Board of Professional Responsibility of Supreme Court, 660 S.W.2d 490, 1983 Tenn. LEXIS 795 (Tenn. 1983); State ex rel. Shelby County Election Com. v. Shelby County Bd. of Comm'rs, 656 S.W.2d 9, 1983 Tenn. App. LEXIS 596 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983); Super Flea Market, Inc. v. Olsen, 677 S.W.2d 449, 1984 Tenn. LEXIS 941 (Tenn. 1984); State ex rel. Baugh v. Williamson County Hospital Trustees, 679 S.W.2d 934, 1984 Tenn. LEXIS 875 (Tenn. 1984); Cleveland Bank & Trust Co. v. Olsen, 682 S.W.2d 200, 1984 Tenn. LEXIS 904 (Tenn. 1984); State ex rel. SCA Chemical Services, Inc. v. Sanidas, 681 S.W.2d 557, 1984 Tenn. App. LEXIS 3429 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984); Gibson County Special School Dist. v. Palmer, 691 S.W.2d 544, 1985 Tenn. LEXIS 523 (Tenn. 1985); State v. Orr, 694 S.W.2d 297, 1985 Tenn. LEXIS 535 (Tenn. 1985); Foley v. Dayton Bank & Trust, 696 S.W.2d 356, 1985 Tenn. App. LEXIS 2778 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985); State, Dep't of Revenue v. Moore, 722 S.W.2d 367, 1986 Tenn. LEXIS 846 (Tenn. 1986); Tennessee Farmers' Cooperative v. State, 736 S.W.2d 87, 1987 Tenn. LEXIS 960 (Tenn. 1987); Sweeney v. State Dep't of Transp., 744 S.W.2d 905, 1987 Tenn. App. LEXIS 2853 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987); WRG Enterprises, Inc. v. Crowell, 758 S.W.2d 214, 1988 Tenn. LEXIS 176 (Tenn. 1988); Aluminum Co. of America v. Celauro, 762 S.W.2d 107, 1988 Tenn. LEXIS 198 (Tenn. 1988); Summers v. Thompson, 764 S.W.2d 182, 1988 Tenn. LEXIS 108 (Tenn. 1988); In re Estate of Powers, 767 S.W.2d 659, 1988 Tenn. App. LEXIS 756 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988); Richards Mfg. Co. v. Great American Ins. Co., 773 S.W.2d 916, 1986 Tenn. App. LEXIS 3433 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986); Freeman v. Burson, 802 S.W.2d 210, 1990 Tenn. LEXIS 337 (Tenn. 1990); Metropolitan Government of Nashville & Davidson County v. Tennessee State Bd. of Equalization, 817 S.W.2d 953, 1991 Tenn. LEXIS 342 (Tenn. 1991); Potts v. State, 833 S.W.2d 60, 1992 Tenn. LEXIS 424 (Tenn. 1992); Williams v. Williamson County Bd. of Educ., 890 S.W.2d 788, 1994 Tenn. App. LEXIS 461 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994); Stewart Title Guar. Co. v. FDIC, 936 S.W.2d 266, 1996 Tenn. App. LEXIS 532 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996); Williamson County Broad. Co. v. Intermedia Partners, 987 S.W.2d 550, 1998 Tenn. App. LEXIS 559 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998); Storey v. Nichols, 27 S.W.3d 886, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 218 (Tenn. 2000); Smith v. Harriman Util. Bd., 26 S.W.3d 879, 2000 Tenn. App. LEXIS 78 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000); Green v. Innovative Recovery Servs., Inc., 42 S.W.3d 917, 2000 Tenn. App. LEXIS 514 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000); Hodges v. Tennessee AG, 43 S.W.3d 918, 2000 Tenn. App. LEXIS 785 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000); State v. Gray, 46 S.W.3d 749, 2000 Tenn. App. LEXIS 677 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000); Tip's Package Store, Inc. v. Commercial Ins. Managers, Inc., 86 S.W.3d 543, 2001 Tenn. App. LEXIS 893 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001); Freeman v. Freeman, 147 S.W.3d 234, 2003 Tenn. App. LEXIS 660 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003); Moody v. Hutchison, 159 S.W.3d 15, 2004 Tenn. App. LEXIS 331 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004); Bell v. Todd, 206 S.W.3d 86, 2005 Tenn. App. LEXIS 583 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005); McCall v. Nat'l Health Corp., — S.W.3d —, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 989 (Tenn. Nov. 3, 2006); Linn v. Howard, — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 52 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 26, 2007); In re T.B.H., — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 239 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 20, 2007); Konvalinka v. Chattanooga-Hamilton County Hosp. Auth., 249 S.W.3d 346, 2008 Tenn. LEXIS 103 (Tenn. Feb. 13, 2008); Nix v. Cantrell (In re J.M.N.), — S.W.3d —, 2008 Tenn. App. LEXIS 346 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 13, 2008); State v. Ream, — S.W.3d —, 2008 Tenn. App. LEXIS 539 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 18, 2008); Byars v. Young, 327 S.W.3d 42, 2010 Tenn. App. LEXIS 344 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 20, 2010).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Nature of Jurisdiction.

The court of appeals is one of review and of final determination, except on petition for certiorari presenting: (1) Errors of law; (2) Errors of fact where there is a nonconcurrence between the trial court and the court of appeals; or (3) Concurrence without any evidence to support the conclusion. Bray v. Blue Ridge Lumber Co., 154 Tenn. 342, 289 S.W. 504, 1926 Tenn. LEXIS 131 (1926).

Jurisdiction of court of appeals is not limited to questions of fact only. Gormany v. Ryan, 154 Tenn. 432, 289 S.W. 497, 1926 Tenn. LEXIS 139 (1926); Garrett v. Garrett, 156 Tenn. 253, 300 S.W. 9, 1927 Tenn. LEXIS 109 (1927).

The powers of the supreme court, under the constitution and statutes, are broader than the powers conferred on the court of appeals by the statutes of its creation. Growers Warehousing Corp. v. W. E. Sawyer Tobacco Co., 5 Tenn. App. 619, — S.W. —, 1927 Tenn. App. LEXIS 101 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1927).

Where appeal of will contest was granted to all contestants but only one of them perfected an appeal, the court of appeals had jurisdiction to review the case as fully as if all the contestants had perfected the appeal granted. Druen v. Hudson, 17 Tenn. App. 428, 68 S.W.2d 146, 1933 Tenn. App. LEXIS 77 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1933).

The court of appeals has appellate jurisdiction only and cannot exercise original jurisdiction to determine the validity of a client's agreement, giving his attorney a lien on a fund for services in protecting the fund from claim of client's adversary where the question was not presented below. John Weis, Inc. v. Reed, 22 Tenn. App. 90, 118 S.W.2d 677, 1938 Tenn. App. LEXIS 9 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1938).

The jurisdiction of the court of appeals being appellate only, such court only reviews the judgment of trial court in disposing of a motion for a new trial and not the grounds themselves, originally, before they were passed upon by the trial judge. Standard Oil Co. v. Naramore, 30 Tenn. App. 430, 207 S.W.2d 7, 1947 Tenn. App. LEXIS 100 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1947).

The jurisdiction of the court of appeals is appellate only, and the court of appeals can only consider such matters as were brought to the attention of the chancellor, and acted upon or pretermitted by him. Clement v. Nichols, 186 Tenn. 235, 209 S.W.2d 23, 1948 Tenn. LEXIS 542 (1948); Loftis v. Stuyvesant Ins. Co., 54 Tenn. App. 371, 390 S.W.2d 722, 1964 Tenn. App. LEXIS 158 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1964).

Court of appeals can only consider such matters as were brought to the attention of the trial court and acted upon or permitted by the trial court. Irvin v. Binkley, 577 S.W.2d 677, 1978 Tenn. App. LEXIS 276 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1978).

The court of appeals has intermediate appellate jurisdiction of appeals from orders relating to suits for negligence even though the existence or nonexistence of worker's compensation coverage may affect the right to recover for negligence. Hill v. King, 663 S.W.2d 435, 1983 Tenn. App. LEXIS 650 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983).

Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals of Tennessee was appellate only, and the appellate court was without jurisdiction to conduct the audit or investigation requested by plaintiff. Houston v. Scott, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 33 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 17, 2012), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 386 (Tenn. May 23, 2012).

Judgment awarding a landlord possession of the property and for unpaid rent against a tenant was affirmed because neither a transcript of the proceedings nor a statement of the evidence was filed and the pleadings filed contained minimal information; without a complete record or sufficient statement of the evidence, the appellate court assumed the sufficiency of the evidence to support the judgment pursuant to T.R.A.P. 13(d). The Court of Appeals of Tennessee had appellate jurisdiction only, and its power to review was limited to those factual and legal issues for which an adequate legal record had been preserved. Reid v. Reid, 388 S.W.3d 292, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 554 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 9, 2012), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 846 (Tenn. Nov. 20, 2012).

2. —“All Civil Cases” — Meaning and Construction.

The term “all civil cases” does not include matters submitted to the juvenile and domestic relations courts of Knox County and were not intended to give the court of appeals jurisdiction of appeals coming up from such additional tribunals. In re Scalf's Adoption, 176 Tenn. 581, 144 S.W.2d 772, 1940 Tenn. LEXIS 104 (1940).

A prosecution for an act violating a city ordinance is a civil, not a criminal proceeding, even though such act be denounced by ordinance as a “misdemeanor” and be also an offense against state law so that appeal is to the court of appeals unless the case falls within one of the exceptions enumerated in this section. O'Dell v. Knoxville, 214 Tenn. 237, 379 S.W.2d 756, 1964 Tenn. LEXIS 469 (1964), overruled, City of Chattanooga v. Davis, 54 S.W.3d 248, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 635 (Tenn. 2001).

3. Method of Trial in Lower Court — Effect.

The jurisdiction on appeal as between the appellate courts turns on the method of procedure in the trial court, whether or not the issues have been there presented and considered by such method as do not call for a consideration, review or determination of questions of fact. Gormany v. Ryan, 154 Tenn. 432, 289 S.W. 497, 1926 Tenn. LEXIS 139 (1926).

The respective jurisdictions depend upon the method of trial in the lower court, and not upon the circumstance that, after appeal, no disputed fact remains open. Gormany v. Ryan, 154 Tenn. 432, 289 S.W. 497, 1926 Tenn. LEXIS 139 (1926); Cumberland Trust Co. v. Bart, 163 Tenn. 272, 43 S.W.2d 379, 1931 Tenn. LEXIS 111 (1931); State v. Retail Credit Men's Ass'n, 163 Tenn. 450, 43 S.W.2d 918, 1931 Tenn. LEXIS 136 (1931); King v. King, 164 Tenn. 666, 51 S.W.2d 488, 1931 Tenn. LEXIS 67 (1932); Lincoln County Bank v. Maddox, 21 Tenn. App. 648, 114 S.W.2d 821, 1937 Tenn. App. LEXIS 66 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1937); Poston v. Aetna Ins. Co., 183 Tenn. 137, 191 S.W.2d 180, 1945 Tenn. LEXIS 283 (1945).

The jurisdiction of the supreme court is not saved by the circumstance that no question of fact is involved on the appeal. Jurisdiction on appeal depends on the method adopted in the trial court, and unless that method precludes a determination of the facts in that court, the appeal is properly to the court of appeals. Garrett v. Garrett, 156 Tenn. 253, 300 S.W. 9, 1927 Tenn. LEXIS 109 (1927).

The jurisdiction of the supreme court depends upon the method adopted in the trial court and unless that method precludes a determination in that court of the facts an appeal is properly taken to the court of appeals. Goins v. Yowell, 199 Tenn. 167, 285 S.W.2d 135, 1955 Tenn. LEXIS 441 (1955); Long v. National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters, 209 Tenn. 435, 354 S.W.2d 255, 1962 Tenn. LEXIS 374 (1962); Bales v. McPhetridge, 209 Tenn. 334, 354 S.W.2d 60, 1962 Tenn. LEXIS 363 (1962).

Appellate jurisdiction of civil case in chancery court in which pleadings presented issues of fact to be determined upon proof to be heard by the court was in the court of appeals and not in the supreme court. State-Wide Sales Finance Corp. v. Long, 206 Tenn. 680, 337 S.W.2d 239, 1960 Tenn. LEXIS 418 (1960).

Jurisdiction of supreme court extends to all cases determined in the trial court on demurrer or other method not involving a review of determination of facts. Long v. National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters, 209 Tenn. 435, 354 S.W.2d 255, 1962 Tenn. LEXIS 374 (1962).

Where decree of lower court was determined by a method not involving a review or determination of the facts, appeal was to supreme court. Pulaski Lumber Co. v. Harpeth South, Inc., 501 S.W.2d 275, 1973 Tenn. LEXIS 533 (Tenn. 1973).

4. Matters Not Raised in Lower Court.

The question of whether an attorney should have a lien on funds of the defendant held by the court is one of original jurisdiction and is therefore not within the jurisdiction of the court of appeals which is appellate only. John Weis, Inc. v. Reed, 22 Tenn. App. 90, 118 S.W.2d 677, 1938 Tenn. App. LEXIS 9 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1938).

Motion to dismiss appeal involving probate of will on ground that some of the proponents who were legatees and devisees had failed to give bond was denied where matter had not been brought to attention of trial court. Gregory v. Susong, 185 Tenn. 232, 205 S.W.2d 6, 1947 Tenn. LEXIS 325 (1947).

Court of appeals did not commit error in refusing to allow complainant to amend original bill after argument by adding party complainant, since court of appeals can only consider matters brought to the attention of the trial court. Clement v. Nichols, 186 Tenn. 235, 209 S.W.2d 23, 1948 Tenn. LEXIS 542 (1948).

Although the trial judge in a divorce action agreed to allow a post-trial deposition which became part of the appellate record, the appellate court would not consider the deposition on appeal since it was neither presented to nor considered by the trial judge. Kinard v. Kinard, 986 S.W.2d 220, 1998 Tenn. App. LEXIS 543 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998), modified, 986 S.W.2d 220, 1998 Tenn. App. LEXIS 598 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998).

Tennessee court of appeals erred in remanding case for discovery concerning allegations of misconduct by chancellor and in ordering that discovery materials be transmitted to it as a supplemental record, where the clear effect of the order was that the court of appeals, not the trial court, would determine the merits of allegations, requiring the court of appeals to make factual findings based upon the “supplemental record,” which determination was an unauthorized exercise of original jurisdiction; proper remedy was for plaintiff to file motion asking court of appeals to remand the case to the trial court for the filing and adjudication of a motion pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60. Peck v. Tanner, 181 S.W.3d 262, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 579 (Tenn. 2005).

Son raised a myriad of issues on appeal that were not considered by the trial court in its limited grant of the motion for summary judgment, and the appellate court declined to address these issues. Long v. Creekmore, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. App. LEXIS 225 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 28, 2013).

Appellate court could not consider a request by an appellant because the request was not considered by the trial court. The appellate court could not exercise original jurisdiction and act as the trier-of-fact because the jurisdiction of the court was appellate only. Granoff v. Granoff, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 214 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 16, 2016).

Appellate court lacked jurisdiction over a lessee's claim of legal malpractice action against the lessee's attorney, when the lessee raised the issue in the lessee's appeal of a breach of contract action because appellate courts could not exercise original jurisdiction and act as the trier-of-fact. Accordingly, the appellate court did not address the issue. 240 Poplar Ave. Gen. P'ship v. Gray, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 75 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 2, 2017).

5. Finality of Proceedings in Lower Court.

Supreme court under this section did not have jurisdiction to review alleged error of trial court in refusing to permit filing of intervening petition in controversy over property rights, since refusal to allow intervening petition was not a final determination of case in trial court. Bernard v. Walker, 183 Tenn. 523, 193 S.W.2d 770, 1946 Tenn. LEXIS 232 (1946).

6. Contempt Proceedings — Nature.

Where an appeal in a contempt case does not involve a question of guilt, but only the legal question of whether the chancery court or the court of appeals could exercise the power to punish, the appeal lies to the supreme court. Collier v. Memphis, 160 Tenn. 500, 26 S.W.2d 152, 1929 Tenn. LEXIS 125 (1930), superseded by statute as stated in, Overnite Transp. Co. v. Teamsters Local Union No. 480, — S.W.3d —, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 402 (Tenn. May 16, 2005), superseded by statute as stated in, Overnite Transp. Co. v. Teamsters Local Union No. 480, 172 S.W.3d 507, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 550 (Tenn. 2005), superseded by statute as stated in, Linn v. Howard, — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 52 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 26, 2007).

Proceedings for punishment for contempt are in their nature criminal and, while an appeal to the supreme court lies on conviction, no appeal lies from an acquittal on the facts. Collier v. Memphis, 160 Tenn. 500, 26 S.W.2d 152, 1929 Tenn. LEXIS 125 (1930), superseded by statute as stated in, Overnite Transp. Co. v. Teamsters Local Union No. 480, — S.W.3d —, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 402 (Tenn. May 16, 2005), superseded by statute as stated in, Overnite Transp. Co. v. Teamsters Local Union No. 480, 172 S.W.3d 507, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 550 (Tenn. 2005), superseded by statute as stated in, Linn v. Howard, — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 52 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 26, 2007).

On review under T.C.A. § 16-4-108(b), although civil contempt was properly found where a city council took new evidence in a zoning case contrary to a trial court's order, the use of a coercive fine was improper because it was awarded retroactively prior to the finding of contempt; even if the trial court's decision was violative of T.C.A. § 13-7-203, the proper avenue was not to disregard it. Flautt & Mann v. Council of Memphis, 285 S.W.3d 856, 2008 Tenn. App. LEXIS 84 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 20, 2008).

7. Disbarment Proceedings.

An appeal from a judgment disbarring a lawyer lies to the court of appeals. Thompson v. Denman, 164 Tenn. 428, 50 S.W.2d 222, 1931 Tenn. LEXIS 45 (1932); Memphis & Shelby County Bar Ass'n v. Himmelstein, 165 Tenn. 102, 53 S.W.2d 378, 1931 Tenn. LEXIS 176 (1932).

Prior decisions of Tennessee supreme court holding that appeal of attorney disciplinary proceedings must be taken to court of appeals overruled by Tenn. R. Sup. Ct. 9, § 1.3.

8. Constitutional Questions.

Whenever good faith constitutional questions are involved which may be determinative, although nonconstitutional questions are also presented, the jurisdiction is exclusively in the supreme court. Nashville v. Dad's Auto Accessories, Inc., 154 Tenn. 194, 285 S.W. 52, 1925 Tenn. LEXIS 116 (1926), dismissed, Dad's Auto Accessories v. Nashville, 47 S. Ct. 20, 273 U.S. 770, 71 L. Ed. 883, 1926 U.S. LEXIS 333 (1926); Kemp v. Caruthers, 11 Tenn. App. 201, 1930 Tenn. App. LEXIS 8 (1930).

Constitutionality of statute relied upon was properly questioned for first time on appeal in error to court of appeals, and, question being debatable, and not frivolous, cause was transferred to supreme court. Mattel v. Clark Hardware Co., 3 Tenn. App. 379, — S.W. —, 1926 Tenn. App. LEXIS 111 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1926).

All cases involving constitutional questions are appealable to the supreme court only. Howard & Herrin v. Nashville, C. & S. L. R. Co., 3 Tenn. App. 174, — S.W. —, 1926 Tenn. App. LEXIS 84 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1926); State v. Monday, 7 Tenn. App. 257, 1928 Tenn. App. LEXIS 37 (1928).

Where the constitutional question is theoretical and wholly insufficient to determine the cause on appeal, the court of appeals will have jurisdiction. Williams v. Realty Dev. Co., 161 Tenn. 451, 33 S.W.2d 64, 1930 Tenn. LEXIS 28 (1930).

If an act whose constitutionality is questioned may be construed as not applicable to the particular case, the constitutional question becomes immaterial and the court of appeals may exercise jurisdiction. Western Auto. Casualty Co. v. Burnell, 17 Tenn. App. 687, 71 S.W.2d 474, 1933 Tenn. App. LEXIS 101 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1933).

The exception as to constitutional questions refers to rights dependent upon the constitutionality of statutes and ordinances, or the denial of privileges expressly guaranteed by the Constitution and, the constitutional questions must be substantial and not incidental to the cause of action. Tennessee C. R. Co. v. Pharr, 183 Tenn. 658, 194 S.W.2d 486, 1946 Tenn. LEXIS 249 (1946).

Mere insistence that there is no evidence upon which the public utilities commission could base a legal and just conclusion is not sufficient to raise a constitutional question as to the taking of property without due process, and thus bring the case under the exception of this section. Tennessee C. R. Co. v. Pharr, 183 Tenn. 658, 194 S.W.2d 486, 1946 Tenn. LEXIS 249 (1946).

Under the statute jurisdiction of constitutional questions lies exclusively in the supreme court, but in order to deprive the court of appeals of jurisdiction on that account the constitutional question must be substantial and not incidental. Memphis & Shelby County Bar Ass'n v. Aspero, 35 Tenn. App. 9, 242 S.W.2d 319, 1950 Tenn. App. LEXIS 164 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1950), cert. denied, Aspero v. Memphis & S. County Bar Asso., 342 U.S. 836, 72 S. Ct. 61, 96 L. Ed. 632, 1951 U.S. LEXIS 1668 (1951), rehearing denied, Aspero v. Memphis & S. County Bar Asso., 343 U.S. 989, 72 S. Ct. 1078, 96 L. Ed. 1375, 1952 U.S. LEXIS 2016 (1952).

Findings of circuit court on certiorari from conservation department that defendant was not “hunting” deer with a shotgun under § 51-425 (now § 70-4-116) and that §§ 51-707 — 51-715 (now §§ 70-6-20270-6-206 (former)) were unconstitutional under state and federal Constitutions, should be appealed to court of appeals since fact question is involved. Findlay v. Davis, 198 Tenn. 107, 278 S.W.2d 87, 1955 Tenn. LEXIS 352 (1955).

If constitutionality of statute is sole determinative question in litigation jurisdiction of appeal is in supreme court, but where appellee questions appellant's right to attack the act, this adds another question to determine and court of appeals will resolve the doubt in favor of their jurisdiction. Davis v. Allen, 43 Tenn. App. 278, 307 S.W.2d 800, 1957 Tenn. App. LEXIS 115 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1957).

Where a number of constitutional questions were received concerning a private act divesting a county judge of juvenile jurisdiction, but the case turned on the issue of fact of whether or not the quarterly county court had ratified the act by the proper 2/3 majority, the court of appeals had jurisdiction. Kesterson v. McKee, 527 S.W.2d 144, 1975 Tenn. App. LEXIS 202 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1975).

Jurisdiction of an appeal as of right was properly perfected directly to supreme court of Tennessee under this section when the sole determinative question is one of constitutional interpretation and construction. McPherson v. Everett, 594 S.W.2d 677, 1980 Tenn. LEXIS 408 (Tenn. 1980).

9. Right to Hold Office.

Where a proceeding is not one between two individuals claiming the right to hold a public office but is a proceeding wherein the holder of an office seeks an injunction against the election of his successor, the right to hold public office is only incidentally involved in the determination of the question of the right to the injunction, and the court of appeals will assume jurisdiction. White v. Knight, 34 Tenn. App. 426, 238 S.W.2d 745, 1950 Tenn. App. LEXIS 157 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1950).

A suit to dismiss a public officer for violation of § 12-4-101, while it seeks a dismissal from public office, does not involve the right to hold such office, hence the supreme court does not have jurisdiction under this section. Crass v. Walls, 194 Tenn. 573, 253 S.W.2d 755, 1952 Tenn. LEXIS 422 (1952).

10. State Revenue.

Question of exemption from taxation, on grounds that defendant was an educational institution, involved state revenue and the supreme court had appellate jurisdiction of the same. State v. Rowan, 171 Tenn. 612, 106 S.W.2d 861, 1937 Tenn. LEXIS 144 (1937).

In consolidated tax suits by city, county and state where the state revenue was the principal matter involved the appellate jurisdiction was in the supreme court. State v. Rowan, 171 Tenn. 612, 106 S.W.2d 861, 1937 Tenn. LEXIS 144 (1937).

11. Mandamus.

While the court of appeals has no appellate jurisdiction of cases of mandamus brought up from a lower court, it has inherent power to grant a writ of mandamus in aid of its own jurisdiction, as to compel a trial judge to sign a bill of exceptions in a case appealable to that court. Hyde v. Dunlap, 3 Tenn. App. 368, — S.W. —, 1926 Tenn. App. LEXIS 109 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1926); Blanton v. Tennessee Cent. Ry., 4 Tenn. App. 335, 1926 Tenn. App. LEXIS 189 (1926); Stargel v. Stargel, 21 Tenn. App. 193, 107 S.W.2d 520, 1937 Tenn. App. LEXIS 20 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1937).

Where a case is transferred to the supreme court because a constitutional question is involved, it will consider all questions properly raised. Chattanooga Dayton Bus Line v. Burney, 160 Tenn. 294, 23 S.W.2d 669, 1929 Tenn. LEXIS 105 (1929); Fonville v. Gregory, 162 Tenn. 294, 36 S.W.2d 900, 1930 Tenn. LEXIS 90 (1931).

Supreme court does not have jurisdiction of appeal from decree dismissing a bill for mandamus to compel county judge to issue to county superintendent of education his warrant for salary alleged to be due, mandamus not being proper remedy. State ex rel. Groce v. Martin, 155 Tenn. 322, 292 S.W. 451, 1926 Tenn. LEXIS 51 (1927).

12. Quo Warranto.

A suit in the name of the state on relation to enjoin a corporation from illegal activities and to have the corporation dissolved and its charter forfeited is in the nature of a quo warranto proceeding, the jurisdiction of which on appeal is with the supreme court. State v. Retail Credit Men's Ass'n, 163 Tenn. 450, 43 S.W.2d 918, 1931 Tenn. LEXIS 136 (1931).

Jurisdiction of an appeal in a case in the nature of quo warranto, which has been determined by the court of appeals, will be taken by the supreme court by certiorari, and the case will be disposed of as though directly appealed to the supreme court. State v. Retail Credit Men's Ass'n, 163 Tenn. 450, 43 S.W.2d 918, 1931 Tenn. LEXIS 136 (1931).

13. Review or Determination of Facts as Affecting Jurisdiction.

The supreme court has jurisdiction of all cases which have been finally determined in the lower courts on demurrer or other method not involving a review or determination of the facts, or in which all the facts have been stipulated, and it may award writs of certiorari and supersedeas, where there is no material controversy over the facts as presented by the pleadings or bill and answer. Cockrill v. Peoples Sav. Bank, 155 Tenn. 342, 293 S.W. 996, 1926 Tenn. LEXIS 53 (1927).

Where the pleadings in a cause show that it must be finally determined upon issues of fact, appellate jurisdiction, in the first instance, is with the court of appeals. First Nat'l Bank v. Planters' Nat'l Bank, 158 Tenn. 50, 12 S.W.2d 528, 1928 Tenn. LEXIS 122 (1929).

Suit testing validity of city ordinance which did not involve a review or determination of facts was properly appealed directly to supreme court. Rutherford v. Nashville, 168 Tenn. 499, 79 S.W.2d 581, 1934 Tenn. LEXIS 82 (1935).

Court of appeals is not without jurisdiction to review decree of chancery court based upon undisputed facts merely because such a review would involve only questions of law. Lincoln County Bank v. Maddox, 21 Tenn. App. 648, 114 S.W.2d 821, 1937 Tenn. App. LEXIS 66 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1937).

In view of the language of the act by which the court of appeals was created, the supreme court does not secure jurisdiction of a direct appeal from the lower court by reason of the fact that nothing but a question of law is presented on the appeal, and its jurisdiction in such cases depends upon the method of trial in the lower court. Poston v. Aetna Ins. Co., 183 Tenn. 137, 191 S.W.2d 180, 1945 Tenn. LEXIS 283 (1945).

Where probate judge in determining validity of claims against estate, decided their merits on the facts without stipulation, court of appeals was proper forum for appeal from such decision. Sizemore v. Rinehart, 193 Tenn. 475, 246 S.W.2d 91, 1952 Tenn. LEXIS 313 (1952).

Where the statute does not expressly cover a situation the respective jurisdictions of the supreme court and the court of appeals depend upon the method of trial in the lower court and unless that method precludes a determination of the facts in that court the appeal is properly to the court of appeals. Mayor of Jackson v. Thomas, 202 Tenn. 26, 302 S.W.2d 56, 1957 Tenn. LEXIS 358 (1957).

The jurisdiction on appeal as between the supreme court and the court of appeals depends on whether or not issues have been presented and considered in the lower court by such method as calls for a consideration and determination of questions of fact and when disputed questions of fact are involved jurisdiction of the appeal is in the court of appeals and not the supreme court. Davenport v. Blankenship, 203 Tenn. 679, 315 S.W.2d 257, 1958 Tenn. LEXIS 234 (1958).

Where question of whether or not statute of limitations applied in ejectment suit was determined on oral testimony as well as exhibits filed with the pleadings, case was determined by method calling for determination of disputed questions of fact and jurisdiction of appeal was in court of appeals and not supreme court. Davenport v. Blankenship, 203 Tenn. 679, 315 S.W.2d 257, 1958 Tenn. LEXIS 234 (1958).

Case tried before chancellor on pleadings and written stipulation of facts came directly to supreme court for review. Marler v. Claunch, 221 Tenn. 693, 430 S.W.2d 452, 1968 Tenn. LEXIS 496 (1968).

Supreme court has jurisdiction to review circuit court's judgment in common law certiorari proceeding setting aside denial by commissioner of insurance and banking (now commissioner of commerce and insurance) of request of insurance companies for rate increase since issue does not involve a review or determination of the facts. Pack v. Royal-Globe Ins. Cos., 224 Tenn. 452, 457 S.W.2d 19, 1970 Tenn. LEXIS 343 (1970).

Where no testimony is involved in case contesting validity of zoning ordinance but a large part of the evidence in the record consists of exhibits which the trial judge is required to consider, the case is not decided in the lower court “on demurrer or other method not requiring a review or determination of the facts,” and jurisdiction of the appeal is in the court of appeals and not the supreme court. Blankenship v. Johnson City, 224 Tenn. 593, 459 S.W.2d 428, 1970 Tenn. LEXIS 360 (1970).

Jurisdiction on appeal from review by chancellor of refusal of civil service commission of metropolitan government of Nashville and Davidson Counties to review dismissal of employee by metropolitan employee benefit board was in supreme court since consideration of questions of fact by chancellor on common law writ of certiorari was precluded. Culbertson v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville & Davidson County, 483 S.W.2d 716, 1971 Tenn. LEXIS 335 (Tenn. 1971).

On motion for summary judgment trial Judge's determination of whether there is a genuine issue as to any material fact when done so upon the record as a whole which contained evidentiary matters such as depositions, affidavits or exhibits was a review or determination of facts and an appeal from a judgment so entered was proper in the court of appeals. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hartford Acci. & Indem. Co., 483 S.W.2d 719, 1972 Tenn. LEXIS 370 (Tenn. 1972).

14. —Effect of Recitation in Decree of Lower Court.

When chancellor recites in his final decree that he is determining the case on pro confesso and depositions, it conclusively appears that he was determining the case otherwise than on demurrer, and by a method involving a determination of the facts, and jurisdiction of appeal is in the court of appeals and not the supreme court. Poston v. Aetna Ins. Co., 183 Tenn. 137, 191 S.W.2d 180, 1945 Tenn. LEXIS 283 (1945).

15. —Stipulation of Facts.

Where cause was heard in chancery court upon agreed stipulations of fact, appeal is direct to supreme court. Manhattan Sav. Bank & Trust Co. v. Bedford, 161 Tenn. 187, 30 S.W.2d 227, 1929 Tenn. LEXIS 49 (1930).

An agreement of counsel that certain depositions and exhibits should be looked to as showing or establishing what the facts are does not constitute a stipulation of what the facts are, as that term is used in this section. Cumberland Trust Co. v. Bart, 163 Tenn. 272, 43 S.W.2d 379, 1931 Tenn. LEXIS 111 (1931).

Exhibits brought into the record as part of the agreed facts or as part of the pleadings were not deemed disputed facts. King v. King, 164 Tenn. 666, 51 S.W.2d 488, 1931 Tenn. LEXIS 67 (1932).

The supreme court has jurisdiction of a case of stipulated facts, notwithstanding the right reserved to counsel, never exercised, to introduce evidence and the fact that counsel may disagree as to the application of undisputed facts or inferences therefrom. King v. King, 164 Tenn. 666, 51 S.W.2d 488, 1931 Tenn. LEXIS 67 (1932).

Where facts were stipulated in action in chancery court to recover on builder's risk policy so that appeal should have been to supreme court, supreme court would upon granting certiorari dispose of case as though it had been appealed directly to that court. Shamrock Homebuilders, Inc. v. Cherokee Ins. Co., 225 Tenn. 236, 466 S.W.2d 204, 1971 Tenn. LEXIS 298 (1971).

Although the jurisdiction of the court of appeals was questionable because all of the facts were stipulated, the court ruled on the merits of the appeal for expediency with confidence that any jurisdictional error would be corrected by the supreme court on certiorari. Adams v. Swift, 500 S.W.2d 437, 1973 Tenn. App. LEXIS 281 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1973).

16. — —Stipulation after Trial.

Jurisdiction on appeal cannot be deflected or conferred by a stipulation or agreement as to facts entered into after trial before the chancellor. Cumberland Trust Co. v. Bart, 163 Tenn. 272, 43 S.W.2d 379, 1931 Tenn. LEXIS 111 (1931).

17. — —Stipulation Supplemented by Proof.

Where a stipulation does not contain all the facts, and shows that it does not do so, but that additional proof was taken and relied on, the appeal lies to the court of appeals. Creasey v. Comargo Coal Co., 154 Tenn. 372, 289 S.W. 524, 1926 Tenn. LEXIS 135 (1926).

Where the stipulation provides for the consideration of depositions, and the record also contains exhibits introduced and agreed to be considered by the chancellor, the appeal lies to the court of appeals, though in that court only a question of law may stand for determination. Cumberland Trust Co. v. Bart, 163 Tenn. 272, 43 S.W.2d 379, 1931 Tenn. LEXIS 111 (1931).

The court of appeals has appellate jurisdiction if the trial court considered evidence not stipulated, although questions of law only are involved on appeal. Lincoln County Bank v. Maddox, 21 Tenn. App. 648, 114 S.W.2d 821, 1937 Tenn. App. LEXIS 66 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1937).

18. —Mixed Question of Law and Fact.

Where the chancellor has to fix the amount of a debt, that incidental or collateral questions are presented for his determination, the ruling of the chancellor on which may be contended to be determinative, such as rulings on exceptions to testimony, does not deprive the court of appeals of appellate jurisdiction. Gormany v. Ryan, 154 Tenn. 432, 289 S.W. 497, 1926 Tenn. LEXIS 139 (1926).

In action on account where setoff is the defense and questions of law and fact are involved, but facts are not stipulated in court below, appeal lies to court of appeals. Johnson v. Stuart, 155 Tenn. 618, 299 S.W. 779, 1926 Tenn. LEXIS 89 (1927).

There being no stipulation as to facts, the question whether an alleged will was subject to probate in this state as one having been probated in a foreign country was, in the lower court, a mixed question of law and fact, so that on appeal jurisdiction was with the court of appeals. In re De Franceschi's Estate, 17 Tenn. App. 673, 70 S.W.2d 513, 1933 Tenn. App. LEXIS 100 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1933).

19. —Demurrer.

Court of appeals does not have jurisdiction of appeal from ruling on demurrer. Swing v. Harnaday, 1 Tenn. App. 568, — S.W. —, 1925 Tenn. App. LEXIS 75 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1925).

Court of appeals had jurisdiction of proceeding in chancery court even though demurrer based on question of law submitted by one of the defendants was sustained where chancery court decided case as against other defendant on pro confesso and depositions. Poston v. Aetna Ins. Co., 183 Tenn. 137, 191 S.W.2d 180, 1945 Tenn. LEXIS 283 (1945).

Where pleading filed as an answer had the legal effect of a demurrer and final determination of trial court was made thereon, appeal was to the supreme court. Smith v. Landsden, 212 Tenn. 543, 370 S.W.2d 557, 1963 Tenn. LEXIS 447 (1963).

Where petition to set aside county court's order approving administratrix' settlement of estate was dismissed on answer treated as demurrer going to legal sufficiency of petition and parties consented to appeal direct to supreme court, supreme court had jurisdiction of the appeal. In re Estate of Williams, 213 Tenn. 707, 378 S.W.2d 775, 1964 Tenn. LEXIS 439 (1964).

Jurisdiction to act on petition for certiorari seeking review of chancellor's decision denying appeal from order sustaining demurrer to cross bill and sustaining motion to dismiss cross bill lay with supreme court. Foster v. First Nat'l Bank, 221 Tenn. 688, 430 S.W.2d 450, 1968 Tenn. LEXIS 495 (1968).

20. —Construction of Instruments.

Appeal from decree of chancellor construing the provisions of a will, which involves no disputed facts, is within the sole jurisdiction of the supreme court. Summers v. Kollock, 1 Tenn. App. 142, — S.W. —, 1925 Tenn. App. LEXIS 21 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1925); Leaver v. McBride, 506 S.W.2d 141, 1974 Tenn. LEXIS 519 (Tenn. 1974).

Where case involves only the construction of a deed as a question of law, court of appeals has no jurisdiction, and appeal to it will be transferred to supreme court. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Newsom, 2 Tenn. App. 70, — S.W. —, 1925 Tenn. App. LEXIS 94 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1925).

21. Effect of Other Statutes.

Statutory provision that an appeal from final judgment of probate court lay to court of appeals or supreme court, “as the case may be,” is equivalent to provision that the appeal shall lie to such courts in all civil cases except those determined in the lower court by methods not involving a review of the determination of facts. Sizemore v. Rinehart, 193 Tenn. 475, 246 S.W.2d 91, 1952 Tenn. LEXIS 313 (1952).

Notwithstanding § 36-235 (now § 36-2-114) appeals from juvenile court must be taken to supreme court when judgment is entered by consent of parties and without introduction of evidence. Smelcer v. Broyles, 225 Tenn. 187, 465 S.W.2d 355, 1971 Tenn. LEXIS 292 (1971).

Procedures for obtaining review of contested cases involving the public service commission are governed by §§ 4-5-117, 4-5-118 (now §§ 4-5-322, 4-5-323) of the administrative procedures law. United Inter-Mountain Tel. Co. v. Public Service Com., 555 S.W.2d 389, 1977 Tenn. LEXIS 627 (Tenn. 1977); Public Service Com. v. General Tel. Co., 555 S.W.2d 395, 1977 Tenn. LEXIS 629 (Tenn. 1977).

The provision in Tenn. Code Ann. § 9-8-403(a)(1), that appeals from the Tennessee claims commission in tax matters shall go directly to the supreme court, was repealed by implication by this section. Stewart Title Guar. Co. v. McReynolds, 886 S.W.2d 233, 1994 Tenn. App. LEXIS 296 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994).

22. Review of Decrees of Court of Appeals.

Revisory jurisdiction of the supreme court of the judgments of the court of appeals does not permit the supreme court to try case anew, but it is the supreme court's duty to ascertain if there are any errors in the actions of the court of appeals and to correct such errors. Schrader v. Kentucky-Tennessee Light & Power Co., 157 Tenn. 391, 8 S.W.2d 495, 1928 Tenn. LEXIS 204, 62 A.L.R. 495 (1928).

Interlocutory decrees of court of appeals are not subject to review by the supreme court. First Nat'l Bank v. Planters' Nat'l Bank, 158 Tenn. 50, 12 S.W.2d 528, 1928 Tenn. LEXIS 122 (1929); State-Wide Sales Finance Corp. v. Long, 206 Tenn. 680, 337 S.W.2d 239, 1960 Tenn. LEXIS 418 (1960).

23. Transfer of Cases.

The statute vests the court of appeals with jurisdiction to determine whether a case appealed to it has been removed by mistake to the wrong court, and its order transferring a case to the supreme court is valid until reversed by that court. Sharpe v. Sharpe, 8 Tenn. App. 392, — S.W.2d —, 1928 Tenn. App. LEXIS 152 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1928).

Where cause was decided by chancellor on proof taken on the merits, the supreme court had no jurisdiction to pass on questions raised in the assignment of errors and would transfer the cause to the court of appeals. Goins v. Yowell, 199 Tenn. 167, 285 S.W.2d 135, 1955 Tenn. LEXIS 441 (1955).

T.C.A. § 16-4-108 only provides statutory authority for the transfer of appeals by the Tennessee supreme court of appeals; as such, it does not provide any authority to allow a chancery court to transfer an improperly made appeal to a circuit court. Graves v. Kraft Gen. Foods, 45 S.W.3d 584, 2000 Tenn. App. LEXIS 692 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000).

The chancery court erred when it dismissed spouse's appeal from probate because under T.C.A. § 16-4-108, it should have transferred the case to the court of appeals; the appellate court vacated the dismissal and remanded the case to the trial court for transfer back to the court of appeals. In re Estate of White, 77 S.W.3d 765, 2001 Tenn. App. LEXIS 803 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001).

Defendant's appeal from a general sessions court finding defendant in criminal contempt arising out of a civil matter was improperly filed in the court of criminal appeals, but the appeal was kept alive upon transfer to the court of appeals where the content requirements for the notice of appeal were sufficient aside from the wrong court designation. State v. Wood, 91 S.W.3d 769, 2002 Tenn. App. LEXIS 330 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2002 Tenn. LEXIS 526 (Tenn. Nov. 12, 2002).

When a case has been appealed to the wrong appellate court it should be transferred to the court having jurisdiction thereof; in this case appeal had to be transferred to the circuit court for Davidson County. Chaffin v. Leathers (In re C.M.C.), — S.W.3d —, 2008 Tenn. App. LEXIS 581 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2008).

While the court of appeals correctly found that an estate appealed a probate court's decision to the wrong court, it should not have summarily dismissed the appeal. Instead, it should have vacated the circuit court's judgment and remanded the case to the circuit court with directions to transfer the case to the court of appeals in accordance with T.C.A. § 16-4-108(a)(2). Once the case was properly before it, the court of appeals could then have addressed the substantive issues raised by the parties. In re Estate of Trigg, 368 S.W.3d 483, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 379 (Tenn. May 30, 2012).

Court of appeals did not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear a mother's appeal flowing from a dependency and neglect action because jurisdiction was with the circuit court, and thus, it transferred the case to the circuit court; the order from which the mother appealed flowed from the dependency and neglect proceedings, and the trial court lost subject matter jurisdiction over the child with the dismissal of the father's dependency and neglect petition. State ex rel. Blandford v. Blandford, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 204 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 24, 2016).

Because the State's notice of appeal was timely filed within the ten-day period for appeals from juvenile court to circuit court, its appeal of an order denying its motion for relief from an agreed order forgiving a portion of a mother's child support arrearage had to be transferred to the circuit court; the court of appeals did not have subject matter jurisdiction to consider the State's appeal because jurisdiction was with the circuit court. State ex rel. Smith v. Thorne, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 294 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 8, 2017).

24. —Refusal to Transfer — Relief.

Where the court of appeals is without jurisdiction but refuses to transfer a quo warranto cause to the supreme court, on motion, the supreme court will entertain a petition for certiorari because of the error in thus refusing, and dispose of the case as though directly appealed to the supreme court. State v. Retail Credit Men's Ass'n, 163 Tenn. 450, 43 S.W.2d 918, 1931 Tenn. LEXIS 136 (1931).

25. —Retransfers.

A case improperly transferred by the court of appeals to the supreme court will be retransferred to the former. Cox v. Smith, 154 Tenn. 369, 289 S.W. 524, 1926 Tenn. LEXIS 134 (1926).

26. Summary Judgment Proceedings.

Although normally, where affidavits or other materials outside the pleadings are considered by the trial court and there is no formal, written stipulation of facts, appellate review of summary judgment proceedings is, under this section, properly in the court of appeals rather than the supreme court, but, under § 27-3-105 (repealed), both courts have discretion to accept for review questions certified for interlocutory appeal, and, under § 27-3-128, either court may remand a case to the trial court for further evidence where it appears from the record that more satisfactory or complete evidence is available for the development of the issues. Layhew v. Dixon, 527 S.W.2d 739, 1975 Tenn. LEXIS 647 (Tenn. 1975).

27. Revivor of Judgment.

The court of appeals has jurisdiction to try any questions, whether of law or fact, in connection with the issuance of a writ of scire facias to revive its judgments or in connection with any subsequent pleadings with reference thereto. Craddock v. Calcutt, 39 Tenn. App. 481, 285 S.W.2d 528, 1955 Tenn. App. LEXIS 84 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1955).

28. Torts.

Jurisdiction of an appeal in a tort action lies in the court of appeals, not the supreme court. Van Cleave v. McKee Baking Co., 712 S.W.2d 94, 1986 Tenn. LEXIS 757 (Tenn. 1986); Smith v. Lincoln Brass Works, Inc., 712 S.W.2d 470, 1986 Tenn. LEXIS 759 (Tenn. 1986).

29. Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction.

Caretaker's appeal of an order requiring her to post security for the care of horses pending the resolution of criminal charges for cruelty to horses was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction; the action described in subsection T.C.A. § 39-14-210(g)(2) is not a forfeiture, but rather, its security and abandonment provisions are part of the criminal procedure pending trial and are therefore not within the jurisdiction of the court of appeals. State v. Tillilie, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 395 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 7, 2016).

Court of appeals lacked jurisdiction over a father's appeal of an order awarding permanent guardianship of his child to foster parents because the father's notice of appeal was filed twenty-eight days after the entry of the trial court's final order awarding permanent guardianship to the foster parents; therefore, the father's appeal was not timely filed and his appeal had to be dismissed. In re Brian G., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 507 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 30, 2018).

Collateral References. 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appeal and Error §§ 1, 4, 6-14, 20, 1007, 1008.

21 C.J.S. Courts §§ 456, 458, 459.

Courts 210-254.

16-4-109. Number of judges necessary to decision.

  1. When sitting in sections of three (3) judges each, the concurrence of two (2) of the judges shall be sufficient to determine all matters coming before the section; and such action, without more, shall have effect, in all respects, as if the entire court of appeals had participated in the action.
  2. When the court sits en banc, the concurrence of seven (7) of the judges, and, when two (2) sections sit together, the concurrence of five (5) of the judges, shall so suffice and be effective.

Acts 1925, ch. 100, § 5; Shan. Supp., § 6325a5; mod. Code 1932, §§ 10612, 10613; Acts 1978, ch. 836, § 3; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-409.

Law Reviews.

A Survey of Civil Procedure in Tennessee — 1977, IV. Pretrial Procedure (John L. Sobieski, Jr.), 46 Tenn. L. Rev. 308.

Collateral References. 21 C.J.S. Courts §§ 183, 217, 458.

16-4-110. Process.

The court of appeals, and the individual members of the court, are given power to grant writs of error, certiorari and supersedeas in cases within the jurisdiction of the court, such writs to be returnable to the court of appeals in the division in which they arose, and the practice in those cases in the court of appeals shall be the same as is prescribed for the supreme court.

Acts 1925, ch. 100, § 11; Shan. Supp., § 6325a11; Code 1932, § 10619; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-410.

Law Reviews.

The Tennessee Court System — Court of Appeals (Frederic S. Le Clercq), 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 219.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Effect of Statute.

Statute gives court of appeals and its individual members power to grant writs of error, certiorari, and supersedeas in cases within its jurisdiction. Sullivan v. Eason, 5 Tenn. App. 137, — S.W. —, 1927 Tenn. App. LEXIS 45 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1927).

2. Jurisdiction to Grant Writs.

The power to grant writs of certiorari and supersedeas to review the actions of lower courts depends upon the same rules governing appeals to the one court or the other. Cox v. Smith, 154 Tenn. 369, 289 S.W. 524, 1926 Tenn. LEXIS 134 (1926). See Cockrill v. Peoples Sav. Bank, 155 Tenn. 342, 293 S.W. 996, 1926 Tenn. LEXIS 53 (1927); First Nat'l Bank v. Planters' Nat'l Bank, 158 Tenn. 50, 12 S.W.2d 528, 1928 Tenn. LEXIS 122 (1929).

3. Prerequisites to Granting Writs.

Court of appeals is without power to order a supersedeas to issue except upon a finding that there is error in the judgments of which the petitioner complains. Sullivan v. Eason, 5 Tenn. App. 137, — S.W. —, 1927 Tenn. App. LEXIS 45 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1927).

The petitioner must demonstrate grounds for extraordinary relief. Myers v. State, 577 S.W.2d 679, 1978 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 279 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978).

4. Court in Which Jurisdiction Lies.

Supreme court held without jurisdiction to grant writs of certiorari and supersedeas to supersede action of circuit court in discharging supersedeas previously granted. State v. Chattanooga, 153 Tenn. 349, 284 S.W. 359, 1925 Tenn. LEXIS 31 (1926).

Where the pleadings disclose issue or issues of fact that are to be determined by proof in the lower court, such reviewing power is with the court of appeals. Cox v. Smith, 154 Tenn. 369, 289 S.W. 524, 1926 Tenn. LEXIS 134 (1926).

Where a demurrer is overruled and answer is filed and excepted to, which exceptions are also overruled, application for a petition for certiorari and supersedeas is to be made to the court of appeals, since, whenever the collateral issues presented by such petition are disposed of, the cause will stand for trial in the lower court upon proof as to facts. Cox v. Smith, 154 Tenn. 369, 289 S.W. 524, 1926 Tenn. LEXIS 134 (1926).

The supreme court is without jurisdiction to grant writs of certiorari and supersedeas in a case pending in the trial court, which has not been there finally determined, and in which the pleadings present issue of fact to be determined upon proof to be heard by that court. Cox v. Smith, 154 Tenn. 369, 289 S.W. 524, 1926 Tenn. LEXIS 134 (1926).

In all cases wherein appeals or appeals in nature of writs of error would lie to court of appeals, that court has power to grant writs of error, certiorari and supersedeas. Hyde v. Dunlap, 3 Tenn. App. 368, — S.W. —, 1926 Tenn. App. LEXIS 109 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1926).

Where none of the controlling facts alleged in a bill of complaint are definitely denied in the answer, no controversy over the facts exists, and the jurisdiction is with the supreme court to revise the decree of the lower court by writs of certiorari and supersedeas. Cockrill v. Peoples Sav. Bank, 155 Tenn. 342, 293 S.W. 996, 1926 Tenn. LEXIS 53 (1927); First Nat'l Bank v. Planters' Nat'l Bank, 158 Tenn. 50, 12 S.W.2d 528, 1928 Tenn. LEXIS 122 (1929).

5. Erroneously Granting Writs.

Where a justice of the supreme court erroneously grants writs of certiorari and supersedeas that should have been presented to a judge of the court of appeals, the supreme court must discharge the writs, and cannot transfer the case to the court of appeals. State v. Chattanooga, 153 Tenn. 349, 284 S.W. 359, 1925 Tenn. LEXIS 31 (1926).

Where the court of appeals is without jurisdiction, the denial by a member of that court of writs of certiorari and supersedeas to review the action of a lower court may be disregarded as ill advised and without effect, the supreme court proceeding to act. First Nat'l Bank v. Planters' Nat'l Bank, 158 Tenn. 50, 12 S.W.2d 528, 1928 Tenn. LEXIS 122 (1929).

Order of court of appeals, superseding an interlocutory decree dissolving an injunction previously granted inhibiting the sale of land was dismissed where the decree of the lower court did not operate to predetermine litigated issues or operate as a denial of relief sought. First Nat'l Bank v. Planters Nat'l Bank, 9 Tenn. App. 87, — S.W.2d —, 1928 Tenn. App. LEXIS 218 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1928).

Collateral References. 21 C.J.S. Courts §§ 306, 458.

16-4-111. Effect of judgments.

The court of appeals is a court of record, and its judgment shall be executed as provided in the Tennessee rules of appellate procedure.

Acts 1925, ch. 100, § 13; Shan. Supp., § 6325a13; mod. Code 1932, § 10627; mod. C. Supp. 1950, § 10627; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-411; Acts 1981, ch. 449, § 2.

Compiler's Notes. This section may be affected by T.R.A.P. 42(a), (b) .

Law Reviews.

The Tennessee Court System — Court of Appeals (Frederic S. Le Clercq), 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 219.

Cited: Pairamore v. Pairamore, 547 S.W.2d 545, 1977 Tenn. LEXIS 559 (Tenn. 1977).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Revivor of Judgment.

The court of appeals has jurisdiction to try any questions, whether of law or fact, in connection with the issuance of a writ of scire facias to revive its judgments or in connection with any subsequent pleadings with reference thereto. Craddock v. Calcutt, 39 Tenn. App. 481, 285 S.W.2d 528, 1955 Tenn. App. LEXIS 84 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1955).

2. Petition for Certiorari.

Decree of court of appeals is not vacated by petition for certiorari but is simply unenforceable by that court for the period mentioned by this section. Ramsey v. Mutual Supply Co., 221 Tenn. 437, 427 S.W.2d 211, 1968 Tenn. LEXIS 473 (1968).

This section was modified by the 1950 code supplement to relieve petitioners for certiorari to review court of appeals judgments from the troublesome task of applying directly to a justice of the supreme court for writs of supersedeas and to relieve the justice of the more troublesome task of making a preliminary review of the record which would be necessary in every petition for review by certiorari. Ramsey v. Mutual Supply Co., 221 Tenn. 437, 427 S.W.2d 211, 1968 Tenn. LEXIS 473 (1968).

3. Contempt.

Where a violation of an injunction ordered by the court of appeals is threatened or committed during the period specified in this section, supreme court has the power to enforce such injunction under its inherent power to make orders necessary to an orderly and just appellate procedure. Ramsey v. Mutual Supply Co., 221 Tenn. 437, 427 S.W.2d 211, 1968 Tenn. LEXIS 473 (1968).

The court of appeals can after the expiration of the time for review punish the violator of an injunction for contempt of that court. Ramsey v. Mutual Supply Co., 221 Tenn. 437, 427 S.W.2d 211, 1968 Tenn. LEXIS 473 (1968).

Collateral References. 21 C.J.S. Courts §§ 456-459.

16-4-112. Concurrent sessions.

The court shall sit in sections concurrently as ordered by the presiding judge in Knoxville, Nashville and Jackson, for the purpose of hearing and determining cases before it and for such length of time as may, in the judgment of the court, be required for the dispatch of the business before the court at such places.

Acts 1925, ch. 100, § 8; Shan. Supp., § 6325a8; mod. Code 1932, § 10616; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-412; Acts 1987, ch. 256, § 1.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 2 Tenn. Juris., Appeal and Error, § 218.

Law Reviews.

An Examination of The Tennessee Law of Administrative Procedure (George Street Boone), 1 Vand. L. Rev. 339.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Panels of the Court.

Fact that plaintiff's appeal was decided by a tribunal comprised of members of the court from the middle section was not unusual nor improper as the Court of Appeals of Tennessee was one court, a single court, not three courts; the court sat in sections concurrently as ordered by the presiding judge for the purpose of hearing and determining cases before it and for such length of time as may, in the judgment of the court, be required for the dispatch of the business before the court. Further, members of the court routinely heard cases from grand divisions other than their own and the panels (the three judges assigned to hear the cases) may have been comprised of members from more than one grand division, and panels comprised solely from one section often heard cases arising from another section of the court. Houston v. Scott, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 33 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 17, 2012), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 386 (Tenn. May 23, 2012).

16-4-113. Sitting in sections — Assignment of judges.

In order to expedite the trial and decision of cases, the court of appeals, when the court deems it advisable so to do, is authorized and empowered to sit in sections of three (3) judges each, at Knoxville, Nashville and Jackson, to hear and determine cases just as though all twelve (12) members were present and participating; and the presiding judge of the court of appeals shall in such event have the right, from time to time, to assign and reassign the judges and sections.

Acts 1925, ch. 100, § 4; Shan. Supp., § 6325a4; mod. Code 1932, § 10611; Acts 1978, ch. 836, § 4; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-413.

Law Reviews.

A Simplified System of Appellate Procedure, 17 Tenn. L. Rev. 651. The Tennessee Court System — Court of Appeals (Frederic S. Le Clercq), 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 219.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Retention.

Trial court erred in holding that intermediate appellate judges were subject to retention only by the qualified voters of the grand division in which the judge resided because the General Assembly intend to create one court of appeals and not three. Hooker v. Haslam, 382 S.W.3d 358, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 511 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 27, 2012).

16-4-114. Transfers between grand divisions.

  1. Any case on the docket of the court of appeals, in any grand division, in which any member of the court residing in that grand division is disqualified to participate, upon order of two (2) of the judges residing in the grand division where the case is pending, may be transferred to, tried and determined in the court of appeals sitting in another grand division where no disqualification of judges exists; and a true copy of the order, duly certified by the clerk, together with a certified bill of the costs accrued on the appeal, shall be transmitted with the transcript of the record to the court of appeals in the grand division to which the case is transferred.
  2. The court of appeals is empowered to make all necessary rules to carry out the purpose of this section and to expedite the hearing of such cases.

Acts 1929, ch. 43, §§ 1, 2; Code 1932, §§ 10625, 10626; Acts 1961, ch. 281, § 1; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-414.

Cross-References. Grand divisions, title 4, ch. 1, part 2.

Law Reviews.

The Tennessee Court System — Court of Appeals (Frederic S. Le Clercq), 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 219.

Collateral References. 21 C.J.S. Courts §§ 456, 458.

16-4-115. Rules of appellate procedure govern.

The procedure on appeal in the court of appeals shall be governed by the Tennessee rules of appellate procedure.

Acts 1925, ch. 100, § 9; Shan. Supp., § 6325a9; mod. Code 1932, § 10617; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-415; Acts 1981, ch. 449, § 2.

Compiler's Notes. This section may be affected by T.R.A.P. 24-26.

Chapter 5
Court of Criminal Appeals

16-5-101. Court of criminal appeals established.

There is created and established an appellate court in this state to be designated and styled the court of criminal appeals of Tennessee.

Acts 1967, ch. 226, § 1; T.C.A., § 16-441.

Cross-References. Power of general assembly to create courts, Tenn. Const., art. VI, § 1.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 17 Tenn. Juris., Jurisdiction, § 21.

Law Reviews.

Tennessee Criminal Law: An Overview of the Courts and a Compendium of Tennessee Criminal Procedure (Michael R. Tilley), 5 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 90.

The Tennessee Court of Appeals: How Often It Corrects the Trial Courts — and Why, 68 Tenn. L. Rev. 557 (2001).

The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals: A Study and Analysis (Daniel J. Foley), 66 Tenn. L. Rev. 427 (1999).

The Tennessee Court System — Court of Criminal Appeals (Frederic S. Le Clercq), 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 231.

Comparative Legislation. Court of criminal appeals:

Ala.  Code § 12-3-1 et seq.

Cited: Columbia Bonding Co. v. State, 225 Tenn. 719, 476 S.W.2d 633, 1972 Tenn. LEXIS 306 (1972); Galbreath v. Bd. of Prof'l Responsibility of the Supreme Court of Tenn., 121 S.W.3d 660, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 1220 (Tenn. 2003).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Retention.

Trial court erred in holding that intermediate appellate judges were subject to retention only by the qualified voters of the grand division in which the judge resided because the General Assembly intend to create one court of appeals and not three. Hooker v. Haslam, 382 S.W.3d 358, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 511 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 27, 2012).

16-5-102. Judges — Qualifications.

The court of criminal appeals shall be composed of twelve (12) judges, of whom no more than four (4) shall reside in any grand division of the state. Immediately preceding appointment, each judge shall be at least thirty (30) years of age, shall have been a resident of the state for at least five (5) consecutive years, shall have been a resident of the grand division from which the judge is appointed for at least one (1) year. For purposes of this section, “resident” has the same meaning as defined in § 2-1-104. The judges shall be duly licensed to practice law in this state.

Acts 1967, ch. 226, § 2; 1969, ch. 330, §§ 1, 2; 1976, ch. 636, § 1; T.C.A., § 16-442; Acts 1996, ch. 847, §§ 1, 2; 2016, ch. 528, § 5.

Compiler's Notes. For the Preamble to the act concerning an orderly procedure for the appointment, confirmation, and retention of appellate court judges as required by Tennessee Constitution, Article VI, Section 3, please refer to Acts 2016, ch. 528.

Amendments. The 2016 amendment rewrote the second sentence which read: “Each judge shall not be less than thirty (30) years of age and shall have been a citizen and resident of the state for at least five (5) years prior to appointment or election under this chapter.”

Effective Dates. Acts 2016, ch. 528, § 23. January 28, 2016.

Cross-References. Grand divisions, title 4, ch.1, part 2.

Law Reviews.

The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals: A Study and Analysis (Daniel J. Foley), 66 Tenn. L. Rev. 427 (1999).

Attorney General Opinions. Factors used to determine residency status, OAG 95-019 (3/27/95).

Cited: Nix v. State, 1 Tenn. Crim. App. 517, 446 S.W.2d 266, 1969 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 338 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1969); McGee v. State, 2 Tenn. Crim. App. 100, 451 S.W.2d 709, 1969 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 356 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1969).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Residency Requirements.

Since judges of intermediate appellate courts are not assigned to any district or circuit, voting by district or circuit is not required, and this is in no way changed by the requirement that no more than four of the 12 judges on each intermediate appellate court may reside in any one of three grand divisions of Tennessee; a district is a political subdivision, and while a district usually connotes a subunit of a county and may be subject to reconfiguration, a grand division refers to one of three permanently defined, large umbrella units, each composed of many counties and districts, and a grand division is not a district within the meaning of the Constitution. Hooker v. Haslam, 437 S.W.3d 409, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 934 (Tenn. Apr. 23, 2014).

Statutes creating the intermediate courts of appeal distinguish between a residency requirement for a candidate for office and residence of voters for purposes of voting in exactly the same way as does the Constitution in establishing the Supreme Court; in both instances, a judicial candidate can be required to live in a certain geographic area as a qualification for office, but still be elected statewide without regard to geographic area in which the qualified voters reside. Hooker v. Haslam, 437 S.W.3d 409, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 934 (Tenn. Apr. 23, 2014).

Even if a grand division were deemed to be a district, the statutory limitation on residence by grand division would still be irrelevant, since the judges of the intermediate appellate courts are not assigned to any grand division; the statutory residence requirement by grand division is merely a limiting qualification for the office of intermediate appellate judge, and it is not a limitation on voting. Hooker v. Haslam, 437 S.W.3d 409, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 934 (Tenn. Apr. 23, 2014).

16-5-103. Election of judges — Oath.

  1. The judges of the court of criminal appeals shall be elected by the qualified voters of the state in a statewide retention election conducted in accordance with title 17, chapter 4, part 1. Vacancies on the court of criminal appeals shall be filled by the governor in accordance with title 17, chapter 4, part 1.
  2. Their oath of office shall be filed and entered on the minutes of the court in the particular grand division from which the judge has been appointed or elected. The oath shall likewise be filed and entered on the records in the office of the secretary of state at Nashville.

Acts 1967, ch. 226, § 3; 1969, ch. 330, § 3; 1976, ch. 636, § 2; modified; T.C.A., § 16-443; Acts 2016, ch. 528, § 19.

Compiler's Notes. For the Preamble to the act concerning an orderly procedure for the appointment, confirmation, and retention of appellate court judges as required by Tennessee Constitution, Article VI, Section 3, please refer to Acts 2016, ch. 528.

Amendments. The 2016 amendment in (a), substituted “of the state in a statewide retention election conducted in accordance with title 17, chapter 4, part 1.” for “for a full term of eight (8) years at the same time the regular judicial election is held in this state for the judges of the other courts of record.” and added the second sentence.

Effective Dates. Acts 2016, ch. 528, § 23. January 28, 2016.

Cross-References. Grand divisions, title 4, ch.1, part 2.

Law Reviews.

The Tennessee Court System — Court of Criminal Appeals (Frederic S. Le Clercq), 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 231.

16-5-104. Limitation of requirements for office.

A judge of the court of criminal appeals shall only be required to qualify as a candidate and be elected by the qualified voters of the state.

Acts 1967, ch. 226, § 4; modified; T.C.A., § 16-444.

Cross-References. Judges, qualifications, § 16-5-102.

16-5-105. Compensation and expenses — Inability of judge to serve — Replacement.

  1. The compensation of the judges of the court of criminal appeals shall be the same as that received by the judges of the court of appeals.
  2. The necessary travel expense and per diem allowance incurred by the judges in the performance of their official duties under this part shall be paid and reimbursed by the state in the same manner as authorized for the judges of the supreme court and court of appeals.
    1. When a judge of the court of criminal appeals is unable to perform the duties of office on account of absence, sickness, disqualification or other disability, the judge or the clerk of the court shall advise the chief justice of the supreme court of the inability to serve and when so advised, the chief justice may assign a judge of the supreme court, a judge of the court of appeals, a circuit or criminal judge or chancellor or a retired judge of any of those courts to the court of criminal appeals to serve such time as the chief justice may direct, except when it appears to the chief justice that the absence, sickness, disqualification or other disability of a judge of the court of criminal appeals may be protracted, the chief justice shall certify this fact to the governor and the governor shall have the power to commission a person to fill the vacancy during the inability of the judge to serve.
    2. The compensation and expense allowance for the appointed judges shall be the same as for regular judges with proper adjustments being made in the compensation of retired judges or judges of trial courts when serving on the court of criminal appeals so that the maximum received by them will not exceed the pay of the regular judges.

Acts 1967, ch. 226, § 5; 1968, ch. 414, § 1; T.C.A., § 16-445.

Cross-References. Court of appeals judges, compensation, § 16-4-103.

Court of appeals, payment of expenses, § 16-4-107.

Supreme court, payment of expenses, § 16-3-103.

Law Reviews.

The Tennessee Court System — Court of Criminal Appeals (Frederic S. Le Clercq), 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 231.

Collateral References.

Substitution of judge in state criminal trial. 45 A.L.R.5th 591.

16-5-106. Election of presiding judge — Rules of practice — Special meetings.

  1. The members of the court at the first meeting of the court, after each judicial election, shall choose one (1) of its members as presiding judge of the court of criminal appeals.
  2. The court at its first meeting under this section shall have the authority to adopt and promulgate its own rules of practice, and the rules may be revised from time to time as the court deems advisable and proper.
  3. The presiding judge shall, upon a request of a majority of the members, call special meetings of the court for the purpose of revising or reconsidering its rules of practice, or for any other purpose that may be desired.

Acts 1967, ch. 226, § 6; T.C.A., § 16-446.

Law Reviews.

The Tennessee Court System — Court of Criminal Appeals (Frederic S. Le Clercq), 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 231.

16-5-107. Places of sitting — Terms — Out of term sittings — Panels and en banc sessions — Majority required for decisions.

  1. The court of criminal appeals shall sit at Knoxville, Nashville, Jackson and such other places as the presiding judge may from time to time designate for the purpose of hearing and deciding cases and such other matters as may come before it for its consideration and determination.
  2. The regular terms of the court of criminal appeals shall be the fourth Monday in June at Knoxville; the third Monday in February at Nashville; and the second Monday in October at Jackson.
  3. The court of criminal appeals may sit at such places as the presiding judge may designate without reference to terms, for the purpose of hearing and deciding cases and other matters before it, and for such period of time as may in the judgment of the court be necessary or required for the prompt and orderly dispatch of the business before the court at such time.
  4. The court of criminal appeals shall sit in panels of three (3) judges. The court may sit en banc, or in panels of five (5) or seven (7) judges, at any regular or special term, in the discretion of the presiding judge thereof, entered upon the minutes of the particular court in each instance. In each such event, the concurrence of a majority of the judges so sitting shall be necessary to constitute a decision of the court.

Acts 1967, ch. 226, § 7; 1969, ch. 330, § 4; 1973, ch. 395, § 1; 1974, ch. 520, § 1; 1976, ch. 636, § 3; T.C.A., § 16-447; Acts 1996, ch. 704, § 1.

Law Reviews.

The Tennessee Court System — Court of Criminal Appeals (Frederic S. Le Clercq), 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 231.

Cited: Ramey v. Russell, 299 F. Supp. 947, 1969 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8599 (E.D. Tenn. 1969); Weaver v. State, 4 Tenn. Crim. App. 435, 472 S.W.2d 898, 1971 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 508 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1971); Taylor v. State, 4 Tenn. Crim. App. 524, 474 S.W.2d 160, 1971 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 414 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1971).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Retention.

Trial court erred in holding that intermediate appellate judges were subject to retention only by the qualified voters of the grand division in which the judge resided because the General Assembly intend to create one court of appeals and not three. Hooker v. Haslam, 382 S.W.3d 358, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 511 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 27, 2012).

16-5-108. Jurisdiction.

  1. The jurisdiction of the court of criminal appeals shall be appellate only, and shall extend to review of the final judgments of trial courts in:
    1. Criminal cases, both felony and misdemeanor;
    2. Habeas corpus and Post-Conviction Procedure Act proceedings attacking the validity of a final judgment of conviction or the sentence in a criminal case, and other cases or proceedings instituted with reference to or arising out of a criminal case;
    3. Civil or criminal contempt arising out of a criminal matter; and
    4. Extradition cases.
  2. The court or any judge of the court shall also have jurisdiction to grant petitions for certiorari and supersedeas in proper cases within its jurisdiction as provided by law.

Acts 1967, ch. 226, § 8; 1971, ch. 156, § 1; T.C.A., § 16-448; Acts 1989, ch. 40, § 1; 1994, ch. 609, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 1989, ch. 40, § 4 provided that any action pending on July 1, 1989, shall be maintained under law prior to the 1989 amendment by that act until its final disposition.

Textbooks. Tennessee Criminal Practice and Procedure (Raybin), §§ 12.48, 33.100.

Tennessee Jurisprudence, 2 Tenn. Juris., Appeal and Error, §§ 16, 30; 4 Tenn. Juris., Bail and Recognizance, § 11; 17 Tenn. Juris., Jurisdiction, § 21.

Law Reviews.

Appellate and Post Conviction Relief in Tennessee (Ronald W. Eades), 5 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 1.

Criminal Appeals as of Right in Tennessee (W. Mark Ward), 31 No. 6 Tenn. B.J. 19 (1995).

“Seeking Justice on Appeal,” 27 No. 4 Tenn. B.J. 28 (1991).

The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals: A Study and Analysis (Daniel J. Foley), 66 Tenn. L. Rev. 427 (1999).

The Tennessee Court System — Court of Criminal Appeals (Frederic S. Le Clercq), 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 231.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Certiorari from Supreme Court.

Defendant is entitled to have all meritorious assignments of error considered by court of criminal appeals on appeal although assignments of error without merit need not be referred to in the opinion, and supreme court cannot consider meritorious assignments of error on certiorari until they are considered in court of criminal appeals. Jacobs v. State, 224 Tenn. 106, 450 S.W.2d 581, 1970 Tenn. LEXIS 303 (1970), cert. denied, Jacobs v. Tennessee, 404 U.S. 910, 92 S. Ct. 237, 30 L. Ed. 2d 183, 1971 U.S. LEXIS 703 (1971).

2. Forfeiture of Bail Bond.

Appeal from final judgment of forfeiture of bail bond is to court of criminal appeals. Columbia Bonding Co. v. State, 225 Tenn. 719, 476 S.W.2d 633, 1972 Tenn. LEXIS 306 (1972).

3. Contempt.

Where witness in civil suit refused to produce written agreement when orally ordered to do so by chancellor and was confined to jail, such contempt was civil, not criminal. Huggins v. Follin, 500 S.W.2d 435, 1973 Tenn. LEXIS 447 (Tenn. 1973).

4. Arising Out of Criminal Case.

An appeal from the denial of a request to attend pretrial proceedings in a criminal case, and the denial of the right of the public and media to intervene and be heard in opposition to motions for closure, is a proceeding “arising out of a criminal case” under this section. State v. Drake, 701 S.W.2d 604, 1985 Tenn. LEXIS 618 (Tenn. 1985).

Appellate court dismissed defendant's appeal, challenging the denial of funding for his psychological expert, because T.R.A.P. 3(b) did not provide a proper mechanism by which the appellate court could address an appeal of an order denying expert funding; review of a denial of funds for expert services could be obtained via T.R.A.P. 9 and T.R.A.P. 10, or when appealed as part of an appeal from a judgment of conviction; however T.R.A.P. 3 did not provide a mechanism by which the appellate court could address an order denying expert funding that was not part of an appeal from a judgment of conviction. State v. Todd, — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 434 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 31, 2007), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 869 (Tenn. Sept. 17, 2007).

Where defendant was convicted of two counts of violation of the state vehicle registration law under T.C.A. § 55-3-102, a violation of the seatbelt law under T.C.A. § 55-9-603, and failure to display a driver's license in violation of T.C.A. § 55-50-351, the Warren County Circuit Court (Tennessee) had jurisdiction to hear and decide defendant's case based upon his commission of “crimes and misdemeanors” within the meaning of T.C.A. § 16-10-102. The Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee had the jurisdiction to hear his appeal, pursuant to T.C.A. § 16-5-108(a)(1). State v. Ferrell, — S.W.3d —, 2009 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 629 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 7, 2009).

Between the judgment of conviction, which referenced a later restitution hearing, and the order emanating from that hearing, the record contained a “final order” and provided a sufficient basis to invoke appellate jurisdiction. State v. Daniels, — S.W.3d —, 2010 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1087 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 23, 2010).

Appellate court had jurisdiction to hear defendant's appeal of defendant's permanent recommitment after failing mandatory outpatient treatment because, while the order followed a plea of “not guilty” and was not a “final judgment” in a criminal case, the order occurred in a proceeding “arising out of a criminal case” for which the appellate court had review authority, under T.C.A. § 16-5-108(a)(2). State v. Mallady, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 614 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 29, 2015).

5. Parole.

Tenn. Code Ann. §  4-5-323 vests appellate jurisdiction of cases brought under the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, compiled in title 4, ch. 5, in the court of appeals, not the court of criminal appeals; therefore, court of criminal appeals did not have jurisdiction over inmates appeal from chancery court, regarding parole eligibility, regardless of transfer under subdivision (a)(2). Slagle v. Reynolds, 845 S.W.2d 167, 1992 Tenn. LEXIS 701 (Tenn. 1992).

6. Review of Special Designation of Judges.

The court of criminal appeals did not have jurisdiction to review the propriety of an order of the supreme court specially designating a judge to hear a post-conviction case. Thompson v. State, 958 S.W.2d 156, 1997 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 522 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997).

7. Authority of Court.

Although the court's jurisdiction is appellate, it is not authorized to conduct hearings and determine disputed issues of fact; nonetheless, it does not logically or necessarily follow that during the appellate process a window of opportunity for criminal mayhem, with no accountability or adverse consequences, is thereby opened. State v. Williams, 52 S.W.3d 109, 2001 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 20 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001).

Where an inmate's petition for writ of error coram nobis was dismissed as untimely and a determination was not made with regard to whether due process required a tolling of the statute of limitations, remand was unnecessary because the record was sufficient to permit a meaningful review of the issue raised. Bonds v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2006 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 953 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 6, 2006), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 417 (Tenn. Apr. 16, 2007).

Denial of the inmate's petition for postconviction relief was appropriate in part because his procedural due process claim was not brought before the postconviction court; thus, the issue of whether his due process rights were impinged upon was beyond the reach of the appellate court, and even if the inmate had raised the claim earlier, he failed to include any citation to applicable legal principles that would have supported his argument. Davis v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 320 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 19, 2007), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 724 (Tenn. Aug. 13, 2007).

Defendant's appeal from the trial court restitution order on his reckless endangerment conviction was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction as the restitution order was incomplete and interlocutory in nature where the trial court intended to further adjudicate the particulars of payment at a future date. State v. Comer, 278 S.W.3d 758, 2008 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 296 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 21, 2008).

8. Final Judgment.

Since the trial court's first judgment did not contain a total restitution amount, a payment schedule, and a payment amount, it could not be considered a final judgment under T.R.A.P. 3(b) and T.C.A. § 16-5-108(a)(1). State v. Howard, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 517 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 11, 2012).

Appellate court lacked jurisdiction over the bonding company's appeal of the trial court's order granting conditional forfeiture because that order was not a final judgment, and the bonding company's failure to appeal from a judgment of final forfeiture precluded the court from exercising its jurisdiction. In re AAA Bonding Co., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 680 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 6, 2018).

23. Transfer of Cases.

Because defendant was found guilty of violating a municipal ordinance, the court of criminal appeals was without subject matter jurisdiction to consider the case, and thus, it had to transfer the case to the court of appeals for further adjudication; a circuit court order found defendant guilty of violating a city ordinance for failure to adhere to a stop sign. City of McMinnville v. Hubbard, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 104 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 20, 2019).

16-5-109. Clerks and marshals — Appeal fees and court costs.

The clerks and marshals of the supreme court shall also act and be the clerks and marshals of the court of criminal appeals. They shall perform the same duties and functions with respect to the court of criminal appeals and be subject to the same liabilities as may be prescribed by law. The appeal fees and court costs in the court of criminal appeals shall be the same as authorized by law, and neither the clerks nor marshals shall receive any additional compensation for their services as clerks and marshals of the court of criminal appeals.

Acts 1967, ch. 226, § 9; T.C.A., § 16-449.

Cross-References. Fees, § 8-21-501.

Supreme court clerks, title 18, ch. 3.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 6 Tenn. Juris., Clerks of Court, § 12.

Law Reviews.

The Tennessee Court System — Court of Criminal Appeals (Frederic S. Le Clercq), 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 231.

Cited: State v. Watts, 670 S.W.2d 246, 1984 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 2332 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1984).

16-5-110. Transfer and docketing of cases.

  1. All cases appealed to the court of criminal appeals for the purpose of review shall be filed and docketed with the clerk of the court of criminal appeals for the grand division within which the case arose. All appeal cases originating in the western grand division shall be filed with the clerk of the court of criminal appeals at Jackson. All cases from the middle grand division shall be filed with the clerk of the court at Nashville, and all cases originating in the eastern grand division shall be filed with the clerk of the court at Knoxville.
  2. The court of criminal appeals, in its discretion, may transfer any case, appeal record, or any other matter of business coming before the court from one grand division to another grand division for hearing when the respective parties agree to the transfer. Upon application or motion by either of the parties for the case to be transferred to another grand division, the court, in its discretion, may issue an order of transfer when it finds the ends of justice require, and the transfer is necessary and proper to safeguard the interest of the respective parties or in the interest of the general public welfare.

Acts 1967, ch. 226, § 10; modified; T.C.A., § 16-450; Acts 1981, ch. 449, § 2.

Compiler's Notes. This section may be affected by T.R.A.P. 17.

Cross-References. Grand divisions, title 4, ch. 1, part 2.

Law Reviews.

The Procedural Details of the Proposed Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, II. Initiation of an Appeal (John L. Sobieski, Jr.), 46 Tenn. L. Rev. 4.

The Procedural Details of the Proposed Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, V. Briefs (John L. Sobieski, Jr.), 46 Tenn. L. Rev. 69.

16-5-111. Effect of judgments.

The court of criminal appeals is a court of record, and its judgment shall be executed as provided in the Tennessee rules of appellate procedure.

Acts 1967, ch. 226, § 11; T.C.A., § 16-451; Acts 1981, ch. 449, § 2.

Compiler's Notes. This section may be affected by T.R.A.P. 39(b), 39(f), 42(a), 42(b).

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 2 Tenn. Juris., Clerks of Court, § 12.

Law Reviews.

Appellate and Post Conviction Relief in Tennessee (Ronald W. Eades), 5 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 1.

The Procedural Details of the Proposed Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, VII. Disposition of Appeals (John L. Sobieski, Jr.), 46 Tenn. L. Rev. 90.

Cited: Cole v. State, 223 Tenn. 20, 442 S.W.2d 246, 1969 Tenn. LEXIS 385 (1969); Rose v. Hodges, 423 U.S. 19, 96 S. Ct. 175, 46 L. Ed. 2d 162, 1975 U.S. LEXIS 93 (1975).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Construction with § 16-5-112.

The period specified by this section after which a judgment of the court of criminal appeals becomes final does not limit the time provided by § 16-5-112 (repealed) for petition for certiorari to the supreme court. Gossett v. State, 224 Tenn. 374, 455 S.W.2d 585, 1970 Tenn. LEXIS 385 (1970).

16-5-112. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former § 16-5-112 (Acts 1967, ch. 226, § 12; 1975, ch. 75, § 1; 1975, ch. 77, § 1; T.C.A., § 16-452) concerning certiorari from the supreme court was repealed by Acts 1981, ch. 449, § 1(1). For present provisions, see T.R.A.P. 11.

16-5-113. Office space for judges — Rental allowance — Secretaries — Salaries and travel expense.

Each judge of the court of criminal appeals shall be furnished office space in the county of the judge's residence by the state. In the event no office space is available either from the state or county, then each judge shall receive the same monthly allowance from the state as authorized by law for office rental expense. Likewise, each judge of the court of criminal appeals shall have a secretary, and the salary and travel expense allowance of the secretary shall be the same as authorized by law for the secretary of each judge of the court of appeals.

Acts 1967, ch. 226, § 13; T.C.A., § 16-453.

Chapter 6
Criminal Justice Veterans Compensation Act (“CJVC”) of 2015

16-6-101. Chapter definitions.

As used in this chapter:

  1. “Nonadversarial approach” means that the district attorney general and the defense attorney work together for the benefit of the veterans treatment court program participants and the program; and
  2. “Veterans treatment court program” means a stand-alone veterans treatment court program established by a judge of a court of this state exercising criminal jurisdiction or a veterans court track created within an existing certified drug court.

Acts 2015, ch. 453, § 3.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2015, ch. 453, § 1 provided that the act, which enacted this chapter, shall be known and may be cited as the “Criminal Justice Veterans Compensation Act of 2015” or the “CJVC Act.”

For the Preamble to the act concerning the establishment of specialized veterans treatment courts, see Acts 2015, ch. 453.

Effective Dates. Acts 2015, ch. 453, § 15. July 1, 2015.

16-6-102. Powers of veterans treatment court program.

A veterans treatment court program shall have the same powers as the court that created it. Any disagreements shall be resolved prior to court and not in front of the participants.

Acts 2015, ch. 453, § 4.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2015, ch. 453, § 1 provided that the act, which enacted this chapter, shall be known and may be cited as the “Criminal Justice Veterans Compensation Act of 2015” or the “CJVC Act.”

For the Preamble to the act concerning the establishment of specialized veterans treatment courts, see Acts 2015, ch. 453.

Effective Dates. Acts 2015, ch. 453, § 15. July 1, 2015.

16-6-103. Key components of veterans treatment court programs.

All veterans treatment court programs in this state shall be established and operated according to the following ten (10) key components as adopted by the National Clearinghouse for Veterans Treatment Courts at the National Association of Drug Court Professionals:

  1. Veterans treatment courts integrate alcohol and drug treatment and mental health services with justice system case processing;
  2. Veterans treatment courts promote public safety while protecting participants' due process rights by prosecution and defense counsel using a nonadversarial approach;
  3. Veterans treatment courts identify eligible participants early and promptly place them in the veterans treatment court program;
  4. Veterans treatment courts provide access to a continuum of alcohol, drug, mental health, and other related treatment and rehabilitation services;
  5. Veterans treatment courts monitor abstinence by frequent alcohol and other drug testing;
  6. Veterans treatment courts establish a coordinated strategy to govern responses to participants' compliance;
  7. Veterans treatment courts maintain ongoing judicial interaction with each veteran as an essential component of the program;
  8. Veterans treatment courts utilize monitoring and evaluation to measure the achievement of program goals and gauge effectiveness;
  9. Veterans treatment courts employ continuing interdisciplinary education and training to promote effective veterans treatment court planning, implementation, and operations; and
  10. Veterans treatment courts forge partnerships among the court, the veterans administration, public agencies, and community-based organizations to generate local support and enhance veterans treatment court effectiveness.

Acts 2015, ch. 453, § 5.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2015, ch. 453, § 1 provided that the act, which enacted this chapter, shall be known and may be cited as the “Criminal Justice Veterans Compensation Act of 2015” or the “CJVC Act.”

For the Preamble to the act concerning the establishment of specialized veterans treatment courts, see Acts 2015, ch. 453.

Effective Dates. Acts 2015, ch. 453, § 15. July 1, 2015.

16-6-104. Administration by department of mental health and substance abuse services.

The department of mental health and substance abuse services shall administer veterans treatment court programs by:

  1. Defining, developing, and gathering outcome measures for veterans treatment court programs, established by this chapter;
  2. Collecting, reporting, and disseminating veterans court treatment program data;
  3. Supporting a state veterans treatment mentor program;
  4. Sponsoring and coordinating state veterans treatment court program training;
  5. Awarding, administering, and evaluating state veterans treatment court program grants;
  6. Developing standards of operation for veterans treatment court programs to ensure there is a significant population of veterans in the criminal justice system willing to volunteer to participate in veterans treatment court programs so that funds are allocated to meet the greatest need; and
  7. Establishing three (3) veterans treatment court advisory committee member positions on the drug court advisory committee established by § 16-22-108.

Acts 2015, ch. 453, § 6.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2015, ch. 453, § 1 provided that the act, which enacted this chapter, shall be known and may be cited as the “Criminal Justice Veterans Compensation Act of 2015” or the “CJVC Act.”

For the Preamble to the act concerning the establishment of specialized veterans treatment courts, see Acts 2015, ch. 453.

Effective Dates. Acts 2015, ch. 453, § 15. July 1, 2015.

16-6-105. Application for veterans treatment court program grant funds — Use of funds.

Through the department of mental health and substance abuse services, a court exercising criminal jurisdiction within this state or a veterans treatment court program may apply for veterans treatment court program grant funds established in § 16-22-109(e)(4), if funds are available, to:

  1. Fund a full-time or part-time program director position;
  2. Fund veterans treatment court program staff whose job duties are directly related to program operations;
  3. Fund substance abuse treatment, mental health treatment, and other direct services for veterans treatment court program participants;
  4. Fund drug testing;
  5. Fund program costs directly related to program operations; and
  6. Implement or continue veterans treatment court program operations.

Acts 2015, ch. 453, § 7.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2015, ch. 453, § 1 provided that the act, which enacted this chapter, shall be known and may be cited as the “Criminal Justice Veterans Compensation Act of 2015” or the “CJVC Act.”

For the Preamble to the act concerning the establishment of specialized veterans treatment courts, see Acts 2015, ch. 453.

Effective Dates. Acts 2015, ch. 453, § 15. July 1, 2015.

16-6-106. Prohibited uses of veterans treatment court program grant awards.

The department of mental health and substance abuse services veterans treatment court program grant awards shall not be:

  1. Used to pay for costs not directly related to veterans treatment court program operations;
  2. Made to any court that does not agree to operate its veterans treatment court program in accordance with the principles set out in this chapter;
  3. Used for construction or land acquisition;
  4. Used to pay bonuses or commissions to any individuals or organizations; or
  5. Used to form a corporation.

Acts 2015, ch. 453, § 8.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2015, ch. 453, § 1 provided that the act, which enacted this chapter, shall be known and may be cited as the “Criminal Justice Veterans Compensation Act of 2015” or the “CJVC Act.”

For the Preamble to the act concerning the establishment of specialized veterans treatment courts, see Acts 2015, ch. 453.

Effective Dates. Acts 2015, ch. 453, § 15. July 1, 2015.

Chapters 7-9
[Reserved]

Chapter 10
Circuit and Criminal Courts

Part 1
Jurisdiction and Powers

16-10-101. General jurisdiction.

The circuit court is a court of general jurisdiction, and the judge of the circuit court shall administer right and justice according to law, in all cases where the jurisdiction is not conferred upon another tribunal.

Code 1858, § 4225 (deriv. Acts 1835-1836, ch. 5, § 7); Shan., § 6063; Code 1932, § 10318; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-501.

Cross-References. Bonds of county officers, duties, §§ 8-19-2058-19-208.

Exclusive original jurisdiction of juvenile court, § 37-1-103.

Personal injury or death cases in chancery or circuit courts, reports, § 16-21-111.

State system of personnel administration, § 8-30-101 et seq.

Textbooks. Pritchard on Wills and Administration of Estates (4th ed., Phillips and Robinson), § 338.

Tennessee Jurisprudence, 10 Tenn. Juris., Elections, § 18; 16 Tenn. Juris., Judges, § 9; 17 Tenn. Juris., Jurisdiction, § 22.

Law Reviews.

Laches at Law in Tennessee, 28 U. Mem. L. Rev. 211 (1997).

The Tennessee Court of Appeals: How Often It Corrects the Trial Courts — and Why, 68 Tenn. L. Rev. 557 (2001).

The Tennessee Court System — Circuit Court (Frederic S. Le Clercq), 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 241.

Comparative Legislation. Circuit courts:

Ala.  Code § 12-11-1 et seq.

Ark.  Code § 16-13-201 et seq.

Ga. O.C.G.A. § 15-6-1 et seq.

Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 23A.010 et seq.

Miss.  Code Ann. § 9-7-1 et seq.

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 478.010 et seq.

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-130 et seq.

Va. Code § 17-116.1 et seq.

Cited: Harris v. Nashville Trust Co., 5 Tenn. Civ. App. (5 Higgins) 678 (1914); State v. Bockman, 139 Tenn. 422, 201 S.W. 741, 1917 Tenn. LEXIS 118 (1917); Roberts v. Vaughn, 142 Tenn. 361, 219 S.W. 1034, 1919 Tenn. LEXIS 65, 9 A.L.R. 1528 (1920); Carriger v. Morristown, 148 Tenn. 585, 256 S.W. 883, 1923 Tenn. LEXIS 45 (1923).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. In General.

Circuit court has jurisdiction of suits in an equitable nature in absence of demurrer to jurisdiction as provided in § 16-10-111. Hewgley v. Trice, 207 Tenn. 466, 340 S.W.2d 918, 1960 Tenn. LEXIS 482 (1960).

In a driver's challenge to circuit court's declaration that she was a motor vehicle habitual offender (MVHO), denial of the driver's motion asking that the MVHO order be declared void was proper because circuit court had subject matter over the driver; proceedings to revoke or suspend driving privileges were civil in nature and not criminal, and such a civil case was properly heard in circuit court because circuit court was a court of general jurisdiction. State v. O'Neal, — S.W.3d —, 2008 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 563 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 8, 2008).

Because the offense occurred in Lawrence County, Tenneesee the Lawrence County Circuit Court had subject matter jurisdiction over defendant's misdemeanor charges; defendant, a resident of the State by his own admission, drove a motor vehicle on a public highway in Lawrence County and then personally appeared in the Lawrence County Circuit Court to stand trial, thus vesting that court with personal jurisdiction. State v. Hirsch, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 887 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 28, 2017).

2. Original Jurisdiction.

Where jurisdiction is not conferred on some other court, the circuit court has original jurisdiction. Staples v. Brown, 113 Tenn. 639, 85 S.W. 254, 1904 Tenn. LEXIS 56 (1904); Johnson v. White, 171 Tenn. 536, 106 S.W.2d 222, 1937 Tenn. LEXIS 134 (1937).

Concomitant with any given court's authority to adjudicate certain types of cases between parties properly subject to being haled into that court is the obligation to exercise that authority in all cases where the jurisdiction is not conferred upon another tribunal. Young v. Kittrell, 833 S.W.2d 505, 1992 Tenn. App. LEXIS 120 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992).

Trial court erred in concluding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider a third party defendant's post-trial motion for attorney's fees and expenses incurred in defending the third party action where its judgment was not yet final and no appeal had been perfected when defendant made the request. Homelift of Nashville, Inc. v. Porta, Inc., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 551 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 11, 2017).

3. Election Contests.

The circuit court takes jurisdiction to try a contest over the election of mayor of a city, under the provision of this section. Baker v. Mitchell, 105 Tenn. 610, 59 S.W. 137, 1900 Tenn. LEXIS 111 (1900); Adcock v. Houk, 122 Tenn. 269, 122 S.W. 979, 1909 Tenn. LEXIS 22 (1909); Taylor v. Carr, 125 Tenn. 235, 141 S.W. 745, 1911 Tenn. LEXIS 21 (1911).

The provision of this section does not deprive the chancery court of its jurisdiction to restrain the exercise of unconstitutional powers, and chancery may restrain the removal of a county seat, for want of the requisite vote, for such suit is not a contested election case. Lindsay v. Allen, 112 Tenn. 637, 82 S.W. 171, 1904 Tenn. LEXIS 61 (1904).

Contest of an election to determine whether a county should take stock in a railroad was not an election contest falling within the jurisdiction of the circuit court under the provisions of this section but was an action which regularly should have been brought in chancery court. Catlett v. Knoxville, S. & E. R. Co., 120 Tenn. 699, 112 S.W. 559, 1908 Tenn. LEXIS 52 (1908).

Cases involving annexation of corporate territory, county subscriptions to railroad companies and removal of county seats are not in the classification of contested elections so as to fall within the jurisdiction of the circuit court but are under the class of cases where the chancery court restrains officers from the exercise of unconstitutional power. Adcock v. Houk, 122 Tenn. 269, 122 S.W. 979, 1909 Tenn. LEXIS 22 (1909).

This statute is broad and comprehensive and affords a remedy in an election contest where it is not conferred upon any other tribunal. Johnson v. White, 171 Tenn. 536, 106 S.W.2d 222, 1937 Tenn. LEXIS 134 (1937).

4. —Cumulative Jurisdiction of City Council.

A city council is not a “judicial tribunal,” within the meaning of this section, and the circuit court is not deprived of its original jurisdiction by giving a city council only cumulative jurisdiction of contested election. Taylor v. Carr, 125 Tenn. 235, 141 S.W. 745, 1911 Tenn. LEXIS 21 (1911).

5. City Board of Censors.

Circuit court properly granted writ of certiorari to review action of board of censors of city of Memphis so as to try de novo and pass upon the merits of the controversy. Binford v. Carline, 9 Tenn. App. 364, — S.W.2d —, 1928 Tenn. App. LEXIS 246 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1928).

6. Juvenile Court.

Circuit court has jurisdiction in an action of common-law certiorari to correct a pretrial action of juvenile court. State v. Womack, 591 S.W.2d 437, 1979 Tenn. App. LEXIS 344 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1979).

7. Effect of Possible Transfer.

A possible transfer to criminal court is not sufficient grounds for negating the statutory general authority of the circuit court in favor of the specific, limited authority of the criminal court which does not arise until transfer. State v. Womack, 591 S.W.2d 437, 1979 Tenn. App. LEXIS 344 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1979).

8. Judicial Immunity.

Court of general jurisdiction of Tennessee and its presiding judge cannot be sued for acts done in exercise of judicial function. Wood v. Circuit Court of Warren County, 331 F. Supp. 1245, 1971 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13389 (E.D. Tenn. 1971).

9. Construction with Other Sections.

This section deals with the general powers and jurisdiction of the circuit court and in no way modifies the provisions of § 16-10-106. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Bradley, 178 Tenn. 317, 157 S.W.2d 829, 1941 Tenn. LEXIS 61 (1942).

10. Child Support Decrees.

Circuit court, under its powers to administer justice in all cases where jurisdiction was not conferred upon another tribunal, had jurisdiction to modify child support decree originally granted by subsequently abolished county court. Jarvis v. Jarvis, 664 S.W.2d 694, 1983 Tenn. App. LEXIS 715 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983).

11. Action for Contribution.

An action for contribution is within the circuit court's general jurisdiction. Young v. Kittrell, 833 S.W.2d 505, 1992 Tenn. App. LEXIS 120 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992).

12. Termination of Parental Rights And Adoption.

Trial court erred in separating grandparents'  termination and adoption actions and transferring only the termination portion of the proceedings to the juvenile court because once the grandparents filed their adoption and termination petition, the trial court acquired exclusive jurisdiction over the matter to the exclusion of all other courts, including the juvenile court. In re Tyler G., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 280 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 3, 2017).

Collateral References. 20 Am. Jur. 2d Courts §§ 87, 88, 91.

21 C.J.S. Courts §§ 11, 456.

Disqualification of judge on ground of being a witness in the case. 22 A.L.R.3d 1198.

Res judicata as affected by limitation of jurisdiction of court which rendered judgment. 83 A.L.R.2d 977.

16-10-102. Criminal jurisdiction.

The circuit court has exclusive original jurisdiction of all crimes and misdemeanors, either at common law or by statute, unless otherwise expressly provided by statute or this code.

Code 1858, § 4226 (deriv. Acts 1835-1836, ch. 19, § 3); Shan., § 6064; mod. Code 1932, § 10319; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-502.

Cross-References. Original jurisdiction of criminal matters, § 40-1-108.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 17 Tenn. Juris., Jurisdiction, § 22.

Law Reviews.

The Tennessee Court System — Circuit Court (Frederic S. Le Clercq), 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 241.

Attorney General Opinions. Jurisdiction of juvenile courts over misdemeanors of child abuse and neglect and contributing to delinquency, OAG 93-24 (3/29/93).

Cited: State v. McFarland, 638 S.W.2d 416, 1982 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 378 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1982); State v. Keller, 813 S.W.2d 146, 1991 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 214 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991); State v. Nixon, 977 S.W.2d 119, 1997 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1202 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997); State v. Booher, 978 S.W.2d 953, 1997 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 799 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997); Clinton Books, Inc. v. City of Memphis, 197 S.W.3d 749, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 313 (Tenn. 2006); Haynie v. Bell, — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 486 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 22, 2007); Brewer v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2008 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 266 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 8, 2008); Blackwell v. Haslam, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 23 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 11, 2012).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Effect of Statute.

The moment an offense was made a misdemeanor, it became an offense cognizable in the circuit and criminal courts by operation of this section. State v. O'Hara, 1 Shan. 457 (1875).

2. Illustrative Cases.

Where defendant was convicted of two counts of violation of the state vehicle registration law under T.C.A. § 55-3-102, a violation of the seatbelt law under T.C.A. § 55-9-603, and failure to display a driver's license in violation of T.C.A. § 55-50-351, the Warren County Circuit Court (Tennessee) had jurisdiction to hear and decide defendant's case based upon his commission of “crimes and misdemeanors” pursuant to T.C.A. § 16-10-102. The Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee had the jurisdiction to hear his appeal in accordance with T.C.A. § 16-5-108(a)(1). State v. Ferrell, — S.W.3d —, 2009 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 629 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 7, 2009).

Defendant's act of driving a vehicle without current registration on a highway violated both T.C.A. §§ 55-3-102 and 55-4-104, and defendant was not entitled to be convicted under one statute in preference to the other. His sentence of 30 days in jail and a $ 50 fine was proper under T.C.A. § 40-35-111(e)(3), and the circuit court had jurisdiction of the crime under T.C.A. § 16-10-102. State v. Ralph, — S.W.3d —, 2010 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 46 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 21, 2010), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2010 Tenn. LEXIS 624 (Tenn. June 25, 2010).

Trial court did not err by denying defendant's motion to dismiss because defendant presented nothing to indicate that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over defendant, who appeared before the trial court, or over the subject matter of the criminal case; the indictment alleged the commission of criminal offenses, and the trial court was empowered to adjudicate criminal cases. State v. Williams, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 41 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 20, 2015), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 364 (Tenn. Apr. 20, 2015).

Trial court had the authority to preside over defendant's criminal charges because defendant was charged with several crimes, including driving with a suspended license, and defendant's vehicle was in fact a “motor vehicle” within the meaning of T.C.A. § 55-50-504(a)(1); defendant's refusal to consent to the laws of the State did not exempt him from following them or defeat the jurisdiction of the courts if he committed a violation of state statute. State v. Webber, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 894 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 6, 2015), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 266 (Tenn. Mar. 30, 2016).

Construed together, T.C.A. §§ 39-13-203 and 40-1-108 limited the chancery court's exercise of subject matter jurisdiction over defendant's declaratory judgment action seeking to enjoin his execution on the ground he met the criteria for intellectual disability because the grant of subject matter jurisdiction to the chancery court had to be express, and there was no such express grant in the intellectual disability statute. Payne v. Carpenter, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 556 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 2, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 877 (Tenn. Nov. 16, 2016).

Chancery court properly dismissed, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, an inmate's declaratory judgment action because sovereign immunity barred his suit against the warden and state attorney general where he failed to state a claim against them in their individual capacities in the absence of a claim that the statute was unconstitutional, exclusive original subject matter jurisdiction over all crimes and misdemeanors was vested in circuit courts, the determination of whether defendant had an intellectual disability at the time of the offense was a part of the prosecution and sentencing processes, and there was no such express grant of subject matter jurisdiction to the chancery court in the intellectual disability statute. Chalmers v. Carpenter, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 558 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 4, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 884 (Tenn. Nov. 16, 2016).

3. Jurisdiction.

Chancery court properly dismissed, for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, defendant's complaint seeking a declaration that he was ineligible to be sentenced to death because the claims were barred by sovereign immunity where, in the absence of a claim that the intellectual disability statute was unconstitutional, defendant failed to state a claim against the warden and state attorney general in their individual capacity, the determination of whether defendant had an intellectual disability at the time of the offense was a part of the prosecution and sentencing processes, and there was no express grant of subject matter jurisdiction to the chancery court in intellectual disability statute. Sims v. Carpenter, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 560 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 4, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 874 (Tenn. Nov. 16, 2016).

Because the offense occurred in Lawrence County, Tennessee the Lawrence County Circuit Court had subject matter jurisdiction over defendant's misdemeanor charges; defendant, a resident of the State by his own admission, drove a motor vehicle on a public highway in Lawrence County and then personally appeared in the Lawrence County Circuit Court to stand trial, thus vesting that court with personal jurisdiction. State v. Hirsch, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 887 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 28, 2017).

Collateral References. 20 Am. Jur. 2d Courts §§ 87, 88, 91.

21 C.J.S. Courts §§ 11, 19.

Const. Law 65.

16-10-103. Will contests.

The circuit court has jurisdiction to try and determine all issues made up to contest the validity of last wills and testaments.

Code 1858, § 4227 (deriv. Acts 1835-1836, ch. 5, § 9); Shan., § 6065; Code 1932, § 10320; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-503; Acts 1991, ch. 152, § 1.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 12 Tenn. Juris., Executors and Administrators, § 5; 17 Tenn. Juris., Jurisdiction, § 22.

Law Reviews.

The Tennessee Court System — Circuit Court (Frederic S. Le Clercq), 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 241.

Cited: State v. Lancaster, 119 Tenn. 638, 105 S.W. 858, 1907 Tenn. LEXIS 27 (1907); Scott v. Atkins, 44 Tenn. App. 353, 314 S.W.2d 52, 1957 Tenn. App. LEXIS 161 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1957); In re Estate of Powers, 767 S.W.2d 659, 1988 Tenn. App. LEXIS 756 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. In General.

Where certain papers were offered for probate as will in county court and heirs at law appeared and contested the validity of the alleged will and the county court ordered that the fact of contest be certified to the circuit court and that the original papers be certified to the circuit court this was sufficient to vest the circuit court with jurisdiction. Druen v. Hudson, 17 Tenn. App. 428, 68 S.W.2d 146, 1933 Tenn. App. LEXIS 77 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1933).

2. More than One Will Propounded.

More than one will may be propounded to a jury in a circuit court during the trial of issues of devisavit vel non. Lillard v. Tolliver, 154 Tenn. 304, 285 S.W. 576, 1925 Tenn. LEXIS 117 (1926).

3. Interest to Contest.

A testatrix's husband had sufficient interest to contest will where they were beneficiaries under a prior will and testatrix left no other relatives by blood or marriage. Melody v. Hamblin, 21 Tenn. App. 687, 115 S.W.2d 237, 1937 Tenn. App. LEXIS 69 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1937).

4. Proponent Relying on Estoppel as to Sanity.

Proponent of will may rely on defense that contestant is estopped to contest on ground of insanity of testator, though proponent failed to plead estoppel specially, the contest being treated as legal action and not suit in equity. Melody v. Hamblin, 21 Tenn. App. 687, 115 S.W.2d 237, 1937 Tenn. App. LEXIS 69 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1937).

5. Ascertaining Fees.

In a will contest, the circuit court after a compromise judgment, may refer the cause to the clerk to ascertain fees of counsel of infant contestant. Roberts v. Vaughn, 142 Tenn. 361, 219 S.W. 1034, 1919 Tenn. LEXIS 65, 9 A.L.R. 1528 (1920).

Decisions Under Prior Law

1. Exclusiveness of Jurisdiction.

Jurisdiction to try an issue of devisavit vel non is exclusively in the circuit court, and the chancery court has no jurisdiction to try such issue. Section 16-11-102 does not confer this jurisdiction on the chancery court. The chancery court cannot even try the issue as an incident in a suit involving other matter of proper equitable congizance, but should direct the parties to take appropriate steps to secure such a trial in the circuit court. Simmons v. Leonard, 89 Tenn. 622, 15 S.W. 444, 1890 Tenn. LEXIS 86 (1891); Simmons v. Leonard, 91 Tenn. 183, 18 S.W. 280, 1891 Tenn. LEXIS 92, 30 Am. St. Rep. 875 (1892).

The jurisdiction of the circuit court is exclusive in the matter of the contest of wills; therefore a chancery court cannot entertain and try an issue of devisavit vel non although it is presented in connection with matters of equitable cognizance. Muse v. Sluder, 600 S.W.2d 237, 1980 Tenn. App. LEXIS 347 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980).

Collateral References. 21 C.J.S. Courts §§ 11, 299.

Courts 485, 487 (1, 5, 7, 10).

16-10-104. Restoration of citizenship.

The circuit court has exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine applications to be restored to citizenship, made by persons who have been rendered infamous by the judgment of any court of this state.

Code 1858, § 4228 (deriv. Acts 1851-1852, ch. 30, § 1); Shan., § 6066; Code 1932, § 10321; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-504.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 6 Tenn. Juris., Citizenship, § 2; 17 Tenn. Juris., Jurisdiction, § 22.

Law Reviews.

Tennessee Civil Disabilities: A Systematic Approach (Neil P. Cohen), 41 Tenn. L. Rev. 253.

Cited: In re Curtis, 6 Tenn. Civ. App. (6 Higgins) 12 (1915).

Collateral References. 21 C.J.S. Courts §§ 11, 490.

Courts 472.1.

16-10-105. Arbitrations and agreed cases.

The circuit court has jurisdiction to enter judgments on awards of arbitrators and to hear and determine agreed cases.

Code 1858, § 4229 (deriv. Acts 1851-1852, ch. 173); Shan., § 6067; Code 1932, § 10322; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-505.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 17 Tenn. Juris., Jurisdiction, § 22.

Law Reviews.

The Tennessee Court System — Circuit Court (Frederic S. Le Clercq), 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 241.

Cited: Kelly v. Milan, 21 F. 842, 1884 U.S. App. LEXIS 2460 (C.C.D. Tenn. 1884).

16-10-106. Contractual debts and demands.

The circuit court has jurisdiction, concurrent with courts of general sessions, to the extent of the jurisdiction of the courts of general sessions, of all debts and demands on contract over fifty dollars ($50.00).

Code 1858, § 4230 (deriv. Acts 1835-1836, ch. 5, § 7); Shan., § 6068; Code 1932, § 10323; impl. am. Acts 1979, ch. 68, §§ 2, 3; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-506.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 17 Tenn. Juris., Jurisdiction, § 22; 19 Tenn. Juris., Motions and Summary Proceedings, § 5.

Law Reviews.

The Tennessee Court System — Circuit Court (Frederic S. Le Clercq), 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 241.

Cited: Lee v. Hall, 790 S.W.2d 293, 1990 Tenn. App. LEXIS 168 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Effect of Other Statutes.

A statute increasing the jurisdiction of justices of the peace (now general sessions court) does not operate to abridge the existing jurisdiction of the circuit court. Taylor, Cole & McLeod v. Pope, 45 Tenn. 413, 1868 Tenn. LEXIS 23 (1868), overruled, A. J. Roach & Co. v. Turk, 56 Tenn. 708, 1872 Tenn. LEXIS 196, 24 Am. Rep. 360 (1872).

Section 16-10-101 deals with the general powers and jurisdiction of the circuit court and in no way modifies the provisions of this section. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Bradley, 178 Tenn. 317, 157 S.W.2d 829, 1941 Tenn. LEXIS 61 (1942).

2. Basis of Jurisdiction.

The jurisdiction of the court does not depend upon the result of the case, but on the amount of the “debt or demand” constituting the foundation of the suit. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Bradley, 178 Tenn. 317, 157 S.W.2d 829, 1941 Tenn. LEXIS 61 (1942).

Trial court erred in concluding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider a third party defendant's post-trial motion for attorney's fees and expenses incurred in defending the third party action where its judgment was not yet final and no appeal had been perfected when defendant made the request. Homelift of Nashville, Inc. v. Porta, Inc., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 551 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 11, 2017).

3. Establishment of Prima Facie Jurisdiction.

If the debt or demand set forth in the declaration exceeds $50.00 the court has prima facie jurisdiction. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Bradley, 178 Tenn. 317, 157 S.W.2d 829, 1941 Tenn. LEXIS 61 (1942).

4. Issue as to Jurisdictional Amount.

Where the writ and declaration are for a sum sufficiently large to give the court jurisdiction, the judgment will be valid, though it be for a sum less than the jurisdictional sum, unless the defendant put the question of jurisdiction in issue by plea in abatement resting the point on the sum actually in dispute. Ross v. Jackson, 3 Tenn. 406, 1 Cooke, 1813 Tenn. LEXIS 48 (1813); Martin v. Carter, 9 Tenn. 489, 1831 Tenn. LEXIS 29 (1831); Covington v. Neilson, 14 Tenn. 474, 14 Tenn. 475, 1834 Tenn. LEXIS 117 (1834). See Jourdan v. Barry, 5 Tenn. 102, 1817 Tenn. LEXIS 63 (1817); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Bradley, 178 Tenn. 317, 157 S.W.2d 829, 1941 Tenn. LEXIS 61 (1942).

If the value of the debt or demand is less than $50.00, although averred in the declaration to be over $50.00, a plea in abatement to the jurisdiction of the circuit court will lie. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Bradley, 178 Tenn. 317, 157 S.W.2d 829, 1941 Tenn. LEXIS 61 (1942).

5. Mechanic's Liens.

The circuit court has no jurisdiction to enforce mechanic's lien where amount does not exceed $50.00. Phillips-Burtoff Mfg. Co. v. Campbell, 93 Tenn. 469, 25 S.W. 961, 1893 Tenn. LEXIS 74 (1894).

16-10-107. Change of name — Legitimation.

The circuit court and the chancery court have concurrent jurisdiction to change and alter the names of persons and to legitimate children.

Code 1858, § 4231 (deriv. Acts 1805, ch. 2); Shan., § 6069; Code 1932, § 10324; impl. am. Acts 1951, ch. 202; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-507; Acts 1984, ch. 682, § 1.

Cross-References. Paternity and legitimation, title 36, ch. 2, part 3.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 17 Tenn. Juris., Jurisdiction, § 22.

Law Reviews.

Change of Names, Legitimation, and Adoption, 19 Tenn. L. Rev. 418.

Cited: Milwaukee Ins. Co. v. Gordon, 54 Tenn. App. 279, 390 S.W.2d 680, 1964 Tenn. App. LEXIS 153 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1964).

Collateral References.

Circumstances justifying grant denial or denial of petition to change adult's name. 79 A.L.R.3d 562.

Right of married woman to use maiden surname. 67 A.L.R.3d 1266.

Courts 472.3.

16-10-108. Divorce — Adoption — Trustees.

The circuit court has concurrent jurisdiction with the chancery court to grant divorces, to authorize the adoption of children, to release testamentary and other trustees, and to appoint trustees in place of those released or dead, and also to decree, on petitions of trustees, by will or otherwise, for the sale of property, real or personal.

Code 1858, § 4232 (deriv. Acts 1835-1836, ch. 19, § 4; 1835-1836, ch. 20, § 1; 1845-1846, ch. 194; 1847-1848, ch. 13); Shan., § 6070; Code 1932, § 10325; Acts 1951, ch. 202, § 40 (Williams, § 9572.52); T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-508.

Cross-References. Adoption, title 36, ch. 1.

Appointment and removal of trustees, title 35, ch. 1.

Divorce and annulment, title 36, ch. 4.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 9 Tenn. Juris., Divorce and Alimony, §§ 2, 18; 11 Tenn. Juris., Equity, § 28; 17 Tenn. Juris., Jurisdiction, § 22.

Law Reviews.

The Tennessee Court System — Circuit Court (Frederic S. Le Clercq), 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 241.

Cited: Davis v. Davis, 87 Tenn. 200, 10 S.W. 363, 1888 Tenn. LEXIS 53 (1889); Leach v. Cowan, 125 Tenn. 182, 140 S.W. 1070, 1911 Tenn. LEXIS 18 (1911); Rains v. Rains, 58 Tenn. App. 214, 428 S.W.2d 650, 1968 Tenn. App. LEXIS 295 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1968); In re Shumate, 39 B.R. 808, 1984 Bankr. LEXIS 5780 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1984); Sizemore v. Sizemore, — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 486 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 30, 2007).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Misjoinder of Actions.

Where a party filed suit for divorce in a court of law, therewith also seeking to have a deed from the state set aside, there was a manifest misjoinder of actions, and the same were appropriately severed, and, as that phase of the action relating to the deed involved matters peculiarly and exclusively with the jurisdiction of equity, subsequent proceedings at law on the question of the deed where properly enjoined, this section and § 16-10-109 being considered inapplicable. McGee v. Carter, 31 Tenn. App. 141, 212 S.W.2d 902, 1948 Tenn. App. LEXIS 78 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1948).

2. Concurrent Jurisdiction.

Circuit court erred in modifying chancery court's permanent parenting plan where the record was devoid of any evidence showing that entry of modified permanent parenting plan was necessary to effectuate mother's order of protection against father because although circuit court would have had jurisdiction under T.C.A. § 16-10-108 concurrent with chancery court, jurisdiction remained in chancery court unless and until jurisdiction was properly vested in another court. Swan v. Swan, — S.W.3d —, 2008 Tenn. App. LEXIS 552 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 24, 2008).

3. Jurisdiction.

Trial court had subject matter jurisdiction to hear a father's petition for change of custody because the statute was not applicable; the allegations in the petition were not tantamount to allegations of dependency and neglect under the statute but were more in the nature of a disagreement over the long-term manner of addressing the children's psychological, behavioral, and educational issues. Holley v. Holley, 420 S.W.3d 756, 2013 Tenn. App. LEXIS 361 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 31, 2013), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 794 (Tenn. Oct. 16, 2013).

Mother was not entitled to relief from the circuit court's judgment entering a modified Permanent Parenting Plan (PPP) because the father appropriately filed his petition seeking modification of the PPP in the circuit court, which possessed continuing, exclusive subject matter jurisdiction of divorce decrees. Cox v. Lucas, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. LEXIS 218 (Tenn. May 29, 2019).

Collateral References.

Court's power to appoint additional trustees over number specified on trust instrument. 59 A.L.R.3d 1129.

Validity and construction of statutory provision relating to jurisdiction of court for purpose of divorce for servicemen. 73 A.L.R.3d 431.

Courts 472.1.

16-10-109. Partition and sale of property.

The circuit court has concurrent jurisdiction with the chancery and county courts to make partition and distribution; and, for this purpose, to sell property, real or personal, if necessary, or manifestly to the interest of the parties; and to sell land to pay debts of decedents where the personal assets are insufficient.

Code 1858, § 4233 (deriv. Acts 1835-1836, ch. 19, § 4; 1835-1836, ch. 20, § 1); Shan., § 6071; Code 1932, § 10326; Acts 1976, ch. 529, § 3; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-509.

Cross-References.  Distribution, partition, and sale of realty in certain counties, § 16-16-108.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 2 Tenn. Juris., Appeal and Error, § 124; 11 Tenn. Juris., Equity, § 28; 17 Tenn. Juris., Jurisdiction, § 22.

Law Reviews.

The Tennessee Court System — Chancery Court (Frederic S. Le Clercq), 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 281.

The Tennessee Court System — Circuit Court (Frederic S. Le Clercq), 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 241.

Cited: Summers v. Conger, 43 Tenn. App. 286, 307 S.W.2d 936, 1957 Tenn. App. LEXIS 116 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1957).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Sale of Lands.

Circuit court's jurisdiction is concurrent with that of the chancery and county courts for the sale of lands for partition and to pay debts of a decedent. Moore's Adm'rs v. Widow & Heirs, 30 Tenn. 512, 1851 Tenn. LEXIS 91 (1851); Parker v. Britt, 51 Tenn. 243, 1871 Tenn. LEXIS 154 (1871); Thompson v. Mebane, 51 Tenn. 370, 1871 Tenn. LEXIS 177 (1871); Kindell v. Titus, 56 Tenn. 727, 1872 Tenn. LEXIS 198 (1872); Connell v. Walker, 74 Tenn. 709, 1881 Tenn. LEXIS 201 (1881); Davis v. Davis, 87 Tenn. 200, 10 S.W. 363, 1888 Tenn. LEXIS 53 (1889); Bashaw v. Temple, 115 Tenn. 596, 91 S.W. 202, 1905 Tenn. LEXIS 93 (1906); Key v. Harris, 116 Tenn. 161, 92 S.W. 235, 1905 Tenn. LEXIS 15 (1905); Puckett v. Wynns, 132 Tenn. 513, 178 S.W. 1184, 1915 Tenn. LEXIS 41 (1915).

2. Matters Not Constituting Partition.

A petition of widow seeking to have substituted for unassigned dower and homestead title in fee to a portion of the realty was not a petition seeking partition. Gillespie v. Jackson, 153 Tenn. 150, 281 S.W. 929, 1925 Tenn. LEXIS 14 (1926).

3. Compelling Accounting.

The court has no jurisdiction to compel a personal representative to account at suit of a distributee. Dougherty v. Maxwell, 25 Tenn. 446, 1846 Tenn. LEXIS 18 (1846).

The court has no jurisdiction to compel settlement of matters of equitable accounting against guardian at instance of ward. Taylor v. Keeton, 29 Tenn. 536, 1850 Tenn. LEXIS 28 (1850).

4. Time of Making Allotment.

Court should not as a matter of practice attempt to determine questions relating to the allotment of homestead and dower until commissioners have been appointed and have reported their findings. Wyrick v. Hale, 30 Tenn. App. 597, 209 S.W.2d 50, 1947 Tenn. App. LEXIS 113 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1947).

Collateral References.

Contractual provisions as affecting right to judicial partition. 37 A.L.R.3d 962.

Courts 472.1.

16-10-110. Abatement of nuisances.

The circuit court is clothed with all the powers of the chancery court to abate nuisances, in an action brought for recovery of damages resulting from a nuisance, upon the finding of a jury that the subject matter of a complaint is a nuisance, and judgment entered thereon.

Code 1858, § 4235; Shan., § 6073; Code 1932, § 10328; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-510.

Cross-References. Abatement of nuisances, title 29, ch. 3.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 11 Tenn. Juris., Equity, § 28; 17 Tenn. Juris., Jurisdiction, § 22.

Law Reviews.

The Tennessee Court System — Circuit Court (Frederic S. Le Clercq), 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 241.

Collateral References.

Right to maintain action to enjoin public nuisance as affected by existence of pollution control agency. 60 A.L.R.3d 665.

Nuisance 28.

16-10-111. Equity powers.

Any suit of an equitable nature, brought in the circuit court, where objection has not been taken to the jurisdiction, may be transferred to the chancery court of the county, or heard and determined by the circuit court upon the principles of a court of equity, with power to order and take all proper accounts, and otherwise to perform the functions of a chancery court.

Code 1858, § 4236 (deriv. Acts 1851-1852, ch. 152, § 9); Shan., § 6074; mod. Code 1932, § 10329; Acts 1972, ch. 565, § 2; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-511.

Textbooks. Gibson's Suits in Chancery (7th ed., Inman), §§ 8, 9, 56, 444.

Pritchard on Wills and Administration of Estates (4th ed., Phillips and Robinson), § 776.

Tennessee Jurisprudence, 2 Tenn. Juris., Appeal and Error, § 118; 11 Tenn. Juris., Equity, §§ 2, 21-29, 32; 17 Tenn. Juris., Jurisdiction, § 22; 19 Tenn. Juris., Municipal, State and County Aid, § 7; 22 Tenn. Juris., Rescission, Cancellation and Reformation, § 33.

Law Reviews.

A Little Bit of Laches Goes a Long Way: Notes on Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 67 Vand. L. Rev. En Banc 1 (2014).

Laches at Law in Tennessee, 28 U. Mem. L. Rev. 211 (1997).

The Supreme Court and the New Equity, 68 Vand. L. Rev. 997 (2015).

The Tennessee Court System — Circuit Court (Frederic S. Le Clercq), 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 241.

Cited: Finch v. Frymire, 36 S.W. 883, 1896 Tenn. Ch. App. LEXIS 13 (1896); United States, use of Brading-Marshal Lumber Co. v. Wells, 203 F. 146, 1913 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1718 (D. Tenn. 1913); Sullivan v. Eason, 8 Tenn. App. 429, — S.W.2d —, 1928 Tenn. App. LEXIS 156 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1928); McGee v. Carter, 31 Tenn. App. 141, 212 S.W.2d 902, 1948 Tenn. App. LEXIS 78 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1948); Gilley v. Jernigan, 597 S.W.2d 313, 1979 Tenn. App. LEXIS 395 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1979); Clinton Books, Inc. v. City of Memphis, 197 S.W.3d 749, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 313 (Tenn. 2006); In re Estate of Brown, — S.W.3d —, 2011 Tenn. App. LEXIS 541 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 4, 2011).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Jurisdiction in General.

Where the jurisdiction is not demurred to, the plaintiff's suit of equitable cognizance will not be dismissed, but the circuit judge may, at his discretion, transfer the cause to the chancery court, or retain and determine it himself upon the principles of equity and according to the practice of the chancery court. Sewanee Mining Co. v. E. L. Best Co., 40 Tenn. 701, 1859 Tenn. LEXIS 206 (1859); Hall v. Jacocks, 52 Tenn. 84, 1871 Tenn. LEXIS 237 (1871); Smith v. Leonard, 1 Shan. 604 (1876); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Humphrey, 167 Tenn. 421, 70 S.W.2d 361, 1933 Tenn. LEXIS 56 (1934).

The circuit court has jurisdiction to enforce equitable remedies where no objection is made. Hunt v. Hoppe, 22 Tenn. App. 540, 124 S.W.2d 306, 1938 Tenn. App. LEXIS 55 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1938).

This section has no application where an action may be filed either in a court of law or a court of chancery and the rule then applies that the court first obtaining jurisdiction shall retain the same. Hamilton Nat'l Bank v. Champion, 202 Tenn. 205, 303 S.W.2d 731, 1957 Tenn. LEXIS 381 (1957).

This section is not a denial of circuit court's jurisdiction of suits of an equitable nature but rather a recognition of such jurisdiction if not challenged by demurrer. Hewgley v. Trice, 207 Tenn. 466, 340 S.W.2d 918, 1960 Tenn. LEXIS 482 (1960).

This section pertains to original, not appellate, jurisdiction of the circuit court. Riden v. Snider, 832 S.W.2d 341, 1991 Tenn. App. LEXIS 901 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991), appeal denied, 1992 Tenn. LEXIS 299 (Tenn. Mar. 30, 1992).

2. Specific Instances of Jurisdiction.

The circuit court has jurisdiction of a suit to invalidate the declared result of an election held to determine whether a county should subscribe to the capital stock of a railroad company, where no objection was made by demurrer. Catlett v. Knoxville, S. & E. R. Co., 120 Tenn. 699, 112 S.W. 559, 1908 Tenn. LEXIS 52 (1908).

Where there was no demurrer to jurisdiction, the circuit court had jurisdiction of a suit for the annulment of a marriage. Southern R. Co. v. Baskette, 175 Tenn. 253, 133 S.W.2d 498, 1939 Tenn. LEXIS 37 (1939).

Where jurisdiction of circuit court to pass on issues raised on appeal to circuit court from county court's dismissal of petition by heir to determine validity of claim against decedent's estate was not questioned, circuit court had jurisdiction to pass on such issues. Brigham v. Southern Trust Co., 201 Tenn. 466, 300 S.W.2d 880, 1957 Tenn. LEXIS 325 (1957).

In personal injury action against master brought in circuit court where defendant raised issue that plaintiff had given its servant, who was primarily negligent, a release and plaintiff joined issue asserting that the instrument was a covenant not to sue, court had authority to construe instrument in view of its ultimate result and properly held that instrument was a covenant not to sue and that such covenant would bar suit against master who was only liable as a result of servant's negligence. Stewart v. Craig, 208 Tenn. 212, 344 S.W.2d 761, 1961 Tenn. LEXIS 413 (1961).

Although physician had told person that she had a possible whiplash injury which might give trouble in the future, a release executed by her husband releasing defendant from “all known, unknown, foreseen, and unforeseen, bodily and personal injuries” and property damage caused by the accident, and the amount paid for such release only covered the cost of repairing the automobile and the loss of its use, plus the cost of a physical examination where the party did not realize the extent of the injuries at the time of the execution of such release, it was a question for the jury to determine whether such release was executed under a mutual mistake of material fact. Warren v. Crockett, 211 Tenn. 173, 364 S.W.2d 352, 1962 Tenn. LEXIS 353 (1962).

Independent suit seeking rescission of lease contract might be maintained in circuit court in absence of objection by demurrer, but a plea claiming recoupment was not such an action and could not be brought within the provisions of this section. Cummings & Co. v. Mascari, 55 Tenn. App. 512, 402 S.W.2d 719, 1965 Tenn. App. LEXIS 264 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1965).

Tennessee circuit court possessed jurisdiction to enter an injunction in a child support case to restrain and enjoin an adoptive parent from further prosecution of a lawsuit which the parent filed in California because the petitioners which sought an injunction in the circuit court were requesting that the circuit court act as a court of equity. In re Justin H., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 414 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 29, 2015), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 863 (Tenn. Oct. 14, 2015).

3. Jurisdiction Upon Demurrer.

The circuit court possesses no equity jurisdiction, except such as is expressly conferred upon it by statute, and, to maintain its jurisdiction, where objection thereto is taken by demurrer, a state of facts must be shown to exist, falling within the provisions of the statute. Arrington v. Grissom, 41 Tenn. 522, 1860 Tenn. LEXIS 99 (1860).

Upon demurrer to its jurisdiction on ground that suit is equitable in nature, circuit court has jurisdiction to pass on such demurrer and determine the nature of the suit. Hewgley v. Trice, 207 Tenn. 466, 340 S.W.2d 918, 1960 Tenn. LEXIS 482 (1960).

Suit for reformation of contract of insurance was of an equitable nature and could not be maintained as an action at law where objection was raised to jurisdiction of circuit court by demurrer. Milwaukee Ins. Co. v. Gordon, 54 Tenn. App. 279, 390 S.W.2d 680, 1964 Tenn. App. LEXIS 153 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1964).

4. Election as to Forum.

Where, in a proceeding by certiorari and supersedeas to quash a levy on exempt property, the defense was that the debtor had given the creditor a lien on the property by the note on which the judgment was rendered, and thereupon the debtor filed an amended petition, alleging that the provisions of the note giving a lien was inserted by the creditor, without his knowledge, the whole litigation should be tried in one forum, and the creditor was given his election to withdraw all objection to the jurisdiction of the law court over the matter of the amended petitions, or to suffer the levy to be quashed without prejudice to his remedy in equity. Mynatt v. Magill, 71 Tenn. 72, 1879 Tenn. LEXIS 36 (1879).

5. Forms and Rules of Procedure.

A suit of an equitable nature is heard and determined in circuit court according to forms and rules of chancery pleading. Shelby County v. Bickford, 102 Tenn. 395, 52 S.W. 772, 1899 Tenn. LEXIS 61 (1899).

Divorce cases, even though tried in the circuit court, are treated as chancery suits. Murrell v. Murrell, 45 Tenn. App. 309, 323 S.W.2d 15, 1958 Tenn. App. LEXIS 129 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1958).

6. —Agreement of Parties — Effect.

A suit brought in the circuit court may, by agreement of the parties, be tried as a chancery cause in that court, and orders, references, and reports made as in chancery. Husky v. Maples, 42 Tenn. 25, 1865 Tenn. LEXIS 6 (1865).

7. —Procedure after Transfer to Chancery.

The proceedings subsequent to the transfer of a case from the circuit court to the chancery court are according to the forms and rules of chancery pleading and practice; and, upon appeal, the hearing will be de novo upon the record as its component parts may appear, and there is no presumption, as in cases at law in the absence of a bill of exceptions, that the evidence below was sufficient to sustain the finding of the court. Shelby County v. Bickford, 102 Tenn. 395, 52 S.W. 772, 1899 Tenn. LEXIS 61 (1899); Leiberman, Loveman & O'Brien v. Bowden, 121 Tenn. 496, 119 S.W. 64, 1908 Tenn. LEXIS 31 (1908).

8. Equitable Defenses.

This section does not mean that, in a case of legal character, the circuit court may assume the functions of a court of equity, because some equitable defense is set up, or a case is developed in the proof, of which a court of equity might have exercised a concurrent jurisdiction, if that forum had been selected in the first instance. In such case, the same general principle would apply since, as well as before, this statute, that the tribunal first taking diction should retain it. Sewanee Mining Co. v. E. L. Best Co., 40 Tenn. 701, 1859 Tenn. LEXIS 206 (1859); Saudek v. Nashville & H. Tpk. Co., 3 Cooper's Tenn. Ch. 473 (1877); Morgan v. Layne, 165 Tenn. 513, 56 S.W.2d 161, 1932 Tenn. LEXIS 78 (1933).

Where the creditor has, upon a sufficient consideration, extended the time of payment to the principal, or refused payment from him when tendered, or has done anything else which, in equity, releases the surety, the surety may make the defense in a court of law, especially under this section. Gillespie v. Darwin, 53 Tenn. 21, 1871 Tenn. LEXIS 312 (1871); Lindsey v. Thompson, 60 Tenn. 463, 1872 Tenn. LEXIS 535 (1873); Lindsey v. Thompson, 1 Cooper's Tenn. Ch. 272 (1873); Renegar v. Thompson, 69 Tenn. 457, 1878 Tenn. LEXIS 117 (1878); Mumford v. Memphis & C.R.R., 70 Tenn. 393, 1879 Tenn. LEXIS 186, 31 Am. Rep. 616 (1879); West v. Gordon, 71 Tenn. 370, 1879 Tenn. LEXIS 91 (1879); Ewing v. Sugg, 80 Tenn. 375, 1883 Tenn. LEXIS 183 (1883); Bryan v. Henderson, 88 Tenn. 23, 12 S.W. 338, 1889 Tenn. LEXIS 29 (1889); Saunders v. Lanier, 128 Tenn. 693, 164 S.W. 780, 1915C Am. Ann. Cas. 370, 1913 Tenn. LEXIS 83 (1913).

While the circuit court is without jurisdiction to relieve against mutual mistake, yet where a defendant pleads in an action at law a release as accord and satisfaction and plaintiff files replication averring that the release was executed under mutual mistake of fact, and issue is taken on the replication, without demurrer to jurisdiction, the circuit court may grant relief on equitable principles. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Humphrey, 167 Tenn. 421, 70 S.W.2d 361, 1933 Tenn. LEXIS 56 (1934).

This section applies only to equitable causes or suits of an equitable nature which are brought in the circuit court by mistake and does not mean that in a case of legal character the circuit court may assume the functions of a court of equity because some equitable defense is set up. Hamilton Nat'l Bank v. Champion, 202 Tenn. 205, 303 S.W.2d 731, 1957 Tenn. LEXIS 381 (1957).

9. Discretionary Appeals in Equity Causes.

In determining when a discretionary appeal will lie from the circuit court in equity causes under § 27-3-105, such section must be construed with this section. Potter v. Sanderson, 199 Tenn. 337, 286 S.W.2d 873, 1956 Tenn. LEXIS 330 (1956).

10. Appeal to Circuit Court.

Suit commenced in general sessions court and appealed to circuit court could not be disposed of on equitable grounds where amount of claim exceeded equitable jurisdiction of general sessions court. Mazikowski v. Central Mut. Ins. Co., 44 Tenn. App. 128, 312 S.W.2d 867, 1958 Tenn. App. LEXIS 137 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1958).

Where, in suit commenced in general sessions court and appealed to circuit court, plaintiffs were not seeking equitable relief, defendant was entitled to only such defenses as are permissible in courts of law and circuit court could not dispose of the suit as an equity case. Mazikowski v. Central Mut. Ins. Co., 44 Tenn. App. 128, 312 S.W.2d 867, 1958 Tenn. App. LEXIS 137 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1958).

11. Suits of Equitable Nature.

Claim against an estate involving complicated accounting was a suit of an equitable nature and there was nothing in § 30-517 (now § 30-2-314) requiring it to be tried in the form of an action at law. Hewgley v. Trice, 51 Tenn. App. 452, 369 S.W.2d 741, 1962 Tenn. App. LEXIS 121 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1962).

In a suit involving complicated accounting so as to be equitable in nature there is no absolute right to trial by jury. Hewgley v. Trice, 51 Tenn. App. 452, 369 S.W.2d 741, 1962 Tenn. App. LEXIS 121 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1962).

It is fundamental that a suit for accounting, involving claims and counterclaims, where the accounts are complicated is a suit of an equitable nature. Hewgley v. Trice, 51 Tenn. App. 452, 369 S.W.2d 741, 1962 Tenn. App. LEXIS 121 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1962).

The jurisdiction to abate a public nuisance is in chancery, circuit, and criminal courts. The statute giving jurisdiction over equitable matters to “circuit courts” refers to courts of law as distinguished from courts of equity and includes criminal courts; therefore, action for a permanent injunction restraining use of property for prostitution was properly brought in criminal court. State ex rel. Webster v. Daugherty, 530 S.W.2d 81, 1975 Tenn. App. LEXIS 172 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1975).

A suit on a note is not inherently of an equitable nature, but when equitable defenses are raised by the answer, the matter is transformed into an equitable action. Continental Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. Simmons, 561 S.W.2d 460, 1977 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 258 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1978).

Appointment of an administrator ad litem for the decedent did not constitute a suit in equity for transfer purposes under T.C.A. § 16-10-111, and for purposes of T.C.A. § 16-1-116, the case could not be transferred to chancery court because the circuit court had jurisdiction to award the damages requested. Owens v. Muenzel, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 752 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 21, 2018).

Collateral References. 27 Am. Jur. 2d Equity § 10.

21 C.J.S. Courts §§ 289, 290.

Equity 1-53.

16-10-112. Appellate jurisdiction.

The circuit court has an appellate jurisdiction of all suits and actions, of whatsoever nature, unless otherwise provided, instituted before any inferior jurisdiction, whether brought by appeal, certiorari, or in any other manner prescribed by law.

Code 1858, § 4234 (deriv. Acts 1835-1836, ch. 19, § 3); Shan., § 6072; mod. Code 1932, § 10327; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-512.

Cross-References. Juvenile courts, appeal from judgment or order as to disposition of child, § 37-1-135.

Textbooks. Tennessee Criminal Practice and Procedure (Raybin), § 16.109.

Tennessee Jurisprudence, 17 Tenn. Juris., Jurisdiction, § 22; 21 Tenn. Juris., Recovery of Personal Property, § 15.

Law Reviews.

Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Personal Injury Forum (William P. Zdancewicz), 26 U. Mem. L. Rev. 1169 (1996).

The Tennessee Court System — Circuit Court (Frederic S. Le Clercq), 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 241.

The Tennessee Court System — Criminal Court (Frederic S. Le Clercq), 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 319.

Cited: Staples v. Brown, 113 Tenn. 639, 85 S.W. 254, 1904 Tenn. LEXIS 56 (1904); Binford v. Carline, 9 Tenn. App. 364, — S.W.2d —, 1928 Tenn. App. LEXIS 246 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1928); Riden v. Snider, 832 S.W.2d 341, 1991 Tenn. App. LEXIS 901 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Juvenile Court.

Under this section and § 16-10-101, one adjudged by the juvenile court of a county to be a delinquent child may obtain a review of his case by certiorari in the circuit court of that county. State v. Bockman, 139 Tenn. 422, 201 S.W. 741, 1917 Tenn. LEXIS 118 (1917).

The means of procuring a review by the circuit court of a judgment of the juvenile court is by the statutory writ of certiorari and on review in the circuit court the parties are entitled to a trial by a jury, if desired, and may introduce competent evidence. Doster v. State, 195 Tenn. 535, 260 S.W.2d 279, 1953 Tenn. LEXIS 375 (1953).

Under this section, the circuit court has appellate jurisdiction of decisions of the juvenile courts. State v. Womack, 591 S.W.2d 437, 1979 Tenn. App. LEXIS 344 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1979).

Circuit court has jurisdiction in an action of common-law certiorari to correct a pretrial action of juvenile court. State v. Womack, 591 S.W.2d 437, 1979 Tenn. App. LEXIS 344 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1979).

2. Special Assessments.

The levy of a special assessment by mayor and aldermen not being a judicial act or proceeding, such levy could not be reviewed for a mere mistake in judgment. Carriger v. Morristown, 148 Tenn. 585, 256 S.W. 883, 1923 Tenn. LEXIS 45 (1923).

3. Authority of Criminal Courts of County.

By virtue of this section and §§ 40-408 (repealed) and 40-426 (repealed), the criminal courts of the county have authority to grant extraordinary relief in appeals from courts of inferior jurisdiction. Franks v. State, 565 S.W.2d 36, 1977 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 271 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1977).

A possible transfer to criminal court is not sufficient grounds for negating the statutory general authority of the circuit court in favor of the specific, limited authority of the criminal court which does not arise until transfer. State v. Womack, 591 S.W.2d 437, 1979 Tenn. App. LEXIS 344 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1979).

3.5. County Probate Court.

County probate court was not inferior to the circuit court and, consequently, appellate jurisdiction granted the circuit court at T.C.A. § 16-10-112 did not apply in an appeal of a ruling of the probate court sustaining the State's claim against a decedent's estate, and the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the appeal from the probate court. In re Estate of Ardell Hamilton Trigg, — S.W.3d —, 2011 Tenn. App. LEXIS 53 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 9, 2011), aff'd, In re Estate of Trigg, 368 S.W.3d 483, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 379 (Tenn. May 30, 2012).

4. Paternity Actions.

In cases to establish paternity brought under the bastardy statute, the circuit court had no jurisdiction unless the defendant made a timely demand for a jury trial under former § 36-2-106 (repealed), and the exclusive method of appellate review was that provided by former § 36-2-114 (repealed) which was to the court of appeals. State ex rel. Winberry v. Brooks, 670 S.W.2d 631, 1984 Tenn. App. LEXIS 2752 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984).

5. Bond on Appeal.

Patient's cash bond was sufficient to perfect an appeal from a general sessions court to a circuit court because the bond vested jurisdiction in the circuit court since T.C.A. § 27-5-103 expressed no limitation as to the type of bond required, so a surety bond in an unlimited amount did not solely provide the “good security” required by T.C.A. § 27-5-103(a). Griffin v. Campbell Clinic, P.A., 439 S.W.3d 899, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 566 (Tenn. July 21, 2014).

6. Authority of Lower Court.

Circuit court, acting within its appellate jurisdiction, properly dismissed an owner's complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because a neighbor and his predecessor consistently objected to both the general sessions and circuit courts'  exercise of jurisdiction over the boundary line dispute and the general sessions court was not statutorily empowered to hear boundary line disputes. Evans v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 614 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 28, 2015).

Collateral References. 21 C.J.S. Courts § 456.

Courts 246.

16-10-113. Jurisdiction of contract enforcement.

Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, contracts for goods or services between individuals, partnerships, associations, corporations, governmental entities or limited liability companies are enforceable in either circuit or chancery court in the county where:

  1. The defendant may be found;
  2. The contract was executed;
  3. The goods were provided or were to be provided; or
  4. Services were rendered or were to be rendered.

Acts 2007, ch. 351, § 1.

Part 2
Operation

16-10-201. Duty of judge to attend court — Adjournment by clerk.

It is the duty of the circuit judge to attend and hold court at the time appointed by law; but if for any reason the circuit judge fails to appear, the clerk of the court may open and adjourn the court from time to time to some future day or days, or, if the clerk thinks the rights and interests of litigants or the business of the court require it, may so open and adjourn the court to some future day or days subsequent to the time allowed by law in which to hold such court. If no judge attends by four o'clock p.m. (4:00 p.m.) on the day to which the clerk last adjourned the court, then the court shall be adjourned by the clerk to the court in course.

Code 1858, § 4220 (deriv. Acts 1835-1836, ch. 5, § 5); Acts 1901, ch. 16, § 1; 1907, ch. 592, § 1; Shan., § 6058; mod. Code 1932, § 10313; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-515; Acts 1984, ch. 931, § 17.

Cross-References. Adjournment by clerk, § 18-4-104.

Terms of court abolished, § 16-2-510.

Textbooks. Tennessee Criminal Practice and Procedure (Raybin), § 24.17.

Tennessee Jurisprudence, 6 Tenn. Juris., Clerks of Court, § 12.

Law Reviews.

The Tennessee Court System — Circuit Court (Frederic S. Le Clercq), 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 241.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Opening Term on Day after Legal Date — Effect.

A term of the circuit court opened on Tuesday, where Monday was the day fixed by law for its commencement, is a legal term and an indictment and conviction for a felony at such term is valid, especially where the objection was waived by plea of not guilty and trial. Henslie v. State, 50 Tenn. 202, 1871 Tenn. LEXIS 84 (1871).

2. Opening and Adjournment by Clerk.

The clerk may open and adjourn court, but he should make an entry on the minutes of the court as to the same. Smith v. State, 28 Tenn. 9, 1848 Tenn. LEXIS 35 (1848); Henslie v. State, 50 Tenn. 202, 1871 Tenn. LEXIS 84 (1871).

16-10-202. Days court not held.

If, from any cause, the court is not held on any day after it has been opened, there shall be no discontinuance; but, as soon as the cause is removed, the court may proceed to business as before.

Code 1858, § 4222 (deriv. Acts 1835-1836, ch. 5, § 5); Shan., § 6060; Code 1932, § 10315; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-516; Acts 1984, ch. 931, § 18.

Cross-References. Terms of court abolished, § 16-2-510.

Textbooks. Tennessee Criminal Practice and Procedure (Raybin), § 24.17.

Law Reviews.

The Tennessee Court System — Circuit Court (Frederic S. Le Clercq), 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 241.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Application.

Under this section, it is an everyday practice for a judge to adjourn his court, in his sound discretion, or to resume business after a failure to hold court for any cause, during a reasonable interval of time. Brewer v. State, 74 Tenn. 198, 1880 Tenn. LEXIS 232 (1880); Ridout v. State, 161 Tenn. 248, 30 S.W.2d 255, 1929 Tenn. LEXIS 55, 71 A.L.R. 830 (1930).

16-10-203. Duration of court.

Each of the circuit courts shall continue until the business of the court is dispatched, unless the judge is sooner compelled to leave, in order to arrive in time at the next succeeding court of the judicial district.

Code 1858, § 4218 (deriv. Acts 1835-1836, ch. 5, § 4); Shan., § 6056; Code 1932, § 10310; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-517; Acts 1984, ch. 931, § 19.

Cross-References. Terms of court abolished, § 16-2-510.

Law Reviews.

The Tennessee Court System — Circuit Court (Frederic S. Le Clercq), 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 241.

Cited: Dunn v. State, 127 Tenn. 267, 154 S.W. 969, 1912 Tenn. LEXIS 26 (1913).

Collateral References. 14 Am. Jur. 2d Courts § 27.

21 C.J.S. Courts § 151.

Courts 63.

16-10-204. Adjournment during trial.

In no case, after the trial of a cause is commenced, shall the judge adjourn the court until the cause is tried, except in cases where the jury cannot agree, or, from some other cause, a mistrial is ordered.

Code 1858, § 4219 (deriv. Acts 1835-1836, ch. 5, § 4); Shan., § 6057; Code 1932, § 10311; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-518.

Law Reviews.

The Tennessee Court System — Circuit Court (Frederic S. Le Clercq), 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 241.

Cited: Dunn v. State, 127 Tenn. 267, 154 S.W. 969, 1912 Tenn. LEXIS 26 (1913).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Failure to Enter Judgment — Effect.

Where court failed to enter judgment at trial term, the case could not be tried on same evidence at the next term without consent of parties. Kyle v. Goulette, 9 Tenn. App. 203, — S.W.2d —, 1928 Tenn. App. LEXIS 224 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1928).

Collateral References. 20 Am. Jur. 2d Courts § 47.

21 C.J.S. Courts § 152.

16-10-205. Relief from firearm disabilities imposed on persons adjudicated as mental defective or judicially committed to mental institution.

  1. A person who is subject to 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(4) and (g)(4) because the person has been adjudicated as a mental defective or judicially committed to a mental institution, as defined in § 16-10-213, may petition the circuit or criminal court that entered the judicial commitment or adjudication order for relief from the firearm disabilities imposed by the adjudication or judicial commitment; provided, that the person may not petition the court until three (3) years from the date of release from commitment or the date of the adjudication order, whichever is later.
  2. A copy of the petition for relief shall also be served on the district attorney general of the judicial district in which the original judicial commitment or adjudication occurred. The district attorney general may appear, support, object to, or present evidence relevant to the relief sought by the petitioner.
  3. The court shall receive and consider evidence in an open proceeding, including evidence offered by the petitioner, concerning:
    1. The circumstances that led to the imposition of the firearms disability under 18 U.S.C. § 922 (d)(4) and (g)(4);
    2. The petitioner's mental health records;
    3. The petitioner's criminal history;
    4. The petitioner's reputation; and
    5. Changes in the petitioner's condition or circumstances relevant to the relief sought.
  4. The court shall grant the petition for relief if it finds by a preponderance of the evidence and enters into the record the following:
    1. The petitioner is no longer likely to act in a manner that is dangerous to public safety; and
    2. Granting the relief would not be contrary to the public interest.
  5. A record of the proceedings shall be made by a certified court reporter or by court-approved electronic means. Except in matters resulting in criminal adjudication, the means of recording is to be provided by the petitioner.
  6. The petitioner may appeal a final order denying the requested relief, and the review on appeal, if granted, shall be de novo.
  7. A person may file a petition for relief under this section no more than once every two (2) years.
  8. Relief from a firearm disability granted under this section has no effect on the loss of civil rights, including firearm rights, for any reason other than the particular adjudication as a mental defective or judicial commitment to a mental institution from which relief is granted.
  9. When the court issues an order granting a petition of relief under subsection (d), the court clerk shall, as soon as practicable but no later than thirty (30) days after issuance, forward a copy of the order to the Tennessee bureau of investigation (TBI). The TBI, upon receipt of the order, shall:
    1. Immediately forward a copy of the order to the department of safety;
    2. Update the National Instant Criminal Background Check System database and transmit the corrected records to the federal bureau of investigation; and
    3. Remove and destroy all records relating to the petition for relief from any database over which the TBI exercises control.
  10. The TBI and the department of safety shall not use or permit the use of the records or information obtained or retained pursuant to this section for any purpose not specified in this section.

Acts 2015, ch. 459, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Former § 16-10-205 (Acts 1899, ch. 40, § 1; Shan., § 6057a1; Code 1932, § 10312; Acts 1947, ch. 48, § 1; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-519), concerning extension of term, was repealed by Acts 1984, ch. 931, § 20. For section abolishing terms of court, see § 16-2-510.

Effective Dates. Acts 2015, ch. 459, § 6. July 1, 2015.

16-10-206. Pleadings in absence of judge.

The nonattendance of a circuit court judge shall not prevent the parties from making up their pleadings in the appearance causes.

Code 1858, § 4224 (deriv. Acts 1809 (Sept.), ch. 49, § 3); Shan., § 6062; Code 1932, § 10317; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-520.

Law Reviews.

The Tennessee Court System — Circuit Court (Frederic S. Le Clercq), 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 241.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Entry of Motion for Judgment Unauthorized.

It is suggested that this section does not authorize the motion for judgment to be entered according to the notice, where there was no court sitting, but that a new notice must be given of a motion to be made at a subsequent term. Thomison v. Hugh Douglass & Co., 62 Tenn. 74, 1873 Tenn. LEXIS 143 (1873).

16-10-207. Continuance in absence of judge.

None of the proceedings pending in the circuit or criminal courts shall be discontinued by the nonattendance of the judge, or the judge's death at any time, but, in such cases, all matters depending shall stand continued, if no designated judge appear to serve.

Code 1858, § 4223 (deriv. Acts 1794, ch. 1, § 8); Shan., § 6061; mod. Code 1932, § 10316; modified; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-521; Acts 1984, ch. 931, § 21.

Cross-References. Terms of court abolished, § 16-2-510.

Textbooks. Tennessee Criminal Practice and Procedure (Raybin), § 24.17.

Law Reviews.

The Tennessee Court System — Circuit Court (Frederic S. Le Clercq), 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 241.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Discontinuance.

The action of the court upon the question of discontinuance is necessary to terminate the suit. Cherry v. Mississippi Valley Ins. Co., 84 Tenn. 292, 1886 Tenn. LEXIS 99 (1886).

2. —Acts of Court Not Working Discontinuance.

There is no discontinuance because of the void disposition of the case by a special judge appointed under an unconstitutional statute, nor by failure to enter a formal continuance in the particular cause. Johnston v. Ditty, 15 Tenn. 84, 15 Tenn. 85, 1834 Tenn. LEXIS 17 (1834); Sims v. State, 72 Tenn. 357, 1880 Tenn. LEXIS 27 (1880).

A discontinuance is the result of some act done or omitted by the plaintiff, which legally withdraws his cause from the power and jurisdiction of the court, and cannot be worked by an order of the court over which the plaintiff has no control, as where the court, of its own motion, made an order transmitting the papers to another court for trial, where such order is simply void. McGuire v. Hay, 25 Tenn. 419, 1846 Tenn. LEXIS 7 (1846).

3. —Arbitration Agreement.

An agreement made out of court to arbitrate matters involved in a pending suit operates as a discontinuance of the suit. Eddings v. Gillespie, 59 Tenn. 548, 1873 Tenn. LEXIS 109 (1873).

4. Time of Attendance of Judge.

This section evidently implies that the judge may attend and commence the term, by presiding in court at any of the times to which the court has been adjourned by the clerk under § 16-10-201 and before the clerk is compelled to adjourn the term to court in course. Henslie v. State, 50 Tenn. 202, 1871 Tenn. LEXIS 84 (1871).

5. Time Pending Matters Continued.

If the circuit judge does not attend at the time to which the clerk has adjourned the court then, but not until then, the term is at an end, and, under this section, all pending matters stand continued until the next succeeding term. Henslie v. State, 50 Tenn. 202, 1871 Tenn. LEXIS 84 (1871).

6. Death of Judge Pending Motion for New Trial.

Where the judge dies pending a motion for new trial, the motion may be heard and determined at the next term. Sims v. State, 72 Tenn. 357, 1880 Tenn. LEXIS 27 (1880).

Collateral References.

Power of successor judge taking office during term time to vacate, set aside, or annul judgment entered by predecessor. 51 A.L.R.5th 747.

Power of successor or substituted judge, in civil case, to render decision or enter judgment on testimony heard by predecessor. 22 A.L.R.3d 922.

16-10-208 — 16-10-211. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former §§ 16-10-20816-10-211 (Code 1858, § 4221 (deriv. Acts 1835-1836, ch. 5, § 5); 1905, ch. 113, § 2; Shan., §§ 5745a2, 6059; Code 1932, §§ 9938, 10314; Acts 1943, ch. 7, §§ 1, 2; C. Supp. 1950, §§ 9945.5, 9945.6 (Williams, § 9945.5); T.C.A. (orig. ed.), §§ 16-522 — 16-525), concerning adjourned terms and process returnable to succeeding term, was repealed by Acts 1984, ch. 931, § 22. For provisions abolishing terms of court, see § 16-2-510.

16-10-212. Money paid into court — Power of disposition.

When money is paid into the circuit or law courts of this state to satisfy judgments rendered in the circuit or law court, or money is paid into the circuit or law courts by reason of other proceedings had in the courts, and the money belongs to or is the property of minors, life tenants, beneficiaries of the remainder interests or contingent beneficiaries of the remainder interests or persons adjudicated incompetent, the courts are vested with powers to dispose of or to enter such orders in regard to the money as courts of chancery now have. Nothing in this section shall be construed as to deprive the chancery courts of their jurisdiction in regard to such matters.

Acts 1955, ch. 140, § 1; T.C.A., § 16-526; Acts 2011, ch. 47, § 12.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2011, ch. 47, § 107 provided that nothing in the legislation shall be construed to alter or otherwise affect the eligibility for services or the rights or responsibilities of individuals covered by the provision on the day before the date of enactment of this legislation, which was July 1, 2011.

Acts 2011, ch. 47, § 108 provided that the provisions of the act are declared to be remedial in nature and all provisions of the act shall be liberally construed to effectuate its purposes.

Amendments. The 2011 amendment substituted “persons adjudicated incompetent” for “persons of unsound mind” in the middle of the first sentence.

Effective Dates. Acts 2011, ch. 47, § 110. July 1, 2011.

16-10-213. Information to be collected and reported to the federal bureau of investigation-NICS index and the department of safety by those circuit courts and criminal courts in which commitments to a mental institution are ordered.

  1. As used in this section:
    1. “Adjudication as a mental defective or adjudicated as a mental defective” means:
      1. A determination by a court in this state that a person, as a result of marked subnormal intelligence, mental illness, incompetency, condition or disease:
        1. Is a danger to such person or to others; or
        2. Lacks the ability to contract or manage such person's own affairs due to mental defect;
      2. A finding of insanity by a court in a criminal proceeding; or
      3. A finding that a person is incompetent to stand trial or is found not guilty by reason of insanity pursuant to §§ 50a and 72b of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, codified in 10 U.S.C. §§ 850a, 876b;
    2. “Judicial commitment to a mental institution” means a judicially ordered involuntary admission to a private or state hospital or treatment resource in proceedings conducted pursuant to title 33, chapter 6 or 7;
    3. “Mental institution” means a mental health facility, mental hospital, sanitarium, psychiatric facility and any other facility that provides diagnoses by a licensed professional of mental retardation or mental illness, including, but not limited to, a psychiatric ward in a general hospital; and
    4. “Treatment resource” means any public or private facility, service or program providing treatment or rehabilitation services for mental illness or serious emotional disturbance, including, but not limited to, detoxification centers, hospitals, community mental health centers, clinics or programs, halfway houses and rehabilitation centers.
  2. Those circuit courts and criminal courts wherein commitments to a mental institution are ordered pursuant to title 33, chapter 6 or 7 or persons are adjudicated as a mental defective shall enter a standing and continuing order instructing the clerk to collect and report as soon as practicable, but no later than the third business day following the date of such an order or adjudication, information described in subsection (c) regarding individuals who have been adjudicated as a mental defective or judicially committed to a mental institution for the purposes of complying with the NICS Improvement Amendments Act of 2007, P.L. 110-180.
  3. The following information shall be collected and reported to the federal bureau of investigation-NICS Index and the department of safety, pursuant to subsection (b):
    1. Complete name and all aliases of the individual judicially committed or adjudicated as a mental defective, including, but not limited to, any names that the individual may have had or currently has by reason of marriage or otherwise;
    2. Case or docket number of the judicial commitment or the adjudication as a mental defective;
    3. Date judicial commitment ordered or adjudication as a mental defective was made;
    4. Private or state hospital or treatment resource to which the individual was judicially committed;
    5. Date of birth of the individual judicially committed or adjudicated as a mental defective, if such information has been provided to the clerk;
    6. Race and sex of the individual judicially committed or adjudicated as a mental defective; and
    7. Social security number of the individual judicially committed or adjudicated as a mental defective if available.
  4. The information in subdivisions (c)(1)-(5), the confidentiality of which is protected by other statutes or regulations, shall be maintained as confidential and not subject to public inspection pursuant to applicable statutes or regulations, except for such use as may be necessary in the conduct of any proceedings pursuant to §§ 38-6-109, 39-17-1316, and 39-17-1352 — 39-17-1354.

Acts 2009, ch. 578, § 1; 2013, ch. 300, § 3; 2018, ch. 799, §§ 2, 5.

Amendments. The 2013 amendment substituted “collect and report as soon as practicable, but no later than the third business day following the date of such an order or adjudication” for “collect and report January 1, April 1, July 1, and October 1 of every year beginning January 1, 2010” in (b).

The 2018 amendment added (c)(6) and (7); and substituted “applicable statutes” for “such statutes” and substituted “pursuant to §§ 38-6-109, 39-17-1316, and 39-17-135239-17-1354” for “pursuant to §§ 39-17-1316, 39-17-1353 and 39-17-1354” at the end of (d).

Effective Dates. Acts 2009, ch. 578, § 13. January 1, 2010.

Acts 2013, ch. 300, § 11. July 1, 2013.

Acts 2018, ch. 799, § 7. July 1, 2018.

Cross-References. Confidentiality of public records, § 10-7-504.

Attorney General Opinions. T.C.A. § 16-10-213 does not conflict with the patient privacy protections of either  T.C.A. title 33 or the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”) privacy provisions.  OAG 10-56, 2010 Tenn. AG LEXIS 56 (4/26/10).

Chapter 11
Chancery Courts

Part 1
Jurisdiction and Powers

16-11-101. General powers.

The chancery court has all the powers, privileges and jurisdiction properly and rightfully incident to a court of equity.

Code 1858, § 4279 (deriv. Acts 1835-1836, ch. 4, § 1); Shan., § 6088; mod. Code 1932, § 10349; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-601.

Cross-References. Banking commissioner's orders, jurisdiction of chancery courts to enforce, § 45-1-108.

Personal injury or death cases in chancery or circuit courts, reports, § 16-21-111.

Probate jurisdiction transferred from county court, §§ 16-16-201, 16-16-202.

State system of personnel administration, title 8, ch. 30.

Textbooks. Gibson's Suits in Chancery (7th ed., Inman), § 1.

Pritchard on Wills and Administration of Estates (4th ed., Phillips and Robinson), § 832.

Tennessee Jurisprudence, 11 Tenn. Juris., Equity, §§ 21, 33, 55.

Law Reviews.

Abolishing Local Action Rules: A First Step toward Modernizing Jurisdiction and Venue in Tennessee, 34 U. Mem. L. Rev. 251 (2004).

Casenote: Estate, Gift and Trust Law-Joint and Mutual Wills-Proper Jurisdictional Vehicles for Contract-Based Mutual Wills Claims, 80 Tenn. L. Rev. 883 (2013). A Little Bit of Laches Goes a Long Way: Notes on Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 67 Vand. L. Rev. En Banc 1 (2014).

Domestic Relations — Inherent Annulment Jurisdiction of Equity Court, 22 Tenn. L. Rev. 1063.

Equity — 1961 Tennessee Survey (II) (T. A. Smedley), 15 Vand. L. Rev. 896.

Justiciability in Tennessee, Part Three: Timing (Barbara Kritchevsky), 16 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 177 (1986).

Laches at Law in Tennessee, 28 U. Mem. L. Rev. 211 (1997).

Quiet Title Actions in Tennessee, 15 Mem. St. U.S. Rev. 263 (1985).

The Chancery Court, 20 Tenn. L. Rev. 245.

The Supreme Court and the New Equity, 68 Vand. L. Rev. 997 (2015).

The Tennessee Court System — Chancery Court (Frederic S. Le Clercq), 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 281.

Comparative Legislation. Chancery courts:

Ark.  Code § 16-13-301 et seq.

Miss.  Code Ann. § 9-5-1 et seq.

Va. Code § 8.01-607 et seq.

Cited: Carter v. Taylor, 409 F. Supp. 1162, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16018 (E.D. Tenn. 1975); Knobler v. Knobler, 697 S.W.2d 583, 1985 Tenn. App. LEXIS 2715 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985); Brandon v. Wright, 838 S.W.2d 532, 1992 Tenn. App. LEXIS 365 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992); City of Jackson v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2008 Tenn. App. LEXIS 318 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 27, 2008); Cheatham County v. Kong, — S.W.3d —, 2009 Tenn. App. LEXIS 405 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 30, 2009).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Construction and Interpretation.

2. —Inherent and Statutory Jurisdiction.

The inherent jurisdiction of our chancery court is the jurisdiction of the high court of chancery of England, which was adopted by North Carolina as the jurisdiction of the chancery court of that state, and which was adopted in this state, upon its formation and organization, by its adoption of the laws of North Carolina, and in the creation of its chancery court; and the jurisdiction subsequently vested in such court by the legislature is called its statutory jurisdiction. J. W. Kelly & Co. v. Conner, 122 Tenn. 339, 123 S.W. 622, 1909 Tenn. LEXIS 26, 25 L.R.A. (n.s.) 201 (1909).

The vesting of jurisdiction in the county court by statute does not deprive the chancery court of its inherent jurisdiction of administration of estates. Dick v. Dick, 223 Tenn. 228, 443 S.W.2d 472, 1969 Tenn. LEXIS 407 (1969), overruled in part, Browne v. Browne, 547 S.W.2d 239, 1977 Tenn. LEXIS 553 (Tenn. 1977).

3. Construction with Other Acts.

Chancery jurisdiction reserved by this section is not taken away by § 30-1313 (now § 30-2-710). Murgitroyde v. Cleary, 84 Tenn. 539, 1886 Tenn. LEXIS 142 (1886).

4. Jurisdiction — Examples.

The chancery court may enforce payment of debts charged on a married woman's separate estate. Jordan v. Everett, 93 Tenn. 390, 24 S.W. 1128, 1893 Tenn. LEXIS 66 (1894).

Inherent jurisdiction over the administration of estates is not taken away by the fact that a distributee or legatee may apply to the chancery court of the county of administration to compel the payment of his share or legacy. Goodman v. Palmer, 137 Tenn. 556, 195 S.W. 165, 1917 Tenn. LEXIS 168 (1917).

The chancery court may compel distribution of a decedent's estate before the expiration of the year allowed therefor, in a proper case. Chester v. Turner, 153 Tenn. 451, 284 S.W. 365, 1925 Tenn. LEXIS 41 (1925).

Chancery court has jurisdiction to enjoin the collection of collateral notes until proper credit has been entered upon the notes they secure; and, such jurisdiction not turning upon amount involved, limitation of jurisdiction of chancery to sums exceeding $50.00 does not apply. Kenyon v. Russell, 5 Tenn. App. 401, — S.W. —, 1927 Tenn. App. LEXIS 71 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1927).

In an action in which a husband's children from a prior marriage contended that a wife's last will was invalid because it breached a contract in which the wife and the husband agreed to make mutual wills, the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction because T.C.A. § 16-16-201(a) provided the court with subject matter jurisdiction to probate wills, T.C.A. § 32-4-109 provided the court with jurisdiction to hear will contests, T.C.A. § 29-14-102 provided the court with jurisdiction to hear declaratory judgment actions, and T.C.A. §§ 16-11-101 and 16-11-102(a) provided the court with jurisdiction to hear actions for breach of oral or written contracts. In re Estate of Brown, 402 S.W.3d 193, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 308 (Tenn. Mar. 22, 2013).

Chancery court erred in exercising subject matter jurisdiction over a bail bond company's action for injunctive relief and declaratory judgment declaring proposed Local Rules of Practice and Procedure for Bail Bond Companies unenforceable, unconstitutional, and in violation of the law because it did not have subject matter jurisdiction to entertain an action for declaratory or injunctive relief regarding the validity of local rules of the criminal court. Memphis Bonding Co. v. Crim. Court of Tenn. 30th Dist., 490 S.W.3d 458, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 930 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 25, 2015), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 247 (Tenn. Mar. 22, 2016).

Because a bail bond company's underlying claim for injunctive relief regarding Local Rules of Practice and Procedure for Bail Bond Companies could not be brought in chancery court, the chancery court could not exercise subject matter jurisdiction over the declaratory judgment aspect of the case either; the courts should not assume that subject matter jurisdiction existed based on the fact that the issue was not addressed. Memphis Bonding Co. v. Crim. Court of Tenn. 30th Dist., 490 S.W.3d 458, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 930 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 25, 2015), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 247 (Tenn. Mar. 22, 2016).

To allow the chancery court to review the validity or enjoin the enforcement of the local rules of the criminal court would interfere with the inherent power of the criminal court to administer its affairs and impose reasonable regulations regarding the making of bonds; the statutes and rules do not authorize chancery court review of the local rules of the criminal court. Memphis Bonding Co. v. Crim. Court of Tenn. 30th Dist., 490 S.W.3d 458, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 930 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 25, 2015), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 247 (Tenn. Mar. 22, 2016).

5. —Possession of Automobile — Fraud.

Where a replevin action between plaintiff and defendant to determine the right to possession of an automobile given to each by a deceased person was instituted in the general sessions court and appealed to the circuit court whereon creditors of the deceased attempted to intervene to have the conveyances to plaintiff and defendant declared fraudulent and the auto declared part of the estate, this intervention could not be sustained since creditors were not judgment creditors nor had they proceeded by attachment. Therefore, the creditors were without interest in the replevin action; also the bill to have the conveyance declared fraudulent was bad since the circuit court had appellate jurisdiction only and could not grant the relief asked. Creditors remedy was in equity. Marlin v. Merrill, 25 Tenn. App. 328, 156 S.W.2d 814, 1941 Tenn. App. LEXIS 113 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1941).

Collateral References. 27 Am. Jur. 2d Equity §§ 4-6, 8-18, 21, 102, 104, 107, 120, 121, 134.

21 C.J.S. Courts §§ 289, 490.

Equity 1-53.

16-11-102. Jurisdiction of civil causes — Transfer to circuit court.

  1. The chancery court has concurrent jurisdiction, with the circuit court, of all civil causes of action, triable in the circuit court, except for unliquidated damages for injuries to person or character, and except for unliquidated damages for injuries to property not resulting from a breach of oral or written contract; and no demurrer for want of jurisdiction of the cause of action shall be sustained in the chancery court, except in the cases excepted.
  2. Any suit in the nature of the cases excepted in subsection (a) brought in the chancery court, where objection has not been taken by a plea to the jurisdiction, may be transferred to the circuit court of the county, or heard and determined by the chancery court upon the principles of a court of law.

Acts 1877, ch. 97, §§ 1, 2; 1915, ch. 47; Shan., § 6109; mod. Code 1932, § 10377; Acts 1977, ch. 294, § 1; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-602.

Cross-References. Probate jurisdiction transferred from county court, §§ 16-16-201, 16-16-202.

Textbooks. Gibson's Suits in Chancery (7th ed., Inman), §§ 4, 8, 14, 56, 105, 504, 576.

Tennessee Jurisprudence, 1 Tenn. Juris., Actions, § 2; 1 Tenn. Juris., Agency, § 38; 2 Tenn. Juris., Appeal and Error, §§ 212, 251; 3 Tenn. Juris., Attachment and Garnishment, § 136; 5 Tenn. Juris., Banks and Banking, § 70; 10 Tenn. Juris., Ejectment, § 12; 11 Tenn. Juris., Equity, §§ 2, 15, 21, 25-29, 32-36, 94, 100; 13 Tenn. Juris., Fraud and Deceit, § 36; 13 Tenn. Juris., Fraudulent and Voluntary Conveyances, § 41; 15 Tenn. Juris., Injunctions, §§ 4, 5; 17 Tenn. Juris., Jurisdiction, § 23; 21 Tenn. Juris., Recovery of Personal Property, § 23.

Law Reviews.

Civil Procedure — Flowers v. Dyer County: The Death of the Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction, 23 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 409 (1993).

Laches at Law in Tennessee, 28 U. Mem. L. Rev. 211 (1997).

Cited: Shipp v. McLean, 54 S.W. 669, 1899 Tenn. Ch. App. LEXIS 125 (1899); Davis v. Parks, 151 Tenn. 321, 270 S.W. 444, 1924 Tenn. LEXIS 67 (1924); State ex rel. Thompson v. Dixie Finance Co., 152 Tenn. 306, 278 S.W. 59, 1925 Tenn. LEXIS 74 (1925); Mack v. Hugger Bros. Constr. Co., 10 Tenn. App. 402, — S.W.2d —, 1929 Tenn. App. LEXIS 47 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1929); Campbell v. Lewisburg & N. R. Co., 160 Tenn. 477, 26 S.W.2d 141, 1929 Tenn. LEXIS 124 (1930); Morgan v. Layne, 165 Tenn. 513, 56 S.W.2d 161, 1932 Tenn. LEXIS 78 (1933); Owens v. Owens, 21 Tenn. App. 104, 106 S.W.2d 227, 1937 Tenn. App. LEXIS 12 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1937); Bunch v. Allison, 596 S.W.2d 814, 1980 Tenn. LEXIS 436 (Tenn. 1980); Duke v. Daniels, 660 S.W.2d 793, 1983 Tenn. App. LEXIS 624 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983); Bill Walker & Associates, Inc. v. Parrish, 770 S.W.2d 764, 1989 Tenn. App. LEXIS 111 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989); Lee v. Hall, 790 S.W.2d 293, 1990 Tenn. App. LEXIS 168 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990); Logan v. Winstead, 23 S.W.3d 297, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 415 (Tenn. 2000); Joiner v. Carter, — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 420 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 27, 2007); Cheatham County v. Kong, — S.W.3d —, 2009 Tenn. App. LEXIS 405 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 30, 2009); Hayes v. State, 341 S.W.3d 293, 2009 Tenn. App. LEXIS 681 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 8, 2009); Young v. Davis, — S.W.3d —, 2009 Tenn. App. LEXIS 728 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 30, 2009); Williams v. City of Milan, — S.W.3d —, 2011 Tenn. App. LEXIS 67 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 16, 2011).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

The statute is constitutional. Ramsey v. Temple, 71 Tenn. 252, 1879 Tenn. LEXIS 70 (1879); Jackson, Morris & Co. v. Nimmo, 71 Tenn. 597, 1879 Tenn. LEXIS 120 (1879).

2. Adherence to Equitable Principles Requisite.

In the exercise of the jurisdiction conferred, chancery will not grant relief contrary to the settled principles and maxims of equity jurisprudence, although a court of law would do so. Lenoir v. Mining Co., 88 Tenn. 168, 14 S.W. 378, 1889 Tenn. LEXIS 39 (1889).

Even though a legal remedy (replevin) be sought in chancery, the complainant must come with clean hands, as if equitable relief were sought. Sartain v. Dixie Coal & Iron Co., 150 Tenn. 633, 266 S.W. 313, 1924 Tenn. LEXIS 34 (1924).

3. Construction and Interpretation.

Statement that when a chancery court has taken jurisdiction for one purpose it will take jurisdiction for all purposes means all purposes “incidental to jurisdiction of main subject.” Tucker v. Simmons, 199 Tenn. 359, 287 S.W.2d 19, 1956 Tenn. LEXIS 334 (1956).

If the main thing involved in the suit is not of such a nature that equity court has jurisdiction then the courts of equity will not take jurisdiction. Tucker v. Simmons, 199 Tenn. 359, 287 S.W.2d 19, 1956 Tenn. LEXIS 334 (1956).

When a court of chancery takes jurisdiction of a case under its inherent jurisdiction, it may decide all issues involved in the matter in order to prevent a multiplicity of actions. Industrial Dev. Bd. v. Hancock, 901 S.W.2d 382, 1995 Tenn. App. LEXIS 92 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995).

4. —“All Civil Causes” — Construed.

The words “all civil causes of action” mean only those civil actions which could have originated in the circuit court, the purpose of the statute being to give litigants the option of bringing suits either in the circuit or the chancery court. Swift & Co. v. Memphis Cold Storage Warehouse Co., 128 Tenn. 82, 158 S.W. 480, 1913 Tenn. LEXIS 27 (1913).

5. —Concurrent Nature of Jurisdiction.

This section does not give the chancery court exclusive, but merely concurrent, jurisdiction of actions specified. Swift & Co. v. Memphis Cold Storage Warehouse Co., 128 Tenn. 82, 158 S.W. 480, 1913 Tenn. LEXIS 27 (1913).

When developers sued a bank in circuit court, which then sued the developers in chancery court, the cases were consolidated, the developers did not appeal the dismissal of the developers'  chancery court counterclaim, and the circuit court case was dismissed, res judicata barred further litigation because (1) a dismissal of the developers'  chancery court counterclaim was an adjudication on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction, due to the chancery court's concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit court, and (2) the suits involved the same parties and events. Rainbow Ridge Resort, LLC v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., 525 S.W.3d 252, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 992 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2016), appeal denied, Rainbow Ridge Resort, LLC v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 301 (Tenn. May 28, 2017).

6. —Unliquidated Damages.

A court of equity has never had jurisdiction to assess unliquidated damages and the Act of 1887 which enlarged the jurisdiction of equity courts specifically exclude cases of unliquidated damages for injury to person or character and for injuries to property not resulting from a breach of contract. Ducktown Sulphur, Copper & Iron Co. v. Fain, 109 Tenn. 56, 70 S.W. 813, 1902 Tenn. LEXIS 57 (1902).

Strictly, unliquidated damages are such as have not been ascertained or fixed by contract. Swift & Co. v. Memphis Cold Storage Warehouse Co., 128 Tenn. 82, 158 S.W. 480, 1913 Tenn. LEXIS 27 (1913).

Unliquidated damages proper. Nashville, C. & S. L. Ry. v. Reams, 157 Tenn. 343, 8 S.W.2d 498, 1928 Tenn. LEXIS 196 (1928).

Suit maintainable in chancery for unliquidated damages for maliciously suing out an attachment, where it is brought on the bond. Nashville Union Stockyards, Inc. v. Grissim, 13 Tenn. App. 115, — S.W.2d —, 1930 Tenn. App. LEXIS 128 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1930).

Suit for personal injuries which also sought to have release alleged to have been fraudulently procured set aside was improperly brought in chancery as the main purpose of the suit was for unliquidated damages and the equitable right to have the release set aside was merely incidental and could be disposed of in a court of law. Tucker v. Simmons, 199 Tenn. 359, 287 S.W.2d 19, 1956 Tenn. LEXIS 334 (1956).

Where the tort was not waived, a suit for unliquidated damages for injuries to property was not allowed in chancery court. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Ins. Co. v. Hartsook, 487 S.W.2d 649, 1972 Tenn. LEXIS 326 (Tenn. 1972).

Chancery court was able to fully adjudicate a matter because, to the extent that the damages sought were unliquidated damages above the exact amount of damages sought for an alleged misappropriation, the court, having taken jurisdiction over the liquidated portion of the damages, was able to fully adjudicate the matter. PNC Multifamily Capital Institutional Fund XXVI Ltd. P'ship v. Bluff City Cmty. Dev. Corp., 387 S.W.3d 525, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 288 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 4, 2012), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 680 (Tenn. Sept. 19, 2012).

To the extent that the damages sought may have been unliquidated, the chancery court, having taken jurisdiction over the portion of the damages arising in contract, was permitted to fully adjudicate the matter. Tennison Bros. v. Thomas, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. App. LEXIS 479 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 6, 2014).

Chancery court properly transferred a case to circuit court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Public Employee Political Freedom Act because, despite the appellate court's clear direction to brief the issue of whether the damages sought by the employee were of the kind that invoked the chancery court's jurisdiction, the employee chose not to brief the issue and her complaint did not sufficiently raise a claim for liquidated damages inasmuch as her alleged damages as a result of embarrassment and humiliation did not constitute liquidated damages, and nothing provided by the employee established her lost wages and benefits to a reasonable certainty that might render her damages liquidated. Thornton v. Coffee Cty. Bd. of Educ., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 586 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 3, 2018).

7. —Statutory Limits.

While this statute has been liberally construed in favor of the extension of the chancery jurisdiction, the courts have declined to apply it to others which, while falling within the words of the statute, were so exceptional in character as to preclude the idea that they were within its intent. Shields v. Davis, 103 Tenn. 538, 53 S.W. 948, 1899 Tenn. LEXIS 134 (1899); McCreary v. First Nat'l Bank, 109 Tenn. 128, 70 S.W. 821, 1902 Tenn. LEXIS 63 (1902).

8. “Jurisdiction” defined.

“Jurisdiction” is the power constitutionally conferred upon a judge or magistrate to determine causes according to law and to carry his sentence into execution; and, since this section specifically excepts certain causes from the jurisdiction of the chancery court, a party cannot, even by express waiver or consent, confer upon that tribunal jurisdiction to hear the excepted causes. Swift & Co. v. Memphis Cold Storage Warehouse Co., 128 Tenn. 82, 158 S.W. 480, 1913 Tenn. LEXIS 27 (1913); Perry v. Young, 133 Tenn. 522, 182 S.W. 577, 1915 Tenn. LEXIS 116, L.R.A. (n.s.) 1917B385 (1916).

9. —Courts First Acquiring Matter.

Where both chancery and circuit courts have jurisdiction, it is the rule that the court which first acquires the matter takes the exclusive jurisdiction to end the matter. Wilson v. Grantham, 739 S.W.2d 776, 1986 Tenn. App. LEXIS 3505 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986).

10. Jurisdiction — Examples.

Jurisdiction of an unlawful detainer action is in a justice of the peace (now general sessions court), the circuit court or the chancery court, and the court which first takes jurisdiction thereby acquires exclusive jurisdiction. Robinson v. Easter, 208 Tenn. 147, 344 S.W.2d 365, 1961 Tenn. LEXIS 407 (1961).

Where insurance company invokes chancery jurisdiction seeking injunctive and declaratory relief to prevent insured from enforcing arbitration provisions of policy, and insured counterclaims under the policy for damages caused by uninsured motorist, the chancery court has jurisdiction if insurer does not comply with arbitration provisions. Cavalier Ins. Corp. v. Osment, 538 S.W.2d 399, 1976 Tenn. LEXIS 491 (Tenn. 1976).

Decedent's real property, which vested in the heirs immediately upon her death, was not part of her estate subject to be sold for payment of her obligations in the absence of proof that her personal property was insufficient to discharge those obligations. The property, therefore, was not affected by statutory provisions relating to the administration of decedents' estates. Since the property passed to the heirs, it was not within the jurisdiction of the probate court. The chancellor properly exercised jurisdiction over it. Clay v. Hall, 597 S.W.2d 737, 1980 Tenn. App. LEXIS 325 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980), appeal dismissed, 449 U.S. 914, 101 S. Ct. 310, 66 L. Ed. 2d 142, 1980 U.S. LEXIS 3562 (1980).

Appointment of an administrator ad litem for the decedent did not constitute a suit in equity for transfer purposes under T.C.A. § 16-10-111, and for purposes of T.C.A. § 16-1-116, the case could not be transferred to chancery court because the circuit court had jurisdiction to award the damages requested. Owens v. Muenzel, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 752 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 21, 2018).

11. —Action for Solid Waste Disposal Fee.

The chancery court was the proper forum for an action against resident for delinquent solid waste disposal fee. City of Bolivar v. Goodrum, 49 S.W.3d 290, 2000 Tenn. App. LEXIS 669 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000).

12. —Contract.

A suit for damages for breach of contract to cut sawlogs is entertained by chancery. Dorris v. King, 54 S.W. 683, 1899 Tenn. Ch. App. LEXIS 131 (1899).

Breach of contract not to engage in business sold. Frumin v. Chazen, 153 Tenn. 1, 282 S.W. 199, 1925 Tenn. LEXIS 1 (1926).

Breach of contract. State ex rel. Hooten v. Hooten, 1 Tenn. App. 154, — S.W. —, 1925 Tenn. App. LEXIS 23 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1925).

Suits for specific performance lie within the inherent jurisdiction of the chancery court. Wright v. Universal Tire, Inc., 577 S.W.2d 194, 1978 Tenn. App. LEXIS 333 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1978).

County probate court had jurisdiction over suit for specific performance of a contract to sell land in light of ch. 366, Private Acts of 1974, which conferred all of the jurisdiction of the county chancery court on the probate court. Wright v. Universal Tire, Inc., 577 S.W.2d 194, 1978 Tenn. App. LEXIS 333 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1978).

In an action in which a husband's children from a prior marriage contended that a wife's last will was invalid because it breached a contract in which the wife and the husband agreed to make mutual wills, the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction because T.C.A. § 16-16-201(a) provided the court with subject matter jurisdiction to probate wills, T.C.A. § 32-4-109 provided the court with jurisdiction to hear will contests, T.C.A. § 29-14-102 provided the court with jurisdiction to hear declaratory judgment actions, and T.C.A. §§ 16-11-101 and 16-11-102(a) provided the court with jurisdiction to hear actions for breach of oral or written contracts. In re Estate of Brown, 402 S.W.3d 193, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 308 (Tenn. Mar. 22, 2013).

Trial court had concurrent subject matter jurisdiction to consider the next of kin's claims against the funeral homes where all plaintiffs, i.e., those who signed contracts and those who did not, sought equitable relief regarding the location and identification of loved ones'  remains, and asserting concurrent jurisdiction prevented a multiplicity of actions. Wofford v. M.J. Edwards & Sons Funeral Home Inc., 528 S.W.3d 524, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 214 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 29, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 483 (Tenn. Aug. 18, 2017).

13. —Implied Contract.

Under this section the chancery court has jurisdiction of a suit by a receiver to recover compensation for his acts as receiver against the complainants and their sureties in the original suit in which a receiver was sought since there exists an implied contract on the part of the complainants in such original suit to compensate the receiver appointed at their solicitation. Taylor v. Smith, 172 Tenn. 247, 111 S.W.2d 1020, 1937 Tenn. LEXIS 74 (1938).

14. —Warranty of Title.

Damages for breach of warranty of title. Williams v. Burg, 77 Tenn. 455, 1882 Tenn. LEXIS 83 (1882); Swift & Co. v. Memphis Cold Storage Warehouse Co., 128 Tenn. 82, 158 S.W. 480, 1913 Tenn. LEXIS 27 (1913).

15. —Note.

Where complainant filed a creditor's bill which he was not entitled to maintain, it was proper for the chancery court to render judgment on the note sued on. Sweetwater Bank & Trust Co. v. Howard, 13 Tenn. App. 592, — S.W.2d —, 1931 Tenn. App. LEXIS 101 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1931).

16. —Bond.

Damages on bond of clerk for taking insufficient supersedeas bond, whereby property levied on was lost. Glenn v. Moore, 79 Tenn. 256, 1883 Tenn. LEXIS 51 (1883); State use of Henning's Heirs v. Keller, 79 Tenn. 399, 1883 Tenn. LEXIS 78 (1883).

Under this section the chancery court may have jurisdiction of a suit on a bond. State ex rel. Hooten v. Hooten, 1 Tenn. App. 154, — S.W. —, 1925 Tenn. App. LEXIS 23 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1925).

Damages on injunction bond. Dafoe v. Starek, 9 Tenn. App. 668, — S.W.2d —, 1929 Tenn. App. LEXIS 128 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1929).

17. —Ejectment.

Ejectment. Frazier v. Browning, 79 Tenn. 253, 1883 Tenn. LEXIS 50 (1883).

Under this section the chancery court has concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit court in ejectment actions. Carr v. Wilbanks, 45 Tenn. App. 372, 324 S.W.2d 786, 1958 Tenn. App. LEXIS 131 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1958).

18. —Surveyor's Mistake.

Damages for mistake of public surveyor. State use of Henning's Heirs v. Keller, 79 Tenn. 399, 1883 Tenn. LEXIS 78 (1883).

19. —Usury.

Suit against a national bank for usury may be in chancery. Bobo v. People's Nat'l Bank, 92 Tenn. 444, 21 S.W. 888, 1892 Tenn. LEXIS 91 (1893), overruled, Meredith v. American Nat'l Bank, 127 Tenn. 90, 153 S.W. 479, 1912 Tenn. LEXIS 12 (1912), overruled in part, Meredith v. American Nat'l Bank, 127 Tenn. 90, 153 S.W. 479, 1912 Tenn. LEXIS 12 (1912).

20. —Detinue.

In view of the enlarged jurisdiction of the chancery court by this section, such court may entertain an action in detinue. Patton v. Hardison, 20 Tenn. App. 585, 101 S.W.2d 698, 1936 Tenn. App. LEXIS 50 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1936).

21. —Election Contest.

Contested elections, if trial not provided for in some other tribunal. Morris v. Nashville, 74 Tenn. 337, 1880 Tenn. LEXIS 257 (1880).

Contest of sheriff's election. Shields v. Davis, 103 Tenn. 538, 53 S.W. 948, 1899 Tenn. LEXIS 134 (1899).

Mayor's election contest. Baker v. Mitchell, 105 Tenn. 610, 59 S.W. 137, 1900 Tenn. LEXIS 111 (1900).

22. —Quiet Possession.

Jurisdiction of bill to quiet the possession of land. Nason v. South Memphis Land Co., 138 Tenn. 21, 195 S.W. 761, 1917 Tenn. LEXIS 2 (1917).

23. —Cloud from Title.

Jurisdiction to remove cloud from title. Bouldin v. Taylor, 152 Tenn. 97, 275 S.W. 340, 1924 Tenn. LEXIS 107 (1924).

24. —Title in Partition.

Determination of conflicting titles in partition suits. Walsh v. Crook, 91 Tenn. 388, 19 S.W. 19, 1892 Tenn. LEXIS 2 (1892).

25. —Damages as Incidental Relief.

While this statute does not confer on the chancery court jurisdiction of unliquidated damages growing out of injury or trespass to property, person, or character (except for damages for injuries to property resulting from a breach of contract), where the court has jurisdiction by injunction, or upon some recognized ground of equity, it may give damages as an incident to such jurisdiction. Horton v. Nashville, 72 Tenn. 39, 1879 Tenn. LEXIS 4, 40 Am. Rep. 1 (1879); State use of Henning's Heirs v. Keller, 79 Tenn. 399, 1883 Tenn. LEXIS 78 (1883).

The statute expressly excepts from the jurisdiction of chancery the cases of injury to property involving unliquidated damages; and chancery can only take jurisdiction of such matter as an incident to equitable relief granted, and not where all equitable relief is refused. Union Planters' Bank & Trust Co. v. Memphis Hotel Co., 124 Tenn. 649, 139 S.W. 715, 1911 Tenn. LEXIS 69, 39 L.R.A. (n.s.) 580 (1911); Swift & Co. v. Memphis Cold Storage Warehouse Co., 128 Tenn. 82, 158 S.W. 480, 1913 Tenn. LEXIS 27 (1913).

A bill to enjoin a flume company from occupying the land of a riparian owner and for part damages therefor, having failed as to the injunctive relief, could not be retained for the purpose of awarding the damages. Tenn. Coal Iron & R.R. Co. v. Paint Rock Flume & Transp. Co., 128 Tenn. 277, 160 S.W. 522, 1913 Tenn. LEXIS 48 (1913); Cash v. Russell, 4 Tenn. Civ. App. (4 Higgins) 601 (1914).

The chancery court has no jurisdiction of the cross action of defendants seeking unliquidated damages against cross defendants, in an original action for possession of realty and for an injunction against defendants restraining them from interfering with new construction. Greeneville Cabinet Co. v. Hauff, 197 Tenn. 321, 273 S.W.2d 9, 1954 Tenn. LEXIS 489 (1954).

Although chancery has no jurisdiction of a suit seeking no relief other than a money recovery for injuries to realty and personalty by reason of a tort, it does have jurisdiction to award such damages as an incident to injunctive relief where there is only one party complainant seeking an injunction and, incidentally, damages sustained by reason of the tort which he seeks to have enjoined. Griffith v. Hurt, 200 Tenn. 133, 291 S.W.2d 271, 1956 Tenn. LEXIS 386 (1956).

Bank and its employees were entitled to judgment as a matter of law in administrators'  action alleging that they failed to spend sufficient money on a deceased while acting as his court appointed guardians because the doctrine of res judicata barred their claims, which had already been litigated in a chancery court during final accounting proceedings; the chancery court is not necessarily precluded from hearing causes of action for unliquidated damages for injuries to person or character. Miller v. Regions Bank, — S.W.3d —, 2009 Tenn. App. LEXIS 780 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 20, 2009).

26. —Negligence of Attorney.

A bill in chancery against an attorney for negligence or failure of duty in collecting claims placed in his hands for collection, whereby they were lost, may be maintained. A. T. Bruce & Co. v. Baxter, 75 Tenn. 477, 1881 Tenn. LEXIS 147 (1881).

27. —Conversion — Suit for Value.

Damages for conversion where the tort is waived and the value is sued for. Coal Creek Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Moses, 83 Tenn. 300, 1885 Tenn. LEXIS 52, 54 Am. Rep. 415 (1885).

28. —Fraud and Deceit.

Fraud and deceit. Shwab v. Walters, 147 Tenn. 638, 251 S.W. 42, 1922 Tenn. LEXIS 71 (1923).

In an action between ex-spouses involving fraud in regard to paternity, because no objection to the chancery court's jurisdiction to award emotional distress damages was made, the chancery court properly considered the matter upon the principles of a court of law, T.C.A. § 16-11-102(b). Hodge v. Craig, — S.W.3d —, 2010 Tenn. App. LEXIS 649 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 13, 2010), appeal dismissed, — S.W.3d —, 2011 Tenn. LEXIS 56 (Tenn. Jan. 18, 2011), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 382 S.W.3d 325, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 720 (Tenn. Oct. 1, 2012).

Chancery court retained subject matter jurisdiction to consider judgment creditors'  motion to revive the judgment because it had subject matter jurisdiction over the original action for money damages and injunctive relief based on claims of fraud and conversion, and the motion was an attempt to continue or extend the original action, not a new cause of action; expiration of the statute of limitations for actions on judgments did not deprive the chancery court of subject matter jurisdiction. Town & Country Jewelers Inc. v. Sheriff, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 326 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 13, 2018).

29. —Liens.

Furnisher's lien on a steamboat. Casey & Hedges Mfg. Co. v. Weatherly, 97 Tenn. 297, 37 S.W. 6, 1896 Tenn. LEXIS 143 (1896).

30. —Penalty Against Bank.

Penalty against national bank. McCreary v. First Nat'l Bank, 109 Tenn. 128, 70 S.W. 821, 1902 Tenn. LEXIS 63 (1902).

31. —Proceeds of Estate.

Recovery of proceeds of an estate converted. Carpenter v. Wright, 158 Tenn. 289, 13 S.W.2d 51, 1928 Tenn. LEXIS 152 (1929).

32. —Forfeitures.

Forfeitures under antitrust law. State ex rel. Astor v. Schlitz Brewing Co., 104 Tenn. 715, 59 S.W. 1033, 1900 Tenn. LEXIS 48, 78 Am. St. Rep. 941 (1900).

33. —Money Lost Gaming.

Money lost at gaming or on wagering contracts. McGrew v. City Produce Exchange, 85 Tenn. 572, 4 S.W. 38, 1886 Tenn. LEXIS 84, 4 Am. St. Rep. 771 (1887); Dunn v. Bell, 85 Tenn. 581, 4 S.W. 41, 1886 Tenn. LEXIS 85 (1887); Simmons v. Leonard, 89 Tenn. 622, 15 S.W. 444, 1890 Tenn. LEXIS 86 (1891).

34. —Mandamus.

Hawkins v. Kercheval, 78 Tenn. 535, 1882 Tenn. LEXIS 220 (1882); Simmons v. Leonard, 89 Tenn. 622, 15 S.W. 444, 1890 Tenn. LEXIS 86 (1891).

Chancery court had jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus the statute vests chancery courts with concurrent jurisdiction over all civil causes of action including petitions for writs of mandamus, T.C.A. § 29-25-101 separately grants chancellors the power to issue writs of mandamus, and the language of T.C.A. § 5-1-107 that duties made incumbent by law upon the county may be enforced by mandamus from the circuit court is permissive rather than exclusionary. State ex rel. Aina-Labinjo v. Metro. Nashville Bd. of Pub. Educ., — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. App. LEXIS 377 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 6, 2013).

35. —Recoupment.

Recoupment may include damages suffered from any matter arising from plaintiff's demand for which defendant would be entitled to recover in cross action and may be claimed in chancery. Mack v. Hugger Bros. Const. Co., 153 Tenn. 260, 283 S.W. 448, 1925 Tenn. LEXIS 27, 46 A.L.R. 389 (1926).

36. Lack of Jurisdiction — Examples.

Chancery court had no jurisdiction to enjoin unlawful detainer suit commenced before justice of the peace (now general sessions court) where only basis of suit in equity was complainant's claim of oral lease for one year and alleged lease, if valid, would have amounted to legal defense to the unlawful detainer action. Robinson v. Easter, 208 Tenn. 147, 344 S.W.2d 365, 1961 Tenn. LEXIS 407 (1961).

37. —Tort of Fraud.

Allegations construed to make a cross bill one for misrepresentations made to one defendant by the agent of another defendant, making it one for the tort of fraud and deceit, of which the chancery court has no jurisdiction, so that the cross bill must be dismissed. Ellett v. Embury & Maury, 142 Tenn. 444, 217 S.W. 818, 1919 Tenn. LEXIS 71 (1919).

38. —Tort of Malice.

Suit for damages for maliciously inducing party to break contract. Varno v. Tindall, 164 Tenn. 642, 51 S.W.2d 502, 1931 Tenn. LEXIS 63 (1932).

39. —Negligence.

Injury to ferry and land. Rhea v. Hooper, 73 Tenn. 390, 1880 Tenn. LEXIS 146 (1880).

Injury to eggs by negligence of warehouseman. Swift & Co. v. Memphis Cold Storage Warehouse Co., 128 Tenn. 82, 158 S.W. 480, 1913 Tenn. LEXIS 27 (1913).

40. —Trespass to Person and Property.

Chancery has no jurisdiction of an action of damages for trespass to person or property. Horton v. Nashville, 72 Tenn. 39, 1879 Tenn. LEXIS 4, 40 Am. Rep. 1 (1879); State use of Henning's Heirs v. Keller, 79 Tenn. 399, 1883 Tenn. LEXIS 78 (1883).

41. —Condemnation of Land.

Condemnation of land for sale under justice's (now general sessions judge's) execution. Shields v. Davis, 103 Tenn. 538, 53 S.W. 948, 1899 Tenn. LEXIS 134 (1899).

Chancery court had no jurisdiction to enjoin taking of sewer and water lines by municipality without just compensation or to entertain suit for unjust enrichment since adequate remedy is provided at law under reverse condemnation procedure in § 29-16-123. Zirkle v. Kingston, 217 Tenn. 210, 396 S.W.2d 356, 1965 Tenn. LEXIS 535 (1965).

42. —Loss of Profits.

Loss of profits on sales. Sanford-Day Iron Works v. Enterprise Foundry & Machine Co., 138 Tenn. 437, 198 S.W. 258, 1917 Tenn. LEXIS 53 (1917).

43. —Restraining Interference.

Restraining interference with right to exercise duties as public officer. State ex rel. Brumit v. Grindstaff, 144 Tenn. 554, 234 S.W. 510, 1921 Tenn. LEXIS 56 (1921).

44. —Devisavit Vel Non.

Trial of issue of devisavit vel non. Simmons v. Leonard, 89 Tenn. 622, 15 S.W. 444, 1890 Tenn. LEXIS 86 (1891).

Although this section provides that the chancery court can hear and determine certain cases in which jurisdiction lies in the circuit court where no objection to the jurisdiction has been taken by a plea, where the issue of jurisdiction was raised in the lower court it was improper for the chancellor to rule on the issue of devisavit vel non. Muse v. Sluder, 600 S.W.2d 237, 1980 Tenn. App. LEXIS 347 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980).

44.5. —Dependency and Neglect Proceedings.

Chancery court erred in granting the parents'  petition for a writ of certiorari because the chancery court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to review a juvenile court's ex parte protective custody order where the chancery court was not a superior court to a juvenile court with regard to dependency and neglect proceedings and a writ of certiorari proceeding did not satisfy either of the types of cases for the chancery court's exercise of jurisdiction. In re Brody S., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 362 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 24, 2016).

45. —Transfer to Circuit Court.

Implicit in the provisions of T.C.A. § 16-11-102 is the positive inference that where a complaint has been filed in the chancery court that lies outside that court's subject matter jurisdiction, and objection has been made, the chancery court may not dismiss the complaint but must transfer it to the appropriate circuit court. Woods v. MTC Mgmt., 967 S.W.2d 800, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 213 (Tenn. 1998).

T.C.A. § 16-11-102 does not authorize a chancery court to transfer an improper appeal made from a general sessions judgment to a circuit court with the proper jurisdiction. Graves v. Kraft Gen. Foods, 45 S.W.3d 584, 2000 Tenn. App. LEXIS 692 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000).

46. Jury Trial.

The parties are entitled to demand a jury in chancery where the case is cognizable under this section. Shepard & Gluck v. Thomas, 147 Tenn. 338, 246 S.W. 836, 1922 Tenn. LEXIS 46 (1922).

In nonequitable cases tried before a chancery court, a party may demand, of right, a jury to try issues of fact, and the jury's verdict has the effect of a verdict at law. Hurt v. Earnhart, 539 S.W.2d 133, 1976 Tenn. App. LEXIS 248 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1976).

47. Jurisdiction — Objections.

The filing of an answer by the defendant is not a waiver of objections to the jurisdiction of chancery, where the action is one falling within the exceptions of this section. Swift & Co. v. Memphis Cold Storage Warehouse Co., 128 Tenn. 82, 158 S.W. 480, 1913 Tenn. LEXIS 27 (1913).

Implicit in the provisions of Tenn.Code Ann. § 16-11-102 is the positive inference that, where a jurisdictional objection has been made, a transfer pursuant to subsection (b) is mandated. Flowers v. Dyer County, 830 S.W.2d 51, 1992 Tenn. LEXIS 491 (Tenn. 1992), rehearing denied, — S.W.2d —, 1992 Tenn. LEXIS 368 (Tenn. May 4, 1992).

48. Federal Courts — Jurisdiction.

This section does not efface the distinction between legal and equitable rights and remedies; and, if it did, it could not confer upon the federal courts jurisdiction in equity to try common law cases. United States v. Wilson, 118 U.S. 86, 6 S. Ct. 991, 30 L. Ed. 110, 1886 U.S. LEXIS 1906 (1886); American Asso. v. Williams, 166 F. 17, 1908 U.S. App. LEXIS 4831 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1908).

49. Parties.

50. —Joinder.

Two or more persons may unite in a bill to enjoin a nuisance although their lands are separate and distinct from each other where it appears that the lands of all are affected in substantially the same way by the nuisance complained of. Griffith v. Hurt, 200 Tenn. 133, 291 S.W.2d 271, 1956 Tenn. LEXIS 386 (1956).

There could be no joinder of parties as complainants for recovery of separate injuries inflicted by the same tort upon separate lands under bill seeking such damages and mandatory injunction for abatement of the condition causing such damages. Griffith v. Hurt, 200 Tenn. 133, 291 S.W.2d 271, 1956 Tenn. LEXIS 386 (1956).

51. Estoppel of Challenge to Jurisdiction.

Having invoked the jurisdiction of the chancery court, plaintiff was estopped to seek to reverse its decision on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Clay v. Hall, 597 S.W.2d 737, 1980 Tenn. App. LEXIS 325 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980), appeal dismissed, 449 U.S. 914, 101 S. Ct. 310, 66 L. Ed. 2d 142, 1980 U.S. LEXIS 3562 (1980).

Collateral References. 27 Am. Jur. 2d Equity §§ 10, 11.

21 C.J.S. Courts §§ 289, 490.

Res judicata as affected by limitation of jurisdiction of court which rendered judgment. 83 A.L.R.2d 977.

Courts 472.1, 472.3.

Equity 44.

16-11-103. Jurisdiction of equity causes.

The chancery court has exclusive original jurisdiction of all cases of an equitable nature, where the debt or demand exceeds fifty dollars ($50.00), unless otherwise provided by this code. It has no jurisdiction of any debt or demand of less value than fifty dollars ($50.00), unless otherwise specifically provided.

Code 1858, §§ 4280, 4281 (deriv. Acts 1801, ch. 6, § 1; 1835-1836, ch. 4, § 1); Shan., §§ 6089, 6090; mod. Code 1932, §§ 10350, 10351; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-603.

Textbooks. Gibson's Suits in Chancery (7th ed., Inman), §§ 5, 8.

Tennessee Jurisprudence, 11 Tenn. Juris., Equity, §§ 2, 21, 26, 33; 17 Tenn. Juris., Jurisdiction, § 23.

Law Reviews.

The Supreme Court and the New Equity, 68 Vand. L. Rev. 997 (2015).

The Tennessee Court System — Chancery Court (Frederic S. Le Clercq), 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 281.

Cited: Tinsley v. Bryan, 148 Tenn. 256, 255 S.W. 49, 1922 Tenn. LEXIS 88 (1923); L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Bracey, 817 S.W.2d 292, 1991 Tenn. LEXIS 346 (Tenn. 1991).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Construction and Interpretation.

Under § 16-10-111 circuit court has jurisdiction of suits of an equitable nature in absence of demurrer to jurisdiction. Hewgley v. Trice, 207 Tenn. 466, 340 S.W.2d 918, 1960 Tenn. LEXIS 482 (1960).

2. —“Original Jurisdiction” — Meaning.

This section is construed as having reference to those equitable rights which result from fraud, accident, mistake, trusts, and the like, originally inherent in a court of equity, and not as denying such equitable remedies as are exclusively conferred upon the chancery court by the Code. Tinsley v. Bryan, 148 Tenn. 256, 255 S.W. 49, 1922 Tenn. LEXIS 88 (1923).

Term “original jurisdiction” refers to class of cases where the right of action itself is equitable, and not to those cases where equitable remedy is involved. Covert v. Nashville, C. & S. L. Ry., 186 Tenn. 142, 208 S.W.2d 1008, 1948 Tenn. LEXIS 529, 1 A.L.R.2d 154 (1948).

3. —Ancillary Jurisdiction.

The jurisdiction of a chancery court is limited by the amount only in those cases of an equitable nature where the chancery court has exclusive original jurisdiction, and there was no intention to limit the jurisdiction of the chancery court by the amount in those cases where the court had exclusive ancillary jurisdiction in the enforcement of a claim or a demand. Covert v. Nashville, C. & S. L. Ry., 186 Tenn. 142, 208 S.W.2d 1008, 1948 Tenn. LEXIS 529, 1 A.L.R.2d 154 (1948).

4. Fifty Dollar Minimum.

Where evidence was to the effect that the value of complainant's name in business was more than $50.00, complainant was not barred by this section from bringing suit to enjoin use of his name in shoe business. McDonald v. Julian, 48 Tenn. App. 427, 348 S.W.2d 749, 1961 Tenn. App. LEXIS 84 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1961).

5. —Exclusive Ancillary Jurisdiction.

The restriction and limitation of jurisdiction of chancery to sums exceeding $50.00 applies only when the jurisdiction turns wholly upon the amount involved. If the jurisdiction to grant the relief sought is exclusively conferred upon the chancery court, the limitation as to amount does not apply, there being no other remedy. Malone v. Dean, 77 Tenn. 336, 1882 Tenn. LEXIS 59 (1882); Washburn v. Moore, 3 Tenn. Civ. App. (3 Higgins) 268 (1912).

Where old board reelected defendant as recorder and new board elected petitioner the chancery court could not enjoin defendant from interfering with petitioner in exercising duties connected with his office pending determination of right to office. State ex rel. Brumit v. Grindstaff, 144 Tenn. 554, 234 S.W. 510, 1921 Tenn. LEXIS 56 (1921).

Plaintiff elected as superintendent was entitled to issuance of an injunction by chancery court against interference in duties of office from defendant where issue of election contest was not involved. Hart v. Pierce, 169 Tenn. 411, 88 S.W.2d 798, 1935 Tenn. LEXIS 64 (1935).

The $50.00 requirement for jurisdiction refers only to those cases in which chancery has exclusive original jurisdiction and does not apply to those cases where chancery has exclusive ancillary jurisdiction in enforcement of demand. Covert v. Nashville, C. & S. L. Ry., 186 Tenn. 142, 208 S.W.2d 1008, 1948 Tenn. LEXIS 529, 1 A.L.R.2d 154 (1948).

The chancery court is limited by the amount of $50.00 only in those cases of an equitable nature where the chancery court has an exclusive original jurisdiction under this section, but is not limited to such amount in other cases of auxiliary or ancillary jurisdiction conferred by other statutes without regard to amount. Tritschler v. Cartwright, 46 Tenn. App. 662, 333 S.W.2d 6, 1959 Tenn. App. LEXIS 120 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1959).

6. —Amount Demanded.

The chancery court has no jurisdiction where the whole demand, without deduction by reason of setoff or payment, is under $50.00. McNew v. Toby, 25 Tenn. 27, 1845 Tenn. LEXIS 7 (1845).

The amount sued for in chancery determines the jurisdiction, and not the amount found to be due on the hearing. Spurlock v. Fulks, 31 Tenn. 289, 1851 Tenn. LEXIS 67 (1851); Brimingham v. Tapscott, 51 Tenn. 382, 1871 Tenn. LEXIS 178 (1871); Wagstaff v. Braden, 60 Tenn. 304, 1872 Tenn. LEXIS 495 (1872); Malone v. Dean, 77 Tenn. 336, 1882 Tenn. LEXIS 59 (1882).

A bill to foreclose a mortgage which instrument recited that it secured a note for $45.00 and expense, including an attorney's fee of $10.00, involved a sum about $50.00. McAffrey v. Richards, 59 S.W. 1064, 1900 Tenn. Ch. App. LEXIS 128 (1900).

In an action to recover for the breach of covenants in a deed, where the sum involved was less than $50.00 and it was insisted that an equity court could not take jurisdiction, held, that if the suit had been only for $50.00 the court could not take jurisdiction but since the bill also sought other relief for which complainant had no remedy at law, the equity court had jurisdiction. Kenyon v. Russell, 5 Tenn. App. 401, — S.W. —, 1927 Tenn. App. LEXIS 71 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1927).

Chancery court did not have jurisdiction of suit of railroad passengers against railroad to determine legal rights of passengers who had paid railroad excess amount for their intrastate tickets as evidenced by receipts issued by railroad for excess payment where individual amount involved as to each plaintiff was less than $50.00 though total amount of excess payments collected was in excess of $250,000 since separate rights were involved. Covert v. Nashville, C. & S. L. Ry., 186 Tenn. 142, 208 S.W.2d 1008, 1948 Tenn. LEXIS 529, 1 A.L.R.2d 154 (1948).

7. —Rule Inapplicable — Examples.

The rule as to limit of amount is not applicable in an ejectment case. Frazier v. Browning, 79 Tenn. 253, 1883 Tenn. LEXIS 50 (1883); Tinsley v. Bryan, 148 Tenn. 256, 255 S.W. 49, 1922 Tenn. LEXIS 88 (1923).

A mandamus case is not subject to the rule as to the limit of amount. State ex rel. Hurt v. Alexander, 115 Tenn. 156, 90 S.W. 20, 1905 Tenn. LEXIS 52 (1905).

Chancery has jurisdiction to set aside a fraudulent conveyance where the demand is under $50.00. Tinsley v. Bryan, 148 Tenn. 256, 255 S.W. 49, 1922 Tenn. LEXIS 88 (1923).

8. —Rule Applicable — Examples.

Chancery is without jurisdiction to enforce an equitable vendor's lien where the demand is under the amount of $50.00. Malone v. Dean, 77 Tenn. 336, 1882 Tenn. LEXIS 59 (1882).

The chancery court has no jurisdiction in ordinary cases where the amount involved is less than $50.00. Frazier v. Browning, 79 Tenn. 253, 1883 Tenn. LEXIS 50 (1883).

Suit in chancery court to enjoin distress warrant for delinquent taxes and to annul the assessment as being void when such taxes plus penalty, interest and cost amounted to less than $50.00 was without the jurisdiction of the chancery court. Tritschler v. Cartwright, 46 Tenn. App. 662, 333 S.W.2d 6, 1959 Tenn. App. LEXIS 120 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1959).

9. Plea in Abatement.

Where the bill shows more than $50.00 to be due, and the defendant desires to raise the question that the court has no jurisdiction, because the amount in fact due is less than $50.00, he must do so by a plea in abatement, averring the amount in controversy to be less than $50.00, otherwise the question as to the jurisdiction is waived. Martin v. Carter, 9 Tenn. 489, 1831 Tenn. LEXIS 29 (1831); Covington v. Neilson, 14 Tenn. 474, 14 Tenn. 475, 1834 Tenn. LEXIS 117 (1834); Frazier v. Browning, 79 Tenn. 253, 1883 Tenn. LEXIS 50 (1883).

10. Waiver of Jurisdiction by Answer.

If, on the face of the bill, the debt or demand be less than $50.00, it should be dismissed; if more than $50.00, the court, prima facie, has jurisdiction; and, if the defendant submits by answering, he cannot resist a decree because the amount found to be due to complainant is less than $50.00. Spurlock v. Fulks, 31 Tenn. 289, 1851 Tenn. LEXIS 67 (1851); Wagstaff v. Braden, 60 Tenn. 304, 1872 Tenn. LEXIS 495 (1872); Tinsley v. Bryan, 148 Tenn. 256, 255 S.W. 49, 1922 Tenn. LEXIS 88 (1923).

11. Suits of Equitable Nature.

Suit for reformation of contract of insurance was of an equitable nature and could not be maintained as an action at law where objection was raised to jurisdiction of circuit court. Milwaukee Ins. Co. v. Gordon, 54 Tenn. App. 279, 390 S.W.2d 680, 1964 Tenn. App. LEXIS 153 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1964).

12. Determination of Tax Liability.

With respect to judicial determinations that have the effect, directly or indirectly, of determining liability for taxes that are collected by the department of revenue, Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-1-1804 overrides the jurisdiction that a chancery court would otherwise have under this section. L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Bracey, 817 S.W.2d 292, 1991 Tenn. LEXIS 346 (Tenn. 1991).

Collateral References. 20 Am. Jur. 2d Courts §§ 88, 154-157, 159, 163-165, 167, 169, 170; 27 Am. Jur. 2d Equity §§ 13, 14.

21 C.J.S. Courts § 490.

Equity 33.

16-11-104. Proceedings in aid of execution.

The chancery court has exclusive jurisdiction to aid a creditor, by judgment or decree, to subject the property of the defendant that cannot be reached by execution to the satisfaction of the judgment or decree under this code.

Code 1858, § 4282; Shan., § 6091; Code 1932, § 10352; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-604.

Textbooks. Gibson's Suits in Chancery (7th ed., Inman), §§ 7, 332, 456.

Tennessee Jurisprudence, 3 Tenn. Juris., Attachment and Garnishment, §§ 25-116, 148; 8 Tenn. Juris., Covenants, § 3; 10 Tenn. Juris., Dower, § 7; 11 Tenn. Juris., Equity, §§ 26, 33; 16 Tenn. Juris., Judgments and Decrees, § 74; 17 Tenn. Juris., Jurisdiction, § 23.

Law Reviews.

Enforcement of judgments in Tennessee, 22 Tenn. L. Rev. 873.

Cited: Tritschler v. Cartwright, 46 Tenn. App. 662, 333 S.W.2d 6, 1959 Tenn. App. LEXIS 120 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1959); United Nat'l Real Estate v. Thompson, 941 S.W.2d 58, 1996 Tenn. App. LEXIS 634 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Construction with Other Acts.

This section and §§ 26-4-101, 26-4-102 should be read in connection with § 21-105 (repealed). Edwards v. Hawks, 189 Tenn. 17, 222 S.W.2d 28, 1949 Tenn. LEXIS 396 (1949).

2. —Divorce Jurisdiction — Circuit Court.

Exclusive jurisdiction of chancery court in enforcing judgments against property subject to execution did not deprive circuit court of exclusive jurisdiction of proceeding by wife to enforce award of alimony and child support provisions of decree entered by circuit court in divorce proceeding, since § 36-822 (now § 36-5-103) provides that court which grants divorce decree may employ for the enforcement of the decree “such other lawful means as are usual and according to the course and practice of the court,” as divorce suit is to all intents and purposes a chancery proceeding. Kizer v. Bellar, 192 Tenn. 540, 241 S.W.2d 561, 1951 Tenn. LEXIS 301 (1951) (decision under prior law).

3. Construction and Interpretation.

4. —“Under the Provisions of This Code” — Meaning.

Exercise of jurisdiction under this section is restricted by this concluding phrase, and is not to be exercised in every case that may arise. North v. Puckett, 164 Tenn. 100, 46 S.W.2d 73, 1931 Tenn. LEXIS 18, 81 A.L.R. 1107 (1932).

5. —Property Covered.

This section is broad and comprehensive, and seems to embrace all kinds of property that is not exempt with the one exception of money in the possession of the defendant. North v. Puckett, 164 Tenn. 100, 46 S.W.2d 73, 1931 Tenn. LEXIS 18, 81 A.L.R. 1107 (1932); Robertson v. Johnson, 27 Tenn. App. 59, 177 S.W.2d 860, 1943 Tenn. App. LEXIS 129 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1943).

6. Basis of Jurisdiction.

7. —Other Equitable Remedy.

That a judgment creditor might be able to obtain an equitable attachment of the debtor's property does not exclude such creditor from proceeding under this section without the necessity of attachment. Hull v. Vaughn, 171 Tenn. 642, 107 S.W.2d 219, 1937 Tenn. LEXIS 146 (1937).

8. —Execution Returned Nulla Bona.

Defense that no execution has been issued and returned nulla bona is to the jurisdiction, and must be made by motion to dismiss, demurrer, or by plea in abatement, but it is unnecessary that it should be made to appear that execution has been issued and returned nulla bona if it is shown by other proof that the judgment debtor is actually insolvent and has no property subject to execution. Hull v. Vaughn, 171 Tenn. 642, 107 S.W.2d 219, 1937 Tenn. LEXIS 146 (1937).

9. —Remedy at Law.

The jurisdiction rests upon the ground that the complainant has no remedy at law, and cannot reach his debtor's property by execution at law; and the statute aids him upon that ground alone. Putnam v. Bentley, 67 Tenn. 84, 1874 Tenn. LEXIS 334 (1874); Malone v. Dean, 77 Tenn. 336, 1882 Tenn. LEXIS 59 (1882); Tinsley v. Bryan, 148 Tenn. 256, 255 S.W. 49, 1922 Tenn. LEXIS 88 (1923); Hull v. Vaughn, 171 Tenn. 642, 107 S.W.2d 219, 1937 Tenn. LEXIS 146 (1937).

Chancery cannot be resorted to when the assets sought to be reached are leviable at law, unless to remove an obstacle to legal enforcement, when there is no lien, fraud, trust, or equitable interest in the same. Bryan v. Zarecor, 112 Tenn. 503, 81 S.W. 1252, 1903 Tenn. LEXIS 118 (1904).

Where defendant in an action at law is fraudulently disposing of his property, plaintiff may maintain a creditor's bill in aid of his lawsuit. Sweetwater Bank & Trust Co. v. Howard, 13 Tenn. App. 592, — S.W.2d —, 1931 Tenn. App. LEXIS 101 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1931).

10. Jurisdiction — Examples.

11. —Debtor's Equitable Interest.

A judgment creditor, whose debtor has no property on which execution is leviable, may, by bill in chancery, subject the equitable interest of his debtor in land, by sale, to the satisfaction of his judgment. Cloud v. Hamilton & Sitler, 11 Tenn. 80, 11 Tenn. 81, 1832 Tenn. LEXIS 22 (1832); Gray v. Faris, 15 Tenn. 154, 15 Tenn. 155, 1834 Tenn. LEXIS 31 (1834); McNairy v. Eastland, 18 Tenn. 310 (1837).

Judgment creditor had a right to subject equity of debtor to the payment of her claim even though a like petition had already been filed by another creditor to reach the same equity and had been sustained by the court, the proof showing that the land was worth substantially more than all the liens against it prior to the filing of the petition by the judgment creditor. Robertson v. Johnson, 27 Tenn. App. 59, 177 S.W.2d 860, 1943 Tenn. App. LEXIS 129 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1943).

12. —Judgment under Fifty Dollars.

The chancery court may aid a judgment creditor whose judgment is less than $50.00 to reach the property of his debtor which is not subject to execution at law, where the debtor has no property subject to execution at law. Putnam v. Bentley, 67 Tenn. 84, 1874 Tenn. LEXIS 334 (1874); State v. Covington, 72 Tenn. 51, 1879 Tenn. LEXIS 5 (1879); Malone v. Dean, 77 Tenn. 336, 1882 Tenn. LEXIS 59 (1882).

13. —Administrator's Bill.

Suit by administrator of estate which was judgment creditor to subject fund in chancery court belonging to debtor to satisfaction of judgment was authorized. Rutherford v. Parker, 29 Tenn. App. 179, 195 S.W.2d 328, 1946 Tenn. App. LEXIS 65 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1946).

14. —Creditor of Estate.

Under this section chancellor could properly decree that judgment creditor was entitled to whatever interest that would pass to a judgment debtor under the terms of a will then in the process of administration. Hull v. Vaughn, 171 Tenn. 642, 107 S.W.2d 219, 1937 Tenn. LEXIS 146 (1937).

Where complainant filed bill in chancery to subject property passing to a judgment debtor under the terms of a will and where chancellor decreed that complainant was entitled to the debtor's interest in the estate and enjoined the executors of the will from delivering or paying over any property or money to the creditor such decree and injunction did not invade the jurisdiction of the county court with reference to administration of the estate since all that was required of the executors was to hold the debtor's proceeds of the estate subject to the orders of the chancery court and there was nothing in the decree to prevent such executors from making settlement of the estate. Hull v. Vaughn, 171 Tenn. 642, 107 S.W.2d 219, 1937 Tenn. LEXIS 146 (1937).

15. —Unassigned Dower.

While not subject to execution, unassigned dower may be subjected under this statute. North v. Puckett, 164 Tenn. 100, 46 S.W.2d 73, 1931 Tenn. LEXIS 18, 81 A.L.R. 1107 (1932).

16. —Funds in Custodia Legis.

Funds in the hands of the clerk and master of the court, subject to orders of distribution, are in custodia legis, and are not subject to execution or attachment at law or to garnishment in aid of a creditor of a party entitled to a portion in the fund. Scott County Nat'l Bank v. Robinson, 143 Tenn. 356, 226 S.W. 218, 1920 Tenn. LEXIS 24 (1920).

Under the inherent jurisdiction of the chancery court, as well as by virtue of this statute, a creditor can bring a bill in equity to subject to the payment of his judgment his debtor's interest in a fund which has been paid into court. Scott County Nat'l Bank v. Robinson, 143 Tenn. 356, 226 S.W. 218, 1920 Tenn. LEXIS 24 (1920).

17. —Fraudulent Conveyances.

A lien attaches to property fraudulently conveyed upon the filing of a bill to set it aside, but such lien does not have complete vitality and become operative as to strangers to the suit until process has been served upon a material defendant. Bank of Delrose v. Mansfield, 4 Tenn. App. 488, — S.W. —, 1926 Tenn. App. LEXIS 199 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1926).

18. —Equity in Real Estate.

Upon nulla bona return, chancery has jurisdiction to subject an equity in realty held in trust for the debtor. Fulghum v. Cotton, 74 Tenn. 590, 1880 Tenn. LEXIS 300 (1880); Schoolfield v. Cogdell, 120 Tenn. 618, 113 S.W. 375, 1908 Tenn. LEXIS 48 (1908).

A judgment creditor, after a nulla bona return of an execution, may reach the equity of his debtor in real estate, by a bill in chancery against such debtor and the other persons holding a trust on such property. Harris v. Beasley, 123 Tenn. 605, 133 S.W. 1110, 1910 Tenn. LEXIS 29 (1911), superseded by statute as stated in, Figlio v. Shelley Ford, Inc., — S.W.2d —, 1988 Tenn. App. LEXIS 425 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 22, 1988).

19. —Trustee of Bankrupt — Assignment of Homestead.

Trustee of bankrupt to whom homestead had never been assigned was entitled to file a bill in chancery for an assignment of homestead rather than by filing bill for discovery of assets, if a bill to compel discovery of homestead was not necessary. Edwards v. Hawks, 189 Tenn. 17, 222 S.W.2d 28, 1949 Tenn. LEXIS 396 (1949).

20. Several Creditors — Same Equity.

Under this section a creditor has the right to subject the equity of a debtor in property to the payment of the creditor's claim and this is true even where another creditor of the debtor has filed a similar petition to reach the same equity and such petition has already been sustained. Robertson v. Johnson, 27 Tenn. App. 59, 177 S.W.2d 860, 1943 Tenn. App. LEXIS 129 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1943).

21. Defense — Sworn Answer of Executor.

Bill in chancery to subject interest of judgment debtor in estate to such judgment was not in the nature of a garnishment so as to bind complainant by the sworn answers of executors that the estate was not indebted to the creditor. Hull v. Vaughn, 171 Tenn. 642, 107 S.W.2d 219, 1937 Tenn. LEXIS 146 (1937).

22. Foreign Judgment Creditors.

The statute does not apply to creditors by judgment in other states with return of nulla bona there. No lien lis pendens is created by filing bill. Broughton v. Slusher, 2 Tenn. Ch. App. 305 (1902).

23. Installment Payments.

When enforcing a money judgment, trial courts have the power to issue an installment payment order only upon motion of the judgment debtor or by agreement. Kuykendall v. Wheeler, 890 S.W.2d 785, 1994 Tenn. LEXIS 353 (Tenn. 1994).

Collateral References. Equity 438.

16-11-105. Suits by state against corporations.

The court has power to hear and determine all controversies between the state and corporations, their stockholders or creditors, upon a bill filed by the attorney general and reporter on behalf of the state.

Code 1858, § 4296 (deriv. Acts 1839-1840, ch. 1, § 4); Shan., § 6105; mod. Code 1932, § 10366; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-605.

Textbooks. Gibson's Suits in Chancery (7th ed., Inman), §§ 7, 506.

Tennessee Jurisprudence, 11 Tenn. Juris., Equity, §§ 34, 35; 17 Tenn. Juris., Jurisdiction, § 23.

Law Reviews.

The Tennessee Court System — Chancery Court (Frederic S. Le Clercq), 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 281.

Cited: State ex rel. Collier v. Enloe, 121 Tenn. 347, 117 S.W. 223, 1908 Tenn. LEXIS 24 (1909).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Jurisdiction.

In suit to abate public nuisance and to revoke corporate charter, fact that criminal court had narrow statutory concurrent jurisdiction with chancery court with reference to abatement of public nuisances did not permit criminal court to retain jurisdiction of suit for purpose of revocation of corporate charter under maxim that equity having taken jurisdiction for one purpose will retain jurisdiction for all purposes. Pan-O-Ram Club, Inc. v. State, 217 Tenn. 137, 395 S.W.2d 803, 1965 Tenn. LEXIS 526 (1965).

16-11-106. Boundary disputes.

  1. The chancery court has jurisdiction to hear and determine all cases in which the boundary line or lines of adjoining or contiguous tracts of land is one, or the only, question at issue in the case.
  2. In all such cases a complete deraignment of title by the complainant from a state grant or common source of title shall not be required as in ejectment cases, but it shall be sufficient to establish title in the complainant where the complainant proves clearly that the complainant is the true owner of the lands described in the complainant's bill.

Acts 1915, ch. 122, §§ 1, 2; Shan., §§ 6106 a1, 6106 a2; mod. Code 1932, §§ 10368, 10369; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), §§ 16-606, 16-607.

Textbooks. Gibson's Suits in Chancery (7th ed., Inman), §§ 7, 121.

Tennessee Jurisprudence, 2 Tenn. Juris., Appeal and Error, § 251; 5 Tenn. Juris., Boundaries, §§ 2-22; 10 Tenn. Juris., Ejectment, § 28; 11 Tenn. Juris., Equity, § 35; 11 Tenn. Juris., Evidence, § 45; 17 Tenn. Juris., Jurisdiction, § 23.

Law Reviews.

An Exegesis of the Ejectment Statutes of Tennessee (R.D. Cox), 18 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 581 (1988).

Cited: McGregor v. Lehman, 14 Tenn. App. 300, — S.W.2d —, 1931 Tenn. App. LEXIS 40 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1931); Ray v. Crain, 18 Tenn. App. 603, 80 S.W.2d 113, 1934 Tenn. App. LEXIS 61 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1934); Stearns Coal & Lumber Co. v. Kitchen Lumber Co., 27 Tenn. App. 468, 182 S.W.2d 4, 1944 Tenn. App. LEXIS 93 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1944); Gibson v. Shular, 29 Tenn. App. 166, 194 S.W.2d 865, 1946 Tenn. App. LEXIS 63 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1946); Carr v. Wilbanks, 45 Tenn. App. 372, 324 S.W.2d 786, 1958 Tenn. App. LEXIS 131 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1958); Arrowood v. Williams, 586 S.W.2d 131, 1979 Tenn. App. LEXIS 331 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1979); Hodges v. Huntington, 595 S.W.2d 824, 1979 Tenn. App. LEXIS 383 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1979); Bynum v. Hollowell, 656 S.W.2d 400, 1983 Tenn. App. LEXIS 602 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Statute Inapplicable.

2. —Enjoining Trespass.

This statute is inapplicable to a suit to enjoin a defendant from cutting timber and to recover for the value of the timber already cut and removed, involving an issue as to the title to a strip of land between adjoining owners, depending on the location of the boundary line. Union Tanning Co. v. Lowe, 148 Tenn. 407, 255 S.W. 712, 1923 Tenn. LEXIS 28 (1923).

3. —Determination by Pleadings.

Purpose of a suit to establish or locate boundary lines of contiguous or adjoining tracts of land can be determined only from the pleadings. Union Tanning Co. v. Lowe, 148 Tenn. 407, 255 S.W. 712, 1923 Tenn. LEXIS 28 (1923).

Where a boundary line dispute was the gravamen of the complaint, an action was a boundary line dispute, not an ejectment action, since, even though defendant's answer alleged title to part of the land by adverse possession, it did not contain a counterclaim. Burks v. Boles, 934 S.W.2d 653, 1996 Tenn. App. LEXIS 371 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996).

4. Jurisdiction.

The determinations of oil and gas unit participation and disputed property boundaries was within the jurisdiction of the chancery court under this section and the jurisdiction of the oil and gas board under § 60-1-202, and the chancellor was not required, under the doctrine of primary jurisdictions, to defer to agency expertise. Freels v. Northrup, 678 S.W.2d 55, 1984 Tenn. LEXIS 944 (Tenn. 1984) (chancellor did not defer to agency).

5. Bifurcated Cases.

It was proper for circuit court judge, acting sua sponte, to order that case be bifurcated, and that there be a trial in the chancery court as to boundary line dispute while retaining tort claims in the circuit court. Burnette v. Pickel, 858 S.W.2d 319, 1993 Tenn. App. LEXIS 15 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993), appeal denied, 1993 Tenn. LEXIS 265 (Tenn. July 6, 1993).

6. Evidence.

Where suit was to determine boundaries, and was not in the nature of ejectment, plaintiff could establish his boundary upon the deeds of all parties to the action, and was not limited to recovery upon the strength of his own title alone. Cusick v. Cutshaw, 34 Tenn. App. 283, 237 S.W.2d 563, 1948 Tenn. App. LEXIS 134 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1948).

It was not necessary for complainants to prove ownership of land in question at time of filing suit where it was shown that they formerly owned the land and had conveyed by a warranty deed and that it was for the protection against liability under such warranty that they brought suit. Patterson v. T. J. Moss Tie Co., 46 Tenn. App. 405, 330 S.W.2d 344, 1959 Tenn. App. LEXIS 107 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1959).

In a boundary dispute complainant must prove that he is the true owner or that he has become entitled to possession of the disputed area of land by clear proof. Carr v. Wilbanks, 45 Tenn. App. 372, 324 S.W.2d 786, 1958 Tenn. App. LEXIS 131 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1958).

Mere fact that defendant specifically asserted in his answer that the cause could be maintained as a suit in ejectment only but filed no cross bill could not deprive the complainants of the right expressly granted by statute to prove their case without a complete deraignment of title. Patterson v. T. J. Moss Tie Co., 46 Tenn. App. 405, 330 S.W.2d 344, 1959 Tenn. App. LEXIS 107 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1959).

Complainants are entitled to establish a boundary line by reference to title papers of other parties as well as their own. Patterson v. T. J. Moss Tie Co., 46 Tenn. App. 405, 330 S.W.2d 344, 1959 Tenn. App. LEXIS 107 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1959).

Where a deed contains an adequate particular description of the property conveyed, it will not be controlled by a recital therein of the quantity or number of acres unless it clearly appears that it was the intention to convey only a definite quantity. Williams v. Daniel, 545 S.W.2d 120, 1976 Tenn. App. LEXIS 258 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1976).

Where a sale of property is in gross and not by the acre and there is opportunity to examine the land and where there is no showing of fraud, the deed will stand as written, despite a mutual mistake as to the number of acres contained in the tract conveyed. Williams v. Daniel, 545 S.W.2d 120, 1976 Tenn. App. LEXIS 258 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1976).

A suit concerning a boundary line dispute was not a suit for ejectment and it was not necessary that plaintiff prove a complete deraignment of title from a state grant or a common source but was only required to prove clearly that he was the true owner of the land described in the complaint. Arrowood v. Williams, 586 S.W.2d 131, 1979 Tenn. App. LEXIS 331 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1979).

To prove clearly that the parties in a boundary dispute are the true owners, simply means that the complainant must prove that he is the true owner or that he had become entitled to the possession of land adjacent to the boundary which he undertakes to have established. Thornburg v. Chase, 606 S.W.2d 672, 1980 Tenn. App. LEXIS 384 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980).

In determining disputed boundaries, resort is to be had first to natural objects or landmarks, because of their very permanent character; next, to artificial monument or marks, then to the boundary lines of adjacent landowners, and then to courses and distances. This rule of construction is to aid in determining the intention of the parties to a deed which is to be determined, if possible, from the instrument in connection with the surrounding circumstances. Thornburg v. Chase, 606 S.W.2d 672, 1980 Tenn. App. LEXIS 384 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980).

The reason why a monument or adjacent line is ordinarily given preference over courses and distances is that the parties so presumed to have examined the property have, in viewing the premises, taken note of the monument or line. Thornburg v. Chase, 606 S.W.2d 672, 1980 Tenn. App. LEXIS 384 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980).

Where a plat showed a straight boundary line between two agreed points but an old fence line along the boundary had a slight bow in it, the artificial markers in the old fence line controlled over the straight line protracted on the subdivision plat, particularly where the evidence in the record establishes the bow in the old fence line could not be detected on a visual inspection of the premises and could only be ascertained through sophisticated surveying equipment which, was not available to surveyor at the time of preparation of the plat. Thornburg v. Chase, 606 S.W.2d 672, 1980 Tenn. App. LEXIS 384 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980).

The complainant is not required to prove a complete deraignment of title from the state nor to prove a common source of title but is required to prove clearly that he is the true owner of the property described in the complaint. Franks v. Burks, 688 S.W.2d 435, 1984 Tenn. App. LEXIS 3365 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984).

Finding in favor of the defendant property owners in a boundary dispute action under T.C.A. § 16-11-106(a) was proper because their survey was correct due to failure by plaintiff property owners'  surveyor to locate a landmark beech tree; it was determined that the predecessors were the most knowledgeable persons about the boundary lines. Lay v. Holmes, — S.W.3d —, 2008 Tenn. App. LEXIS 467 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 12, 2008).

In a boundary dispute under T.C.A. § 16-11-106, the evidence did not preponderate against a trial court's placement of a disputed fifteen-acre tract to the south of a certain line because the succession of deeds conveying the tract to the adjoining landowners and numerous surveys supported the location of the tract; no other credible evidence of old boundaries was introduced. Cass Rye & Assocs. v. Coleman, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 640 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 13, 2012).

In a boundary dispute, a landowner had superior title over neighbors because, even though a 1991 quitclaim deed conveyed the disputed parcel to the neighbors, the grantor of the disputed area had transferred his total interest to a different grantee, and as such, the 1991 quitclaim deed was held for naught. Moore v. Brock, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. App. LEXIS 407 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 21, 2013).

7. —Burden of Proof.

The burden of the plaintiff in a boundary line dispute is somewhat less than that borne by the plaintiff in an ejectment action, but, he must, nevertheless, establish title in the complainant and he must prove clearly that he is the true owner of the lands described in his bill. Nelson v. Walls Properties, Inc., 611 S.W.2d 409, 1981 Tenn. LEXIS 400 (Tenn. 1981).

Subsection (b) simply means that the complainant must prove that he is the true owner or that he had become entitled to the possession of land adjacent to the boundary which he undertakes to have established, that is, the disputed area of land, by clear proof, and the chancellor would be confined to a determination by the clear proof, if he rested his decision upon title, to decree title only to the particular disputed area. Blankenship v. Blankenship, 658 S.W.2d 125, 1983 Tenn. App. LEXIS 611 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983).

8. —Defective Deeds.

Plaintiff established title to property and correct boundary where defendant's deed descriptions were deemed defective and defendant did not establish adverse possession. Blankenship v. Blankenship, 658 S.W.2d 125, 1983 Tenn. App. LEXIS 611 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983).

9. Damages — “Mild” Rule.

Where in a boundary dispute there was a real question as to the location of the boundary and no question of any willful trespass the damages were properly determined according to the “mild” rule. Stearns Coal & Lumber Co. v. Kitchen Lumber Co., 27 Tenn. App. 468, 182 S.W.2d 4, 1944 Tenn. App. LEXIS 93 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1944).

10. Ejectment.

Where suit was actually one in ejectment although defendant led trial court into believing that it was a boundary line dispute and trial court erroneously treated cause as boundary line dispute, cause would be remanded to be proceeded to a conclusion as an ejectment suit and to afford complainant an opportunity to deraign title from a common source or grant from the state. Carr v. Wilbanks, 45 Tenn. App. 372, 324 S.W.2d 786, 1958 Tenn. App. LEXIS 131 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1958).

11. —Additional Remedy.

Decree dismissing suit to enjoin defendants from cutting timber on land in which the defendant denied complainant's title to the land, on the ground that complainant did not deraign title, should not preclude complainant from suing in ejectment for the land, and the bill should be dismissed without prejudice. Union Tanning Co. v. Lowe, 148 Tenn. 407, 255 S.W. 712, 1923 Tenn. LEXIS 28 (1923).

12. —Adverse Possession — Proof.

Where a boundary dispute begun under this section developed into an ejectment action and the defendant failed to establish an actual, open, notorious, exclusive and hostile possession for the required statutory time, he could not get title by adverse possession. Stearns Coal & Lumber Co. v. Kitchen Lumber Co., 27 Tenn. App. 468, 182 S.W.2d 4, 1944 Tenn. App. LEXIS 93 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1944).

Where boundary dispute begun under this section develops into an ejectment action and defendant fails to establish an actual open, notorious, exclusive and hostile possession for the required statutory time he cannot get title by adverse possession. Carr v. Wilbanks, 45 Tenn. App. 372, 324 S.W.2d 786, 1958 Tenn. App. LEXIS 131 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1958).

Proof of record title and that plaintiff rode his horses and gave others permission to ride their horses on disputed parcel was sufficient to establish title in plaintiff and overcome claim of adverse possession. Blankenship v. Blankenship, 658 S.W.2d 125, 1983 Tenn. App. LEXIS 611 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983).

13. Oral Agreement.

Disputed boundary lines may be established by oral agreement as such agreements do not fall within the prohibition of the statute of frauds, and the parties will thereafter be estopped to question the line thus established even though it may afterwards be demonstrated that such line was erroneous. Webb v. Harris, 44 Tenn. App. 492, 315 S.W.2d 274, 1958 Tenn. App. LEXIS 100 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1958).

14. Decree.

In a boundary dispute the decree of the chancellor is confined to the disputed area. Carr v. Wilbanks, 45 Tenn. App. 372, 324 S.W.2d 786, 1958 Tenn. App. LEXIS 131 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1958).

15. Inaccuracies in Surveys.

Where surveys show inaccuracies in the metes and bounds in descriptions of large bodies of land, courses and distances yield to calls for natural objects and lines of adjacent owners. Patterson v. T. J. Moss Tie Co., 46 Tenn. App. 405, 330 S.W.2d 344, 1959 Tenn. App. LEXIS 107 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1959).

16. Limitations of Actions.

The seven-year limitation statute, § 28-2-102, applies in a boundary line dispute, even though the title was not derived from a state grant or a common source of title. Williams v. Daniel, 545 S.W.2d 120, 1976 Tenn. App. LEXIS 258 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1976).

17. Parties.

Where suit was brought by former owners who disposed of property by warranty deed for the purpose of avoiding possible future liability under covenant of warranty such right was independent of any rights the grantee may have had and it was not required that the grantee be made a party. Patterson v. T. J. Moss Tie Co., 46 Tenn. App. 405, 330 S.W.2d 344, 1959 Tenn. App. LEXIS 107 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1959).

One without title to real property has no justifiable interest in its boundaries. Nelson v. Walls Properties, Inc., 611 S.W.2d 409, 1981 Tenn. LEXIS 400 (Tenn. 1981).

18. Presumptions.

The object in all boundary questions is to find, as nearly as may be, certain evidences of what particular land was meant to be included for conveyance, and the natural presumption is that the conveyance is made after and with reference to an actual view of the premises by the parties to the instrument. Thornburg v. Chase, 606 S.W.2d 672, 1980 Tenn. App. LEXIS 384 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980).

19. Collateral Estoppel.

When a plaintiff had previously failed to prove his title to certain lands in an ejectment proceeding, he was collaterally estopped from bringing an action on the boundary lines of that same property. Nelson v. Walls Properties, Inc., 611 S.W.2d 409, 1981 Tenn. LEXIS 400 (Tenn. 1981).

20. Joint Possession.

Title in plaintiff was established where plaintiff showed he had record title and defendant failed to prove adverse possession because earlier parol agreement could not be used to establish color of title and because joint possession by the legal title holder and another is deemed to be possession of the holder of the legal title. Blankenship v. Blankenship, 658 S.W.2d 125, 1983 Tenn. App. LEXIS 611 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983).

Collateral References. 11 C.J.S. Boundaries, §§ 99, 103; C.J.S. Courts § 490.

16-11-107. Suits on foreign judgments.

When a judgment has been recovered in any other state against a resident of such state, and the creditor has exhausted the creditor's legal remedy, the real or personal property of the debtor in this state may be subjected to the satisfaction of such debt, by bill stating the facts under oath, and filed in the court of the county in which the property is situated.

Code 1858, § 4297 (deriv. Acts 1801, ch. 6, § 2); Shan., § 6106; Code 1932, § 10367; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-608.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 3 Tenn. Juris., Attachment and Garnishment, §§ 4, 76, 114; 14 Tenn. Juris., Guardian and Ward, § 4; 16 Tenn. Juris., Judgments and Decrees, § 102; 17 Tenn. Juris., Jurisdiction, § 23; 18 Tenn. Juris., Liens, § 7.

Law Reviews.

Enforcement of Judgments in Tennessee, 22 Tenn. L. Rev. 873.

Cited: Thornburg v. Chase, 606 S.W.2d 672, 1980 Tenn. App. LEXIS 384 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980); Barone v. Barone, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 218 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 3, 2012).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Jurisdiction.

General sessions court lacked jurisdiction to enroll a Mississippi judgment pursuant to T.C.A. § 26-6-104(a) of the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, and it did not have jurisdiction to allow an in rem proceeding pursuant to T.C.A. § 16-11-107. Therefore, its garnishment orders against a garnishee were set aside. Studsvik Logistics, LLC v. Royal Furniture Co., — S.W.3d —, 2010 Tenn. App. LEXIS 277 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 20, 2010).

2. —Exhaustion of Legal Remedies.

The exhaustion of the legal remedy against a judgment debtor in another state is shown by the fact that the property of such debtor in the state of his residence has been placed at the suit of creditors, in the possession of a receiver under a statute forbidding interference with it. Commercial Nat'l Bank v. Matherwell Iron & Steel Co., 95 Tenn. 172, 31 S.W. 1002, 1895 Tenn. LEXIS 75, 29 L.R.A. 164 (1895).

In action to enforce foreign judgment against nonresident by bill against property in this state, and averment that complainant had attempted to collect his claim, and had not succeeded, was not a sufficient showing that complainant had exhausted his legal remedies so as to warrant attachment under the statute. Brown v. Pace, 49 S.W. 355, 1898 Tenn. Ch. App. LEXIS 123 (1898).

3. —Exhaustion of Foreign Remedies.

If foreign debtor has no property in state of his residence but does have property in Tennessee, equity is authorized to act in rem by virtue of Acts 1801, ch. 6, § 2 whereas prior to 1801 equity could only act in personam. Davis's Ex'rs v. Fulton, 1 Tenn. 121, 1805 Tenn. LEXIS 13 (1805).

The supreme court has repeatedly applied this section in cases where suits were brought in chancery by nonresidents, who had exhausted their remedy in the foreign state, to subject specific property in this state, of a nonresident debtor, recognizing that this was the purpose of the statute. The statute confers on the chancery court jurisdiction to give relief under these conditions “and under no other.” Phillips v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 183 Tenn. 266, 191 S.W.2d 554, 1946 Tenn. LEXIS 210 (1946).

4. —Judgment — Necessity.

Nonresident creditor without a judgment may under appropriate circumstances maintain a bill against a nonresident debtor in Tennessee under the general principles of equity jurisprudence. Hall v. Jordan, 190 Tenn. 1, 227 S.W.2d 35, 1950 Tenn. LEXIS 411 (1950), superseded by statute as stated in, Toler by Lack v. City of Cookeville, 952 S.W.2d 831, 1997 Tenn. App. LEXIS 89 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997).

5. —Debtor Becoming Resident of State — Statute Inapplicable.

This section was intended to give a remedy only against judgment debtors who were nonresidents at the time of the filing of the bill to subject property here; and where a judgment was rendered against the defendant when a nonresident of this state, and he afterwards removed to this state, this statute was not applicable when he became a resident here. Broughton v. Slusher, 2 Tenn. Ch. App. 305 (1902).

6. Jurisdiction — Examples.

7. —Creditor and Debtor Nonresidents.

Where the debtor and creditor are nonresidents of this state and both residents of the same state, and the judgment creditor has exhausted his legal remedy in the state of their common residence, our chancery courts have jurisdiction, independent of the attachment laws, to aid such creditor to subject his debtor's “real or personal property” situate in this state to the payment of his debts. This rule is not affected by § 29-6-109. Taylor v. Badoux, 92 Tenn. 249, 21 S.W. 522, 1892 Tenn. LEXIS 69 (1893); Commercial Nat'l Bank v. Matherwell Iron & Steel Co., 95 Tenn. 172, 31 S.W. 1002, 1895 Tenn. LEXIS 75, 29 L.R.A. 164 (1895).

8. —Judgment Confessed by Foreign Corporation.

A judgment confessed by a debtor corporation of another state, in favor of its creditor of that state, after a petition has been filed for its enforced dissolution, though, in such state, there is a statute making a judgment confessed by a corporation, after such a petition has been filed, void as against its receiver and creditors, is valid, and gives the creditor in whose favor so confessed a remedy, under this section, to the same extent and in the same manner, and with the same priority, as a citizen of Tennessee, notwithstanding such statute, which is not effective to defeat an attachment of property in this state for the satisfaction of such judgment. Commercial Nat'l Bank v. Matherwell Iron & Steel Co., 95 Tenn. 172, 31 S.W. 1002, 1895 Tenn. LEXIS 75, 29 L.R.A. 164 (1895); Hardee v. Wilson, 129 Tenn. 511, 167 S.W. 475, 1914 Tenn. LEXIS 141 (1914).

9. —Equitable Appropriation of Funds in State.

Where a nonresident loaned money to another nonresident, on the borrower's promise to repay the loan out of funds then in, or to come into, the hands of persons of Tennessee, for the borrower, such promise amounted to an equitable appropriation of an appropriate portion of such funds, which equity could enforce in this state. Allison v. Pearce, 59 S.W. 192, 1900 Tenn. Ch. App. LEXIS 77 (1900).

10. —Foreign Receivers — Right to Sue in State.

Where his suit is not inimical to the interest of local creditors, or of anyone who has acquired rights under a local statute, nor in contravention of the policy of the forum, an ordinary chancery receiver appointed by the court of another state is accorded the privilege of bringing a suit in this state, as a matter of comity. Hardee v. Wilson, 129 Tenn. 511, 167 S.W. 475, 1914 Tenn. LEXIS 141 (1914).

11. —Justice's Judgment.

Judgment of a justice of the peace in another state is effective under this section, so as to entitle the judgment creditor to take advantage of its provisions where he has exhausted his legal remedy on such judgment in such other state. J. S. Menken Co. v. Brinkley, 94 Tenn. 721, 31 S.W. 92, 1895 Tenn. LEXIS 58 (1895).

12. Personam Suits — Circuit Court.

This section does not bar suit in circuit court by foreign corporation against Florida resident on a judgment secured in Florida, since suit is in personam and not in rem. Phillips v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 183 Tenn. 266, 191 S.W.2d 554, 1946 Tenn. LEXIS 210 (1946).

13. Priority of Liens.

Where creditor filed suit on its foreign judgment and amount of foreign judgment was deposited with Tennessee court prior to federal government's filing of tax lien against debtor, creditor had valid lien on money deposited with priority over government's lien. S & S Gasket Co. v. United States, 635 F.2d 568, 1980 U.S. App. LEXIS 11515 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1980).

Collateral References. 50 C.J.S. Judgments § 877.

Judgment 933.

16-11-108. Persons adjudicated incompetent.

The chancery court has jurisdiction, concurrent with the county court, over persons adjudicated incompetent and their estates.

Code 1858, § 4298 (deriv. Acts 1851-1852, ch. 163, § 1); Shan., § 6107; Code 1932, § 10375; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-609; Acts 2011, ch. 47, § 13.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2011, ch. 47, § 107 provided that nothing in the legislation shall be construed to alter or otherwise affect the eligibility for services or the rights or responsibilities of individuals covered by the provision on the day before the date of enactment of this legislation, which was July 1, 2011.

Acts 2011, ch. 47, § 108 provided that the provisions of the act are declared to be remedial in nature and all provisions of the act shall be liberally construed to effectuate its purposes.

Amendments. The 2011 amendment substituted “persons adjudicated incompetent and their estates” for “the persons and estates of idiots, lunatics, and other persons of unsound mind” at the end.

Effective Dates. Acts 2011, ch. 47, § 110. July 1, 2011.

Cross-References. Personal service on incompetents, Tenn. R. Civ. P. 4.04(2).

Textbooks. Gibson's Suits in Chancery (7th ed., Inman), § 62.

Tennessee Jurisprudence, 11 Tenn. Juris., Equity, § 30; 14 Tenn. Juris., Guardian and Ward, § 4; 17 Tenn. Juris., Jurisdiction, § 23.

Law Reviews.

The Tennessee Court System — Chancery Court (Frederic S. Le Clercq), 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 281.

Cited: Tinsley v. Bryan, 148 Tenn. 256, 255 S.W. 49, 1922 Tenn. LEXIS 88 (1923); Brewer v. Griggs, 10 Tenn. App. 378, — S.W.2d —, 1929 Tenn. App. LEXIS 46 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1929).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Process Service.

Persons of unsound mind must be served with process and appear by guardian or guardian ad litem. Quinn v. Quinn, 169 Tenn. 173, 83 S.W.2d 269, 1935 Tenn. LEXIS 26 (1935).

2. Insurance Policies — Reformation.

Insurance policies, like other written instruments, may be reformed in equity in cases of mutual mistake. Dickens v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 170 Tenn. 403, 95 S.W.2d 910, 1935 Tenn. LEXIS 146 (1936).

3. Conservatorship Proceeding.

In a conservatorship proceeding where the brother-in-law sought to be appointed conservator over the elderly widow, the record contained clear and convincing evidence that the brother-in-law was a party, along with the deceased, to a conveyance to the brother-in-law undertaken for the sole purpose of enabling the deceased and the widow to qualify for governmental assistance under TennCare to which they would not otherwise have been entitled; therefore, because of the fraudulent character of the conveyance and the brother-in-laws' role in it, the brother-in-law was not entitled to gain personally from the transfer of funds by being permitted to retain the money, and the trial court did not err by setting aside the transaction and ordering the brother-in-law to return the unspent remainder of the certificate of deposit. In re Conservatorship Groves, 109 S.W.3d 317, 2003 Tenn. App. LEXIS 112 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003).

Chancery court erred in setting aside the probate court's order granting conservators'  motion to remove because it was without subject matter jurisdiction to review the probate court's actions or issue any rulings in the case, and thus, all of its orders were void and of no effect; once the conservators decided to file the conservatorship in the property court, any appeals had to be to the court of appeals. In re Conservatorship of Beasley, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 393 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 28, 2015).

Collateral References. 56 C.J.S. Mental Health §§ 55 et seq., 165 et seq.

16-11-109. Infants and guardians.

The chancery court has jurisdiction, concurrent with the county court, of the persons and estates of infants, and of the appointment and removal of guardians.

Code 1858, § 4299; Shan., § 6108; Code 1932, § 10376; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-610.

Cross-References. Concurrent jurisdiction with county and juvenile courts, §§ 34-2-101, 37-1-104.

Guardianship, title 34.

Personal service on infants, Tenn. R. Civ. P. 4.04(2).

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 11 Tenn. Juris., Equity, § 30; 17 Tenn. Juris., Jurisdiction, § 23; 18 Tenn. Juris., Minors, § 23.

Law Reviews.

A Study of Domestic Relations, Juvenile and Family Courts in Tennessee, 10 Vand. L. Rev. 592.

Cited: Kansas City, Ft. S. & M. R. Co. v. Morgan, 76 F. 429, 1896 U.S. App. LEXIS 2142 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1896); Dick v. Dick, 223 Tenn. 228, 443 S.W.2d 472, 1969 Tenn. LEXIS 407 (1969); Cockrell v. Woods, 528 S.W.2d 206, 1975 Tenn. LEXIS 624 (Tenn. 1975); Wilson v. Grantham, 739 S.W.2d 776, 1986 Tenn. App. LEXIS 3505 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Venue.

It was proper to challenge, by plea in abatement, venue of action to remove testamentary guardian, which was brought in chancery court of county where testator died, in which his will was probated and letters of guardianship taken out, where the appointment was made while guardian and ward lived in another county, in which they continued to live at time of the suit. State ex rel. Logan v. Graper, 155 Tenn. 565, 4 S.W.2d 955, 1926 Tenn. LEXIS 80 (1927).

2. Consent Decree.

A consent decree affecting the rights of an infant entered by his solicitor or by a duly authorized agent is voidable, and subject to be set aside if found to be prejudicial to his rights. Ledford v. Johnson City Foundry & Machine Co., 169 Tenn. 430, 88 S.W.2d 804, 1935 Tenn. LEXIS 66 (1935).

3. Construction with Other Sections.

This section, to the extent that it is in conflict with any of the provisions of Acts 1951, ch. 202 (§§ 36-101 — 36-137) see now title 36, chapter 1, part 1 or Acts 1955, ch. 177 (§§ 37-242 — 37-259) (now §§ 37-1-101, 37-1-14337-1-159) has been repealed. St. Peter's Orphan Asylum Asso. v. Riley, 43 Tenn. App. 683, 311 S.W.2d 336, 1957 Tenn. App. LEXIS 144 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1957).

4. Abandoned Children.

The chancery or circuit court has no jurisdiction to declare a child an “abandoned child” except in connection with a petition for adoption under the provisions of §§ 36-110 (now § 36-1-110), 37-243 (now § 37-1-144). St. Peter's Orphan Asylum Asso. v. Riley, 43 Tenn. App. 683, 311 S.W.2d 336, 1957 Tenn. App. LEXIS 144 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1957).

5. Custody of Minors.

Although the chancery court has inherent jurisdiction of the persons and estates of minors, the state has conferred upon juvenile courts the special exclusive jurisdiction to determine custody of a dependent or delinquent minor. State ex rel. Baker v. Turner, 562 S.W.2d 435, 1977 Tenn. App. LEXIS 258 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1977).

Collateral References. 30 C.J.S. Equity § 51; 39 C.J.S. Guardian and Ward §§ 11, 45-47; 43 C.J.S. Infants §§ 6, 124.

Infants 33.

16-11-110. Divorce proceedings — Adoptions.

The chancery court has jurisdiction, concurrent with the circuit court, of all proceedings for divorce and for the adoption of children.

Code 1858, § 4301 (deriv. Acts 1835-1836, ch. 20, § 1); Shan., § 6111; Code 1932, § 10379; Acts 1951, ch. 202, § 2 (Williams, § 9572.16); modified; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-612.

Cross-References. Adoption, title 36, ch. 1.

Custody, title 36, ch. 6.

Divorce and annulment, title 36, ch. 4.

Textbooks. Gibson's Suits in Chancery (7th ed., Inman), § 8.

Tennessee Jurisprudence, 9 Tenn. Juris., Divorce and Alimony, §§ 2, 18; 11 Tenn. Juris., Equity, § 28; 17 Tenn. Juris., Jurisdiction, § 23.

Law Reviews.

A Study of Domestic Relations, Juvenile and Family Courts in Tennessee, 10 Vand. L. Rev. 592.

Courts, Legislatures, and Second-Parent Adoptions: On Judicial Deference, Specious Reasoning, and the Best Interests of the Child, 66 Tenn. L. Rev. 019 (1999).

Cited: Rains v. Rains, 58 Tenn. App. 214, 428 S.W.2d 650, 1968 Tenn. App. LEXIS 295 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1968); Sizemore v. Sizemore, — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 486 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 30, 2007); In re Angela E., 303 S.W.3d 240, 2010 Tenn. LEXIS 87 (Tenn. Feb. 16, 2010).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Custody of Minors.

Although the chancery court has inherent jurisdiction of the persons and estates of minors, the state has conferred upon juvenile courts the special exclusive jurisdiction to determine custody of a dependent or delinquent minor. State ex rel. Baker v. Turner, 562 S.W.2d 435, 1977 Tenn. App. LEXIS 258 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1977).

3. Jurisdiction.

Trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over a wife's contempt petition where the petition sought to secure the husband's compliance with the marriage dissolution agreement that had been made an order of the court, and Tennessee courts were empowered to inflict punishments for contempt of court. Foster v. Foster, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 214 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 2, 2019).

10. Actions on Judgments.

Chancery court retained subject matter jurisdiction to consider judgment creditors'  motion to revive the judgment because it had subject matter jurisdiction over the original action for money damages and injunctive relief based on claims of fraud and conversion, and the motion was an attempt to continue or extend the original action, not a new cause of action; expiration of the statute of limitations for actions on judgments did not deprive the chancery court of subject matter jurisdiction. Town & Country Jewelers Inc. v. Sheriff, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 326 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 13, 2018).

Collateral References. 30A C.J.S. Equity §§ 5, 74.

Validity and construction of statutory provision relating to jurisdiction of court for purpose of divorce for servicemen. 73 A.L.R.3d 431.

16-11-111. Partition or sale of property.

The chancery court has jurisdiction, concurrent with the circuit and county courts, of proceedings for the partition or sale of estates by personal representatives, guardians, heirs, or tenants in common, and for the sale of land at the instance of creditors of the decedent, if the personal property is insufficient to satisfy the debts of the estate.

Code 1858, § 4302 (deriv. Acts 1787, ch. 17; 1835-1836, ch. 20, § 1); Shan., § 6112; mod. Code 1932, § 10380; Acts 1976, ch. 529, § 4; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-613.

Cross-References.  Distribution, partition, and sale of realty, § 16-16-108.

Partition and sale of property, § 16-10-109.

Partition, remedies and special proceedings, title 29, ch. 27.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 2 Tenn. Juris., Appeal and Error, § 124; 11 Tenn. Juris., Equity, §§ 28, 30; 17 Tenn. Juris., Jurisdiction, § 23; 20 Tenn. Juris., Partition, § 8.

Law Reviews.

The Tennessee Court System — Chancery Court (Frederic S. Le Clercq), 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 281.

Cited: Bashaw v. Temple, 115 Tenn. 596, 91 S.W. 202, 1905 Tenn. LEXIS 93 (1906); Puckett v. Wynns, 132 Tenn. 513, 178 S.W. 1184, 1915 Tenn. LEXIS 41 (1915); Summers v. Conger, 43 Tenn. App. 286, 307 S.W.2d 936, 1957 Tenn. App. LEXIS 116 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1957); Dick v. Dick, 223 Tenn. 228, 443 S.W.2d 472, 1969 Tenn. LEXIS 407 (1969).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Construction with Other Acts.

A court of equity under this section has jurisdiction to set aside homestead and dower although this section and §§ 16-10-109, 16-16-107 and 30-902 (now § 30-2-202) do not, in express terms, include jurisdiction to set aside homestead. Wyrick v. Hale, 30 Tenn. App. 597, 209 S.W.2d 50, 1947 Tenn. App. LEXIS 113 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1947).

2. Sale of Decedent's Lands in Another State.

A court of equity has no jurisdiction to compel a decedent's heirs to convey his lands in another state to a special commissioner for the sale thereof in order to pay decedent's debts, although the estate be insolvent. Creditors must seek relief in the courts of the state where such lands are located. Robinson v. Johnson, 52 S.W. 704, 1899 Tenn. Ch. App. LEXIS 28 (1899).

The Tennessee chancery court did not have jurisdiction to divest the title out of the third party and vest it in another since the real estate was located in another state and the court has no power to act upon foreign land. Estate of Trivette v. Trivette, 564 S.W.2d 672, 1977 Tenn. App. LEXIS 271 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1977).

Decisions Under Prior Law

1. Dower.

Chancery has jurisdiction to allot dower, and, as incident thereto, to compel the production of title papers, and the discovery of any matters necessary to a proper ascertainment of the condition of the landed estate of the deceased husband in the possession of the heirs. Clift v. Clift, 87 Tenn. 17, 9 S.W. 198, 1888 Tenn. LEXIS 29 (1888).

The primary duty of determining whether dower may be set aside and, if so, fixing the boundaries thereof, rests with the commissioners and secondarily, with the court in event exceptions are filed by any interested party. Wyrick v. Hale, 30 Tenn. App. 597, 209 S.W.2d 50, 1947 Tenn. App. LEXIS 113 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1947).

The court should not attempt to determine questions relating to the allotment of homestead and dower until commissioners have been appointed and have reported their findings. Wyrick v. Hale, 30 Tenn. App. 597, 209 S.W.2d 50, 1947 Tenn. App. LEXIS 113 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1947).

2. Homestead.

Statutes giving chancery court jurisdiction concurrent with county court do not in express terms include jurisdiction to set aside homestead, but same may be said for section defining jurisdiction of county courts however, both courts have jurisdiction from ancient times and practice has been both in county and chancery court to appoint commissioners to set aside homestead. Wyrick v. Hale, 30 Tenn. App. 597, 209 S.W.2d 50, 1947 Tenn. App. LEXIS 113 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1947).

3. Commissioner's Findings.

Court should not as a matter of practice attempt to determine questions relating to the allotment of homestead and dower until commissioners have been appointed and have reported their findings. Wyrick v. Hale, 30 Tenn. App. 597, 209 S.W.2d 50, 1947 Tenn. App. LEXIS 113 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1947).

Collateral References. 27 Am. Jur. 2d Equity § 63.

21 C.J.S. Courts §§ 490, 492.

Contractual provisions as affecting right to judicial partition. 37 A.L.R.3d 962.

Partition 39.

16-11-112. Arbitration and agreed cases.

The chancery court has jurisdiction, concurrent with all other judicial tribunals, of arbitration and agreed cases under this code.

Code 1858, § 4303 (deriv. Acts 1851-1852, ch. 173, § 1); Shan., § 6113; Code 1932, § 10381; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-614.

Cross-References. Arbitration, remedies and special proceedings, title 29, ch. 5.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 11 Tenn. Juris., Equity, § 28; 17 Tenn. Juris., Jurisdiction, § 23.

Law Reviews.

The Tennessee Court System — Chancery Court (Frederic S. Le Clercq), 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 281.

Collateral References. 6 C.J.S. Arbitration §§ 11, 145-148, 159-160; 21 C.J.S. Courts §§ 11, 490.

16-11-113. Appointment of administrator.

The chancery court may appoint an administrator of a decedent's estate six (6) months after the decedent's death, where no person can be procured to administer in the usual way, as provided in title 30, chapter 3.

Code 1858, § 4304 (deriv. Acts 1841-1842, ch. 177, § 1); Shan., § 6114; Code 1932, § 10382; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-615.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 11 Tenn. Juris., Equity, §§ 30, 35; 12 Tenn. Juris., Executors and Administrators, § 6; 17 Tenn. Juris., Jurisdiction § 23.

Law Reviews.

The Tennessee Court System — Chancery Court (Frederic S. Le Clercq), 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 281.

Cited: Dick v. Dick, 223 Tenn. 228, 443 S.W.2d 472, 1969 Tenn. LEXIS 407 (1969).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Allegations in Bill — Sufficiency.

Bill for appointment of administrator in chancery was sufficient though not specifically alleging the residence of deceased and her debtors, where it could be inferred from the charges in the bill that such residences were in the county in which the bill was filed. Hall v. Calvert, 46 S.W. 1120 (Tenn. Ch. App. 1897).

2. Concurrent Jurisdiction.

Generally both the county and chancery courts are vested with jurisdiction in the appointment and removal of personal representatives and administration of decedents' estates. Dick v. Dick, 223 Tenn. 228, 443 S.W.2d 472, 1969 Tenn. LEXIS 407 (1969), overruled in part, Browne v. Browne, 547 S.W.2d 239, 1977 Tenn. LEXIS 553 (Tenn. 1977).

3. Serious Disputes or Complications.

Although as a general rule both the county court and chancery court are vested with jurisdiction in the administration of decedents' estates, in instances of serious dispute or complication the chancery courts may assume jurisdiction of the administration of an estate although the county court has previously undertaken such administration. Dick v. Dick, 223 Tenn. 228, 443 S.W.2d 472, 1969 Tenn. LEXIS 407 (1969), overruled in part, Browne v. Browne, 547 S.W.2d 239, 1977 Tenn. LEXIS 553 (Tenn. 1977).

Collateral References. 27 Am. Jur. 2d Equity §§ 5, 63.

21 C.J.S. Courts §§ 289, 490; 33, 34 C.J.S. Executors and Administrators §§ 72, 76, 725.

Ex and Ad 13.

16-11-114. Venue of suits.

The local jurisdiction of the chancery court is subject to the following rules:

  1. All bills filed in any court seeking to divest or clear the title to land, or to enforce the specific execution of contracts relating to realty, or to foreclose a mortgage or deed of trust by a sale of personal property or realty, shall be filed in the county in which the land, or a material part of it, lies, or in which the deed or mortgage is registered;
  2. Bills seeking to enjoin proceedings at law may be filed in the county in which the suit is pending, or to which execution has issued;
  3. Bills against nonresidents, or persons whose names or residences are unknown, may be filed in the county in which the cause of action arose, or the act on which the suit is predicated was to be performed, or in which is the subject of the suit, or any material part thereof; and
  4. When attachment of property is allowed in lieu of personal service of process, the bill may be filed in the county in which the property, or any material part of the property sought to be attached, is found at the commencement of the suit.

Code 1858, § 4311 (deriv. Acts 1787, ch. 22, § 1; 1801, ch. 6, § 2; 1825, ch. 22, §§ 1, 2; 1827, ch. 42, § 1; 1833, ch. 52); Acts 1877, ch. 107, § 1; Shan., § 6121; Code 1932, § 10388; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-617; Acts 1994, ch. 560, § 1.

Textbooks. Gibson's Suits in Chancery (7th ed., Inman), § 121.

Tennessee Jurisprudence, 3 Tenn. Juris., Attachment and Garnishment, §§ 76, 86; 11 Tenn. Juris., Equity, §§ 27, 47; 15 Tenn. Juris., Injunctions, § 25; 16 Tenn. Juris., Judgments and Decrees, § 11; 24 Tenn. Juris., Vendor and Purchaser, § 66; 24 Tenn. Juris., Venue, § 4.

Law Reviews.

Real Property (Herman L. Trautman), 6 Vand. L. Rev. 1080.

Cited: Gregory v. Merchants State Bank, 23 Tenn. App. 567, 135 S.W.2d 465, 1939 Tenn. App. LEXIS 63 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1939); Terrell v. Terrell, 192 Tenn. 317, 241 S.W.2d 411, 1951 Tenn. LEXIS 407 (1951); Martin v. Martin, 755 S.W.2d 793, 1988 Tenn. App. LEXIS 18 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988); Phillips v. State Bd. of Regents, 771 S.W.2d 410, 1989 Tenn. LEXIS 191 (Tenn. 1989); Woods v. Fields, 798 S.W.2d 239, 1990 Tenn. App. LEXIS 216 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990); Hawkins v. Tenn. Dep't of Corr., 127 S.W.3d 749, 2002 Tenn. App. LEXIS 536 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002); Haggard v. Aguilar, — S.W.3d —, 2010 Tenn. App. LEXIS 760 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 7, 2010).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. County Where Property Found.

2. —Assets of Estate.

Administrator appointed by county court was not entitled to file a proceeding in chancery court located in same county to recover assets of estate from defendant living in another county where it was not alleged that chattels or goods were located in county of suit. Harris v. Harris, 190 Tenn. 506, 230 S.W.2d 982, 1950 Tenn. LEXIS 513 (1950).

3. —Winding Up Foreign Corporations.

Chancery jurisdiction over property of a foreign corporation for winding up the same and distributing its assets here. Hadley v. Freedman's Sav. & Trust Co., 2 Cooper's Tenn. Ch. 122 (1874); Smith v. St. Louis Mut. Life Ins. Co., 3 Cooper's Tenn. Ch. 502 (1877).

4. County Where Defendant Resides.

5. —Distributee Suing Administrator Wherever Found.

Any chancery court, within territorial limits of which the defendant is served with process, has jurisdiction of a bill filed by distributee of an estate against the administrator thereof, for a settlement of the administration and the recovery of the complainant's distributive share, although the bill shows that the estate, the administration, and the administrator are in another county, and no final settlement had been made, but all the other distributees had been settled with and paid. Parkes v. Parkes, 3 Cooper's Tenn. Ch. 647 (1878).

6. —Deed Reformation.

Where in a suit to reform a deed the court had jurisdiction of the subject matter and three of the defendants named in such suit resided in the county where the suit was brought and the other nonresident defendants were served by publication the decree of the court allowing such reformation was immune from collateral attack. Globe & Republic Ins. Co. v. Shields, 170 Tenn. 485, 96 S.W.2d 947, 1936 Tenn. LEXIS 20 (1936).

7. —Winding up Trusteeship under Deed of Trust.

The chancery court of this state has jurisdiction, at the suit of the maker of a deed of trust, who is a resident of another state, where the land conveyed was situated and the beneficiaries and trustees resided, to have a judgment, recovered in this state on a note embraced in the deed of trust, collected and appropriated to the payment of claims of the beneficiaries, and the surplus thereof paid to the complainant, and to have a settlement of accounts with the trustees, all other matters in the trust having been disposed of, and the bill being filed in the county in which the judgment debtor resided, or was when the bill was filed and he was served with process. Wilcox v. Morrison, 77 Tenn. 699, 1882 Tenn. LEXIS 126 (1882).

8. County Where Land Located.

9. —Land Partly in More than One County.

The statutes contemplate a single tract of land lying partly in two or more counties, in which case jurisdiction of a court in either county is undoubted. French v. Buffatt, 161 Tenn. 500, 33 S.W.2d 92, 1930 Tenn. LEXIS 35 (1930).

Where plaintiff owned a tract of land located in both Hamilton and Marion Counties, and defendant owned a smaller tract located in Marion County but whose description was contained in metes and bounds set forth in plaintiff's tract, a suit filed by plaintiff in Hamilton County chancery court for the purpose of preventing cutting of timber and a decree declaring deed to defendants to be champertous was properly dismissed for lack of jurisdiction though court had personal jurisdiction of defendants, since legislature in enacting § 20-4-103 and this section localized proceedings involving real estate. Carter v. Brown, 196 Tenn. 35, 263 S.W.2d 757, 1953 Tenn. LEXIS 403 (1953).

Where a tract of land lies partly in two counties, jurisdiction of a court in either county is undoubted. Medlock v. Ferrari, 602 S.W.2d 241, 1979 Tenn. App. LEXIS 397 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1979).

10. —Decedent's Estates — Lands in Another County.

In suits to administer estates of decedents, the court may decree the sale of lands in any county, under § 30-606 (now § 30-2-403). The question was reserved as to whether this rule applies to general creditors' bills in chancery to wind up insolvent corporations. French v. Buffatt, 161 Tenn. 500, 33 S.W.2d 92, 1930 Tenn. LEXIS 35 (1930).

Jurisdiction of a suit to foreclose a vendor's lien would be in the county where the land lay even though the court of another county had jurisdiction of the estate of the deceased owner of the land. Patrick v. Hardin, 215 Tenn. 348, 385 S.W.2d 905, 1964 Tenn. LEXIS 526 (1964).

Where holder of notes secured by vendor's lien on land failed to file claim with administratrix of insolvent estate in accordance with § 30-704 (now § 30-5-104), action for money judgment was barred but suit to enforce vendor's lien could be brought in county where land lay. Patrick v. Hardin, 215 Tenn. 348, 385 S.W.2d 905, 1964 Tenn. LEXIS 526 (1964).

11. —Quiet Title.

Under a bill to quiet title and to have rights declared in the land, nonresident defendants may be brought in by publication, for personal service of process is dispensed with in such cases. Attachment of the land is unnecessary. The filing of the bill in such case creates a lis pendens, and the issuance of an injunction is sufficient. Ray v. Haag, 1 Tenn. Ch. App. 249 (1901).

Where a nonresident defendant was before the court by publication, and the cause was at issue by pro confesso, and evidence taken before the pro confesso was read on the trial without objection, though the nonresident defendant never in fact appeared, objection to such evidence because taken before the pro confesso cannot be made for the first time in the appellate court, especially when there upon writ of error, because such writ waives all such objections. Ray v. Haag, 1 Tenn. Ch. App. 249 (1901).

Proceeding seeking to enjoin foreclosure of trust deed on land, to enjoin transfer of note secured by such trust deed, to cancel trust deed and note and to recover for breach of contract for alleged failure to fulfill contract to construct dwelling on such land was a suit to clear title and venue was in county where land lay. Stinnett v. Tom-Ken Builders, Inc., 214 Tenn. 262, 379 S.W.2d 766, 1964 Tenn. LEXIS 473 (1964).

Chancery Court for Cumberland County, Tennessee, erred in attempting to invalidate a DeKalb County, Tennessee, lien because to the extent a limited liability company (LLC) sought to quiet title to land in DeKalb County, Cumberland County was not the proper venue; the chancery court was directed on remand to transfer the case to an appropriate court in DeKalb County to address the LLC's action to quiet title to land in that county. Little Hurricane Props., LLC v. Cafaro, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 489 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 22, 2018).

12. —Bill to Confirm Exchange of Minor's Realty.

Bill to confirm exchange of realty belonging to minor must be brought in county where minor resides, or in county where land lies. Smartt v. Smartt, 1 Tenn. App. 68, — S.W. —, 1925 Tenn. App. LEXIS 12 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1925).

13. —Resulting Trust in Land.

A bill against nonresidents to divest title to land and to enforce resulting trust relating to land is within the jurisdiction of the chancery court of the county in which the land lies. Robert v. Frogge, 149 Tenn. 181, 258 S.W. 782, 1923 Tenn. LEXIS 91 (1924).

Since a bill to divest title to land and to enforce a resulting trust relating to land brings the property within the grasp of the court as effectively as if attachment had issued, a decree rendered thereon was binding on defendants proceeded against as nonresidents, in so far as the land was concerned. Robert v. Frogge, 149 Tenn. 181, 258 S.W. 782, 1923 Tenn. LEXIS 91 (1924).

14. —Suit to Remove Clouds.

A suit to recover possession of land and to remove clouds upon complainant's title is a local action and is properly brought in the county where the land, or part of it, lies; and the recovery sought for the value of the timber cut and removed is merely incidental. Frankfort Land Co. v. Hughett, 137 Tenn. 32, 191 S.W. 530, 1916 Tenn. LEXIS 50 (1916).

15. —Realty Converted Into Personalty.

Statute requiring that actions relating to real estate be filed in county where real estate is situated did not apply to house and lot treated as personal property under doctrine of equitable conversion, and fact that such house and lot were situated in county did not give county court jurisdiction over action against nonresident executor by virtue of service of process on clerk of county court. Pinkerton v. Fox, 23 Tenn. App. 159, 129 S.W.2d 514, 1939 Tenn. App. LEXIS 22 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1939).

16. —Supplemental Bill by Purchaser at Judicial Sale.

Where the chancery court acquires jurisdiction properly, and decrees lands to be sold in its county and lands in another county, the purchaser of the lands in the other county may file a supplemental bill in the case, if done before the payment of the purchase price or termination of the suit, making new parties who are nonresidents, and have the legal title divested out of them, or have his purchase rescinded for failure of title, though such new parties did not appear or make defense. Robertson v. Winchester, 85 Tenn. 171, 1 S.W. 781, 1886 Tenn. LEXIS 28 (1886).

17. —Partition.

If any portion of the land sought to be sold for partition lies in the county of the chancery court, it has jurisdiction to sell the lands in any other county or counties within the state. Todd v. Cannon, 27 Tenn. 512, 1847 Tenn. LEXIS 119 (1847); Winchester v. Winchester, 38 Tenn. 460, 1858 Tenn. LEXIS 213 (1858).

18. —Action Sounding in Tort.

Because third-party plaintiffs' claim against third-party defendant was one in tort, based on the tortious interference with a business relationship involving a land sale contract, and the alleged tortious conduct took place in Sullivan County, and at all times relevant to the claim, third-party defendant was a resident of Sullivan County, the proper venue for the claim was Sullivan County. Valley Fidelity Bank & Trust Co. v. Ayers, 861 S.W.2d 366, 1993 Tenn. App. LEXIS 361 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993).

19. Enjoining Proceedings at Law.

20. —Court's Own Execution.

A court of chancery will entertain an original bill, in a proper case, to enjoin its own execution. Anderson v. Mullenix, 73 Tenn. 287, 1880 Tenn. LEXIS 126 (1880).

21. —County to Which Execution Issued.

A bill to enjoin an execution may be filed in the county to which it has been issued and the officer is sufficient as a material defendant. Douglass v. Joyner, 60 Tenn. 32, 1872 Tenn. LEXIS 471 (1872).

22. —County of Prosecution.

Where bills in two suits consolidated and tried by chancery court in Rutherford County alleged that certain notes had been procured by fraud, and prayed that injunction issue restraining defendants from further prosecution of notes in circuit court of Rutherford County and that an accounting by trustee of defendant bank be required and judgments rendered against trustee and bank, chancery court had jurisdiction of suits to enjoin even though defendants were residents of, and served in, Gibson County; but upon these facts it had no jurisdiction to entertain suits for accounting and judgment thereon, if objection was properly and seasonably made. Gregory v. Merchants State Bank, 23 Tenn. App. 567, 135 S.W.2d 465, 1939 Tenn. App. LEXIS 63 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1939).

In suit brought in chancery court of Rutherford County to enjoin defendant from further prosecution of note in circuit court of that county, and in which complainants demanded an accounting and judgment thereon, the statutory jurisdiction of the chancery court to issue such an injunction failed for defect of proof, and with this failure all of its power likewise failed except its power to give judgment for costs. Gregory v. Merchants State Bank, 23 Tenn. App. 567, 135 S.W.2d 465, 1939 Tenn. App. LEXIS 63 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1939).

23. Nonresidents and Unknowns.

Where insurance company, deposited sum in court with interpleader bill, claiming that the same might be claimed by a Tennessee resident or certain Texas residents, the money in question was never the property of the Texas residents but the property of the insurance company and therefore not an in rem proceeding such as would authorize jurisdiction over the Texas residents to be extent of the res. American Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Newland, 202 Tenn. 134, 303 S.W.2d 332, 1957 Tenn. LEXIS 371 (1957).

24 —Unknown Parties Defendant.

A bill will not lie against unknown parties at all, unless there is tangible property upon which to base jurisdiction, or unless the unknown party is identified by description, so that the publication may be directed to a sufficiently identified individual; but where the court has no control of property, and no means of identifying the unknown party, publication would rest on nothing, and would be simply nugatory. Creswell v. Smith, 2 Cooper's Tenn. Ch. 416 (1875).

25. —Partnership Settlement.

The chancery court of a county in which a partnership was formed and conducted has jurisdiction, under this statute, of a suit by resident partner against the other partner who is a nonresident, for a partnership settlement, or to ascertain a debt growing out of the partnership transactions; and to issue to other counties attachments, injunctions, or other necessary process. Wells v. Collins, 79 Tenn. 213, 1883 Tenn. LEXIS 45 (1883).

If, in addition, the object of a bill for debt, growing out of partnership in county where formed and conducted, be to attach a judgment recovered by the nonresident defendant partner against a third person, and to have the benefit of any recovery in a suit commenced by him in the chancery court of another county for the collection of the judgment, the object may be attained by impounding the existing judgment and the expected recovery for its collection, without interfering with the prosecution of the suit; but if the injunction sued out be broader than it ought to be, it would not affect the jurisdiction of the court granting it, because it is subject to be modified on motion. Wells v. Collins, 79 Tenn. 213, 1883 Tenn. LEXIS 45 (1883).

A bill to wind up an association, filed in Bedford County, and thereunder to sell its lands in Davidson County, was sustained where personal appearance was entered and the local jurisdiction of the court not challenged as set forth in § 16-616 (repealed). Johnson v. Evans, 1 Tenn. Ch. App. 603 (1903).

26. —Reformation of Assignment of Life Policy.

Where the insured, in a life policy assigned it to his mother who thereafter died before his death, sued to reform the assignment to make it conform to an alleged actual agreement between them, to which suit the nonresident insurance company and the distributees of the mother, both residents and nonresidents, were made parties, such suit was to settle the interests of only those made parties, and was quasi in rem, and the court having jurisdiction of the res or policy, though it was in the actual possession of complainant, but in the power of the court at any moment to order its actual filing, had jurisdiction of the whole cause and could by its judgment bind the nonresident defendant distributees. Perry v. Young, 133 Tenn. 522, 182 S.W. 577, 1915 Tenn. LEXIS 116, L.R.A. (n.s.) 1917B385 (1916).

27. —Suit Quasi in Rem.

A suit against a nonresident, without the service of process, upon seizure of property and publication, is necessarily a local action, and a suit quasi in rem; and it must be brought in the court that has jurisdiction of the property. Robert v. Frogge, 149 Tenn. 181, 258 S.W. 782, 1923 Tenn. LEXIS 91 (1924).

28. Attachment.

29. —Purpose.

An attachment is levied against property of defendant. Terril v. Rogers, 4 Tenn. 203, 1817 Tenn. LEXIS 8 (1817).

The object of the provision as to publication or judicial attachment was to give the court jurisdiction when the defendant could not, for any reason, be personally served with process. It was neither intended to, nor does it, deprive any other chancery court of the jurisdiction it may be able to acquire over the person by actual service of process on a defendant found within its county or jurisdictional district, as provided in § 16-11-203 (repealed). Parkes v. Parkes, 3 Cooper's Tenn. Ch. 647 (1878).

30. —Realty — When Attachment Unnecessary.

An attachment of real property is not required, when the filing of a proper bill creates a lien lis pendens. Ray v. Haag, 1 Tenn. Ch. App. 249 (1901).

31. —Impossibility of Personal Service.

The attachment, under this statute, can only be issued in lieu of personal service of process; and the provision does not apply if process can be personally served. Simonton v. Porter, 60 Tenn. 213, 1872 Tenn. LEXIS 475 (1873).

32. —Claim by Nonresident Debtor.

Where a fund is already in court, brought there under an attachment against a nonresident debtor of the complainant, and the debtor put in a plea disclaiming the property or fund, but stating that it was the property of a nonresident firm of which he was a member, the complainant may file an amended and supplemental bill against the other members of the firm to ascertain the interest of his debtor in the fund, and a prayer that the fund already in court be held subject to the order of the court probably dispenses with a formal attachment thereof, and the court has jurisdiction. Morrow v. Fossick, 71 Tenn. 129, 1879 Tenn. LEXIS 47 (1879).

33. —Foreign Corporation's Property Attached.

A foreign corporation, though doing business in this state, is a nonresident within the meaning of our attachment laws, and may be proceeded against by attachment of its property. Hadley v. Freedman's Sav. & Trust Co., 2 Cooper's Tenn. Ch. 122 (1874).

34. Lands Situated in Another State.

Although a partition of lands lying without the state cannot be made, nor can they be sold under the decrees of the courts of this state, and, consequently, a partition of land lying in this state cannot be made by the courts of another state; a suit for specific performance may be maintained when the land lies out of the state, if the court has jurisdiction of the person of the defendant. Johnson v. Kimbro, 40 Tenn. 557, 1859 Tenn. LEXIS 164 (1859); Topp v. White, 59 Tenn. 165, 1873 Tenn. LEXIS 43 (1873); Miller v. Birdsong, 66 Tenn. 531, 1874 Tenn. LEXIS 176 (1874).

Chancery has no jurisdiction to entertain a suit to try title to or to recover possession of land, or to enjoin a threatened trespass, where the land is situated in another state, so that, to enforce its decree, the process of the court would have to act upon the property, since such actions are local, and not transitory, while chancery acts in personam, and not in rem. Anderson-Tully Co. v. Thompson, 132 Tenn. 80, 177 S.W. 66, 1915 Tenn. LEXIS 3 (1915).

35. —Land Lying Partly in Another State.

Where the tract of land lies both in this state and in an adjoining state, the chancery court here cannot decree a sale of that part lying in the adjoining state, but if the holder of the legal title is before the court, he may, in a proper case, be compelled to convey the same to a resident administrator, and then the administrator may be directed to sell the same for the benefit of creditors, under the direction of the court. Miller v. Birdsong, 66 Tenn. 531, 1874 Tenn. LEXIS 176 (1874).

36. Suit in Wrong County — Fee for Receiver Appointed.

Where suit to wind up an insolvent corporation was brought in wrong county, and receiver was appointed, the court had jurisdiction to allow such receiver a fee for the work done by him. Crosby Milling Co. v. Grant, 7 Tenn. App. 162, — S.W. —, 1927 Tenn. App. LEXIS 19 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1927).

37. Abatement Plea.

The usual rule is that jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter need not be pleaded in abatement, but where, under this section, the court has general original jurisdiction and the limitation on its power is only on its power to decree as to realty in another county, no question as to local jurisdiction of the court can be raised except by plea in abatement, demurrer or motion to dismiss. Section 16-11-114 is read into this section or along with it. Johnson v. Evans, 1 Tenn. Ch. App. 603 (1903); Crosby Milling Co. v. Grant, 154 Tenn. 375, 289 S.W. 511, 1926 Tenn. LEXIS 136 (1926).

Chancellor's jurisdiction where bill in nature of general creditor's bill, involving sale of land, none of which was located in county, was properly raised by plea in abatement, which plea was not waived by answer after plea overruled. Crosby Milling Co. v. Grant, 154 Tenn. 375, 289 S.W. 511, 1926 Tenn. LEXIS 136 (1926).

Where a judgment creditor with nulla bona return filed a bill in Washington County to reach defendant's interest in realty lying in Knox County along with interest in realty in Washington County, a plea in abatement deprived the court of jurisdiction to sell the interest in the separate tract in Knox County. French v. Buffatt, 161 Tenn. 500, 33 S.W.2d 92, 1930 Tenn. LEXIS 35 (1930).

Collateral References. 77 Am. Jur. 2d Venue §§ 1-39.

21 C.J.S. Courts § 15.

Venue 2.

16-11-115. Jurisdiction of contract enforcement.

Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, contracts for goods or services between individuals, partnerships, associations, corporations, governmental entities or limited liability companies are enforceable in either chancery or circuit court in the county where:

  1. The defendant may be found;
  2. The contract was executed;
  3. The goods were provided or were to be provided; or
  4. Services were rendered or were to be rendered.

Acts 2007, ch. 351, § 2.

Part 2
Operation

16-11-201. Transfers between courts.

Any cause pending in the chancery court may be transferred, by consent of parties, to the chancery court of another county.

Code 1858, § 4308 (deriv. Acts 1835-1836, ch. 4, § 10); Shan., § 6118; mod. Code 1932, § 10386; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-618.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 11 Tenn. Juris., Equity, § 47.

Collateral References. 21 C.J.S. Courts §§ 502, 507.

72 C.J.S. Process § 32.

16-11-202. Relief from firearm disabilities imposed on persons adjudicated as mental defective or judicially committed to mental institution.

  1. A person who is subject to 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(4) and (g)(4) because the person has been adjudicated as a mental defective or judicially committed to a mental institution, as defined in § 16-11-206, may petition the chancery court that entered the judicial commitment or adjudication order or the chancery court where the petitioner resides for relief from the firearm disabilities imposed by the adjudication or judicial commitment; provided, that the person may not petition the court until three (3) years from the date of release from commitment or the date of the adjudication order, whichever is later.
  2. A copy of the petition for relief shall also be served on the district attorney general of the judicial district in which the original judicial commitment or adjudication occurred. The district attorney general may appear, support, object to, or present evidence relevant to the relief sought by the petitioner.
  3. The court shall receive and consider evidence in an open proceeding, including evidence offered by the petitioner, concerning:
    1. The circumstances that led to the imposition of the firearms disability under 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(4) and (g)(4);
    2. The petitioner's mental health records;
    3. The petitioner's criminal history;
    4. The petitioner's reputation; and
    5. Changes in the petitioner's condition or circumstances relevant to the relief sought.
  4. The court shall grant the petition for relief if it finds by a preponderance of the evidence and enters into the record the following:
    1. The petitioner is no longer likely to act in a manner that is dangerous to public safety; and
    2. Granting the relief would not be contrary to the public interest.
  5. A record of the proceedings, to be provided by the petitioner, shall be made by a certified court reporter or by court-approved electronic means.
  6. The petitioner may appeal a final order denying the requested relief, and the review on appeal, if granted, shall be de novo.
  7. A person may file a petition for relief under this section no more than once every two (2) years.
  8. Relief from a firearm disability granted under this section has no effect on the loss of civil rights, including firearm rights, for any reason other than the particular adjudication as a mental defective or judicial commitment to a mental institution from which relief is granted.
  9. When the court issues an order granting a petition of relief under subsection (d), the court clerk shall, as soon as practicable but no later than thirty (30) days after issuance, forward a copy of the order to the Tennessee bureau of investigation (TBI). The TBI, upon receipt of the order, shall:
    1. Immediately forward a copy of the order to the department of safety;
    2. Update the National Instant Criminal Background Check System database and transmit the corrected records to the federal bureau of investigation; and
    3. Remove and destroy all records relating to the petition for relief from any database over which the TBI exercises control.
  10. The TBI and the department of safety shall not use or permit the use of the records or information obtained or retained pursuant to this section for any purpose not specified in this section.

Acts 2015, ch. 459, § 2.

Compiler's Notes. Former § 16-11-202 (Acts 1909, ch. 551, § 2; Shan., § 5745a5; Code 1932, § 9941; Acts 1941, ch. 47, §§ 1-4; C. Supp. 1950, §§ 9945.1-9945.4; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), §§ 16-619 — 16-623), concerning adjourned terms, was repealed by Acts 1984, ch. 931, § 22. For provisions abolishing terms of court, see § 16-2-510.

Effective Dates. Acts 2015, ch. 459, § 6. July 1, 2015.

16-11-203. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former § 16-11-203 (Code 1858, § 4305; Shan., § 6115; Code 1932, § 10383; T.C.A., (orig. ed.), § 16-624), concerning action in personam, was repealed by Acts 1992, ch. 753, § 1.

16-11-204. Counterpart summons.

Counterpart summons, accompanied by copies of the bill, may be issued to any other counties of the state for defendants not to be found in the county in which the suit is properly brought.

Code 1858, § 4306 (deriv. Acts 1789, ch. 57, § 1); Shan., § 6116; Code 1932, § 10384; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-625.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 11 Tenn. Juris., Banks and Banking, § 54; 11 Tenn. Juris., Equity, §§ 13, 27.

Cited: Wilkins v. Jetton, 8 Tenn. App. 641, — S.W.2d —, 1928 Tenn. App. LEXIS 187 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1928); Minor v. E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 164 Tenn. 226, 47 S.W.2d 748, 1931 Tenn. LEXIS 26 (1932).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Stockholders — Service On.

Where bill to wind up corporation as insolvent is filed in county of its home office, process may issue to other counties to bring in stockholders as defendants. Sugg v. Farmers' Mut. Ins. Ass'n, 63 S.W. 226, 1901 Tenn. Ch. App. LEXIS 66 (1901).

2. Foreign Corporation Sued.

Where a corporation of another state appeared and defended the bill, this was equivalent to service of process within the jurisdiction, and authorized the issuance of counterpart process for all other material defendants in any county within the state. University v. Cambreling, 14 Tenn. 78, 14 Tenn. 79, 1834 Tenn. LEXIS 56 (1834).

Suit against a foreign insurance company by service on the insurance commissioner may be brought in any county, with counterpart to another county for a material defendant, after the insurance company has ceased to do business in the state. Southern Paving Const. Co. v. Knoxville, 245 F. 421, 1917 U.S. App. LEXIS 1503 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1917).

3. Actions on Bonds.

After surety on performance bond had been made party to action for declaration of rights of subcontractors on general contractor's performance bond by service in the county, surety was entitled to file cross bill against principal on bond and indemnitor of surety who had been served by counterpart summons as residents of another county. Engert v. Peerless Ins. Co., 53 Tenn. App. 310, 382 S.W.2d 541, 1964 Tenn. App. LEXIS 105 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1964).

In declaratory judgment proceeding brought by subcontractors for declaration of their rights to payment by the surety on a general contractors' performance bond, where insurance company which was surety on the bond was found in county where suit was brought, service on principal on the bond and indemnitor of surety could be had by counterpart summons where they were residents of another county. Engert v. Peerless Ins. Co., 53 Tenn. App. 310, 382 S.W.2d 541, 1964 Tenn. App. LEXIS 105 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1964).

16-11-205. Process to other counties in general.

If the suit is properly instituted, attachments, injunctions, and all other process known to the court, and necessary to attain the ends of justice, may be issued to any other county.

Code 1858, § 4307; Shan., § 6117; Code 1932, § 10385; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-626.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Jurisdiction.

When chancery court takes jurisdiction for one purpose, it will take jurisdiction for all purposes incidental to the jurisdiction of the main subject. Martin v. Martin, 755 S.W.2d 793, 1988 Tenn. App. LEXIS 18 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988).

16-11-206. Information to be collected and reported to the federal bureau of investigation-NICS index and the department of safety by those chancery courts in which commitments to a mental institution are ordered.

  1. As used in this section:
    1. “Adjudication as a mental defective or adjudicated as a mental defective” means:
      1. A determination by a court in this state that a person, as a result of marked subnormal intelligence, mental illness, incompetency, condition or disease:
        1. Is a danger to such person or to others; or
        2. Lacks the ability to contract or manage such person's own affairs due to mental defect;
      2. A finding of insanity by a court in a criminal proceeding; or
      3. A finding that a person is incompetent to stand trial or is found not guilty by reason of insanity pursuant to §§ 50a and 72b of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, codified in 10 U.S.C. §§ 850a, 876b;
    2. “Judicial commitment to a mental institution” means a judicially ordered involuntary admission to a private or state hospital or treatment resource in proceedings conducted pursuant to title 33, chapter 6 or 7;
    3. “Mental institution” means a mental health facility, mental hospital, sanitarium, psychiatric facility and any other facility that provides diagnoses by a licensed professional of mental retardation or mental illness, including, but not limited to, a psychiatric ward in a general hospital; and
    4. “Treatment resource” means any public or private facility, service or program providing treatment or rehabilitation services for mental illness or serious emotional disturbance, including, but not limited to, detoxification centers, hospitals, community mental health centers, clinics or programs, halfway houses and rehabilitation centers.
  2. Those chancery courts wherein commitments to a mental institution are ordered pursuant to title 33, chapter 6 or chapter 7 or persons are adjudicated as a mental defective shall enter a standing and continuing order instructing the clerk to collect and report as soon as practicable, but no later than the third business day following the date of such an order or adjudication, information described in subsection (c) regarding individuals who have been adjudicated as a mental defective or judicially committed to a mental institution for the purposes of complying with the NICS Improvement Amendments Act of 2007, P.L. 110-180.
  3. The following information shall be collected and reported to the federal bureau of investigation-NICS index and the department of safety, pursuant to subsection (b):
    1. Complete name and all aliases of the individual judicially committed or adjudicated as a mental defective, including, but not limited to, any names that the individual may have had or currently has by reason of marriage or otherwise;
    2. Case or docket number of the judicial commitment or the adjudication as a mental defective;
    3. Date judicial commitment ordered or adjudication as a mental defective was made;
    4. Private or state hospital or treatment resource to which the individual was judicially committed;
    5. Date of birth of the individual judicially committed or adjudicated as a mental defective, if such information has been provided to the clerk;
    6. Race and sex of the individual judicially committed or adjudicated as a mental defective; and
    7. Social security number of the individual judicially committed or adjudicated as a mental defective if available.
  4. The information in subdivisions (c)(1)–(7), the confidentiality of which is protected by other statutes or regulations, shall be maintained as confidential and not subject to public inspection pursuant to such statutes or regulations, except for such use as may be necessary in the conduct of any proceeding pursuant to §§ 38-6-109, 39-17-1316, and 39-17-1352 — 39-17-1354.

Acts 2009, ch. 578, § 2; 2013, ch. 300, § 4; 2019, ch. 262, §§ 5, 6.

Amendments. The 2013 amendment substituted “collect and report as soon as practicable, but no later than the third business day following the date of such an order or adjudication” for “collect and report January 1, April 1, July 1, and October 1 of every year beginning January 1, 2010” in (b).

The 2019 amendment added (c)(6) and (c)(7); and, in (d), substituted “subdivisions (c)(1)-(7)” for “subdivisions (c)(1)-(5)”, and substituted “proceeding pursuant to §§ 38-6-109, 39-17-1316, and 39-17-1352 - 39-17-1354” for “proceedings pursuant to §§ 39-17-1316, 39-17-1353 and 39-17-1354”.

Effective Dates. Acts 2009, ch. 578, § 13. January 1, 2010.

Acts 2013, ch. 300, § 11. July 1, 2013.

Acts 2019, ch. 262, § 7. July 1, 2019.

Cross-References. Confidentiality of public records, § 10-7-504.

Part 1
Establishment

16-15-101. Establishment — Certain counties excepted.

  1. There is created and established a court in and for each county of the state, except in counties having a population of not less than nine thousand one hundred seventy-five (9,175) nor more than nine thousand two hundred (9,200), according to the last federal census or any subsequent federal census, which shall be designated as the court of general sessions.
  2. It is the intent of this section to create a general sessions court in every county not expressly excepted in this section. In any county where a general sessions court has been created pursuant to the general provisions of this chapter, it is intended that the county shall always have a general sessions court unless abolished by another general statute. In counties in which there is no court of general sessions as provided in this section, references in this code to the court of general sessions are deemed to include the court having the jurisdiction of the court of general sessions in such counties.

Acts 1959, ch. 109, §§ 1, 22; 1959, ch. 255, § 1; 1959, ch. 265, § 1; 1961, ch. 30, § 1; 1961, ch. 51, § 1; 1961, ch. 188, § 1; 1963, ch. 307, §§ 1, 2; 1965, ch. 116, § 1; 1974, ch. 507, § 1; 1976, ch. 738, § 1; 1979, ch. 68, § 1; T.C.A., § 16-1101; Acts 1998, ch. 573, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. For table of U.S. decennial populations of Tennessee counties, see Volume 13 and its supplement.

Cross-References. Power of general assembly to create courts, Tenn. Const., art. VI, § 1.

Textbooks. Tennessee Criminal Practice and Procedure (Raybin), § 7.1.

Tennessee Jurisprudence, 17 Tenn. Juris., Justices of Peace and General Sessions Courts, §§ 2, 4.

Law Reviews.

Don't miss a move. Making rules 5 and 5.1 work for your clients in General Sessions Court (Robert Little), 37 No. 3 Tenn. B.J. 12 (2001).

Effective Minor Courts — Key to Court Modernization, (James G. France), 40 Tenn. L. Rev. 29.

The Impossible Balance: A Tennessee judge makes the case for abolishing state's part-time judgeships (Judge James L. Cotton Jr.), 37 No. 5 Tenn. B.J. 12 (2001).

Cited: Crawford v. Gilpatrick, 646 S.W.2d 433, 1983 Tenn. LEXIS 608 (Tenn. 1983); Sexton v. Sevier County, 948 S.W.2d 747, 1997 Tenn. App. LEXIS 71 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Purpose of Statute.

It was the purpose of Acts 1959, ch. 109 to create a statewide system of courts of general sessions except in those counties expressly excepted from the application of the statute. Biggs v. Memphis Loan & Thrift Co., 215 Tenn. 294, 385 S.W.2d 118, 1964 Tenn. LEXIS 566 (1964); Lawler v. McCanless, 220 Tenn. 342, 417 S.W.2d 548, 1967 Tenn. LEXIS 418, 1967 Tenn. LEXIS 419 (1967).

2. Sanctions.

Circuit court erred in affirming a general sessions court's award of attorney's fees as sanctions because the general sessions court did not have statutory authority to impose attorney's fees as sanctions, the alleged debtor never pursued such sanctions, Tennessee caselaw was devoid of any authority that the general sessions court could impose sanctions in the form of attorney's fees absent a finding of contempt, the general sessions court lacked inherent authority to impose attorney's fees as sanctions against parties as opposed to their counsel, and the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act was never pleaded before the general sessions court. Baxter Bailey Invs. LLC v. APL Ltd., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 755 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 21, 2015), review denied and ordered not published, Baxter Bailey Invs. LLC v. APL Ltd. Inc., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 192 (Tenn. Mar. 23, 2016).

Collateral References. Counties 24.

16-15-102. Courtroom — Supplies and equipment — Expenses.

  1. Each county shall provide a courtroom for the general sessions court in the county seat and all necessary supplies and equipment for the maintenance of the court and shall defray the expenses thereof from the general fund of the county.
  2. In counties having a population of not less than thirteen thousand two hundred seventy-five (13,275) nor more than thirteen thousand two hundred ninety-five (13,295) and not less than fourteen thousand six hundred fifty (14,650) nor more than fourteen thousand six hundred seventy (14,670), according to the federal census of 1960 and every subsequent federal census, the general sessions judges shall be entitled to secretarial and office expenses in the amount of six hundred dollars ($600) per annum, payable monthly from the general funds of such counties.
  3. In counties having a population of not less than twenty-four thousand two hundred twenty (24,220) nor more than twenty-four thousand two hundred thirty-five (24,235) or not less than twelve thousand five hundred (12,500) nor more than twelve thousand six hundred (12,600), according to the 1960 federal census or any subsequent federal census, the general sessions judge shall be entitled to an allowance of one thousand dollars ($1,000) per annum, for secretarial and office expenses and the same shall be paid in equal monthly installments from the general fund of the counties.
  4. In counties of this state having a population of not less than twenty-four thousand five hundred seventy (24,570) nor more than twenty-four thousand five hundred eighty (24,580), according to the 1960 federal census or any subsequent federal census, the general sessions judge shall be entitled to an allowance of one thousand eight hundred dollars ($1,800) per annum for secretarial and office expenses, to be paid in equal monthly installments from the general fund of the county.

Acts 1959, ch. 109, § 1; 1961, ch. 146, § 1; 1961, ch. 279, § 1; 1965, ch. 366, § 1; 1968, ch. 430, § 1; T.C.A., § 16-1102.

Compiler's Notes. For table of U.S. decennial populations of Tennessee counties, see Volume 13 and its supplement.

Law Reviews.

The Tennessee Court System — General Sessions Court (Frederic S. Le Clercq), 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 375.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Compensation for Special General Sessions Judges.

No statute explicitly requires counties to compensate special general sessions court judges appointed in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 17-2-116(a)(1); this obligation, however, must necessarily be implied from the statutes creating the general sessions courts, providing for their funding, and governing the selection not only of regular general sessions judges but also of their temporary replacements. State ex rel. Witcher v. Bilbrey, 878 S.W.2d 567, 1994 Tenn. App. LEXIS 103 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994).

16-15-103. Holding court at places other than county seat.

The county legislative body of each county shall be authorized and empowered, in its discretion, to require the court of general sessions to meet at not more than three (3) places in the county in addition to the county seat, to prescribe the place or places of meeting of the court, and to provide a courtroom, equipment and furnishings at such other places in the county in addition to the county seat for the sessions of the court.

Acts 1959, ch. 109, § 1; impl. am. Acts 1978, ch. 934, §§ 7, 36; T.C.A., § 16-1103.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 17 Tenn. Juris., Justices of Peace and General Sessions Courts, § 2.

Law Reviews.

The Tennessee Court System — General Sessions Court (Frederic S. Le Clercq), 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 375.

Collateral References.

Place of holding sessions of trial court as affecting validity of its proceedings. 18 A.L.R.3d 572.

Part 2
Judge

16-15-201. Judge of court — Qualifications — Number.

  1. There shall be one (1) judge for each court with the same qualifications and term of office as provided by the constitution of Tennessee for inferior courts.
  2. In addition to the qualifications prescribed in subsection (a), the judges of courts of general sessions of counties of the eighth class having a population of not less than nine thousand two hundred thirty (9,230) nor more than nine thousand two hundred fifty (9,250), according to the 1960 federal census or any subsequent federal census, shall have the qualifications required for the courts of record provided for in § 17-1-106.
  3. In addition to the qualifications prescribed in subsection (a), the judges of courts of general sessions of counties of the seventh class having a population of not less than fourteen thousand six hundred fifty (14,650) nor more than fourteen thousand six hundred seventy (14,670), according to the 1960 federal census or any subsequent federal census, shall have the qualifications required for the courts of record provided for in § 17-1-106.
  4. In addition to the qualifications prescribed in subsection (a), the judges of courts of general sessions of counties of the fifth class having a population of not less than twenty-eight thousand six hundred sixty (28,660) nor more than twenty-eight thousand six hundred ninety (28,690), according to the 1980 federal census or any subsequent federal census, shall have the qualifications required for the courts of record provided for in § 17-1-106.
  5. This section shall not be construed to affect or change the number of judges prescribed for any court of general sessions in any county by private act in effect as of March 11, 1959, or any private act that may be thereafter enacted prescribing more than one (1) judge for a court of general sessions in a particular county. In event of any conflict between this section and a private act as to the number of judges presiding over the court of general sessions in any particular county, the private act shall control.

Acts 1959, ch. 109, § 9; 1965, ch. 114, § 2; 1967, ch. 276, § 2; 1968, ch. 635, § 2; 1969, ch. 44, § 2; modified; T.C.A., § 16-1105; Acts 1982, ch. 564, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Section 1 of Acts 1968, ch. 635 amended Acts 1965, ch. 114 by providing for local approval, and § 2 of Acts 1968, ch. 635 validated Acts 1965, ch. 114. Acts 1968, ch. 635 has been approved by the local governing body.

Section 1 of Acts 1969, ch. 44 amended Acts 1967, ch. 276 by providing for local approval and § 2 of Acts 1969, ch. 44 validated Acts 1967, ch. 276. Acts 1969, ch. 44 has been approved by the local governing body.

For table of U.S. decennial populations of Tennessee counties, see Volume 13 and its supplement.

Cross-References. Compensation and qualifications of judges, jurisdiction, title 50, ch. 15, part 50.

Qualifications of judges of inferior courts, Tenn. Const., art. VI, § 4.

Textbooks. Tennessee Criminal Practice and Procedure (Raybin), §§ 6.1, 7.1.

Tennessee Jurisprudence, 17 Tenn. Juris., Justices of Peace and General Sessions Courts, § 4.

Law Reviews.

The Impossible Balance: A Tennessee judge makes the case for abolishing state's part-time judgeships (Judge James L. Cotton Jr.), 37 No. 5 Tenn. B.J. 12 (2001).

The Tennessee Court System — General Sessions Court (Frederic S. Le Clercq), 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 375.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Qualifications.

There is no mandatory general law prescribing requisite qualifications of judges of general sessions courts. Crawford v. Gilpatrick, 646 S.W.2d 433, 1983 Tenn. LEXIS 608 (Tenn. 1983).

16-15-202. Election — Term.

  1. The judges of the court of general sessions shall be elected at the general August election each eight (8) years. They shall hold office for the term for which they are elected or until their successors are elected and qualified. Notwithstanding any other provision of private act or general law to the contrary, the term of office of any general sessions judge whose base salary is set by § 16-15-205 [repealed] or whose salary is adjusted during such term of office by the method provided by § 16-15-205 [repealed] or by the method established by § 8-23-103, shall be eight (8) years.
  2. Notwithstanding § 2-13-203, or any other provisions of a private act or general law to the contrary, in any county with more than one (1) judge of the court of general sessions, and where the most recent of private acts creating the judgeships provide for the nonpartisan election of the additional judges, then at subsequent regular August elections all judges of such court shall be elected on a nonpartisan basis.

Acts 1959, ch. 109, § 13; modified; T.C.A., § 16-1106; Acts 1982, ch. 945, § 4; 1997, ch. 357, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Former § 16-15-205, referred to in this section, was repealed by Acts 1993, ch. 241, § 3.

Cross-References. General sessions judges, compensation, duties, qualifications, jurisdiction, part 50 of this chapter.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 17 Tenn. Juris., Justices of Peace and General Sessions Courts, § 3.

Law Reviews.

The Tennessee Court System — General Sessions Court (Frederic S. Le Clercq), 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 375.

16-15-203. Oath.

The oath of office shall be the same as that prescribed for circuit court judges and chancellors and shall be taken and filed in the same manner and with the same officers as prescribed for circuit court judges and chancellors.

Acts 1959, ch. 109, § 13; T.C.A., § 16-1107.

Cross-References. Oaths of judges and chancellors, § 17-1-104.

Law Reviews.

The Tennessee Court System — General Sessions Court (Frederic S. Le Clercq), 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 375.

16-15-204. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former § 16-15-204 (Acts 1959, ch. 109, § 11; modified; T.C.A. § 16-1108), concerning the classification of counties for determining compensation of judges, was repealed by Acts 1993, ch. 241, § 2.

16-15-205. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former § 16-15-205 (Acts 1959, ch. 109, § 11; 1961, ch. 30, § 2; 1963, ch. 346, § 1; 1965, ch. 97, § 1; 1965, ch. 113, § 1; 1965, ch. 245, § 1; 1965, ch. 341, § 1; 1965, ch. 365, § 1; 1965, ch. 366, § 2; 1967, ch. 13, § 1; 1967, ch. 234, § 1; 1968, ch. 444, § 1; 1968, ch. 454, § 1; 1968, ch. 490, § 1; 1968, ch. 499, § 1; 1968, ch. 504, § 1; 1969, ch. 72, § 1; 1969, ch. 94, § 1; 1969, ch. 100, § 1; 1969, ch. 122, § 1; 1971, ch. 95, § 1; 1972, ch. 790, § 1; 1974, ch. 432, § 1; 1974, ch. 607, § 1; 1974, ch. 808, § 1; 1975, ch. 348, § 1; 1977, ch. 44, § 6; 1978, ch. 564, § 1; 1979, ch. 400, § 1; 1980, ch. 832, § 1; T.C.A., § 16-1109; Acts 1981, ch. 456, § 1; 1982, ch. 564, § 2; 1982, ch. 761, § 1; 1982, ch. 920, § 1; 1982, ch. 945, § 1; 1987, ch. 307, § 1), concerning salaries of general sessions court judges, was repealed by Acts 1993, ch. 241, § 3.

16-15-206. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former § 16-15-206 (Acts 1959, Ch. 109, § 11; modified; T.C.A. § 16-1110), concerning the salaries of general sessions court judges presiding over courts that had been created by a special act, was repealed by Acts 1993, ch. 241, § 4.

16-15-207. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former § 16-15-207 (Acts 1959, ch. 109, § 11; T.C.A., § 11-1112), concerning the payment of general sessions court judges' salaries, was repealed by Acts 1993, ch. 241, § 5.

16-15-208. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former § 16-15-208 (Acts 1959, ch. 109, §§ 11, 12; 1965, ch. 101, § 1; 1974, ch. 808, § 2; 1978, ch. 518, §§ 1, 2; 1979, ch. 400, § 2; 1980, ch. 832, § 2; modified; T.C.A., § 16-1113; 1982, ch. 945, § 5; 1987, ch. 11, § 1; 1987, ch. 453, § 1; 1988, ch. 541, § 1; 1993, ch. 66, § 23), concerning the required hours for general sessions court judges, and limitations on the practice of law by the judges, was repealed by Acts 1993, ch. 241, § 6.

16-15-209. Failure of judge to attend — Selection of special judge.

  1. If the judge of a court of general sessions or juvenile court finds it necessary to be absent from holding court, the judge may seek a special judge in accordance with the requirements of and in the numerical sequence designated by this section.
    1. If a special judge is necessary, the judge shall attempt to identify another judge who may serve by interchange, pursuant to § 17-2-208. If another judge cannot serve by interchange, a judge may seek to find any former or retired judge, who will, by mutual agreement, sit as special judge. The special judge shall serve by designation of the chief justice of the supreme court.
    2. If the judge is unable to secure a judge under subdivision (a)(1), the judge may apply to the administrative office of the courts for assistance in finding a judge to sit by designation of the chief justice as a special judge.
    3. Only after exhausting the procedures set out in subdivisions (a)(1) and (2), a judge may appoint a lawyer from a list, on a rotating basis, of lawyers that have been previously approved by the judge or judges of the district or county who are constitutionally qualified, in good standing, and possess sufficient experience and expertise. A lawyer appointed is subject to the following limitations, which shall be made known to persons attending any court proceeding presided over by a lawyer, as evidenced by an entry in the minutes or other permanent record of the court:
      1. The lawyer may preside only if the parties and counsel are notified that the duly elected or appointed judge will be absent and that a practicing lawyer will serve as a special judge;
      2. The parties choose to proceed and not to continue the case pending return of the duly elected or appointed judge;
      3. The lawyer shall not approve the payment of attorney's fees involving an indigent defense claim or any discretionary fees. A special judge shall approve fees only when the exact amount is set by statute; and
      4. At the opening of any court session presided over by a lawyer appointed pursuant to this section, an announcement shall be made to persons in attendance conveying the information contained in subdivisions (a)(3)(A) and (B). The making of such an announcement constitutes compliance with the notice requirements of this section.
  2. A general sessions or juvenile judge assigned to a court outside the judge's county of residence shall receive reimbursement for travel expenses from the county to which the judge is assigned. Reimbursement shall be in an amount in accordance with the comprehensive travel regulations promulgated by the supreme court.
  3. The county legislative body, by resolution adopted by a two-thirds (2/3) vote, may authorize the payment of compensation to a special judge selected pursuant to subdivision (a)(2). The amount of compensation shall not exceed the rate of compensation for other judges of the general sessions court or juvenile court for the county.
  4. Notwithstanding the provisions of subdivisions (a)(1) and (2), a general sessions or juvenile judge who encounters a sudden and unexpected emergency which causes the judge to be absent from court may forego the requirements of those subdivisions and appoint a lawyer in accordance with subdivision (a)(3). The circumstances requiring the appointment of a lawyer pursuant to this subsection (d) shall be entered upon the minutes or other permanent record of the court in addition to the information required in subdivision (a)(3).
    1. Upon approval of this subsection (e) and subsections (f)-(h) by resolution adopted by a two-thirds (2/3) vote of the county legislative body of any county having a population in excess of eight hundred thousand (800,000), according to the 1990 federal census or any subsequent federal census, and notwithstanding any other provision of this subsection (e) and subsections (f)-(h) to the contrary, if a judge of a court of general sessions or juvenile court in the county finds it necessary to be absent from holding court, another judge may sit by interchange for the absent judge upon entering an order finding it in the best interest of judicial efficiency. The order shall identify the absent judge and the interchanging judge, and shall be kept on file in the office of the clerk of the court. Upon a finding that interchange is not in the best interest of judicial efficiency, the judge so finding may appoint an attorney as a special judge. The appointments shall be on a rotating basis, from a list of attorneys previously approved by all of the duly elected or appointed general sessions or juvenile court judges, as being constitutionally qualified, in good standing, and possessing sufficient experience and skill. The appointment of a special judge shall be by written order, identifying the absent judge and the special judge, and shall be kept on file in the office of the clerk of the court.
    2. During the month of September each year, the clerk of the court shall prepare, for each division of court governed by subdivision (e)(1), an annual report for the preceding twelve (12) months, setting out the total number of sessions of court presided over by a special judge, or by a judge sitting by interchange. The clerk shall also report the total number of sessions of court that are scheduled in each division of court for that period. The orders and reports required by this subdivision (e)(2) shall be filed, and kept open for public inspection, by the clerk of the court. The clerk of the court shall promptly file a copy of the annual report with the administrative office of the courts, created by § 16-3-801.
  5. All special judges appointed under subsection (e) shall be subject to the following limitations:
    1. All parties and counsel appearing before the special judge shall be notified that the duly elected or appointed judge is absent, and that a practicing attorney is serving as special judge;
    2. If there is no duly elected or appointed judge available to preside over the trial of a contested case, either side shall be entitled to continue the case pending the return of a duly elected or appointed judge;
    3. A special judge shall not preside over a contested cause without a consent form signed by all litigants who are present at the beginning of the proceeding. The consent form shall be kept on file with the clerk of the court as part of the legal record of that cause; and
    4. A special judge shall not approve the payment of attorney fees, involving an indigent defense claim or any discretionary fees; provided, that a special judge may enter a judgment for attorney fees when:
      1. The exact amount is set by statute; or
      2. The party to be charged has executed a written agreement calling for the payment of attorney fees, and the fees shall be the amount specified in the agreement, but in no case more than one third (1/3) of the principal amount of the debt upon which the suit is brought.
    1. Subsections (e) and (f) shall not apply where a judge finds it necessary to be absent from holding court and appoints as a special judge:
      1. A duly elected or appointed judge of any other juvenile or general sessions court, a trial court judge; or
      2. A full-time officer of the judicial system under the judge's supervision whose duty it is to perform judicial functions, such as a juvenile magistrate, a child support magistrate or clerk and master, who is a licensed attorney in good standing with the Tennessee supreme court. The judicial officer shall only serve as special judge in matters related to that officer's duties as a judicial officer.
    2. Notwithstanding subsections (e) and (f), a general sessions or juvenile court judge shall have the authority to appoint a special judge as provided in subdivision (g)(1).
    1. Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, in any county having a population of more than eight hundred thousand (800,000), according to the 1990 federal census or any subsequent federal census, the county governing body of that county may appoint a special substitute judge or judges to serve as a judge in the court of general sessions or juvenile court in the county in the absence of any one (1) of such elected judge or judges.
    2. A special substitute judge appointed shall be an attorney licensed to practice law by this state and in good standing with the board of professional responsibility.
    3. The compensation for a special substitute judge pursuant to subsections (e)-(f) and this subsection (h) shall be fixed by the county governing body and shall be paid from any fund appropriated for such purpose by the county governing body.

Acts 1959, ch. 109, § 14; 1968, ch. 533, § 1; T.C.A., § 16-1114; Acts 1994, ch. 751, § 1; 1997, ch. 473, § 3; 1998, ch. 943, § 1; 2009, ch. 235, § 1; 2010, ch. 757, §§ 1, 2.

Compiler's Notes. For table of U.S. decennial populations of Tennessee counties, see Volume 13 and its supplement.

Acts 2009, ch. 235, § 1 directed the code commission to change all references from “child support referee” to “child support magistrate” and all references from “juvenile referee” to “juvenile magistrate” and to include all such changes in supplements and replacement volumes for the Tennessee Code Annotated.

Amendments. The 2009 amendment substituted “child support magistrate” for “child support referee” and “juvenile magistrate” for “juvenile referee” in (g)(1)(B).

The 2010 amendment, in (a), combined former (1) and (2) as present (1) and rewrote former (1) and (2) which read: “(1)  If a special judge is necessary in a county or district with more than one (1) general sessions or juvenile judge, the judge shall interchange within such judge's county, pursuant to § 17-2-208. If a judge cannot serve by interchange, a judge may seek to find any current, former, or retired judge, who will, by mutual agreement, sit as special judge. The designation shall be made by the chief justice of the supreme court.“(2)  In a county with only one (1) general sessions judge or juvenile court judge, the judge shall seek to find any current, former or retired judge, who will, by mutual agreement, sit as special judge. The special judge shall serve by designation of the chief justice of the supreme court.”, redesignated former (3) and (4) as present (2) and (3), in present (2), substituted “subdivision (a)(1),” for “subdivision (a)(1) or (a)(2),” and substituted “designation of the chief justice as a special judge” for “designation as special judge”, and in present (3), substituted “subdivisions (a)(1) and (2),” for “subdivisions (a)(1), (2) and (3),” in the first sentence, added “, which shall be made known to persons attending any court proceeding presided over by a lawyer, as evidenced by an entry in the minutes or other permanent record of the court” to the end of the second sentence, and added (D); and rewrote (d) which read: “A general sessions or juvenile judge may issue and may amend, upon showing a change in circumstances, a standing order regarding compliance with subdivisions (a)(1)-(4). The order may include a finding regarding whether a current, former or retired judge will sit by mutual agreement in accordance with subdivision (a)(2); whether the administrative office of the courts can comply with emergency requests for substitute judges in less than seventy-two (72) hours in accord with subdivision (a)(3); and the list of lawyers to be contacted on a rotating basis under subdivision (a)(4).”

Effective Dates. Acts 2009, ch. 235, § 2. May 20, 2009.

Acts 2010, ch. 757, § 3. April 13, 2010.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 16 Tenn. Juris., Judges, § 22.

Law Reviews.

The Tennessee Court System — General Sessions Court (Frederic S. Le Clercq), 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 375.

Attorney General Opinions. Attorneys to sit as “special judges” in Hamilton county, OAG 96-003 (1/16/96).

Supreme Court has no authority to prohibit use of special judges, OAG 96-127 (11/12/96).

Cited: State ex rel. Witcher v. Bilbrey, 878 S.W.2d 567, 1994 Tenn. App. LEXIS 103 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994); State v. Daniel, — S.W.3d —, 2006 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 834 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 30, 2006); United States v. Master, 614 F.3d 236, 2010 FED App. 276P, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 18133 (6th Cir. Aug. 31, 2010).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Substantial Compliance.

Where regular judge left signed orders for the appointment of a special judge in the clerk's office with the name of the special judge left blank and the court designated attorneys who were to be appointed and such attorney was notified, either by the judge or someone in his office and the blank space was filled in with the name of the attorney when he assumed office, there was a substantial compliance with this section. Feagins v. State, 596 S.W.2d 108, 1979 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 314 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1979).

2. Issuance of Search Warrants.

The “special judge” has the same authority as the general sessions judge to issue search warrants. State v. Smith, 867 S.W.2d 343, 1993 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 254 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993).

Retired judge did not have legal authority as a special general sessions judge under Tenn. Code Ann. T.C.A. § 16-15-209 because the authority of special judges attaches only when the active general sessions judge is unavailable; therefore, the warrant was void ab initio and the evidence had to be suppressed. United States v. Scott, 260 F.3d 512, 2001 FED App. 235P, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 16516 (6th Cir. Tenn. 2001).

3. Completion of Duties.

Where a general sessions judge resumes judicial activities, the judge's special general sessions judge replacement loses claim to de facto judicial status. United States v. Scott, 69 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15564 (E.D. Tenn. 1999)..

4. Special Judge.

Although the judge for defendant's second driving under the influence conviction might not have been elected according to the specific statutory provisions regarding special judges, the judge was a de facto judicial officer whose judicial acts were valid and not subject to collateral attack. State v. Posey, 99 S.W.3d 141, 2002 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 727 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2002).

In a termination of parental rights proceeding, a local attorney was permitted to hear the case as a special judge. The trial court did not follow the proper procedure for appointing a special judge; there was no evidence regarding whether the absence of the sitting judge was necessary, and the record was inadequate to support the attorney's authority to serve as a special judge. State Dep't of Children's Servs. v. A.M.H., 198 S.W.3d 757, 2006 Tenn. App. LEXIS 156 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006), appeal denied, In re A. B., — S.W.3d —, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 543 (Tenn. June 5, 2006), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 537 (Tenn. 2006).

Mother was correct that a referee (now magistrate) did not have authority to hear a parental termination rights case as a special judge where there was no order appointing him as a special judge and no evidence that the trial judge's absence was necessary; as a result, there was no evidence that the trial court followed T.C.A. § 16-15-209 and T.C.A. § 17-2-118. State Dep't of Children's Servs. v. F.R.G., — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 87 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 16, 2007), appeal denied, State v. F. R. G., — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 514 (Tenn. May 21, 2007).

Because the mother raised no objection, prior to or during trial, to an attorney presiding as a special judge, she waived her argument challenging his authority to preside over the termination of parental rights proceedings as a special judge. Furthermore, the record contained no evidence that the attorney acted other than in the good faith belief of his right to act as a special judge in the case; thus, the attorney served as a de facto judge and the parties were bound by his acts. In re Marterrio H., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 236 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 12, 2017).

16-15-210. Vacancy in office of judge — Filling.

  1. Except as provided in subsection (b), any vacancy in the office of judge of the court of general sessions shall be filled by the county legislative body as provided in § 5-1-104.
    1. In a multi-county court, the vacancy shall be filled by concurring resolutions of the legislative bodies of the affected counties.
    2. In the event of nonconcurrence, the vacancy shall be filled by resolution of the legislative body of the county of residence of the last judge of the multi-county court.
    1. In the event of an interim suspension of a general sessions court or juvenile court judge pursuant to § 17-5-306(f), the county legislative body shall appoint a temporary replacement to serve until the interim suspension is lifted or the office becomes vacant.
    2. In a multi-county court, the temporary replacement shall be appointed by concurring resolutions of the legislative bodies of the affected counties. In the event of nonconcurrence, the temporary replacement shall be appointed by resolution of the legislative body of the county of residence of the judge who has been suspended.

Acts 1959, ch. 109, § 15; T.C.A., § 16-1115; Acts 1993, ch. 241, § 7; 1998, ch. 669, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. This section was declared invalid by the supreme court in State ex rel. Winstead v. Moody , 596 S.W.2d 811 (Tenn. 1980). See Notes to Decisions below. The section has since been amended to remove the unconstitutional provisions.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 8  Tenn. Juris., Counties, § 13; 17 Tenn. Juris., Justices of Peace and General Sessions Courts, § 2.

Law Reviews.

The Tennessee Court System — General Sessions Court (Frederic S. Le Clercq), 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 375.

Attorney General Opinions. Authority to appoint temporary replacement for suspended general sessions judge, OAG 06-044 (3/9/06).

Cited: State ex rel. Witcher v. Bilbrey, 878 S.W.2d 567, 1994 Tenn. App. LEXIS 103 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994); Jordan v. Knox County, 213 S.W.3d 751, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 26 (Tenn. 2007).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

As the Hamblen County general sessions court was a county office, authority to fill vacancies in that office is vested in the county legislative body by the 1978 amendment to Tenn. Const., art. VII, § 2, and this section was rendered invalid by that amendment. State ex rel. Winstead v. Moody, 596 S.W.2d 811, 1980 Tenn. LEXIS 429 (Tenn. 1980).

Collateral References. Judges 8.

16-15-211. Seminars.

All general sessions court judges shall be required to attend seminars offered for the particular benefit of the judges. Guidelines for the seminars, workshops, and training sessions are to be established by the administrative director of the courts. Travel and mileage expenses relative to attendance at the seminars shall be paid on an individual basis by each general sessions court judge.

Acts 1982, ch. 945, § 3; 1993, ch. 66, § 24.

Part 3
Clerk

16-15-301. Clerk of court.

  1. The clerk of the circuit court of the county shall act as clerk of the court of general sessions, and when acting as clerk of the general sessions court shall be designated as the clerk of the court of general sessions of that county.
  2. In addition, the clerk of any special court now established or hereafter established, having exactly the same jurisdiction as and no more jurisdiction than the circuit court within any part and for a portion of a particular county, shall also serve as clerk of the court of general sessions within the venue of the special court.
  3. In any county in which the office of a separate clerk of a court of general sessions is created by private act, the clerk shall continue to serve as the clerk of the court of general sessions of the county in accordance with the private act.
  4. Upon written application to the circuit court judge, the clerk of the court of general sessions may be authorized and empowered to appoint deputies for the sole purpose of issuing process. Upon consideration of the application, the circuit court judge shall note the circuit court judge's approval or disapproval by a formal order upon the minutes of the court, and the order shall state the reasons why the judge deems this action to be in the public interest.

Acts 1959, ch. 109, § 16; 1961, ch. 329, § 1; 1963, ch. 345, § 1; T.C.A., § 16-1116.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 6 Tenn. Juris., Clerks of Court, § 12; 17 Tenn. Juris., Justices of Peace and General Sessions Courts, § 2.

Law Reviews.

The Tennessee Court System — General Sessions Court (Frederic S. Le Clercq), 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 375.

16-15-302. Salaries of court officers in metropolitan government counties.

In counties governed by a metropolitan government as provided in title 7, the salaries of court officers of circuit, chancery and general sessions courts shall be the same and equal to the salaries of the court officers of the criminal courts of those counties.

Acts 1971, ch. 201, § 1; 1972, ch. 710, § 1; T.C.A., § 16-1125.

Law Reviews.

The Tennessee Court System — General Sessions Court (Frederic S. Le Clercq), 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 375.

16-15-303. General sessions court clerk.

  1. A general sessions court clerk shall:
    1. Retain, preserve and file away in order, and properly mark for easy reference all the papers in civil cases before them, unless returned or transmitted, in pursuance of law, to the circuit court upon appeal or otherwise;
    2. Transmit all the papers relative to the trial of a cause in which an appeal has been taken to the circuit court at least five (5) days before the term to which the appeal is returnable, unless the appeal is taken within the five (5) days, and then on, or by the first day of, the term;
    3. Transmit copies of such papers in the same way, in cases where only a portion of the parties have appealed;
    4. Return such papers, when an execution has been levied on real estate of the defendant, to the circuit court, on or before the second day of the term next after the levy; and
    5. Not issue an alias or pluries execution until the execution previously issued is returned, or affidavit made accounting for its absence, and a showing that it is unsatisfied.
  2. A general sessions court clerk shall keep, in a well-bound book, properly ruled for that purpose, a docket of all judgments rendered by the court, showing in whose favor and against whom each judgment is rendered, the names of the parties in full, and the date and amount of the judgment.
    1. A general sessions court clerk shall also keep, in the same book, an execution docket, showing the amount of each execution, in whose favor and against whom issued, the date of issuance, to whom delivered, the date of return and by whom returned, and the substance of the return, specifying particularly whether satisfied in whole or in part.
    2. The general sessions court clerk shall enter in the execution docket, in continuous order, and in distinct columns, with proper date to each act:
      1. The number of each case;
      2. The date of trial, and of each continuance, if any;
      3. The names of the parties in full;
      4. The amount of the judgment;
      5. The name of the stayor, if any;
      6. The name of the officer who returns the warrant;
      7. The date of the issuance of each execution, and to whom delivered;
      8. The bill of costs, the items written in words, with the amounts in figures; and
      9. The date of the return of the execution, by whom returned, and the substance of the return.
  3. A substantial compliance with the requirements of this section is sufficient to render the proceedings and entries valid for all purposes, so far as the parties are concerned, and all persons claiming under them.
  4. It is a Class C misdemeanor for a clerk to fail to keep the docket of judgments rendered and an execution docket, as required by subsections (b) and (c). Conviction under this section is grounds for removal under title 8, chapter 47. In addition, a person injured by the failure of a general sessions court clerk to preserve and keep the clerk's papers or dockets may recover civil damages pursuant to the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act, compiled in  title 29, chapter 20.
    1. Any information required to be kept as a public record by a clerk of a court of general sessions may be maintained on a computer or removable computer storage media in lieu of docket books or other bound books; provided, that the following standards are met:
      1. The information is available for public inspection, unless it is a confidential record according to law;
      2. Due care is taken to maintain the information as a public record during the time required by law for retention;
      3. All daily data generated and stored within the computer system shall be copied to computer storage media daily, and the newly created computer storage media more than one (1) week old shall be stored at a location other than at the building where the original is maintained; and
      4. The clerk can provide a paper copy of the information when needed or when requested by a member of the public.
    2. Nothing in subdivision (f)(1) shall be construed as requiring the clerk to sell the media upon which the information is stored or maintained.
    1. As used in this subsection (g):
      1. “Adjudication as a mental defective or adjudicated as a mental defective” means:
        1. A determination by a court in this state that a person, as a result of marked subnormal intelligence, mental illness, incompetency, condition or disease:
          1. Is a danger to such person or to others; or
          2. Lacks the ability to contract or manage such person's own affairs due to mental defect;
        2. A finding of insanity by a court in a criminal proceeding; or
        3. A finding that a person is incompetent to stand trial or is found not guilty by reason of insanity pursuant to §§ 50a and 72b of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, codified in 10 U.S.C. §§ 850a, 876b;
      2. “Judicial commitment to a mental institution” means a judicially ordered involuntary admission to a private or state hospital or treatment resource in proceedings conducted pursuant to title 33, chapter 6 or 7;
      3. “Mental institution” means a mental health facility, mental hospital, sanitarium, psychiatric facility and any other facility that provides diagnoses by a licensed professional of mental retardation or mental illness, including, but not limited to, a psychiatric ward in a general hospital;
      4. “Treatment resource” means any public or private facility, service or program providing treatment or rehabilitation services for mental illness or serious emotional disturbance, including, but not limited to, detoxification centers, hospitals, community mental health centers, clinics or programs, halfway houses and rehabilitation centers.
    2. In addition to the duties prescribed in this part, the clerks of the general sessions courts wherein commitments to a mental institution are ordered pursuant to title 33, chapter 6 or 7 or persons are adjudicated as a mental defective shall collect and report as soon as practicable, but no later than the third business day following the date of such an order or adjudication, information described in subsection (c) regarding individuals who have been adjudicated as a mental defective or judicially committed to a mental institution after a finding of probable cause pursuant to § 33-6-422 for the purposes of complying with the NICS Improvement Amendments Act of 2007, P.L. 110-180.
    3. The following information shall be collected and reported to the federal bureau of investigation-NICS Index and the department of safety, pursuant to subdivision (g)(2):
      1. Complete name and all aliases of the individual judicially committed or adjudicated as a mental defective, including, but not limited to, any names that the individual may have had or currently has by reason of marriage or otherwise;
      2. Case or docket number of the judicial commitment or the adjudication as a mental defective;
      3. Date judicial commitment ordered or adjudication as a mental defective was made;
      4. Private or state hospital or treatment resource to which the individual was judicially committed;
      5. Date of birth of the individual judicially committed or adjudicated as a mental defective, if such information has been provided to the clerk;
      6. Race and sex of the individual judicially committed or adjudicated as a mental defective; and
      7. Social security number of the individual judicially committed or adjudicated as a mental defective if available.
    4. The information in subdivisions (g)(3)(A)–(G), the confidentiality of which is protected by other statutes or regulations, shall be maintained as confidential and not subject to public inspection pursuant to such statutes or regulations, except for such use as may be necessary in the conduct of any proceeding pursuant to §§ 38-6-109, 39-17-1316, and 39-17-1352 — 39-17-1354.

Acts 1993, ch. 241, § 8; 2009, ch. 578, § 3; 2013, ch. 300, § 5; 2019, ch. 262, §§ 3, 4.

Amendments. The 2009 amendment, effective January 1, 2010, added (g).

The 2013 amendment substituted “collect and report as soon as practicable, but no later than the third business day following the date of such an order or adjudication” for “collect and report January 1, April 1, July 1, and October 1 of every year beginning January 1, 2010” in (g)(2).

The 2019 amendment added (d)(3)(F) and (d)(3)(G); and, in (d)(4), substituted “subdivisions (g)(3)(A)-(G)” for “subdivisions (g)(3)(A)-(E)”, substituted “pursuant to such statutes or regulations” for “ pursuant to the provisions of such statutes or regulations”, and substituted “pursuant to §§ 38-6-109, 39-17-1316, and 39-17-135239-17-1354” for “pursuant to §§ 39-17-1316, 39-17-1353 and 39-17-1354”.

Effective Dates. Acts 2009, ch. 578, § 13. January 1, 2010.

Acts 2013, ch. 300, § 11. July 1, 2013.

Acts 2019, ch. 262, § 7. July 1, 2019.

Cross-References. Confidentiality of public records, § 10-7-504.

Penalty for Class C misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Record on Appeal.

In a garnishment case, although the issue was moot because all facts contained in several allegedly missing documents were proven by witness testimony during a circuit court hearing; any papers filed during the pendency of the action in a general sessions court should have been transmitted to the circuit court upon appeal and properly included in the circuit court record. Emrick v. Moseley, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. App. LEXIS 448 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 30, 2014), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 986 (Tenn. Nov. 20, 2014).

16-15-304. Dockets.

Separate dockets shall be kept in the court for civil and criminal cases. Upon the civil docket shall be entered the style of each case, the names of the attorneys for the parties, the date of issuance of the warrant and process, the name of the officer to whom delivered, the return of the process, in brief form the action of the court both interlocutory and final, orders, judgments, executions, garnishments, list of fees of the court, of the sheriff, the sheriff's deputies, constables, game wardens, state highway patrol officers and other officers for their services, fees of witnesses for attendance and credits for payments upon judgments and upon costs. All cases shall be indexed.

Acts 1959, ch. 109, § 8; T.C.A., § 16-1123; Acts 1993, ch. 241, § 21; T.C.A., § 16-15-704.

Law Reviews.

The Tennessee Court System — General Sessions Court (Frederic S. Le Clercq), 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 375.

Part 4
Powers and Duties

16-15-401. General powers.

  1. Each general sessions court judge is vested with power to:
    1. Grant writs of attachment, returnable to the circuit court, in the same manner and to the same extent as the circuit judge;
    2. Enter up judgment by confession of a defendant to any amount within the judge's jurisdiction in the particular case;
    3. Issue an execution in the judge's county upon a certified execution from another county;
    4. Issue a subpoena for witnesses, in any matter to be tried before the judge, to the judge's own or an adjoining county;
    5. Issue scire facias to revive judgments against the personal representatives and heirs of deceased parties, to any county in the state;
    6. Issue alias and pluries executions whenever necessary;
    7. Issue counterpart writs to any county in the state for the principal maker of any bill, bond, or note, at the instance of the surety or endorser who is sued thereon; and
    8. Punish persons disturbing them in the discharge of their official duties.
  2. Judges of general sessions courts have the same authority as circuit court judges or chancellors to grant fiats for writs of injunction, attachments and other extraordinary process. They also have the same jurisdiction relative to the suspension and revocation of sentences imposed by them as that conferred upon all trial judges by title 40, chapter 29.
  3. The judges of courts of general sessions of counties of the third class, as defined in § 16-15-204 [repealed], having a population of not less than forty-seven thousand eight hundred fifty (47,850) nor more than forty-seven thousand eight hundred seventy-five (47,875), according to the 1970 federal census or any subsequent federal census, in addition to the jurisdiction and powers conferred elsewhere in this chapter, have the authority to sit by interchange for the county judge in nonsupport, probate, juvenile and lunacy proceedings.

Code 1858, § 4125 (deriv. Acts 1794, ch. 1, § 19; 1801, ch. 7, § 4; 1805, ch. 66, §§ 4, 6; 1837-1838, ch. 102, § 1; 1843-1844, ch. 112, § 1; 1847-1848, ch. 55, § 15; 1849-1850, ch. 103, § 1; 1851-1852, ch. 181, § 3); Shan., § 5937; Code 1932, § 10138; Acts 1959, ch. 109, § 2; 1961, ch. 138, § 1; 1965, ch. 114, § 1; 1967, ch. 276, § 1; 1968, ch. 635, § 2; 1969, ch. 44, § 2; 1973, ch. 88, § 2; 1973, ch. 355, § 2; 1974, ch. 432, § 2; impl. am. 1979, ch. 68, §§ 2, 3; modified; T.C.A., § 19-202; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-1104; Acts 1993, ch. 241, § 9.

Compiler's Notes. Former § 16-15-204, referred to in this section, was repealed by Acts 1993, ch. 241, § 2.

For table of U.S. decennial populations of Tennessee counties, see Volume 13 and its supplement.

Cross-References. Compensation and qualifications of judges, jurisdiction, title 16, ch. 15, part 50.

Power to grant certiorari and supersedeas, § 27-8-105.

Process to other counties, §§ 20-2-107, 20-2-108.

Textbooks. Tennessee Criminal Practice and Procedure (Raybin), § 7.12.

Tennessee Jurisprudence, 17 Tenn. Juris., Justices of Peace and General Sessions Courts, §§ 13, 21, 35; 25 Tenn. Juris., Weapons, § 7.

Law Reviews.

The Tennessee Court System (Frederic S. Le Clercq), 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 189.

Attorney General Opinions. A general sessions court that revokes a defendant’s probation has authority under T.C.A. § 40-35-308(c) to extend the probationary period for up to two years. OAG 15-79, 2015 Tenn. AG LEXIS 80 (12/15/2015).

Cited: Rhinehart v. State, 121 Tenn. 420, 117 S.W. 508, 1908 Tenn. LEXIS 28 (1908); Benson v. Herbst, 240 S.W.3d 235, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 317 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 18, 2007).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Attachments — Issuing.

Justices (now general sessions court judges) have the power to issue attachments returnable to the circuit court, even in cases for amounts beyond their jurisdiction. Galbraith v. McFarland, 43 Tenn. 267, 1866 Tenn. LEXIS 50 (1866). See Gardner v. Swift & Co., 113 Tenn. 1, 80 S.W. 764, 1904 Tenn. LEXIS 1 (1904).

2. Contempt.

A city judge is authorized to punish for contempt. State ex rel. May v. Krichbaum, 152 Tenn. 416, 278 S.W. 54, 1925 Tenn. LEXIS 85 (1925).

3. Nonsuit.

When a parent nonsuited a healthcare liability claim in general sessions court after a hospital confessed judgment, it was error for a circuit court to subsequently grant summary judgment against the parent based on the confession because the hospital did not obtain a right to confess judgment that was superior to the parent's right to nonsuit the case, since the parent sought nonsuit before the general sessions court entered judgment on the confession. Ross v. Grandberry, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. App. LEXIS 321 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 30, 2014), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 851 (Tenn. Oct. 17, 2014).

Collateral References. 51 C.J.S. Justices of the Peace § 59.

Criminal law 86.

Justices of the peace 31-62.

Records 17(7).

16-15-402. General duties.

It is the duty of a general sessions court judge:

  1. To return all marriage licenses under which the judge has solemnized the rites of matrimony to the office of the county clerk within thirty (30) days;
  2. To deliver over, in case of resignation, removal, or expiration of the judge's term of office, all the judge's official books and papers, according to law; and
  3. Not to sign a warrant or summons or any other leading process, attachment or document until written out in full.

Code 1858, § 4126 (deriv. Acts 1805, ch. 66, § 1; 1809 (Sept.), ch. 63, § 2; 1829, ch. 125, § 1; 1835-1836, ch. 17, §§ 7, 13-15); Acts 1889, ch. 251, §§ 1, 2; Shan., § 5938; mod. Code 1932, § 10139; impl. am. Acts 1978, ch. 934, §§ 22, 36; impl. am. Acts 1979, ch. 68, §§ 2, 3; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 19-203; Acts 1993, ch. 241, §§ 10, 11.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 17 Tenn. Juris., Justices of Peace and General Sessions Courts, §§ 9, 26, 32.

Law Reviews.

General Sessions Courts: Origin and Recent Legislation (Paul M. Bryan and Isadore B. Baer), 24 Tenn. L. Rev. 667.

Cited: United States ex rel. Watts v. Lauderdale County Justices, 10 F. 460, 1882 U.S. App. LEXIS 2302 (C.C.D. Tenn. 1882); Rowland v. Quarles, 20 Tenn. App. 470, 100 S.W.2d 991, 1936 Tenn. App. LEXIS 38 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1936); State v. McClintock, 732 S.W.2d 268, 1987 Tenn. LEXIS 1063 (Tenn. 1987).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Execution.

2. —Alias or Pluries.

A justice of the peace (now general sessions court judges) cannot issue an alias or pluries execution until the execution previously issued is returned, or affidavit filed accounting for its absence, and showing that it is unsatisfied. Rowland v. Quarles, 20 Tenn. App. 470, 100 S.W.2d 991, 1936 Tenn. App. LEXIS 38 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1936).

3. —Use Second Time.

Where on the day execution was issued the officer summoned the garnishee, without attempting to find personal property of the debtor but would have found no personal property if he had looked, made sufficient response on the back of the execution but did not return it to the justice (now general sessions court) and then again summoned the garnishee by use of the same execution within the 30-day limit and again made response and this time returned it to the justice the second garnishment was valid. Rowland v. Quarles, 20 Tenn. App. 470, 100 S.W.2d 991, 1936 Tenn. App. LEXIS 38 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1936).

4. —Real Estate Levy.

The purpose of Acts 1899, ch. 39, providing that whenever any execution, issued by a justice of the peace (now general sessions court), is levied on real estate, the title to the real estate shall not be affected as to third parties, unless the execution or the papers in the case are filed in the circuit court within 10 days after the levy, is to give third parties notice of the lien of the execution, and is for the protection of third parties. Baker Watkins Supply Co. v. Fowlkes, 129 Tenn. 663, 168 S.W. 153, 1914 Tenn. LEXIS 157 (1914).

5. —Lost Summons.

An execution issued by a justice of the peace (now general sessions court) was not rendered invalid by the fact that at the date of its issuance the original summons was lost, and no steps had then been taken to supply it; Shannon's Code, § 4800 (§ 19-604) (now § 16-15-803), providing that when the docket book and the original papers are destroyed, the justice of the peace may supply them, and issue execution as though they had not been destroyed, not being applicable, since it outlines the practice where all the papers and docket books are lost, and not where the summons alone is lost. Baker Watkins Supply Co. v. Fowlkes, 129 Tenn. 663, 168 S.W. 153, 1914 Tenn. LEXIS 157 (1914).

6. Warrant or Summons.

7. —Interchangeable Use.

Contention that suing out of warrants before justice of peace (now general sessions court) could not be considered commencement of an action had no merit in view of fact that words “warrant” and “summons,” as applicable to proceedings before justices of peace, are used interchangeably both in decisions and statutes. Galbraith v. Kirby, 21 Tenn. App. 303, 109 S.W.2d 1168, 1937 Tenn. App. LEXIS 35 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1937).

8. —Signature and Endorsement of Warrant.

A warrant unsigned by a justice of the peace (now general sessions judge) is a nullity, and all proceedings under it are void, unless the objection be in some manner waived by the party. It is the duty of the justice issuing a warrant not only to sign it himself, but to endorse on the back of it the date of its issuance, which becomes an important matter under the plea of the statute of limitations. Smith v. Kirkwood, 3 Shan. 650 (1875).

9. —Evidence as to Issuance of Warrant.

Oral evidence is admissible to prove that a justice's (now general sessions judge's) warrant was forged or fraudulent, as well as to show that it is genuine. On a plea of the statute of limitations, the defendant is entitled to prove, by oral evidence, when the suit was, in fact, commenced, especially when the date of the issuance of the warrant is not given. Smith v. Kirkwood, 3 Shan. 650 (1875). See Osborne v. State, 17 Tenn. 488, 1836 Tenn. LEXIS 92 (1836).

16-15-403. Conservator of peace — Oaths.

Every general sessions court judge is a conservator of the peace in the county in which the judge serves, and has authority to administer oaths when required by law, unless the power is expressly entrusted to some other officer, and to exercise such other powers as are conferred upon the general sessions court judge by law.

Code 1858, § 343; Shan., § 432; Code 1932, § 679; impl. am. Acts 1979, ch. 68, §§ 2, 3; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 19-201.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 3 Tenn. Juris., Attachment and Garnishment, § 28; 17 Tenn. Juris., Justices of Peace and General Sessions Courts, § 9.

Law Reviews.

The Tennessee Court System — The County Court, 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 419.

Attorney General Opinions. General authority of judges of general sessions to administer oaths is not limited by T.C.A. §§ 8-18-107, 8-18-109(b) or 17-1-105, OAG 03-043 (4/15/03).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Pauper Oath for Suit in Circuit Court.

The pauper oath in lieu of a prosecution bond for costs and ancillary attachment in a suit instituted in the circuit court may be taken before a justice of the peace (now general sessions court judge) of the county. Phipps v. Burnett, 96 Tenn. 175, 33 S.W. 925, 1895 Tenn. LEXIS 22 (1896); Fawcett v. Chicago, S. L. & N. O. R. Co., 113 Tenn. 246, 81 S.W. 839, 1904 Tenn. LEXIS 21 (1904).

2. Oath to Affidavit in Support of Writ of Attachment.

Where suit against nonresident was by original attachment in circuit court for damages for tort committed by defendant, court properly sustained defendant's motion to quash the attachment and dismiss the suit, because the affidavit in support of the writ of attachment was verified by oath attested by notary public instead of by the clerk who issued the writ. Notary public has same power as justices (now general sessions court judges) to administer oaths; and justices have no such power where that power is “expressly entrusted to some other officer.” Campbell v. Brady, 158 Tenn. 98, 11 S.W.2d 687, 1928 Tenn. LEXIS 128 (1928).

16-15-404. Hearing causes at any time.

Each general sessions court judge is authorized to try any cause that may be brought before the judge at any time and at any place within the county, unless expressly prohibited by some positive provision of this code.

Code 1858, § 4128 (deriv. Acts 1835-1836, ch. 17, § 3); Shan., § 5940; Code 1932, § 10141; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 19-205.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 17 Tenn. Juris., Justices of Peace and General Sessions Courts, §§ 13, 24.

Tennessee Criminal Practice and Procedure (Raybin), § 7.1.

Cited: Glenn v. Payne, 153 Tenn. 240, 280 S.W. 1019, 1925 Tenn. LEXIS 24 (1926).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Sunday Court.

The language of this section is, perhaps, sufficiently broad to enable a justice of the peace (now general sessions court) to try a case on Sunday, at least a criminal case. It may be that the preservation of the public peace would sometimes require a justice of the peace to try and commit persons brought before him on Sunday. Moss v. State, 131 Tenn. 94, 173 S.W. 859, 1914 Tenn. LEXIS 90, L.R.A. (n.s.) 1915D361 (1914).

2. —Search Warrant — Sunday Issuance.

A search warrant is criminal process issuable on Sunday. Seals v. State, 157 Tenn. 538, 11 S.W.2d 879, 1928 Tenn. LEXIS 218 (1928).

16-15-405. Relief from firearm disabilities imposed on persons adjudicated as mental defective or judicially committed to mental institution.

  1. A person who is subject to 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(4) and (g)(4) because the person has been adjudicated as a mental defective or judicially committed to a mental institution, as defined in § 16-15-303, may petition the general sessions court that entered the judicial commitment or adjudication order for relief from the firearm disabilities imposed by the adjudication or judicial commitment; provided, that the person may not petition the court until three (3) years from the date of release from commitment or the date of the adjudication order, whichever is later.
  2. A copy of the petition for relief shall also be served on the district attorney general of the judicial district in which the original judicial commitment or adjudication occurred. The district attorney general may appear, support, object to, or present evidence relevant to the relief sought by the petitioner.
  3. The court shall receive and consider evidence in an open proceeding, including evidence offered by the petitioner, concerning:
    1. The circumstances that led to the imposition of the firearms disability under 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(4) and (g)(4);
    2. The petitioner's mental health records;
    3. The petitioner's criminal history;
    4. The petitioner's reputation; and
    5. Changes in the petitioner's condition or circumstances relevant to the relief sought.
  4. The court shall grant the petition for relief if it finds by a preponderance of the evidence and enters into the record the following:
    1. The petitioner is no longer likely to act in a manner that is dangerous to public safety; and
    2. Granting the relief would not be contrary to the public interest.
  5. A record of the proceedings, to be provided by the petitioner, shall be made by a certified court reporter or by court-approved electronic means.
  6. The petitioner may appeal a final order denying the requested relief, and the review on appeal, if granted, shall be de novo.
  7. A person may file a petition for relief under this section no more than once every two (2) years.
  8. Relief from a firearm disability granted under this section has no effect on the loss of civil rights, including firearm rights, for any reason other than the particular adjudication as a mental defective or judicial commitment to a mental institution from which relief is granted.
  9. When the court issues an order granting a petition of relief under subsection (d), the court clerk shall, as soon as practicable but no later than thirty (30) days after issuance, forward a copy of the order to the Tennessee bureau of investigation (TBI). The TBI, upon receipt of the order, shall:
    1. Immediately forward a copy of the order to the department of safety;
    2. Update the National Instant Criminal Background Check System database and transmit the corrected records to the federal bureau of investigation; and
    3. Remove and destroy all records relating to the petition for relief from any database over which the TBI exercises control.
  10. The TBI and the department of safety shall not use or permit the use of the records or information obtained or retained pursuant to this section for any purpose not specified in this section.

Acts 2015, ch. 459, § 3.

Compiler's Notes. Former § 16-15-405 (Code 1858, §§ 4129-4134 (deriv. Acts 1835-1836, ch. 17, § 7); Shan., §§ 5941-5946; Code 1932, §§ 10142-10147; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), §§ 19-206 — 19-209; Acts 1984, ch. 772, § 1; 1989, ch. 591, § 113), concerning dockets to be kept by general sessions court judges, was repealed by Acts 1993, ch. 241, § 12.

Effective Dates. Acts 2015, ch. 459, § 6. July 1, 2015.

16-15-406. Rules of court.

Judges of the courts of general sessions shall adopt such rules as may be necessary to expedite the trial and disposal of cases.

Acts 1959, ch. 109, § 7; T.C.A., § 16-1120.

Law Reviews.

The Tennessee Court System — General Sessions Court (Frederic S. Le Clercq), 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 375.

Attorney General Opinions. County courthouse security and dress rules.  OAG 12-107, 2012 Tenn. AG LEXIS 111 (11/26/12).

Part 5
Jurisdiction

16-15-501. General jurisdiction.

  1. The court of general sessions is vested with all of the jurisdiction and shall exercise the authority formerly conferred by law upon justices of the peace in civil and criminal cases, suits and actions. The jurisdiction, power and authority of the court shall be coextensive with the county.
    1. Notwithstanding any provision of the law to the contrary, judges of courts of general sessions have jurisdiction to try and dispose of violations of municipal ordinances where the sheriff of the county is acting under the authority of §§ 8-8-201 and 12-9-104; provided, that a certified copy of the ordinances of the municipality have been filed with the court. Judges of courts of general sessions shall direct the clerk of the court that all fines collected shall be paid over to the municipality and all court costs collected shall be paid and accounted for according to former § 16-15-703(d) [repealed], to help administer the cost of enforcement; provided, that reasonable costs have been set by ordinance of the municipality.
    2. The judges of courts of general sessions of counties having a population of not less than fourteen thousand six hundred fifty (14,650) nor more than fourteen thousand six hundred seventy (14,670), according to the 1960 federal census or any subsequent federal census, have, in addition to the jurisdiction and powers conferred above, concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit court judge and chancellor in that county or counties in workers' compensation cases, divorce cases and those powers specifically conferred upon both those courts of record under § 29-31-101.
    3. The judges of courts of general sessions of counties having a population of not less than nine thousand two hundred thirty (9,230) nor more than nine thousand two hundred fifty (9,250), according to the 1960 federal census or any subsequent federal census, have, in addition to the jurisdiction and powers conferred above, concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit judge and chancellor in that county or counties in divorce cases.
    4. Judges of courts of general sessions in any county having a population of not less than seventy-seven thousand seven hundred (77,700) nor more than seventy-seven thousand eight hundred (77,800), according to the 1980 federal census or any subsequent federal census, in addition to the jurisdiction and powers conferred above, have concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit judge and chancellor in that county in domestic relations cases.
    1. All courts of general sessions in this state created by private act have the powers and jurisdiction conferred by this chapter and §§ 18-4-201 — 18-4-203, 20-12-143, 27-5-108, 40-1-109, 40-4-117 and former 40-4-118 [repealed], and in addition, have such further powers and jurisdiction as may be conferred by the private act creating that court. It is not the intention of this chapter to divest any court of general sessions of any jurisdiction conferred by any private act.
    2. This chapter shall not diminish the powers, jurisdiction or provisions governing the operation of any court of general sessions created by private act. It is the intent of the general assembly that each court of general sessions of this state has all the powers and jurisdiction granted by the public acts and applicable private acts.
    1. The jurisdiction of courts of general sessions, where they have been created, shall extend to the sum of twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) in all civil cases, both law and equity; provided, that this section shall not apply to cases of forcible entry and detainer, in which the court shall have unlimited original jurisdiction; and provided further, that this section shall not apply to actions to recover personal property, in which the court shall have unlimited original jurisdiction, including jurisdiction to award an alternative money judgment; and general sessions judges shall have jurisdiction to issue restraining orders and to enforce the penalty provisions for violation of those restraining orders.
    2. For the purpose of calculating whether a judgment entered by a court of general sessions is within or exceeds the monetary jurisdictional limits established for the courts by subdivision (d)(1), the following amounts shall not be included:
      1. Any amount awarded for attorney fees;
      2. Any court costs assessed by the court; and
      3. Any discretionary costs assessed by the court.

Code 1858, § 4123 (deriv. Acts 1827, ch. 51, § 1; 1841-1842, ch. 186, § 1; 1849-1850, ch. 269, § 1; 1853-1854, ch. 58, §§ 1, 2; 1857-1858, ch. 56, § 3; 1857-1858, ch. 62, § 1); Acts 1865-1866, ch. 51, § 1; 1875, ch. 11, §§ 1-3; Shan., § 5935; mod. Code 1932, § 10136; Acts 1853, ch. 39, § 1; 1959, ch. 109, §§ 2, 22; 1961, ch. 138, § 1; 1965, ch. 114, § 1; 1967, ch. 276, § 1; 1968, ch. 635, § 2; 1969, ch. 44, § 2; 1969, ch. 133, § 1; 1970, ch. 341, § 1; 1973, ch. 88, § 2; 1973, ch. 355, § 2; 1973, ch. 365, § 10; 1974, ch. 432, § 2; 1974, ch. 659, § 1; 1977, ch. 295, §§ 1, 2; 1978, ch. 560, § 1; 1979, ch. 68, § 2; impl. am. Acts 1979, ch. 68, § 3; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), §§ 16-1104, 16-1124, 19-301; Acts 1981, ch. 289, § 4; 1982, ch. 655, §§ 1-3; 1982, ch. 930, § 3; 1982, ch. 945, § 2; 1983, ch. 231, § 1; 1983, ch. 283, §§ 1, 2; 1985, ch. 368, § 1; 1986, ch. 698, § 3; 1988, ch. 698, § 10; 1993, ch. 241, §§ 13-15; 1997, ch. 472, §§ 1-3; 1999, ch. 259, § 1; 2000, ch. 743, § 1; 2000, ch. 764, § 1; 2006, ch. 722, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Section 1 of Acts 1968, ch. 635, amended Acts 1965, ch. 114 by providing for local approval and § 2 of Acts 1968, ch. 635 validated Acts 1965, ch. 114. Acts 1968, ch. 635 has been approved by the local governing body.

Section 1 of Acts 1969, ch. 44 amended Acts 1967, ch. 276 by providing for local approval and § 2 of Acts 1969, ch. 44 validated Acts 1967, ch. 276. Acts 1969, ch. 44 has been approved by a local governing body.

Section 1 of Acts 1972, ch. 664 provided that in counties with a population of not less than 47,750 and not more than 49,750, the judges of general session courts shall be authorized to sit by interchange with any circuit, criminal or any other court of general jurisdiction provided that they have the proper qualifications.

Acts 1986, ch. 698, § 5 provided that “all existing agreements between municipalities and county sheriffs, courts of general sessions, and governing bodies of counties for the enforcement of municipal ordinances are ratified and validated.”

Former § 16-15-204, referred to in this section, was repealed by Acts 1993, ch. 241, § 2.

Former § 16-15-703, referred to in this section, was repealed by Acts 1993, ch. 241, § 20.

Former § 40-4-118, referred to in this section, was repealed by Acts 1993, ch. 241, § 64.

Acts 2000, ch. 743, § 2 provided that the addition of (d)(2)(B) shall have no effect unless it is approved by a two-thirds (2/3) vote of the county legislative body. Its approval or non-approval shall be proclaimed by the presiding officer of the county legislative body and certified to the secretary of state. The amendment was approved June 19, 2000.

For table of U.S. decennial populations of Tennessee counties, see Volume 13 and its supplement.

Cross-References. Compensation and qualifications of judges, jurisdiction, title 16, ch. 15, part 50.

General sessions court actions recommenced in circuit or chancery court, § 28-1-105.

General sessions court counterclaim, cross-claim, or third party complaint recommenced in circuit or chancery court, §§ 28-1-114, 47-2-725.

General sessions court judge acting as city judge, § 6-4-301.

Jurisdiction under Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act, §§ 29-20-305, 29-20-307.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 1 Tenn. Juris., Amendments, § 9; 13 Tenn. Juris., Fires, § 7; 13 Tenn. Juris., Forcible Entry and Detainer, § 13; 17 Tenn. Juris., Jurisdiction, §§ 6, 22, 25; 17 Tenn. Juris., Justices of Peace and General Sessions Courts, §§ 2-19, 21; 19 Tenn. Juris., Municipal, State and County Securities, § 8; 25 Tenn. Juris., Weapons, § 7.

Law Reviews.

Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Personal Injury Forum (William P. Zdancewicz), 26 U. Mem. L. Rev. 1169 (1996).

The Tennessee Court System — General Sessions Court (Frederic S. Le Clercq), 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 375.

Attorney General Opinions. Concurrent jurisdiction, OAG 89-25 (2/16/89).

Lewis County court has no concurrent divorce jurisdiction, OAG 96-114 (9/5/96).

Appeals from grant or denial of order of protection, OAG 98-043 (2/17/98).

The Gibson County General Sessions Court has countywide jurisdiction to try and dispose of all misdemeanor cases, regardless of the location of the offense in the county; thus, the Gibson County General Sessions Court, sitting in two parts with one judge, is not subject to the same jurisdictional limits as the Law Court of Humboldt, OAG 00-108 (6/12/00).

In some cases, the general sessions courts have jurisdiction for enforcement of a child curfew law against a parent, OAG 00-158 (10/17/00).

The term “General Sessions Court” cannot accurately refer to a city court, OAG 01-160 (10/25/01).

Cited: Farris v. Blanton, 528 S.W.2d 549, 1975 Tenn. LEXIS 628 (Tenn. 1975); Alcoa v. Blount County, 658 S.W.2d 116, 1983 Tenn. App. LEXIS 608 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983); Benson v. Herbst, 240 S.W.3d 235, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 317 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 18, 2007); Steelman v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 537 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 21, 2007); Philpot v. Tenn. Health Mgmt., 279 S.W.3d 573, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 765 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 12, 2007); McGregor v. Christian Care Ctr. of Springfield, LLC, — S.W.3d —, 2010 Tenn. App. LEXIS 309 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 29, 2010); Crowley v. Thomas, 343 S.W.3d 32, 2011 Tenn. LEXIS 599 (Tenn. June 17, 2011).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

Although under Tennessee statutory law, a justice of the peace (now judge of the court of general sessions) has the power to issue criminal warrants returnable to the general sessions court, as a matter of state and federal constitutional law, he does not have such power, since under § 8-21-401(a)(1)(c) (repealed) a justice of the peace receives a fee “for issuing a state's warrant with affidavit” and therefore cannot be neutral and detached in issuing such warrant in violation of U.S. Const., amend. 14 and Tenn. Const., art. I, § 8. In re Dender, 571 S.W.2d 491, 1978 Tenn. LEXIS 647 (Tenn. 1978).

2. Power and Authority of Judges.

Judges of court of general sessions have the same jurisdiction as trial judges and the power and authority of the judge is reviewable to the supreme court, as in other criminal cases under former § 40-2907 (repealed). Moss v. State, 584 S.W.2d 220, 1978 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 364 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978).

While a general sessions court may hear suits in equity pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-15-501, the section does not confer upon the court the extraordinary jurisdiction of a chancellor. Riden v. Snider, 832 S.W.2d 341, 1991 Tenn. App. LEXIS 901 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991), appeal denied, 1992 Tenn. LEXIS 299 (Tenn. Mar. 30, 1992).

Following the expiration of the automatic stay of the chancery court's April 16, 2017 judgment, appellant failed to obtain a stay pending appeal and thus the judgment became enforceable on May 15, 2017 and remained enforceable when appellee sought to enforce the judgment by filing a detainer summons in the general sessions court and when appellant appealed to the circuit court. The trial court had subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate this detainer action. Bottorff v. Sears, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 259 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 23, 2019).

3. Qualifications of Judge.

There is no mandatory general law prescribing requisite qualifications of judges of general sessions courts. Crawford v. Gilpatrick, 646 S.W.2d 433, 1983 Tenn. LEXIS 608 (Tenn. 1983).

4. Revocation of Suspended Sentence.

Appellant has the right to appeal the revocation of his suspended sentence as in other criminal cases. Moss v. State, 584 S.W.2d 220, 1978 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 364 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978).

5. Judge Not Required to Be Attorney.

Any additional jurisdiction subsection (c) might confer upon the general sessions court of Cocke County does not clothe that court with jurisdiction and powers over and beyond that which is generally conferred upon general sessions courts, so as to require the judge of such court to be an attorney. State ex rel. Swann v. Freshour, 219 Tenn. 482, 410 S.W.2d 885, 1967 Tenn. LEXIS 451 (1967), rev'd, Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., 391 U.S. 216, 88 S. Ct. 1472, 20 L. Ed. 2d 538, 1968 U.S. LEXIS 1632 (1968).

6. Probate Courts.

County probate court had plenary jurisdiction over probate of wills and administration of estates, and this jurisdiction was not limited to the $25,000 amount set forth in T.C.A. § 16-15- 501(d)(1); probate court had jurisdiction to hear  the case. In re Estate of Creswell, — S.W.3d —, 2008 Tenn. App. LEXIS 714 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 25, 2008).

7. Boundary Line Disputes.

Circuit court, acting within its appellate jurisdiction, properly dismissed an owner's complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because a neighbor and his predecessor consistently objected to both the general sessions and circuit courts'  exercise of jurisdiction over the boundary line dispute and the general sessions court was not statutorily empowered to hear boundary line disputes. Evans v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 614 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 28, 2015).

Decisions Under Prior Law

1. Appeal and Review.

If it is manifest from the papers or judgment that the justice had no jurisdiction, the appellate court will, on appeal, dismiss the cause, although no motion to dismiss was made in the court below. Harris v. David Hadden & Co., 75 Tenn. 214, 1881 Tenn. LEXIS 98 (1881); White v. Buchanan, 46 Tenn. 32, 1868 Tenn. LEXIS 66 (1868). See Jacobs v. Parker, 66 Tenn. 434, 1874 Tenn. LEXIS 161 (1874).

On appeal circuit court had no statutory authority to render judgment in excess of the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace (now general sessions court). Securities Inv. Co. v. White, 19 Tenn. App. 540, 91 S.W.2d 581, 1935 Tenn. App. LEXIS 66 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1935).

2. Jurisdictional Amount.

Where justice of the peace (now general sessions court judge) was under duty to take replevin bond in double the value of property, his acceptance of $500 bond which plaintiff executed and tendered raised presumption that property was valued by them at $250. Securities Inv. Co. v. White, 19 Tenn. App. 540, 91 S.W.2d 581, 1935 Tenn. App. LEXIS 66 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1935).

3. —Reduction of Demand.

The plaintiff's demand may be reduced to the justice's (now general sessions court judge's) jurisdictional amount by payments made thereon, but not by the defendant's setoff. Ross v. Jackson, 3 Tenn. 406, 1 Cooke, 1813 Tenn. LEXIS 48 (1813); Jourdan v. Barry, 5 Tenn. 102, 1817 Tenn. LEXIS 63 (1817).

4. —Sum of Different Causes.

Where different causes of action are joined in a warrant, if the combined amount sued for exceeds the jurisdictional amount as to either cause of action; that is, exceeds the jurisdictional amount of the smallest cause of which the court has jurisdiction, the judgment will be void, and should be quashed upon certiorari. Harris v. David Hadden & Co., 75 Tenn. 214, 1881 Tenn. LEXIS 98 (1881). See Johnson v. Pirtle, 31 Tenn. 262, 1851 Tenn. LEXIS 58 (1851).

5. —Raising Question of Jurisdiction.

If the judgment rendered upon the indorsement exceeds the amount of the jurisdiction, but there is nothing in the warrant or judgment to show in what character the liability of the indorser arose, the defendant can only avail himself of the want of jurisdiction by appeal or by certiorari and supersedeas in lieu of an appeal; but not by a collateral proceeding, as by certiorari in lieu of audita querela, sued out to quash the judgment and execution. So, where the proceedings in any case do not show what was the character of the defendant's liability, the judgment is not open to a collateral attack. Witt v. Russey, 29 Tenn. 208, 1849 Tenn. LEXIS 48, 51 Am. Dec. 701 (1849); Mason v. Westmoreland, 38 Tenn. 555, 1858 Tenn. LEXIS 225 (1858); Anderson v. Kimbrough, 45 Tenn 260, 1868 Tenn. LEXIS 5 (1868); Starkey v. Hammer, 60 Tenn. 438, 1872 Tenn. LEXIS 529 (1872); Summar v. Jarrett, 62 Tenn. 23, 1873 Tenn. LEXIS 129 (1873); Gibson v. Compton, 62 Tenn. 220, 1873 Tenn. LEXIS 176 (1873). But it is otherwise where the want of jurisdiction appears on the face of the papers or proceedings. Harris v. David Hadden & Co., 75 Tenn. 214, 1881 Tenn. LEXIS 98 (1881); White v. Buchanan, 46 Tenn. 32, 1868 Tenn. LEXIS 66 (1868); Houser v. McKennon, 60 Tenn. 287, 1872 Tenn. LEXIS 490 (1873).

6. —Judgment Exceeding Jurisdiction.

A justice's (now general sessions court judge's) judgment for a sum exceeding his jurisdiction, shown by the papers or the judgment, is void, though the excess may be for accumulated interest, and jurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent; but the circuit court may render judgment for interest on a justice's judgment not exceeding his jurisdiction. If it does not appear from the papers or judgment that the judgment exceeded the justice's jurisdiction, the judgment is not void, but only voidable. Wallen v. Lane, 1 Tenn. 74, 1804 Tenn. LEXIS 24 (1799); Morrow v. Calloway, 8 Tenn. 240, 1827 Tenn. LEXIS 41 (1827); Dixon v. Caruthers, 17 Tenn. 30, 1836 Tenn. LEXIS 9 (1836); Noel & Co. v. Scoby, 49 Tenn. 20, 1870 Tenn. LEXIS 183 (1870); Patterson v. Sheffield, 54 Tenn. 373, 1872 Tenn. LEXIS 61 (1872); Park v. Bybee, 60 Tenn. 267, 1872 Tenn. LEXIS 486 (1873); Houser v. McKennon, 60 Tenn. 287, 1872 Tenn. LEXIS 490 (1873); Summar v. Jarrett, 62 Tenn. 23, 1873 Tenn. LEXIS 129 (1873); Harris v. David Hadden & Co., 75 Tenn. 214, 1881 Tenn. LEXIS 98 (1881).

Where there was no evidence to support jury's verdict on appeal that value of car was in excess of jurisdictional amount, and it appeared on face of record that court had jurisdiction of parties and subject matter of replevin action, the sum which defendant was entitled to recover of plaintiff and surety on replevin bond was subject to adjudication unless and until it could be established as a fact of record that value of car exceeded such jurisdictional amount at time it was replevined. Securities Inv. Co. v. White, 19 Tenn. App. 540, 91 S.W.2d 581, 1935 Tenn. App. LEXIS 66 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1935).

7. —Proceedings in Circuit Court.

As the justice (now general sessions court judge) cannot render a judgment for an amount beyond his jurisdiction, so the circuit court cannot confer that power indirectly by entering a remittitur. Dixon v. Caruthers, 17 Tenn. 30, 1836 Tenn. LEXIS 9 (1836); Crow v. Cunningham, 45 Tenn. 255, 1868 Tenn. LEXIS 4 (1868); Memphis & C. R. Co. v. Bond, 3 Shan. 588 (1875).

The circuit court, on appeal or certiorari, has jurisdiction only to the extent of the justice (now general sessions court judge). Crow v. Cunningham, 45 Tenn. 255, 1868 Tenn. LEXIS 4 (1868); White v. Buchanan, 46 Tenn. 32, 1868 Tenn. LEXIS 66 (1868); Patterson v. Sheffield, 54 Tenn. 373, 1872 Tenn. LEXIS 61 (1872); Houser v. McKennon, 60 Tenn 287, 1872 Tenn. LEXIS 490 (1872). But the circuit court may render judgment for more than the maximum amount of the justice's jurisdiction, if the excess consists of interest accrued since the appeal. Dixon v. Caruthers, 17 Tenn. 30, 1836 Tenn. LEXIS 9 (1836); Patterson v. Sheffield, 54 Tenn. 373, 1872 Tenn. LEXIS 61 (1872); Tuck v. Chaffin, 89 Tenn. 566, 15 S.W. 97, 1890 Tenn. LEXIS 79 (1891).

8. —Removal to Federal Court.

In suit appealed to state circuit court, where defendant pleaded $3,000 setoff, but under statute cannot recover more than $500 in that court, it is that sum which is “the matter in dispute” and the federal court can have no jurisdiction by removal under Acts 1875, ch. 137, § 2. New York I. & P. Co. v. Milburn Gin & Mach. Co., 35 F. 225, 1888 U.S. App. LEXIS 2448 (C.C.D. Tenn. 1888).

9. Jury Trial — Security for Appeal.

The right of trial by jury is not unduly obstructed by enlarging the civil jurisdiction of justices of the peace (now general sessions court judges) by increasing the dollars and cents limit of their jurisdiction, and by requiring every appellant to give security to pay and satisfy the judgment of the appellate court in order to obtain a trial by a common law jury on appeal. Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 19 S. Ct. 580, 43 L. Ed. 873, 1899 U.S. LEXIS 1480 (1899).

Collateral References.

Arrest, power of justice of peace to take affidavit as basis for warrant of. 16 A.L.R. 923.

Necessity as justifying action by magistrate otherwise disqualified to act in particular case. 39 A.L.R. 1476.

Setoff as between judgments, jurisdiction of justice of the peace to order. 121 A.L.R. 480.

Summons or notice of commencement of action emanating from justice's court, effect of defects or informalities as to appearance or return day in. 6 A.L.R. 851, 97 A.L.R. 746.

Criminal law 86.

Justices of the peace 31-62.

16-15-502. Actions to recover personal property.

Actions to recover personal property may be conducted in general sessions courts, as prescribed in former § 29-30-211 [repealed], and §§ 29-30-21229-30-217.

Code 1858, § 4172; Shan., § 5984; Code 1932, § 10185; impl. am. Acts 1979, ch. 68, §§ 2, 3; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 19-302; Acts 1989, ch. 20, § 3.

Compiler's Notes. Section 29-30-211, referred to in this section, was repealed by Acts 1989, ch. 439, § 1.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 2 Tenn. Juris., Appeal and Error, § 83; 17 Tenn. Juris., Jurisdiction, § 25; 17 Tenn. Juris., Justices of Peace and General Sessions Courts, § 2.

16-15-503. Geographical jurisdiction.

The jurisdiction of general sessions courts, when not otherwise provided, is geographically coextensive with the limits of their respective counties.

Code 1858, § 4113 (deriv. Const. 1834, art. 6, § 15); Shan., § 5925; Code 1932, § 10126; impl. am. Acts 1979, ch. 68, §§ 2, 3; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 19-303.

Cross-References. Change of venue, title 20, ch. 4, part 2.

Process to other counties, §§ 20-2-107, 20-2-108.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 17 Tenn. Juris., Jurisdiction, § 25; 17 Tenn. Juris., Justices of Peace and General Sessions Courts, §§ 2, 19.

Attorney General Opinions. Performance of marriages outside jurisdiction, OAG 85-189 (6/10/85).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Decisions Under Prior Law

1. Marriages.

The official acts of justices (now general sessions court judges) are confined to the limits of their own counties, and they cannot perform a marriage ceremony out of their own county. Bashaw v. State, 9 Tenn. 176, 9 Tenn. 177, 1829 Tenn. LEXIS 36 (1829); Stewart v. Roberts, 9 Tenn. 386, 9 Tenn. 387, 1830 Tenn. LEXIS 28 (1830).

2. Property Outside District.

In action to recover possession of personal property from a defendant who was not a resident of the county, evidence that warrant was returned before a justice of the peace (now general sessions court judge) in a district other than the one in which the property was found does not show that the trial magistrate was without jurisdiction, since the warrant may be returned before the most convenient justice of the peace and the trial magistrate may have been the most convenient. Ross v. Bandy, 165 Tenn. 499, 56 S.W.2d 754, 1932 Tenn. LEXIS 75 (1933).

16-15-504. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former § 16-15-504 (Code 1858, §§ 4121, 4122 (deriv. Acts 1841-1842, ch. 186, § 1); Shan., §§ 5933, 5934; Code 1932, §§ 10134, 10135; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), §§ 19-309, 19-310), concerning venue in the general sessions courts, was repealed by Acts 1993, ch. 241, § 16.

16-15-505. Objections to jurisdiction.

Objections to the jurisdiction of the general sessions court before which the warrant is returned shall be made before the hearing, or they will be considered as waived.

Code 1858, § 4120; Shan., § 5932; Code 1932, § 10133; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 19-311.

Part 6
Service of Process [Repealed]

16-15-601 — 16-15-605. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former part 6, §§ 16-15-60116-15-605 (Acts 1959, ch. 109, § 18; 1972, ch. 564, § 1; 1979, ch. 419, §§ 1, 2; 1980, ch. 799, § 1; T.C.A., §§ 16-1117, 16-1126, 16-1127, 16-1129 — 16-1131), concerning service of process, was repealed by Acts 1993, ch. 241, § 17.

Part 7
Miscellaneous Provisions

16-15-701. Electronic filing.

Any court governed by this chapter may, by local rule, allow papers to be filed, signed, or verified by electronic means that comply with technological standards promulgated by the supreme court. Pleadings and other papers filed electronically under such local rules shall be considered the same as written papers.

Acts 2018, ch. 809, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Former § 16-15-701 (Acts 1959, ch. 109, § 6; T.C.A., § 16-1118; Acts 1983, ch. 176, § 1), concerning pleading and practice and examination of witnesses in the general sessions courts, was repealed by Acts 1993, ch. 241, § 18.

Effective Dates. Acts 2018, ch. 809, § 2. July 1, 2018.

16-15-702. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former § 16-15-702 (Acts 1959, ch. 109, § 3; T.C.A., § 16-1119; Acts 1984, ch. 910, § 1), concerning cost bond or cash deposit in the general sessions court, was repealed by Acts 1993, ch. 241, § 19.

16-15-703. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former 16-15-703 (Acts 1959, ch. 109, §§ 7, 16; T.C.A., § 16-1121, 16-1122), concerning costs and fees, was repealed by Acts 1993, ch. 241, § 20.

16-15-704. [Transferred.]

Compiler's Notes. Former § 16-15-704, concerning civil and criminal dockets, was transferred to § 16-15-304 in 1993.

16-15-705. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former § 16-15-705 (Acts 1959, ch. 109, § 6; T.C.A., § 16-1118), concerning the scheduling of cases, was repealed by Acts 1993, ch. 241, § 22.

16-15-706. Infants or incompetents — Representation.

Whenever an infant or incompetent person has a representative, such as a general guardian, conservator or other like fiduciary, the representative may sue or defend on behalf of the infant or incompetent person. If an infant or incompetent person does not have a duly appointed representative, or if justice requires, the infant or incompetent person may sue by a next friend. The court shall appoint a guardian ad litem to defend an action for an infant or incompetent person who does not have a duly appointed representative, or whenever justice requires. The court may, in its discretion, allow the guardian ad litem a reasonable fee for the guardian's services, to be taxed as costs.

Acts 1972, ch. 564, § 1; T.C.A., § 16-1128.

Law Reviews.

The Tennessee Court System — General Sessions Court (Frederic S. Le Clercq), 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 375.

16-15-707. Plaintiffs — Nonsuits — Dismissals.

The plaintiff shall have the right to take a voluntary nonsuit or to dismiss an action without prejudice at any time before the cause is finally submitted to the court, but not afterwards; provided, that such a dismissal operates as an adjudication upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff who has twice dismissed in any court an action based on or including the same claim.

Acts 1972, ch. 564, § 1; T.C.A., § 16-1132.

Compiler's Notes. Other procedural provisions for the general sessions courts appear in title 19.

Law Reviews.

The Tennessee Court System — General Sessions Court (Frederic S. Le Clercq), 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 375.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Right to Nonsuit.

When a parent nonsuited a healthcare liability claim in general sessions court after a hospital confessed judgment, it was error for a circuit court to subsequently grant summary judgment against the parent based on the confession because the hospital did not obtain a right to confess judgment that was superior to the parent's right to nonsuit the case, since the parent sought nonsuit before the general sessions court entered judgment on the confession. Ross v. Grandberry, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. App. LEXIS 321 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 30, 2014), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 851 (Tenn. Oct. 17, 2014).

Collateral References. Pretrial Procedure 562.

16-15-708. Subpoena of witnesses.

  1. The attendance of witnesses to give testimony in court or by deposition is procured by subpoena or summons, requiring the witness to be present at a prescribed place and time, to give testimony in a case or matter stated in the subpoena or summons, mentioning the names of the parties litigant and the party at whose instance the witness is to be summoned, and, if necessary, requiring the witness also to bring any books, papers, documents or tangible things stated in the subpoena or summons. The subpoena is issued by a judge or clerk of the court at any time, and to any county within the state, on request of the party wishing the process, and may be served by any person authorized to serve process, by delivering or offering to deliver a copy of the subpoena to the person to whom it is directed. If any person without cause refuses to appear, to testify or to produce evidence when duly subpoenaed to do so, that person shall be committed to jail by the court before whom that person is bound to testify, to remain in jail without bail until willing to testify or give evidence as the law directs.
  2. This section shall govern when a judge or clerk is required to issue a subpoena and the consequences of a person's refusal to appear, testify or produce evidence when subpoenaed pursuant to this section. If any local rule of court conflicts with this section, this section shall prevail and the clerk or other official shall issue subpoenas and the judge shall punish the failure to respond to subpoenas in accordance with this section.

Acts 1972, ch. 564, § 1; impl. am. Acts 1979, ch. 68, §§ 2, 3; T.C.A., § 16-1133; Acts 1997, ch. 377, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Other procedural provisions for the general sessions courts appear in title 19.

Textbooks. Tennessee Criminal Practice and Procedure (Raybin), § 23.10.

Law Reviews.

The Tennessee Court System — General Sessions Court (Frederic S. Le Clercq), 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 375.

Attorney General Opinions. Court order restricting issuance of subpoenas, OAG 96-151 (12/31/96).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Construction.

There is nothing in the statute indicating that a non-party to an ongoing proceeding cannot also be subject to the court's subpoena power, and the extent to which one is subject to that power, however, depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. Apexworks Restoration v. Scott, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 514 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 24, 2019).

2. Jurisdiction.

Having been personally served with the subpoena, the witness received adequate notice of the pending judicial proceedings such that the General Sessions Court obtained personal jurisdiction over her, and the fact that the server failed to include his address on the return did nothing to render that notice ineffective; there was no evidence to suggest that the server had not been designated by plaintiff and the fact that he effected proper service of the subpoena indicate, without proof to the contrary, that he had been designated. Apexworks Restoration v. Scott, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 514 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 24, 2019).

Collateral References. Witness 10.

16-15-709. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former § 16-15-709 (Acts 1972, ch. 64, § 1; T.C.A. § 16-1134), concerning official records as evidence in the general sessions court, was repealed by Acts 1993, ch. 241, § 23.

16-15-710. Commencement of actions — New process when not served.

The suing out of a warrant is the commencement of a civil action within the meaning of this title, whether it is served or not; but if the process is returned unserved, plaintiff, if plaintiff wishes to rely on the original commencement as a bar to the running of a statute of limitations, must either prosecute and continue the action by applying for and obtaining new process from time to time, each new process to be obtained within nine (9) months from return unserved of the previous process, or plaintiff must recommence the action within one (1) year after the return of the initial process not served.

Acts 1972, ch. 564, § 1; T.C.A., § 16-1135; Acts 1992, ch. 804, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Other procedural provisions for the general sessions courts appear in title 19.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 17 Tenn. Juris., Justices of Peace and General Sessions Courts, § 26; 21 Tenn. Juris., Process, § 6.

Law Reviews.

The Tennessee Court System — General Sessions Court (Frederic S. Le Clercq), 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 375.

Cited: Vinson v. Mills, 530 S.W.2d 761, 1975 Tenn. LEXIS 568 (Tenn. 1975).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Statute of Limitations.

Because an estate did not comply with T.C.A. § 16-15-710 by either having process reissued within nine months after the previous process was returned unserved, or recommencing the action within one year after the return of the initial process not served, the estate could not rely on the original filing in the general sessions court to toll the statute of limitations, and T.C.A. § 29-1-105, the savings statute, did not apply because a voluntary non-suit was taken. Davis v. Mirts, — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 231 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 19, 2007).

Lawsuit was barred by the statute of limitations because the requirement of obtaining new process or recommencing the action in general sessions court was triggered for purposes of T.C.A. § 16-15-710 by the failure to return unserved the prior process within 60 days as required by T.C.A. § 16-15-902. Gates v. Perry, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. App. LEXIS 172 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 26, 2014), review denied and ordered not published, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 689 (Tenn. Sept. 22, 2014).

Because plaintiff's civil warrant was not both filed and issued on or before January 27, 2014, plaintiff failed to commence his personal injury action in a timely manner and his lawsuit was barred by the one-year statute of limitations set forth in T.C.A. § 16-15-710. Accordingly, the trial court properly granted defendants'  motion for judgment on the pleadings. Lee v. Estes Express, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 122 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 11, 2019).

2. Construction.

Language and requirements of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 3 and 4.03(1) and T.C.A. §§ 16-15-710 and 16-15-902(a) are substantively identical; like Tenn. R. Civ. P. 4.03(1), T.C.A. § 16-15-902 does not state that promptly returning proof of service to the court is necessary to accomplish service. Hart v. Memphis Light Gas & Water Div., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 725 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 14, 2018).

3. Compliance.

Plaintiff did not follow the procedure set out in T.C.A. § 16-15-710 for unserved process, and instead, she relied on the original commencement of the action in general sessions court to toll the statute of limitations; the process was returned served, but the return receipt and affidavit were lost, and based on case law, plaintiff's failure to make return to the court did not, ipso facto, constitute a lack of service of process. Hart v. Memphis Light Gas & Water Div., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 725 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 14, 2018).

Collateral References.

Right in absence of express statutory authorization, of one convicted of crime and imprisoned or paroled, to prosecute civil action. 74 A.L.R.3d 680.

16-15-711. Survival of actions — Substitution of parties.

  1. If a party dies and the claim is not extinguished by the death, the court may order substitution of the proper parties. The motion for substitution may be made by any party or by the successors or representatives of the deceased party and, together with notice of hearing, shall be served on the parties by delivering or mailing a copy of the motion and notice to the parties and shall be served upon persons not parties in the manner provided for service of process. Unless the motion for substitution is made not later than ninety (90) days after the death is suggested in the case by service of a statement of the fact of the death as provided in this subsection (a) for the service of the motion, the action shall be dismissed as to the deceased party.
  2. In the event of the death of one (1) or more of the plaintiffs or one (1) or more of the defendants in an action in which the right sought to be enforced survives only to the surviving plaintiffs or only against the surviving defendants, the action does not abate. The death shall be suggested in the case and the action shall proceed in favor or against the surviving parties.

Acts 1972, ch. 564, § 1; T.C.A., § 16-1136.

Compiler's Notes. Other procedural provisions for the general sessions courts appear in title 19.

Law Reviews.

The Tennessee Court System — General Sessions Court (Frederic S. Le Clercq), 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 375.

Collateral References. Parties 62.

16-15-712. Enforcement of judgments — Examination of judgment debtor and others.

In all courts exercising general sessions jurisdiction, the procedure on execution, in proceedings supplementary to and in aid of a judgment, and in proceedings on and in aid of execution shall be in accordance with the statutes of this state and with the general practice followed in the courts of this state. In aid of the judgment or execution, however, the judgment creditor, or the judgment creditor's successor in interest when that interest appears of record, may examine any person, including the judgment debtor, by subpoenaing the person to court, or by conducting discovery in any manner provided by the Tennessee rules of civil procedure.

Acts 1978, ch. 589, § 1; T.C.A., § 16-1137; Acts 1999, ch. 277, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Other procedural provisions for the general sessions courts appear in title 19.

Cross-References. Depositions, Tenn. R. Civ. P. 27-32.

Attorney General Opinions. Authority of general sessions court to issue post-judgment subpoenas, OAG 98-0124 (7/20/98).

Procedure for conducting post-judgment discovery in general sessions court, OAG 98-0124 (7/20/98).

16-15-713. Attachments and contempts.

  1. Notwithstanding any provision of the law or private act to the contrary, courts of general sessions have the power to issue attachments and inflict punishments for contempts of court. The punishments for contempts shall be limited to:
    1. A fine not exceeding fifty dollars ($50.00) and imprisonment not exceeding ten (10) days if the judge of the general sessions court is licensed to practice law; and
    2. A fine not exceeding fifty dollars ($50.00) if the judge of the general sessions court is not licensed to practice law.
  2. Courts of general sessions have the power to punish for contempt persons who fail to appear for traffic violations.

Acts 1985, ch. 324, § 2; 1986, ch. 484, § 1; 1987, ch. 12, § 1; 1987, ch. 34, § 1; 1988, ch. 656, § 1; 1990, ch. 647, §§ 1, 2; 1991, ch. 410, § 1; 1992, ch. 804, § 2; 1998, ch. 682, § 9.

Cross-References. Punishment for contempt, § 29-9-103.

Attorney General Opinions. General sessions court contempt powers, OAG 89-08 (1/26/89).

Limitation of contempt powers, OAG 89-15 (2/8/89).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Authorized Punishment for Contempt.

Judgment granting a habeas corpus writ was reversed because the general sessions court, regardless of any legal error, had the authority to summarily hold defendant in contempt; under T.C.A. § 16-15-713, the general sessions court judge was authorized to impose a punishment of five days imprisonment upon finding defendant in contempt. Lambert v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 223 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 10, 2012), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 536 (Tenn. Aug. 15, 2012), cert. denied, Lambert v. Tennessee, 184 L. Ed. 2d 740, 133 S. Ct. 950, 568 U.S. 1131, 2013 U.S. LEXIS 860 (U.S. 2013).

16-15-714. Pleadings and practice — General sessions courts.

Practice and pleadings in the general sessions courts shall be as provided in this chapter and other provisions of law and private acts establishing the courts and local rules of practice not inconsistent with law.

Acts 1993, ch. 241, § 25.

Attorney General Opinions. Sheriff's authority to serve process for general sessions courts, OAG 94-146 (12/29/94).

Cited: Graham v. Walldorf Prop. Mgmt., — S.W.3d —, 2009 Tenn. App. LEXIS 107 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 19, 2009).

16-15-715. Court bailiffs.

The sheriff shall, unless otherwise provided, provide sufficient bailiffs to serve the general sessions courts.

Acts 1993, ch. 241, § 25.

Attorney General Opinions. Sheriff has the duty to appoint court officers for general sessions courts, except in municipalities having a metropolitan form of government and a population of more than 450,000, OAG 05-026 (3/21/05).

Appointment of court officer authorized to carry weapon in courtrooms; required training, qualifications, etc.  OAG 10-77, 2010 Tenn. AG LEXIS 83 (6/1/10).

POST certification of bailiffs and court officers.  OAG 10-107, 2010 Tenn. AG LEXIS 113 (10/28/10).

16-15-716. Warrants.

A civil action in the general sessions courts is commenced by a civil warrant being filed with the clerk in substance as follows:

State of Tennessee

County

To any lawful process server to execute and return: summon

defendant  to appear before the general sessions court of this county in

address  city or

, at  on  to answer plaintiff(s)  in

county,   time    date

a civil action for

(include as many lines as necessary)

under  dollars. This

date

clerk/deputy

Acts 1993, ch. 241, § 25; 2017, ch. 267, § 1.

Amendments. The 2017 amendment substituted “being filed with” for “issued by” in the introductory language.

Effective Dates. Acts 2017, ch. 267, § 2. May 4, 2017.

Cited: West v. AMISUB (SFH), Inc., — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. App. LEXIS 191 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 21, 2013).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Pleadings.

Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) was violated when debt collector served civil warrant on plaintiff from action initiated in Tennessee General Sessions court because, while civil warrant was pleading, it was not considered by Tennessee courts to be formal pleading and therefore not excepted from FDCPA. Murr v. Tarpon Fin. Corp., — F. Supp. 2d —, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16047 (E.D. Tenn. Feb. 10, 2014).

16-15-717. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former § 16-15-717 (Acts 1993, ch. 241, § 25), concerning service of process and the issuance of civil warrants, was repealed by Acts 1994, ch. 991, § 1.

16-15-718. Fees to clerk.

Before the issuance of any original process in a civil action, the plaintiff shall deposit with the clerk a sum that the clerk has previously established as adequate to pay the usual costs, including litigation taxes as calculated in accordance with § 8-21-401, and any local litigation tax as authorized by a private act. The clerk may allow a cost bond with adequate security in the amount of five hundred dollars ($500); provided, that any eligible plaintiff may proceed on a pauper's oath instead of the cash deposit or cost bond.

Acts 1993, ch. 241, § 25.

16-15-719. Appeal bond.

An appeal bond returned with other papers to the circuit court is a conclusive presumption that an appeal was taken.

Acts 1993, ch. 241, § 25.

16-15-720. Continuances.

A continuance may be granted in the judge's discretion.

Acts 1993, ch. 241, § 25.

Attorney General Opinions. General sessions judge's legal authority, OAG 00-001 (1/4/00).

16-15-721. Rules of evidence — Application.

Unless specifically provided otherwise, the Tennessee rules of evidence shall be fully applicable in general sessions courts.

Acts 1993, ch. 241, § 25.

16-15-722. Attachment.

  1. General sessions courts have jurisdiction as in subsection (b) to proceed by attachment against the property of the defendant, in the same way as the courts of record, under the rules, regulations and provisions in this code prescribed in regard to proceedings by attachment, as far as they are applicable and not controlled by other express provisions.
  2. The jurisdiction of general sessions courts in attachment cases is limited to the amount of their jurisdiction over the subject matter of suit or cause of action.

Code 1858, §§ 4173, 4174; Shan., §§ 5985, 5986; Code 1932, §§ 10186, 10187; impl. am. Acts 1979, ch. 68, §§ 2, 3; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), §§ 19-405, 19-406; Acts 1993, ch. 241, § 33; T.C.A., § 19-1-105.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 3 Tenn. Juris., Attachment and Garnishment, §§ 4, 107, 110.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Ancillary Attachments.

Justices of the peace (now general sessions courts) have jurisdiction to issue ancillary attachments in aid of suits pending in the circuit court, just as upon an original cause. Scott v. White, 1 Shan. 23 (1849).

Collateral References. Justices of the peace 42, 43(1), 48.

16-15-723. Proceedings after attachment.

The proceedings after the issuance and service of attachment and on the trial and enforcement of the plaintiff's claim, are the same as if the suit had been commenced in the ordinary way, the rights acquired by the attachment being governed by the provisions of this code regulating attachments.

Code 1858, § 4175; Shan., § 5987; Code 1932, § 10188; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 19-407; Acts 1993, ch. 241, § 34; T.C.A., § 19-1-106.

Cited: Smith v. Thomas, 1 Shannon 655 (1876).

Collateral References. Justices of the peace 147(7).

16-15-724. Cross actions.

Cross actions shall be instituted by cross summons to be filed any day before the day of trial, unless a nonresident defendant enters an appearance and waives publication. In such case, the cross summons shall be filed within two (2) whole days after entry of appearance. In all such actions instituted before courts of general sessions, the case shall not be set for trial until the fourth day after the date of service of original summons, or return date of any publication for a nonresident, or date of entry of appearance of a nonresident.

Acts 1939, ch. 180, § 1; C. Supp. 1950, § 8749.1; impl. am. Acts 1979, ch. 68, §§ 2, 3; modified; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 19-416; Acts 1993, ch. 241, 40; T.C.A., § 19-1-112.

Cross-References. Cross actions and counterclaims, Tenn. R. Civ. P. 13.

Collateral References. Justices of the peace 93.

16-15-725. Judgment for defendant on setoff.

  1. If the defendant pleads a setoff to the plaintiff's debt, and it appears that there is a balance due in favor of the defendant, the general sessions court shall enter up judgment in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff for the balance. If the plaintiff fails in establishing any demand against the defendant, the defendant shall have a judgment against the plaintiff for the amount that the proof upon the defendant's cross action shows that the defendant is entitled to, with costs.
  2. If the residue upon the defendant's setoff, after satisfying the plaintiff's debt, exceeds the court's jurisdiction, the defendant may enter on the court's docket a satisfaction of so much of the defendant's claim as the amount of the plaintiff's demand, as ascertained by the court, and tender the plaintiff a receipt for the amount thus setoff, in which case judgment shall be rendered in favor of the defendant for costs.

Code 1858, §§ 4160, 4162 (deriv. Acts 1815, ch. 53, § 1); Acts 1879, ch. 222, § 1; Shan., §§ 5973, 5975; Code 1932, §§ 10174, 10176; impl. am. Acts 1979, ch. 68, §§ 2, 3; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), §§ 19-417, 19-419; Acts 1993, ch. 241, § 41; T.C.A., § 19-1-113.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 17 Tenn. Juris., Justices of Peace and General Sessions Courts, § 14; 22 Tenn. Juris., Setoff, Recoupment and Counterclaim, § 13.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Decisions Under Prior Law

1. Dismissal by Plaintiff.

Circuit court was not entitled to dismiss case on motion of plaintiff where defendant had obtained judgment in justice court (now general sessions court) for excess of setoff over amount demanded in complaint. Riley & White v. Carter, 22 Tenn. 230, 1842 Tenn. LEXIS 77 (1842).

Where the defendant has filed a plea of setoff, if the plaintiff voluntarily dismisses his suit, the defendant may elect to proceed on his setoff in the capacity of plaintiff and the cause will be tried as if he had brought an independent suit on his counterclaim. Meyer, Weis & Co. v. Gateus, 4 F. 35, 1880 U.S. App. LEXIS 2260 (C.C.D. Tenn. 1880).

2. Appeal — Setoff by Defendant.

In trial of case on appeal from justice court (now general sessions court) wherein plaintiff had recovered judgment of $59.00 the defendant was entitled to introduce evidence of a setoff between $90.00 and $100, since if setoff was proved, the defendant would be entitled to a judgment for balance due in amount within jurisdiction of justice court. McClain v. Kincaid, 13 Tenn. 232, 1833 Tenn. LEXIS 149 (1833).

Collateral References. Justices of the peace 45, 119(2).

16-15-726. Remittitur.

If the sum found for either plaintiff or defendant exceeds the jurisdiction of the general sessions court, that party may remit the excess, and take judgment for the residue, but the party cannot afterwards sue for the amount so remitted.

Code 1858, § 4161; Shan., § 5974; Code 1932, § 10175; impl. am. Acts 1979, ch. 68, §§ 2, 3; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 19-418; Acts 1993, ch. 241, § 42; T.C.A., § 19-1-114.

Cross-References. Additur, § 20-10-101.

Remittitur, §§ 20-10-102, 20-10-103.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Purpose.

The remittitur and additur statutes were enacted for the purpose of giving the plaintiff, in the case of remittiturs, and the defendant, in the case of additurs, the right to accept, under protest and appeal, a right that had been denied those respective classes of litigants by case law prior to the enactment of such statutes. Smith v. Shelton, 569 S.W.2d 421, 1978 Tenn. LEXIS 619 (Tenn. 1978), overruled in part, Foster v. Amcon International, Inc., 621 S.W.2d 142, 1981 Tenn. LEXIS 477 (Tenn. 1981), superseded by statute as stated in, Palanki v. Vanderbilt Univ., 215 S.W.3d 380, 2006 Tenn. App. LEXIS 731 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006).

2. Remittitur before Justice — Necessity.

The defendant, before judgment, may remit the excess over the justice's jurisdiction, and take a valid judgment upon his setoff for a sum within the justice's (now general sessions judge's) jurisdiction; but if the remittitur is not made before the justice, it cannot be made upon appeal in the circuit court to give jurisdiction. Crow v. Cunningham, 45 Tenn. 255, 1868 Tenn. LEXIS 4 (1868).

3. Interest Making Excess.

If interest on the judgment makes an excess, the circuit court may render a judgment including it though it is in excess of the justice's (now general sessions judge's) jurisdiction. Patterson v. Sheffield, 54 Tenn. 373, 1872 Tenn. LEXIS 61 (1872).

4. Appeal in Nature of Writ of Error.

Where a case is tried with the intervention of a jury, the appeal is expressly governed by § 27-3-108 (repealed), being in the nature of a writ of error, and neither the trial judge's disagreement with the amount of the jury verdict, nor acceptance of a remittitur or additur rather than a new trial, provides a basis for the application of § 27-3-103 (repealed). Smith v. Shelton, 569 S.W.2d 421, 1978 Tenn. LEXIS 619 (Tenn. 1978), overruled in part, Foster v. Amcon International, Inc., 621 S.W.2d 142, 1981 Tenn. LEXIS 477 (Tenn. 1981), superseded by statute as stated in, Palanki v. Vanderbilt Univ., 215 S.W.3d 380, 2006 Tenn. App. LEXIS 731 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006).

5. Weight of Jury's Determinations.

Appellate review of a trial judge's actions in making use of remittitur or additur resolves into a determination of whether or not the jury verdict is within the range of reasonableness established by the credible proof, and throughout the review the jury's determinations should be given primary weight and the trial judge's secondary weight. Smith v. Shelton, 569 S.W.2d 421, 1978 Tenn. LEXIS 619 (Tenn. 1978), overruled in part, Foster v. Amcon International, Inc., 621 S.W.2d 142, 1981 Tenn. LEXIS 477 (Tenn. 1981), superseded by statute as stated in, Palanki v. Vanderbilt Univ., 215 S.W.3d 380, 2006 Tenn. App. LEXIS 731 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006).

6. Power of Trial Judges.

It is the exclusive province of the jury to assess damages within the range of reasonableness established by the credible proof; and trial judges are without authority to reduce or increase jury verdicts that are between the upper and lower limits of that range, but if a trial judge sitting as thirteenth juror cannot approve a jury verdict that is within the range of reasonableness established by the credible proof, he has the authority to order a new trial, but not to increase or reduce the verdict. Smith v. Shelton, 569 S.W.2d 421, 1978 Tenn. LEXIS 619 (Tenn. 1978), overruled in part, Foster v. Amcon International, Inc., 621 S.W.2d 142, 1981 Tenn. LEXIS 477 (Tenn. 1981), superseded by statute as stated in, Palanki v. Vanderbilt Univ., 215 S.W.3d 380, 2006 Tenn. App. LEXIS 731 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006).

7. Scope of Review.

If it is determined on appeal that the jury's verdict is within the range of reasonableness or that both the jury's and the trial judge's awards are within that range, the appellate court must restore the jury verdict; if only the trial judge's award is within the range, it must be affirmed; if neither are within the range of reasonableness, the court of appeals should make appropriate use of remittitur or additur and render judgment within the range of reasonableness based upon the credible proof of damages. Smith v. Shelton, 569 S.W.2d 421, 1978 Tenn. LEXIS 619 (Tenn. 1978), overruled in part, Foster v. Amcon International, Inc., 621 S.W.2d 142, 1981 Tenn. LEXIS 477 (Tenn. 1981), superseded by statute as stated in, Palanki v. Vanderbilt Univ., 215 S.W.3d 380, 2006 Tenn. App. LEXIS 731 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006).

16-15-727. Correction of judgment — Mistakes, inadvertence, excusable neglect and fraud.

  1. Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.01, regarding clerical mistakes, shall apply to all courts of general sessions. The general sessions judge shall have the authority under the same circumstances and in the same manner as is provided in Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.01 to correct such mistakes.
  2. Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02, regarding mistakes, inadvertence, excusable neglect, fraud and other similar reasons set out in that rule, shall apply to all courts of general sessions. A motion under the general sessions court's authority under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 shall be filed within ten (10) days of the date of judgment. Once filed, the motion shall toll the ten-day period for seeking de novo review in the circuit court until the determination of the motion is concluded. Thereafter, an appeal for de novo review in the circuit court shall be filed within ten (10) days of the general sessions court's ruling on the motion to relieve a party or the parties' legal representative from a final judgment, order or proceeding in the same manner as provided in Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02.

Acts 1859-1860, ch. 109; Shan., § 4600; mod. Code 1932, § 8724; impl. am. Acts 1979, ch. 68, §§ 2, 3; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 19-423; Acts 1993, ch. 241, § 44; T.C.A., § 19-1-116; Acts 2004, ch. 875, § 1; 2007, ch. 443, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. References in some of the annotations for this section to “justices of the peace” are deemed references to “courts of general sessions” or “judges of courts of general sessions.” See Acts 1979, ch. 68, §§ 2, 3.

Cross-References. Revival of judgments, § 25-4-103.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 17 Tenn. Juris., Justices of Peace and General Sessions Courts, § 30.

Attorney General Opinions. Authority of general sessions judge to correct a judgment, OAG 04-090 (5/10/04).

Cited: Jackson Energy Auth. v. Diamond, 181 S.W.3d 735, 2005 Tenn. App. LEXIS 22 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005); Benson v. Herbst, 240 S.W.3d 235, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 317 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 18, 2007); Tenn. Prot. Agency, Inc. v. Mathies, — S.W.3d —, 2010 Tenn. App. LEXIS 465 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 23, 2010).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Default Judgment.

General sessions court did not have jurisdiction to set aside an original default judgment entered for a landlord pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60 because a tenant's motion seeking to set the default judgment aside was not filed within ten days of the judgment as required under T.C.A. § 16-15-727; the tenant had notice that the lawsuit was pending, had appeared for one hearing, and had sought a continuance to pursue settlement, and then failed to appear for the later hearing after sending an offer of settlement. Enters. v. Penny, — S.W.3d —, 2010 Tenn. App. LEXIS 125 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 22, 2010).

2. Timeliness.

After making installment payments on two judgments for over a year, A General Sessions Court properly overruled defendants' Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 motion to set aside the judgments because the motion was filed more than 10 days after the challenged judgments were entered and, thus, was not timely under T.C.A. § 16-15-727(b). First Cmty. Fin. Servs. v. Simmons, — S.W.3d —, 2011 Tenn. App. LEXIS 316 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 10, 2011).

Because appellant failed to file a de novo appeal within 10 days of a general sessions court order setting aside a default judgment but instead filed a petition for writ of certiorari, the trial court properly dismissed the writ on the grounds that appellant had a plain, speedy and adequate remedy provided by T.C.A. § 16-15-727(b), a de novo appeal. Brookside Homeowners Ass'n v. Vaught, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 911 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 13, 2015).

Property owner's motion to set aside was timely filed and tolled the time for perfecting a de novo appeal to the circuit court because the owner filed his motion the day after the general sessions court entered its judgment for possession. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Dorris, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 836 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2017).

3. Jurisdiction.

General sessions court did not have the authority to consider a homeowner's motion for Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 relief because the homeowner did not file the motion within ten days of the entry of the judgment dismissing her complaint with prejudice. Hanke v. Landon Smelcer Constr., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 346 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 19, 2015), review denied and ordered not published, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 762 (Tenn. Sept. 16, 2015).

Circuit court did not err in denying a homeowner's motion to set aside the general sessions court's judgment granting her motion to withdraw her complaint and dismissing the complaint with prejudice because the homeowner was not entitled to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.01 relief; the judgments at issue did not reflect mechanical errors of computation or copying even when viewing the record in its entirety. Hanke v. Landon Smelcer Constr., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 346 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 19, 2015), review denied and ordered not published, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 762 (Tenn. Sept. 16, 2015).

Legislature amended subsection(a) to specifically provide that the general sessions court may only correct clerical mistakes, not errors arising from oversight or omissions. Hanke v. Landon Smelcer Constr., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 346 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 19, 2015), review denied and ordered not published, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 762 (Tenn. Sept. 16, 2015).

In the totality of the circumstances, including the absence of an express rule disallowing the premature filing of a notice of appeal in general sessions court, a notice of appeal filed while a timely subsection (b) is pending will be treated as a prematurely filed notice of appeal and will be sufficient to perfect the appellant's appeal once the general sessions court disposes of the motion. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Dorris, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 836 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2017).

Trial court erred in ruling that it lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate a property owner's de novo appeal because the owner's motion to set aside was timely, and thus, the owner's premature notice of appeal was sufficient to perfect his appeal to the trial court. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Dorris, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 836 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2017).

Trial court erred in dismissing a property owner's appeal from the general sessions court because the general sessions court had jurisdiction to adjudicate the owner's pending motion to set aside; the filing of the notice of appeal did not immediately divest the general sessions court of jurisdiction to consider the pending subsection (b) motion. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Dorris, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 836 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2017).

Party cannot deprive the general sessions court of its statutory authority to adjudicate a timely filed subsection (b) motion by filing an intervening notice of appeal; to so hold would be to improperly limit the general sessions court's authority, which has been conferred by the Tennessee General Assembly. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Dorris, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 836 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2017).

At the time of the institution of a second case and throughout the proceedings of the second case, the time for filing an appeal of the first case had not expired. As such, the trial court's conclusion that the general sessions court's judgment in the first case was final, notwithstanding the timely filed and pending motion to set aside the judgment in the first case, was in error. Collins v. Sams East Inc., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 131 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 13, 2018).

4. Procedure.

While a motion under subsection (b) may only succeed when a movant can show grounds under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02, the procedure of a subsection (b) motion is not identical to a Rule 60.02 motion; procedural rules that are applicable to a Rule 60.02 motion are therefore not necessarily applicable to motions filed pursuant to subsection (b), and while a subsection (b) motion may be granted only on grounds as specified in Rule 60.02, the procedure is more akin to that under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 59.04. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Dorris, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 836 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2017).

Case law stands for the proposition that the 10-day requirement in T.C.A. § 16-15-727(b) is inapplicable when the basis upon which relief is sought is that service of process was never achieved, thereby rendering the judgment void ab initio; in this case, the general sessions court did have jurisdiction to rule on defendants'  motion to void the default judgments. Apexworks Restoration v. Scott, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 514 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 24, 2019).

It would work a substantial injustice to appellee to deny him relief from a judgment entered in 2011 in an action which had been initiated with a civil warrant filed in 2007 but not executed on until 2018; therefore, the statute did not prevent the general sessions court from exercising its authority to determine the validity of the judgment and to grant appellee relief. Cornerstone Fin. Credit Union v. Mundy, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 517 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 23, 2019).

Decisions Under Prior Law

1. Small Offense Case — Showing Fact of Plea of Guilty.

Where the warrant charged an assault with intent to kill, and the justice (now general sessions judge) acquitted the defendant of the felony, and entered a judgment of fine and costs against him, not showing on its face that the defendant submitted and pleaded guilty of the assault, upon the trial of a certiorari to supersede the judgment and motion to quash the execution, the court may allow the justice to amend his judgment, so as to show the fact of plea of guilty as to the assault and battery. There can be no objection to this practice. Powell v. State, 3 Shan. 75 (1879).

2. Striking Out Illegal Matter and Surplusage.

Where a justice (now general sessions judge) rendered judgment for the amount due on a note, and added the words “to be discharged in Tennessee and Kentucky bank notes,” and about a week after the execution had been stayed at the instance of the defendant, the justice, at the instance of the plaintiff in the judgment, struck out and erased the quoted words, it was held that there was no error in this, because such words were illegal and surplusage. Womack v. Walling, 60 Tenn. 425, 1872 Tenn. LEXIS 526 (1873).

3. Capacity in Which Defendant Liable.

A justice of the peace (now general sessions judge) cannot correct his judgment rendered against one as trustee, and make it a judgment against him individually, if his liability was fiduciary and not personal; but where the word trustee is merely descriptive, it may be done, as it is immaterial. Conn v. Scruggs, 64 Tenn. 567, 1875 Tenn. LEXIS 126 (1875).

4. Amount of Judgment.

It is a proper exercise of power to correct judgments for a justice of the peace (now general sessions judge), upon motion of the plaintiff, after due notice to the defendant, to strike out the words, “subject to all credits, if any,” appearing in his judgment for a definite sum endorsed on the warrant, thereby making it conform to the truth and the entry on his docket. Torilla v. Alexander, 104 Tenn. 453, 58 S.W. 124, 1900 Tenn. LEXIS 16, 78 Am. St. Rep. 928 (1900).

5. No Entry — Correction After Appeal.

Where a justice of the peace (now general sessions judge) entered judgment against one defendant, and made no entry as to another, he cannot while the cause is on trial in the circuit court, be called in, and, upon his memory alone, be allowed to enter a judgment by way of amendment as to the other defendant, against whom he had made no entry, or to prove the facts by parol. The presumption is that the suit was dismissed as to the defendant against whom no entry was made. Trevathan v. Caldwell, 51 Tenn. 535, 1871 Tenn. LEXIS 201 (1871).

16-15-728. Proceedings presumed valid.

Every intendment is in favor of the sufficiency and validity of proceedings before general sessions courts, when brought in question, either directly or collaterally, in any of the courts, where it appears on the face of the proceedings that the general sessions court had jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties.

Code 1858, § 4176 (deriv. Acts 1851-1852, ch. 100, § 1); Shan., § 5988; Code 1932, § 10189; impl. am. Acts 1979, ch. 68, §§ 2, 3; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 19-424; Acts 1993, ch. 241, § 45; T.C.A., § 19-1-117.

Compiler's Notes. References in some of the annotations for this section to “justices of the peace” are deemed references to “courts of general sessions” or “judges of courts of general sessions.” See Acts 1979, ch. 68, §§ 2, 3.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 2 Tenn. Juris., Appeal and Error, § 232; 17 Tenn. Juris., Justices of Peace and General Sessions Courts, §§ 13, 25, 27.

Cited: State v. McClintock, 732 S.W.2d 268, 1987 Tenn. LEXIS 1063 (Tenn. 1987); State v. Cottrell, 868 S.W.2d 673, 1992 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 940 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Decisions Under Prior Law

1. Validity of Proceedings.

2. —Generally.

Our courts have repeatedly made liberal intendments in favor of the proceedings and judgments of justices (now general sessions judges), and have allowed great liberality of construction to sustain the regularity of their proceedings. Baker v. Allen, 2 Tenn. 175, 1812 Tenn. LEXIS 2 (1812); Parker v. Swan, 20 Tenn. 80, 1839 Tenn. LEXIS 19 (1839); Johnson v. Billingsley, 22 Tenn. 151, 1842 Tenn. LEXIS 53 (1842); Heffly v. Hall, 24 Tenn. 581, 1845 Tenn. LEXIS 135 (1845); Glass v. Stovall, 29 Tenn. 453, 1850 Tenn. LEXIS 12 (1850); Hubbard v. Birdwell, 30 Tenn. 220, 1850 Tenn. LEXIS 98 (1850); McClellan v. Cornwell, 42 Tenn. 298, 1865 Tenn. LEXIS 62 (1865); Anderson v. Kimbrough, 45 Tenn. 260, 1868 Tenn. LEXIS 5 (1868); Odell v. Koppee, 52 Tenn. 88, 1871 Tenn. LEXIS 238 (1871); Watkins v. Kittrell, 62 Tenn. 38, 1873 Tenn. LEXIS 134 (1873); Myers v. Hammond, 65 Tenn. 61, 1873 Tenn. LEXIS 299 (1873); Elliott & Co. v. Jordan, 66 Tenn. 376, 1874 Tenn. LEXIS 147 (1874); Cowan, McClung & Co. v. Lowry, 75 Tenn. 620, 1881 Tenn. LEXIS 158 (1881); Memphis S. R. Co. v. Flood, 122 Tenn. 56, 113 S.W. 384, 1909 Tenn. LEXIS 3 (1908), overruled, Shay v. Harper, 202 Tenn. 141, 303 S.W.2d 335, 1957 Tenn. LEXIS 373, 1957 Tenn. LEXIS 374 (1957); Christie v. Williamsom, 4 Tenn. Civ. App. 161 (1914).

The strictness required in keeping the docket of a superior court need not be observed by a justice of the peace (now general sessions judge) in order to make the docket good and valid for all purposes for which it is kept. Fleming v. Kemp, 27 Tenn. App. 150, 178 S.W.2d 397, 1943 Tenn. App. LEXIS 137 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1943).

It is the duty of courts in reviewing proceedings before a general sessions court to regard them with unusual indulgence and great liberality so that the ends of justice may be reached and every intendment of the sufficiency of the proceedings must be indulged in. Spencer v. Dixie Finance Co., 205 Tenn. 485, 327 S.W.2d 301, 1959 Tenn. LEXIS 387 (1959).

3. —Jurisdictional Facts — Showing Requisite.

There is no presumption to support the judgment of a court of inferior jurisdiction, and the record must affirmatively show the existence of all jurisdictional facts, such as service of process. Bass v. Southern Surety Co., 158 Tenn. 233, 12 S.W.2d 714, 1928 Tenn. LEXIS 143 (1929).

4. —Presumptions.

Every reasonable presumption must be indulged to uphold the proceedings of a justice of the peace (now general sessions judge). Fleming v. Kemp, 27 Tenn. App. 150, 178 S.W.2d 397, 1943 Tenn. App. LEXIS 137 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1943).

Where pleadings in general sessions court and in circuit court on appeal were ore tenus, court of appeals would indulge in presumption that any amendments necessary to give notice to defendants were made orally in circuit court. Smith v. Leedy, 42 Tenn. App. 117, 299 S.W.2d 29, 1956 Tenn. App. LEXIS 118 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1956).

Where warrants showed on their face that general sessions court and circuit court on appeal had jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties, court of appeals would indulge every intendment in favor of validity of judgments. Smith v. Leedy, 42 Tenn. App. 117, 299 S.W.2d 29, 1956 Tenn. App. LEXIS 118 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1956).

5. —Impeachment by Justice.

The judgment imports verity, and the justice (now general sessions judge) cannot impeach it by his subsequent statement that he did not consider the evidence presented. Reed v. State, 162 Tenn. 643, 39 S.W.2d 749, 1931 Tenn. LEXIS 80 (1931), superseded by statute as stated in, State v. Little, 560 S.W.2d 403, 1978 Tenn. LEXIS 568 (Tenn. 1978).

Where a search warrant was accompanied by an affidavit which was regular on its face the judgment of the justice of the peace (now general sessions judge) in issuing such warrant could not be attacked on the ground that the justice subsequently stated that the name of the informant was not disclosed to him at the time he issued the warrant. Gallimore v. State, 173 Tenn. 178, 116 S.W.2d 1001, 1938 Tenn. LEXIS 5 (1938), superseded by statute as stated in, State v. Little, 560 S.W.2d 403, 1978 Tenn. LEXIS 568 (Tenn. 1978).

6. —Conformity with Other Acts — Necessity.

The presumption in favor of the validity of justice's (now general sessions judge's) proceedings will not be extended to the point of violating positive requirements of other statutory provisions. Odell v. Koppee, 52 Tenn. 88, 1871 Tenn. LEXIS 238 (1871).

7. Variance between Warrant and Proof.

On a warrant distinctly setting forth a cause of action, the plaintiff cannot on the trial prove and prevail on another and distinct cause of action. Watkins v. Kittrell, 62 Tenn. 38, 1873 Tenn. LEXIS 134 (1873).

8. Waiver — Answer by Garnishee.

Where judgment against garnishee was assailed on ground that it was based on execution in which return of deputy sheriff had been omitted, appearance and answer of garnishment by garnishee constituted waiver of objection to manner of garnishment summons. Saunders v. Moore, 21 Tenn. App. 375, 110 S.W.2d 1046, 1937 Tenn. App. LEXIS 40 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1937).

Where a garnishee voluntarily appears and answers, he waives all defects in the garnishment summons or its service on him. Stonecipher v. Knoxville Sav. & Loan Asso., 42 Tenn. App. 86, 298 S.W.2d 785, 1956 Tenn. App. LEXIS 115 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1956).

9. Correction of Proceedings.

Where a justice's (now general sessions judge's) docket omits a proceeding which should have been entered, other proper evidence may be admitted to prove the proceeding, and, where entries on the docket are not sufficiently complete to be intelligible parol evidence may be admitted to show the proceedings. Fleming v. Kemp, 27 Tenn. App. 150, 178 S.W.2d 397, 1943 Tenn. App. LEXIS 137 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1943).

16-15-729. Trial de novo on appeal — Decision on merits.

No civil case, originating in a general sessions court and carried to a higher court, shall be dismissed by such court for any informality whatever, but shall be tried on its merits; and the court shall allow all amendments in the form of action, the parties thereto, or the statement of the cause of action, necessary to reach the merits, upon such terms as may be deemed just and proper. The trial shall be de novo, including damages.

Code 1858, § 4177 (deriv. Acts 1851-1852, ch. 100, § 2); Shan., § 5989; mod. Code 1932, § 10190; impl. am. Acts 1979, ch. 68, §§ 2, 3; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 19-425; Acts 1993, ch. 241, § 46; T.C.A., § 19-1-118; Acts 1995, ch. 418, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. References in some of the annotations for this section to “justices of the peace” are deemed references to “courts of general sessions” or “judges of courts of general sessions.” See Acts 1979, ch. 68, §§ 2, 3.

Cross-References. Correction of formal errors on appeal, § 20-11-108.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 1 Tenn. Juris., Amendments, §§ 2, 7, 9, 14, 17; 2 Tenn. Juris., Appeal and Error, § 50; 17 Tenn. Juris., Justices of Peace and General Sessions Courts, §§ 27, 41, 43.

Law Reviews.

The Pauper's Oath in Appeals From General Sessions Court (Robert A. Lanier), 19 No. 2 Tenn. B.J. 17 (1983).

Cited: Red Boiling Springs v. Whitley, 777 S.W.2d 706, 1989 Tenn. App. LEXIS 457 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989); Steve Frost Agency v. Spurlock, 859 S.W.2d 337, 1993 Tenn. App. LEXIS 213 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993); Morris v. Clarksville-Montgomery County Consol. Bd. of Educ., 867 S.W.2d 324, 1993 Tenn. App. LEXIS 511 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993); Auto Credit of Nashville v. Wimmer, 231 S.W.3d 896, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 642 (Tenn. Aug. 16, 2007); McPherson v. Shea Ear Clinic, — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 265 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 27, 2007); McGee v. Jacobs, 236 S.W.3d 162, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 320 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 18, 2007); West v. AMISUB (SFH), Inc., — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. App. LEXIS 191 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 21, 2013).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. In General.

General sessions court is a successor to the justice of the peace court and substantially the same rules of procedure apply to general sessions courts as applied to justice of the peace courts. Weaver v. Cromer, 54 Tenn. App. 510, 392 S.W.2d 835, 1965 Tenn. App. LEXIS 277 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1965).

A provision for de novo trial in the circuit court must be taken to mean a de novo trial as to the parties before that court by appeal. Braverman v. Roberts Constr. Co., 748 S.W.2d 433, 1987 Tenn. App. LEXIS 3114 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987).

In an unlawful detainer action, denial of tenant's motion to amend his pleadings under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 15.01 was appropriate because the request came right before trial, new claims would have been added, the case had been in litigation for more than a year, and landlord had no notice of the proposed amendment or new claims; further, T.C.A. § 16-15-729 did not mandate the amendment. WS Inv. Holdings, LP v. Danner, — S.W.3d —, 2008 Tenn. App. LEXIS 525 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 10, 2008), rehearing denied, WS Invs. v. David E. Danner, P.C., — S.W.3d —, 2008 Tenn. App. LEXIS 597 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 26, 2008), appeal denied, WS Invs. v. David E. Danner, P.C., — S.W.3d —, 2009 Tenn. LEXIS 190 (Tenn. Mar. 16, 2009).

Trial court properly found that truck buyer acquired title because buyer was a bona fide purchaser in the ordinary course of business, and under T.C.A. § 47-2-403 claimant’s entrustment of the truck to merchant provided merchant with authority to transfer title to buyer. Best Signs, Inc. v. King, 358 S.W.3d 226, 2009 Tenn. App. LEXIS 6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 12, 2009).

Court of appeals was unable to consider the merits of the appeal because the procedural posture of the case made appellate review inappropriate; in response to a wife's appeal, a bank filed a motion to dismiss her appeal on the basis of res judicata or collateral estoppel, but the defendant was the party who filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's case, arguing that the issues raised in the case had been previously decided. US Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Brooks, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 847 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 4, 2016).

2. Legislative Intent.

It was the clear intention of the legislature to allow such amendments in the circuit court as will permit the case to be heard on its merits. Spencer v. Dixie Finance Co., 205 Tenn. 485, 327 S.W.2d 301, 1959 Tenn. LEXIS 387 (1959).

3. Construction with Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure apply to cases appealed to the circuit court from the general sessions court, but they do not require the filing of written pleadings, issuance of new process, or any other steps which have been completed prior to appeal. Vinson v. Mills, 530 S.W.2d 761, 1975 Tenn. LEXIS 568 (Tenn. 1975); Ware v. Meharry Medical College, 898 S.W.2d 181, 1995 Tenn. LEXIS 189 (Tenn. 1995).

In accord with Vinson v. Mills.Ware v. Meharry Medical College, 898 S.W.2d 181, 1995 Tenn. LEXIS 189 (Tenn. 1995).

In a case arising from an automobile accident, damages should not have been awarded for personal injuries because an insurer's claim was not made until after the statute of limitations had run, and an appeal to the circuit court from the general sessions court did not extend the limitations period; in such an appeal, the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure did not expand the circuit court's jurisdiction. The savings statute did not permit the insurer to refile the previous action and rely upon the original filing of the lawsuit in order to add a claim for personal injuries. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Blondin, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 189 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 14, 2016).

4. Appeal to Circuit Court.

In a case appealed from the general sessions court to the circuit court and subjected to de novo review, the rule limiting plaintiff's recovery to the jurisdictional limits of the general sessions court is not viable in the light of the adoption of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure and the principles of judicial economy; abrogating Moran v. Weinberger, 149 Tenn. 537, 260 S.W. 966, 1923 Tenn. LEXIS 112 (1924). Ware v. Meharry Medical College, 898 S.W.2d 181, 1995 Tenn. LEXIS 189 (Tenn. 1995).

Cases appealed from the general sessions court to the circuit court pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-15-729 should be treated for all purposes as if they originated in the circuit court. The parties should be permitted to file amended pleadings to the fullest extent permitted by Tenn. R. Civ. P. 15 without regard to the general sessions court's monetary limits as doing so will promote judicial economy by enabling the parties to resolve their disputes on the merits in a single proceeding. B & G Constr. v. Polk, 37 S.W.3d 462, 2000 Tenn. App. LEXIS 249 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000), rehearing denied, B & G Constr., Inc. v. Polk, — S.W.3d —, 2000 Tenn. App. LEXIS 312 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 12, 2000).

Where defendants' appeal to the circuit court opened the door for the plaintiff to amend its complaint to include relief not available in the general session proceeding, the circuit court acted properly in awarding plaintiff in landlord and tenant dispute not only possession, but also damages and discretionary costs. B & G Constr. v. Polk, 37 S.W.3d 462, 2000 Tenn. App. LEXIS 249 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000), rehearing denied, B & G Constr., Inc. v. Polk, — S.W.3d —, 2000 Tenn. App. LEXIS 312 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 12, 2000).

Defendant failed to obtain a trial date within 45 days after perfecting his appeal from general sessions court and he allowed his case to languish for over 18 months; trial court properly acted within its sound discretion when it entered its order dismissing defendant's case and the action dismissing defendant's appeal pursuant to Davidson County, Tenn., R. 20(b) did not run afoul of T.C.A. § 16-15-729. Metropolitan Gov't of Nashville v. Cuozzo, — S.W.3d —, 2008 Tenn. App. LEXIS 498 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 25, 2008).

While plaintiff tenant had waived remand for failure to file a motion to remand timely as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), and he had asserted federal arguments including violation of his due process and equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and violations of the Fair Housing Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794, there was a question whether defendant housing authority, under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), could remove a state court eviction action based on federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 merely by labeling the tenant's petition/appeal in that action as a “complaint” (which was itself an appeal for a trial de novo pursuant to T.C.A. §§ 29-18-128, 16-15-729, of a final judgment in the housing authority's state court unlawful detainer action) and the tenant as a “plaintiff,” thus, briefing was required as to whether subject matter existed. Felts v. Cleveland Hous. Auth., 821 F. Supp. 2d 968, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110300 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 26, 2011).

Circuit court properly dismissed defendant's appeal and affirmed the judgment of the general sessions court pursuant to T.C.A. § 27-5-107 because to preserve plaintiff's original cause of action after dismissal, plaintiff had to perfect an appeal to the circuit court as prescribed by T.C.A. § 27-5-108, but plaintiff did not appeal the judgment, and his cause of action proceeded to the circuit court only by virtue of defendant's appeal; while defendant's appeal was pending, plaintiff was free to amend his complaint pursuant to T.C.A. § 16-15-729, however, defendant could dismiss the appeal without the consent and over the objection of plaintiff, and the dismissal of defendant's appeal removed the case from the circuit court and was fatal to plaintiff's amended cause of action. Crowley v. Thomas, 343 S.W.3d 32, 2011 Tenn. LEXIS 599 (Tenn. June 17, 2011).

Court of appeals did not err in affirming an order dismissing an insured's underinsured motorist claim against an insurer because the insured failed to amend to increase the amount of damages beyond those specified in the warrant she filed in general sessions court after she perfected a de novo appeal to the circuit court, and the amount of the insured's damages was limited to the amount she requested in her general sessions warrant; the amount of damages a party appealing to circuit court from general sessions court seeks to recover is limited to the amount sought in the warrant filed in general sessions court until an amendment to increase the amount of damages is filed in the circuit court. Brown v. Roland, 357 S.W.3d 614, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 2 (Tenn. Jan. 18, 2012).

Defendant, a purported independent contractor, did not waive the issue of venue based on proceedings in the sessions court because plaintiff corporation's appeal from the sessions court to the circuit court was treated as if the case had originated in the circuit court, pursuant to T.C.A. § 16-15-729. Masquerade Fundraising, Inc. v. Stott, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 97 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 14, 2012).

As appellants filed an appeal of a decision of the General Session Court to the Circuit Court, arising from a vehicle accident, but they failed to file an appeal bond pursuant to T.C.A. §§ 27-5-103 and 27-5-108(a)(1), the attempted appeals due were properly dismissed due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction; the failure to timely file an appeal bond was not merely an informality under T.C.A. § 16-15-729. Jacob v. Partee, 389 S.W.3d 339, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 555 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 10, 2012), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 924 (Tenn. Dec. 12, 2012), overruled, Bernatsky v. Designer Baths & Kitchens, LLC, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. App. LEXIS 106 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 15, 2013), overruled in concurring opinion at Bernatsky v. Designer Baths & Kitchens, LLC, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. App. LEXIS 106 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 15, 2013), overruled, Meacham v. Starnes, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. App. LEXIS 135 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2013), overruled, Andrews v. Clemmer, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. App. LEXIS 145 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 28, 2013), overruled, Brown v. Shtaya, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. App. LEXIS 162 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 6, 2013), overruled, Moore v. Correct Care Solutions, LLC, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. App. LEXIS 199 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 25, 2013), overruled, Griffin v. Campbell Clinic, P.A., — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. App. LEXIS 487 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 31, 2013), overruled, Peterson v. Lepard, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. App. LEXIS 153 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 20, 2014), overruled, Griffin v. Campbell Clinic, P.A., 439 S.W.3d 899, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 566 (Tenn. July 21, 2014).

In a garnishment case, although the issue was moot because all facts contained in several allegedly missing documents were proven by witness testimony during a circuit court hearing; any papers filed during the pendency of the action in a general sessions court should have been transmitted to the circuit court upon appeal and properly included in the circuit court record. Emrick v. Moseley, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. App. LEXIS 448 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 30, 2014), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 986 (Tenn. Nov. 20, 2014).

Circuit court did not err in its award of damages to landlords of beyond the monetary limit for general sessions court because the landlords elected to proceed on their detainer summons, which sought a judgment for all unpaid rent owed as of the court date. Therefore, the landlords were not limited to recovering the monetary limit simply because they appealed from general sessions court. Flynn v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 874 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 26, 2015), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 126 (Tenn. Feb. 18, 2016).

Action which is barred by the statute of limitations in the general sessions court may not be made timely as a result of an appeal from the general sessions court to the circuit court. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Blondin, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 189 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 14, 2016).

Boat repairman did not show a circuit court failed to conduct a de novo review of a general sessions court's proceedings because, (1) absent a transcript, the extent of the circuit court's proceedings could not be found, and (2) the circuit court's findings and conclusions showed the court heard the parties'  testimony and found credibility and the damages the repairman was entitled to under quantum meruit. Arthur v. Stewart, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 649 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 30, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 967 (Tenn. Dec. 15, 2016).

Trial court erred in dismissing a wife's appeal from the general sessions judgment in favor of a bank under the de novo standard because the bank was required to submit proof to establish its entitlement to the property. US Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Brooks, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 847 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 4, 2016).

5. Informalities Not Fatal — Examples.

Although person appealing from judgment of general sessions court did not actually appear before the judge and request or be granted an appeal but merely, within the time required, filed a pauper's oath in lieu of bond in which he mentioned the “appeal this day prayed for and granted him” and the papers were then lodged in the circuit court such appeal was valid. Spencer v. Dixie Finance Co., 205 Tenn. 485, 327 S.W.2d 301, 1959 Tenn. LEXIS 387 (1959).

It is not necessary that a warrant set out a cause of action with the particularity and precision required in a declaration in a court of law and it is sufficient if there is a general statement indicating the grounds of action so that defendant will not be misled in preparing his defense, the warrant being simply a summons rather than standing in lieu of a declaration with the pleadings being ore tenus. Weaver v. Cromer, 54 Tenn. App. 510, 392 S.W.2d 835, 1965 Tenn. App. LEXIS 277 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1965).

Sessions court warrant calling on defendant to appear and answer “a civil action for property damage caused by the negligent, careless and unlawful operation of an automobile owned and driven by the defendant on or about May 10, 1963 on State Highway #99 in Marshall County, Tennessee in an amount under $750.00” was sufficient. Weaver v. Cromer, 54 Tenn. App. 510, 392 S.W.2d 835, 1965 Tenn. App. LEXIS 277 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1965).

Amendments in criminal process may be authorized by trial court even though not specifically provided for by statute. Murff v. State, 221 Tenn. 111, 425 S.W.2d 286, 1967 Tenn. LEXIS 359 (1967).

Although credit card company failed to attach to it pleadings the credit card agreement upon which its collection claim was based as required by Tenn. R. Civ. P. 10.03, circuit court should not have dismissed the action under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) because the action originated in general sessions court, and pursuant to the terms of T.C.A. § 16-15-729 no civil case originating in a general sessions court should be dismissed by a higher court for any informality. Discover Bank v. Henson, — S.W.3d —, 2008 Tenn. App. LEXIS 737 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 18, 2008), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2009 Tenn. LEXIS 444 (Tenn. June 15, 2009).

6. Final Judgment.

Appellate court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the claimant's appeal, because the circuit court had not made a finding on whether the claimant had stated a claim for relief for the attorney's failure to pay rent under the third lease agreement, and without such a finding, the order granting summary judgment in favor of the attorney was not a final judgment. Smith v. Potter, — S.W.3d —, 2009 Tenn. App. LEXIS 171 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 28, 2009).

Decisions Under Prior Law

1. Appeal to Circuit Court.

2. —Generally.

An appeal is authorized by this section. Lightfoot v. Grove, 52 Tenn. 473, 1871 Tenn. LEXIS 281 (1871).

3. —Prayer and Grant of Appeal Not Shown.

Where the papers do not show an appeal to have been prayed and granted, such defect was not intended to be cured by this section, and the circuit court would not have any jurisdiction to affirm the justice's (now general sessions judge's) judgment, but only to render judgment for the costs of the attempted appeal, and award a procedendo and return the record to the justice. Jackson v. Baxter, 73 Tenn. 344, 1880 Tenn. LEXIS 135 (1880); Douglass v. Neguelona, 88 Tenn. 769, 14 S.W. 283, 1890 Tenn. LEXIS 19 (1890).

4. Warrant — Amendment.

Although only statement of case in warrant was “Personal and Property damage,” where in trial before circuit court there was an oral stipulation of counsel as to the case, such stipulation amounted to an amendment of the warrant curing its defect. Shay v. Harper, 202 Tenn. 141, 303 S.W.2d 335, 1957 Tenn. LEXIS 373, 1957 Tenn. LEXIS 374 (1957).

5. —Material Matters.

A warrant may be amended, in a material matter, in the circuit court after appeal thereto. Reeves v. Henderson, 90 Tenn. 521, 18 S.W. 242, 1891 Tenn. LEXIS 35 (1891).

6. —Cause of Action.

A justice's (now general sessions judge's) warrant which is so defective in failing to state a cause of action as not to be cured by verdict may be amended in the circuit court on any trial before verdict so as to set forth a cause of action. Baker v. Griffeth, 138 Tenn. 670, 200 S.W. 823, 1917 Tenn. LEXIS 74 (1918).

7. —New Cause of Action.

The circuit court has not only the power, but it is its duty to permit a motion for money collected by an officer on an execution and not paid over, originally made before a justice of the peace, to be amended so as to make the suit one for insufficient return, as well as for the delinquency in failing to pay over the money collected. King v. Breeden, 42 Tenn. 455, 1865 Tenn. LEXIS 87 (1865).

8. —Construction with Other Sections.

This section and §§ 20-11-101 (repealed) and 20-11-108 evince a clear intention on the part of the legislature to allow such amendments in the circuit court as will permit the appellant to have his case heard and determined in that court on its merits. Walker v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 175 Tenn. 118, 132 S.W.2d 219, 1939 Tenn. LEXIS 19 (1939).

9. —“State for Use of” — Designation.

Where suit is brought on the bond of an officer in the name of the party aggrieved, the court should permit an amendment, so as to make the suit in the name of the state for the use of such party (the plaintiff), and upon reversing the case for such formal defects, the appellate court will remand the case for such amendment and further proceedings. Smith v. Thomas, 1 Shannon 655 (1876).

10. —Amendment in Absence of Defendant.

Since a defendant who appealed from a judgment before a justice of the peace (now general sessions judge) had the duty to prosecute the appeal, it was not improper for the circuit court to allow a motion to amend the warrant issued by the justice of the peace even though the defendant was not in court. Cooke v. Neighborhood Grocery, 173 Tenn. 681, 122 S.W.2d 438, 1938 Tenn. LEXIS 54 (1938).

11. Appeal Bond.

12. —Amendment.

The appeal bond was amendable even after a further appeal had been prayed to the court of appeals. Frazier v. Biddle Auto Co., 6 Tenn. Civ. App. (6 Higgins) 489 (1916).

Circuit judge, on appeal from judgment of a justice (now general sessions judge), may allow amendment of an appeal bond not complying with statute. Frazier v. Biddle Auto Co., 138 Tenn. 428, 198 S.W. 257, 1917 Tenn. LEXIS 51 (1917).

Under this section the circuit court should have allowed the amendment of an appeal bond even though the parties described as sureties had not signed the bond. McAnally v. Stansell, 177 Tenn. 376, 150 S.W.2d 724, 1941 Tenn. LEXIS 13 (1941).

Where warrant and appeal bond of suit tried before a magistrate was duly filed and the warrant showed that the appeal had been prayed although it did not show the appeal had been granted, the trial court erred in refusing to allow an amendment to the appeal bond to correct a defect therein and in dismissing the suit. McAnally v. Stansell, 177 Tenn. 376, 150 S.W.2d 724, 1941 Tenn. LEXIS 13 (1941).

13. —Adding Sufficient Surety.

It was proper for the circuit judge to permit a defendant who had appealed from the judgment of a justice of the peace (now general sessions judge) to the circuit court to amend his appeal bond by adding a sufficient surety. Walker v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 175 Tenn. 118, 132 S.W.2d 219, 1939 Tenn. LEXIS 19 (1939).

14. Scire Facias — Amendment.

A scire facias to revive a judgment before a justice, when so defective that a judgment of revivor cannot be pronounced upon it, may be amended in the circuit court, if there on appeal. Bryant v. Smith, 47 Tenn. 113, 1869 Tenn. LEXIS 15 (1869); Whitworth v. Thompson, 76 Tenn. 480, 1881 Tenn. LEXIS 36 (1881).

15. Notice to Defendant.

This section does not require the giving of notice to the defendant that a motion will be made to amend a writ or warrant. Cooke v. Neighborhood Grocery, 173 Tenn. 681, 122 S.W.2d 438, 1938 Tenn. LEXIS 54 (1938).

16. Waiver.

Where judgment against garnishee was assailed on ground that it was based on execution in which return of deputy sheriff had been omitted, appearance and answer of garnishment by garnishee constituted waiver of objection to manner of garnishment summons. Saunders v. Moore, 21 Tenn. App. 375, 110 S.W.2d 1046, 1937 Tenn. App. LEXIS 40 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1937).

Where a garnishee voluntarily appears and answers, he waives all defects in the garnishment summons or its service on him. Stonecipher v. Knoxville Sav. & Loan Asso., 42 Tenn. App. 86, 298 S.W.2d 785, 1956 Tenn. App. LEXIS 115 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1956).

Collateral References. Justices of the peace 170-181.

16-15-730. Presumption of regularity of execution.

If the judgment is rendered by one general sessions judge, and execution is issued by another, and in all other cases where steps appear to be taken by one judge instead of another, the presumption, in the absence of proof to the contrary, is that the execution was issued and steps taken regularly.

Code 1858, § 4138; Shan., § 5950; Code 1932, § 10151; impl. am. Acts 1979, ch. 68, §§ 2, 3; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 19-435; Acts 1993, ch. 241, § 48; T.C.A., § 19-1-120.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 17 Tenn. Juris., Justices of Peace and General Sessions Courts, §§ 30, 32.

16-15-731. Actions in the nature of interpleader.

  1. Notwithstanding any rule of court or any law to the contrary, actions in the nature of interpleader, in which the value of the money that is the subject of the action does not exceed the jurisdictional limit of the general sessions court, may be filed in general sessions court under this part. Any such action involving money in the custody or possession of a person acting in the capacity of a real estate broker may be filed on forms prescribed by the Tennessee real estate commission pursuant to its authority under § 62-13-203.
  2. The failure of a competing claimant to recover in an interpleader action shall not be considered as a judgment against the competing claimant, and shall not be used to impair the credit of the claimant.

Acts 1987, ch. 331, § 1; 1988, ch. 523, § 1; 1991, ch. 338, §§ 1, 2; 1993, ch. 241, § 49; T.C.A., § 19-1-121.

Attorney General Opinions. Interpleader actions by real estate brokers as unauthorized practice of law.  OAG 14-08, 2014 Tenn. AG LEXIS 8 (1/14/14).

16-15-732. Removal of actions — Exceptions.

  1. At any time at least three (3) or more business days prior to the scheduled trial date of a civil action commenced in general sessions court, any defendant in the action may apply to have the action and all the papers of the action removed to a court having jurisdiction of appeals from courts of general sessions. A case properly removed pursuant to this section shall be tried by the appellate court in the same manner as appeals from general sessions court civil actions are currently tried, except there shall be no default or other judgment entered at the general sessions level, and except that a case removed pursuant to this section shall not be subject to any monetary jurisdictional limit that would have applied in the general sessions court if the case had not been removed.
  2. Any defendant seeking to remove an action pursuant to subsection (a) shall file with the application an affidavit stating that the defendant has a substantial defense to the action and/or that the defendant's defense will be of such a complex or expensive nature that the interests of justice require that the defendant not be required to present the defense at the general sessions level. The affidavit shall state the grounds of the defense and why the affiant believes it to be sufficiently substantial, complex or expensive to merit the removal of the case. The affidavit and application shall also be accompanied by a cost bond sufficient to defray all costs that have accrued prior to the time application for removal is made.
    1. If the general sessions judge finds that a defendant's defense is substantial, complex or expensive to present, and that the defendant has posted a sufficient cost bond, the judge shall order the action removed to the court that would have jurisdiction of an appeal if the action had been tried in general sessions court. The judge shall direct the clerk to promptly transmit the papers in the action to the clerk of the court to which the action is removed.
    2. If the judge finds the defense will not be substantial, complex or expensive or that the cost bond is not sufficient, the judge shall deny the application and proceed to try the action.
  3. If an action is removed pursuant to this section, in no event shall an objection to venue be considered by the circuit court, unless raised by a defendant in the defendant's affidavit in support of removal filed in the general sessions court.
  4. This section does not apply in any county having a population of not less than seven hundred seventy thousand (770,000) nor more than seven hundred eighty thousand (780,000), according to the federal census of 1980 or any subsequent federal census.

Acts 1988, ch. 732, §§ 1, 2; 1993, ch. 241, § 50; T.C.A., § 19-1-122; Acts 1994, ch. 690, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 1994, ch. 690, § 2 provided that the act is remedial in nature and is declarative of the general assembly's intent in enacting Acts 1988, ch. 732.

For table of U.S. decennial populations of Tennessee counties, see Volume 13 and its supplement.

Cited: Benson v. Herbst, 240 S.W.3d 235, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 317 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 18, 2007); Cruzen v. Awad, — S.W.3d —, 2010 Tenn. App. LEXIS 404 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 25, 2010).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Jurisdiction.

Trial court erred in holding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction on the ground that the tenants failed to comply with bond requirements set forth in T.C.A. § 16-15-732(b) and (c)(1) (2009) where nothing in the record suggested that the amount of cash bond they paid was insufficient. Bevels v. Tubbs, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. App. LEXIS 778 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 27, 2013).

16-15-733. Motions against officers.

  1. Sheriffs, coroners, constables, and their sureties are liable to judgment by motion for the amount to which the plaintiff is entitled, with interest, and damages at the rate of twelve and one half percent (12.5%) in the following cases:
    1. In the general sessions court of the county where such officer, by virtue of the officer's position, collects or receives money upon any debt or demand, under a magistrate's jurisdiction, put into the officer's hands for collection, and fails to pay it over to the person entitled, whether the officer collected or received the money before or after the issuance of a warrant, or before or after the rendition of judgment;
    2. In the general sessions court having legal custody of the papers, where an execution from a general sessions court having come to the officer's hands, the officer fails to return it within thirty (30) days after its issuance, or where, having collected money on execution issued by a general sessions court, the officer fails or refuses to pay it; and
    3. In the general sessions court of the county on motion by any general sessions judge or witness, for failing to pay over costs on execution, collected and due the officer, or failing to return execution issued for the cost; and any number of cases in favor of one (1) general sessions judge or witness may be joined in one (1) motion.
  2. The inability of the officer to make due return of an execution under subsection (a) on account of sickness, high water or engagement in executing any precept on behalf of the state shall be sufficient excuse to discharge the officer from the penalties prescribed.
  3. The officer, if to be found in the county, shall have five (5) days' notice, in writing, of the time and place of motion.
  4. Before the plaintiff is entitled to judgment against the sureties, the plaintiff shall produce to the court a certified copy of the official bond of the officer.

Code 1858, §§ 4167-4170 (deriv. Acts 1835-1836, ch. 17, §§ 4, 5; Acts 1835-1836, ch. 19, § 6; Acts 1841-1842, ch. 37); Shan., §§ 5979-5982; Code 1932, §§ 10180-10183; modified; impl. am. Acts 1979, ch. 68, §§ 2, 3; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), §§ 19-501 — 19-504; Acts 1993, ch. 241, § 51; T.C.A., § 19-2-101.

Cross-References. Concurrent jurisdiction of circuit court, § 25-3-141.

Defense of mailing to another county, § 25-3-109.

Excuse of inability to return, § 25-3-110.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 2 Tenn. Juris., Appeal and Error, § 246; 3 Tenn. Juris., Attachment and Garnishment, § 39; 17 Tenn. Juris., Justices of Peace and General Sessions Courts, § 26; 19  Tenn. Juris., Motions and Summary Proceedings, §§ 3-7; 22 Tenn. Juris., Sheriffs, § 24.

Law Reviews.

Judicial Reform at the Lowest Level: A Model Statute for Small Claims Courts, Part II, 28 Vand. L. Rev. 730.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Decisions Under Prior Law

1. Default in Executing and Returning Attachment.

A summary proceeding by mere motion is not an admissible remedy for the default of an officer in failing to execute and make due return of an attachment writ issued by a justice of the peace (now general sessions court). Erkman v. Carnes, 101 Tenn. 136, 45 S.W. 1067, 1898 Tenn. LEXIS 41 (1898).

2. False Return — Remedy by Action on the Case.

Where plaintiff moved for summary judgment against sheriff for failure to return an execution seasonably, but the return showed that it was seasonably made, such return could not be collaterally attacked, and the court's docket, although showing that the return was not seasonably made, was inadmissible, and the motion was properly dismissed; the plaintiff's remedy being by action on the case for false return. First Nat'l Bank v. Tate, 15 Tenn. App. 462, — S.W.2d —, 1932 Tenn. App. LEXIS 115 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1932).

3. Surety on Sheriff's Bond.

There is no liability of a surety on the bond of a sheriff where that officer took and held possession of a stolen automobile under instructions of nonresident police chief, since such possession was not under “color of office,” where the car was destroyed while being driven by the sheriff on private business. The common law rule that a sheriff holds stolen property for the sovereign is not in force in Tennessee. State use of Rosser v. Freeman, 166 Tenn. 296, 61 S.W.2d 459, 1933 Tenn. LEXIS 95 (1933).

4. Constable's Bond.

The constable's bond becomes a judicial record in the sense of this section, and a copy thereof, certified in accordance with this section, is necessary to give a justice of the peace (now general sessions court) jurisdiction to render judgment thereon, by motion, as against the sureties, in the absence of notice to them. Morgan v. Betterton, 109 Tenn. 84, 69 S.W. 969, 1902 Tenn. LEXIS 60 (1902).

Collateral References. Justices of the peace 123.

16-15-734. Motion by surety or stayor.

When any surety or stayor is compelled to pay a general sessions court's judgment against a principal debtor for which the surety or stayor is liable, the surety or stayor may, by motion, before the general sessions court having legal custody of the judgment, recover judgment against the principal debtor for the judgment with interest and costs, or against a cosurety or stayor, for the ratable part thereof, which judgment is not liable to be stayed, except by consent of the surety or stayor in writing.

Code 1858, § 4171 (deriv. Acts 1849-1850, ch. 38, § 3); Shan., § 5983; mod. Code 1932, § 10184; impl. am. Acts 1979, ch. 68, §§ 2, 3; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 19-505; Acts 1993, ch. 241, § 52; T.C.A., § 19-2-102.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 19 Tenn. Juris., Motion and Summary Proceedings, §§ 4-6.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Decisions Under Prior Law

1. Stayor as Surety.

The relation of principal and surety is contracted between the stayor and the party for whom he stays the judgment, by the agreement to stay. Stinnett v. Crookshank, 48 Tenn. 496, 1870 Tenn. LEXIS 98 (1870).

2. Section as Exception to § 19-3-201.

This section creates an exception to § 19-3-201 (repealed), by its provision that a judgment, recovered by motion, in favor of a stayor or surety against the principal debtor, or a cosurety or stayor, after he has been compelled to pay the debt, shall not be stayed, except by the written consent of the stayor, surety, or cosurety, as the case may be. Spradlin v. Bratton, 74 Tenn. 685, 1881 Tenn. LEXIS 198 (1881).

16-15-735. Notice to plaintiff of possible additional defendants.

  1. In cases or controversies arising in a court of general sessions, if a defendant feels that the defendant is either not at fault or that another person is also at fault, the defendant is to notify the opposing party or parties and the clerk of the court in writing forty-eight (48) hours prior to the scheduled date of the hearing of the names, if known, of the other person or persons at fault. If the defendant fails to so notify, the plaintiff shall be entitled to a continuance.
  2. After receiving notice that additional defendants may exist, the clerk of the court shall notify the plaintiff of this fact. The clerk shall automatically continue the hearing for thirty (30) days following notification to the plaintiff that additional defendants exist so the plaintiff can issue service and amend the warrant to include any new defendants.

Acts 1997, ch. 522, § 1.

Part 8
General Provisions

16-15-801. General sessions courts empowered to issue execution.

The general sessions court that renders a judgment may issue execution on the judgment.

Code 1858, § 3070 (deriv. Acts 1835-1836, ch. 17, §§ 14, 16); Shan., § 4797; Code 1932, § 8928; impl. am. Acts 1979, ch. 68, §§ 2, 3; modified; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 19-601; Acts 1993, ch. 241, § 53; T.C.A., § 19-3-101.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 17 Tenn. Juris., Justices of Peace and General Sessions Courts, § 32.

Law Reviews.

Enforcing Money Judgments in Tennessee, 4 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 65.

Judicial Reform at the Lowest Level: A Model Statute for Small Claims Courts, Part II, 28 Vand. L. Rev. 730.

Collateral References. Execution 60.

16-15-802. Compromise after appeal.

Where an appeal has been prayed and obtained from a judgment of a general sessions court, if the plaintiff and defendant compromise the case before the papers have been returned to the court to which the appeal was taken, and file with the general sessions court a written notice of the fact, signed by both parties, the general sessions court shall issue execution on the judgment, as if no appeal had been taken.

Code 1858, § 3072 (deriv. Acts 1829, ch. 33, § 5); Shan., § 4799; Code 1932, § 8930; impl. am. Acts 1979, ch. 68, §§ 2, 3; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 19-603; Acts 1993, ch. 241, § 53; T.C.A., § 19-3-102.

16-15-803. Issuance after destruction of records.

When the docket book and original papers belonging to the general sessions court are destroyed, and the judge makes oath to that effect, it shall be lawful for the judge, or the judge's successor in office, upon the plaintiff, the plaintiff's agent, attorney, or returning officer filing with the judge an affidavit setting forth the name of the plaintiff or plaintiffs, defendant or defendants, the date and amount of judgment as near as may be, and that the judgment has not been paid, to issue execution as though the original papers and docket book had not been destroyed; and it shall be as good and valid, and have the same force and effect, as other executions issued by general sessions courts.

Acts 1859-1860, ch. 54, § 1; Shan., § 4800; Code 1932, § 8931; impl. am. Acts 1979, ch. 68, §§ 2, 3; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 19-604; Acts 1993, ch. 241, § 53; T.C.A., § 19-3-103.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 17 Tenn. Juris., Justices of Peace and General Sessions Courts, § 32; 18 Tenn. Juris., Lost Instruments and Records, §§ 13, 14.

Cited: Fleming v. Kemp, 27 Tenn. App. 150, 178 S.W.2d 397, 1943 Tenn. App. LEXIS 137 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1943).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Presumed Validity of Original.

The original judgment will be presumed to be valid and sufficiently formal, and the production of a copy of a defective judgment from the justice's (now general sessions judge's) docket does not negative a proper judgment on the warrant. White v. Patterson, 60 Tenn. 450, 1872 Tenn. LEXIS 531 (1873).

2. Execution Without Supplying Lost Judgment.

Execution, in a proper case, may issue upon a lost judgment, without supplying it. Childress v. Marks, 61 Tenn. 12, 1872 Tenn. LEXIS 334 (1872); Scott v. Watson, 3 Cooper's Tenn. Ch. 652 (1878).

3. Affidavit of Loss by Incumbent.

The affidavit of loss or destruction of the judgment, record, and papers must be made by the incumbent justice of the peace (now general sessions judge), and not by his predecessor who rendered the judgment, and is now out of office. Park v. Park, 65 Tenn. 404, 1873 Tenn. LEXIS 373 (1873).

4. Compliance with Section.

The lost papers before a justice (now general sessions judge) cannot be supplied by his certificate of loss and certified copies of such papers, but they must be supplied as provided by this section. Halliburton v. Jackson, 79 Tenn. 471, 1883 Tenn. LEXIS 86 (1883). See Buckner v. Geodeker, 45 S.W. 448, 1897 Tenn. Ch. App. LEXIS 1, 1897 Tenn. Ch. App. LEXIS 105 (1897).

5. Summons Lost — Statute Inapplicable.

An execution issued by a justice (now general sessions judge) is not rendered invalid by the fact that, at the date of its issuance, the original summons was lost, and no steps had then been taken to supply it, for this section is not applicable in such case. Baker Watkins Supply Co. v. Fowlkes, 129 Tenn. 663, 168 S.W. 153, 1914 Tenn. LEXIS 157 (1914).

6. Chancery Court — Lack of Jurisdiction to Supply.

The chancery court has no jurisdiction, in the absence of other equities, to supply the record of a justice's (now general sessions judge's) judgment destroyed by fire. Scott v. Watson, 3 Cooper's Tenn. Ch. 352 (1878).

16-15-804. Execution on real property.

  1. Whenever any execution issued by a general sessions court is levied on real estate, and ten (10) days from date of the levy has expired, the title to real estate shall not be affected as to third parties until the execution or the papers in the cause are filed in the circuit court of the county in which the land lies.
  2. The officer making the levy shall, within ten (10) days thereafter, return the execution to the circuit court, where the cause will be at once docketed, and the officer will return the fact of the return of the execution to the circuit court to the general sessions court issuing the execution, whereupon the general sessions court shall file the remaining papers in the cause in the circuit court as required by subdivision (c)(1).
    1. When an execution issued by a general sessions court is levied on real estate, it shall be the duty of the general sessions court to whom the execution is returned to send the execution, together with the judgment and the papers in the cause, to the next circuit court of the general sessions court's county for condemnation.
    2. The circuit court, upon the return made pursuant to subdivision (c)(1), may condemn the land, and order the land, or so much of the land as it may see proper, to be sold by the sheriff of the county in satisfaction of the judgment and costs.
  3. If the circuit court condemns the land to be sold, the clerk shall enter on the minutes the warrant, attachment or other leading process, with the officer's return on the warrant, attachment or other leading process, the prosecution and other bonds where the condition has not been discharged, affidavits for attachment or other process, the judgment of the general sessions court, the execution levied with the officer's return and the judgment of the court.
  4. When several executions in favor of the same plaintiff are returned at the same term of the court, levied on the same tract of land, they shall all be included in one (1) judgment of condemnation, and only one (1) order of sale shall issue.
    1. The clerk of the circuit court may issue execution for the unsatisfied debt and costs, in all cases where a general sessions court's execution has been levied on land, and return made of the execution to the general sessions court, according to law, and the real estate executed fails, for any cause, to satisfy the judgment.
    2. Executions under subdivision (f)(1) may be issued to any county from which the plaintiff shall receive the same benefit, and the officer into whose hands it may come shall have the same authority to proceed as if the execution had issued from a general sessions court on a judgment rendered by it in the county to which the execution is directed.

Code 1858, §§ 3076, 3077, 3080-3083 (deriv. Acts 1786, ch. 14, § 10; Acts 1825, ch. 23, § 1; Acts 1825, ch. 66, § 1; Acts 1829, ch. 12, § 1; Acts 1835-1836, ch. 17, § 11; Acts 1839-1840, ch. 161, § 1); Acts 1899, ch. 39, §§ 1, 2; Shan., §§ 4804, 4805, 4808-4811; mod. Code 1932, §§ 8935, 8936, 8939-8945; impl. am. Acts 1979, ch. 68, §§ 2, 3; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), §§ 19-605 — 19-612; Acts 1993, ch. 241, § 53; T.C.A., § 19-3-104.

Compiler's Notes. References in some of the annotations for this section to “justices of the peace” are deemed references to “courts of general sessions” or “judges of courts of general sessions.” See Acts 1979, ch. 68, §§ 2, 3.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 3 Tenn. Juris., Attachment and Garnishment, §§ 31, 98, 110; 10 Tenn. Juris., Ejectment, § 9; 17 Tenn. Juris., Justices of Peace and General Sessions Courts, §§ 26, 32-36.

Law Reviews.

Enforcement of Judgments in Tennessee, 22 Tenn. L. Rev. 873.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Decisions Under Prior Law

1. In General.

The purpose of subsection (b) is to prevent secret liens under justices' (now general sessions judges') judgments, by requiring the executions levied on land to be filed and docketed in the circuit court of the county where the land lies. Thompson v. Blanks, 114 Tenn. 54, 84 S.W. 804, 1904 Tenn. LEXIS 69 (1905).

The policy underlying subsection (b) is the protection of third parties, and its purpose is to give third parties notice of the lien of the execution. Baker Watkins Supply Co. v. Fowlkes, 129 Tenn. 663, 168 S.W. 153, 1914 Tenn. LEXIS 157 (1914).

2. Amendment of Levy Return.

Pending the motion, in the circuit court, to condemn land levied on, it appearing that the officer had not signed the levy return, he was allowed to amend the same by signing his name thereto. Elliott & Co. v. Jordan, 66 Tenn. 376, 1874 Tenn. LEXIS 147 (1874).

3. Condemnation.

The order of condemnation is not a judgment in the strict sense of the word, but only a mode of executing the levy. The order gives no lien, but merely continues the lien of the levy, to which the title of the purchaser under the sale will relate. Overton v. Perkins, 8 Tenn. 367, 1828 Tenn. LEXIS 14 (1828); Ashworth v. Demier & Boyles, 60 Tenn. 323, 1872 Tenn. LEXIS 500 (1872); Mann v. Roberts, 79 Tenn. 57, 1883 Tenn. LEXIS 13 (1883); Crabtree v. Bank of Winchester, 108 Tenn. 483, 67 S.W. 797, 1901 Tenn. LEXIS 49 (1902).

Condemnation under the levy of a justice's (now general session judge's) execution upon land follows as matter of course where the judgment is not void on its face, and the proceedings are in other respects regular. Cowan, McClung & Co. v. Lowry, 75 Tenn. 620, 1881 Tenn. LEXIS 158 (1881); Crabtree v. Bank of Winchester, 108 Tenn. 483, 67 S.W. 797, 1901 Tenn. LEXIS 49 (1902).

The necessary implication is that the legislative scheme for the condemnation of land levied on under an execution issuing from a justice's (now general sessions judge's) judgment contemplates that the filing of the papers in the cause in the circuit court carries with it the judgment as well, and thus the justice would be stripped of every vestige of control over the cause. The circuit court acquires, and the justice's court (now general sessions court) loses, all jurisdiction over the case upon delivery of the papers and docketing of the case in the circuit court. Crabtree v. Bank of Winchester, 108 Tenn. 483, 67 S.W. 797, 1901 Tenn. LEXIS 49 (1902).

4. —Record of Condemnation — Effect.

While the record of the condemnation in the circuit court after levy of execution from a justice's (now general sessions judge's) judgment is, as a general proposition, constructive notice of the sheriff's sale, the order of condemnation is not a judgment, nor does it fix a lien, but is only a mode of executing the levy, and merely continues the lien fixed by the levy. Hammock v. Qualls, 139 Tenn. 388, 201 S.W. 517, 1917 Tenn. LEXIS 114 (1918).

The record merely continues the lien of the levy to which the purchaser's title will relate when he procures a deed from the sheriff. Hammock v. Qualls, 139 Tenn. 388, 201 S.W. 517, 1917 Tenn. LEXIS 114 (1918).

5. —Judgment Debtor's Objection.

The judgment debtor has the right to offer any objection to the condemnation of his land, which can be made upon the papers properly returned into the circuit court. Cowan, McClung & Co. v. Lowry, 75 Tenn. 620, 1881 Tenn. LEXIS 158 (1881).

6. —Collateral Attack on Justice's Judgment.

The justice's (now general sessions judge's) judgment cannot be collaterally impeached, upon a motion to condemn land levied on, by extraneous proof showing irregularities, for the attack must be by a direct proceeding, such as by certiorari and supersedeas. Hall v. Heffly, 25 Tenn. 444, 1846 Tenn. LEXIS 17 (1846); Turner v. Ireland, 30 Tenn. 447, 1850 Tenn. LEXIS 151 (1850); Anderson v. Kimbrough, 45 Tenn. 260, 1868 Tenn. LEXIS 5 (1868); Sullivan v. Fugate, 48 Tenn. 20, 1870 Tenn. LEXIS 7 (1870); Elliott & Co. v. Jordan, 66 Tenn. 376, 1874 Tenn. LEXIS 147 (1874); Montgomery v. Rich, 3 Cooper's Tenn. Ch. 660 (1878); Pope v. Harrison, 84 Tenn. 82, 1885 Tenn. LEXIS 118 (1885).

7. —Venditioni Exponas — Formalities of Issuance.

The writ of venditioni exponas, like an ordinary execution, may issue on a judgment condemning land, tested at a subsequent term, without any renewal of the order for its issuance. Henry v. Wilson, 77 Tenn. 176, 1882 Tenn. LEXIS 33 (1882).

8. —Appeal.

The judgment of condemnation is such a judgment that an appeal or writ of error therefrom may be prosecuted by the defendant whose land was levied on; and from the court's refusal of the order of condemnation an appeal or writ of error may be prosecuted by the plaintiff. Turner v. Ireland, 30 Tenn. 447, 1850 Tenn. LEXIS 151 (1850); Anderson v. Kimbrough, 45 Tenn. 260, 1868 Tenn. LEXIS 5 (1868); Sullivan v. Fugate, 48 Tenn. 20, 1870 Tenn. LEXIS 7 (1870); Rumbough v. White, 58 Tenn. 260, 1872 Tenn. LEXIS 256 (1872); Halliburton v. Jackson, 79 Tenn. 471, 1883 Tenn. LEXIS 86 (1883); Crabtree v. Bank of Winchester, 108 Tenn. 483, 67 S.W. 797, 1901 Tenn. LEXIS 49 (1902).

9. Depositing Execution in Clerk's Office Insufficient.

It is not sufficient merely to deposit the execution in the clerk's office. Thompson v. Blanks, 114 Tenn. 54, 84 S.W. 804, 1904 Tenn. LEXIS 69 (1905).

10. Lost Records.

11. —Supplying in Circuit Court.

A note lost after suit has been brought upon it before a justice of the peace (now general sessions judge) may be supplied by copy in the circuit court. Travis v. Laurace, 2 Shan. 109 (1876).

12. —Enforcing Lien of Levy in Chancery.

Where, in a condemnation proceeding, it appeared that the warrant and other original papers in the cause were lost by the negligence or fraud of the defendant, who had become the successor in office of the justice (now general sessions judge) rendering the judgment, and by no fault of the plaintiff, it was held that a court of equity would entertain a bill to perfect the inchoate lien acquired by the levy of the execution, by a sale of the property for the satisfaction of the judgment. Bright v. Newland, 36 Tenn. 440, 1857 Tenn. LEXIS 29 (1857); Alley v. Carrol, 53 Tenn. 221, 1871 Tenn. LEXIS 347 (Tenn. Oct. 4, 1871); Scott v. Watson, 3 Cooper's Tenn. Ch. 652 (1878).

13. —Writ of Venditioni Exponas Lost.

A sale of land under an order of condemnation and a writ of venditioni exponas is not invalidated by loss of the writ, provided it appears by the testimony of the clerk, the memorandum on his execution docket, and the recitals in the sheriff's deed, that the writ issued and the sale was made by virtue of the same. Gaugh v. Henderson, 39 Tenn. 628, 1859 Tenn. LEXIS 293 (1859).

14. Nature and Scope of Circuit Court's Jurisdiction.

The jurisdiction of the circuit court to condemn is original and not appellate, and not dependent upon the limit fixed for justice's (now general sessions judge's) jurisdiction. Tuck v. Chaffin, 89 Tenn. 566, 15 S.W. 97, 1890 Tenn. LEXIS 79 (1891).

15. Omissions from Affidavit — Effect.

Judgment in attachment in justice (now general sessions court) proceeding was void where affidavit did not state cause for which attachment was issued, since affidavit formed a material part of the record. Maples v. Tunis, 30 Tenn. 108, 1850 Tenn. LEXIS 69 (1850).

16. Omissions from Entry — Effect.

The title of the purchaser of land under the levy of a justice's (now general sessions judge's) execution, and a judgment of condemnation thereon, cannot be collaterally impeached by the misprision of the clerk in omitting in the entry of the justice's judgment, the amount of the judgment, where the omission is supplied by other parts of the same entry. Simpson v. Sparkman, 80 Tenn. 360, 1883 Tenn. LEXIS 180 (1883).

17. Papers to be Returned — Entered on Minutes.

All the papers in the cause should be returned to the circuit court, but only such as are named in subsection (d) need be entered on the minutes. Neither the evidence, documentary or otherwise, on which the judgment was obtained, nor the affidavit, if any, on which the execution was sued out, constitute a part of the papers to be entered of record. Hall v. Heffly, 25 Tenn. 444, 1846 Tenn. LEXIS 17 (1846); Elliott & Co. v. Jordan, 66 Tenn. 376, 1874 Tenn. LEXIS 147 (1874); Cowan, McClung & Co. v. Lowry, 75 Tenn. 620, 1881 Tenn. LEXIS 158 (1881). See Crabtree v. Bank of Winchester, 108 Tenn. 483, 67 S.W. 797, 1901 Tenn. LEXIS 49 (1902).

18. Purchaser Between Levy and Order of Condemnation.

A levy of an execution from a justice (now general sessions judge) on land, and a return of the execution, the justice's judgment and the papers in the case to the next term of circuit court of the county, and a proper order of condemnation by that court at that term, fix a lien on the land superior to the rights of a purchaser purchasing between the levy and order of condemnation. Courtland Wagon Co. v. Shields, 56 S.W. 275, 1896 Tenn. Ch. App. LEXIS 127 (1896).

19. Revisor Against Heirs.

20. —Necessity.

Where the defendant dies before the order of condemnation, before the issuance of the venditioni exponas, or before the sale is actually made under it, though the levy was made before his death, a revivor against his heirs, devisees, or intervening purchaser is necessary. In such case, a sale without revivor and adjudication of the exhaustion of the personalty of the decedent's estate is void. Overton v. Perkins, 18 Tenn. 328, 1837 Tenn. LEXIS 29 (1837); Stockard v. Pinkard, 25 Tenn. 119, 1845 Tenn. LEXIS 39 (1845); Rutherford v. Read, 25 Tenn. 423, 1846 Tenn. LEXIS 8 (1846); Bryant v. McCollum, 51 Tenn. 511, 1871 Tenn. LEXIS 197 (1871); Ashworth v. Demier & Boyles, 60 Tenn. 323, 1872 Tenn. LEXIS 500 (1872); Hewgly v. Johns, 62 Tenn. 85, 1873 Tenn. LEXIS 146 (1873); Harman v. Hann, 65 Tenn. 90, 1873 Tenn. LEXIS 307 (1873); Puckett v. Richardson, 74 Tenn. 49, 1880 Tenn. LEXIS 210 (1880); Mann v. Roberts, 79 Tenn. 57, 1883 Tenn. LEXIS 13 (1883); Montgomery v. Realhafer, 85 Tenn. 668, 5 S.W. 54, 1887 Tenn. LEXIS 9, 4 Am. St. Rep. 780 (1887).

The same rules applies to attachments levied on land. Green v. Shaver, 22 Tenn. 139, 1842 Tenn. LEXIS 47 (1842); Perkins' Heirs v. Norvell, 25 Tenn. 151, 1845 Tenn. LEXIS 49 (1845); Snell v. Allen, 31 Tenn. 208, 1851 Tenn. LEXIS 49 (1851); Boggess v. Gamble, 43 Tenn. 148, 1866 Tenn. LEXIS 30 (1866); Bryant v. McCollum, 51 Tenn. 511, 1871 Tenn. LEXIS 197 (1871); Watson v. Ryan, 3 Cooper's Tenn. Ch. 40 (1875); McKnight v. Hughes, 72 Tenn. 522, 1880 Tenn. LEXIS 56 (1880); Puckett v. Richardson, 74 Tenn. 49, 1880 Tenn. LEXIS 210 (1880); Montgomery v. Realhafer, 85 Tenn. 668, 5 S.W. 54, 1887 Tenn. LEXIS 9, 4 Am. St. Rep. 780 (1887); Herman v. Katz, 101 Tenn. 118, 47 S.W. 86, 1898 Tenn. LEXIS 39, 41 L.R.A. 700 (1897).

21. —Sufficiency.

Where the defendant dies after the rendition of judgment against him before a justice of the peace (now general sessions judge), and after a levy of the execution on his land, and after the papers have been returned to the circuit court for condemnation, whereupon a writ of scire facias is ordered to be issued against the administrator and heirs of the deceased, naming all of them, except one heir, and the writ as issued was actually served upon the administrator and all the heirs, naming them, the revivor is valid, although the true given name of their heir whose name was entirely omitted in the order awarding the issuance of the writ was not given, but a wrong name was stated. McCracken v. Nelson, 83 Tenn. 312, 1885 Tenn. LEXIS 53 (1885).

22. —Scire Facias.

Where a justice's (now general sessions judge's) execution is levied on land, and a condemnation is had in circuit court, and the defendant dies, the judgment may be revived in that court upon scire facias. McEwen v. Brandeau, 2 Shan. 48 (1876).

23. —Plaintiff Dying Before Sale under Venditioni Exponas.

If the plaintiff dies before the sale under venditioni exponas, there must be a revivor in the name of his personal representative. Hewgly v. Johns, 62 Tenn. 85, 1873 Tenn. LEXIS 146 (1873).

24. Subsection (b) Construed.

Subsection (b)'s meaning is that the levy of a justice's execution on land creates a lien from the date of its levy; but, in order to continue the lien beyond 10 days from the date of the levy, so as to affect third parties, the levied execution must be returned to the circuit court clerk and filed and docketed in the circuit court, within ten days after the levy is made, and the remaining papers in the case must be returned by the justice (now general sessions judge) to the first term of the court thereafter. Thompson v. Blanks, 114 Tenn. 54, 84 S.W. 804, 1904 Tenn. LEXIS 69 (1905); Baker Watkins Supply Co. v. Fowlkes, 129 Tenn. 663, 168 S.W. 153, 1914 Tenn. LEXIS 157 (1914).

25. Subdivision (f)(1) Construed.

The rule embodied in subdivision (f)(1) is extended to authorize the clerk in a vendor's suit to enforce his lien to issue execution for the amount remaining due on the judgment after appropriation of proceeds of sale, though not awarded in terms by the court. Hyder v. Butler, 103 Tenn. 289, 52 S.W. 876, 1899 Tenn. LEXIS 107 (1899).

26. Time of Return.

It is better to follow the statute, but as between the plaintiff and execution debtor it is perhaps not fatal to the lien that the papers were not returned to the next term. Zook v. Smith, 65 Tenn. 213, 1873 Tenn. LEXIS 335 (1873).

Where the papers are not returned to the next term of court after the levy, but are returned to the term next after that, and in the meantime an innocent purchaser, for a valuable consideration paid, and without notice, buys the land and takes a deed to it, he will hold the land discharged from the levy. Zook v. Smith, 65 Tenn. 213, 1873 Tenn. LEXIS 335 (1873).

Where, after the condemnation, the debtor superseded the venditioni exponas, and the suit was not prosecuted further for nearly five years, and about three years and six months after the commencement of the period of neglect, the land was bought by an innocent purchaser, without notice, for a valuable consideration paid, the greater part of the consideration going to pay off other encumbrances, it was held that the lien of the justice's (now general sessions judge's) levy was lost by negligence. Mann v. Roberts, 79 Tenn. 57, 1883 Tenn. LEXIS 13 (1883); Robinson v. Bierce, 102 Tenn. 428, 52 S.W. 992, 1899 Tenn. LEXIS 65, 47 L.R.A. 275 (1899).

Unless the execution is filed and docketed within the 10 days, the lien is suspended and does not exist as against third parties. Thompson v. Blanks, 114 Tenn. 54, 84 S.W. 804, 1904 Tenn. LEXIS 69 (1905).

27. Warrant.

28. —Irregularities as to Warrant Not Vitiating Judgment.

The fact that the warrant does not show affirmatively that the note sued on, and upon which judgment was rendered, is within the justice's jurisdiction, does not render the judgment void, if the judgment was rendered for an amount within the jurisdiction. Baker v. Allen, 2 Tenn. 175, 1812 Tenn. LEXIS 2 (1812); Marshall v. Penington, 16 Tenn. 424, 1835 Tenn. LEXIS 98 (1835); Elliott & Co. v. Jordan, 66 Tenn. 376, 1874 Tenn. LEXIS 147 (1874).

29. —Judgment Not Written on Warrant — Effect.

If no judgment was entered on the warrant, a certified copy form the justice's (now general sessions judge's) docket may be filed pending the motion for condemnation, though the defendant objected thereto. R. S. Hollins & Co. v. Johnson, 40 Tenn. 346, 1859 Tenn. LEXIS 94 (1859); Elliott & Co. v. Jordan, 66 Tenn. 376, 1874 Tenn. LEXIS 147 (1874); Baker Watkins Supply Co. v. Fowlkes, 129 Tenn. 663, 168 S.W. 153, 1914 Tenn. LEXIS 157 (1914).

30. —Date on Warrant Controls.

Where the judgment on the docket was a year later than that on the warrant, and was stayed, and execution was issued a few days after the expiration of the stay period of eight months from the date of the judgment on the warrant, and was levied on land, and the papers were returned to the circuit court, the date on the warrant must prevail, and the condemnation must be allowed, because the clear mistake cannot vitiate the proceedings. Anderson v. Kimbrough, 45 Tenn. 260, 1868 Tenn. LEXIS 5 (1868).

31. —Endorsement of Justice.

The failure of the justice (now general sessions judge) to endorse on its back the fact and date of issuance of the warrant does not render the judgment void. Elliott & Co. v. Jordan, 66 Tenn. 376, 1874 Tenn. LEXIS 147 (1874).

32. —Warrant to Appear Immediately.

Judgment on warrant citing defendant to appear “immediately” is not void, because the law fixes no time in which the defendant shall be required to appear, and the defendant could get to the office of the justice (now general sessions judge) as soon as the officers could do so to return the papers. Elliott & Co. v. Jordan, 66 Tenn. 376, 1874 Tenn. LEXIS 147 (1874).

Collateral References. 33 C.J.S. Executions §§ 61, 62.

Justices of the peace 135(3), 141(4).

16-15-805. Execution on personal property.

  1. The officer levying an execution issued by a general sessions court on personalty shall advertise the sale of the personalty for ten (10) days at one (1) public place in the district in which the defendant resides, at the courthouse door of the county and at two (2) public places in the district where the sale is made, subject to § 26-5-101.
  2. Where there is not sufficient time between the levy and return day of an execution from a general sessions court's judgment to sell, or where, for any reason, the sale cannot be had before the return, the lien given by the levy shall continue, and the general sessions court, or other proper officer, shall issue an order of sale on the execution levied and returned.

Code 1858, §§ 3079, 3084 (deriv. Acts 1829, ch. 90, § 1; Acts 1835-1836, ch. 17, § 4); Shan., §§ 4807, 4812; mod. Code 1932, §§ 8938, 8945; impl. am. Acts 1979, ch. 68, §§ 2, 3; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), §§ 19-613, 19-614; Acts 1993, ch. 241, § 53; T.C.A., § 19-3-105.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 17 Tenn. Juris., Justices of Peace and General Sessions Courts, § 32.

Law Reviews.

The Tennessee Court System — Circuit Court (Frederic S. Le Clercq), 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 241.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Waiver of Advertisement — Effect as to Stayor.

Parties interested under an execution may agree to a sale without advertisement, and the sale will be valid and pass the title. Such sale will not discharge a stayor of another execution subsequently levied on the property subject to such prior levy. Amis v. Dreer, 3 Shan. 698 (1875).

If the officer is guilty of collusion in selling without advertisement under a waiver thereof, or makes himself liable for an insufficient return on the last execution, the execution creditor is not bound to pursue his remedies against the officer for the benefit of the stayor, and the stayor is not thereby discharged. Amis v. Dreer, 3 Shan. 698 (1875).

Collateral References. 33 C.J.S. Executions § 211.

Justices of the peace 135(3).

16-15-806. Executions enforceable in all counties.

Except with regard to executions on real property that are governed by §§ 16-15-804 and 16-15-805, after the time for filing appeal has expired, the procedure for executions and proceedings supplementary to and in aid of judgments of courts of general sessions, including, but not limited to, garnishments, shall be enforceable in every county in this state in the same manner as a judgment of a court of record.

Code 1858, §§ 3073-3075 (deriv. Acts 1805, ch. 66, §§ 4, 6; Acts 1851-1852, ch. 181, § 3); Shan., §§ 4801-4803; Code 1932, §§ 8932-8934; Acts 1970, ch. 453, § 1; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), §§ 19-615 — 19-617; Acts 1989, ch. 404, § 4; 1993, ch. 241, § 53; T.C.A., § 19-3-106.

Compiler's Notes. References in some of the annotations for this section to “justices of the peace” are deemed references to “courts of general sessions” or “judges of courts of general sessions.” See Acts 1979, ch. 68, §§ 2, 3.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 3 Tenn. Juris., Attachment and Garnishment, § 173; 17 Tenn. Juris., Justices of Peace and General Sessions Courts, § 32.

Law Reviews.

Enforcing Money Judgments in Tennessee, 4 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 65.

Cited: Sullivan v. Eason, 8 Tenn. App. 429, — S.W.2d —, 1928 Tenn. App. LEXIS 156 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1928); Erwin Nat'l Bank v. Riddle, 18 Tenn. App. 561, 79 S.W.2d 1032, 1934 Tenn. App. LEXIS 58 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1934); Saunders v. Moore, 21 Tenn. App. 375, 110 S.W.2d 1046, 1937 Tenn. App. LEXIS 40 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1937).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Decisions Under Prior Law

1. Execution from Other County.

2. —Void on Face — Example.

Where a justice of the peace (now general sessions judge) for Coffee County issued an execution on a judgment which had been rendered in Rutherford County, reciting “that the same was obtained before H. C. Carter, a justice of the peace for Rutherford County, Tennessee, on the 13th day of March, 1861, against the said J. A. Moore, as appears by a certified execution issued by W. D. Hicks, justice of the peace for Rutherford County, and certified by James —, county court clerk of said county, which is on file in my office,” the new execution was held to be void on its face. Moore v. Lynch, 63 Tenn. 287, 1874 Tenn. LEXIS 243 (1874); State v. Hood, 84 Tenn. 235, 1886 Tenn. LEXIS 89 (1886).

3. —Return Made — Effect.

An execution issued and placed in the hands of an officer, when returned by him with his endorsement, is then functus officio, and a justice's (now general sessions judge's) execution upon which a return has been made cannot be certified to another county and execution there issued on the same. An execution intended to be so certified should not be placed in the hands of an officer. Paine v. Hoskins, 71 Tenn. 284, 1879 Tenn. LEXIS 77 (1879).

4. —Clerk's Certificate.

A certificate substantially complies with this statute, when, in all respects, it properly states the official character of the justice (now general sessions judge) issuing the execution, and also states that the person, naming him, who rendered the judgment, was an acting justice of the peace at the time of the rendition of the same, the context fairly implying that he was then a justice of the county of which the certificate showed that the certifying officer was clerk. State v. Hood, 84 Tenn. 235, 1886 Tenn. LEXIS 89 (1886).

5. — —Form.

State of Tennessee — Davidson County.

I, AB, clerk of the county court (now county clerk) for said county, certify that CD, whose genuine signature is affixed or annexed to the above (or within) execution, was at the date of the same an acting justice of the peace (now general sessions judge) for said county, and that —, who rendered the judgment, was an acting justice of the peace for said county, at the time of the rendition of the judgment, upon which the execution issued.Given under my hand, this the — day of —, 19 AB, Clerk.

State v. Hood, 84 Tenn. 235, 1886 Tenn. LEXIS 89 (1886).

6. —Certiorari to County of Issuance.

The circuit court of the county in which an execution is issued upon a certified execution from another county has jurisdiction of a petition for certiorari and supersedeas to bring up such an execution, and to have it quashed on the ground that it is void or voidable, but it has no jurisdiction to bring up the cause for a new trial, because the jurisdiction for that purpose is in the county in which the judgment was rendered. Rogers v. Miller, 31 Tenn. 22, 1851 Tenn. LEXIS 6 (1851); Cotton v. Dromgoole, 62 Tenn. 229, 1873 Tenn. LEXIS 180 (1873); Saunders v. Russell, 78 Tenn. 293, 1882 Tenn. LEXIS 179 (1882) (same rule applied to distress warrant for taxes).

7. Execution on Defectively Certified Execution.

Where the clerk's certificate did not show of what court or county he was clerk, or for what county the justice (now general sessions judge) who issued the execution certified by the clerk was acting, except that he was so acting in the clerk's county, the new execution issued in pursuance of the execution so certified was not void, but voidable only at the instance of the judgment debtor. If the certificate is in substantial although not in literal compliance, the new execution will not be void, but, at most, will be voidable at the instance of the judgment debtor, and will render the officer liable for failure to execute it. Stevenson v. McLean, 24 Tenn. 332, 1844 Tenn. LEXIS 68 (1844); Eason v. Cummins, 30 Tenn. 210, 1850 Tenn. LEXIS 94 (1850); State v. Hood, 84 Tenn. 235, 1886 Tenn. LEXIS 89 (1886).

Where the clerk's certificate to the original execution was defective in omitting to state that the justice (now general sessions judge) rendering the judgment was “an acting justice of the peace (now general sessions judge) of said county,” at the time of the rendition of the judgment, the new execution issued thereon will be void, and no protection to the officer acting under it, nor will he be liable for failure to act under it. Eason v. Cummins, 30 Tenn. 210, 1850 Tenn. LEXIS 94 (1850); Apperson v. Smith, 37 Tenn. 372, 1858 Tenn. LEXIS 19 (1858); State ex rel. Chaffin v. Bettick, 60 Tenn. 209, 1872 Tenn. LEXIS 474 (1872); Moore v. Lynch, 63 Tenn. 287, 1874 Tenn. LEXIS 243 (1874); State v. Hood, 84 Tenn. 235, 1886 Tenn. LEXIS 89 (1886).

Parol or extrinsic evidence is not to be admitted to supply an omission. Colville v. Neal, 32 Tenn. 89, 1852 Tenn. LEXIS 23 (1852).

8. New Execution.

9. —Requisites.

The execution issued upon an execution certified from another county must recite the fact that it is issued on an execution certified from the county in which the judgment was rendered, and must also recite all the facts necessary to show the special jurisdiction of the justice (now general sessions judge) to issue it. Gibbs v. Bourland, 14 Tenn. 481, 1834 Tenn. LEXIS 120 (1834); Colville v. Neal, 32 Tenn. 89, 1852 Tenn. LEXIS 23 (1852).

10. —Strict Compliance with Statute Necessary.

The execution must be certified as required by the statute, or the new execution based upon it will be void, and the new execution must recite the fact that it is issued upon an execution certified from the county in which the judgment was rendered. The mode must be strictly pursued. Gibbs v. Bourland, 14 Tenn. 481, 1834 Tenn. LEXIS 120 (1834); Colville v. Neal, 32 Tenn. 89, 1852 Tenn. LEXIS 23 (1852); Moore v. Lynch, 63 Tenn. 287, 1874 Tenn. LEXIS 243 (1874).

This section created a new special and peculiar jurisdiction, and must be strictly complied with in their material provisions, in order to make valid the proceedings thereunder, for there is no presumption in their favor. Gibbs v. Bourland, 14 Tenn. 481, 1834 Tenn. LEXIS 120 (1834); Eason v. Cummins, 30 Tenn. 210, 1850 Tenn. LEXIS 94 (1850); Colville v. Neal, 32 Tenn. 89, 1852 Tenn. LEXIS 23 (1852); Moore v. Lynch, 63 Tenn. 287, 1874 Tenn. LEXIS 243 (1874).

11. —Date of Issuance of Certification and New Execution.

The execution must be certified in the original county (the county in which the judgment was rendered), before the expiration of the 30 days within which it is returnable, and, if certified after the 30 days have expired, it is void; but it is no objection that the execution in the county to which the certified execution was sent was issued more than 30 days after the execution was certified from the first county. Cotton v. Dromgoole, 62 Tenn. 229, 1873 Tenn. LEXIS 180 (1873); Lemons v. Wilson, 65 Tenn. 143, 1873 Tenn. LEXIS 324 (1884).

12. —Extent of Jurisdiction of Court of County to Which Execution Certified.

A justice of the peace (now general sessions judge) has no power to render a new judgment upon a duly certified justice's execution from another county, but only to issue an execution on the certified judgment. If, however, the execution actually issued by him is in conformity with the statute, the fact that he had also rendered a judgment will not vitiate it, for such judgment is void. Perry v. Royle, 17 Tenn. 18, 1836 Tenn. LEXIS 5 (1836); Eason v. Cummins, 30 Tenn. 210, 1850 Tenn. LEXIS 94 (1850).

13. —Credit Endorsed on Certified Execution — Showing on New Execution.

Where the certified execution has a credit endorsed on it, the justice to whom it comes may issue execution for the balance, the face of the execution showing the date and amount of the judgment, and the date and amount of the credit, and the sum named as the balance then due being the correct amount, and costs; and this is not irregular; or he may issue the execution for the full amount of the judgment, and endorse the credit on the back of the same. Perry v. Royle, 17 Tenn. 18, 1836 Tenn. LEXIS 5 (1836).

14. Evidence.

15. —Copy of Executions.

No error can be predicated on chancellor's admission in evidence of a copy of two executions issued by a justice of the peace (now general sessions judge) of one county purporting to be based on two certified executions from a justice of the peace of another county where no objections to competency of the evidence were made when it was offered at the hearing. Erwin Nat'l Bank v. Riddle, 18 Tenn. App. 561, 79 S.W.2d 1032, 1934 Tenn. App. LEXIS 58 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1934).

16. —Ejectment — Record of Judgment.

Plaintiff in ejectment suit based on sheriff's deed must produce record of judgment on which execution was issued in order to prove title. Gillespie v. Badgett, 70 Tenn. 652, 1879 Tenn. LEXIS 214 (1879).

17. Status of Lien of Levy of Justice's Execution.

Where complainant purchased land covered by a mortgage and took a deed for the same, and the holder of the mortgage debt endorsed on the deed his release of the mortgage debt to be paid by the purchaser, and the deed and release were executed before the creditors of the vendor and mortgagor had obtained judgment against him before a justice (now general sessions judge), but were thereafter registered together, the purchaser's title was superior to lien of levy of justice's execution, and transferee of bid at sale, after transfer of papers to circuit court and condemnation of land, could be enjoined from prosecuting ejectment suit against complainant. Anderson v. Robertson, 137 Tenn. 182, 192 S.W. 917, 1916 Tenn. LEXIS 68 (1917).

Collateral References. Justices of the peace 141(4).

16-15-807. Priority of time.

When an execution issued from the judgment of a court of record, and an execution from a general sessions court's judgment, are levied on the same personal property, the execution first levied shall have preference.

Code 1858, § 3078 (deriv. Acts 1845-1846, ch. 72); Shan., § 4806; Code 1932, § 8937; impl. am. Acts 1979, ch. 68, §§ 2, 3; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 19-618; Acts 1993, ch. 241, § 53; T.C.A., § 19-3-107.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 3 Tenn. Juris., Attachment and Garnishment, § 68.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Equality Between Executions.

This section gives an execution from a justice of peace court (now general sessions court) and a court of record a status of equality. Cooper v. Potter, 175 Tenn. 664, 137 S.W.2d 276, 1939 Tenn. LEXIS 89 (1940).

2. Executions — Priority in Time.

Where execution on judgment obtained by plaintiff against defendant in circuit court was placed in the hands of the sheriff at the same time as an execution obtained by defendant against defendant before a justice of the peace (now general sessions court) it was proper for the sheriff to satisfy the justice of the peace judgment out of proceeds collected on the circuit court judgment. Cooper v. Potter, 175 Tenn. 664, 137 S.W.2d 276, 1939 Tenn. LEXIS 89 (1940).

3. Attachment Levy.

This statute has no application to a levy under an attachment issued by a justice of the peace (now general sessions court). The lien of an execution from a court of record, if of older teste, prevails over it. Peck v. Robinson, 40 Tenn. 438, 1859 Tenn. LEXIS 122 (1859).

4. Date of Execution.

The lien of an execution dates from its teste. Stahlman v. Watson, 39 S.W. 1055, 1897 Tenn. Ch. App. LEXIS 18 (1897).

Part 9
Service of Process

16-15-901. Issuance and service of civil warrants, writs and other papers.

  1. Upon filing of civil warrants, writs and other papers, the clerk of the general sessions court in which the civil warrants, writs or other papers are filed, shall issue the required process, writs or other papers, and cause it or them, with necessary copies of the civil warrant, writ or papers, to be delivered for service to the person authorized to serve process as may be designated by the party filing the civil warrant, writ or other papers or the party's attorney if represented by counsel. The authorized person shall serve the civil warrant, writ or other papers, and the return endorsed on the warrant, writ or other papers shall be proof of the time and manner of service. A civil warrant, writ or other papers may be issued for service in any county, against any defendant or additional defendants.
  2. A civil warrant, attachment or any other leading process used to initiate an action in general sessions court and subpoenas or summons may be served by any person designated by the party or the party's attorney, if represented by counsel, who is not a party to the action and is not less than eighteen (18) years of age. Service of other process and orders of the courts of this state shall be by sheriffs, constables or as provided by law. If service of process is made by a sheriff, constable, or other law enforcement officer, the process server must be identified by name and agency on the service return or in a supplemental affidavit. If service of process is made by a private process server, the process server must be identified by name and a mailing or physical address on the service return or in a supplemental affidavit. Failure of the process server to include this information does not render the service invalid if the service is otherwise valid, but the court may require a private process server to provide the private process server's mailing or physical address to the party on whom process was served.
  3. Nothing in this section shall affect existing laws with respect to venue.

Acts 2002, ch. 794, § 2; 2019, ch. 196, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Former Part 9, §§ 16-15-90116-15-905 (Acts 1995, ch. 205, §§ 2-6), concerning service of process, was repealed by Acts 2002, ch. 794, effective July 1, 2002.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment, effective January 1, 2020, in (b), rewrote the third sentence which read, “The process server must be identified by name and address on the return.” and added the  last two sentences.

Effective Dates. Acts 2019, ch. 196, § 2.  January 1, 2020.

Attorney General Opinions. A private process server simply designated by a party or the party's attorney may not serve a levy of execution, a summons of garnishment, or any process in connection with a garnishment in aid of execution, OAG 02-079 (7/15/02).

Cited: Yousif v. Clark, 317 S.W.3d 240, 2010 Tenn. App. LEXIS 10 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 13, 2010).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Service by Certified Mail.

Trial court properly granted summary judgment to an attorney in his action to enforce a judgment against a former client's real property because the judgment was not subject to collateral attack where it was not void on its face, the client was properly served by certified return receipt mail, the issuing court did not lack subject matter or personal jurisdiction, and the judgment was not outside the pleadings. Taylor v. Cloud, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 611 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 29, 2015), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 989 (Tenn. Nov. 25, 2015).

2. Process Server's Address Required.

General sessions court was without authority to enter a default judgment against defendant and that judgment was void as the general sessions court failed to obtain personal jurisdiction over her because the evidence established that defendant was not properly served with the general sessions civil warrant as she testified that she never received the civil warrant and never met the process server face-to-face; plaintiff offered no rebuttal to defendant's testimony; the civil warrant in the record did not contain the address of the process server; and the affidavit of the process server, detailing the manner of service, as required for proof of service, was missing from the record. Morrow v. Gault Fin., LLC, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 275 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 17, 2018).

16-15-902. Return.

  1. Any person serving the process from the general sessions court shall promptly and within the time during which the person is served must respond, make proof of service to the court and shall identify the person served and shall describe the manner of service.
  2. Process shall be served within sixty (60) days of issuance.
  3. When process is served by mail, the original warrant, writ or other papers shall be endorsed by manner of service. In addition, an affidavit of the person making service setting forth the personal compliance of this section and the return receipt shall be sent to and filed with the clerk of the court. The person making service in this manner shall endorse over the signature on the original warrant, writ or other papers the date of mailing a certified copy of the warrant, writ or other papers to the defendant and the date of receipt of return receipt from the defendant. If the return receipt is signed by the defendant or any person designated by this section or by statute, service on the defendant is complete. If not, service by mail may be attempted or any other methods authorized by this section or by statute may be used.

Acts 2002, ch. 794, § 2; 2008, ch. 608, § 1.

Cited: Yousif v. Clark, 317 S.W.3d 240, 2010 Tenn. App. LEXIS 10 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 13, 2010).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Statute of Limitations.

Lawsuit was barred by the statute of limitations because the requirement of obtaining new process or recommencing the action in general sessions court was triggered for purposes of T.C.A. § 16-15-710 by the failure to return unserved the prior process within 60 days as required by T.C.A. § 16-15-902. Gates v. Perry, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. App. LEXIS 172 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 26, 2014), review denied and ordered not published, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 689 (Tenn. Sept. 22, 2014).

2. Proof of Service.

General sessions court was without authority to enter a default judgment against defendant and that judgment was void as the general sessions court failed to obtain personal jurisdiction over her because the evidence established that defendant was not properly served with the general sessions civil warrant as she testified that she never received the civil warrant and never met the process server face-to-face; plaintiff offered no rebuttal to defendant's testimony; the civil warrant in the record did not contain the address of the process server; and the affidavit of the process server, detailing the manner of service, as required for proof of service, was missing from the record. Morrow v. Gault Fin., LLC, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 275 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 17, 2018).

Plaintiff did not follow the procedure set out in T.C.A. § 16-15-710 for unserved process, and instead, she relied on the original commencement of the action in general sessions court to toll the statute of limitations; the process was returned served, but the return receipt and affidavit were lost, and based on case law, plaintiff's failure to make return to the court did not, ipso facto, constitute a lack of service of process. Hart v. Memphis Light Gas & Water Div., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 725 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 14, 2018).

Language and requirements of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 3 and 4.03(1) and T.C.A. §§ 16-15-710 and 16-15-902(a) are substantively identical; like Tenn. R. Civ. P. 4.03(1), T.C.A. § 16-15-902 does not state that promptly returning proof of service to the court is necessary to accomplish service. Hart v. Memphis Light Gas & Water Div., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 725 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 14, 2018).

3. Construction.

Read together, T.C.A. §§ 16-15-901(b) and 16-15-902(a) allow the warrant to be served by someone other than the sheriff and require that the server be identified by name and address on the warrant, along with the manner of service. Cornerstone Fin. Credit Union v. Mundy, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 517 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 23, 2019).

4. Compliance.

Service of the warrant did not comply with T.C.A. §§ 16-15-901(b) and 16-15-902(a) as the return of service did not describe the manner and did not identify or give an address for the sheriff, and appellant did not file an affidavit of the person who purportedly served the warrant or any other evidence from which to satisfy its burden of establishing that the court had personal jurisdiction over appellee through valid service of process. Consequently, the judgment entered in general sessions court was void. Cornerstone Fin. Credit Union v. Mundy, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 517 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 23, 2019).

16-15-903. Service upon defendants in this state.

The plaintiff shall after issuance by the clerk of the general sessions court furnish the persons making the service with all necessary copies. Service shall be made as follows:

  1. Upon an individual other than an unmarried infant incompetent person, by delivering a copy of the warrant, writ or other papers to the individual personally, or if the individual evades or attempts to evade service, by leaving copies of the warrant, writ or other papers at the individual's dwelling house or usual place of abode with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing in the dwelling house or usual place of abode, whose name shall appear on the proof of service, or by delivering the copies to an agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service on behalf of the individual served;
  2. Upon an unmarried infant or an incompetent person, by delivering a copy of the warrant, writ or other papers to the person's residence guardian or conservator if there is one known to the plaintiff, by delivering the copies to the individual's parent having custody within this state; or if no such parent is within this state, then by delivering the copies to the person within this state having control of the individual. If none of the persons defined and enumerated in this subdivision (2) exists, the court shall appoint a practicing attorney as guardian ad litem to whom the copies shall be delivered. If any of the persons directed by this subdivision (2) to be served is a plaintiff, then the person who is not a plaintiff who stands next in the order named in this subdivision (2) shall be served. In addition to the service provided in this subdivision (2), service shall also be made on an unmarried minor who is fourteen (14) years of age or more and who is not otherwise incompetent;
  3. Upon a partnership or unincorporated association, including a limited liability company, that is named defendant under a common name, by delivering a copy of the warrant, writ or other papers to a partner or managing agent of the partnership, to an officer or managing agent of the association or to an agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service on behalf of the partnership or association;
  4. Upon a domestic corporation or a foreign corporation doing business in this state, by delivering a copy of the warrant, writ or other papers to an officer or managing agent of the corporation, to the chief agent in the county in which the action is brought, or by delivering the copies to any other agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service on behalf of the corporation;
  5. Upon a nonresident individual who transacts business through an office or agency in this state, or a resident individual who transacts business through an office or agency in a county other than the county in which the resident individual resides, in any action growing out of or connected with the business of that office or agency, by delivering a copy of the warrant, writ or other papers to the person in charge of the office or agency;
  6. Upon the state of Tennessee or any agency of the state, by delivering a copy of the warrant, writ or other papers to the attorney general of the state or to any assistant attorney general and reporter;
  7. Upon a county, by delivering a copy of the warrant, writ or other papers to the county mayor, or if absent from the county, to the county attorney if there is one designated; if not, by delivering the copies to the county court clerk;
  8. Upon a municipality, by delivering a copy of the warrant, writ or other papers to the chief executive officer or to the city attorney;
  9. Upon any governmental or any quasi-government entity, by delivering a copy of the warrant, writ or other papers to any officer or managing agent of the entity; and
  10. Service by mail of a warrant, writ, or other papers upon a defendant may be made by the plaintiff, the plaintiff's attorney, or by any person authorized by statute. After the complaint, warrant, writ, or other papers are filed, the clerk shall, upon request, furnish the original warrant, writ, or other papers, a certified copy of the original warrant, writ, or other paper, and a copy of the filed warrant, writ, or other papers to the plaintiff, the plaintiff's attorney, or other authorized person for service by mail. Such person shall send, postage prepaid, a certified copy of the warrant, writ, or other papers by registered return receipt or certified return receipt mail to the defendant. The original warrant, writ, or other papers shall be used for return of service of process. Service by mail shall not be the basis for the entry of a judgment by default unless the record contains a return receipt showing personal acceptance by the defendant or by persons designated by this section. If the defendant is a domestic corporation, or a foreign corporation authorized to conduct business in this state, a refusal to accept delivery shall be the basis for a default judgment only where the request for default is accompanied by evidence from the Tennessee secretary of state showing that the moving party made the certified mail service with the correct entity name and the correct name and address for the registered agent authorized by law to receive service of process. If service by mail is unsuccessful, it may be attempted again or other methods authorized by this title or by statute may be used.

Acts 2002, ch. 794, § 2; 2003, ch. 90, § 2; 2018, ch. 806, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2003, ch. 90, § 2, directed the code commission to change all references from “county executive” to “county mayor” and to include all such changes in supplements and replacement volumes for the Tennessee Code Annotated.

Acts 2018, ch. 806, § 3 provided that the act, which amended this section, shall apply to service of process sent by registered or certified mail on or after July 1, 2018.

Amendments. The 2018 amendment in (10), added the penultimate sentence and inserted commas where they appear preceding “or” throughout the subdivision.

Effective Dates. Acts 2018, ch. 806, § 3. July 1, 2018.

Cross-References. Certified mail in lieu of registered mail, § 1-3-111.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. No Substitute Service.

Order dismissing an account holder's petition for a writ of certiorari was vacated because the account holder's knowledge of the existence of a suit, in which a judgment was eventually entered against him, and his knowledge of a hearing date was not a proper substitute for service under T.C.A. § 16-15-903. Yousif v. Clark, 317 S.W.3d 240, 2010 Tenn. App. LEXIS 10 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 13, 2010), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2010 Tenn. LEXIS 558 (Tenn. June 16, 2010).

2. Service Improper.

Circuit court erred in reinstating a money judgment a lessor obtained against a purported lessee because the lessee was not properly served for purposes of entry of a default judgment for money, and thus, the circuit court lacked jurisdiction over the lessee; there was no evidence that the lessee had evaded personal service, which would allow for service on his father to be effective, or that the father was the lessee's agent, with authority to accept service on his behalf. Tommy Burney Homes v. Francis, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 650 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 12, 2015).

3. Service Proper.

Having been personally served with the warrant and by signing it, defendant received adequate notice of the pending judicial proceedings such that the general sessions court obtained personal jurisdiction over him, and the fact that the process server failed to include his address on the return did nothing to render that notice ineffective. Apexworks Restoration v. Scott, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 514 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 24, 2019).

16-15-904. Service upon defendants outside of state.

    1. Whenever the law of this state authorizes service outside this state, service, when reasonably calculated to give notice, may be made:
      1. By any form of service authorized within this state pursuant to this part;
      2. In any manner prescribed by the law of the state in which service is effected for an action in any of the courts of general jurisdiction in that state; and
      3. As directed by the court.
    2. This section is inapplicable when service is effected in a place not within any judicial district of the United States.
  1. Service of process pursuant to this section shall include a copy of the warrant, writ or other papers.
  2. Service by mail upon a corporation shall be addressed to an officer or managing agent of the corporation, to the chief agent in the county in which the action is brought or by delivering the copies to any other agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service on behalf of the corporation.
  3. Service by mail upon a partnership or unincorporated association, included a limited liability company, that is named defendant upon a common name shall be addressed to a partner or managing agent of the partnership or to an officer or managing agent of the association, or to an agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service on behalf of the partnership or association.
  4. When service of a warrant, writ, or other papers is provided for or permitted by registered or certified mail under the laws of this state, and the addressee, or the addressee's agent, refuses to accept delivery, and it is so stated in the return receipt of the United States postal service, the written return receipt, if returned and filed in the action, shall be deemed an actual and valid service of the warrant, writ, or other papers. Service by mail is complete upon mailing. Service by mail shall not be the basis for the entry of a judgment by default unless the record contains either:
    1. A return receipt showing personal acceptance by the defendant or by persons designated by statute; or
    2. A return receipt stating that the addressee or the addressee's agent refused to accept delivery, which is deemed to be personal acceptance by the defendant pursuant to this subsection (e).

Acts 2002, ch. 794, § 2; 2018, ch. 806, § 2.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2018, ch. 806, § 3 provided that the act, which amended this section, shall apply to service of process sent by registered or certified mail on or after July 1, 2018.

Amendments. The 2018 amendment rewrote (e) which read: “When service of warrant, writ or other papers is provided for or permitted by registered or certified mail under the laws of this state, and the addressee, or the addressee's agent, refuses to accept delivery, and it is so stated in the return receipt of the United States postal service, the written return receipt, if returned and filed in the action, shall be deemed an actual and valid service of the warrant, writ or other papers. Service by mail is complete upon mailing. For purposes of this subsection (e), the United States postal service notation that a properly addressed registered or certified letter is ‘unclaimed,’ or other similar notation, is sufficient evidence of the defendant's refusal to accept delivery.”

Effective Dates. Acts 2018, ch. 806, § 3, July 1, 2018.

Cross-References. Certified mail in lieu of registered mail, § 1-3-111.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Service by Certified Mail.

Trial court properly granted summary judgment to an attorney in his action to enforce a judgment against a former client's real property because the judgment was not subject to collateral attack where it was not void on its face, the client was properly served by certified return receipt mail, the issuing court did not lack subject matter or personal jurisdiction, and the judgment was not outside the pleadings. Taylor v. Cloud, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 611 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 29, 2015), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 989 (Tenn. Nov. 25, 2015).

16-15-905. Constructive service.

In cases where constructive service of process is permissible under the statutes of this state, constructive service shall be made in the manner prescribed by those statutes, unless otherwise expressly provided in this part.

Acts 2002, ch. 794, § 2.

Parts 10-49
[Reserved]

Part 50
Compensation and Qualifications of Judges — Jurisdiction

16-15-5001. Classification of counties for determining compensation of judge.

  1. For the purpose of determining the compensation of a general sessions judge, the counties of this state are divided into seven (7) classes as follows:
    1. Counties having a population of more than forty-nine thousand (49,000) constitute counties of the first class;
    2. Counties having a population of more than thirty-eight thousand (38,000) but not more than forty-nine thousand (49,000) constitute counties of the second class;
    3. Counties having a population of more than thirty thousand (30,000) but not more than thirty-eight thousand (38,000) constitute counties of the third class;
    4. Counties having a population of more than twenty-four thousand (24,000) but not more than thirty thousand (30,000) constitute counties of the fourth class;
    5. Counties having a population of more than nineteen thousand (19,000) but not more than twenty-four thousand (24,000) constitute counties of the fifth class;
    6. Counties having a population of more than ten thousand (10,000) but not more than nineteen thousand (19,000) constitute counties of the sixth class; and
    7. Counties having a population of ten thousand (10,000) or less constitute counties of the seventh class.
  2. The class into which a county falls shall be determined by the 1990 federal census and any subsequent federal census or any special census conducted by the department of economic and community development.
    1. For the purpose of determining the compensation of a general sessions judge who presides over a consolidated general sessions court consisting of two (2) or more counties, the populations of all counties served by the court shall be added together, and the resultant sum shall be increased to the next higher classification for the purpose of determining the class of counties in accordance with subsection (a).
    2. Each county served by a consolidated general sessions court shall pay its proportional share of the compensation of the judge or judges of the consolidated court based on a ratio established by using the population of the county according to the latest available census compared to the population of the counties comprising the consolidated general sessions court using the latest available census.
    3. For the purposes of this subsection (c) only, the compensation of such judge shall be based on what a judge of the next higher classification is to receive on September 1, 1998.
    1. If a county is in one class as provided in this section on September 1 of the year in which a judge is elected to office, and after that date the county moves into a lower class on the basis of a subsequent federal census, the salary of the judge shall not be diminished during the time for which the judge was elected.
    2. If a county is in one class as provided in this section on September 1 of the year in which a judge is elected to office and after that date the county moves into a higher class on the basis of a subsequent census, the salary of the judge shall be determined by the higher classification for the remainder of the term for which the judge was elected and subsequent terms of office. In no instance shall a judge's salary, for a county moving into a higher classification, be less than the salary paid prior to the reclassification.

Acts 1988, ch. 698, § 1; 1990, ch. 637, § 1; 1992, ch. 952, § 13; 1993, ch. 347, § 1; 1997, ch. 555, § 1; 2002, ch. 723, § 1; 2003, ch. 256, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 1992, ch. 952, § 15 provided that the amendments by that act apply to all matters as to which a notice of appeal is filed from and after May 1, 1992.

Acts 2002, ch. 723, § 1 amended the county classifications described in this section and eliminated Class 8 counties, effective September 1, 2006.

For table of U.S. decennial populations of Tennessee counties, see Volume 13 and its supplement.

Attorney General Opinions. Salary of general sessions' judge in excess of statutory requirements, OAG 98-0141 (8/7/98).

If a county moves into a higher classification as a result of the 2000 census, the compensation of a general sessions judge for that county should be determined based upon the higher classification for the remainder of the term for which the judge was elected; however, if a county moves into a lower classification as a result of the 2000 census, the compensation of a general sessions judge for that county should be determined based upon the county's previous classification for the remainder of the term for which the judge was elected, OAG 00-123 (8/4/00).

If a county is reclassified as a Class 1 county as a result of the 2000 federal census, and if the compensation to be paid general sessions judges in Class 1 counties is less than the compensation previously received by the general sessions judge in that county as a Class 3 county, then the compensation of such judge would continue to be determined based upon the county's previous classification as a Class 3 county, OAG 00-123 (8/4/00).

Any increase in compensation due to reclassification based upon the results of the 2000 federal census would take effect as of the effective date of the census, or April 1, 2000, OAG 00-123 (8/4/00).

16-15-5002. Time judge must devote to office — Practice of law or other employment.

  1. All general sessions judges in Class 1, 2 or 3 counties shall devote full time to the duties of such office and shall be prohibited from the practice of law or any other employment which conflicts with the performance of their duties as judge.
  2. General sessions judges in Class 4 through Class 8 counties shall be considered part-time judges and shall not be prohibited from the practice of law or other gainful employment while serving as judge except to the extent the practice or employment constitutes a conflict of interest.
  3. Notwithstanding this section to the contrary, a judge of the general sessions court in any county with a population of not less than eighteen thousand three hundred one (18,301) nor more than eighteen thousand four hundred (18,400), according to the 2010 federal census or any subsequent federal census, upon adoption of a resolution by a two-thirds (2/3) majority vote of the county legislative body, shall devote full time to the duties of such office and shall be prohibited from the practice of law or any other employment which conflicts with the performance of their duties as judge.

Acts 1988, ch. 698, § 2; 2018, ch. 921, § 2.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2002, ch. 723, § 1 amended the county classifications described in § 16-15-5001 and eliminated Class 8 counties, effective September 1, 2006.

For tables of U.S. decennial populations of Tennessee counties, see Volume 13 and its supplement.

Amendments. The 2018 amendment added (c).

Effective Dates. Acts 2018, ch. 921, § 3. May 1, 2018.

Cross-References. Courts and judicial functions, part-time judges, § 7-3-311.

Law Reviews.

The Impossible Balance: A Tennessee judge makes the case for abolishing state's part-time judgeships (Judge James L. Cotton Jr.), 37 No. 5 Tenn. B.J. 12 (2001).

Attorney General Opinions. City attorney may not simultaneously serve as general sessions judge, OAG 98-0131 (7/27/98).

The Lake County general sessions judge is not prohibited from the private practice of law while in office, except to the extent such practice constitutes a conflict of interest, as the private act making the office of Lake County general sessions judge a full-time position was superseded by T.C.A. § 16-15-5002, OAG 02-046 (4/15/02).

If the current Lake County general sessions judge were to resign, the person appointed to fill the vacancy would be part-time, as T.C.A. § 16-15-5002 superseded the private act making the office of Lake County general sessions judge a full-time position, OAG 02-047 (4/15/02).

16-15-5003. Base salaries — Annual supplement — Restrictions on adding jurisdiction — Annual adjustment — Construction.

  1. The annual base salaries for general sessions judges shall be as follows:
    1. Counties of the first class  $70,000
    2. Counties of the second class  50,000
    3. Counties of the third class  40,000
    4. Counties of the fourth class  32,000
    5. Counties of the fifth class  26,000
    6. Counties of the sixth class  22,000
    7. Counties of the seventh class  20,000
    1. In addition to the base salary provided by subsection (a), if a general sessions judge in a Class 2 or 3 county has or by operation of law obtains any of the following additional jurisdictions, the general sessions judge shall receive an annual supplement in the amounts indicated below:
      1. Juvenile jurisdiction  $20,000
      2. Probate  10,000
      3. Domestic relations  10,000
      4. Workers' compensation  10,000
    2. Regardless of the kind or amount of additional jurisdiction a Class 2 judge may have, the judge shall not receive annual supplements in excess of twenty thousand dollars ($20,000).
    3. Regardless of the kind or amount of additional jurisdiction a Class 3 judge may have, the judge shall not receive annual supplements in excess of forty thousand dollars ($40,000).
    1. In addition to the base salary provided by subsection (a), if a general sessions judge in a Class 4, 5 or 6 county has or by operation of law obtains any of the following additional jurisdictions, the general sessions judge shall receive an annual supplement in the amounts indicated below:
      1. Juvenile jurisdiction  $10,000
      2. Probate  5,000
      3. Domestic relations  5,000
      4. Workers' compensation  5,000
      5. Mental health commitments  10,000
    2. Regardless of the kind or amount of additional jurisdiction a Class 4, 5 or 6 judge may have, the judge shall not receive annual supplements in excess of twenty thousand dollars ($20,000).
    3. Upon adoption of a resolution by a two-thirds (2/3) majority vote of the county legislative body, in addition to the base salary and additional supplements stated in subsections (a) and (c), any Class 4, 5 or 6 judge who is required to exercise the duties and powers set forth in title 33, chapter 6, part 4 regarding the emergency custody and hospitalization of persons believed to be mentally ill, due to a mental hospital or treatment source being located in the county where the judge presides, the judge shall receive an additional annual supplement of five thousand dollars ($5,000), which may be in excess of the twenty thousand dollars ($20,000) limitation on supplements set forth in subdivision (c)(2).
    1. In addition to the base salary provided by subsection (a), if a general sessions judge in a Class 7 county has or by operation of law obtains any of the following jurisdictions, the general sessions judge shall receive an annual supplement in the amounts indicated below:
      1. Juvenile jurisdiction  $7,500
      2. Probate  2,500
      3. Domestic relations  2,500
      4. Workers' compensation  2,500
    2. Regardless of the kind or amount of additional jurisdiction a Class 7 judge may have, the judge shall not receive annual supplements in excess of ten thousand dollars ($10,000).
    1. On July 1, 1991, the base salaries established by this section shall be adjusted in accordance with subdivision (e)(2) to reflect the percentage of change in the average consumer price index (all items — city average) as published by the United States department of labor, bureau of labor statistics, between calendar year 1989 and calendar year 1990. Each succeeding July 1, a similar adjustment shall be made upon the percentage of change in the average consumer price index between the two (2) calendar years preceding July 1 of the year in which the adjustment is made. However, no reduction shall be made by way of adjustment on account of any decrease in the average consumer price index between the two (2) successive calendar years.
    2. For each two percent (2%) increase in the average consumer price index between two (2) successive calendar years, the base salaries shall be adjusted by one percent (1%). No annual adjustment shall exceed four percent (4%) regardless of the increase in the average consumer price index between any two (2) successive calendar years. Annual adjustments shall be made upon the base salary set out in subsection (a) and the adjustment shall not include any supplement that may be received pursuant to subsection (b) or (c).
  2. The compensation, supplement and annual adjustment provisions of this section are to be construed as minimum levels. Nothing in this part shall be construed as prohibiting a county, by private act, from compensating its general sessions judge or judges at levels in excess of what is required by this part. Any private or public act in effect on September 1, 1990, that provides greater compensation for a general sessions judge than is required by this section shall, to the extent of the judge's amount of compensation, prevail over this part, and the base salary of the judge shall be the salary paid to the holder of that office on August 31, 1990, pursuant to such public or private act, plus a percentage increase equivalent to the same percentage increase given by subsection (a) to a judge of a Class 6 county. Nothing in this part shall prevent a county from establishing and funding the position of part-time general sessions judge in a county with a full-time general sessions judge.
  3. Notwithstanding any provision of law or this part to the contrary, no judge of a general sessions court shall be paid a salary that is greater than the salary paid to a judge of a circuit court.
    1. Effective September 1, 1998, the annual salary for a general sessions court judge shall be increased over the annual compensation and supplements and annual adjustments that each judge actually received as of August 31, 1998, by the lesser of:
      1. Ten thousand dollars ($10,000); or
      2. Twenty percent (20%) of the annual compensation and supplements and annual adjustments as of August 31, 1998.
    2. Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, each full-time general sessions court judge in a county shall receive the same compensation as the most highly compensated general sessions court judge in that county if the judges have the same jurisdiction.
    3. Instead of the annual adjustments authorized in subsection (e), on July 1, 1999, and each succeeding July 1, the base salaries as adjusted annually and supplements as adjusted annually established by this section shall be adjusted in accordance with § 8-23-103.
      1. The compensation, supplement and annual adjustment provisions of this section are to be construed as minimum levels. The compensation schedule established by this part is a comprehensive plan, and no salary supplement in excess of the supplements provided by this part shall be available to a general sessions judge unless expressly provided and funded by a private act.
      2. Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, a judge of a court of general sessions may not be paid compensation based on both this part and the compensation provisions in a private act.
      3. Nothing in this part shall be construed as prohibiting a county, by private act, from compensating its general sessions judge or judges at levels in excess of what is required by this part. Any private or public act in effect on September 1, 1998, that provides greater compensation for a general sessions judge than is required by this section shall, to the extent of the judge's amount of compensation, prevail over this part, and the base salary of the judge shall be the salary paid to the holder of that office on August 31, 1998, pursuant to the public or private act plus a percentage increase equivalent to the same percentage increase given by subdivision (h)(1) to a judge of a Class 6 county determined as of August 31, 1998.
    1. Notwithstanding any law or public chapter to the contrary, effective September 1, 2006, the annual salary for a general sessions court judge who is compensated under this section shall be increased over the annual compensation and supplements and annual adjustments that each judge actually received as of August 31, 2006, by the lesser of:
      1. Ten thousand dollars ($10,000); or
      2. Twenty percent (20%) of the annual compensation and supplements and annual adjustments as of August 31, 2006.
    2. A judge of a general sessions court may not be paid compensation based on both this part and the compensation provisions of a private act.
    3. Notwithstanding any provision of this subsection (i) to the contrary, each general sessions court judge in a Class 1 county who is compensated under this section shall receive the same compensation as the most highly compensated general sessions court judge in a Class 1 county who is compensated under this section.
    4. Notwithstanding any provision of this subsection (i) to the contrary, each general sessions court judge in a Class 2-7 county who is compensated under this section and who receives the maximum amount of annual supplements shall receive the same compensation as the most highly compensated general sessions court judge in the same county classification who is compensated under this section. All other general sessions court judges in Class 2-7 counties who are compensated under this section shall receive the same compensation as the most highly compensated general sessions court judge in the same county classification with the same jurisdiction who is compensated under this section; provided, however, that no judge shall be paid a salary that reflects jurisdictional supplements that the judge is not entitled to exercise by law.
    5. Instead of the annual adjustments authorized in subsection (e), on July 1, 2007, and each succeeding July 1, the annual compensation and supplements and annual adjustments established under this section shall be adjusted in accordance with § 8-23-103.
    6. Nothing in this part shall be construed as prohibiting a county, by public or private act, from compensating its general sessions court judge or judges at levels in excess of what is required by this section. Any public or private act in effect on September 1, 2006, that provides greater compensation for a general sessions court judge than is required by this section shall, to the extent of the judge's amount of compensation, prevail over this section. Notwithstanding any provision of this subsection (i) to the contrary, a general sessions court judge in a Class 6 county who receives no supplements and who is compensated under the provisions of a private or public act and not under this section shall receive the same increase provided in subdivision (i)(1).
    7. On or before July 15, 2006, each general sessions court judge shall certify to the administrative office of the courts (AOC) the total amount of the judge's actual compensation as of August 31, 2006, the jurisdictions exercised by the judge, the legal basis for exercising the jurisdiction, and whether the judge is compensated under this section or under a public or private act. Included in the information submitted by the judge to the AOC shall be a certification of the county's chief financial officer of the actual compensation of the judge as of August 31, 2006, or other verifiable proof of the judge's actual compensation. When all judges have certified the required information to the AOC, the AOC shall report to each general sessions court judge the amount of compensation to be paid to the general sessions court judge beginning on September 1, 2006, based on the information provided by the judge. Thereafter, when a new court is created, a new judge takes office or any similar change occurs, or upon the completion of a new federal census, the administrative office of the courts shall report the amount of compensation to be paid to any judge affected by the change.
    8. The judges of the general sessions court in any county with a population of not less than three hundred eighty-two thousand (382,000) nor more than three hundred eighty-two thousand one hundred (382,100), according to the 2000 federal census or any subsequent federal census, and that has a charter form of government shall receive the same annual compensation as the general sessions judges in those counties with a metropolitan form of government and a population in excess of five hundred thousand (500,000), according to the 2000 federal census or any subsequent federal census.
    9. No general sessions judge who engages in the private practice of law shall receive any increase in salary pursuant to this subsection (i), if the judge is prohibited by law from engaging in private practice.
  4. Notwithstanding any provision of law or this part to the contrary, no judge of a general sessions court shall be paid a salary which is greater than the salary paid to a judge of a circuit court.
  5. In addition to the base salary provided by this section, a judge of the general sessions court in any county with a population of not less than eighteen thousand three hundred one (18,301) nor more than eighteen thousand four hundred (18,400), according to the 2010 federal census or any subsequent federal census, shall receive an additional twenty thousand dollars ($20,000) in salary upon adoption of a resolution by a two-thirds (2/3) majority vote of the county legislative body approving the increased salary and if such position is full time.

Acts 1988, ch. 698, § 3; 1990, ch. 637, § 2; 1997, ch. 555, §§ 2, 5; 1998, ch. 1131, § 1; 2000, ch. 947, § 8A; 2002, ch. 723, §§ 2, 3; 2005, ch. 324, § 1; 2006, ch. 957, §§ 1, 2; 2018, ch. 921, § 1.

Code Commission Notes.

For the fiscal year county officials salary schedule, see the County Technical Assistance Service web site at http:// www.ctas.tennessee.edu.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2005, ch. 324, § 1 purported to amend subdivision (a)(1), effective September 1, 2006. Acts 2006, ch. 957, § 2 repealed Acts 2005, ch. 324. The amendment by ch. 324, if it had taken effect, would have amended subdivision (a)(1) to read: “Effective September 1, 2006, general sessions judges in counties of the first class shall be paid a salary equivalent to ninety-seven and one-half percent (97.5%) of the salary paid to a circuit court judge.”

For tables of U.S. decennial populations of Tennessee counties, see Volume 13 and its supplement.

Amendments. The 2018 amendment added (k).

Effective Dates. Acts 2018, ch. 921, § 3. May 1, 2018.

Attorney General Opinions. Coffee County general sessions judge entitled to annual supplement, OAG 94-004 (1/11/94).

Salary supplements for juvenile court jurisdiction, OAG 94-044 (4/4/94).

Nonlawyer judges, eligibility, OAG 94-84 (8/5/94).

Compensation of juvenile court referee in mental health commitment proceedings, OAG 94-121 (10/10/94).

Applicability to municipal judges, OAG 98-013 (1/9/98).

Salary of general sessions' judge in excess of statutory requirements, OAG 98-0141 (8/7/98).

In determining an increase in salary under T.C.A. § 16-15-5003(i)(1) (now T.C.A. § 16-15-5003(h)(1)) the base amount is the annual compensation (with supplements and annual adjustments) a judge actually received as of August 31, 1998; thus, under applicable private and public acts, the base salary is the higher of $ 36,730, the salary payable to a general county officer in a county of the sixth class, or the sum of $ 20,000 plus required cost-of-living adjustments, plus a $ 10,000 supplement for juvenile and domestic relations jurisdiction, OAG 00-165 (12/20/00).

The current salary for a Class 7 general sessions judge who exercised juvenile and domestic relations jurisdictions was the base salary, with annual adjustments, and jurisdictional supplements, increased as required under T.C.A. § 16-15-5003(i)(1) (now T.C.A. § 16-15-5003(h)(1)), which provided for an increase of $ 10,000 or 20 percent, whichever was less, of the salary the judge actually received on August 31, 1998, plus annual adjustments on the entire amount to reflect changes in the consumer price index, OAG 00-190 (12/20/00).

An increase in salary resulting from a change in the class of the county is payable as of the effective date of a census, OAG 00-190 (12/20/00).

A county which was a second class county under the 1990 census and which becomes a first class county under the 2000 census should determine the compensation of its general sessions judge in the following manner: (1) The new base salary should be $ 70,000, plus all cost of living adjustments required for that salary from July 1, 1990, to July 1, 1998; (2) To this figure should be added the actual one-time increase made to the general sessions judge's salary effective September 1, 1998; (3) To this figure should be added the cost of living adjustments required for that salary on July 1, 1999, and July 1, 2000; and (4) The total salary may not be higher than the salary paid to a judge of a circuit court, OAG 01-024 (2/15/01).

For the remainder of the judge's original term, the salary of the general sessions judge in a first class county who took office in 1996 for the remainder of a term that began in 1990 was determined as follows: (1) A base salary of $ 70,000 salary, plus annual adjustments to the base; (2) As of 1996, this figure included all of the annual adjustments made through July 1, 1995, for that salary due before July 1, 1996, and all the annual adjustments made through July 1, 1996, for the salary due thereafter; and (3) Annual adjustments would then be added the subsequent July 1, 1997, and July 1, 1998, OAG 01-029 (3/5/01).

For a new term beginning in 1998, the salary of the general sessions judge in a first class county who took office in 1996 for the remainder of a term that began in 1990 was determined as follows: (1) A $ 70,000 base salary, plus all annual adjustments due until July 1, 1998; and (2) To this sum was added the one-time increase of $ 10,000 effective September 1, 1998, OAG 01-029 (3/5/01).

Excluding jurisdictional supplements from the salary for judges in counties that have moved into counties of the first class as a result of the 2000 census does not violate legislative intent that judges in the same class counties with the same jurisdictions be paid equal salaries, OAG 01-107 (6/29/01).

The equal protection clause of U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, § 1 is not violated by the calculation of salaries of different general sessions judges exercising the same jurisdiction in counties of the first class in different manners, i.e, by judges who were receiving supplements under former T.C.A. § 16-15-205 and Opinion 94-44 and who were reelected to office receiving a salary that continues to reflect those supplements, while judges in counties that moved into the first class as a result of the 2000 census receiving a salary that does not reflect those supplements, OAG 01-107 (6/29/01).

Where a judge in a county of the sixth class received an increase equal to 20 percent of the salary the judge was actually receiving as of August 31, 1998, and that county, under the 2000 census results, becomes a county of the fifth class, the judge's salary from 2000 on should not include an increase equal to 20 percent of the salary that judge would have been receiving if the county had been in the fifth class as of August 31, 1998, OAG 01-108 (6/29/01).

Where the increase in the consumer price index during a year was three percent, a judge is entitled to an adjustment of one percent, rather than one and one-half percent, as T.C.A. § 16-15-5003 provides that an adjustment will be made to reflect two percent incremental changes, OAG 01-108 (6/29/01).

Where, under the results of the 2000 census, a county became a county in the first class for purposes of calculating its general sessions judge's salary, the judge's new salary would be the $ 70,000 base for class one judges, increased by cost of living increases payable under T.C.A. 16-15-5003(f) (now T.C.A. § 16-15-5003(e)) to July 30, 1998, plus $ 10,000 or 20 percent of the salary the judge was actually receiving as of August 31, 1998, whichever was greater, OAG 01-109 (7/6/01).

The equal protection clauses of the Tennessee and United States Constitution are not violated to the extent that T.C.A. § 16-15-5003 provides for different salaries for judges in counties of the first class who exercise the same jurisdiction since the discrepancies provided for by the statute are rationally related to a legitimate state interest in retaining experienced judges, OAG 01-110 (7/6/01).

To the extent that the statute provides for different salaries for judges in counties of the first class who exercise the same jurisdiction, the statute is not internally inconsistent or contradictory as it provides that differently situated judges in counties of the first class will receive different salary levels, OAG 01-110 (7/6/01).

In a county which was a sixth class county under the 1990 census and which becomes a fifth class county under the 2000 census, the new salary for its general sessions judge is the base salary for a judge in a county of the fifth class, plus cost-of-living increases to the base under T.C.A. 16-15-5003(f) (now T.C.A. § 16-15-5003(e)), plus the increase the judge actually received on September 1, 1998, and applicable jurisdictional supplements for a judge in a county of the fifth class, plus cost-of-living increases under T.C.A. 16-15-5003(i)(3) (now T.C.A. §  16-15-5003(h)(3)),OAG 01-122 (8/7/01).

Cited: Tenn. Div. of the United Daughters of the Confederacy v. Vanderbilt Univ., 174 S.W.3d 98, 2005 Tenn. App. LEXIS 272 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Salary Supplement.

General sessions judge received jurisdiction over mental health commitments by operation of law under Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-203 and thus was entitled to a salary supplement for the exercise of that jurisdiction in addition to the salary supplement received for the exercise of juvenile jurisdiction, even though the exercise of the latter jurisdiction was a necessary prerequisite to the exercise of mental health commitment jurisdiction. Wilson v. Johnson County, 879 S.W.2d 807, 1994 Tenn. LEXIS 165 (Tenn. 1994).

Judge of a trial justice court created by private act could not invoke the doctrine of equitable estoppel to require salary supplements by the county, as provided for general sessions court judges, which were never paid or promised to the judge, and which were not authorized in the private act. Sexton v. Sevier County, 948 S.W.2d 747, 1997 Tenn. App. LEXIS 71 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997), appeal denied, — S.W.2d —, 1997 Tenn. LEXIS 352 (Tenn. June 30, 1997).

2. Special General Session Judges.

No statute explicitly requires counties to compensate special general sessions court judges appointed in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann.§ 17-2-116(a)(1); this obligation, however, must necessarily be implied from the statutes creating the general sessions courts, providing for their funding, and governing the selection not only of regular general sessions judges but also of their temporary replacements. State ex rel. Witcher v. Bilbrey, 878 S.W.2d 567, 1994 Tenn. App. LEXIS 103 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994).

16-15-5004. Concurrent jurisdiction — Domestic relations — Workers' compensation — Probate cases — Mental commitments.

  1. In any county having a population of not less than seventy-seven thousand seven hundred (77,700) nor more than seventy-seven thousand eight hundred (77,800), according to the 1980 federal census or any subsequent federal census, on July 1 of each year, the general session judges shall have concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit and chancery courts over domestic relations cases. When the general sessions court of any such county is exercising domestic relations jurisdiction under the authority conferred by this subsection (a) or § 16-15-501(b)(4), the clerk and master of the county shall serve as the clerk of the general sessions court.
  2. In counties of the second class having a population of not less than forty-seven thousand five hundred seventy-five (47,575) nor more than forty-seven thousand six hundred fifteen (47,615), according to the 1980 federal census or any subsequent federal census:
    1. The general sessions court shall have concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit and chancery courts over domestic relations cases. The circuit court clerk shall be designated as the clerk of the general sessions domestic relations court; and
    2. The base salary of the general sessions judge in those counties shall be as provided by this part.
  3. In counties of the third class having a population of not less than thirty-two thousand six hundred (32,600) nor more than thirty-two thousand seven hundred (32,700), according to the 1980 federal census or any subsequent federal census:
    1. The general sessions court shall have concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit and chancery courts over workers' compensation cases. The clerk and master of the chancery court shall be designated as the clerk of the general sessions workers' compensation court; and
    2. The base salary of the general sessions judge in the counties shall be as provided by this part.
  4. In counties of the sixth class having a population of not less than fourteen thousand eight hundred (14,800) nor more than fourteen thousand eight hundred fifty (14,850), according to the 1980 federal census or any subsequent federal census:
    1. The general sessions court shall have concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit and chancery courts over domestic relations cases, probate cases and mental health commitments; and
    2. Regardless of the court exercising jurisdiction, domestic relations cases, probate cases and mental health commitments shall continue to be filed in the clerk's office where the cases are currently filed. When the general sessions court of the county is exercising any of the jurisdiction set out in subdivision (d)(1), the appropriate clerk shall also serve as the clerk of the general sessions court.
    1. In counties of the fourth class having a population of not less than twenty five thousand three hundred (25,300) nor more than twenty five thousand three hundred fifty (25,350), according to the 1980 federal census or any subsequent federal census:
      1. The general sessions court shall have concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit and chancery courts over probate cases and mental health commitments; and
      2. Regardless of the court exercising jurisdiction, probate cases and mental health commitments shall continue to be filed in the clerk's office where the cases are currently filed.
    2. Notwithstanding the limitation on annual supplements in § 16-15-5003(c)(2), the judge of the court of general sessions to which subdivision (e)(1) is applicable shall receive the total amount of the supplements authorized by law for the judge.
    3. This subsection (e) shall have no effect unless it is approved by a two-thirds (2/3) vote of the legislative body of any county to which it may apply. Its approval or nonapproval shall be proclaimed by the presiding officer of the county legislative body and certified to the secretary of state.
    1. In counties of the fourth class having a population of not less than twenty-six thousand one hundred (26,100) nor more than twenty-six thousand two hundred (26,200), according to the 1990 federal census or any subsequent federal census:
      1. The general sessions court shall have concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit and chancery courts over workers' compensation cases, divorce and all other domestic relations cases, mental health commitment cases, probate cases and cases involving decedents' estates; and
      2. Regardless of the court exercising jurisdiction, workers' compensation cases, divorce and all other domestic relations cases, mental health commitment cases, probate cases and cases involving decedents' estates shall continue to be filed in the clerk's office where the cases were filed on June 30, 1999.
    2. Subdivision (f)(1) shall have no effect unless it is approved by a two-thirds (2/3) vote of the legislative body of any county to which it may apply. Its approval or nonapproval shall be proclaimed by the presiding officer of the county legislative body and certified to the secretary of state.
    1. In counties of the sixth class having a population of not less than seventeen thousand two hundred fifty (17,250) nor more than seventeen thousand five hundred fifty (17,550), according to the 1990 federal census or any subsequent federal census:
      1. The general sessions court has concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit and chancery courts over divorce and all other domestic relations cases, mental health commitment cases, probate cases and cases involving decedents' estates.
      2. Regardless of the court exercising jurisdiction, divorce and all other domestic relations cases, mental health commitment cases, probate cases and cases involving decedents' estates shall continue to be filed in the clerk's office where the cases were filed on June 30, 2000.
    2. Subdivision (g)(1) shall have no effect unless it is approved by a two-thirds (2/3) vote of the legislative body of any county to which it applies. Its approval or nonapproval shall be proclaimed by the presiding officer of the legislative body and certified to the secretary of state.

Acts 1988, ch. 698, §§ 9, 12, 13; 1989, ch. 81, §§ 1, 3; 1991, ch. 396, § 1; 1991, ch. 501, §§ 1, 2; 1999, ch. 352, § 1; 2000, ch. 877, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. For table of U.S. decennial populations of Tennessee counties, see Volume 13 and its supplement.

Cross-References. Jurisdiction, title 16, ch. 15, part 5.

Attorney General Opinions. In those counties meeting the population requirements of T.C.A. § 16-15-5004(d), a party who wishes to invoke the jurisdiction of the general sessions court in a domestic relations, probate, or mental health commitment case should make that choice of forum clear in the complaint but should file the complaint with the clerk of the court where such cases were customarily filed before May 22, 1991, OAG 00-182 (12/7/00).

16-15-5005. Judges to be licensed — Vacancies.

    1. Notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, all persons occupying the office of general sessions judge shall be licensed to practice law in this state.
    2. Any person serving in the office of general sessions judge on August 1, 1990, who is not a licensed attorney may seek reelection to the position and serve as a general sessions judge as long as the person is continuously reelected.
    3. If a vacancy occurs in the office of a non-attorney general sessions judge elected pursuant to this section, the vacancy shall be filled by a person licensed to practice law and the qualifications set out in subdivision (a)(1) shall thereafter apply to that position.
    1. Notwithstanding this section, if a vacancy occurs in the office of general sessions judge and no licensed attorney appears at the meeting when the vacancy is being filled by the county legislative body and offers to become a candidate for the office, the vacancy may be filled by a person not licensed to practice law.
    2. If no licensed attorney qualifies for an election being held to fill the office of general sessions judge, or the only attorney candidate legally withdraws, the county election commission shall extend the qualification deadline for a period of ten (10) days, during which period persons not licensed to practice law may qualify to seek the office of general sessions judge.
    3. Subdivision (b)(2) shall not apply in counties having a population of not less than fifty-one thousand twenty-five (51,025) nor more than fifty-one thousand one hundred twenty-five (51,125), according to the 1980 federal census or any subsequent federal census.

Acts 1988, ch. 698, § 5; 1990, ch. 637, §§ 3, 4; 1990, ch. 862, § 1; 1990, ch. 1017, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. For table of U.S. decennial populations of Tennessee counties, see Volume 13 and its supplement.

Cross-References. Qualifications of judges, § 16-15-201.

Attorney General Opinions. Candidates for office required to be licensed, OAG 97-110 (8/06/97).

Cited: In re Williams, 987 S.W.2d 837, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 453 (Tenn. 1998).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Authorized Punishment for Contempt.

Judgment granting a habeas corpus writ was reversed because the general sessions court, regardless of any legal error, had the authority to summarily hold defendant in contempt; under T.C.A. § 16-15-713, the general sessions court judge was authorized to impose a punishment of five days imprisonment upon finding defendant in contempt. Lambert v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 223 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 10, 2012), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 536 (Tenn. Aug. 15, 2012), cert. denied, Lambert v. Tennessee, 184 L. Ed. 2d 740, 133 S. Ct. 950, 568 U.S. 1131, 2013 U.S. LEXIS 860 (U.S. 2013).

16-15-5006. Financial responsibility of counties — Litigation tax for counties.

  1. Each county shall be responsible for paying the base salary, any supplements and any annual adjustments for all of the general sessions judges in the county. Counties are authorized to impose a local litigation tax on each civil case filed in general sessions court, or in a court where the general sessions judge serves as judge, except juvenile court, and are authorized to impose a local litigation tax on each criminal conviction in general sessions court. In order for the tax to be effective, it must be approved by a two-thirds (2/3) vote of the county legislative body of any county wishing to impose it. Its approval by the county legislative body must be proclaimed by the presiding officer of the body and certified by the presiding officer to the secretary of state. The litigation tax authorized by this section may be effective on or after July 1, 1990, and may be in any amount up to six dollars ($6.00) per case. Proceeds of the litigation tax shall be paid to the county general fund. It is the intent of the general assembly that the proceeds of this local tax aid in defraying the cost to counties of paying the general sessions court judges. If, during any fiscal year, the amount of revenue generated by the local tax enacted pursuant to this section does not sufficiently fund the increase in the general sessions judge's compensation mandated by this part or the salary supplement as provided for under § 16-15-205(d)(2) [repealed], the local litigation tax may be raised to an amount more than six dollars ($6.00) necessary to fund the increase mandated by this part or the salary supplement as provided for under § 16-15-205(d)(2) [repealed]; provided, that any increase to fund the supplement shall be adjusted annually.
  2. Any increase in expenditures by a county resulting from the increase provided by this part shall be appropriated from funds that the county receives from the state government that are not earmarked by statute for a particular purpose.

Acts 1988, ch. 698, § 7; 1990, ch. 637, § 5; 1997, ch. 556, § 1; 2004, ch. 684, § 1; 2015, ch. 223, § 1.

Amendments. The 2015 amendment deleted the following language from the second sentence in (a) following “Counties,”: “, except those having a population in excess of five hundred thousand (500,000), according to the 2000 federal census and any subsequent federal census and a metropolitan form of government,” which formerly qualified which counties were authorized to impose a litigation tax.

Effective Dates. Acts 2015, ch. 223, § 1. April 20, 2015.

Cross-References. Local litigation taxes, title 67, ch. 4, part 6.

Attorney General Opinions. Proposed amendment to litigation tax, OAG 96-099 (7/31/96).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Compensation for Special General Sessions Judges.

No statute explicitly requires counties to compensate special general sessions court judges appointed in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann.§ 17-2-116(a)(1); this obligation, however, must necessarily be implied from the statutes creating the general sessions courts, providing for their funding, and governing the selection not only of regular general sessions judges but also of their temporary replacements. State ex rel. Witcher v. Bilbrey, 878 S.W.2d 567, 1994 Tenn. App. LEXIS 103 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994).

16-15-5007. Administrative director of Tennessee general sessions judge's conference — Litigation tax for state.

The administrative director of the courts shall also serve as the administrative director of the Tennessee general sessions judges’ conference. The administrative director of the courts may serve the conference with existing staff or may, with a portion of the proceeds of the litigation tax earmarked to the administrative director's office, employ such additional staff as may be necessary to adequately serve the general sessions judges.

Acts 1988, ch. 698, § 6; 1990, ch. 637, § 6; 1993, ch. 66, § 25; 1993, ch. 241, § 24; 2005, ch. 429, § 19.

Cross-References. Applicability to certain counties, § 16-15-5011.

16-15-5008. Additional litigation tax for state.

Effective July 1, 1988, there is imposed a litigation tax, in addition to the tax imposed by § 16-15-5007 of two dollars ($2.00) on each civil case filed in general sessions court or in a court where the general sessions judge serves as judge, and of two dollars ($2.00) on each criminal conviction in general sessions court. The litigation tax imposed by this section shall not apply to cases in juvenile court.

Acts 1988, ch. 698, § 6; 1990, ch. 637, § 7.

Cross-References. Applicability to certain counties, § 16-15-5011.

16-15-5009. Jurisdiction added by private act.

  1. If added jurisdiction to hear probate, domestic relations or workers' compensation cases is given to a general sessions court by private act, cases shall be filed in either the circuit court clerk's or clerk and master's office unless otherwise provided by private act. The general sessions court that has been given the added jurisdiction to hear such cases shall be assigned cases for hearing by agreement of the general sessions court judges and the circuit court judges and the chancellors.
  2. If added jurisdiction in juvenile cases is given to a general sessions court by private act, cases shall be filed in the clerk's office where the cases are presently filed unless otherwise provided by private act.

Acts 1988, ch. 698, § 11.

16-15-5010. Index and table of jurisdiction.

The Tennessee code commission shall publish in this code an index of acts pertaining to the jurisdiction of courts of general sessions by county and compile a tabulation of such jurisdiction by court.

Acts 1988, ch. 698, § 3.

Compiler's Notes. For the index of acts, referred to in this section, see Volume 13 and its supplement.

16-15-5011. Applicability to certain counties.

Only §§ 16-15-5007 and 16-15-5008 apply to any county having a population in excess of four hundred fifty thousand (450,000) and any county having a population of not less than two hundred eighty-seven thousand seven hundred (287,700) nor more than two hundred eighty-seven thousand eight hundred (287,800), according to the 1980 federal census or any subsequent federal census.

Acts 1988, ch. 698, § 8.

Compiler's Notes. For table of U.S. decennial populations of Tennessee counties, see Volume 13 and its supplement.

16-15-5012. Promulgation of uniform general sessions court warrant.

    1. The administrative office of the courts (AOC), in consultation with the general sessions judges’ conference, court clerks' association, the sheriffs' association and the association of chiefs of police, shall design and promulgate a uniform general sessions court warrant. The purpose of the warrant is to make uniform the information contained on the warrant so that the AOC can compile accurate data on cases in general sessions courts across the state and to make the transfer of the warrant or information contained on the warrant to the AOC as quick and efficient as possible.
    2. Upon the warrant being promulgated, it shall be used exclusively in all general sessions courts and other courts when exercising general sessions court jurisdiction; provided, in general sessions courts that use a warrant containing substantially the same information as that contained on the uniform warrant and where warrant information collected by the AOC is collected and maintained electronically by the general sessions court clerk, a non-uniform warrant may be used.
  1. The AOC, in consultation with the general sessions judges’ conference, Tennessee bar association, court clerks' association, Tennessee trial lawyers' association and the sheriffs' association, shall design and promulgate a uniform general sessions civil warrant. Upon the civil warrant being promulgated, it shall be used exclusively in all general sessions courts and other courts when exercising general sessions court jurisdiction; provided, in general sessions courts that use a civil warrant containing substantially the same information as that contained on the uniform civil warrant and where civil warrant information collected by the AOC is collected and maintained electronically by the general sessions court clerk, a non-uniform civil warrant may be used.

Acts 2000, ch. 968, § 1; 2001, ch. 362, § 1.

16-15-5013. Designation of division of general sessions court as mental health court.

  1. The county commission of any county having a population of eight hundred thousand (800,000) or more, according to the 2000 federal census or any subsequent federal census, may designate a division of the county's general sessions court as the mental health court. The mental health court shall be staffed using existing general sessions court staff members.
  2. The mental health court is granted the power to hear cases involving petitions filed under the mental health law, compiled in title 33, and mental commitments.
  3. The mental health court shall strive to identify and provide treatment and services to persons who are mentally ill, developmentally disabled or dually diagnosed, or persons who have a history of alcohol or drug abuse.
  4. The mental health court shall also strive to create a single point of contact for persons governed by this section and shall seek to provide case management, forensic alternative community treatment and community-based services.

Acts 2004, ch. 703, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. For table of U.S. decennial populations of Tennessee counties, see Volume 13 and its supplement.

16-15-5014. Domestic violence court for Shelby County.

  1. In order to maximize and concentrate limited prosecutorial, counseling and other social resources to victims of domestic violence, the tenth division of the Shelby County general sessions court shall serve as the domestic violence court for Shelby County.
  2. Provided that the caseload of the domestic violence court does not exceed the capacity of the tenth division to hear all such cases, the tenth division of the Shelby County general sessions court shall have exclusive jurisdiction over matters involving domestic violence, orders of protection, domestic assault and all other cases incident to domestic abuse as defined in § 36-3-601; provided, however, that the tenth division may retain concurrent jurisdiction over other types of cases. The determination whether the tenth division of the Shelby County general sessions court has exceeded its capacity to hear all domestic violence cases shall be made by the presiding judge of the tenth division in consultation with the chief judge of the Shelby County general sessions court.
  3. If it has been determined pursuant to subsection (b) that the caseload of the domestic violence court exceeds the capacity of the tenth division of the Shelby County general sessions court to hear all such cases, then the excess cases shall be distributed among the remaining divisions of the Shelby County general sessions court to be heard.
  4. The general sessions court shall commence as the domestic violence court for Shelby County no later than September 1, 2009.

Acts 2009, ch. 391, § 1.

Effective Dates. Acts 2009, ch. 391, § 2. June 9, 2009.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Exclusive Jurisdiction.

Tenth division of the Shelby County general sessions court has exclusive jurisdiction over matters involving domestic violence, orders of protection, domestic assault and all other cases incident to domestic abuse to the exclusion of the other general sessions courts; however, this does not impact the jurisdiction of the circuit, chancery, and juvenile courts in Shelby County to adjudicate such matters. Therefore, a request for an order of protection did not have to be transferred from a circuit court back to a general sessions court. Pantik v. Pantik, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. App. LEXIS 130 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 10, 2014).

Chapter 16
County Courts

Part 1
General Provisions [Repealed in certain counties]

16-16-101. Establishment.

  1. A court is established in each county for the dispatch of probate and other business entrusted to it, to be called the county court.
  2. Subsection (a) shall only apply in counties having a population, according to the 2000 federal census or any subsequent federal census, of:

    not less than  not more than

    12,800 12,900

    27,100 27,200

    43,100 43,200

    62,300 62,400

    182,000 182,100

  3. In counties having a population of not less than thirty-nine thousand fifty (39,050) nor more than thirty-nine thousand one hundred fifty (39,150), according to the 2000 federal census or any subsequent federal census, the circuit court clerk, who also serves as the general sessions court clerk, shall serve as the clerk of the court with probate jurisdiction in any such counties.

Code 1858, § 127 (deriv. Acts 1835-1836, ch. 6, § 1); Shan., § 221; Code 1932, § 161; modified; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-701; Acts 2003, ch. 310, §§ 1, 6-10; 2005, ch. 245, §§ 1, 2.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2003, ch. 310, § 8, effective July 21, 2003, provided that subsection (a) shall only apply in counties having a population of not less than thirty-nine thousand fifty (39,050) nor more than thirty-nine thousand one hundred fifty (39,150), according to the 2000 federal census or any subsequent federal census. Acts 2005, ch. 24, § 1 deleted Acts 2003, ch. 310, § 8, effective April 5, 2005.

Acts 2003, ch. 310, § 9, effective July 21, 2003, provided, in part, that, in any county with a population of not less that twelve thousand eight hundred (12,800) nor more than twelve thousand nine hundred (12,900) according to the 2000 federal census or any subsequent federal census, the clerk who is serving as clerk of the court with probate jurisdiction on June 30, 2003, shall continue to serve as the clerk of the court with probate jurisdiction after the effective date of this act.

Acts 2005, ch. 24, § 1 provided that Acts 2003, ch. 310, § 8 is amended by deleting that section in its entirety.

Acts 2005, ch. 24, § 3 provided that, for the purpose of transferring records, files and other documents relating to probate matters in counties having a population of not less than thirty-nine thousand fifty (39,050) nor more than thirty-nine thousand one hundred fifty (39,150), according to the 2000 federal census of population or any subsequent federal census, from the office of the county court clerk to the office of the circuit court clerk, the act shall take effect April 5, 2005. For all other purposes, including the transfer of duties and authority over probate matters to the circuit court clerk, the act shall take effect on July 1, 2005.

For table of U.S. decennial populations of Tennessee counties, see Volume 13 and its supplement.

Cross-References. Election of county court judge, Tenn. Const. art. VI, § 4.

Jurisdiction of chancery courts of probate and related matters, §§ 16-16-201, 16-16-202.

State system of personnel administration, § 8-30-101 et seq.

Power of general assembly to create courts, Tenn. Const., art. VI, § 1.

Term of office of county judges, § 5-6-102.

Law Reviews.

The Tennessee Court System — The County Court (Frederic S. Le Clercq), 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 419.

Comparative Legislation. County courts:

Ark.  Code § 16-15-101 et seq.

Ky. Const. § 140.

Miss.  Code Ann. § 9-9-1 et seq.

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 49.010 et seq.

Va. Code § 16.1-69.5.

Cited: Hollifield v. McMahan, 438 F. Supp. 589, 1976 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11860 (E.D. Tenn. 1976).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. County Court as a Constitutional Institution.

The county courts are wholly wanting in common law powers. Nashville & K. R. Co. v. Wilson County, 89 Tenn. 597, 15 S.W. 446, 1890 Tenn. LEXIS 84 (1891); Shelby County v. Tennessee Centennial Exposition Co., 96 Tenn. 653, 36 S.W. 694, 1896 Tenn. LEXIS 19, 33 L.R.A. 717 (1896).

County courts are constituted corporations and can exercise only such powers as may be entrusted to them by the legislature. Wright v. State, 171 Tenn. 628, 106 S.W.2d 866, 1937 Tenn. LEXIS 145 (1937).

The county courts of Tennessee are recognized by the Constitution but they possess no judicial jurisdiction other than that conferred by statute. Dick v. Dick, 223 Tenn. 228, 443 S.W.2d 472, 1969 Tenn. LEXIS 407 (1969), overruled in part, Browne v. Browne, 547 S.W.2d 239, 1977 Tenn. LEXIS 553 (Tenn. 1977).

2. Powers — Derivation from Legislature.

The powers “entrusted to” the county courts emanate from the legislature alone; hence, when a power claimed for them is not so conferred, it must be held not to exist. Nashville & K. R. Co. v. Wilson County, 89 Tenn. 597, 15 S.W. 446, 1890 Tenn. LEXIS 84 (1891); Shelby County v. Tennessee Centennial Exposition Co., 96 Tenn. 653, 36 S.W. 694, 1896 Tenn. LEXIS 19, 33 L.R.A. 717 (1896).

3. Probate Jurisdiction.

The statutes make it clear that the county court is the probate court. The 1978 constitutional amendments superseded this court. Viewed realistically the probate court is just as much a part of our judicial system as the juvenile court. Probate judges are county officers. Marion County Bd. of Comm'rs v. Marion County Election Com., 594 S.W.2d 681, 1980 Tenn. LEXIS 407 (Tenn. 1980).

Collateral References. Courts 182-185.

16-16-102. Special laws continued.

  1. All the existing laws defining the local limits of the jurisdiction of the county courts, and fixing the times and places for holding the county courts, are continued in full force and effect, unless inconsistent with some positive provision of this code.
  2. Subsection (a) shall only apply in counties having a population, according to the 2000 federal census or any subsequent federal census, of:

    not less than  not more than

    12,800 12,900

    27,100 27,200

    43,100 43,200

    62,300 62,400

    182,000 182,100

  3. In counties having a population of not less than thirty-nine thousand fifty (39,050) nor more than thirty-nine thousand one hundred fifty (39,150), according to the 2000 federal census of population or any subsequent federal census, the circuit court clerk, who also serves as the general sessions court clerk, shall serve as the clerk of the court with probate jurisdiction in any such counties.

Code 1858, § 128; Shan., § 222; Code 1932, § 162; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-702; Acts 2003, ch. 310, §§ 1, 6-10; 2005, ch. 24, §§ 1, 2.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2003, ch. 310, § 8, effective July 21, 2003, provided that subsection (a) shall only apply in counties having a population of not less than thirty-nine thousand fifty (39,050) nor more than thirty-nine thousand one hundred fifty (39,150), according to the 2000 federal census or any subsequent federal census. Acts 2005, ch. 24, § 1 deleted Acts 2003, ch. 310, § 8, effective April 5, 2005.

Acts 2003, ch. 310, § 9, effective July 21, 2003, provided, in part, that, in any county with a population of not less that twelve thousand eight hundred (12,800) nor more than twelve thousand nine hundred (12,900) according to the 2000 federal census or any subsequent federal census, the clerk who is serving as clerk of the court with probate jurisdiction on June 30, 2003, shall continue to serve as the clerk of the court with probate jurisdiction after the effective date of this act.

Acts 2005, ch. 24, § 1 provided that Acts 2003, ch. 310, § 8 is amended by deleting that section in its entirety.

Acts 2005, ch. 24, § 3 provided that, for the purpose of transferring records, files and other documents relating to probate matters in counties having a population of not less than thirty-nine thousand fifty (39,050) nor more than thirty-nine thousand one hundred fifty (39,150), according to the 2000 federal census of population or any subsequent federal census, from the office of the county court clerk to the office of the circuit court clerk, the act shall take effect April 5, 2005. For all other purposes, including the transfer of duties and authority over probate matters to the circuit court clerk, the act shall take effect on July 1, 2005.

For table of U.S. decennial populations of Tennessee counties, see Volume 13 and its supplement.

16-16-103. Attendance at court.

  1. The judge shall attend at the courthouse of the county in which the judge serves on the first Monday of every month; and shall, on first Mondays and subsequent days as may be necessary, attend to all matters and adjudicate and determine all questions and do all other acts and things required.
  2. Subsection (a) shall only apply in counties having a population, according to the 2000 federal census or any subsequent federal census, of:

    not less than  not more than

    12,800 12,900

    27,100 27,200

    43,100 43,200

    62,300 62,400

    182,000 182,100

  3. In counties having a population of not less than thirty-nine thousand fifty (39,050) nor more than thirty-nine thousand one hundred fifty (39,150), according to the 2000 federal census of population or any subsequent federal census, the circuit court clerk, who also serves as the general sessions court clerk, shall serve as the clerk of the court with probate jurisdiction in any such counties.

Acts 1875, ch. 70, § 1; Shan., § 6006; mod. Code 1932, § 10204; modified; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-705; Acts 2003, ch. 310, §§ 1, 6-10; 2005, ch. 24, §§ 1, 2.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2003, ch. 310, § 8, effective July 21, 2003, provided that subsection (a) shall only apply in counties having a population of not less than thirty-nine thousand fifty (39,050) nor more than thirty-nine thousand one hundred fifty (39,150), according to the 2000 federal census or any subsequent federal census. Acts 2005, ch. 24, § 1 deleted Acts 2003, ch. 310, § 8, effective April 5, 2005.

Acts 2003, ch. 310, § 9, effective July 21, 2003, provided, in part, that, in any county with a population of not less that twelve thousand eight hundred (12,800) nor more than twelve thousand nine hundred (12,900) according to the 2000 federal census or any subsequent federal census, the clerk who is serving as clerk of the court with probate jurisdiction on June 30, 2003, shall continue to serve as the clerk of the court with probate jurisdiction after the effective date of this act.

Acts 2005, ch. 24, § 1 provided that Acts 2003, ch. 310, § 8 is amended by deleting that section in its entirety.

Acts 2005, ch. 24, § 3 provided that, for the purpose of transferring records, files and other documents relating to probate matters in counties having a population of not less than thirty-nine thousand fifty (39,050) nor more than thirty-nine thousand one hundred fifty (39,150), according to the 2000 federal census of population or any subsequent federal census, from the office of the county court clerk to the office of the circuit court clerk, the act shall take effect April 5, 2005. For all other purposes, including the transfer of duties and authority over probate matters to the circuit court clerk, the act shall take effect on July 1, 2005.

For table of U.S. decennial populations of Tennessee counties, see Volume 13 and its supplement.

Cross-References. Election, qualifications, and term of county court judges, Tenn. Const., art. VI, § 4.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Subsequent Days.

“Subsequent days” is not to be construed to be limited to those immediately succeeding the first Monday. The necessity of exercise of functions on any day of the month is apparent. There may be special or adjourned sessions. S. M. Williamson & Co. v. Shelton, 158 Tenn. 166, 11 S.W.2d 882, 1928 Tenn. LEXIS 137 (1928).

16-16-104. Terms of court.

  1. The county court to be held by the county judge shall have its regular sessions on the first Monday of each month; and the court shall sit from day to day, so long as the business of the court may require.
  2. Subsection (a) shall only apply in counties having a population, according to the 2000 federal census or any subsequent federal census, of:

    not less than  not more than

    12,800 12,900

    27,100 27,200

    43,100 43,200

    62,300 62,400

    182,000 182,100

  3. In counties having a population of not less than thirty-nine thousand fifty (39,050) nor more than thirty-nine thousand one hundred fifty (39,150), according to the 2000 federal census of population or any subsequent federal census, the circuit court clerk, who also serves as the general sessions court clerk, shall serve as the clerk of the court with probate jurisdiction in any such counties.

Code 1858, § 4198 (deriv. Acts 1855-1856, ch. 253, § 5); Shan., § 6023; Code 1932, § 10222; impl. am. Acts 1978, ch. 934, §§ 7, 36; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-706; Acts 2003, ch. 310, §§ 1, 6-10; 2005, ch. 24, §§ 1, 2.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2003, ch. 310, § 8, effective July 21, 2003, provided that subsection (a) shall only apply in counties having a population of not less than thirty-nine thousand fifty (39,050) nor more than thirty-nine thousand one hundred fifty (39,150), according to the 2000 federal census or any subsequent federal census. Acts 2005, ch. 24, § 1 deleted Acts 2003, ch. 310, § 8, effective April 5, 2005.

Acts 2003, ch. 310, § 9, effective July 21, 2003, provided, in part, that, in any county with a population of not less that twelve thousand eight hundred (12,800) nor more than twelve thousand nine hundred (12,900) according to the 2000 federal census or any subsequent federal census, the clerk who is serving as clerk of the court with probate jurisdiction on June 30, 2003, shall continue to serve as the clerk of the court with probate jurisdiction after the effective date of this act.

Acts 2005, ch. 24, § 1 provided that Acts 2003, ch. 310, § 8 is amended by deleting that section in its entirety.

Acts 2005, ch. 24, § 3 provided that, for the purpose of transferring records, files and other documents relating to probate matters in counties having a population of not less than thirty-nine thousand fifty (39,050) nor more than thirty-nine thousand one hundred fifty (39,150), according to the 2000 federal census of population or any subsequent federal census, from the office of the county court clerk to the office of the circuit court clerk, the act shall take effect April 5, 2005. For all other purposes, including the transfer of duties and authority over probate matters to the circuit court clerk, the act shall take effect on July 1, 2005.

For table of U.S. decennial populations of Tennessee counties, see Volume 13 and its supplement.

Law Reviews.

The Constitutional Policy That Judges Be Learned in the Law (Frederic S. Le Clercq), 47 Tenn. L. Rev 689.

Cited: Johnson v. Brice, 112 Tenn. 59, 83 S.W. 791, 1903 Tenn. LEXIS 90 (1904); Ragland v. Davidson County Board of Education, 203 Tenn. 317, 312 S.W.2d 855, 1958 Tenn. LEXIS 306 (1958).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Commencement of Court at Proper Time — Showing.

Where the caption of the court, preceding an order appointing an administrator, recited that “court was opened and held … on the 2d day of July, 1907, when the following business was had and entered of record,” it was held that such order was not to be construed as stating that the regular session of the court was begun on that day (which was Tuesday, and not the first Monday in the month), and that it did not show want of jurisdiction. Dayton Coal & I. Co. v. Dodd, 188 F. 597, 1911 U.S. App. LEXIS 4350, 37 L.R.A. (n.s.) 456 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1911).

2. Judicial Notice of Terms.

Court of appeals took official notice of terms of county court as specified in this section. Plumb v. Plumb, 52 Tenn. App. 267, 372 S.W.2d 771, 1962 Tenn. App. LEXIS 135 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1962).

Collateral References. Courts 63.

16-16-105. Court always open.

  1. The county court to be held by the county judge shall be deemed always open for the transaction of any business and the exercise of any jurisdiction conferred upon the county judge or upon the court held by the county judge.
  2. Subsection (a) shall only apply in counties having a population, according to the 2000 federal census or any subsequent federal census, of:

    not less than  not more than

    12,800 12,900

    27,100 27,200

    43,100 43,200

    62,300 62,400

    182,000 182,100

  3. In counties having a population of not less than thirty-nine thousand fifty (39,050) nor more than thirty-nine thousand one hundred fifty (39,150), according to the 2000 federal census of population or any subsequent federal census, the circuit court clerk, who also serves as the general sessions court clerk, shall serve as the clerk of the court with probate jurisdiction in any such counties.

Acts 1911, ch. 3, § 1; Shan., § 6006a1; mod. Code 1932, § 10205; modified; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-707; Acts 2003, ch. 310, §§ 1, 6-10; 2005, ch. 24, §§ 1, 2.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2003, ch. 310, § 8, effective July 21, 2003, provided that subsection (a) shall only apply in counties having a population of not less than thirty-nine thousand fifty (39,050) nor more than thirty-nine thousand one hundred fifty (39,150), according to the 2000 federal census or any subsequent federal census. Acts 2005, ch. 24, § 1 deleted Acts 2003, ch. 310, § 8, effective April 5, 2005.

Acts 2003, ch. 310, § 9, effective July 21, 2003, provided, in part, that, in any county with a population of not less that twelve thousand eight hundred (12,800) nor more than twelve thousand nine hundred (12,900) according to the 2000 federal census or any subsequent federal census, the clerk who is serving as clerk of the court with probate jurisdiction on June 30, 2003, shall continue to serve as the clerk of the court with probate jurisdiction after the effective date of this act.

Acts 2005, ch. 24, § 1 provided that Acts 2003, ch. 310, § 8 is amended by deleting that section in its entirety.

Acts 2005, ch. 24, § 3 provided that, for the purpose of transferring records, files and other documents relating to probate matters in counties having a population of not less than thirty-nine thousand fifty (39,050) nor more than thirty-nine thousand one hundred fifty (39,150), according to the 2000 federal census of population or any subsequent federal census, from the office of the county court clerk to the office of the circuit court clerk, the act shall take effect April 5, 2005. For all other purposes, including the transfer of duties and authority over probate matters to the circuit court clerk, the act shall take effect on July 1, 2005.

For table of U.S. decennial populations of Tennessee counties, see Volume 13 and its supplement.

Law Reviews.

The Constitutional Policy That Judges Be Learned in the Law (Frederic S. Le Clercq), 47 Tenn. L. Rev. 689.

The Tennessee Court System — Probate Courts, 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 461.

Cited: Department of Highways & Public Works v. Gamble, 18 Tenn. App. 95, 73 S.W.2d 175, 1934 Tenn. App. LEXIS 16 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1934); Ragland v. Davidson County Board of Education, 203 Tenn. 317, 312 S.W.2d 855, 1958 Tenn. LEXIS 306 (1958).

Collateral References. 21 C.J.S. Courts § 148.

16-16-106. Practice of law by judge.

  1. The county judge is not precluded from practicing in the supreme, chancery, circuit, and criminal courts of this state, but shall not act as counsel in any case going up from the judge's court.
  2. Subsection (a) shall only apply in counties having a population, according to the 2000 federal census or any subsequent federal census, of:

    not less than  not more than

    12,800 12,900

    27,100 27,200

    43,100 43,200

    62,300 62,400

    182,000 182,100

  3. In counties having a population of not less than thirty-nine thousand fifty (39,050) nor more than thirty-nine thousand one hundred fifty (39,150), according to the 2000 federal census of population or any subsequent federal census, the circuit court clerk, who also serves as the general sessions court clerk, shall serve as the clerk of the court with probate jurisdiction in any such counties.

Code 1858, § 4200 (deriv. Acts 1855-1856, ch. 253, § 12); Shan., § 6026; Code 1932, § 10224; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-708; Acts 2003, ch. 310, §§ 1, 6-10; 2005, ch. 24, §§ 1, 2.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2003, ch. 310, § 8, effective July 21, 2003, provided that subsection (a) shall only apply in counties having a population of not less than thirty-nine thousand fifty (39,050) nor more than thirty-nine thousand one hundred fifty (39,150), according to the 2000 federal census or any subsequent federal census. Acts 2005, ch. 24, § 1 deleted Acts 2003, ch. 310, § 8, effective April 5, 2005.

Acts 2003, ch. 310, § 9, effective July 21, 2003, provided, in part, that, in any county with a population of not less that twelve thousand eight hundred (12,800) nor more than twelve thousand nine hundred (12,900) according to the 2000 federal census or any subsequent federal census, the clerk who is serving as clerk of the court with probate jurisdiction on June 30, 2003, shall continue to serve as the clerk of the court with probate jurisdiction after the effective date of this act.

Acts 2005, ch. 24, § 1 provided that Acts 2003, ch. 310, § 8 is amended by deleting that section in its entirety.

Acts 2005, ch. 24, § 3 provided that, for the purpose of transferring records, files and other documents relating to probate matters in counties having a population of not less than thirty-nine thousand fifty (39,050) nor more than thirty-nine thousand one hundred fifty (39,150), according to the 2000 federal census of population or any subsequent federal census, from the office of the county court clerk to the office of the circuit court clerk, the act shall take effect April 5, 2005. For all other purposes, including the transfer of duties and authority over probate matters to the circuit court clerk, the act shall take effect on July 1, 2005.

For table of U.S. decennial populations of Tennessee counties, see Volume 13 and its supplement.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 16 Tenn. Juris., Judges, § 8.

Law Reviews.

The Constitutional Policy That Judges Be Learned in the Law (Frederic S. Le Clercq), 47 Tenn. L. Rev. 689.

Cited: State ex rel. Brooks v. Eblen, 185 Tenn. 566, 206 S.W.2d 793, 1947 Tenn. LEXIS 415 (1947).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

This section is not unconstitutional as making an arbitrary and unreasonable discrimination between county judges on one hand and chancellors, circuit judges and criminal judges on the other. Reynolds v. Chumbley, 175 Tenn. 492, 135 S.W.2d 939, 1939 Tenn. LEXIS 66 (1940).

Collateral References. 46 Am. Jur. 2d Judges § 34.

48 C.J.S. Judges § 9.

Propriety and permissibility of judge engaging in practice of law. 89 A.L.R.2d 886.

16-16-107. Original jurisdiction.

    1. The county court has original jurisdiction in the following cases:
      1. The probate of wills;
      2. The granting of letters testamentary and of administration, and the repeal and revocation of letters testamentary and of administration;
      3. All controversies in relation to the right of executorship or of administration;
      4. The settlement of accounts of executors and administrators;
      5. The partition and distribution of the estates of decedents; and for these purposes, the power to sell the real and personal property belonging to the estates, if necessary to make the partition and distribution, or if manifestly for the interest of the parties;
      6. To sell real estate for the payment of debts of a decedent as provided in former §§ 30-602 and 30-603;
      7. The appointment and removal of guardians for minors and conservators for persons adjudicated incompetent, and all controversies as to the right of guardianship and conservatorship, and the settlement of guardian and conservator accounts;
      8. The partition, sale or division of land;
      9. The changing of names and the legitimation of children;
      10. The issuance of inquisitions of unsoundness of mind; and
      11. The binding out of apprentices, and all controversies between master and apprentice.
    2. In counties having a county judge, the county judge shall have the powers enumerated in subdivision (a)(1).
  1. Subsection (a) shall only apply in counties having a population, according to the 2000 federal census or any subsequent federal census, of:

    not less than  not more than

    12,800 12,900

    27,100 27,200

    43,100 43,200

    62,300 62,400

    182,000 182,100

  2. In counties having a population of not less than thirty-nine thousand fifty (39,050) nor more than thirty-nine thousand one hundred fifty (39,150), according to the 2000 federal census of population or any subsequent federal census, the circuit court clerk, who also serves as the general sessions court clerk, shall serve as the clerk of the court with probate jurisdiction in any such counties.

Code 1858, §§ 4201, 4202 (deriv. Acts 1797, ch. 41; 1805, ch. 2, § 1; 1815, ch. 115; 1835-1836, ch. 6, § 2; 1849-1850, ch. 27, § 1; 1849-1850, ch. 77, § 1; 1849-1850, ch. 185, § 1; 1851-1852, ch. 338, §§ 1, 2; 1853-1854, ch. 53, § 1); Acts 1873, ch. 64, § 1; Shan., §§ 6027, 6029; Code 1932, §§ 10225, 10227; impl. am. Acts 1951, ch. 202; Acts 1976, ch. 529, § 5; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-709; Acts 2003, ch. 310, §§ 1, 6-10; 2005, ch. 24, §§ 1, 2; 2011, ch. 47, § 14.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2003, ch. 310, § 8, effective July 21, 2003, provided that subsection (a) shall only apply in counties having a population of not less than thirty-nine thousand fifty (39,050) nor more than thirty-nine thousand one hundred fifty (39,150), according to the 2000 federal census or any subsequent federal census. Acts 2005, ch. 24, § 1 deleted Acts 2003, ch. 310, § 8, effective April 5, 2005.

Former §§ 30-602 and 30-603, referred to in (6), have been amended and renumbered as §§ 30-2-402 and 30-2-403.

Acts 2003, ch. 310, § 9, effective July 21, 2003, provided, in part, that, in any county with a population of not less that twelve thousand eight hundred (12,800) nor more than twelve thousand nine hundred (12,900) according to the 2000 federal census or any subsequent federal census, the clerk who is serving as clerk of the court with probate jurisdiction on June 30, 2003, shall continue to serve as the clerk of the court with probate jurisdiction after the effective date of this act.

Acts 2005, ch. 24, § 1 provided that Acts 2003, ch. 310, § 8 is amended by deleting that section in its entirety.

Acts 2005, ch. 24, § 3 provided that, for the purpose of transferring records, files and other documents relating to probate matters in counties having a population of not less than thirty-nine thousand fifty (39,050) nor more than thirty-nine thousand one hundred fifty (39,150), according to the 2000 federal census of population or any subsequent federal census, from the office of the county court clerk to the office of the circuit court clerk, the act shall take effect April 5, 2005. For all other purposes, including the transfer of duties and authority over probate matters to the circuit court clerk, the act shall take effect on July 1, 2005.

Acts 2011, ch. 47, § 107 provided that nothing in the legislation shall be construed to alter or otherwise affect the eligibility for services or the rights or responsibilities of individuals covered by the provision on the day before the date of enactment of this legislation, which was July 1, 2011.

Acts 2011, ch. 47, § 108 provided that the provisions of the act are declared to be remedial in nature and all provisions of the act shall be liberally construed to effectuate its purposes.

For table of U.S. decennial populations of Tennessee counties, see Volume 13 and its supplement.

Amendments. The 2011 amendment rewrote (a)(1)(G) which read: “The appointment and removal of guardians for minors and persons of unsound mind, and all controversies as to the right of guardianship, and the settlement of guardian accounts;”.

Effective Dates. Acts 2011, ch. 47, § 110. July 1, 2011.

Cross-References. Jurisdiction of chancery courts of probate and related matters, §§ 16-16-201, 16-16-202.

Textbooks. Pritchard on Wills and Administration of Estates (4th ed., Phillips and Robinson), §§ 39, 44, 317, 323, 535, 554, 601, 602.

Tennessee Jurisprudence, 11 Tenn. Juris., Equity, § 30; 12 Tenn. Juris., Executors and Administrators, §§ 7, 54, 66; 17 Tenn. Juris., Jurisdiction, § 24; 20 Tenn. Juris., Partition, § 7; 25 Tenn. Juris., Wills, § 45.

Law Reviews.

Decedent's Estates: The Rights of Adopted Persons Under Tennessee's Descent and Distribution and Adoption Statutes to Take by Intestate Succession or by Will or Trust, 22 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 339 (1992).

The Tennessee Court System — The County Court (Frederic S. Le Clercq), 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 419.

Attorney General Opinions. General sessions court of Jackson County.  OAG 10-80, 2010 Tenn. AG LEXIS 86 (6/3/10).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Original Jurisdiction.

The jurisdiction of the county courts is limited in the presence of controverted and disputed issues which may not be resolved by simple calculation or in a summary manner. Dick v. Dick, 223 Tenn. 228, 443 S.W.2d 472, 1969 Tenn. LEXIS 407 (1969), overruled in part, Browne v. Browne, 547 S.W.2d 239, 1977 Tenn. LEXIS 553 (Tenn. 1977).

2. —History.

At the time of the adoption of the Constitution in 1870, the county court consisted of the justices of the county held monthly and divided into a quarterly court held by all or any number of the justices necessary to transact business and a quorum court held by three or more of the justices designated at the quarterly session, the quorum court in counties authorized to elect a county judge being abolished and the jurisdiction and powers thereof vested in the county judge. Davis v. Williams, 158 Tenn. 34, 12 S.W.2d 532, 1928 Tenn. LEXIS 121 (1928).

3. —Conclusiveness.

The proceedings in matters of probate and administration, or in other matters where the county court's jurisdiction is original, general, and exclusive, are as conclusive as the proceedings of other superior courts, and if its judgment is valid on its face, it can only be attacked in a direct proceeding for that purpose; and every intendment is in favor of the county court's such jurisdiction, and the rightful exercise of it. Brien v. Hart, 25 Tenn. 131, 1845 Tenn. LEXIS 43 (1845); Townsend v. Townsend, 44 Tenn. 70, 1867 Tenn. LEXIS 15 (1867); Carr v. Lowe's Ex'rs, 54 Tenn. 84, 1871 Tenn. LEXIS 418 (1871); Andrews v. Andrews, 54 Tenn. 234, 1872 Tenn. LEXIS 42 (1872); Varnell v. Loague, 77 Tenn. 158, 1882 Tenn. LEXIS 29 (1882); Posey v. Eaton, 77 Tenn. 500, 1882 Tenn. LEXIS 91 (1882); Railway Co. V. Mahoney, 89 Tenn. 311, 15 S.W. 652, 1890 Tenn. LEXIS 54 (1890); Eller v. Richardson, 89 Tenn. 575, 15 S.W. 650, 1890 Tenn. LEXIS 81 (1891); Franklin v. Franklin, 91 Tenn. 119, 18 S.W. 61, 1891 Tenn. LEXIS 84 (1892).

The county court is not a court of general jurisdiction, but its jurisdiction is statutory and limited, and no presumption is made in its favor, or rather nothing shall be intended to be within its jurisdiction unless it so appear. Linnville v. Darby, 60 Tenn. 306, 1872 Tenn. LEXIS 496 (1873); Leonard v. Haynes, 82 Tenn. 447, 1884 Tenn. LEXIS 146 (1884); Nashville & K. R. Co. v. Wilson County, 89 Tenn. 597, 15 S.W. 446, 1890 Tenn. LEXIS 84 (1891).

4. —Showing of Jurisdiction.

County court is not an inferior court, especially in its general and exclusive jurisdiction, but it is established and its jurisdiction defined by the general law of the land. Campbell v. M'Iver, 5 Tenn. 60 (1817); Fields v. State, 8 Tenn. 167, 8 Tenn. 168, 1827 Tenn. LEXIS 27 (1827); Brien v. Hart, 25 Tenn. 131, 1845 Tenn. LEXIS 43 (1845); Pope v. Harrison, 84 Tenn. 82, 1885 Tenn. LEXIS 118 (1885).

County court's jurisdiction is limited as to some matters and general as to others. Brewer v. Griggs, 10 Tenn. App. 378, — S.W.2d —, 1929 Tenn. App. LEXIS 46 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1929).

5. —General and Special Jurisdiction.

County courts have original jurisdiction in the matter of probating wills and in granting letters testamentary and of administration and the repeal and revocation thereof, and as to these subjects, county courts are not inferior courts in the common law acceptance of that term. Walker v. Verble, 5 Tenn. Civ. App. (5 Higgins) 651 (1914).

The county court in the matter of probate of wills and grants of administration is a court of general jurisdiction but has special and limited jurisdiction over an inquisition of lunacy or a sale of land for the payment of debts. Brewer v. Griggs, 10 Tenn. App. 378, — S.W.2d —, 1929 Tenn. App. LEXIS 46 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1929).

6. —Equitable Procedure.

None of the matters in which the county court is given jurisdiction are matters coming within the jurisdiction of common law courts as they existed at common law and, in the exercise of its jurisdiction, it proceeds as a court of equity. In re Wolf, 188 F. 519, 1911 U.S. App. LEXIS 4343 (C.C.D. Tenn. 1911).

7. Letters of Administration.

8. —Grant and Revocation.

The court may, on petition, revoke its own improvident grant of letters testamentary and of administration, and annul its own judgment; but the appointee must have due notice of the proceeding. State v. Anderson, 84 Tenn. 321, 1886 Tenn. LEXIS 105 (1886).

Petitioner was not entitled to file bill in chancery for removal of administrator appointed by the county court on the ground that deceased was not a resident of the county, since county court had original and exclusive jurisdiction over appointment and revocation of letters testamentary and administration. Bellenfant v. American Nat'l Bank, 184 Tenn. 50, 195 S.W.2d 30, 1946 Tenn. LEXIS 259 (1946).

Wherever there is doubt as to the question of original jurisdiction in the granting and revocation of letters of administration within the provisions of this section that doubt should be resolved in favor of the original jurisdiction of the county court. Fox v. Commerce Union Bank, 186 Tenn. 181, 209 S.W.2d 1, 1948 Tenn. LEXIS 534 (1948).

9. —Appointment by Chancery.

Chancery court does not have authority to appoint an administrator ad litem for an estate on the ground that bank acting as administrator of estate was also acting as liquidator of business formerly operated by deceased, since authority to appoint an administrator was in the court administering the estate. Fox v. Commerce Union Bank, 186 Tenn. 181, 209 S.W.2d 1, 1948 Tenn. LEXIS 534 (1948).

10. Accounts of Administrators.

11. —Accounting.

County court has jurisdiction to dispose of exceptions to accounts of executors, and it is not necessary to appeal to the circuit or chancery court as in case of insolvent estates. Gaines v. Eason, 130 Tenn. 86, 169 S.W. 309, 1914 Tenn. LEXIS 5 (1914).

While county court has no jurisdiction of a petition to require an administrator to charge himself with a sum with which he had charged himself as administrator of another estate, when considered as an independent and original action drawing into the question the title to property, it has jurisdiction. Black v. Black, 134 Tenn. 517, 184 S.W. 27, 1915 Tenn. LEXIS 175 (1916).

The county court possesses the necessary authority and has the requisite facilities to have a full and complete accounting with an administrator, making all proper charges against him, and allowing him credit for all items to which he is entitled. In re Love's Estate, 176 Tenn. 696, 145 S.W.2d 778, 1940 Tenn. LEXIS 121 (1940).

The probate court or the circuit or chancery court on appeal has jurisdiction to determine whether an administrator should be charged with the particular item on an exception to the inventory and settlement although the administrator insisted the item did not belong to the estate. Teague v. Gooch, 206 Tenn. 291, 333 S.W.2d 1, 1960 Tenn. LEXIS 364 (1960).

12. Administration of Estates.

Generally both the county and chancery courts are vested with jurisdiction in the appointment and removal of personal representatives and administration of decedents' estates. Dick v. Dick, 223 Tenn. 228, 443 S.W.2d 472, 1969 Tenn. LEXIS 407 (1969), overruled in part, Browne v. Browne, 547 S.W.2d 239, 1977 Tenn. LEXIS 553 (Tenn. 1977).

Although as a general rule both the county court and chancery court are vested with jurisdiction in the administration of decedents' estates, in instances of serious disputes or complications the chancery court may assume jurisdiction of the administration of an estate although the county court has previously undertaken such administration. Dick v. Dick, 223 Tenn. 228, 443 S.W.2d 472, 1969 Tenn. LEXIS 407 (1969), overruled in part, Browne v. Browne, 547 S.W.2d 239, 1977 Tenn. LEXIS 553 (Tenn. 1977).

13. —Sale of Lands to Pay Debts.

County court's jurisdiction to sell land for payment of debts of a decedent. Apple v. Owens, 1 Tenn. Ch. App. 135 (1902).

14. —Insolvent Estates.

In the provision as to insolvent estates, the “amount of the estate” has reference to assets receivable by the personal representative, and not to real estate of decedent. Fleming v. Talliafer, 51 Tenn. 352, 1871 Tenn. LEXIS 174 (1871).

In the settlement of insolvent estates, the court may set aside homestead. Galyon v. Gilmore, 93 Tenn. 671, 28 S.W. 301, 1894 Tenn. LEXIS 14 (1894).

15. —Jurisdiction Generally.

All doubts as to jurisdiction of matters involving administration of an estate should be resolved in favor of county court. Fox v. Commerce Union Bank, 186 Tenn. 181, 209 S.W.2d 1, 1948 Tenn. LEXIS 534 (1948).

The county court in the exercise of its probate jurisdiction has the authority to adjudicate conflicting claims of ownership and right of possession to personal property which is claimed both by the representatives of a decedent's estate and by third parties who claim title, not through the decedent and his representative, but from another source. Browne v. Browne, 547 S.W.2d 239, 1977 Tenn. LEXIS 553 (Tenn. 1977).

16. Probate of Wills.

Under this section it is not to be doubted that prior to a contest, the jurisdiction for the probate of wills is exclusively in the county court. Jones v. Witherspoon, 182 Tenn. 498, 187 S.W.2d 788, 1945 Tenn. LEXIS 245 (1945).

17. —Contest in Circuit Court.

Where contestant in petition filed in county court attacked holographic will executed in 1937 and stated that it was not the true will and that instrument executed in 1917 with codicil attached was the true will and prayed “that original document executed in 1917 be certified to circuit court in order that an issue may be made as to whether it is the last will and testament of deceased” the circuit court had jurisdiction to determine which will was the valid will, and upon verdict of jury that estate should be distributed under terms of 1917 will certify that fact to the county court for further steps in administration. Jones v. Witherspoon, 182 Tenn. 498, 187 S.W.2d 788, 1945 Tenn. LEXIS 245 (1945).

18. Estates of Non Compos Mentis.

History of jurisdiction of estates of non compos mentis traced. Brewer v. Griggs, 10 Tenn. App. 378, — S.W.2d —, 1929 Tenn. App. LEXIS 46 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1929).

19. Guardians.

The county court has no power to render a judgment against a guardian. Pickens v. Bivens, 51 Tenn. 229, 1871 Tenn. LEXIS 152 (1871).

20. Dower and Homestead.

Statutes giving chancery court jurisdiction concurrent with county court do not in express terms include jurisdiction to set aside homestead, but same may be said for section defining jurisdiction of county courts; however, both courts have jurisdiction from ancient times and practice has been both in county and chancery courts to appoint commissioners to set aside homestead. Wyrick v. Hale, 30 Tenn. App. 597, 209 S.W.2d 50, 1947 Tenn. App. LEXIS 113 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1947).

21. Lien for Attorney Fees.

Probate court had jurisdiction to allow the lien for attorney fees because the probate court had jurisdiction over the estate, and therefore, control over the money or property that was the subject of the lien by virtue of T.C.A. § 16-16-107; the money or property that was the subject of the lien came within the control of the probate court in the case in which the attorney rendered services, and as such, the probate court had jurisdiction to grant the attorney a lien for his fee for his services rendered in the case. In re Estate of Arthur, 302 S.W.3d 284, 2009 Tenn. App. LEXIS 341 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 27, 2009), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2009 Tenn. LEXIS 749 (Tenn. Nov. 23, 2009).

Collateral References. 20 Am. Jur. 2d Courts §§ 24, 30, 78, 79, 87, 88, 91-93, 97, 142, 147, 148, 151.

21 C.J.S. Courts §§ 490, 491.

Circumstances justifying grant denial or denial of petition to change adult's name. 79 A.L.R.3d 562.

Contractual provisions as affecting right to judicial partition. 37 A.L.R.3d 962.

Right of married woman to use maiden surname. 67 A.L.R.3d 1266.

Courts 154.

16-16-108. Distribution, partition, and sale of realty.

  1. The county court shall have concurrent jurisdiction with the chancery and circuit courts to sell real estate of decedents and for distribution or partition. The mode of procedure in those cases in the county courts shall conform in every respect to the rules and regulations laid down for the conduct of similar causes in the chancery and circuit courts.
  2. Subsection (a) shall only apply in counties having a population, according to the 2000 federal census or any subsequent federal census, of:

    not less than  not more than

    12,800 12,900

    27,100 27,200

    43,100 43,200

    62,300 62,400

    182,000 182,100

  3. In counties having a population of not less than thirty-nine thousand fifty (39,050) nor more than thirty-nine thousand one hundred fifty (39,150), according to the 2000 federal census of population or any subsequent federal census, the circuit court clerk, who also serves as the general sessions court clerk, shall serve as the clerk of the court with probate jurisdiction in any such counties.

Acts 1873, ch. 64, §§ 1, 2; Shan., § 6028; Code 1932, § 10226; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-710; Acts 2003, ch. 310, §§ 1, 6-10; 2005, ch. 24, §§ 1, 2.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2003, ch. 310, § 8, effective July 21, 2003, provided that subsection (a) shall only apply in counties having a population of not less than thirty-nine thousand fifty (39,050) nor more than thirty-nine thousand one hundred fifty (39,150), according to the 2000 federal census or any subsequent federal census. Acts 2005, ch. 24, § 1 deleted Acts 2003, ch. 310, § 8, effective April 5, 2005.

Acts 2003, ch. 310, § 9, effective July 21, 2003, provided, in part, that, in any county with a population of not less that twelve thousand eight hundred (12,800) nor more than twelve thousand nine hundred (12,900) according to the 2000 federal census or any subsequent federal census, the clerk who is serving as clerk of the court with probate jurisdiction on June 30, 2003, shall continue to serve as the clerk of the court with probate jurisdiction after the effective date of this act.

Acts 2005, ch. 24, § 1 provided that Acts 2003, ch. 310, § 8 is amended by deleting that section in its entirety.

Acts 2005, ch. 24, § 3 provided that, for the purpose of transferring records, files and other documents relating to probate matters in counties having a population of not less than thirty-nine thousand fifty (39,050) nor more than thirty-nine thousand one hundred fifty (39,150), according to the 2000 federal census of population or any subsequent federal census, from the office of the county court clerk to the office of the circuit court clerk, the act shall take effect April 5, 2005. For all other purposes, including the transfer of duties and authority over probate matters to the circuit court clerk, the act shall take effect on July 1, 2005.

For table of U.S. decennial populations of Tennessee counties, see Volume 13 and its supplement.

Cross-References. Transfer of probate jurisdiction to chancery court, §§ 16-16-201, 16-16-202.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 11 Tenn. Juris., Equity, § 30; 12 Tenn. Juris., Executors and Administrators, § 54.

Law Reviews.

The Tennessee Court System — The County Court, 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 419.

Cited: Dick v. Dick, 223 Tenn. 228, 443 S.W.2d 472, 1969 Tenn. LEXIS 407 (1969); In re Estate of Ardell Hamilton Trigg, — S.W.3d —, 2011 Tenn. App. LEXIS 53 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 9, 2011).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Distribution of Powers — Effect of Section.

This section does not interfere with the distribution of powers between the county and chancery courts. Key v. Harris, 116 Tenn. 161, 92 S.W. 235, 1905 Tenn. LEXIS 15 (1905); Puckett v. Wynns, 132 Tenn. 513, 178 S.W. 1184, 1915 Tenn. LEXIS 41 (1915).

2. Jurisdiction.

3. —Consent of Parties.

Jurisdiction could not be conferred by consent of the parties. Reynolds v. Hamilton, 18 Tenn. App. 380, 77 S.W.2d 986, 1934 Tenn. App. LEXIS 40 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1934).

4. —Partition.

County court has jurisdiction to make a sale in a partition case and to thereby bar the life estate which an infant may have in the premises. Henry v. Henry, 1 Tenn. Ch. App. 240 (1901).

Jurisdiction of county court in suit for partition is limited to making and completion of sale, and court has no jurisdiction where it is necessary as a preliminary to settle title. Reynolds v. Hamilton, 18 Tenn. App. 380, 77 S.W.2d 986, 1934 Tenn. App. LEXIS 40 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1934).

5. Contingent Remainder.

A contingent remainder interest is not subject to execution and sale by a judgment creditor. Harris v. Bittikofer, 562 S.W.2d 815, 1978 Tenn. LEXIS 593 (Tenn. 1978).

Collateral References.

Contractual provisions as affecting right to judicial partition. 37 A.L.R.3d 962.

Courts 180.

Partition 38.

16-16-109. Powers necessary to jurisdiction.

  1. The county court is expressly vested, over all subjects enumerated in §§ 16-16-107 and 16-16-108, with all the power and authority necessary and proper to the exercise of the jurisdiction conferred.
  2. Subsection (a) shall only apply in counties having a population, according to the 2000 federal census or any subsequent federal census, of:

    not less than  not more than

    12,800 12,900

    27,100 27,200

    43,100 43,200

    62,300 62,400

    182,000 182,100

  3. In counties having a population of not less than thirty-nine thousand fifty (39,050) nor more than thirty-nine thousand one hundred fifty (39,150), according to the 2000 federal census of population or any subsequent federal census, the circuit court clerk, who also serves as the general sessions court clerk, shall serve as the clerk of the court with probate jurisdiction in any such counties.

Code 1858, § 4203; Shan., § 6030; Code 1932, § 10228; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-711; Acts 2003, ch. 310, §§ 1, 6-10; 2005, ch. 24, §§ 1, 2.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2003, ch. 310, § 8, effective July 21, 2003, provided that subsection (a) shall only apply in counties having a population of not less than thirty-nine thousand fifty (39,050) nor more than thirty-nine thousand one hundred fifty (39,150), according to the 2000 federal census or any subsequent federal census. Acts 2005, ch. 24, § 1 deleted Acts 2003, ch. 310, § 8, effective April 5, 2005.

Acts 2003, ch. 310, § 9, effective July 21, 2003, provided, in part, that, in any county with a population of not less that twelve thousand eight hundred (12,800) nor more than twelve thousand nine hundred (12,900) according to the 2000 federal census or any subsequent federal census, the clerk who is serving as clerk of the court with probate jurisdiction on June 30, 2003, shall continue to serve as the clerk of the court with probate jurisdiction after the effective date of this act.

Acts 2005, ch. 24, § 1 provided that Acts 2003, ch. 310, § 8 is amended by deleting that section in its entirety.

Acts 2005, ch. 24, § 3 provided that, for the purpose of transferring records, files and other documents relating to probate matters in counties having a population of not less than thirty-nine thousand fifty (39,050) nor more than thirty-nine thousand one hundred fifty (39,150), according to the 2000 federal census of population or any subsequent federal census, from the office of the county court clerk to the office of the circuit court clerk, the act shall take effect April 5, 2005. For all other purposes, including the transfer of duties and authority over probate matters to the circuit court clerk, the act shall take effect on July 1, 2005.

For table of U.S. decennial populations of Tennessee counties, see Volume 13 and its supplement.

Cross-References. Transfer of probate jurisdiction to chancery court, §§ 16-16-201, 16-16-202.

Textbooks. Pritchard on Wills and Administration of Estates (4th ed., Phillips and Robinson), § 317.

Law Reviews.

The Tennessee Court System — Probate Courts, 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 461.

Cited: Davis v. Williams, 158 Tenn. 34, 12 S.W.2d 532, 1928 Tenn. LEXIS 121 (1928); Brewer v. Griggs, 10 Tenn. App. 378, — S.W.2d —, 1929 Tenn. App. LEXIS 46 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1929); Browne v. Browne, 547 S.W.2d 239, 1977 Tenn. LEXIS 553 (Tenn. 1977); In re Estate of Ardell Hamilton Trigg, — S.W.3d —, 2011 Tenn. App. LEXIS 53 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 9, 2011).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Generally.

All powers necessary and proper to the exercise of the jurisdiction are granted. Black v. Black, 134 Tenn. 517, 184 S.W. 27, 1915 Tenn. LEXIS 175 (1916).

2. Guardian's Settlement.

Settlement by a guardian may be had by proper measures. Pickens v. Bivens, 51 Tenn. 229, 1871 Tenn. LEXIS 152 (1871).

3. Administrator's Accounting.

The county court possesses the necessary authority and has the requisite facilities to have a full and complete accounting with an administrator, making all proper charges against him, and allowing him credit for all items to which he is entitled. In re Love's Estate, 176 Tenn. 696, 145 S.W.2d 778, 1940 Tenn. LEXIS 121 (1940).

The probate court or the circuit or chancery court on appeal has jurisdiction to determine whether an administrator should be charged with the particular item on an exception to the inventory and settlement although the administrator insisted the item did not belong to the estate. Teague v. Gooch, 206 Tenn. 291, 333 S.W.2d 1, 1960 Tenn. LEXIS 364 (1960).

4. Persons and Estates of Persons of Unsound Mind.

County court has concurrent jurisdiction with chancery court over person and estate of person of unsound mind. Union Planters' Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Bornds, 168 Tenn. 289, 77 S.W.2d 645, 1934 Tenn. LEXIS 55 (1935).

Collateral References. Courts 201.

16-16-110. Powers in sale of property.

  1. The court may, pursuant to § 16-16-109, appoint commissioners to make sale of real or personal property, taking bond and security for the faithful performance of duty, when deemed necessary; may revise, set aside, or confirm the proceedings of the commissioners, as such other courts; render judgments or decrees upon notes and obligations taken in the progress of a cause, and relieve, upon petition, any purchaser or party, or person interested, by opening biddings, setting aside sales, or otherwise, like the circuit or chancery court in similar cases.
  2. Subsection (a) shall only apply in counties having a population, according to the 2000 federal census or any subsequent federal census, of:

    not less than  not more than

    12,800 12,900

    27,100 27,200

    43,100 43,200

    62,300 62,400

    182,000 182,100

  3. In counties having a population of not less than thirty-nine thousand fifty (39,050) nor more than thirty-nine thousand one hundred fifty (39,150), according to the 2000 federal census of population or any subsequent federal census, the circuit court clerk, who also serves as the general sessions court clerk, shall serve as the clerk of the court with probate jurisdiction in any such counties.

Code 1858, § 4205 (deriv. Acts 1849-1850, ch. 185, §§ 1, 2); Shan., § 6032; Code 1932, § 10230; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-712; Acts 2003, ch. 310, §§ 1, 6-10; 2005, ch. 24, §§ 1, 2.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2003, ch. 310, § 8, effective July 21, 2003, provided that subsection (a) shall only apply in counties having a population of not less than thirty-nine thousand fifty (39,050) nor more than thirty-nine thousand one hundred fifty (39,150), according to the 2000 federal census or any subsequent federal census. Acts 2005, ch. 24, § 1 deleted Acts 2003, ch. 310, § 8, effective April 5, 2005.

Acts 2003, ch. 310, § 9, effective July 21, 2003, provided, in part, that, in any county with a population of not less that twelve thousand eight hundred (12,800) nor more than twelve thousand nine hundred (12,900) according to the 2000 federal census or any subsequent federal census, the clerk who is serving as clerk of the court with probate jurisdiction on June 30, 2003, shall continue to serve as the clerk of the court with probate jurisdiction after the effective date of this act.

Acts 2005, ch. 24, § 1 provided that Acts 2003, ch. 310, § 8 is amended by deleting that section in its entirety.

Acts 2005, ch. 24, § 3 provided that, for the purpose of transferring records, files and other documents relating to probate matters in counties having a population of not less than thirty-nine thousand fifty (39,050) nor more than thirty-nine thousand one hundred fifty (39,150), according to the 2000 federal census of population or any subsequent federal census, from the office of the county court clerk to the office of the circuit court clerk, the act shall take effect April 5, 2005. For all other purposes, including the transfer of duties and authority over probate matters to the circuit court clerk, the act shall take effect on July 1, 2005.

For table of U.S. decennial populations of Tennessee counties, see Volume 13 and its supplement.

Cross-References. Transfer of probate jurisdiction to chancery court, §§ 16-16-201, 16-16-202.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 11 Tenn. Juris., Equity, § 21; 16 Tenn. Juris., Judicial Sales, § 37; 20 Tenn. Juris., Partition, § 7.

Cited: Brewer v. Griggs, 10 Tenn. App. 378, — S.W.2d —, 1929 Tenn. App. LEXIS 46 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1929).

Collateral References. Judicial Sales 1-3, 22.

16-16-111. Powers after confirmation of sale.

  1. When land is sold by any order or decree of the county court, and the sale reported by the clerk and confirmed by the court, the county court shall have the same power and jurisdiction over the cause against the purchaser as the chancery court has by law, notwithstanding the sale has been reported and confirmed.
  2. Subsection (a) shall only apply in counties having a population, according to the 2000 federal census or any subsequent federal census, of:

    not less than  not more than

    12,800 12,900

    27,100 27,200

    43,100 43,200

    62,300 62,400

    182,000 182,100

  3. In counties having a population of not less than thirty-nine thousand fifty (39,050) nor more than thirty-nine thousand one hundred fifty (39,150), according to the 2000 federal census of population or any subsequent federal census, the circuit court clerk, who also serves as the general sessions court clerk, shall serve as the clerk of the court with probate jurisdiction in any such counties.

Acts 1873, ch. 88, § 2; Shan., § 6034; Code 1932, § 10231; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-713; Acts 2003, ch. 310, §§ 1, 6-10; 2005, ch. 24, §§ 1, 2.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2003, ch. 310, § 8, effective July 21, 2003, provided that subsection (a) shall only apply in counties having a population of not less than thirty-nine thousand fifty (39,050) nor more than thirty-nine thousand one hundred fifty (39,150), according to the 2000 federal census or any subsequent federal census. Acts 2005, ch. 24, § 1 deleted Acts 2003, ch. 310, § 8, effective April 5, 2005.

Acts 2003, ch. 310, § 9, effective July 21, 2003, provided, in part, that, in any county with a population of not less that twelve thousand eight hundred (12,800) nor more than twelve thousand nine hundred (12,900) according to the 2000 federal census or any subsequent federal census, the clerk who is serving as clerk of the court with probate jurisdiction on June 30, 2003, shall continue to serve as the clerk of the court with probate jurisdiction after the effective date of this act.

Acts 2005, ch. 24, § 1 provided that Acts 2003, ch. 310, § 8 is amended by deleting that section in its entirety.

Acts 2005, ch. 24, § 3 provided that, for the purpose of transferring records, files and other documents relating to probate matters in counties having a population of not less than thirty-nine thousand fifty (39,050) nor more than thirty-nine thousand one hundred fifty (39,150), according to the 2000 federal census of population or any subsequent federal census, from the office of the county court clerk to the office of the circuit court clerk, the act shall take effect April 5, 2005. For all other purposes, including the transfer of duties and authority over probate matters to the circuit court clerk, the act shall take effect on July 1, 2005.

For table of U.S. decennial populations of Tennessee counties, see Volume 13 and its supplement.

Cross-References. Transfer of probate jurisdiction to chancery court, §§ 16-16-201, 16-16-202.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 11 Tenn. Juris., Equity, § 21.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Confirmation of Report of Sale — Effect on Court's Power.

County court cannot set aside sale or grant purchaser other relief after confirmation of report of sale, and if, thereafter, any matter of equity should arise or exist, entitling the purchaser to relief, resort must be had to the chancery court. Young v. Shumate, 35 Tenn. 369, 1855 Tenn. LEXIS 73 (1855); Bond v. Clay, 39 Tenn. 379, 1859 Tenn. LEXIS 230 (Tenn. Apr. 1859); Young v. Thompson, 42 Tenn. 596, 1865 Tenn. LEXIS 105 (1865).

2. Court's Power before Confirmation of Report of Sale.

Before the confirmation of the report of sale, the county court may set it aside. Young v. Thompson, 42 Tenn. 596, 1865 Tenn. LEXIS 105 (1865); Porter v. Woodard, 44 Tenn. 598, 1867 Tenn. LEXIS 76 (1867).

3. Purchase Money Notes — Judgment On.

County court may render judgment on purchase money notes given for the purchase of land sold under its decrees, and this may be done upon motion and without notice, but, this being a summary proceeding, “every fact which is necessary to give the court jurisdiction and to authorize the judgment must be set out in the judgment as having been made to appear.” Rucker v. Moore, 48 Tenn. 726, 1870 Tenn. LEXIS 139 (1870).

4. Motion Judgment against Representative of Deceased Clerk.

No motion judgment against representative of deceased clerk can be rendered in favor of beneficiaries of a fund in the deceased clerk's hands, in a suit pending in the court. Prowell v. Fowlkes, 64 Tenn. 649, 1875 Tenn. LEXIS 148 (1875).

5. Will Authorizing Sale by Executor.

County court has no jurisdiction to sell lands for division among legatees where the will empowered the executor to make sale and divide the proceeds among such legatees. The chancery court has such jurisdiction. Cross v. Bloomer, 65 Tenn. 74, 1873 Tenn. LEXIS 304 (1873); Barton v. Cannon, 66 Tenn. 398, 1874 Tenn. LEXIS 152 (1874).

Collateral References. Judicial Sales 1-3, 22.

16-16-112. Enforcement of small liens.

  1. Jurisdiction is conferred upon the county court to enforce vendors' liens and foreclose mortgages upon all sums under fifty dollars ($50.00), and also to enforce all liens on all sums under fifty dollars ($50.00) in such cases as the chancery court alone would have jurisdiction if the amount were more than fifty dollars ($50.00). The rules of practice and pleading in use in the chancery court on sums above fifty dollars ($50.00) shall be adopted or followed.
  2. Subsection (a) shall only apply in counties having a population, according to the 2000 federal census or any subsequent federal census, of:

    not less than  not more than

    12,800 12,900

    27,100 27,200

    43,100 43,200

    62,300 62,400

    182,000 182,100

  3. In counties having a population of not less than thirty-nine thousand fifty (39,050) nor more than thirty-nine thousand one hundred fifty (39,150), according to the 2000 federal census of population or any subsequent federal census, the circuit court clerk, who also serves as the general sessions court clerk, shall serve as the clerk of the court with probate jurisdiction in any such counties.

Acts 1887, ch. 141, §§ 1, 2; 1889, ch. 30, § 1; Shan., §§ 6035, 6036; mod. Code 1932, §§ 10232, 10233; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-714; Acts 2003, ch. 310, §§ 1, 6-10; 2005, ch. 24, §§ 1, 2.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2003, ch. 310, § 8, effective July 21, 2003, provided that subsection (a) shall only apply in counties having a population of not less than thirty-nine thousand fifty (39,050) nor more than thirty-nine thousand one hundred fifty (39,150), according to the 2000 federal census or any subsequent federal census. Acts 2005, ch. 24, § 1 deleted Acts 2003, ch. 310, § 8, effective April 5, 2005.

Acts 2003, ch. 310, § 9, effective July 21, 2003, provided, in part, that, in any county with a population of not less that twelve thousand eight hundred (12,800) nor more than twelve thousand nine hundred (12,900) according to the 2000 federal census or any subsequent federal census, the clerk who is serving as clerk of the court with probate jurisdiction on June 30, 2003, shall continue to serve as the clerk of the court with probate jurisdiction after the effective date of this act.

Acts 2005, ch. 24, § 1 provided that Acts 2003, ch. 310, § 8 is amended by deleting that section in its entirety.

Acts 2005, ch. 24, § 3 provided that, for the purpose of transferring records, files and other documents relating to probate matters in counties having a population of not less than thirty-nine thousand fifty (39,050) nor more than thirty-nine thousand one hundred fifty (39,150), according to the 2000 federal census of population or any subsequent federal census, from the office of the county court clerk to the office of the circuit court clerk, the act shall take effect April 5, 2005. For all other purposes, including the transfer of duties and authority over probate matters to the circuit court clerk, the act shall take effect on July 1, 2005.

For table of U.S. decennial populations of Tennessee counties, see Volume 13 and its supplement.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Consent of Parties.

Jurisdiction in excess of that conferred by statute could not be conferred by consent of the parties. Reynolds v. Hamilton, 18 Tenn. App. 380, 77 S.W.2d 986, 1934 Tenn. App. LEXIS 40 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1934).

2. Deed of Trust over Fifty Dollars.

The county court had no jurisdiction to enforce a deed of trust for over $50.00, even where the lien on the land had been released and the litigation involved a fund paid into court. Reynolds v. Hamilton, 18 Tenn. App. 380, 77 S.W.2d 986, 1934 Tenn. App. LEXIS 40 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1934).

Collateral References. Courts 169.

16-16-113. Writs of possession.

  1. The county court shall have the same power to issue writs of possession to put the purchaser in possession in all cases that the chancery court has and shall be governed by the same rules.
  2. Subsection (a) shall only apply in counties having a population, according to the 2000 federal census or any subsequent federal census, of:

    not less than  not more than

    12,800 12,900

    27,100 27,200

    43,100 43,200

    62,300 62,400

    182,000 182,100

  3. In counties having a population of not less than thirty-nine thousand fifty (39,050) nor more than thirty-nine thousand one hundred fifty (39,150), according to the 2000 federal census of population or any subsequent federal census, the circuit court clerk, who also serves as the general sessions court clerk, shall serve as the clerk of the court with probate jurisdiction in any such counties.

Acts 1887, ch. 141, § 3; Shan., § 6037; Code 1932, § 10234; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-715; Acts 2003, ch. 310, §§ 1, 6-10; 2005, ch. 24, §§ 1, 2.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2003, ch. 310, § 8, effective July 21, 2003, provided that subsection (a) shall only apply in counties having a population of not less than thirty-nine thousand fifty (39,050) nor more than thirty-nine thousand one hundred fifty (39,150), according to the 2000 federal census or any subsequent federal census. Acts 2005, ch. 24, § 1 deleted Acts 2003, ch. 310, § 8, effective April 5, 2005.

Acts 2003, ch. 310, § 9, effective July 21, 2003, provided, in part, that, in any county with a population of not less that twelve thousand eight hundred (12,800) nor more than twelve thousand nine hundred (12,900) according to the 2000 federal census or any subsequent federal census, the clerk who is serving as clerk of the court with probate jurisdiction on June 30, 2003, shall continue to serve as the clerk of the court with probate jurisdiction after the effective date of this act.

Acts 2005, ch. 24, § 1 provided that Acts 2003, ch. 310, § 8 is amended by deleting that section in its entirety.

Acts 2005, ch. 24, § 3 provided that, for the purpose of transferring records, files and other documents relating to probate matters in counties having a population of not less than thirty-nine thousand fifty (39,050) nor more than thirty-nine thousand one hundred fifty (39,150), according to the 2000 federal census of population or any subsequent federal census, from the office of the county court clerk to the office of the circuit court clerk, the act shall take effect April 5, 2005. For all other purposes, including the transfer of duties and authority over probate matters to the circuit court clerk, the act shall take effect on July 1, 2005.

For table of U.S. decennial populations of Tennessee counties, see Volume 13 and its supplement.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 11 Tenn. Juris., Equity, § 21.

Collateral References. 72 C.J.S. Possessory Warrant § 6.

16-16-114. Bastardy.

  1. The court has also original jurisdiction over bastardy and bastards, and general supervision of bastards.
  2. Subsection (a) shall only apply in counties having a population, according to the 2000 federal census or any subsequent federal census, of:

    not less than  not more than

    12,800 12,900

    27,100 27,200

    43,100 43,200

    62,300 62,400

    182,000 182,100

  3. In counties having a population of not less than thirty-nine thousand fifty (39,050) nor more than thirty-nine thousand one hundred fifty (39,150), according to the 2000 federal census of population or any subsequent federal census, the circuit court clerk, who also serves as the general sessions court clerk, shall serve as the clerk of the court with probate jurisdiction in any such counties.

Code 1858, § 4208 (deriv. Acts 1741, ch. 14, § 10); Shan., § 6040; Code 1932, § 10237; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-716; Acts 2003, ch. 310, §§ 1, 6-10; 2005, ch. 24, §§ 1, 2.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2003, ch. 310, § 8, effective July 21, 2003, provided that subsection (a) shall only apply in counties having a population of not less than thirty-nine thousand fifty (39,050) nor more than thirty-nine thousand one hundred fifty (39,150), according to the 2000 federal census or any subsequent federal census. Acts 2005, ch. 24, § 1 deleted Acts 2003, ch. 310, § 8, effective April 5, 2005.

Acts 2003, ch. 310, § 9, effective July 21, 2003, provided, in part, that, in any county with a population of not less that twelve thousand eight hundred (12,800) nor more than twelve thousand nine hundred (12,900) according to the 2000 federal census or any subsequent federal census, the clerk who is serving as clerk of the court with probate jurisdiction on June 30, 2003, shall continue to serve as the clerk of the court with probate jurisdiction after the effective date of this act.

Acts 2005, ch. 24, § 1 provided that Acts 2003, ch. 310, § 8 is amended by deleting that section in its entirety.

Acts 2005, ch. 24, § 3 provided that, for the purpose of transferring records, files and other documents relating to probate matters in counties having a population of not less than thirty-nine thousand fifty (39,050) nor more than thirty-nine thousand one hundred fifty (39,150), according to the 2000 federal census of population or any subsequent federal census, from the office of the county court clerk to the office of the circuit court clerk, the act shall take effect April 5, 2005. For all other purposes, including the transfer of duties and authority over probate matters to the circuit court clerk, the act shall take effect on July 1, 2005.

For table of U.S. decennial populations of Tennessee counties, see Volume 13 and its supplement.

Cited: Ex parte Tweedy, 22 F. 84, 1884 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 159 (D. Tenn. 1884).

Collateral References. 10 C.J.S. Bastards § 56.

16-16-115. Powers to exercise concurrent jurisdiction.

  1. The county court is, in cases of concurrent jurisdiction, vested with all the incidental powers belonging to or conferred by law upon the court with which its jurisdiction is concurrent, for the purpose of exercising and effectuating such jurisdiction.
  2. Subsection (a) shall only apply in counties having a population, according to the 2000 federal census or any subsequent federal census, of:

    not less than  not more than

    12,800 12,900

    27,100 27,200

    43,100 43,200

    62,300 62,400

    182,000 182,100

  3. In counties having a population of not less than thirty-nine thousand fifty (39,050) nor more than thirty-nine thousand one hundred fifty (39,150), according to the 2000 federal census of population or any subsequent federal census, the circuit court clerk, who also serves as the general sessions court clerk, shall serve as the clerk of the court with probate jurisdiction in any such counties.

Code 1858, § 4204; Shan., § 6031; Code 1932, § 10229; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-717; Acts 2003, ch. 310, §§ 1, 6-10; 2005, ch. 24, §§ 1, 2.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2003, ch. 310, § 8, effective July 21, 2003, provided that subsection (a) shall only apply in counties having a population of not less than thirty-nine thousand fifty (39,050) nor more than thirty-nine thousand one hundred fifty (39,150), according to the 2000 federal census or any subsequent federal census. Acts 2005, ch. 24, § 1 deleted Acts 2003, ch. 310, § 8, effective April 5, 2005.

Acts 2003, ch. 310, § 9, effective July 21, 2003, provided, in part, that, in any county with a population of not less that twelve thousand eight hundred (12,800) nor more than twelve thousand nine hundred (12,900) according to the 2000 federal census or any subsequent federal census, the clerk who is serving as clerk of the court with probate jurisdiction on June 30, 2003, shall continue to serve as the clerk of the court with probate jurisdiction after the effective date of this act.

Acts 2005, ch. 24, § 1 provided that Acts 2003, ch. 310, § 8 is amended by deleting that section in its entirety.

Acts 2005, ch. 24, § 3 provided that, for the purpose of transferring records, files and other documents relating to probate matters in counties having a population of not less than thirty-nine thousand fifty (39,050) nor more than thirty-nine thousand one hundred fifty (39,150), according to the 2000 federal census of population or any subsequent federal census, from the office of the county court clerk to the office of the circuit court clerk, the act shall take effect April 5, 2005. For all other purposes, including the transfer of duties and authority over probate matters to the circuit court clerk, the act shall take effect on July 1, 2005.

For table of U.S. decennial populations of Tennessee counties, see Volume 13 and its supplement.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 11 Tenn. Juris., Equity, §§ 2, 21; 20 Tenn. Juris., Partition, § 7.

Law Reviews.

The Tennessee Court System — The County Court (Frederic S. Le Clercq), 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 419.

Cited: In re Estate of Ardell Hamilton Trigg, — S.W.3d —, 2011 Tenn. App. LEXIS 53 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 9, 2011).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Consent to Jurisdiction — Effect.

Jurisdiction is not conferrable by consent. Dean v. Snelling, 49 Tenn. 484, 1871 Tenn. LEXIS 35 (1871).

2. Incidental Powers Conferred.

There are conferred the powers possessed by a court of equity incident to effectuating the jurisdiction. Somerville v. Somerville, 52 Tenn. 160, 1871 Tenn. LEXIS 246 (1871).

3. Homestead and Dower.

The county court has, in a proceeding by a widow seeking assignment of homestead and dower, jurisdiction to deny her relief upon the production of her uncontested deed relinquishing her right to the heirs. Tucker v. Tucker, 100 Tenn. 310, 45 S.W. 344, 1897 Tenn. LEXIS 118 (1898).

4. Determining Disputed Land Titles.

The county court has no jurisdiction to determine disputed land titles, not even as an incident to the exercise of its undoubted jurisdiction to sell a decedent's lands for the payment of debts. This section does not confer such jurisdiction, and it cannot be conferred by answering and submitting to same. Walsh v. Crook, 91 Tenn. 388, 19 S.W. 19, 1892 Tenn. LEXIS 2 (1892); Tucker v. Tucker, 100 Tenn. 310, 45 S.W. 344, 1897 Tenn. LEXIS 118 (1898).

The county court must determine the question of conflicting titles, whenever the heirs or any one else may intervene and set up claims to the lands sought to be sold, and the court may decree any lands to be sold that shall appear from the record to have belonged to the decedent, and the purchaser at such sale will acquire such title, and such only, as belonged to the decedent, for such determination will not operate as res judicata in any subsequent action between the purchaser and one claiming adversely to the title of the decedent. Such adverse claimant may resist the title of the purchaser under such decree when sued, or may prefer a bill to have such purchaser's title canceled and removed as a cloud. Walsh v. Crook, 91 Tenn. 388, 19 S.W. 19, 1892 Tenn. LEXIS 2 (1892).

5. Persons and Estates of Persons of Unsound Mind.

County court has concurrent jurisdiction with chancery court over person and estate of person of unsound mind. Union Planters' Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Bornds, 168 Tenn. 289, 77 S.W.2d 645, 1934 Tenn. LEXIS 55 (1935).

6. Trustees.

The jurisdiction of the county court may be limited to special cases of resignation, removal, and appointment of trustees and settlement of accounts of the outgoing trustees and, to that extent, be concurrent with the same jurisdiction in the circuit and chancery court. Leach v. Cowan, 125 Tenn. 182, 140 S.W. 1070, 1911 Tenn. LEXIS 18 (1911).

7. Condemnation Proceedings.

Under this section, § 16-10-205 (repealed) relating to extension of terms of court was applicable to the county court as well as the circuit court in condemnation proceedings for school purposes under §§ 49-801 — 49-817 (now §§ 49-6-200149-6-2007, 49-1-304, and 49-50-401) where the action could have been brought in either court. Ragland v. Davidson County Board of Education, 203 Tenn. 317, 312 S.W.2d 855, 1958 Tenn. LEXIS 306 (1958).

Collateral References. 20 Am. Jur. 2d Courts §§ 128, 130.

21 C.J.S. Courts § 490.

Courts 201.

16-16-116. Clerk.

  1. The county clerk shall be the clerk of the court held by the county judge.
  2. Subsection (a) shall only apply in counties having a population, according to the 2000 federal census or any subsequent federal census, of:

    not less than  not more than

    12,800 12,900

    27,100 27,200

    43,100 43,200

    62,300 62,400

    182,000 182,100

  3. In counties having a population of not less than thirty-nine thousand fifty (39,050) nor more than thirty-nine thousand one hundred fifty (39,150), according to the 2000 federal census of population or any subsequent federal census, the circuit court clerk, who also serves as the general sessions court clerk, shall serve as the clerk of the court with probate jurisdiction in any such counties.

Code 1858, § 4199 (deriv. Acts 1855-1856, ch. 253, § 7); Shan., § 6025; Code 1932, § 10223; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-718; Acts 2003, ch. 310, §§ 1, 6-10; 2005, ch. 24, §§ 1, 2.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2003, ch. 310, § 8, effective July 21, 2003, provided that subsection (a) shall only apply in counties having a population of not less than thirty-nine thousand fifty (39,050) nor more than thirty-nine thousand one hundred fifty (39,150), according to the 2000 federal census or any subsequent federal census. Acts 2005, ch. 24, § 1 deleted Acts 2003, ch. 310, § 8, effective April 5, 2005.

Acts 2003, ch. 310, § 9, effective July 21, 2003, provided, in part, that, in any county with a population of not less that twelve thousand eight hundred (12,800) nor more than twelve thousand nine hundred (12,900) according to the 2000 federal census or any subsequent federal census, the clerk who is serving as clerk of the court with probate jurisdiction on June 30, 2003, shall continue to serve as the clerk of the court with probate jurisdiction after the effective date of this act.

Acts 2005, ch. 24, § 1 provided that Acts 2003, ch. 310, § 8 is amended by deleting that section in its entirety.

Acts 2005, ch. 24, § 3 provided that, for the purpose of transferring records, files and other documents relating to probate matters in counties having a population of not less than thirty-nine thousand fifty (39,050) nor more than thirty-nine thousand one hundred fifty (39,150), according to the 2000 federal census of population or any subsequent federal census, from the office of the county court clerk to the office of the circuit court clerk, the act shall take effect April 5, 2005. For all other purposes, including the transfer of duties and authority over probate matters to the circuit court clerk, the act shall take effect on July 1, 2005.

For table of U.S. decennial populations of Tennessee counties, see Volume 13 and its supplement.

Cross-References. Duties of county clerk, title 18, ch. 6.

Cited: Johnson v. Brice, 112 Tenn. 59, 83 S.W. 791, 1903 Tenn. LEXIS 90 (1904).

16-16-117. Procedure in exercising concurrent jurisdiction.

  1. The mode of procedure in the county court, where the jurisdiction is concurrent either with the circuit or chancery court, shall be as near as may be, according to the rules laid down for the conduct of similar business in those courts.
  2. Subsection (a) shall only apply in counties having a population, according to the 2000 federal census or any subsequent federal census, of:

    not less than  not more than

    12,800 12,900

    27,100 27,200

    43,100 43,200

    62,300 62,400

    182,000 182,100

  3. In counties having a population of not less than thirty-nine thousand fifty (39,050) nor more than thirty-nine thousand one hundred fifty (39,150), according to the 2000 federal census of population or any subsequent federal census, the circuit court clerk, who also serves as the general sessions court clerk, shall serve as the clerk of the court with probate jurisdiction in any such counties.

Code 1858, § 4196; Shan., § 6021; Code 1932, § 10220; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-719; Acts 2003, ch. 310, §§ 1, 6-10; 2005, ch. 24, §§ 1, 2.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2003, ch. 310, § 8, effective July 21, 2003, provided that subsection (a) shall only apply in counties having a population of not less than thirty-nine thousand fifty (39,050) nor more than thirty-nine thousand one hundred fifty (39,150), according to the 2000 federal census or any subsequent federal census. Acts 2005, ch. 24, § 1 deleted Acts 2003, ch. 310, § 8, effective April 5, 2005.

Acts 2003, ch. 310, § 9, effective July 21, 2003, provided, in part, that, in any county with a population of not less that twelve thousand eight hundred (12,800) nor more than twelve thousand nine hundred (12,900) according to the 2000 federal census or any subsequent federal census, the clerk who is serving as clerk of the court with probate jurisdiction on June 30, 2003, shall continue to serve as the clerk of the court with probate jurisdiction after the effective date of this act.

Acts 2005, ch. 24, § 1 provided that Acts 2003, ch. 310, § 8 is amended by deleting that section in its entirety.

Acts 2005, ch. 24, § 3 provided that, for the purpose of transferring records, files and other documents relating to probate matters in counties having a population of not less than thirty-nine thousand fifty (39,050) nor more than thirty-nine thousand one hundred fifty (39,150), according to the 2000 federal census of population or any subsequent federal census, from the office of the county court clerk to the office of the circuit court clerk, the act shall take effect April 5, 2005. For all other purposes, including the transfer of duties and authority over probate matters to the circuit court clerk, the act shall take effect on July 1, 2005.

For table of U.S. decennial populations of Tennessee counties, see Volume 13 and its supplement.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 11 Tenn. Juris., Equity, §§ 2, 21.

Law Reviews.

The Tennessee Court System — The County Court (Frederic S. Le Clercq), 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 419.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Condemnation Proceedings.

Mere fact that in condemnation proceedings by county school board commenced in county court under §§ 49-801 — 49-804 (now § 49-6-2001) there was an appeal to the circuit court would not prevent jurisdiction from being concurrent where it was conceded that the action could have been commenced in either court. Ragland v. Davidson County Board of Education, 203 Tenn. 317, 312 S.W.2d 855, 1958 Tenn. LEXIS 306 (1958).

2. Concurrent Jurisdiction.

Concurrent jurisdiction is that which may be exercised at the same time over the same subject matter in the same county wherein litigants may in the first instance resort to either court indifferently. Ragland v. Davidson County Board of Education, 203 Tenn. 317, 312 S.W.2d 855, 1958 Tenn. LEXIS 306 (1958).

Collateral References. 20 Am. Jur. 2d Courts §§ 128, 130.

21 C.J.S. Courts § 490.

Courts 184.

16-16-118. Return of process.

  1. Unless otherwise ordered by the court, all process shall be returnable to the first Monday coming five (5) days after the service of such process.
  2. Subsection (a) shall only apply in counties having a population, according to the 2000 federal census or any subsequent federal census, of:

    not less than  not more than

    12,800 12,900

    27,100 27,200

    43,100 43,200

    62,300 62,400

    182,000 182,100

  3. In counties having a population of not less than thirty-nine thousand fifty (39,050) nor more than thirty-nine thousand one hundred fifty (39,150), according to the 2000 federal census of population or any subsequent federal census, the circuit court clerk, who also serves as the general sessions court clerk, shall serve as the clerk of the court with probate jurisdiction in any such counties.

Acts 1911, ch. 3, § 2; Shan., § 6006a2; Code 1932, § 10206; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-720; Acts 2003, ch. 310, §§ 1, 6-10; 2005, ch. 24, §§ 1, 2.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2003, ch. 310, § 8, effective July 21, 2003, provided that subsection (a) shall only apply in counties having a population of not less than thirty-nine thousand fifty (39,050) nor more than thirty-nine thousand one hundred fifty (39,150), according to the 2000 federal census or any subsequent federal census. Acts 2005, ch. 24, § 1 deleted Acts 2003, ch. 310, § 8, effective April 5, 2005.

Acts 2003, ch. 310, § 9, effective July 21, 2003, provided, in part, that, in any county with a population of not less that twelve thousand eight hundred (12,800) nor more than twelve thousand nine hundred (12,900) according to the 2000 federal census or any subsequent federal census, the clerk who is serving as clerk of the court with probate jurisdiction on June 30, 2003, shall continue to serve as the clerk of the court with probate jurisdiction after the effective date of this act.

Acts 2005, ch. 24, § 1 provided that Acts 2003, ch. 310, § 8 is amended by deleting that section in its entirety.

Acts 2005, ch. 24, § 3 provided that, for the purpose of transferring records, files and other documents relating to probate matters in counties having a population of not less than thirty-nine thousand fifty (39,050) nor more than thirty-nine thousand one hundred fifty (39,150), according to the 2000 federal census of population or any subsequent federal census, from the office of the county court clerk to the office of the circuit court clerk, the act shall take effect April 5, 2005. For all other purposes, including the transfer of duties and authority over probate matters to the circuit court clerk, the act shall take effect on July 1, 2005.

For table of U.S. decennial populations of Tennessee counties, see Volume 13 and its supplement.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Notice of Hearing in Pending Case.

Where the county court rendered judgment condemning land but reserved the question of damages, and where subsequently the landowners petitioned for damages, such petition was merely a continuation of the condemnation action and notice of such petition was not a leading process, but was similar to notice of the date set for trial, so that reasonable notice was all that was required. Department of Highways & Public Works v. Gamble, 18 Tenn. App. 95, 73 S.W.2d 175, 1934 Tenn. App. LEXIS 16 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1934).

Collateral References. 72 C.J.S. Process § 14.

16-16-119. Reference of questions of fact to clerk — Designation as probate master.

  1. In the exercise of the jurisdiction conferred by § 16-16-107, by title 33, or by title 34, chapter 10, the county judge may, in the county judge's discretion, by general or special orders of reference, refer questions of fact to the county clerk, for taking of proof, either by depositions or by oral testimony, and making findings of fact with respect to the depositions or oral testimony. The county clerk or a deputy named by the county clerk may be designated as probate master and in that capacity shall have all the powers of a clerk and master in chancery.
  2. Subsection (a) shall only apply in counties having a population, according to the 2000 federal census or any subsequent federal census, of:

    not less than  not more than

    12,800 12,900

    27,100 27,200

    43,100 43,200

    62,300 62,400

    182,000 182,100

  3. In counties having a population of not less than thirty-nine thousand fifty (39,050) nor more than thirty-nine thousand one hundred fifty (39,150), according to the 2000 federal census of population or any subsequent federal census, the circuit court clerk, who also serves as the general sessions court clerk, shall serve as the clerk of the court with probate jurisdiction in any such counties.

Acts 1955, ch. 146, § 1; impl. am. Acts 1978, ch. 934, §§ 22, 36; modified; T.C.A., § 16-721; Acts 2003, ch. 310, §§ 1, 6-10; 2005, ch. 24, §§ 1, 2.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2003, ch. 310, § 8, effective July 21, 2003, provided that subsection (a) shall only apply in counties having a population of not less than thirty-nine thousand fifty (39,050) nor more than thirty-nine thousand one hundred fifty (39,150), according to the 2000 federal census or any subsequent federal census. Acts 2005, ch. 24, § 1 deleted Acts 2003, ch. 310, § 8, effective April 5, 2005.

Acts 2003, ch. 310, § 9, effective July 21, 2003, provided, in part, that, in any county with a population of not less that twelve thousand eight hundred (12,800) nor more than twelve thousand nine hundred (12,900) according to the 2000 federal census or any subsequent federal census, the clerk who is serving as clerk of the court with probate jurisdiction on June 30, 2003, shall continue to serve as the clerk of the court with probate jurisdiction after the effective date of this act.

Acts 2005, ch. 24, § 1 provided that Acts 2003, ch. 310, § 8 is amended by deleting that section in its entirety.

Acts 2005, ch. 24, § 3 provided that, for the purpose of transferring records, files and other documents relating to probate matters in counties having a population of not less than thirty-nine thousand fifty (39,050) nor more than thirty-nine thousand one hundred fifty (39,150), according to the 2000 federal census of population or any subsequent federal census, from the office of the county court clerk to the office of the circuit court clerk, the act shall take effect April 5, 2005. For all other purposes, including the transfer of duties and authority over probate matters to the circuit court clerk, the act shall take effect on July 1, 2005.

For table of U.S. decennial populations of Tennessee counties, see Volume 13 and its supplement.

Textbooks. Pritchard on Wills and Administration of Estates (4th ed., Phillips and Robinson), § 837.

Law Reviews.

The Tennessee Court System — Probate Courts (Frederic S. Le Clercq), 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 461.

16-16-120. Information to be collected and reported to the federal bureau of investigation-NICS index and the department of safety by those county and probate courts in which commitments to a mental institution are ordered.

  1. As used in this section:
    1. “Adjudication as a mental defective or adjudicated as a mental defective” means:
      1. A determination by a court in this state that a person, as a result of marked subnormal intelligence, mental illness, incompetency, condition or disease:
        1. Is a danger to such person or to others; or
        2. Lacks the ability to contract or manage such person's own affairs due to mental defect;
      2. A finding of insanity by a court in a criminal proceeding; or
      3. A finding that a person is incompetent to stand trial or is found not guilty by reason of insanity pursuant to §§ 50a and 72b of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, codified in 10 U.S.C. §§ 850a, 876b;
    2. “Judicial commitment to a mental institution” means a judicially ordered involuntary admission to a private or state hospital or treatment resource in proceedings conducted pursuant to title 33, chapter 6 or 7;
    3. “Mental institution” means a mental health facility, mental hospital, sanitarium, psychiatric facility and any other facility that provides diagnoses by a licensed professional of mental retardation or mental illness, including, but not limited to, a psychiatric ward in a general hospital;
    4. “Treatment resource” means any public or private facility, service or program providing treatment or rehabilitation services for mental illness or serious emotional disturbance, including, but not limited to, detoxification centers, hospitals, community mental health centers, clinics or programs, halfway houses and rehabilitation centers.
  2. Those county or probate courts wherein commitments to a mental institution are ordered pursuant to title 33, chapter 6 or 7 or persons are adjudicated as a mental defective shall enter a standing and continuing order instructing the clerk to collect and report as soon as practicable, but no later than the third business day following the date of such an order or adjudication, information described in subsection (c) regarding individuals who have been adjudicated as a mental defective or judicially committed to a mental institution for the purposes of complying with the NICS Improvement Amendments Act of 2007, P.L. 110-180.
  3. The following information shall be collected and reported to the federal bureau of investigation-NICS Index and the department of safety, pursuant to subsection (b):
    1. Complete name and all aliases of the individual judicially committed or adjudicated as a mental defective, including, but not limited to, any names that the individual may have had or currently has by reason of marriage or otherwise;
    2. Case or docket number of the judicial commitment or the adjudication as a mental defective;
    3. Date judicial commitment ordered or adjudication as a mental defective was made;
    4. Private or state hospital or treatment resource to which the individual was judicially committed; and
    5. Date of birth of the individual judicially committed or adjudicated as a mental defective, if such information has been provided to the clerk.
  4. The information in subdivisions (c)(1)-(5), the confidentiality of which is protected by other statutes or regulations, shall be maintained as confidential and not subject to public inspection pursuant to such statutes or regulations, except for such use as may be necessary in the conduct of any proceedings pursuant to §§ 39-17-1316, 39-17-1353 and 39-17-1354.

Acts 2009, ch. 578, § 4; 2013, ch. 300, § 6.

Amendments. The 2013 amendment substituted “collect and report as soon as practicable, but no later than the third business day following the date of such an order or adjudication” for “collect and report January 1, April 1, July 1, and October 1 of every year beginning January 1, 2010” in (b).

Effective Dates. Acts 2009, ch. 578, § 13. January 1, 2010.

Acts 2013, ch. 300, § 11. July 1, 2013.

Cross-References. Confidentiality of public records, § 10-7-504.

16-16-121. Relief from firearm disabilities imposed on persons adjudicated as mental defective or judicially committed to mental institution.

  1. A person who is subject to 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(4) and (g)(4) because the person has been adjudicated as a mental defective or judicially committed to a mental institution, as defined in § 16-16-120, may petition the county or probate court that entered the judicial commitment or adjudication order for relief from the firearm disabilities imposed by the adjudication or judicial commitment; provided, that the person may not petition the court until three (3) years from the date of release from commitment or the date of the adjudication order, whichever is later.
  2. A copy of the petition for relief shall also be served on the district attorney general of the judicial district in which the original judicial commitment or adjudication occurred. The district attorney general may appear, support, object to, or present evidence relevant to the relief sought by the petitioner.
  3. The court shall receive and consider evidence in an open proceeding, including evidence offered by the petitioner, concerning:
    1. The circumstances that led to the imposition of the firearms disability under 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(4) and (g)(4);
    2. The petitioner's mental health records;
    3. The petitioner's criminal history;
    4. The petitioner's reputation; and
    5. Changes in the petitioner's condition or circumstances relevant to the relief sought.
  4. The court shall grant the petition for relief if it finds by a preponderance of the evidence and enters into the record the following:
    1. The petitioner is no longer likely to act in a manner that is dangerous to public safety; and
    2. Granting the relief would not be contrary to the public interest.
  5. A record of the proceedings, to be provided by the petitioner, shall be made by a certified court reporter or by court-approved electronic means.
  6. The petitioner may appeal a final order denying the requested relief, and the review on appeal, if granted, shall be de novo.
  7. A person may file a petition for relief under this section no more than once every two (2) years.
  8. Relief from a firearm disability granted under this section has no effect on the loss of civil rights, including firearm rights, for any reason other than the particular adjudication as a mental defective or judicial commitment to a mental institution from which relief is granted.
  9. When the court issues an order granting a petition of relief under subsection (d), the court clerk shall, as soon as practicable but no later than thirty (30) days after issuance, forward a copy of the order to the Tennessee bureau of investigation (TBI). The TBI, upon receipt of the order, shall:
    1. Immediately forward a copy of the order to the department of safety;
    2. Update the National Instant Criminal Background Check System database and transmit the corrected records to the federal bureau of investigation; and
    3. Remove and destroy all records relating to the petition for relief from any database over which the TBI exercises control.
  10. The TBI and the department of safety shall not use or permit the use of the records or information obtained or retained pursuant to this section for any purpose not specified in this section.

Acts 2015, ch. 459, § 4.

Effective Dates. Acts 2015, ch. 459, § 6. July 1, 2015.

Part 2
Transfer of Probate Jurisdiction to Chancery Court

16-16-201. Probate jurisdiction and administration of estates in chancery court.

  1. In all counties where not otherwise specifically provided by public, private, special or local acts, all jurisdiction relating to the probate of wills and the administration of estates of every nature, including the estates of decedents and of wards under guardianships or conservatorships and related matters previously vested in the county court, the county judge or county chair, is vested in the chancery court of the respective counties. The chancery court in such counties shall have exclusive jurisdiction over the probate of wills and the administration of estates of every nature, including the estates of decedents and of wards under guardianships or conservatorships, and all matters relating thereto, previously vested in the county court.
  2. The clerk and master in such counties shall be authorized and empowered to grant letters of administration and letters testamentary, letters of guardianship and letters of conservatorship, appoint administrators and executors, appoint guardians and conservators, receive and adjudicate all claims, probate wills in common form, determine allowances to the surviving spouse and family of the deceased, preside over the assignment of homestead, preside over proceedings for the elective share, take and state all accounts and settlements, subject to the approval of the chancellor, direct and approve final distributions, and hear and determine all probate matters whether enumerated or not in this subsection (b). The chancellor shall hear all probates in solemn form and may hear such other probate matters as the chancellor may deem proper. All accounts, settlements and final orders of distribution shall be made subject to the approval of the chancellor. All action taken by the clerk and master shall be subject to review by the chancellor by simple motion, petition or the filing of exceptions as may be appropriate.
  3. The court of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from the decisions of the chancery court in such probate matters.
  4. Notwithstanding any private act to the contrary, effective July 1, 2014, in counties having a population of not less than forty-one thousand (41,000) nor more than forty-one thousand one hundred (41,100), according to the 2010 federal census or any subsequent federal census, all jurisdiction relating to the probate of wills and the administration of estates of every nature, including the estates of decedents and of wards under guardianships or conservatorships and related matters presently in the court of general sessions shall be transferred to chancery court. On such date, the chancellor shall assume all duties and responsibilities with respect to the administration of estates, guardian appointments and other probate matters. All probate files, records and other documents maintained in the general sessions or circuit court in such counties shall be transferred to the custody of the clerk and master.

Acts 1980, ch. 875, § 1; T.C.A., § 16-1301; Acts 1982, ch. 858, § 1; 1985, ch. 140, § 3; 2003, ch. 114, § 1; 2014, ch. 756, § 2.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2003, ch. 114, § 2 provided that all records, files, papers and other documents, whether electronic or otherwise, relating to probate or the administration of estates in the possession of the county clerk of any county to which former subsection (d) applied prior to July 1, 2003, shall within thirty (30) days of July 1, 2003, be transferred to the clerk and master of any such county.

Pursuant to Article III, Section 18 of the Constitution of Tennessee, Acts 2014, ch. 756 took effect on April 21, 2014.

For table of U.S. decennial populations of Tennessee counties, see Volume 13 and its supplement.

Amendments. The 2014 amendment added (d).

Effective Dates. Acts 2014, ch. 756, § 3. April 21, 2014. [See the Compiler’s Notes.]

Cross-References. Duties of county clerk relating to administration of estates, § 18-6-106.

Powers of court after confirmation of sale of land, § 16-16-111.

Textbooks. Gibson's Suits in Chancery (7th ed., Inman), § 432.

Pritchard on Wills and Administration of Estates (4th ed., Phillips and Robinson), §§ 36, 38, 42, 44, 45, 123, 338, 535, 555, 572, 832, 837, 852, 892, 896.

Tennessee Jurisprudence, 2 Tenn. Juris., Appeal and Error, §§ 16, 30, 63; 11 Tenn. Juris., Equity, §§ 30, 35; 12 Tenn. Juris., Executors and Administrators, §§ 6, 7, 12, 15, 54, 66, 71, 78-108, 112; 16 Tenn. Juris., Judicial Sales, § 5; 17 Tenn. Juris., Jurisdiction, §§ 23, 24; 25 Tenn. Juris., Wills, §§ 45, 51, 59, 66.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Dickson County.

By Private Acts of 1982, ch. 267, § 2, the exclusive jurisdiction of probate matters in Dickson County was vested in the probate court of that county. In re Estate of Powers, 767 S.W.2d 659, 1988 Tenn. App. LEXIS 756 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988).

2. Jurisdiction.

The probate court of Blount County had plenary jurisdiction over an action to remove the executors of an estate and for damages, and had jurisdiction to empanel a jury. Thompson v. Young (In re Estate of Thompson), 952 S.W.2d 429, 1997 Tenn. App. LEXIS 2 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997).

In an action in which a husband's children from a prior marriage contended that a wife's last will was invalid because it breached a contract in which the wife and the husband agreed to make mutual wills, the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction because T.C.A. § 16-16-201(a) provided the court with subject matter jurisdiction to probate wills, T.C.A. § 32-4-109 provided the court with jurisdiction to hear will contests, T.C.A. § 29-14-102 provided the court with jurisdiction to hear declaratory judgment actions, and T.C.A. §§ 16-11-101 and 16-11-102(a) provided the court with jurisdiction to hear actions for breach of oral or written contracts. In re Estate of Brown, 402 S.W.3d 193, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 308 (Tenn. Mar. 22, 2013).

Chancery court properly dismissed a daughter's complaint to contest her father's will because, while the complaint was timely filed and the court had subject matter jurisdiction, the daughter, an unnamed heir in a prior will contest filed by another daughter, could not institute a second will contest, her complaint was not an amendment to the other will contest, and she did not have to be made a party to the prior proceeding in order for the trial court to determine the validity of the will. In re Estate of Sutton, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. App. LEXIS 805 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 17, 2013), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 404 (Tenn. May 15, 2014).

Probate division of a chancery court had jurisdiction to remove an executor of an estate, while a ruling that the executor had depleted the estate was pending on appeal, because the depletion case and the estate case were two separate matters handled by two different chancellors, and the appeal of the depletion case did not operate as a stay of the estate proceeding. In re Estate of McMillin, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 69 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 12, 2015).

Chancery court properly granted an executor's motion to dismiss a contestant's second will contest with prejudice because the Supreme Court of Tennessee held that when a chancery court served as the probate court for the county, it could simply assume jurisdiction and that no formal certification was required, the contestant's voluntary nonsuit of his first will contest had the legal effect of dismissing the will contest and did not allow the institution of a second will contest. In re Estate of Smalling, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 467 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 13, 2018).

3. Authority of Clerk and Master.

Appellate court rejected an argument by the daughters of a decedent that it erred by concluding that the trial court's December 14, 2001, order was the order that admitted the decedent's will and first two codicils to probate in solemn form; the appellate court stated that, while a clerk and master of the chancery court had express statutory authority to grant letters testamentary, to appoint executors and executrices, and even to admit wills to probate in common form, he or she had no similar authority to admit a will to probate in solemn form. In re Estate of Boote, 198 S.W.3d 699, 2005 Tenn. App. LEXIS 804 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005).

Evidence supported the determination that a 21-year-old son, with spina bifida and other health issues, lacked the capacity to fully attend to his needs without assistance and that the appointment of a conservator was warranted. In re Hess, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 532 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 31, 2012).

Collateral References. Courts 200.

16-16-202. Construction of former statutes.

All sections of Tennessee Code Annotated conferring jurisdiction in probate and related matters in the county courts, the county judge or county chair hereafter shall be construed to be applicable to the chancery court in those counties of the state to which this part applies and shall be deemed as amended accordingly. In all other counties the references are to the court having probate jurisdiction.

Acts 1980, ch. 875, § 2; T.C.A., § 16-1302; Acts 1993, ch. 241, § 26.

Cross-References. Duties of county clerk relating to administration of estates, § 18-6-106.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 2 Tenn. Juris., Appeal and Error, § 63; 11 Tenn. Juris., Equity, § 35; 25 Tenn. Juris., Wills, § 45.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Jurisdiction.

Chancery court erred in setting aside the probate court's order granting conservators'  motion to remove because it was without subject matter jurisdiction to review the probate court's actions or issue any rulings in the case, and thus, all of its orders were void and of no effect; once the conservators decided to file the conservatorship in the property court, any appeals had to be to the court of appeals. In re Conservatorship of Beasley, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 393 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 28, 2015).

Chapter 17
City Courts In Home Rule Municipalities

16-17-101. Establishment of city courts.

  1. In each home rule municipality that does not have a city court ordained and established by the general assembly, a city court is created to try violations of municipal ordinances. The governing body of the municipality may increase the number of divisions of the court created by this subsection (a).
  2. The governing bodies of all home-rule municipalities may also decrease the number of divisions of city courts by ordinance, but no division shall be eliminated except when a term of a city court judge expires or when a vacancy in the office of city court judge exists.
  3. [Deleted by 2019 amendment.]

Acts 1972, ch. 778, § 1; T.C.A., § 16-1201; Acts 1994, ch. 712, § 1; 2003, ch. 113, § 2; 2009, ch. 128, § 1; 2019, ch. 420, § 11.

Amendments. The 2009 amendment rewrote (a) which read: “(a) In all home rule municipalities, the governing bodies are authorized to establish city courts to try violations of municipal ordinances, and in those municipalities which now have city courts, the governing bodies may increase the number of divisions of same.”

The 2019 amendment deleted former (c), which read: “Notwithstanding this section or any other provision of the law to the contrary, no municipality shall create a municipal court with concurrent general sessions court jurisdiction from May 12, 2003, until such time as the Tennessee judicial council, having heard the report of the committee it created to examine the issue of the proliferation of municipal courts in the state, has made a recommendation to the general assembly and the general assembly has had until the adjournment of the first session of the 103rd General Assembly to consider the issue and determine whether any legislative changes are necessary. During the second session of the 103rd General Assembly, and thereafter, any legislation on the subject of municipal courts with concurrent general sessions court jurisdiction may be considered and enacted.”

Effective Dates. Acts 2009, ch. 128, § 4. May 5, 2009.

Acts 2019, ch. 420, § 27. May 21, 2019.

Cross-References. Home rule, Tenn. Const., art. XI, § 9.

Places where supreme court to hold court, Tenn. Const., art. VI, § 2.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 17 Tenn. Juris., Jurisdiction, § 26.

Law Reviews.

The Tennessee Court System — Municipal Courts (Frederic S. Le Clercq), 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 431.

Attorney General Opinions. The term “general sessions court” cannot accurately refer to a city court, OAG 01-160 (10/25/01).

Comparative Legislation. Municipal courts:

Ala.  Code § 12-14-1 et seq.

Ark.  Code § 16-17-201 et seq.

Ga. O.C.G.A. § 36-32-1 et seq.

Miss.  Code Ann. § 21-23-1 et seq.

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 478.230.

Va. Code § 16.1-69.1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. State Criminal Jurisdiction.

The general assembly may confer state criminal jurisdiction upon corporation courts if it sees fit to do so. Knoxville ex rel. Roach v. Dossett, 672 S.W.2d 193, 1984 Tenn. LEXIS 804 (Tenn. 1984).

This section and former § 16-17-103 (repealed) did not confer state criminal jurisdiction upon corporation courts in those municipalities within counties whose jurisdiction was removed by §§ 40-4-12140-4-124. Knoxville ex rel. Roach v. Dossett, 672 S.W.2d 193, 1984 Tenn. LEXIS 804 (Tenn. 1984).

Municipal courts of the City of Knoxville did not have jurisdiction over state criminal offenses committed within the municipal boundaries. Knoxville ex rel. Roach v. Dossett, 672 S.W.2d 193, 1984 Tenn. LEXIS 804 (Tenn. 1984).

2. Legislative Intent.

Sections 16-17-10116-17-105 were not intended to repeal §§ 40-4-12140-4-124. Knoxville ex rel. Roach v. Dossett, 672 S.W.2d 193, 1984 Tenn. LEXIS 804 (Tenn. 1984).

3. “All Home Rule Municipalities.”

The phrase “all home rule municipalities” means all except those in §§ 40-4-12140-4-124. Knoxville ex rel. Roach v. Dossett, 672 S.W.2d 193, 1984 Tenn. LEXIS 804 (Tenn. 1984).

Collateral References. Courts 42(5).

16-17-102. Judges — Appointment and election.

The judge of the city court shall be appointed on the nomination of the mayor and concurred in by the city council or other legislative body, but the appointed judge shall serve only until the next general election, at which time a judge or judges will be elected.

Acts 1972, ch. 778, § 2; modified; T.C.A., § 16-1202; Acts 2009, ch. 128, § 2.

Amendments. The 2009 amendment rewrote the section which read: “The judges of the city court hereinafter established by the governing body of home rule municipalities shall be appointed on the nomination of the mayor or chief executive officer, concurred in by the city council or other legislative body, but the judges so appointed shall run for election in the next general election.”

Effective Dates. Acts 2009, ch. 128, § 4. May 5, 2009.

Law Reviews.

The Tennessee Court System — Municipal Courts (Frederic S. Le Clercq), 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 431.

Attorney General Opinions. A former city judge was not entitled to salary or benefits, including payment by the city for COBRA coverage, after the successor assumed office where the judge was originally elected to a term that would have ended in April 2001, but the law mandating the election time for city judge was changed after the judge took office, and the judge's successor took office on September 1, 2000, OAG 01-006 (1/10/01).

T.C.A. § 16-17-102 applies only to a court newly created under the authority of the section, but not to additional divisions added to an existing court under the section, OAG 01-153 (10/1/01).

Assuming that current city judges were selected by a city commission, they were not appointed as required under the statute as the statute requires that interim city judges must be nominated by the mayor with the concurrence of the city commission, OAG 01-153 (10/1/01).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Legislative Intent.

Sections 16-17-10116-17-105 were not intended to repeal §§ 40-4-12140-4-124. Knoxville ex rel. Roach v. Dossett, 672 S.W.2d 193, 1984 Tenn. LEXIS 804 (Tenn. 1984).

Collateral References. Judges 3.

16-17-103. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former § 16-17-103 (Acts 1972, ch. 778, § 3; T.C.A., § 16-1203), concerning power and authority of judges, was repealed by Acts 2004, ch. 914, § 6(e), effective March 1, 2005.

16-17-104. Increase of divisions — Powers.

In those home rule municipalities that have city courts and whose divisions have been increased by the legislative body, the new divisions have the same power as other divisions and are under the same direction and control as provided in this part and the municipality's charter.

Acts 1972, ch. 778, § 4; T.C.A., § 16-1204; Acts 2009, ch. 128, § 3.

Amendments. The 2009 amendment rewrote the section which read: “In those home rule cities which have city courts and in which the legislative body increases the number of divisions thereof, the legislative body shall authorize the same power as other divisions, and the newly created divisions shall be under the same direction and control as presently provided in the municipal charter.”

Effective Dates. Acts 2009, ch. 128, § 4. May 5, 2009.

Law Reviews.

The Tennessee Court System — Municipal Courts (Frederic S. Le Clercq), 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 431.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Legislative Intent.

Sections 16-17-10116-17-105 were not intended to repeal §§ 40-4-12140-4-124. Knoxville ex rel. Roach v. Dossett, 672 S.W.2d 193, 1984 Tenn. LEXIS 804 (Tenn. 1984).

16-17-105. Costs — Limitation.

Municipal court costs shall be set and collected in accordance with § 16-18-304, and the litigation tax shall be levied and collected in accordance with § 16-18-305.

Acts 1972, ch. 778, § 5; T.C.A., § 16-1205; Acts 2004, ch. 914, § 6(e)(2).

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2004, ch. 914, § 8(b) provided that, notwithstanding any provision of former § 16-17-101(c), or any other law to the contrary, from May 12, 2003, through March 1, 2005, concurrent general sessions jurisdiction shall not be newly conferred upon any existing or newly created municipal court.

Cross-References. Fees collectible by general sessions court clerks, § 8-21-401.

Law Reviews.

The Tennessee Court System — Municipal Courts (Frederic S. Le Clercq), 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 431.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Legislative Intent.

Sections 16-17-10116-17-105 were not intended to repeal §§ 40-4-12140-4-124. Knoxville ex rel. Roach v. Dossett, 672 S.W.2d 193, 1984 Tenn. LEXIS 804 (Tenn. 1984).

Chapter 18
Municipal Courts—Judges

Part 1
Establishment of Office

16-18-101. Governing body may provide for office of municipal judge.

In any municipality in this state having a mayor's court or a municipal court presided over by the mayor of the municipality or the city recorder of the municipality and having no other provision for a municipal judge for the municipality, the governing body of the municipality is authorized by ordinance to provide for the office of municipal judge.

Acts 1973, ch. 330, § 1; 1975, ch. 231, § 1; T.C.A., § 17-123; modified; T.C.A., § 17-1-501.

Compiler's Notes. This section was formerly compiled as § 17-1-501.

Cross-References. City courts, title 6, ch. 4, part 3.

Power of general assembly to create court, Tenn. Const., art. VI, § 1.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 17 Tenn. Juris., Jurisdiction, § 26.

Law Reviews.

The Tennessee Court System — Municipal Courts (Frederic S. Le Clercq), 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 431.

Attorney General Opinions. Repeal of adoption of home rule, 98-0106 (6/11/98).

Comparative Legislation. Municipal court judges:

Ala.  Code § 12-14-30 et seq.

Ark.  Code § 16-17-207 et seq.

Ga. O.C.G.A. § 36-32-1 et seq.

Miss.  Code Ann. § 21-23-1 et seq.

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 478.230.

Va. Code § 16.1-69.6:1 et seq.

Cited: City of White House v. Whitley, 979 S.W.2d 262, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 573 (Tenn. 1998).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Applicability.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 6-21-501 already specifically provides for a city court for municipalities with a city manager — commission charter; § 16-18-101 and § 16-18-102, which are general provisions, are not operative under that charter system. Summers v. Thompson, 764 S.W.2d 182, 1988 Tenn. LEXIS 108 (Tenn. 1988), appeal dismissed, 488 U.S. 977, 109 S. Ct. 524, 102 L. Ed. 2d 556, 1988 U.S. LEXIS 5418 (1988).

Collateral References. Judges 3.

16-18-102. Contents of ordinance.

The ordinance providing for the office of municipal judge shall provide:

  1. That the municipal judge is vested with the judicial powers and functions of the mayor or city recorder of such municipality, and is subject to the provisions of law and the municipality's charter governing the mayor's court or the municipal court presided over by the mayor or city recorder;
  2. For qualifications of the municipal judge;
  3. That the municipal judge shall be appointed by the governing body of the municipality, to serve at the pleasure of the governing body;
  4. That vacancies in the office shall be filled for the unexpired term by the governing body;
  5. For oath of office and bonding of the municipal judge before entering upon the duties of this office;
  6. That the cost of making the bond of the municipal judge shall be paid by the municipality;
  7. That the salary of the municipal judge shall be fixed by the governing body before the municipal judge's appointment, and shall not be altered during the municipal judge's term of service; and
  8. For the designation of a person to serve as judge during the absence or disability of the municipal judge.

Acts 1973, ch. 330, §§ 1, 2; 1975, ch. 231, § 1; T.C.A., § 17-123; modified; T.C.A., § 17-1-502.

Compiler's Notes. This section was formerly compiled as § 17-1-502.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 17 Tenn. Juris., Jurisdiction, § 26.

Cited: State by South Carthage v. Barrett, 840 S.W.2d 895, 1992 Tenn. LEXIS 570 (Tenn. 1992); City of White House v. Whitley, 979 S.W.2d 262, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 573 (Tenn. 1998).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Applicability.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 6-21-501 already specifically provides for a city court for municipalities with a city manager — commission charter; § 16-18-101 and § 16-18-102, which are general provisions, are not operative under that charter system. Summers v. Thompson, 764 S.W.2d 182, 1988 Tenn. LEXIS 108 (Tenn. 1988), appeal dismissed, 488 U.S. 977, 109 S. Ct. 524, 102 L. Ed. 2d 556, 1988 U.S. LEXIS 5418 (1988).

Collateral References.

Substitution of judge in state criminal trial. 45 A.L.R.5th 591.

Part 2
Popularly Elected City Judges

16-18-201. Ordinances — Election.

Any incorporated city or town may by ordinance provide for the election of a city judge or judges by popular vote. The popular election of the judge or judges may be an alternative to the method provided in the charter or applicable general law provisions or in addition to that method, with one (1) or more judges being chosen under charter or applicable general law provisions and one (1) or more being chosen by popular vote pursuant to this part. In the election for city judge, only qualified voters of the city or town may vote.

Acts 1993, ch. 115, § 1.

Cross-References. Forfeiture warrant, § 40-33-204.

Cited: City of White House v. Whitley, 979 S.W.2d 262, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 573 (Tenn. 1998).

16-18-202. Qualifications.

Any city judge elected by popular vote must meet the requirements established in Tenn. Const. art. VI, § 4 for judges of inferior courts.

Acts 1993, ch. 115, § 1.

Cited: City of White House v. Whitley, 979 S.W.2d 262, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 573 (Tenn. 1998).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Subject Matter Jurisdiction.

Because defendant was found guilty of violating a municipal ordinance, the court of criminal appeals was without subject matter jurisdiction to consider the case, and thus, it had to transfer the case to the court of appeals for further adjudication; a circuit court order found defendant guilty of violating a city ordinance for failure to adhere to a stop sign. City of McMinnville v. Hubbard, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 104 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 20, 2019).

16-18-203. Term of office.

The term of office of the city judge elected pursuant to this part shall be eight (8) years, except for any initial term that may be shorter. Once the ordinance is adopted providing for the popularly elected judge, the municipal governing body may appoint a qualified person to serve in that position until the next regular August general state election. The first city judge popularly elected pursuant to this part shall be elected at the next regular August general state election that takes place at least thirty (30) days after the ordinance is passed calling for the judge's election. The person elected at this election shall serve only until replaced by a successor to be chosen at the next regular judicial election held in accordance with Tenn. Const. art. VII, §  5. All subsequent elections for city judge pursuant to this part shall be held in accordance with Tenn. Const. art. VII, §  5.

Acts 1993, ch. 115, § 1.

Attorney General Opinions. “City election” under city charter construed as November elections, OAG 98-0103 (6/8/98).

A former city judge was not entitled to salary or benefits, including payment by the city for COBRA coverage, after the successor assumed office where the judge was originally elected to a term that would have ended in April 2001, but the law mandating the election time for city judge was changed after the judge took office, and the judge's successor took office on September 1, 2000, OAG 01-006 (1/10/01).

16-18-204. Vacancies.

A vacancy in the office of the popularly elected city judge shall be filled by appointment by the governing body. The person appointed, however, may serve only until the next regular August general state election. At this election, a person shall be elected to serve any unexpired term if the full term is not to be filled at the election. In the temporary absence or inability of the city judge, the governing body shall appoint a qualified person to serve until the judge's return.

Acts 1993, ch. 115, § 1.

Attorney General Opinions. “City election” under city charter construed as November elections, OAG 98-0103 (6/8/98).

16-18-205. Salary.

  1. The salary of the popularly elected city judge shall be established in one (1) of the following ways:
    1. The salary may be fixed by the governing body by ordinance or resolution prior to the term of office and shall not be increased nor diminished during the term;
    2. The salary shall be set in private act or general law charter provisions or other general law provisions applicable to the particular city or town. Present salary provisions in charters that are applicable to nonpopularly elected city judges may be used for popularly elected judges, and may be amended from time to time as long as the salary is neither increased nor diminished during the term of office.
      1. If there is no charter or general law provision applicable to the particular city or town setting the city judge's salary, the salary of the popularly elected judge shall be as follows:

        Municipalities with a population of 100,000 or more  $2,000 per month.

        Municipalities with a population of 25,000 to 99,999 1,000 per month.

        Municipalities with a population less than 25,000 500 per month.

      2. All populations shall be as determined by the latest federal census. This salary shall prevail until a different one is set for the city or town by charter or general law. This salary, however, may not be increased nor diminished during a term of office. The salary of the popularly elected city judge shall be paid monthly from the general fund of the city or town.
  2. Except as otherwise provided in this section relative to the salary of the popularly elected judge, the city governing body shall set the annual budget of the city court.

Acts 1993, ch. 115, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. For table of populations of Tennessee municipalities see Volume 13 and its supplement.

16-18-206. [Repealed.]

Compiler's Notes. Former § 16-18-206 (Acts 1993, ch. 115, § 1), concerning jurisdiction of city judges, was repealed by Acts 2004, ch. 914, § 6(f), effective March 1, 2005.

16-18-207. City court clerk — Election — Term of office — Duties — Removal — Vacancies.

  1. The municipal governing body may by ordinance require the city court clerk serving the popularly elected city judge to be elected by the voters of the city or town for a term of four (4) years. The elected clerk may be an alternative or in addition to the court clerk provided for by charter. The initial term may be a transitional term established by ordinance to make the clerk's election coincide at every other election with the election of the city judge. The elected clerk shall perform the duties set out in the charter and ordinances of the city or town for the city court clerk.
  2. The elected clerk may be removed by the city judge:
    1. Upon conviction of a misdemeanor in office or of a felony;
    2. For failing to give security as required by law or ordinance;
    3. For failing to pay over public moneys or moneys collected officially;
    4. For incapacity, neglect of duty or misbehavior in office; or
    5. For any other cause to which the penalty of removal is attached by law.
  3. A vacancy in the office of the elected city court clerk may be filled temporarily by appointment by the city judge until the next regular municipal or general election. At this election, a person shall be elected to serve any unexpired term if the full term is not to be filled at the election.
  4. If a city or town chooses to have an elected clerk but does not wish to elect a city court clerk specifically for the city or town, the clerk of the general sessions court in the county may by agreement with the city or town serve as the clerk of the city court.

Acts 1993, ch. 115, § 1.

Attorney General Opinions. “City election” under city charter construed as November elections, OAG 98-0103 (6/8/98).

Part 3
Municipal Court Reform Act

16-18-301. Short title — Construction of terms.

  1. This part shall be known and may be cited as the “Municipal Court Reform Act of 2004.”
  2. As used in this part:
    1. “Any law to the contrary” includes, but is not limited to, any conflicting provision of any general statute, local law, private act, charter provision, municipal law or municipal ordinance; and
    2. “Municipal court” includes the city, town, mayor's, recorder's or municipal court, or other similarly functioning court, however designated, for any city, town, municipality or metropolitan government, whether the court exists pursuant to general statute, local law, private act, charter provision, municipal law, municipal ordinance or other legal authorization.

Acts 2004, ch. 914, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Former part 3, § 16-18-301 (Acts 1999, ch. 149, § 1), concerning administration of oaths by municipal court judges, was repealed and replaced by Acts 2004, ch. 914, § 2, effective March 1, 2005.

Acts 2004, ch. 914, § 8(b) provided that, notwithstanding any provision of former § 16-17-101(c), or any other law to the contrary, from May 12, 2003, through March 1, 2005, concurrent general sessions jurisdiction shall not be newly conferred upon any existing or newly created municipal court.

Comparative Legislation. Court reform:

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 476.015 et seq.

16-18-302. Jurisdiction of municipal courts.

  1. For any municipality that does not have, on May 5, 2009, a municipal court that was ordained and established by the general assembly, a municipal court is created to be presided over by a city judge. Notwithstanding any law to the contrary:
    1. A municipal court possesses jurisdiction in and over cases:
      1. For violation of the laws and ordinances of the municipality; or
      2. Arising under the laws and ordinances of the municipality; and
    2. A municipal court also possesses jurisdiction to enforce any municipal law or ordinance that mirrors, substantially duplicates or incorporates by cross-reference the language of a state criminal statute, if and only if the state criminal statute mirrored, duplicated or cross-referenced is a Class C misdemeanor and the maximum penalty prescribed by municipal law or ordinance is a civil fine not in excess of fifty dollars ($50.00).
  2. Notwithstanding subdivision (a)(2) or any other law to the contrary, in any municipality having a population in excess of one hundred fifty thousand (150,000), according to the 2000 federal census or any subsequent federal census, a municipal court also possesses jurisdiction to enforce any municipal law or ordinance that mirrors, substantially duplicates or incorporates by cross-reference the language of any of the following state criminal statutes relative to:
    1. The offense of operating a motor vehicle without a valid driver license, § 55-50-301;
    2. The Class B misdemeanor offense of reckless driving, § 55-10-205;
    3. The Class A misdemeanor offenses of underage purchasing, possession, transportation or consumption of alcoholic beverages, wine or beer, § 1-3-113(b);
    4. The Class A misdemeanor offenses of underage consumption, possession or transportation of beer or any intoxicating liquor, § 57-3-412(a)(3);
    5. The Class A misdemeanor offenses of underage purchasing or attempting to purchase any alcoholic beverage, § 57-3-412(a)(5);
    6. The Class A misdemeanor offenses of underage purchasing, attempting to purchase or possession of any alcoholic beverages, § 57-4-203(b)(2);
    7. The Class A misdemeanor offenses of underage purchasing or attempting to purchase beer or alcoholic beverages, § 57-5-301(d); or
    8. The Class A misdemeanor offenses of underage possession or transportation of beer, § 57-5-301(e).
  3. Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, in addition to jurisdiction authorized pursuant to subsection (a) or (b), a municipal court may also exercise concurrent jurisdiction with the court of general sessions if, and only if:
    1. The municipal court possessed and exercised such concurrent general sessions jurisdiction continuously on and before May 11, 2003; or
    2. After May 12, 2003, concurrent general sessions jurisdiction is duly conferred upon the municipal court in accordance with the procedures and requirements set forth in § 16-18-311.
  4. Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, a municipal court may exercise no jurisdiction other than the jurisdiction authorized by this section; provided, however, that this section shall not be construed to impair or in any way restrict the authority of a juvenile judge to waive jurisdiction over any cases or class of cases of alleged traffic violations, as authorized pursuant to § 37-1-146, or the authority of a municipal court to receive and dispose of such cases or classes of cases of alleged traffic violations.

Acts 2004, ch. 914, § 2; 2006, ch. 1004, § 1; 2009, ch. 144, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Former part 3, § 16-18-301 (Acts 1999, ch. 149, § 1), concerning administration of oaths by municipal court judges, was repealed and replaced by Acts 2004, ch. 914, § 2, effective March 1, 2005.

Acts 2004, ch. 914, § 8(b) provided that, notwithstanding any provision of former § 16-17-101(c), or any other law to the contrary, from May 12, 2003, through March 1, 2005, concurrent general sessions jurisdiction shall not be newly conferred upon any existing or newly created municipal court.

For tables of population of Tennessee municipalities, see Volume 13 and its supplement.

Amendments. The 2009 amendment added the first sentence of the introductory paragraph of (a).

Effective Dates. Acts 2009, ch. 144, § 2. May 5, 2009.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class A, B and C misdemeanors, § 40-35-111.

Attorney General Opinions. Whether a private or public act may constitutionally authorize a city to establish an environmental court with injunctive powers and power to imprison, OAG 07-147 (10/19/07).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Jurisdiction Established.

Fine imposed by Knoxville, Tenn., City Code § 17-210 is a civil fine for purposes of establishing the Knoxville municipal court's jurisdiction pursuant to T.C.A. § 16-18-302, and the fine was a civil fine for procedural and appellate issues; however, there was no remedial purpose to the fine imposed by § 17-210, and because the fine imposed was intended to be punitive and a deterrent, constitutional protections were triggered. City of Knoxville v. Brown, 284 S.W.3d 330, 2008 Tenn. App. LEXIS 436 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 30, 2008), rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2008 Tenn. App. LEXIS 813 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 22, 2008), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2009 Tenn. LEXIS 193 (Tenn. Feb. 17, 2009).

2. Practice and Procedure.

Traffic citation issued to defendant by a municipal police officer, which charged defendant with speeding in violation of Tennessee's statutory prohibition on speeding, was insufficient to provide defendant with reasonable notice of the municipal ordinance which defendant was charged with violating, even though the municipal code adopted by reference the state traffic statutes. The city could have moved to amend the citation to specify a violation of the municipal ordinance and allowing defendant further time to prepare a defense. City of La Vergne v. LeQuire, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 778 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 19, 2016).

3. Subject Matter Jurisdiction.

Because defendant was found guilty of violating a municipal ordinance, the court of criminal appeals was without subject matter jurisdiction to consider the case, and thus, it had to transfer the case to the court of appeals for further adjudication; a circuit court order found defendant guilty of violating a city ordinance for failure to adhere to a stop sign. City of McMinnville v. Hubbard, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 104 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 20, 2019).

16-18-303. Administration of oaths.

Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, every popularly elected or appointed judge of a municipal court is authorized to administer oaths.

Acts 2004, ch. 914, § 2.

Compiler's Notes. Former part 3, § 16-18-301 (Acts 1999, ch. 149, § 1), concerning administration of oaths by municipal court judges, was repealed and replaced by Acts 2004, ch. 914, § 2, effective March 1, 2005.

Acts 2004, ch. 914, § 8(b) provided that, notwithstanding any provision of former§ 16-17-101(c), or any other law to the contrary, from May 12, 2003, through March 1, 2005, concurrent general sessions jurisdiction shall not be newly conferred upon any existing or newly created municipal court.

16-18-304. Court costs as prescribed by municipal law or ordinance — Allocation of fees — Training and continuing education for judges and clerks — Fees when exercising concurrent general sessions court jurisdiction.

  1. Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, municipal court costs shall be set and collected in the amount prescribed by municipal law or ordinance. From such amount, one dollar ($1.00) shall be forwarded by the municipal court clerk to the state treasurer for deposit and shall be credited to the account for the administrative office of the courts (AOC) for the sole purpose of defraying the administrative director's expenses in providing training and continuing education courses for municipal court judges and municipal court clerks. The AOC shall allocate fifty percent (50%) of such funds exclusively for the purpose of providing training and continuing education for municipal court clerks. The AOC is authorized to contract with qualified persons, entities or organizations in order to provide required training or continuing education for municipal court judges. The AOC shall contract with the municipal technical advisory service of the University of Tennessee institute for public service in order to provide required training or continuing education for municipal court clerks and may contract with other qualified persons, entities or organizations to provide additional or alternate training to municipal court clerks.
  2. Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, to the extent that a municipal court is exercising its duly conferred, concurrent general sessions court jurisdiction in a given case, this section does not apply and costs in such case shall be assessed, collected and distributed in the same manner as such costs are assessed, collected and distributed in the court of general sessions.

Acts 2004, ch. 914, § 2.

Compiler's Notes. Former part 3, § 16-18-301 (Acts 1999, ch. 149, § 1), concerning administration of oaths by municipal court judges, was repealed and replaced by Acts 2004, ch. 914, § 2, effective March 1, 2005.

Acts 2004, ch. 914, § 8(b) provided that, notwithstanding any provision of former § 16-17-101(c), or any other law to the contrary, from May 12, 2003, through March 1, 2005, concurrent general sessions jurisdiction shall not be newly conferred upon any existing or newly created municipal court.

16-18-305. Levy of state privilege tax on litigation — Collection — Liability for failure to collect or disburse tax — Tax when exercising concurrent general sessions court jurisdiction.

  1. Notwithstanding § 67-4-602, or any other law to the contrary, there is levied a state privilege tax on litigation of thirteen dollars and seventy-five cents ($13.75) in all cases in a municipal court. All taxes levied pursuant to this subsection (a) shall be collected in accordance with § 67-4-603 and shall be paid into the state treasury and allocated in accordance with § 67-4-606.
  2. There is also levied a state privilege tax on litigation of one dollar ($1.00) for each and every violation of any municipal law or ordinance governing use of a public parking space. The tax is due and shall be collected even if the offender does not appear before the court. Notwithstanding this section or any other law to the contrary, the only litigation privilege tax collected for a violation of any municipal law or ordinance governing the use of a public parking space shall be the one dollar ($1.00) litigation tax levied by this subsection (b). The revenue generated by the privilege tax levied by this subsection (b) shall be apportioned in accordance with § 67-4-606.
  3. Notwithstanding § 67-4-602, or any other law to the contrary, no other state privilege tax on litigation shall be levied or collected with respect to litigation in a municipal court; provided, however, that this section shall not be construed to repeal existing authority for the levy of a municipal litigation tax, nor shall this section be construed to grant new authority for the levy of a municipal litigation tax.
  4. Any state privilege tax imposed pursuant to this section that the clerk of the court fails to collect and pay over to the department of revenue shall be a debt of the clerk. Any clerk of the court failing or refusing to collect and pay over to the department state litigation taxes imposed pursuant to this section shall be liable for the taxes and the clerk's official bondsman shall also be liable for the taxes, and the commissioner or the commissioner's delegate may collect the amount of the tax from the clerk or the clerk's official bondsman pursuant to title 67, chapter 1, part 14.
  5. Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, to the extent that a municipal court is exercising its duly conferred concurrent general sessions jurisdiction in a given case, this section does not apply and litigation taxes in the case shall be levied and collected in the same manner as taxes are levied and collected in the general sessions court.
  6. For receiving and paying over all privilege taxes on litigation, the clerk of a municipal court is entitled to a commission of two percent (2%).

Acts 2004, ch. 914, § 2; 2005, ch. 429, §§ 20, 27.

Compiler's Notes. Former part 3, § 16-18-301 (Acts 1999, ch. 149, § 1), concerning administration of oaths by municipal court judges, was repealed and replaced by Acts 2004, ch. 914, § 2, effective March 1, 2005.

Acts 2004, ch. 914, § 8(b) provided that notwithstanding any provision of former§ 16-17-101(c), or any other law to the contrary, from May 12, 2003, through March 1, 2005, concurrent general sessions jurisdiction shall not be newly conferred upon any existing or newly created municipal court.

Attorney General Opinions. For collecting and paying over litigation taxes on cases heard under the municipal court's concurrent general sessions jurisdiction, a municipal court clerk is entitled to receive a commission of 2%, OAG 06-147 (9/27/06).

16-18-306. Fine for contempt of municipal court.

Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, contempt of a municipal court shall be punishable by fine in the amount of fifty dollars ($50.00), or such lesser amount as may be imposed in the judge's discretion.

Acts 2004, ch. 914, § 2.

Compiler's Notes. Former part 3, § 16-18-301 (Acts 1999, ch. 149, § 1), concerning administration of oaths by municipal court judges, was repealed and replaced by Acts 2004, ch. 914, § 2, effective March 1, 2005.

Acts 2004, ch. 914, § 8(b) provided that, notwithstanding any provision of former§ 16-17-101(c), or any other law to the contrary, from May 12, 2003, through March 1, 2005, concurrent general sessions jurisdiction shall not be newly conferred upon any existing or newly created municipal court.

Attorney General Opinions. Authority of city court to punish an individual for contempt of court when the person fails to appear in court for an appointed court date.  OAG 11-17, 2011 Tenn. AG LEXIS 19 (2/15/11).

16-18-307. Appeal of municipal court judgment — Bond.

Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, any person dissatisfied with the judgment of a municipal court, in any case or cases heard and determined by the court acting pursuant to § 16-18-302(a), may, within ten (10) days thereafter, Sundays exclusive, appeal to the circuit court of the county, upon giving bond in the amount of two hundred fifty dollars ($250) for the person's appearance and the faithful prosecution of the appeal. As used in this section, person includes, but is not limited to, a natural person, corporation, business entity or the municipality.

Acts 2004, ch. 914, § 2.

Compiler's Notes. Former part 3, § 16-18-301 (Acts 1999, ch. 149, § 1), concerning administration of oaths by municipal court judges, was repealed and replaced by Acts 2004, ch. 914, § 2, effective March 1, 2005.

Acts 2004, ch. 914, § 8(b) provided that, notwithstanding any provision of former§ 16-17-101(c), or any other law to the contrary, from May 12, 2003, through March 1, 2005, concurrent general sessions jurisdiction shall not be newly conferred upon any existing or newly created municipal court.

Attorney General Opinions. Municipal court clerk's obligation to transmit appeal bond to the circuit-court clerk. OAG 15-07, 2015 Tenn. AG LEXIS 6 (1/27/15).

16-18-308. Concurrent holding of any other office or employment.

  1. Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, a judge of a municipal court may not concurrently hold any other office or employment with the municipality. This section does not apply to any municipal official or employee who, on March 1, 2005, concurrently holds office as judge of the municipal court; provided, however, that if the official or employee either discontinues service as a municipal official or employee or discontinues service as judge of the municipal court, then the exemption granted by this section no longer applies.
  2. Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) to the contrary, if a municipal charter provides that the person who serves as judge of the municipal court shall also serve as the recorder for the municipality, then the person may concurrently hold both offices.

Acts 2004, ch. 914, § 2; 2009, ch. 505, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Former part 3, § 16-18-301 (Acts 1999, ch. 149, § 1), concerning administration of oaths by municipal court judges, was repealed and replaced by Acts 2004, ch. 914, § 2, effective March 1, 2005.

Acts 2004, ch. 914, § 8(b) provided that, notwithstanding any provision of former§ 16-17-101(c), or any other law to the contrary, from May 12, 2003, through March 1, 2005, concurrent general sessions jurisdiction shall not be newly conferred upon any existing or newly created municipal court.

Amendments. The 2009 amendment added (b).

Effective Dates. Acts 2009, ch. 505, § 4. June 25, 2009.

16-18-309. Training and continuing education.

    1. Except as otherwise provided in subdivision (a)(4), each calendar year, the judge of each municipal court must attend at least three (3) hours of training or continuing education courses provided by, through or with approval of the administrative office of the courts (AOC) and must certify attendance to the administrative director. The three (3) hours of training or continuing education required by this subsection (a) shall consist of material specifically designed for municipal court judges and for training the judges concerning the issues, procedures and new developments relevant to the judges. General legal training or continuing legal education shall not be sufficient to satisfy the requirement. If a municipal court judge fails to timely comply with such requirements, then the judge shall be extended a six (6) month grace period in order to achieve compliance; provided, however, that training obtained to satisfy requirements for the preceding calendar year shall not also be used to satisfy requirements for the current calendar year. The failure of the judge to achieve compliance prior to conclusion of the six (6) month grace period shall render all subsequent judgments of the judge null and void and of no effect, until such time as the requirements are met. The training and continuing education courses may be offered by the AOC in conjunction with the annual meeting of the Tennessee municipal judges’ conference held in accordance with § 17-3-301(c).
    2. Each municipal judge shall be compensated and reimbursed for attending required training or continuing education in accordance with the travel policy of the municipality.
    3. If a municipal court judge attends more than three (3) hours of qualifying training or continuing education in a calendar year, the hours in excess of three (3) hours may be carried over for one (1) calendar year.
    4. If the judge of a municipal court is authorized to practice law in the courts of this state, and if the judge satisfies the annual continuing legal education requirements for practicing attorneys and three (3) of the hours completed in satisfying the continuing legal education requirements are training or continuing education courses required by subdivision (a)(1), then the judge shall not be required to complete three (3) additional hours of training or continuing education courses required by subdivision (a)(1). By March 1 following the year for which the requirements are met, the judge shall submit to the administrative office of the courts a copy of the statement of compliance issued by the commission on continuing legal education verifying the number of continuing legal education hours completed for such year.
    1. Each calendar year, the clerk of each municipal court must attend at least three (3) hours of training or continuing education courses provided by, through or with approval of the AOC and must certify attendance to the administrative director; provided, however, that such attendance requirements do not apply to any municipal clerk who is required to be certified pursuant to § 6-54-120.
    2. Each municipal court clerk shall be compensated and reimbursed for attending required training and continuing education in accordance with the travel policy of the municipality.

Acts 2004, ch. 914, § 2; 2006, ch. 1004, §§ 3, 4; 2009, ch. 505, §§ 2, 3.

Compiler's Notes. Former part 3, § 16-18-301 (Acts 1999, ch. 149, § 1), concerning administration of oaths by municipal court judges, was repealed and replaced by Acts 2004, ch. 914, § 2, effective March 1, 2005.

Acts 2004, ch. 914, § 8(b) provided that, notwithstanding any provision of former§ 16-17-101(c), or any other law to the contrary, from May 12, 2003, through March 1, 2005, concurrent general sessions jurisdiction shall not be newly conferred upon any existing or newly created municipal court.

Amendments. The 2009 amendment added “Except as otherwise provided in subdivision (a)(4),” to the beginning of the first sentence of (a)(1); and added (a)(4).

Effective Dates. Acts 2009, ch. 505, § 4. June 25, 2009.

Attorney General Opinions. Constitutionality of education requirement for city judges under T.C.A.§ 16-18-309(a)(1), OAG 05-127 (8/22/05).

16-18-310. Clerk of the municipal court.

  1. Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, at all times there shall be a person elected, appointed or otherwise designated to serve as clerk of the municipal court. Immediately upon each such election, appointment or designation, the chief administrative officer of the municipality shall promptly certify the results of the election, appointment or designation to the administrative office of the courts and shall supply such additional information concerning the clerk as required by the administrative director.
  2. Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, the clerk of the municipal court shall maintain an accurate and detailed record and summary report of all financial transactions and affairs of the court. The record and report shall accurately reflect all disposed cases, assessments, collections, suspensions, waivers and transmittals of litigation taxes, court costs, forfeitures, fines, fees and any other receipts and disbursements. An audit of the financial records and transactions of the municipal court shall be made each year as part of any audit performed pursuant to § 6-56-101 or § 6-56-105.

Acts 2004, ch. 914, § 2.

Compiler's Notes. Former part 3, § 16-18-301 (Acts 1999, ch. 149, § 1), concerning administration of oaths by municipal court judges, was repealed and replaced by Acts 2004, ch. 914, § 2, effective March 1, 2005.

Acts 2004, ch. 914, § 8(b) provided that, notwithstanding any provision of former§ 16-17-101(c), or any other law to the contrary, from May 12, 2003, through March 1, 2005, concurrent general sessions jurisdiction shall not be newly conferred upon any existing or newly created municipal court.

Attorney General Opinions. The method by which the city court clerk must be chosen depends on the statute or private act under which that court was created, OAG 08-183 (12/11/08).

16-18-311. Compliance with the procedures and requirements for concurrent general sessions jurisdiction — Feasibility study committee to determine need of additional court to exercise general sessions jurisdiction.

  1. Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, on or after May 12, 2003, concurrent general sessions jurisdiction shall be newly conferred upon an existing or newly created municipal court only in compliance with the procedures and requirements set forth in this section.
    1. A majority of the total membership of the municipal legislative body must vote in favor of seeking concurrent general sessions jurisdiction for an existing or newly created municipal court.
    2. The municipal legislative body must notify, by petition, the county legislative body of the municipality's intention to seek concurrent general sessions jurisdiction for the municipal court.
    3. The petition must contain the following:
      1. A plan for an adequate and secure courtroom;
      2. Agreement to comply with state mandated technical computer support comparable with the Tennessee court information system (TnCIS) program specifications and requirements;
      3. Agreement to comply with state laws governing general sessions court litigation taxes, costs, fees and assessments and to legally remit such items to the state department of revenue or to the county government, if appropriate; and
      4. Agreement to comply with state laws subjecting the financial transactions of the court to annual public audits.
    4. The municipal legislative body and the county legislative body must appoint a feasibility study committee. The membership of the committee shall consist of the county mayor, the municipal mayor, one (1) member of the municipal legislative body, one (1) member of the county legislative body, the district attorney general who serves the county and the district public defender who serves the county. The membership of the committee shall also consist of three (3) members appointed by the municipal legislative body from the following list: the chief of police, the city recorder/clerk, the city judge, the city attorney, and one (1) citizen member. The membership of the committee shall also consist of three (3) members appointed by the county legislative body from the following list: the sheriff who serves the county, a general sessions judge who serves the county, the general sessions court clerk, the county attorney, and one (1) citizen member.
    5. The feasibility study committee shall determine whether the county requires an additional court to exercise general sessions jurisdiction. In making the determination, the committee shall consider and evaluate the following factors:
      1. The economic, administrative and personnel impact of the proposal upon the existing general sessions court;
      2. The impact of the proposal upon existing judicial services and law enforcement resources;
      3. The extent, if any, to which the proposed plan is necessary to promote and ensure the efficient administration of justice in relation to county and municipal populations, county population density, geographic logistics and distances, caseloads, the number of judges, and the current caseload burden on the existing system;
      4. The plan's provision of adequate secure and comparable courtroom facilities for the hearing of cases in that location;
      5. The extent, if any, to which the proposed plan would unduly burden the existing staffs of the district attorney general or district public defender and the extent, if any, to which the plan proposes adequate funding for additional staff requirements; and
      6. The extent, if any, to which the proposed plan would provide for compliance with state mandated technical computer support.
    6. By majority vote of its total membership, the feasibility study committee must agree upon written findings and recommendations and must submit the findings and recommendations to the municipal legislative body and to the county legislative body. The findings and recommendations must include one of the following alternatives:
      1. There is a clearly demonstrated need for a new general sessions court in the county, and the court would best be administered by the county;
      2. There is a clearly demonstrated need for a new general sessions court in the county, and the court would best be administered by the municipality, either as a new or existing municipal court with concurrent general sessions jurisdiction; or
      3. There is no clearly demonstrated need, at the time, for any of the alternatives set forth in subdivisions (a)(6)(A) and (B).
    7. If the feasibility study committee determines that there is no clearly demonstrated need for any of the alternatives set forth in subdivisions (a)(6)(A) and (B), then for one (1) year thereafter, neither the county nor the municipality may pursue further implementation of any of the alternatives set forth in subdivision (a)(6)(A) or (a)(6)(B). After passage of one (1) year, if the majority of the total membership of the municipal legislative body again votes in favor of seeking concurrent general sessions jurisdiction for an existing or newly created municipal court, then a petition must again be submitted to the county legislative body and the procedures set forth in this section must again be followed.
    8. If the feasibility study committee recommends any one (1) of the findings set forth in subdivision (a)(6)(A) or (a)(6)(B), and if the county wishes to pursue creation of a new general sessions court in the county or if the municipality wishes to pursue extension of concurrent general sessions jurisdiction to a newly created or existing municipal court, then the county or municipality, as appropriate, shall:
      1. Submit the written findings and recommendations of the feasibility study committee to the judiciary committee of the senate and the judiciary committee of the house of representatives; and
      2. Cause legislation to be timely introduced for consideration by the general assembly.
  2. Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, any legislation proposed to create a new general sessions court or to create a new municipal court with concurrent general sessions jurisdiction or to confer concurrent general sessions jurisdiction on an existing municipal court must be approved by a majority of the total membership of the judiciary committee of the senate prior to passage by the senate and must be approved by a majority of the total membership of the judiciary committee of the house of representatives prior to passage by the house of representatives.
  3. Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, if a municipality is located in two (2) or more counties of this state, then, as used in this section, “county” means the county of this state containing the largest geographical portion of the municipality.

Acts 2004, ch. 914, § 2; 2013, ch. 236, § 32; 2019, ch. 345, § 22; 2019, ch. 420, § 12.

Compiler's Notes. Former part 3, § 16-18-301 (Acts 1999, ch. 149, § 1), concerning administration of oaths by municipal court judges, was repealed and replaced by Acts 2004, ch. 914, § 2, effective March 1, 2005.

Acts 2004, ch. 914, § 8(b) provided that, notwithstanding any provision of former§ 16-17-101(c), or any other law to the contrary, from May 12, 2003, through March 1, 2005, concurrent general sessions jurisdiction shall not be newly conferred upon any existing or newly created municipal court.

Amendments. The 2013 amendment substituted “the civil justice committee of the house of representatives” for “the judiciary committee of the house of representatives” in (a)(8)(A) and (b).

The 2019 amendment by ch. 345 substituted “judiciary” for “civil justice” preceding “committee of the house” in (a)(8)(A) and (b).

The 2019 amendment by ch. 420 rewrote former (a)(8), which read: “If the feasibility study committee recommends any one (1) of the findings set forth in subdivision (a)(6)(A) or (a)(6)(B), and if the county wishes to pursue creation of a new general sessions court in the county or if the municipality wishes to pursue extension of concurrent general sessions jurisdiction to a newly created or existing municipal court, then the county or municipality, as appropriate, shall: “(A) Submit the written findings and recommendations of the feasibility study committee to the judiciary committee of the senate, the civil justice committee of the house of representatives and the judicial council;“(B) Cause legislation to be timely prepared and submitted for review and evaluation by the judicial council in accordance with procedures set forth in § 16-21-107(a)(3) for a judicial district seeking creation of a state trial court; and”.

Effective Dates. Acts 2013, ch. 236, § 94. April 19, 2013.

Acts 2019, ch. 345, § 148. May 10, 2019.

Acts 2019, ch. 420, § 27. May 21, 2019.

Attorney General Opinions. Failure to comply with T.C.A. § 16-18-311(b) would not affect the validity of a private act creating new part of a county general sessions court so long as it was adopted in compliance with constitutional requirements, OAG 06-087 (5/11/06).

16-18-312. Substituted judges — Sitting by interchange for other judges.

  1. If a municipal judge is unable to preside over municipal court for any reason, then a special substitute municipal judge shall be determined pursuant to an ordinance of the governing body of such municipal court. In the absence of such an ordinance, then the municipal judge may designate in writing, to be filed with the clerk of the municipal court, the name of a special substitute judge to hold court in the municipal judge's place and stead. The special substitute judge must meet the qualifications of a municipal judge and the special substitute judge shall take the same oath and have the same authority as the regular municipal judge to hold court for the occasion. Such appointment of a special substitute judge is effective for no more than thirty (30) days, after which a new appointment is required.
  2. Municipal court judges and general sessions court judges are empowered to sit by interchange for other municipal court judges.

Acts 2006, ch. 1004, § 5; 2019, ch. 72, § 1.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment added (a).

Effective Dates. Acts 2019, ch. 72, § 2. July 1, 2019.

Chapter 19
[Reserved]

Chapter 20
The Victim-Offender Mediation Center

16-20-101. Legislative findings and intent.

  1. The general assembly finds and declares that:
    1. The resolution of felony, misdemeanor and juvenile delinquent disputes can be costly and complex in a judicial setting where the parties involved are necessarily in an adversarial posture and subject to formalized procedures; and
    2. Victim-offender mediation centers can meet the needs of the state's citizens by providing forums in which persons may voluntarily participate in the resolution of disputes in an informal and less adversarial atmosphere.
  2. It is the intent of the general assembly that programs established pursuant to this chapter:
    1. Stimulate the establishment and use of victim-offender mediation centers to help meet the need for alternatives to the courts for the resolution of certain disputes;
    2. Encourage continuing community participation in the development, administration and oversight of local programs designed to facilitate the informal resolution of disputes between and among members of the community;
    3. Offer structures for dispute resolution that may serve as models for centers in other communities; and
    4. Serve a specific community or locale and resolve disputes that arise within that community or locale.

Acts 1993, ch. 420, § 1.

Law Reviews.

Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Personal Injury Forum (William P. Zdancewicz), 26 U. Mem. L. Rev. 1169 (1996).

Mediation U.S.A. (Peter S. Chantilis), 26 U. Mem. L. Rev. 1031 (1996).

Victim-Offender Reconciliation Program — A New Paradigm toward Justice (Susan C. Taylor), 26 U. Mem. L. Rev. 1187 (1996).

Comparative Legislation. Victim-Offender Mediation Act:

Ark.  Code § 16-90-701 et seq.

Collateral References. 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law § 572 et seq.

16-20-102. Operation by a corporation.

  1. A victim-offender mediation center may be created and operated by a corporation organized to resolve disputes. The corporation shall not be organized for profit and no part of the net earnings may inure to the benefit of any private shareholders or individuals. The majority of the directors of the corporation shall not consist of members of any single profession.
  2. To be eligible for funds under this chapter, a center must do the following:
    1. Comply with this chapter and the rules adopted by the supreme court of Tennessee;
    2. Provide neutral mediators who have received training in conflict resolution techniques in accordance with rules of the supreme court;
    3. Provide victim-offender mediation in felony, misdemeanor and juvenile delinquent cases without cost to the participants;
    4. Provide dispute resolution services to the community on a voluntary basis; and
    5. At the conclusion of the mediation process, provide a written agreement or decision to the referral source setting forth the settlement of the issues and future responsibilities of each participant.
  3. Each center that receives funds under this chapter must:
    1. Be operated by a grant recipient;
    2. Be operated in compliance with rules adopted by the supreme court;
    3. Be operated under a contract with the administrative office of the courts (AOC); and
    4. Comply with this chapter.
    1. Funds available for the purposes of this chapter may be allocated for services provided by eligible centers.
    2. A center applying for funding is to include the following information in its application:
      1. The cost of operating the center, including the compensation of employees;
      2. A description of the proposed area of service and number of participants expected to be served;
      3. Proof of nonprofit 501(c)(3) status;
      4. A charter of incorporation; and
      5. Evidence of support of criminal justice agencies to make referrals.
  4. The AOC may accept, apply for and disburse public or private funds for the purposes of this chapter.
    1. The comptroller of the treasury or the comptroller's authorized representatives may inspect, examine and audit the fiscal affairs of local programs or centers.
    2. Centers must, whenever reasonably possible, make use of public facilities at free or nominal cost.
  5. A center operated under this chapter is not a state agency or an instrumentality of the state. Employees and volunteers of a center are not employees of the state.
    1. A center that receives funds under this chapter must annually provide the AOC with statistical data regarding the following:
      1. The operating budget;
      2. The number of referrals, categories or types of cases referred;
      3. The number of parties serviced;
      4. The number of disputes resolved;
      5. The nature of the resolution, amount and type of restitution to the victim or community, or both; and
      6. Rates of compliance.
    2. The data shall maintain the confidentiality and anonymity of all mediation participants.

Acts 1993, ch. 420, § 2.

Compiler's Notes. Section 501(c)(3), referred to in this section, is codified at 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3).

Cross-References. Confidentiality of public records, § 10-7-504.

16-20-103. Confidential and privileged documents and communications.

  1. All memoranda, work notes or products, or case files of centers established under this chapter are confidential and privileged and are not subject to disclosure in any judicial or administrative proceeding unless the court or administrative tribunal determines that the materials were submitted by a participant to the center for the purpose of avoiding discovery of the material in a subsequent proceeding. Any communication relating to the subject matter of the resolution made during the resolution process by any participant, mediator, or any other person is a privileged communication and is not subject to disclosure in any judicial or administrative proceeding unless all parties to the communication waive the privilege.
  2. The privilege and limitation on evidentiary use described in subsection (a) does not apply to any communication of a threat that injury or damage may be inflicted on any person or on the property of a party to the dispute, to the extent the communication may be relevant evidence in a criminal matter. Such communications shall not be construed to be public records pursuant to title 10, chapter 7.

Acts 1993, ch. 420, § 3.

Cross-References. Confidentiality of public records, § 10-7-504.

Collateral References.

Waiver of evidentiary privilege by inadvertent disclosure—state law. 51 A.L.R.5th 603.

16-20-104. Withdrawal from dispute resolution.

Any person who voluntarily enters a dispute resolution process at a center established under this chapter may revoke the person's consent, withdraw from dispute resolution and seek judicial or administrative redress prior to reaching a written resolution agreement. No legal penalty, sanction or restraint may be imposed upon the person.

Acts 1993, ch. 420, § 4.

16-20-105. Immunity from suit.

  1. Members of the board of directors of a victim-offender mediation center are immune from suit in any civil action based on any proceedings or other official acts performed in good faith as members of the board.
  2. Employees and volunteers of a center are immune from suit in any civil action based on any proceedings or other official acts performed in their capacity as employees or volunteers, except in cases of willful or wanton misconduct.
  3. A center is immune from suit in any civil action based on any of its proceedings or other official acts performed by its employees, volunteers, or members or its board of directors, except in cases of:
    1. Willful or wanton misconduct by its employees or volunteers; and
    2. Official acts performed in bad faith by members of its board.

Acts 1993, ch. 420, § 5.

16-20-106. Raising and disbursing funds — State funding.

  1. A victim-offender mediation center may raise and disburse funds from any public or private source for the purposes of this chapter.
  2. A center's share of funding from the state shall not exceed fifty percent (50%) of the approved estimated cost of the program; provided, that during the first three (3) years of operation for any new center, the fifty percent (50%) limitation upon funding from the state shall not apply. In distributing state funds to victim-offender mediation centers, the administrative office of the courts shall consider the need of each center applying for funding.
    1. By a two-thirds (2/3) vote of its legislative body, each county and municipality, as provided in this subdivision (c)(1), is authorized to levy an additional one dollar ($1.00) litigation tax per case, to be denominated as a part of the court costs, in matters before the local general sessions courts and juvenile courts. This subdivision (c)(1) shall only apply in any municipality in any county having a metropolitan form of government and a population of more than one hundred thousand (100,000), according to the 1990 federal census or any subsequent federal census, and in any county having a population according to such census as follows:

      not less than  nor more than

      9,000  9,250

      34,735 34,800

      51,350 51,450

      54,600 55,000

      68,100 68,400

    2. Any revenue generated by a county pursuant to subdivision (c)(1) shall be used exclusively to support the local victim-offender mediation center or centers organized pursuant to this chapter and shall be distributed on a monthly basis by the county to such victim-offender mediation center or centers for the purpose of handling victim-offender mediation and other community mediation matters.
  3. By a two-thirds (2/3) vote of its legislative body, each county to which subdivision (c)(1) does not apply is authorized to levy an additional one dollar ($1.00) litigation tax per case, to be denominated as a part of the court costs, in matters before the local general sessions courts and juvenile courts. Any revenue so generated by the county shall be held in a separately designated account until a local victim-offender mediation center is established in the county pursuant to this chapter. Upon the establishment of the victim-offender mediation center, the revenue generated pursuant to this subsection (d) shall be distributed by the county in the manner prescribed by subdivision (c)(2).
  4. The taxes levied by subsections (c) and (d) shall be in addition to any other taxes levied on litigation.
    1. By a two-thirds (2/3) vote of its legislative body, any county having a charter form of government that has a population of less than four hundred thousand (400,000), according to the 2000 federal census or any subsequent federal census, is authorized to levy an additional litigation tax of one dollar ($1.00) up to a maximum of five dollars ($5.00), to be denominated as a part of the court costs for each petition, warrant and citation, including warrants and citations for traffic offenses, in matters before the local general sessions courts and juvenile courts. The additional one dollar ($1.00) litigation tax may be increased yearly by one dollar ($1.00) until a total litigation tax of five dollars ($5.00) has been levied for such filings.
    2. Any revenue generated by a county pursuant to subdivision (f)(1) shall be used exclusively to support a local victim-offender mediation center or centers organized pursuant to this chapter and shall be distributed on a monthly basis by the county to the victim-offender mediation center or centers for the purpose of handling victim-offender mediation and other community mediation matters.
    3. The taxes levied pursuant to this subsection (f) shall be in addition to any other taxes levied on litigation.
    1. By a two-thirds (2/3) vote of its legislative body, each county to which subdivision (c)(1) or (d) is applicable is authorized to levy an additional one-dollar ($1.00) litigation tax, for a total of two dollars ($2.00) per case, to be denominated as a part of the court costs for each petition, warrant and citation, including warrants and citations for traffic offenses, in matters before the local general sessions courts and juvenile courts.
    2. Any revenue generated by subdivision (g)(1) shall be used by the county for the exclusive purpose of supporting a local victim-offender mediation center or centers organized pursuant to this chapter. Such funds shall be distributed on a monthly basis by the county to the victim-offender mediation center or centers for the purpose of handling victim-offender mediation and other community mediation matters.
    3. The taxes levied pursuant to this subsection (g) shall be in addition to any other taxes levied on litigation.
    4. Notwithstanding any  provision of this subsection (g) to the contrary, any fees  increased by this subsection (g) that are assessed against the state or that  otherwise represent a  cost to the state shall be  limited to the amounts  chargeable prior to  January 1, 2012.

Acts 1993, ch. 420, § 6; 1999, ch. 533, §§ 1-3; 2008, ch. 800, § 1; 2009, ch. 495, §§ 1, 2; 2011, ch. 254, § 1; 2012, ch. 982, §§ 1, 2.

Compiler's Notes. For table of U.S. decennial populations of Tennessee counties, see Volume 13 and its supplement.

Amendments. The 2009 amendment deleted “not less than 335,000 nor more than 336,000” from the table in (c)(1); and added (f).

The 2011 amendment added “for the purpose of handling victim-offender mediation and other community mediation matters” at the end of (c)(2).

The 2012 amendment added (g).

Effective Dates. Acts 2009, ch. 495, § 3. June 23, 2009.

Acts 2011, ch. 254, § 2. May 23, 2011.

Acts 2012, ch. 982, § 3. May 10, 2012.

Chapter 21
Judicial Organizations

16-21-101. [Repealed.]

Acts 1943, ch. 130, § 1; 1945, ch. 89, § 1; C. Supp. 1950, § 738.1 (Williams, § 738.5); Acts 1967, ch. 132, § 1; 1973, ch. 65, § 1; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-901; Acts 1993, ch. 66, § 26; 1993, ch. 241, § 27; 1999, ch. 311, § 3; 2001, ch. 451, § 1; 2003, ch. 399, § 3; 2004, ch. 914, § 3a; 2013, ch. 236, § 32; 2019, ch. 345, § 23; repealed by Acts 2019, ch. 420, § 13, effective May 21, 2019.

Compiler's Notes. Former § 16-21-101 concerned establishment — membership.

16-21-102. [Repealed.]

Acts 1943, ch. 130, § 2; 1945, ch. 89, § 2; C. Supp. 1950, § 738.2 (Williams, § 738.6); Acts 1967, ch. 132, § 2; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-902; Acts 1993, ch. 66, § 27; 2003, ch. 399, § 4; 2013, ch. 236, § 48; 2019, ch. 345, § 24, repealed by Acts 2019, ch. 420, § 14, effective May 21, 2019.

Compiler's Notes. Former § 16-21-102 concerned terms of members.

16-21-103. [Repealed.]

Acts 1943, ch. 130, § 2a, as added by Acts 1947, ch. 47, § 1; C. Supp. 1950, § 738.3 (Williams, § 738.6a); T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-903; repealed by Acts 2019, ch. 420, § 15, effective May 21, 2019.

Compiler's Notes. Former § 16-21-103 concerned elected members.

16-21-104. [Repealed.]

Acts 1943, ch. 130, § 2a, as added by Acts 1947, ch. 47, § 1; C. Supp. 1950, § 738.3 (Williams, § 738.6b); T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-904; repealed by Acts 2019, ch. 420, § 16, effective May 21, 2019.

Compiler's Notes. Former § 16-21-104 concerned vacancies in membership.

16-21-105. [Repealed.]

Acts 1943, ch. 130, § 3; C. Supp. 1950, § 738.4 (Williams, § 738.7); T.C.A., § 16-905; Acts 1989, ch. 154, §§ 1, 2; 1993, ch. 65, § 3; repealed by Acts 2019, ch. 420, § 17, effective May 21, 2019.

Compiler's Notes. Former § 16-21-105 concerned organization — assistants — expenses.

16-21-106. [Repealed.]

Acts 1943, ch. 130, § 4; C. Supp. 1950, § 738.5 (Williams, § 738.8); T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-906; Acts 1982, ch. 751, § 1; 1994, ch. 686, § 1; repealed by Acts 2019, ch. 420, § 18, effective May 21, 2019.

Compiler's Notes. Former § 16-21-106 concerned meetings.

16-21-107. [Repealed.]

Acts 1943, ch. 130, § 5; C. Supp. 1950, § 738.6 (Williams, § 738.9); T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-907; Acts 1986, ch. 909, § 4; 1989, ch. 588, §§ 9, 10; 1990, ch. 751, § 4; 1990, ch. 1024, § 16; 1992, ch. 966, § 1; 1993, ch. 65, § 4; 1994, ch. 686, § 2; 1994, ch. 1005, §§ 2, 3; 1995, ch. 326, § 1; 1999, ch. 311, §§ 1, 2; 2001, ch. 408, §§ 6, 7; 2003, ch. 399, § 5; 2004, ch. 756, § 1; 2013, ch. 236, § 32; 2019, ch. 345, § 25; repealed by Acts 2019, ch. 420, § 19, effective May 21, 2019.

Compiler's Notes. Former § 16-21-107 concerned duties of council.

16-21-108. [Repealed.]

Acts 1943, ch. 130, § 6; C. Supp. 1950, § 738.7 (Williams, § 738.10); T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-908; repealed by Acts 2019, ch. 420, § 20, effective May 21, 2019.

Compiler's Notes. Former § 16-21-108 concerned reports by judges and officials.

16-21-109. [Repealed.]

Acts 1943, ch. 130, § 7; C. Supp. 1950, § 738.8 (Williams, § 738.11); T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-909; repealed by Acts 2019, ch. 420, § 21, effective May 21, 2019.

Compiler's Notes. Former § 16-21-109 concerned expenses of members.

16-21-110. [Repealed.]

Acts 1943, ch. 130, §§ 5, 8; 1945, 89, § 3; C. Supp. 1950, §§ 738.6, 738.9 (Williams, §§ 738.9, 738.12); modified; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 16-910; repealed by Acts 2019, ch. 420, § 22, effective May 21, 2019.

Compiler's Notes. Former § 16-21-110 concerned appropriations.

16-21-111. Personal injury or death cases in chancery or circuit courts — Reports.

  1. The clerks of circuit courts and the clerks and masters of chancery courts shall report, on a monthly basis, to the administrative office of the courts on a form to be devised and distributed by the administrative office of the courts, the following data:
    1. The number of cases filed claiming money damages for personal injury or death;
    2. The number of such cases actually proceeding to trial; and
    3. For each such case actually proceeding to trial, the number of cases in which the plaintiff was awarded some money damages for personal injury or death, the amount of the verdict given in a jury case, the amount of judgment in a case without a jury, and any additur or remittitur awarded in the case by the trial judge.
  2. The presiding judge in each circuit shall verify the trial data reported to the administrative office of the courts.
  3. The administrative office of the courts shall compile such data and report the findings of the previous fiscal year, on or before February 1 of each year, to the chair of the senate judiciary committee, the chair of the judiciary committee of the house of representatives, and the attorney general and reporter. The report is a public document, available on request from the administrative office of the courts.

Acts 1989, ch. 53, § 1; 2013, ch. 236, § 32; 2019, ch. 345, § 26; 2019, ch. 420, § 23.

Amendments. The 2013 amendment substituted “the chair of the civil justice committee of the house of representatives” for “the chair of the judiciary committee of the house of representatives” in the first sentence of (c).

The 2019 amendment by ch. 345 substituted “judiciary” for “civil justice” following “chair of the” in the first sentence of (c).

The 2019 amendment by ch. 420 substituted “administrative office of the courts” for “Tennessee judicial council”, and “administrative office of the courts” for “judicial council” throughout the section.

Effective Dates. Acts 2013, ch. 236, § 94. April 19, 2013.

Acts 2019, ch. 345, § 148. May 10, 2019.

Acts 2019, ch. 420, § 27. May 21, 2019.

Chapter 22
Drug Court Treatment Act of 2003

16-22-101. Short title.

This chapter shall be known and may be cited as the “Drug Court Treatment Act of 2003.”

Acts 2003, ch. 335, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Former ch. 22, §§ 16-22-10116-22-105 (Acts 1957, ch. 409, § 1; 1961, ch. 98, §§ 1-3; 1965, ch. 215, § 1; T.C.A., §§ 16-1001 — 16-1005), which created the position of cost accountant and budget officer in the judicial branch, was repealed by Acts 1981, ch. 21, § 2.

Attorney General Opinions. If a probationer satisfied the requirements of participation in the “drug court program,” and participation in the program was ordered as a modification of the conditions of probation pursuant to a revocation hearing, then a drug court could assume jurisdiction over the probation by transfer of the probation to the drug court, OAG 03-164 (12/23/03).

As long as participation in the “drug court program” was ordered as a condition of the probation after a revocation hearing, defendant satisfied the criteria for participation in the program, and the case was one where the general sessions and circuit courts had concurrent jurisdiction, then a drug court would be able to accept a transfer of probation for a misdemeanant sentenced to probation in a general sessions court, OAG 03-164 (12/23/03).

As circuit courts are courts of general jurisdiction and maintain exclusive original jurisdiction over criminal matters, a circuit court or drug court created by a circuit court would have subject matter jurisdiction over any criminal case in that judicial district, OAG 03-164 (12/23/03).

Just as a sentence of probation may be transferred from one jurisdiction to another, there is nothing in the Tennessee code that would prevent a sentence of probation from being transferred from one division of a circuit court to another, OAG 03-164 (12/23/03).

Drug court treatment program participant facing sanctions, but not termination from program, for infractions—notice and hearing rights; recusal of judge.  OAG 11-10, 2011 Tenn. AG LEXIS 10 (1/18/11).

Cited: State v. Stewart, — S.W.3d —, 2010 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 691 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 18, 2010).

16-22-102. Legislative intent — Goals.

  1. The general assembly recognizes that a critical need exists in this state for criminal justice system programs to reduce the incidence of drug use, drug addiction and crimes committed as a result of drug use and drug addiction. It is the intent of the general assembly by this chapter to create a program to facilitate the implementation of new and the continuation of existing drug court treatment programs.
  2. The goals of the drug court treatment programs created under this chapter include the following:
    1. To reduce the use of jail and prison beds and other correctional services by nonviolent chemically dependent offenders by diverting them into rehabilitative programs;
    2. To reduce incidences of drug use and drug addiction among offenders;
    3. To reduce crimes committed as a result of drug use and addiction;
    4. To promote public safety through these reductions;
    5. To increase the personal, familial and societal accountability of offenders; and
    6. To promote effective interaction and the use of resources among local criminal justice agencies and community agencies.

Acts 2003, ch. 335, § 1.

16-22-103. Chapter definitions.

As used in this chapter:

  1. “Chemically dependent” means a maladaptive pattern of substance use leading to clinically significant impairment or distress as manifested by two (2) or more of the pre-determinate symptoms occurring at any time in the same twelve-month period;
  2. “Drug court treatment program” means any drug court treatment program created within the state that follows the general principles referenced in § 16-22-104 and that is established by the judge of a court in this state exercising criminal jurisdiction or by the judge of a juvenile court. A “drug court treatment program” shall have the same powers as the court that created it;
  3. “Nonadversarial approach” means that the district attorney general and the defense attorney work together for the benefit of the drug court treatment program participants and the program. Any disagreements are to be resolved prior to court and not in front of the participants; and
    1. “Violent offender” means a person who:
      1. Is convicted of an offense, during the course of which:
  1. The person carried, possessed or used a firearm or dangerous weapon;
  2. There occurred the death of or serious bodily injury to any person; or
  3. There occurred the use of force against the person of another; or

Has one (1) or more prior convictions for a felony crime of violence involving the use or attempted use of force against a person with the intent to cause death or serious bodily harm;

In determining whether a defendant is a “violent offender” under subdivision (4)(A)(i), it does not matter whether one (1) or more of the circumstances described in subdivision (4)(A)(i)(a ), (4)(A)(i)(b ), or (4)(A)(i)(c ) is or is not an element of the offense for which the person is convicted.

Acts 2003, ch. 335, § 1; 2007, ch. 375, § 1; 2012, ch. 889, § 1.

Amendments. The 2012 amendment, in the definition of “violent offender”, rewrote the introductory paragraph of (A)(i) which read: “Is charged with or convicted of an offense, during the course of which offense or conduct, without regard to whether any of the circumstances described in subdivision (4)(A)(i), (4)(A)(ii), or (4)(A)(iii) is an element of the offense or conduct of which or for which the person is charged or convicted:”, and added (B).

Effective Dates. Acts 2012, ch. 889, § 2. May 9, 2012.

Attorney General Opinions. Drug court treatment program participant facing sanctions, but not termination from program, for infractions—notice and hearing rights; recusal of judge.  OAG 11-10, 2011 Tenn. AG LEXIS 10 (1/18/11).

16-22-104. General principles.

All drug court treatment programs in this state shall be established and operate according to the following general principles as established by the National Association of Drug Court Professionals, Drug Court Standards Committee:

  1. Drug courts integrate alcohol and other drug treatment services with justice system case processing;
  2. Drug courts use a nonadversarial approach, with prosecution and defense counsel promoting public safety while protecting participants' due process rights;
  3. Drug courts identify eligible participants early and promptly place them in the drug court treatment program;
  4. Drug courts provide access to a continuum of alcohol, drug, mental health and other related treatment and rehabilitation services;
  5. Drug courts monitor abstinence by frequent alcohol and other drug testing;
  6. Drug courts use a coordinated strategy to govern responses to participants' compliance;
  7. Drug courts use ongoing judicial interaction with each drug court participant as an essential component of the program;
  8. Drug courts utilize monitoring and evaluation to measure the achievement of program goals and gauge effectiveness;
  9. Drug courts employ continuing interdisciplinary education to promote effective drug court planning, implementation and operations; and
  10. Drug courts forge partnerships among the courts, public agencies and community-based organizations to generate local support and enhance drug court effectiveness.

Acts 2003, ch. 335, § 1; 2010, ch. 833, § 1.

Amendments. The 2010 amendment inserted “, mental health” in (4).

Effective Dates. Acts 2010, ch. 833, § 3. April 27, 2010.

Attorney General Opinions. The judge, prosecutor and public defender should be personally immune from money damages for allegedly wrongful acts or omissions arising from their participation in cases in drug court, OAG 05-138 (9/8/05).

Drug court treatment program participant facing sanctions, but not termination from program, for infractions—notice and hearing rights; recusal of judge.  OAG 11-10, 2011 Tenn. AG LEXIS 10 (1/18/11).

Cited: State v. Stewart, — S.W.3d —, 2010 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 691 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 18, 2010).

16-22-105. Administration.

The department of mental health and substance abuse services shall administer the drug court treatment program by:

  1. Defining, developing, and gathering outcome measures for drug court treatment programs relating to § 16-22-102;
  2. Collecting, reporting and disseminating drug court treatment data;
  3. Supporting a state drug treatment mentor program;
  4. Sponsoring and coordinating state drug court treatment training;
  5. Awarding, administering and evaluating state drug court treatment grants; and
  6. Developing standards of operation for drug court treatment programs.

Acts 2003, ch. 335, § 1; 2007, ch. 375, § 2; 2015, ch. 453, § 11.

Compiler's Notes Acts 2015, ch. 453, § 1 provided that the act, which amended this section, shall be known and may be cited as the “Criminal Justice Veterans Compensation Act of 2015” or the “CJVC Act.”

For the Preamble to the act concerning the establishment of specialized veterans treatment courts, see Acts 2015, ch. 453.

Amendments. The 2015 amendment substituted “department of mental health and substance abuse services” for “department of finance and administration, office of criminal justice programs”.

Effective Dates. Acts 2015, ch. 453, § 15. July 1, 2015.

16-22-106. Application for grant funds.

Through the department of mental health and substance abuse services, a court exercising criminal jurisdiction within this state or an existing drug court treatment program created by a court exercising criminal jurisdiction may apply for drug court treatment program grant funds to:

  1. Fund a full-time or part-time program director position;
  2. Fund drug court treatment staff whose job duties are directly related to program operations;
  3. Fund substance abuse treatment, mental health and other direct services for drug court treatment participants;
  4. Fund drug testing;
  5. Fund program costs directly related to program operations; and
  6. Implement or continue drug court treatment program operations.

Acts 2003, ch. 335, § 1; 2007, ch. 375, § 3; 2010, ch. 833, § 2; 2015, ch. 453, § 12.

Compiler's Notes Acts 2015, ch. 453, § 1 provided that the act, which amended this section, shall be known and may be cited as the “Criminal Justice Veterans Compensation Act of 2015” or the “CJVC Act.”

For the Preamble to the act concerning the establishment of specialized veterans treatment courts, see Acts 2015, ch. 453.

Amendments. The 2010 amendment inserted “, mental health” in (3).

The 2015 amendment substituted “department of mental health and substance abuse services” for “office of criminal justice programs”.

Effective Dates. Acts 2010, ch. 833, § 3. April 27, 2010.

Acts 2015, ch. 453, § 15. July 1, 2015.

16-22-107. Prohibited use of grant awards.

Department of mental health and substance abuse services grant awards may not be:

  1. Used to pay for wages not directly related to drug court treatment program operations;
  2. Made to any court that does not agree to operate its program in accordance with the principles in § 16-22-104;
  3. Used for construction or land acquisition;
  4. Used to pay bonuses or commissions to any individuals or organizations; or
  5. Used to form a corporation.

Acts 2003, ch. 335, § 1; 2015, ch. 453, § 13.

Compiler's Notes Acts 2015, ch. 453, § 1 provided that the act, which amended this section, shall be known and may be cited as the “Criminal Justice Veterans Compensation Act of 2015” or the “CJVC Act.”

For the Preamble to the act concerning the establishment of specialized veterans treatment courts, see Acts 2015, ch. 453.

Amendments. The 2015 amendment substituted “department of mental health and substance abuse services” for “office of criminal justice programs”.

Effective Dates. Acts 2015, ch. 453, § 15. July 1, 2015.

16-22-108. Establishment of advisory committee.

The commissioner of finance and administration shall establish an advisory committee composed of seven (7) members, two (2) of whom shall be judges who have presided over a drug court for at least two (2) years and two (2) of whom shall be drug coordinators who have functioned as drug coordinators in actively implemented drug courts for at least two (2) years. The committee shall review all program criteria established by the department of mental health and substance abuse services and shall advise the commissioner on the allocation of funds under this chapter. Before appointing the members, the commissioner shall consult with the president of the Tennessee Association of Drug Court Professionals, the president of the Tennessee Association of Alcohol and Drug Abuse Services and the Tennessee Association of Mental Health Organizations. After the commissioner establishes staggered terms with the initial appointments, a member shall have a four-year term, and a member may be appointed to serve one (1) additional consecutive term. Each member shall be reimbursed from the drug court treatment program resources fund established in § 16-22-110 for travel expenses for attending a meeting of the advisory committee in accordance with the provisions of the comprehensive travel regulations promulgated by the department of finance and administration and approved by the attorney general and reporter.

Acts 2003, ch. 335, § 1; 2008, ch. 883, § 1; 2015, ch. 453, § 14.

Compiler's Notes Acts 2015, ch. 453, § 1 provided that the act, which amended this section, shall be known and may be cited as the “Criminal Justice Veterans Compensation Act of 2015” or the “CJVC Act.”

For the Preamble to the act concerning the establishment of specialized veterans treatment courts, see Acts 2015, ch. 453.

Amendments. The 2015 amendment substituted “department of mental health and substance abuse services” for “office of criminal justice programs”.

Effective Dates. Acts 2015, ch. 453, § 15. July 1, 2015.

16-22-109. Collection and assessment of fees

  1. The clerks of all courts of general sessions, circuit and criminal courts and municipal courts exercising the jurisdiction of courts of general sessions shall collect the sum of seventy-five dollars ($75.00), or in counties establishing or operating a veterans treatment court in accordance with § 16-6-104, one hundred thirty dollars ($130), from any person who:
    1. Enters a plea of guilty;
    2. Enters a plea of nolo contendere;
    3. Is adjudicated at trial;
    4. Enters a plea pursuant to any of the diversionary sentencing statutes to any criminal offense described in subsection (b), for attempt or conspiracy to commit any such offense or for aiding, abetting or acting in the capacity of an accessory in the commission of any such offense; or
    5. Is found in violation of the terms and conditions of a suspended sentence imposed for any criminal offense described in subsection (b).
  2. The fee established in subsection (a) applies to any offense under the Tennessee Drug Control Act, compiled in title 39, chapter 17, part 4.
  3. The clerks of all courts of general sessions, circuit and criminal courts and municipal courts exercising the jurisdiction of courts of general sessions shall collect the sum of seventy-five dollars ($75.00), or in counties establishing or operating a veterans treatment court in accordance with § 16-6-104, one hundred thirty dollars ($130), from any person who is found in violation of the terms and conditions of a suspended sentence imposed for any criminal conviction in which the violation is premised upon a positive drug screen.
  4. Except as provided in subsection (e), this assessment shall be subject to § 8-21-401 and shall be in addition to all other taxes, costs and fines. The first five dollars ($5.00) of each such assessment shall be paid to the clerks of the court imposing assessment, who shall transfer it to the state treasurer, who shall credit it to the general fund and earmark it for use by the department of finance and administration, office of criminal justice programs, for funding drug court treatment program administration and funding such grant awards as are made by the department of finance and administration, office of criminal justice programs. The remainder of the assessments shall be deposited by the clerk of the collecting court into a dedicated county fund. The fund shall not revert to the county general fund at the end of the fiscal year, but shall remain for the purposes set out in this section. The money shall be used by the county exclusively for the creation and maintenance of state drug court treatment programs as defined in § 16-22-104. In the event no drug court treatment program operates in a county, the remainder of the funds from that county shall be remitted annually in full to the state of Tennessee to be placed in the drug court treatment program resources fund to be administered by the department of finance and administration, office of the criminal justice programs, in accordance with § 16-22-110. The comptroller's regular audit of a local government shall also include the dedicated county fund established by this section.
  5. For counties establishing or operating a veterans treatment court program in accordance with § 16-6-104:
    1. This assessment shall be subject to § 8-21-401 and shall be in addition to all other taxes, costs, and fines;
    2. The first ten dollars ($10.00) of each such assessment shall be paid to the clerks of the court imposing the assessment, who shall transfer it to the state treasurer, who shall credit it to the general fund and earmark it for use by the department of mental health and substance abuse services for funding drug court treatment program and veterans treatment court program administration;
    3. The revenue generated by seventy dollars ($70.00) of each such assessment shall be deposited by the clerk of the collecting court into a dedicated county fund and used by the county exclusively for the creation and maintenance of state drug court treatment programs as defined in § 16-22-104; provided, that this fund shall not revert to the county general fund at the end of the fiscal year, but shall remain for the purposes set out in this subdivision (e)(3). In the event no drug court treatment program operates in a county, the remainder of the funds from that county shall be remitted annually in full to the state to be placed in the drug court treatment program resources fund to be administered by the department of mental health and substance abuse services, in accordance with § 16-22-110;
    4. The remaining fifty dollars ($50.00) of each such assessment shall be deposited by the clerk of the collecting court into a dedicated county fund and used by the county exclusively for the operation and maintenance of veterans treatment court programs in the county; provided, that this fund shall not revert to the county general fund at the end of the fiscal year, but shall remain for the purposes set out in this subdivision (e)(4). In the event no veterans treatment court program operates in a county, the remainder of the funds from that county shall be remitted annually in full to the state, deposited in a separate account in the general fund, and designated for the exclusive use of the department of mental health and substance abuse services to assist existing veterans treatment court programs and to create and establish veterans treatment court programs in areas of this state that have a significant veteran population involved in the criminal justice system. The department is not required to distribute money to any county that operates or establishes a veterans treatment court program that does not operate according to the ten (10) key components or, for which program, the judge or other court professionals have not completed nationally recognized training and state certification as established by the department;
    5. The comptroller's regular audit of a local government shall also include the dedicated county funds established by this section; and
    6. As used in this subsection (e), “veterans treatment court program” has the same meaning as defined in §  16-6-101.
  6. The funds collected from this assessment are dedicated to the administration and operation of drug court treatment programs created by courts exercising criminal jurisdiction.

Acts 2003, ch. 335, § 1; 2005, ch. 429, § 2; 2007, ch. 375, §§ 4-6; 2015, ch. 453, §§ 9, 10.

Compiler's Notes  Acts 2015, ch. 453, § 1 provided that the act, which amended this section, shall be known and may be cited as the “Criminal Justice Veterans Compensation Act of 2015” or the “CJVC Act.”

For the Preamble to the act concerning the establishment of specialized veterans treatment courts, see Acts 2015, ch. 453.

Amendments. The 2015 amendment substituted “seventy-five dollars ($75.00), or in counties establishing or operating a veterans treatment court in accordance with § 16-6-104, one hundred thirty dollars ($130),” for “seventy-five dollars ($75.00)” in (a) and (c); substituted “Except as provided in subsection (e), this assessment”  for “This assessment” in (d); added (e) and redesignated existing (e) as (f).

Effective Dates. Acts 2015, ch. 453, § 15. July 1, 2015.

16-22-110. Administration and disbursement of fees.

The assessment collected and remitted to the state shall be placed in a drug court treatment program resources fund for the purposes of funding drug court treatment program administration and the grant awards as provided in §§ 16-22-105 and 16-22-106. The office of criminal justice programs shall administer the money in the drug court treatment program resources fund. Any unspent money shall not be transferred or placed to the credit of the general revenue fund of the state at the end of each year, but shall remain deposited to the credit of the drug court treatment program resources fund for future allocation.

Acts 2003, ch. 335, § 1.

16-22-111. No right to treatment conferred.

Nothing contained in this chapter shall confer a right or an expectation of a right to treatment for an offender within the criminal justice system.

Acts 2003, ch. 335, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Denial of Alternative Sentencing Affirmed.

In a case in which defendant pled guilty to three counts of forgery and received a total effective sentence of six years in the Tennessee Department of Correction, the trial court did not err in denying defendant alternative sentencing, specifically drug court, because the trial court found that considering defendant's criminal history, commission of an offense while on bond, previous failures to comply with the terms of release, and breach of a private trust, he was not a good candidate for drug treatment. State v. Garwood, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 573 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 30, 2017).

16-22-112. Construction.

Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to limit the ability of any jurisdiction to create or maintain a drug court treatment program that adheres to the guidelines set forth in § 16-22-104.

Acts 2003, ch. 335, § 1.

16-22-113. Treatment program participants.

Each participant in a drug court treatment program shall:

  1. Not be a violent offender as defined in § 16-22-103;
  2. Be substance abusing or chemically dependent, or both; and
  3. Be willing to participate in a treatment program.

Acts 2003, ch. 335, § 1; 2007, ch. 375, § 7.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Denial of Alternative Sentencing Affirmed.

In a case in which defendant pled guilty to three counts of forgery and received a total effective sentence of six years in the Tennessee Department of Correction, the trial court did not err in denying defendant alternative sentencing, specifically drug court, because the trial court found that considering defendant's criminal history, commission of an offense while on bond, previous failures to comply with the terms of release, and breach of a private trust, he was not a good candidate for drug treatment. State v. Garwood, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 573 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 30, 2017).

16-22-114. Juvenile court drug court treatment programs.

In addition to courts exercising criminal jurisdiction and authorized to serve as drug treatment courts, courts exercising jurisdiction over juveniles alleged to be delinquent or unruly may also develop and operate drug court treatment programs, subject to all guidelines and requirements in this chapter. The juvenile drug court treatment programs shall not be funded or supported by revenues collected by the clerks of general sessions, circuit and criminal courts or municipal courts exercising general sessions court jurisdiction pursuant to § 16-22-109.

Acts 2007, ch. 375, § 8.